Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpe
PII:
DOI:
Reference:
S0925-5273(14)00323-5
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.10.009
PROECO5903
To appear in:
Article Title
Developing Green Purchasing Relationships for the Manufacturing Industry: An Evolutionary
Game Theory Perspective
Journal name
International Journal of Production Economics
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the useful comments and suggestions made by two peer reviewers.
The authors acknowledge The Hong Kong Polytechnic University for the financial support of the
project (G-RTES). The work described in this paper was also supported by one grant from the
National Nature Science Foundation of China (Project No. NSFC 61174171).
1. Introduction
In the era of the low carbon economy, the conflicts between environmental
management and economic development have been intensified. Traditionally, supplier
selection criteria are quality, delivery on time, price, risk, safety, manufacturing
capability, flexibility, reputation, etc. (Dickson, 1966; Weber et al., 1991; Ravindran et
al., 2010; Ho et al., 2010). Currently, customers are increasingly concerned about
purchasing environmental products. Supplier relationship management, as a vital part
of supply chain management (SCM), has to adopt green criteria to satisfy the
requirements of customers and improve the green degree in SCM.
As a pioneer, Bloemhof et al. (1995) pointed out the value of operations research
models to solve environmental issues. Jeremy (2000) suggested that the relationships
between buyers and suppliers play an important role during the decision process,
which also could motivate the environmental changes within the supply chain. Based
on the triple bottom lines, Hollos et al. (2012) conducted an investigation on Western
European firms. The results showed that sustainable supplier co-operation could bring
positive effects on the firms performance in three aspects: social, environmental and
economic. In the evolution processes of green supply chain management (GSCM),
many researchers emphasized on green purchasing (Lu et al., 2007; Bai and Sarkis,
2010; Zhou et al., 2012; Genovese et al., 2013). In practice, recycling and
remanufacturing are taken as a significant operation strategy for a manufacturer (or a
buyer) to select proper raw materials (products). For instance, Hewlett-Packard
Development Company (HP) has executed a product return and recycling program for
various products all over the world. After using these products, HP provides the
additional services (free delivery to HP) to motivate the environmental protection of
consumers awareness.
Given above brief introduce and the practical example, the green supplier
relationship management with recycling becomes a significant research topic. In the
academic field, however, existing researches just focus on one-time evaluation, and
few of them can further evaluate the possibility of cooperation between suppliers and
buyers after the procurement cycle. Besides, to improve the environmental protection
of the upstream companies in a supply chain, both suppliers and manufacturers have
responsible to work together.
In order to gain deeper insight on the issue of green purchasing relationship, from
game theoretical perspective, this paper adopts Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) to
cast new light on this issue. Based on the philosophy of GSCM, a novel game model
is proposed to take full considerations of two aspects: recycling different kinds of
material wastes from manufacturer, and focusing on the cooperation tendency of
relationship between buyers and suppliers after a procurement cycle is completed.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review from three aspects: traditional evaluation criteria, green supplier relationship
2. Literature review
In GSCM, green supplier relationship management has attracted attention from
many scholars during the past twenty five years. The literature review section consists
of three parts: traditional evaluation criteria, methods applied in green supplier
relationship management, and the applications of EGT models.
2.1 Traditional evaluation criteria
In supply chain management, supplier evaluation and selection, as one of the key
areas, has attracted the attention of many scholars during the past half century.
Dickson (1966), a pioneer in this field, conducted a survey on the factors that affect
decision making in selecting suppliers, based on questionnaires. He concluded there
were 23 different criteria, including quality, net price, delivery, warrant and policy,
performance, production facilities and capacity and so forth. Weber et al. (1991)
reviewed 74 relevant papers published since 1966 and gave special attention to the
supplier evaluation criteria. In response to the interest of the impact of just in time
on supplier selection, they identified price, delivery, quality, technology capability, etc.
as key factors.
During the past decades, supplier selection has been studied extensively, in which
criteria and decision techniques are two significant aspects. Based on decision making
theory, de Boer et al. (2001) took sustainable factors as the starting point to categorize
and evaluate the decision models. They built a framework which combined the
industrial market purchasing models from Faris et al. (1967) and Kraljic et al. (1983).
