Geluz vs CA

TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner
and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she
and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she
found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she
again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter
Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his
consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and
Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because
Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as
indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

Mercado vs manzano 307 scra 630

Certiorari
Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1999
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Quick Guide: Edu Manzano ran for the position of vice mayor in 1998 and got the most number of
votes. His co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen
(US and PH). Petition was dismissed. There is no doubt that Manzano is a dual citizen upon birth being
born to both Filipino parents in California. Court held that the disqualification of dual citizens
contemplates dual allegiance and by merely registering as a voter, filing CoC and electing in the said
certificate Philippine citizenship, Manzano has effectively renounced his US citizenship.
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective
office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents.
Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running any elective local position.
Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor
in Makati City in the May 11, 1998

Manzano got the most number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the PH but of the US

On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC of the
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position

Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and
is considered an American citizen under US laws

31August: COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano
qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998

In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati

Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition

Issue/s:
Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City
ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification
Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:
1.

YES

Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioners Motion to Intervene justifies petitioner to file
this case

2.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS DUAL ALLEGIANCE

DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states

DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states; result of
an individuals own volition

Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their country of origin

Disqualification based on dual citizenship contemplates dual allegiance

For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect Philippine citizenship upon
filing their CoC to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
HELD:
No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship
per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The
COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
According to Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual
allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004

Republic of the Philippines v Chule Y Lim
Facts:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, who
never got married due to a prior subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that
there were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all of her school records
and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have
been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in fact, it should have been
illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals granted the respondents petition.

Issue:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Supreme Court on the following grounds:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule
Y. Lim from Chinese to Filipino despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to continue using her fathers surname
despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child.

Held:
1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Supreme Court
held that the two above provisions only apply to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of
the respondent who was an illegitimate child considering that her parents never got married. By being
an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as
such, there was no more need for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Also, she registered as a voter inside the country when she reached 18 years old. The
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
2. No. The Republics submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use
her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember. The court held that prohibiting the respondent to
use her fathers surname would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 which
regulates the use of aliases as well as the jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a person to use a

name by which he has been known since childhood. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
illegitimate children of their father from using his surname. While judicial authority is required for a
chance of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a
person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to
the community in general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition brought by the Republic is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
Tecla allegedly married Eustaqiuo on September 30, 1942, officiated by the parish priest of Talibon,
Bohol. According to her, a Certification was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Talibon despite the
fact that the Certificate of Marriage was registered therein, because all the records were destroyed due
to World War II. The two lived together as husband and wife and begot four children. In 1954,
Eustaquio left them, never to come back. She learned that after their separation, Eustaquio lived with
another woman, and then married another woman in 1979. This woman is Peregrina. Eustaqiuo died in
1989. In 1998, Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between Eustaquio and
Peregrina. According to her, the marriage between the two was bigamous due to the subsistence of her
(Teclas) marriage to Eustaquio.
In her answer, Peregrina averred that she is the legal surviving wife of Eustaquio. The complaint was
merely filed to deprive her of the properties which she and Eustaquio acquired during their marriage.
Among the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Tecla are the following: a)Testimonies
of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her
alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio; b) Documentary evidence such as the
following: Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol; Certification of Submission of a copy of
Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and
marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only
in 1932; Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;
Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido; Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; Certification
of Birth of Editha Avenido; Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; Certification that record of birth from 1900 to
1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco
Avenido; Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla; Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.
Peregrina, on the other hand presented the following evidence: Marriage Contract between Pregrina
and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979; Affidavit of Eustaquio executed
on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner
although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children
namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; Letter of Atty. Edgardo T.
Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte; and Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of Tecla, holding that she was not able to prove her marriage to
Eustaquio. Tecla appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court, holding
that the lower court erred in not appreciating the testimonies presented by Tecla to prove the fact of

marriage to Eustaquio, as well as the fact that secondary evidence were presented to prove the loss or
non-production of the Certificate of Marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio.
Pererina appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court, her issue being that the CA erred in holding
secondary evidence admissible to prove the fact of marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio, and
applying the principle of presumption of validity of marriage to the case.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and
documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind
the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of
the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
Petition denied.
Case Digest: Macua vda. de Avenido v. Hoybia Avenido

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol
in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded

with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and
Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the
fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on
22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the
marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties
have previously narrated the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a
party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the civil registrar
of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered
as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing,
jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial,
petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or

for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
opposition.
ISSUE Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for change of entry in the birth certificate?
HELD
No, there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effect. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act 3753). If the determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth is not attendant by error, the same is immutable and may not be changed by
reason of a sex reassignment surgery.

