JAIME M. BARRIOS, substituted by G.R. No.

148089
his heirs, ERLINDA BARRIOS and
Present:
CHRISTIANNE JOY BARRIOS,
Petitioners,
- versus -

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT Promulgated:
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
March 24, 2006
ADMINISTRATION),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] dated February 9, 2001 and Resolution[2] dated April 30, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48150.
The pertinent facts as gleaned from the records are:
Jaime M. Barrios, now deceased, substituted by his heirs, wife
Erlinda and daughter Christianne Joy, now petitioners herein, was employed on
February 1, 1975 as a driver in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
respondent. On January 16, 1997, he retired as Driver-Mechanic 3 after rendering
twenty-two (22) years of public service. He was then fifty (50) years old.

From August 5 to 17, 1996, or five months and 11 days before his retirement,
Barrios was confined at the Lung Center of thePhilippines due to chronic renal
failure and diabetes mellitus. Prior thereto, he had been suffering from diabetes for
fifteen (15) years. After his discharge from the Lung Center, his condition did not
improve. On October
8-31,
1996,
he
was
treated
at
the ManilaDoctors Hospital for end stage kidney disease secondary to diabetic
nephropathy. On his second day, he began undergoing dialysis.
On September 2, 1997, Barrios filed with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) a claim for income benefits, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 626,[3] as amended. The GSIS denied his claim on the ground that end stage
renal disease and diabetic nephropathy are not among the compensable
occupational diseases listed under Annex A of the Decree; and that there is no
showing that his job as a driver-mechanic increased the risk of contracting the
ailments.
Barrios filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the GSIS denied the same. He then
appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).
On January 15, 1998, while the case was pending in the ECC, Barrios
passed away. The cause of death as shown by the Death Certificate was renal
failure secondary to diabetes mellitus.[4]
On April 17, 1998, the ECC rendered its Decision affirming the GSIS ruling.
The heirs of Barrios then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review.
On February 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of
merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 17, 1998 of respondent
Employees Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MG-93711197 affirming the letter dated October 7, 1997 of respondent
Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for income
benefit is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In denying the petition, the Court of Appeals held:

Petitioners arguments rest mainly on their claim that Jaimes
circumstance was the same as those of Geronimos. However, a perusal
of the records of this case discloses that while Mr. Barrios had been, in
his lifetime, contending that his case falls squarely under
the Narazo Case, they however failed to present any evidence to
establish the claimed similarities. There was no evidence to prove Jaimes
nature of work and working condition. More importantly, no evidence
whatsoever was presented on any reasonable relationship between
Jaimes working condition and the disease which eventually claimed his
life. All he and his heirs had were bare assertions that his job as a drivermechanic increased the risk of him contracting the said disease. But bare
allegation does not ipso facto make Jaimes disease compensable. Award
of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The
beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. And,
while it is not required that the work-connection be proved by direct
evidence, it is however required that the claimant should at the very least
submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding
ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of
contracting that ailment. Sadly, neither the deceased nor his heirs have
discharged this duty and for this reason we have no recourse but to agree
with the findings of the respondent ECC.
Further, assuming arguendo that indeed part of Jaimes work was to drive
around Metro Manila for 3 to 5 hours daily, carrying officials of the NIA
to their respective appointments, still, the Narazo Case cannot be applied
to his case because his nature of work and work condition is not the
same as in the case of Geronimo. While Geronimo was a Budget
Examiner in the Office of the Governor primarily dealing with the
detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or

examination of other provincial and municipal offices a job requiring full

concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget
and/or financial reports, Jaimes job, on the other hand, does not require
the same degree of concentration as would make him forego urinating or
control the same. His job requires skill not analytical thinking. And,
unlike Geronimo, Jaime could relieve himself without having to worry
about forgetting what the last transaction was, what the last entry in the
ledger was, how much it costs or if the local government has fund for it.
Moreover, while waiting for the officials of the NIA, Jaime has a waiting
period which he can make use of the rest and relieve himself if need be.
Besides, it is most probable that Jaime is not the only driver at the NIA
and such being the case, he could not have been driving for the officials
of the said office day in and day out. There would be others on duty and
there must have been a working schedule being followed by the drivers
of NIA so that not one of them would be unjustly burdened with driving
everyday. In addition, we also find it impossible that the officials of NIA
were attending meetings outside their office everyday that would warrant
the daily driving activities of Jaime.

Petitioners seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of

Appeals denied the same.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The sole issue before us is whether petitioners are entitled to income benefits under
P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. No. 626, as amended, provides:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex A of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.