The framework considered different types of procurement situations, including
first-time buys, modified buys, and straight buys. The framework also described four
Ho et al. (2010) surveyed over 60 papers, and pointed that the most used
individual decision technique is data envelopment analysis (DEA) and quality is the
most popular criterion. Meanwhile, Bhattacharya et al. (2010) put forward evaluation
criteria from both the engineering requirements and the customer requirements
aspects. Kumaraswamy et al. (2011) adopted similar evaluation criteria.
From the above brief review, it is noticed that early criteria neglected the
influences which are generated by environmental protection. Recently, with the
increasing awareness of environmental protection, green criteria should be considered
in supplier selection. The study of green supplier selection and evaluation only began
to appear in depth in recent years.
2.2 Green supplier selection methods
In order to fully reflect the multi-objective (criteria) nature of green supplier
selection and evaluation, many scholars studied this subject from both qualitative and
quantitative aspects.
Noci (1997) firstly proposed a green supplier evaluation system which
incorporated green capability to improve environmental efficiency. Many methods
were since developed from both qualitative and quantitative aspects.
Kuo and Wang et al. (2010) developed a hybrid model which integrated artificial
neural network (ANN) and two multi-attribute decision analysis (MADA) methods
DEA and analytic network process (ANP). The models were applied to help a camera
manufacturer to select proper green suppliers, and the results from the models
indicated that the ANN-DEA method was superior to the ANP-DEA. Zhou et al.
(2012) proposed an integrated method by combining ANP and the radial basic
function (RBF) neural network to select a green supplier for the chemical industry.
Meanwhile, Bykzkana G. (2012) used a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
model to calculate the relative weights of the criteria, and an axiomatic design
(AD)-based fuzzy group decision-making method to evaluate green supplier selection.
Kannan et al. (2013) integrated the fuzzy AHP with multi-objective linear
programming to select the best green supplier and calculate the order allocation issue.
In the green supplier selection model, eco-design was taken as an independent
criterion for the environmental competency aspect. The main objective of eco-design
is recycling or recovery of materials. Recently, Dou et al. (2014) presented a grey
ANP-based model to implement green supplier development programs. As to the
environmental criteria, they fully followed the environmental factors from Klassen
and Whybark (1999) and Gauthier (2005). Moreover, Bhattacharya et al. (2014)
adopted a fuzzy ANP-based balanced scorecard method to measure the green
performance of a supply chain. A comprehensive green criteria was suggested from
eco-design, green supplychain processes, and sustainable performance.
Using the Decision-making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL)
approach, Hsu et al. (2013) developed a supplier selection framework, which mainly
integrated three dimensions (planning, implementation, and management) and
included thirteen sub-criteria from the carbon emission aspect. In the meantime, Mavi
et al. (2013) adopted a more complicated model the Fuzzy Logic DEMATEL to
identify green suppliers. They took reverse logistics as an evaluation dimension
including remanufacturing, recycling, and taking back packaging. Similarly, Fu et al.
(2012) introduced a grey-based DEMATEL model to evaluate green supplier
development programs. Shen et al. (2013) adopted fuzzy TOPSIS (Technique for
Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) to evaluate green suppliers.
TOPSIS was initially suggested by Hwang (1981). Kannan et al. (2014) also
Santos et al., 2012). The EGT can fully reflect the relationship between strategy
change and payoff fluctuation, and this advantage has lead to the EGT being applied
in different research fields, such as biology and economics.
Vincent et al. (2009) studied the issue of species abundance within a community
by use of EGT. The species were taken as ecological strategies. In addition, the EGT
can also be taken as an optimization tool. Jin et al. (2010) applied the EGT to
transform a multi-objective optimization problem into a game strategic model. The
optimized strategy was achieved by the process of dynamic game evolution.