G.R. No. 167684

July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him
and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime,
he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented
to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most

Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall
in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena
who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with
another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792
allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same
was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by
him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant
were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the
church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church
wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was
born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because
it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was
during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial
separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made
inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony
was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9,
1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of
San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11,
1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of
the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married
on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr.,
the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to
lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her
family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to
worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them
that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her

family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was
made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately.
On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged,
since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero,
plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit.
She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would
take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which
she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed
to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like,
"speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon."
Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him.
They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half
years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off,
while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing.
Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a
break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the
United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned
home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up
under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital
confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with
plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church
wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each
other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983
(Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty.
Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified
a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract
(Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the
trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I",
"E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and
the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage
contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as
well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy

Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil
Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of
the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004,
the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no
less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for
the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore
just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in
the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage
license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it
"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an
entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite
of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the
contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was
purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab
initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of
the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity
of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is
null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in
the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before
the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided
the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14
where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office
to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the
said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim
that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued
by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was
ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the
moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which
may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act
or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be
overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several
years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed
the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27
We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013 Abbas vs Abbas Digest

December 16, 2014 Case Eaters
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Abbas vs Abbas

Facts:
This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the
Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario
Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo,
mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did
not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the
Family Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3)
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those
marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception to those
covered by the preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.,
Respondent
For Bigamy To Exist, The Second Or Subsequent Marriage Must Have All The Essential
Requisites For Validity Except For The Existence Of A Prior Marriage
July 21, 2015 by The Lawyer's Post
The Facts:
Benjamin Jr. (Respondent) married Azucena Alegre in September 1973. In 1979, he and Sally
Go-Bangayan (petitioner) developed a romantic affair; since Sallys father was against the relationship,
Sally, to appease her father, brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract; Sally, despite knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him the
marriage would not be registered. They then lived together as husband and wife, producing two
children, Bernice and Bentley. During their cohabitation, several properties were acquired by them. In
1994, their relationship soured, and Sally then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using the purported simulated marriage contract. Benjamin then
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and lacked the formal requisites of a valid marriage. He also
prayed that the trial court order a partition of the properties he acquired with Sally, he be appointed
as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. In her answer, Sally stated that aside from the seven properties
declared by Benjamin in his petition, there were 37 other properties acquired during their marriage.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed his demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied; she then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, and prayed for issuance of a TRO, which
was never issued. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence but she did
not do so, hence the trial court submitted the case for resolution.
Ruling in favour of Benjamin, the trial court held that the marriage of Benjamin and Sally was
non-existent, not bigamous, and made in jest, bolstered by the following findings: Marriage License
No. N-07568 was not issued to the two; only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February, 1982; the marriage was not recorded in the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office due to the subsisting marriage of Benjamin with Azucena. It denied
Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin, and did not give support to
Bernice and Bentley who were of legal age and did not ask for support. It then disposed the properties
as follows:
A. Sally could not claim the 37 properties Sally alleged in her answer as part of the conjugal
properties since she was not married to Benjamin. The properties were owned by Benjamins
properties who gave them as advance inheritance; Sallys inclusion in the titles were merely
descriptive.

B. Lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 19060 were bought by Benjamin using his own money;
C. Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots and condominium covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N193656, 253681, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783; TCT No. 61722 , 61720, 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were bought by Benjamins earnings alone, hence part of the conjugal property of Benjamin and
Azucena. Since Azucena acted in bad faith since she knew Benjamin was married to Azucena, her
share in TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were forfeited in Bernice and Bentleys favour.
Sally appealed to the Court of Appeals, after her Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition was
denied by the RTC. The appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC ruling. It ruled that Sally
was given every opportunity to present her case but did not do so, hence the RTC did not err in
submitting the case for resolution; it also did not err in declaring Sallys marriage to Benjamin was null
and void, but modified the partition of the properties by declaring that Benjamin was able to prove that
he acquire solely the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860; the properties under TCT Nos. N193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the
absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The property under TCT No.
61722 were owned by them in common but Benjamins share in the property accrued to his conjugal
partnership with Azucena.
Sally elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.
The Issues:
Whether Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
Whether Sallys marriage to Benjamin was void and non-existent;
Whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the RTC ruling on the property relations
between Sally and Benjamin.
The Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived
her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she
and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court1 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence
was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008,
4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that
in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date
of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial
court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been
deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and
she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to
present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her
lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because
she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any

temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties2.
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio.
Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was married to her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims
that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges
that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license
issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150
were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license3 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered
into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.4
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Pasig5 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;6 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.7 The documentary
and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed
out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was made only in jest 8 and a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation
coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives.9 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was
not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
198210 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.11 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March
1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, shall be void from
the beginning. In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 12 which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.

Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning.13
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that the rest of the decision stands.14 While the Court of
Appeals did not discuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that the rest of the decision stands that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court
stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall
not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the
face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence
of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior
existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.15
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.16 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office.
In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial
court even admitted that Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.17

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.18 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin19 with the descriptive title married to Sally. The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 20 with the descriptive title
married to Benjamin while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words married to preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner21. Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.22
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge.23 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself.24 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Ronulo v. People

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest
refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where
the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's
knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was
not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
authority of the solemnizing officer; and his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of
the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer; and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in
the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

CASE #26: MALLION vs. ALCANTARAG.R. No. 141528Oct. 3 ,2006

TOPIC:
Void marriage
FACTS:

Petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. It was dismissed by the trial court and when judgment attained finality, he filed another
case, this time based on the fact that no marriage license was obtained by the parties prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is res judicata?
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner, forgets that he is simply involving different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the "key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage. It bears
stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. Plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in
his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury.

G.R. No. 141528

October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question
of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family
Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP
4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997
upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the
relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a
resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within
the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated
August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A.IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL
OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
HIS WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT
HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN
DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED,
DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING
OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct
and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they
were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no
identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second
petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum
shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the
present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same
remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner
violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on
multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be
raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence
of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the
prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res
judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which
makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on

the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the
public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in
its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the
other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the
present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the
second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the
presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an
identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence
necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored
on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage

to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been
solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The
alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and
heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter
offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by
simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this
Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20

x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it
grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not
necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been
open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after
the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the
pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to
place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried
piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims
to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first
fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all
matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by
law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the
present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred
by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Navarro v Domagtoy 129 SCRA 259

Facts:
Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Rodolfo G. Navarro filed charges against Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. He solemnized the wedding of Tagadan & Borga despite knowing that Tagadan
(groom) was merely separated from his wife. He presumed that Tagadans first wife was already dead
because Tagadan has not seen her for seven years. Presumption was made without the requisite
summary proceeding. Second instance was when he performed marriage ceremony between Sumaylo
& del Rosario in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON judge acted with gross misconduct in these instances?

HELD:
Yes. Suspended for six months.
RATIO:
1. First marriage is bigamous. Presumption of death for purposes of marriage needs a summary
proceeding (Art. 41 FC). Affidavits saying that Tagadans wife has not been heard of for almost seven
years are not sufficient proof. 2. Second marriage is beyond judges jurisdiction. Marriage can only be
held outside a judges chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in remote places (c)
request of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC). Sumaylo & del Rosario were not under
any of these conditions. Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire country. Judges
with specific jurisdictions can only officiate within those areas.