Under the above Rule, for the death of Barrios to be compensable, petitioners, as
claimants, must prove that (a) his sickness was the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex A of the Rules of Employees Compensation, or (b) the
risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions.
In Salalima v.
Employees
Compensation
Commission,
[5]
we held that where thedisease or illness that caused the death or disability of the
employee is not included in Annex A, his or her heirs are entitled to compensation
if they can prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his or her
working conditions. The law does not require that the connection be established
with absolute certainty or that a direct causal relation be shown. It is enough that
the theory upon which the claim is based is probable. Probability, not certainty, is
the touchstone.[6]
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners main argument that a
driver-mechanic in Metro Manila, tasked with transporting NIA officials to their
destinations for several hours a day, would have severe problems associated with
urinary
functions. Petitioners
invoked
our
ruling
[7]
in Narazo v. Empoloyees Compensation
Commission. In
this
case,
Geronimo Narazo(deceased, and substituted by his wife Amalia) was a former
budget examiner in the Office of the Governor of Negros Occidental.Geronimos
duties were preparing the provincial budget, drafting financial reports, and
reviewing the budgets of provincial and municipal offices. He had to sit for hours
and, more often than not, had to forego or even delay urinating so as not to
interrupt his concentration. Moreover, he was under tremendous tension and
pressure. Because of the nature of his work, which required full attention and
thorough studies of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports,
he
suffered uremia
due
to
destructive
nephropathy
and
benign prostatic hypertrophy which caused his death. Although uremia is not
among the compensable ailments under P.D. No. 626, we granted him
compensation benefits. We held that under the circumstances, the risk of
contracting his disease was aggravated by his working condition.

It is true that the work of the late Barrios did not require analytical mental
process. As the Court of Appeals held, he did not have to worry about forgetting
what the last transaction was, what the last entry in the ledger was, how much it
costs or if the local government has funds for it. However, the Appellate Court
failed to consider the nature of his ailment and the working conditions associated
with his employment. The court then failed to see the connection between these
two.
Barrios was diagnosed to be suffering from diabetes mellitus complicated by end
stage renal disease. This is where the line must be drawn between him and
Geronimo Narazo.
Diabetes mellitus is a metabolic disorder in which the ability to oxidize
carbohydrates is more or less completely lost, usually due to faulty pancreatic
activity, especially of the islets of Langerhaus and subsequent disturbance of
normal
insulin
mechanism. This
produces hypoglycemia with
resulting glycosuria and polyuria giving symptoms of thirst, hunger, emaciation
and weakness and also imperfect combustion of fats with resulting acidosis.
[8]
Glycosuria is the presence of an abnormal amount of glucose in the urine.
[9]
Polyuria, in turn, is the passage of a large volume of urine in a given period. [10] A
fundamental characteristic of diabetes, regardless of whether it is Type 1 (insulin
dependent) or Type 2 (non-insulin dependent), is frequent urination or polyuria.[11]
End stage renal disease, on the other hand, is attributable to complications
of diabetes. The kidneys or renal system filter waste products out of the blood and
recycle other important substances. This ailment is the stage where the kidneys or
renal system fail to perform their function of filtering waste products out of the
blood. Damaging chemicals, such as creatinine and urea, remain in the blood, thus,
necessitating dialysis or mechanical cleansing of the blood.[12]
Diabetes is a deficiency condition marked by habitual discharge of an excessive
amount of urine.[13] Simply put, a diabetic sufferer has to urinate
frequently. Otherwise, he will suffer nephropathy or kidney disease.

Records show that as a driver-mechanic, Barrios was tasked with transporting NIA
officials, various consultants, and even World Bank officers, to different
destinations in Metro Manila and the surrounding provinces of Central Luzon and
Southern Tagalog.These travels required him to sit behind the wheel for many
hours. Job efficiency required him to transport his passengers to their respective
destinations on time. He thus faced a situation where he had to forego urinating for
hours. To this must be added the stress and strain every driver encounters while on
the road.[14]
We have no argument with the finding of the Court of Appeals that as a driver,
Barrios had waiting times during which he could freely relieve his bladder. But
what the court overlooked was his need to urinate frequently due to his
diabetes. This ailment afflicted him not only when he was resting, but also when he
was on the road. With high ranking passengers in his charge, he had no choice but
to drive continuously most of the time. As a consequence, his disease was
aggravated. Nephropathy then set in with fatal results.
Under these circumstances, we must apply the avowed policy of the State to
construe social legislation liberally in favor of the beneficiaries. [15] This is in line
with Article 166 of P.D. No. 626, as amended, which reads:
ART. 166. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt
employees compensation program whereby employees and their
dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may
promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical or related
benefits.

P.D. No. 626 is a specie of social legislation. Its primary purpose is to

provide meaningful protection to the ordinary worker against the perils of
disability, the hazards of illness, and hardships of other contingencies which may
result in the loss of income. It seeks to give full force and effect to the policy of the
State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor.[16] This is so mandated by
Section 18, Article II of the Constitution which provides:

SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic

force. It shall protect the rights of the workers and promote their
welfare.

Where, as here, there is a basis for inferring that the risk of contracting the disease
was aggravated by the employees working conditions, it is but proper that the
ECC, tasked with implementing social legislation, adopt a liberal attitude in favor
of petitioners, like the widow and orphan of the late Barrios.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48150
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The GSIS is directed to promptly pay the
petitioners compensation benefits arising from the death of Jaime Barrios pursuant
to P.D. No. 626, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165545

March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. 10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. 11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid
for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the
SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, 17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons
beneficiaries before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during

his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailons
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation
in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did
not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of
Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she
had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon
was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake." 28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999
as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and
by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law
wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary,
to the latters death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and
burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her
by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the
findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the
second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere

does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the
RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of
fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given
ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the
latters death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was
likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of
the SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by
virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court.
The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the
exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47(Underscoring
supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by therecording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except
in a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spousebeneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 168821

INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JAIME A. VALENCIANO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 10, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the July 7, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 78511
which reversed and set aside the June 26, 2003 Decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission[3] (ECC) dismissing the claim by respondent Jaime A.
Valenciano for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626 or
the Employees Compensation Law.
The facts of the case as summarized in the ECC Decision are as follows:
The [respondent], Jaime Valenciano, started his career in government on
November 8, 1977 as Clerk II of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA),
South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. He was promoted to Clerk B, Traffic
Systems Implementation Specialist, Terminal Operations Officer,
Terminal Operations Officer A, and, finally, as Senior Terminal
Operations Officer in 1993.
[Respondents] job description showed that he was responsible for the
following:
1. Analyzes effectiveness of system and procedures to determine
reliability and integrity of financial, administrative, engineering and
operational transactions;
2. Analyzes and evaluates implementation and compliance of RCs, PDS
and service agents to PPA policies, rules and regulations;
3. Appraises the organizational structure and adequacy and effectiveness
of internal control to ascertain the extent to which the assets and other

resources of the agency are accounted for and safeguarded from losses of
all kinds;
4. Conducts review of services provided by PPA RCs/Units and
appraises quality of performance;
5. Prepares audit reports and presents to management, key officials
findings/observation gathered during the audit;
6. Recommends to management action to be taken to improve
performance of PPA RCs and services agencies;
7. Conducts researches on issuances and publications related to assigned
areas;
8. Performs other related functions.
A Medical Certificate from the University of Santo Tomas Hospital
(UST), Espana, Manila dated April 12, 1984 reveals that the
[respondent], a chain smoker since age twenty (20), was admitted at the
said hospital on February 27, 1984 where he was diagnosed to be
suffering from Coronary Artery Disease.
Sometime in 1986, it was discovered that the appellant was
suffering from Diabetes. His Physical and Medical Examination Record
shows that sometime in 1988, the [respondent] experienced insomnia
and sudden loss of appetite accompanied by dyspnea (shortness of
breathing), cough with whitish phlegm, and chest pain. Despite
medications, no improvement was noted and he soon complained of
lumbar pain, hoarseness of voice and itchiness of throat. He was
diagnosed to be suffering from Hypertension. His blood pressure
reading then was noted to be at 150/100 mmHg to 160/100 mmHg.
On March 8, 1999, the [respondent] was confined at Medical Center
Manila, Ermita, Manila due to cough, fever and hemoptysis (the
coughing out of blood) where his ailment was diagnosed as Pulmonary
Tuberculosis III.
Sometime in April, 2001, the [respondent] felt chest pain. Immediate
consultative diagnosis taken at The Doctors Hospital, Bacolod Cityfound
him to be suffering from Bronchial Asthma, Chronic Intermittent;
Infero Lateral Wall, Non ST elevation Myocardial Infarction;
Dyslipidemia. His medical records show that starting April, 2001, he
frequently went on sick leave due to his ailments. From May to
December, 2001, he was hospitalized for several times at
the Manila Doctors Hospital, United Nations Ave., Manila. His ailment

was diagnosed as Ischemic Heart Disease; Non-Insulin Dependent

Diabetes Mellitus; Dyslipidemia.
On November 28, 2001, the [respondent] was admitted at the Manila
Doctors Hospital due to cough with phlegm. His attending physician
diagnosed
his
ailment
as Pneumonia,
moderate
risk
resolved; Cerebrovascular
Disease (CVD),
bleed,
left
thalaminc; Hypertensive
Cardiovascular
Disease,
not
in
failure; Diabetes Mellitus, type II.
When the [respondents] chest was subjected to x-ray on October 17,
2002 at New World Laboratory, Quezon City, it was found out that his
heart was suffering from Lateral Wall Ischemia; Left Atrial
Enlargement.[4]