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of
gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September
27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that
they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not
returned and been heard for almost seven years.
The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of
Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and
the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance
did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

BESO vs. DAGUMAN (323 SCRA 566 , January 28, 2000 )

FACTS:
Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the
marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judges
residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave for
abroad the same day as she was an OFW, among other reasons. After the wedding, Yman abandoned
Beso for no clear reason. She then went to check the marriage contract with the Local Civil Registrar
of Calbayog, from which she learned that said marriage was not registered. Responding to Besos
letter about the matter, Daguman told her that all copies of the marriage contract were taken by
Yman, and none was retained by the judge.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of his
courts jurisdiction;
(2)
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and not registering
the marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registry.
HELD:
A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only (1) at the point of
death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these instances was present in this case.
Considering that Judge Dagumans jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Margarita,
Tarangan and Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize marriages in
CAlbayog City. Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exert extra care in the exercise of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe
extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the

Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in
Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate

REPUBLIC vs. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 72,
with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got married in 1961. The marriage produced five children.
But the marriage faded because Fely was a nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In 1984, Fely left
for the United States. Barely a year after she left, Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request. Sometime in 1985, he was informed that Fely had
already married an American. In 1987, she came back to the Philippines with her American family. In
1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their eldest son, but in the invitations, she used the
surname of her American husband. She returned in 1992 for the operation of their fourth child. In her
Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was already an American citizen in 1988, that she was
no longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and that the only reason she went to the United
States was that their income was not enough to sustain their family, that it was Crasus who was
irresponsible and in fact living with another woman who bore her a child. She also denied that she sent
a letter requesting him to sign the divorce papers. After hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the marriage null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court but this time it had added a ratiocination,
stating that Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code is applicable also to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity on the part of Fely?
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable?

RULINGS:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was held in previous rulings that
irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. As
plainly worded, the provision refers to a special situation wherein a foreigner divorces his or her Filipino
spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be applied because of the simple fact that at the time Fely
secured a divorce decree, she was still a Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she married her American spouse in 1985 but she also admitted that she became and American citizen
only in 1988. Thus, she was still a Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code applies, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity, even though
she was already living abroad.

Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his
son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and later became
a US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married another
man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC
Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido
filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship
at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent evidence showing
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his
wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry
another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with
the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that
the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code
because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of
the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the
petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree.
The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.
He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted
for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving
him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in
their respective Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution
of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should

not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of
the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the

foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status,
i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g)
adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment

can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Atienza v. Brillantes AM NO. MTJ 92 706 March 25, 1995

Civil Law Jurisprudence
FACTS:
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against
Judge Brillantes.
Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living together in a
home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Upon
inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Lupo left the home
without confronting Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and
even alienated the affection of his children from him. Lupo claims that Brillantes is married to Ongkiko
with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged that Lupo was not married to de Castro and
that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5 children with her. Brillantes claims that
when he married de Castro in 1991 at California, he believed in all good faith and with all legal intents
and purposes, that he was single because her first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines while the second marriage which took place in 1991 was governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.
HELD:
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in
1988 regardless of date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code said Art. 15 is given
retroactive effect insofar as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
Civil Code or other laws. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke
good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
cohabit with a woman.
CASE DIGEST ON ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES [243 SCRA 32 (1995)]
F: This is an administrative complaint filed by Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against J. Brillantes, Presiding Judge of MTC, Mla. It was alleged in the complaint that
Brillantes has been cohabiting w/ Yolanda De Castro (w/ whom Atienza had 2 children) when he
(Brillantes) was already married to one Zenaida Ongkiko w/ whom he has 5 children. xxx Resp. denies

having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children w/ her. He alleges that while he
and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not valid for lack of marriage license.
The second marriage bet. the two also lacked the required license. He claims that when he married De
Castro in LA, California, he believed, in all GF and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
bec. his first marriage was solemnized w/o a license.
HELD: Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. of the nullity of a previous marriage bef. a party
thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. (Art. 40.) Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of the first marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the NCC or other
laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly true w/ Art. 40 w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May
21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that
they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.