Respondent filed with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a

claim for compensation benefits under PD No. 626. However, petitioner denied the
respondents claim on the ground that the ailments, Hypertension, Cerebrovascular
Accident (CVA), Diabetes Mellitus type II are not considered occupational
diseases; neither is there any showing that his duties have increased the risk of
contracting said ailments.[5]
Respondents appeal to the ECC was dismissed for lack of merit [6] on the grounds
that hypertension,[7] pneumonia and pulmonary tuberculosis[8] are mere
complications of his primary ailment, diabetes mellitus, which is not an
occupational disease hence, not compensable. Even if cerebrovascular accident is
an occupational disease under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, the ECC held that its compensability requires compliance with all
the conditions set forth in the rules which respondent failed to show.[9]
On petition for review, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the ECC that
diseases, such as Ischemic Heart Disease, Coronary Artery Disease, Myocardial
Infarction, Bronchial Asthma, dyspnea and dyslipidemia, are complications of
diabetes mellitus, which is not work-connected hence not compensable. [10] The
appellate court also noted that respondent failed to prove that the risk of
contracting these diseases is increased by his working conditions.[11]

The appellate court however disagreed with the findings of the ECC
that pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis and hypertension are solely caused and
directly connected with respondents diabetes mellitus and that the cerebrovascular
accident (stroke) he sustained did not sufficiently comply with the requirements of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation thereby justifying the dismissal
of his claim.[12] According to the appellate tribunal, pneumonia and pulmonary
tuberculosis are respiratory diseases which may be caused by the environment or
occupation depending on the level of sanitation of the surroundings. [13] In the
course of his employment, respondent was stationed in the Port of Manila which is
located in an area where sanitation is questionable. [14]His work required him to
mingle with people from different walks of life. [15] His job also demanded a lot of
mental work thereby making him susceptible to stress and fatigue that could
weaken his resistance and cause hypertension which in turn could trigger a
cerebrovascular accident or stroke.[16]
The Court of Appeals thus held that respondent is entitled to claim compensation
benefits because pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis and hypertension are
among the occupational diseases listed in Annex A of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner insists that hypertension is a
complication of respondents diabetes mellitus which has been found to be nonwork connected; as such, respondent could not validly claim compensation benefits
under this disease.[17]It asserts that medical science has proven that diabetics are
vulnerable to various infections and that pneumonia is common among them.
[18]
As regards respondents pulmonary tuberculosis, petitioner alleges that
respondent suffered the same way back in 1999 and that his medical records show
that he is no longer afflicted with the disease.[19]
Respondent,
on
the
other
hand,
argues
that hypertension,
pneumonia and pulmonary tuberculosis are not caused by diabetes mellitus alone
but also by other environmental and occupational factors.[20] He alleges that his
work entailed a lot of analysis, appraisals, review, audit and research which may
have caused him to suffer cerebrovascular accident and pneumonia.[21]

The issue before us is whether respondents hypertension, pneumonia or

pulmonary tuberculosis is compensable under the Employees Compensation Act.
We affirm the Court of Appeals ruling with modification.
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing PD No. 626, as amended,
states that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the same must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A with
the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
We find that respondents hypertension is a complication of his primary
ailment which is diabetes mellitus, a non-occupational disease, hence not
compensable. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
In 1986, [respondent] was found to have been suffering from Diabetes
Mellitus, a Non-Insulin Dependent type (NIDDM) which renders
patients suffering from this sickness insulin resistant. Insulin
resistance is common in patients with NIDDM and the same has been
suggested as being responsible for the increased arterial pressure
sufficient to cause hypertension. Diabetes mellitus can also trigger an
increased incidence of large vessel atherosclerosis or arteriosclerosis and
myocardial infarction in patients with insulin and non-insulin dependent
diabetes mellitus. These are some of the contributory factors that can
cause a coronary artery disease which is the commonly cause of death in
adult patients with diabetes mellitus. Diabetic patients suffer
abnormalities in blood circulation. The sickness can cause an impairment
in the reverse cholesterol transport out of the arteries and this can cause
clogging of one or several coronary arteries in the heart. The disease is
characterized as procoagulant and the failure to deliver sufficient blood
supply to the heart because of the narrowing or clogging of one of the
main coronary arteries automatically cuts off the distribution of oxygen
and nourishment to the heart area it serves.This would result
to myocardial infarction and eventually to hypertension. x x x.[22]
xxxx
x x x [D]iabetes mellitus, especially the NIDDM-type, is acquired
through the mechanism of inheritance. It is an endocrine and familial

disease characterized by metabolic abnormalities remotely caused by

environmental and occupational conditions. x x x.[23]

As regards pneumonia[24] and pulmonary tuberculosis,[25] both are listed in

Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation as occupational
diseases and are deemed compensable. As found by the appellate court, the
possible cause of these diseases may be environmental or occupational depending
on the level of sanitation of the surroundings and the health condition of the
persons he mingles with. While diabetic persons are prone to various infections, it
is also equally true that ones susceptibility to these maladies is increased by the
occupational and environmental exposure to the pathogens, not to mention fatigue
and mental and emotional strain that affects the physical condition of a person.
Respondents work entailed that he be stationed in the Port of Manila and
the South Harbor, areas whose sanitation and overall environmental condition are
suspect. Moreover, respondents duties required that he mingle with numerous
persons who may have been carriers of the disease-causing virus. The nature of his
job demanded long working hours to maintain the efficient and systematic release
of outgoing vessels and the reception of incoming vessels.
The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.
Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially
where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a workconnection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. [26] While
claimant must adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is
increased by the working conditions to which an employee is exposed to, we
cannot close our eyes to any reasonable work-related connection of the workers
ailment and his employment.[27] Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in
favor of the employee, considering that P.D. No. 626 is a social legislation.[28]

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of

compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens
Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the
official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.[29]
WHEREFORE, the July 7, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78511 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Jaime A.
Valencianos hypertension is held to be directly connected to his primary ailment,
diabetes mellitus, and therefore non-compensable. However, Jaime A. Valenciano
is DECLARED entitled to claim for benefits for his compensable diseases, namely
pneumonia and pulmonary tuberculosis. The Government Service Insurance
System isDIRECTED to pay respondents claim under the Employees
Compensation Act.
SO ORDERED.
ASIATIC DEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 169136
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

SPOUSES WELLINGTON and

FLORDELIZA BROGADA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 14, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assails the May 31, 2005 decision [1] and July 28,
2005 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
84702 affirming the September 24, 2003 resolution [3] of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 6-14922-99.

Respondents Wellington and Flordeliza Brogada are the parents

of Fermin B. Brogada who was allegedly employed by petitioner
Asiatic Development Corporation[4] from July 1994 up to his death
in November 14, 1996. Respondents filed with the SSC a petition for
social security coverage and payment of contributions in order to
avail of the benefits accruing from the death of Fermin. They alleged
that Fermin worked as survey aide under Engr. Bienvenido Orense,
petitioners geodetic engineer. Fermin was working on a project
withEngr. Orense for one of petitioners clients when he was shot
and killed.

Petitioner denied its liability. It argued that there was no employeremployee

relationship

between

it

andFermin. It

claimed

that Fermin was the employee of Engr. Orense. Thus, it was not
obliged to report Ferminfor social security coverage.

The SSC rendered judgment in favor of respondents:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that the

late Fermin Brogada was an employee[,] subject to [social
security] compulsory coverage, of [petitioner] for the period July
1994 to November 14, 1996.

Accordingly, [petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay the [Social

Security System], within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Resolution, the amount of P12,419.00 representing the unpaid
[social
security]
contributions
in
favor
of
the
late FerminBrogada for the aforestated period of employment, the
amount of P35,815.84 as 3% per month penalty for late payment
computed as of October 31, 2003 without prejudice to the
collection of additional penalty that may accrue thereafter until
fully paid, and the amount of P32,000.00 as damages for failure to
report Fermin Brogada for [social security] coverage prior to his
death pursuant to Section 24(a) of the [Social Security] Law, as
amended.

The [Social Security System] is directed to immediately pay the

lump sum death benefit to the [respondents], in their capacity as
secondary beneficiaries, in accordance with its existing rules and
regulations, and to inform this Commission of its compliance
herewith.

As to the [petitioners] liability, if any under [Employers

Compensation] Law, the [Social Security System] is advised to
take appropriate action for the collection of the same.

SO ORDERED.[5]

On

appeal,

the

CA. Undaunted,

SSC

petitioner

resolution
filed

was

this

affirmed
petition

by

the

insisting

that Fermin was not its employee.

The petition is denied.

The

issue

of

whether

or

not

an

employer-employee

relationship exists in a given case is essentially a question of fact.

[6]

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only

questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon

by this Court.[7] Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the
SSC, when adopted and confirmed by the CA and if supported by
substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by
this

Court.[8] While

exceptions[9] to

this

this
rule,

Court
none

has
of

recognized

these

exceptions

several
finds

application here.
Both the SSC and CA found that Fermin was petitioners
employee. Thus, petitioner is liable for unpaid social security
contributions.

Petitioners claims are a mere reiteration of arguments

unsuccessfully raised before the SSC and the CA. No compelling

reason whatsoever is shown by petitioner for this Court to reverse

the SSCs findings and conclusions, as affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ADELAIDA B. AQUINO, G.R. No. 149256
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

- v e r s u s - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
U.S. NAVAL COMMISSARY
STORE, Subic Bay,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 21, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

At bar is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 60726, entitled Adelaida B. Aquino v. Social
Security
under

System,

dismissing

Presidential

Decree

petitioner Adelaida Aquinos claim

(PD)

No.

626

(the

Employees

Compensation Act).

Petitioners husband, Jaime Aquino, worked as grocery man

for the US Navy Commissary, Subic Bay,Olongapo City from 1970
to 1977. He performed the following tasks: (1) checked the
availability of stocks before they were turned over to the
supervisor of the store; (2) piled items in shelves and display

cases and assisted patrons in locating them; (3) processed retail

price changes by conducting inventories of items and (4) operated
the forklift.

On February 2, 2000 or about 23 years after his separation

from employment, he died of congestive heart failure. Petitioner filed
a claim for surviving spouses compensation benefits under PD 626
with respondent Social Security System (SSS). The latter denied the
claim.

Petitioner then appealed the case to the Employees Compensation

Commission (ECC) which affirmed SSSsdismissal of the claim on
the ground that the cause of death of petitioners husband was not
attributable to the nature of his work as a grocery man in the
Commissary. He was no longer connected with the store at that
time.

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA seeking the reversal of

the ECCs decision. There, petitioner insisted that the cause of her
husbands death was traceable to the nature of his job at the
commissary store. The CA dismissed her appeal. [1] Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the CA decision[2] but it was denied, hence, this
petition.

In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for not finding

that the ailment causing her husbands death was compensable
under PD 626.[3]

The petition will not prosper.

Under the law, the beneficiary of an employee is entitled to
death benefits if the cause of death is (1) an illness accepted as an
occupational disease by the ECC or (2) any other illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same
was increased by the working conditions.[4]

Stated otherwise, a claimant must prove that the illness is

listed as an occupational disease by the ECC; otherwise, he must
present substantial evidence showing that the nature of the work
increased the risk of contracting it.

In

the

case

of Panangui v.

Employees

Compensation

Commission,[5] the Court explained congestive heart failure as:

a clinical syndrome which develops eventually in 50-60% of

all patients with organic cardiovascular disease. It is defined as
the clinical state resulting from the inability of the heart to expel
sufficient blood for the metabolic demands of the body. Heart
failure may therefore be present when the cardiac output is high,

normal or low, regardless of the absolute level, the cardiac output

is reduced to metabolic demands

Under the Rules on Employees Compensation, particularly

Annex A thereof which contains the list of occupational diseases,
congestive heart failure is not included. Hence, petitioner should
have shown proof that the working conditions in the commissary
store where her husband worked aggravated the risk of contracting
the ailment.[6] Petitioner should have adduced evidence of a
reasonable connection between the work of her deceased husband
and the cause of his death, or that the progression of the disease
was brought about largely by the conditions in her husbands job as
grocery man at the commissary store. [7]Failing in this aspect, we are
constrained to rule that her husbands illness which eventually
caused his demise was not compensable.

Moreover, even if we were to construe the ailment of petitioners

husband as cardiovascular disease compensable under ECC
Resolution No. 432, the petition will still not prosper. To be
compensable,

the

cardiovascular

(or

heart)

disease

of

Jaime Aquino must have occurred under any of the following

conditions:

(a)

[i]f the heart disease was known to have been present

during employment[,] there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reason of the nature of his work;

(b)

[t]he strain of work that [brought] about an acute attack

must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within
twenty-four (24) hours by clinical signs of a cardiac insult to
constitute causal relationship;

(c)

[i]f a person who was apparently symptomatic before

subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his
work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it [was]
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.[8]

Clearly, the circumstances of the present case do not fall

under any of the foregoing conditions.

In addition, granting petitioners claim will set a bad precedent

considering that 23 years elapsed from the time her husband
stopped working at the commissary store up to the time he died. If
we were to grant it, we might unduly burden the funds of the ECC
and jeopardize it with a flood of unsubstantiated claims. Besides,
the Court cannot remain oblivious to the possibility that, within

that 23-year period, other factors intervened to cause the death of

petitioners husband. Petitioner was thus under an even greater
compulsion to proffer evidence to negate this possibility and
establish the causal connection between her husbands work and
his

death. The

23-year

gap

between

his

separation

from

employment in 1977 and his death in 2000 was a gaping hole in

petitioners claim.

Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact

of administrative officials who have acquired expertise on account of
their specialized jurisdiction are accorded by the Courts not only
respect but, most often, with finality.

Lastly, while it is true that PD 626 operates on the principle of

social justice, sympathy for the workers should also be placed in a
sensible equilibrium with the stability of the ECC trust fund.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 60726 is herebyAFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166556
INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Petitioner, Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LUZ M. BAUL, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 31, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---x
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside

the May 31, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 76461 which reversed the Decision [2] of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-

12984-202 denying the claim for compensation benefits of Luz M.

Baul under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.

Luz M. Baul was employed by the Department of Education

and Culture and Sports (DECS), Tarlac South District, as an
elementary school teacher on August 1, 1962.
Medical records show that due to extreme dizziness,
headache, chest pain, slurred speech, vomiting and general body
weakness, she was admitted to the St. Martin de Porres Hospital
inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac from July 1 to 9, 1993.
Dr. Salvador A. Fontanilla, the medical director of the hospital,
diagnosed her illness as Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease
(HCVD)-Essential Hypertension. Prognosis was poor and guarded.
[3]
To monitor her health condition, she had frequent consultation
and treatment as an outpatient until her compulsory retirement
on May 2, 1998.[4]

On January 19 to 20, 1999, Luz was confined at

the Ramos General Hospital in Ligtasan, Tarlac City. Dr. Conrado
M. Orquiola, a cardiologist, corroborated the earlier findings of Dr.
Fontanilla that she had a HCVD. On May 17, 1999, she consulted
Dr. Ernesto Cunanan, an internal medicine specialist, and the
doctor noted that her hypertension had worsened to Transient
Ischemic Attack (TIA), Essential Hypertension Stage III (moderate
to severe hypertension). Eventually, on April 17, 2000, she
suffered from a Cerebro-Vascular Accident (CVA), i.e., stroke, and
was rushed to the Ramos General Hospital where she stayed for
four days under the medical supervision of Dr. Orquiola and Dr.
Albert Lapid, a neurologist.[5] The CT Scan result revealed the
impression ischemic infarct, right occipital lobe. [6]

Convinced that her hypertension supervened by reason and in the

course of her employment with the DECS and persisted even after
her retirement, she filed a claim on June 10, 1999 before the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Tarlac Branch, for

disability and hospital medical benefits under Presidential Decree

(P.D.) No. 626, as amended.[7]

On August 15, 2001, GSIS Tarlac Branch Manager Amando A.

Inocentes denied petitioners claim due to the alleged absence of
proof to confirm that there was a resulting permanent disability
due to hypertension prior to retirement. [8]

In
its January
23,
2003 decision,
the
Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) sustained the conclusions of the
GSIS,[9]holding that although hypertension is among the listed
compensable illnesses in Annex A of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, its compensability is qualified. The ECC
declared that petitioner failed to establish that her hypertension
had caused an impairment of body organ functions resulting in
permanent disability. In the same way, even if her CVA is an
occupational disease under No. 19 of Annex A of the Amended
Rules of the ECC, she failed to show the existence of such
conditions as required by the Rules.

Luz filed a petition for review with the CA for the reversal of the
ECC decision. On May 31, 2004, the appellate court reversed the
ECC ruling and ordered the GSIS to pay petitioner the benefits
corresponding to permanent partial disability before retirement
and permanent total disability after retirement benefits. [10] The CA
ruled that probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
workmens compensation. Since hypertension is listed as a
compensable occupational disease, it is presumed that such
illness is reasonably work-connected. Petitioner had proved by
substantial evidence that her hypertension was work-related; it
emanated from the stress caused by the mental strain of teaching
many pupils aside from the loads of obligations and
responsibilities appurtenant to the profession.

The ECC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [11] which the CA

denied.[12]
The GSIS, now petitioner, sought relief in this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioner insists that the ruling of the CA
rests on mere presumptions, and points out that an award of
disability benefits cannot depend on surmises and conjectures.
The beneficiary must present evidence to prove that the illness
was caused by employment or that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Also, there is no
showing that respondents ailment is at all considered permanent
partial or total disability by the GSIS and approved by the ECC
medical groups.

Petitioner also claims that the Court must respect the

findings of quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training. In this case, respondent failed to file the claim before
retirement and adduce evidence to prove compensability of her
illness; there was no such finding of permanent partial or total
disability at the time of her retirement. Moreover, her sickness,
which developed after her retirement, could not be attributed to
her former occupation but to factors independent thereof.

The petition is denied.

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are

considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex A of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No.
626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of
causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in
the respondents disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically
paid benefits.[13]

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential

hypertension
are
listed
occupational
diseases,
their
compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set
forth in the Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational
diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove
the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be
proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to
unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or
undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a
direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of
the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the
trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On
the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it
causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart,
eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that,
the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b)
ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and
(e) C-T scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the

above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmens claim is based is probable.
[14]
As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings.[15] For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions
of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees
welfare. To safeguard the workers rights, any doubt as to the
proper interpretation and application must be resolved in their
favor.[16]
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of
respondents attending physicians sufficiently support her claim

for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly
deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made
part of the record and there is no showing that they are false or
erroneous, or resorted to as a means of deceiving the Court,
hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of
respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required
by the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no
moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG
are not indispensable prerequisites to compensability, [17] the
reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be
observed in claims for compensation. [18] Medical findings of the
attending physician may be received in evidence and used as
proof of the fact in dispute. [19] The doctors certification as to the
nature of claimants disability may be given credence as he or she
normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no
physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching
and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a
money claim against a government agency would vouch
indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and
protection.[20]

Significantly, even medical authorities have established that the

exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately
traced:

The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate

those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal
basis cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a
mediator of other influences. Since even this latter relationship is not
entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category
of
unknown
etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to
define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our
inability to understand adequately the forces at work. [21]

It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments

tracing the etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a
relationship between the sickness and the nature and conditions
of work.[22] In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number
of cases[23] the strenuous office of a public school teacher. The
case of Makabali v. Employees Compensation Commission,
[24]
which we have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De Vera
v.
Employees
Compensation
Commission,[25] Antiporda
v.
[26]
Workmen's Compensation Commission,
and De la Torre v.
[27]
Employees Compensation Commission,
amply summarized,
thus:

We are well aware of the fact that only a handful of public

elementary school teachers are fortunate enough to be assigned in
urban areas where the working conditions are comparatively much
better than those in the rural areas. A large majority of public
elementary school teachers, as in the case of the petitioner, work in
remote places such as sitios and barrios under poor working
conditions. Thus, the daily task of conducting classes (normally
composed of 40 to 50 pupils in urban areas and up to 70 pupils in rural
areas) in an atmosphere that is, by any standard, not conducive to
learning becomes even more physically taxing to the teachers.
Tremendous amount of paper work during and after office hours (from
correcting examination papers, assignments, school projects and
reports to writing lesson plans and the computation and recording of
grades) can be very physically draining especially to the senior
members of the teaching profession such as the petitioner. Such and
other related school activities of a teacher, aggravated by
substandard, if not adverse, working conditions, give rise to increased
tension, if not emotional and psychological disturbance on the part of
the teachers. This is especially true in the case of public elementary
school teachers whose pupils, being of tender age and immature, need
to be disciplined and to be taught good manners and right conduct, as
well as to be assisted in their formal school lessons

[We] must not also neglect to mention the fact that public
elementary school teachers are the lowest paid government workers,

considering the nature and importance of the services they render.

They are the most reliable and dedicated public servants being
constantly called upon by officials of the local and national government
to assist in various extra-curricular and civic activities which contribute
to the welfare of the community and the country. Their responsibility in
molding the values and character of the young generations of the
country, cannot be overestimated.

Significantly, even Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise

known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers,
mandates in one of its provisions that 'teachers shall be
protected against the consequences of employment injury
in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the
physical and nervous strain on the teacher's health shall
be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with existing laws. (Calvero v. ECC, et al., 117
SCRA 462 [1982].[28]

The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent

worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out
of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its
compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by
reason of her employment, and any non-work related factor that
contributed to its aggravation is immaterial. [29]

Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at

one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be
temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from
the same cause.[30] The right to compensation extends to
disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and
naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out
of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or

misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow

from the primary injury are compensable. [31]

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the

presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
prevalent under the Workmens Compensation Act. Nonetheless,
we ruled in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of
Appeals,[32] that:

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability

established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees' compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude
in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the
1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself
under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic
approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all
doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the
employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of
the law on employees compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder. [33]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.