Considering the dynamic behavior of the population size was neglected,
Melbinger et al. (2010) proposed a generic stochastic model to study the internal
evaluation and dynamic growth of the population. From another angle, Hilbe (2011)
studied an EGT model with infinite and finite populations. The results showed that
strategies were selected according to a probabilistic Moran process under finite
populations.
In terms of GSCM applications, Naini et al. (2011) developed a mixed
performance measurement system which integrated the EGT and the balanced
scorecard (BSC). The decision maker can select the best strategy by the dynamic
approach. Requejo and Camacho (2011) also studied the evolution of cooperative
behavior with limited resources by connecting resource based models and the EGT.
Vasile et al. (2012) studied market competition and cooperation based on the EGT.
Different decision variables or factors could influence companies payoff, and
prerequisites for cooperation or competition were discussed. In addition, the
correlation analysis between strategies (cooperation or competition) and model
parameters were also analyzed. Given the booming network market and limited
network resources, Seredynski and Bouvry (2013) used the EGT to study the
development of cooperation, the network size, and the type of participating nodes.
Similarly, Kim (2011) presented a new online power control scheme using the EGT.
In order to improve network efficiency and flexibility, a scheme was suggested by
analyzing the network equilibrium. Jin et al. (2013) applied the EGT to build a
computer virus propagation model, which described the game processes between
normal users and potential attackers. The equilibrium and stable strategy was
discussed by a replication dynamic system. Recently, Tian et al. (2014) developed a
system dynamics model by using EGT to discuss the relationship between subsidy
policies and the diffusion of green supply chain management in China. Simulations
results showed that subsidies for manufacturers are superior to consumers, besides,
the environmental awareness is key factor to GSCM.
Traditional supplier selection criteria, green supplier selection model, and
applications of the EGT have been elucidated. The analysis results show that: (1)
green supplier relationship management issue has been mainly studied since 2010;
Not all of methods and evaluation criteria are suitable to a specific industry; (2) the
models reviewed in section 2.2 are just focusing on the one-time procurement; In
reality, the selection process owns a multi-period property, thus, the supplier selection
concept model suggested by de Boer et al. (2001) should be a closed loop;
From the above literature review, it is noticed that the EGT is a good tool to help
social scientists to study human cooperation (Rosas, 2010). Naturally, the EGT owns
the advantage of dealing with cooperation or competition between two parties
(players). In a supply chain, the relationship between the suppliers and the buyers, the
two players, is either competition or cooperation, so it is natural to apply the EGT to
green supply chain management. The EGT can effectively reflect the complex
relationships among multi-stakeholders, such as suppliers and manufacturers. The
different green strategies adopted by multi-stakeholders which directly influence the
green degree of a supply chain. Besides, the EGT also could used to observe the
changing of cooperation tendency among multi-stakeholders.
The objective of this paper is to study the changing of cooperation tendency
among multi-stakeholders (buyers and suppliers). The EGT is adopted to describe the
phase of further evaluation by analyzing green costs and its benefits of players. More
specifically, based on the results of final selection, and with consideration of
environmental protection, the recycling factor, as the green criterion, is investigated
from the viewpoint of manufacturers (buyer) in order to prepare well for future
procurement. The outcome of this study will provide suggestions for those industries,
who are willing to transfer from the traditional mode to the green mode.
k
i
Ci
wi
eik
Ri k
ik
Ui
D(ik)
Cj
Pj
D(Pj)
Uj
y 3 s1 (1 y ) 3 s 2
(1)
fs2
y 3 s 3 (1 y ) 3 s 4
(2)
where,
3 s1
(3)
3 s2
(4)
3 s3
(5)
3s4
(6)
Equations (3) to (6) describe the payoff functions of a supplier who adopts
different strategies. If a supplier chooses the recycling strategy, then its payoff
functions are s1 and s2. The differences between equations (3) and (4) are the sales
price and the wholesale price. Under the non-recycling strategy, the penalty cost (B) is
the only difference between s3 and s4.
Similarly, the fitness payoffs of the manufacturers with the two different
strategies (buying or not, respectively) are fm1 and fm2.
f m1
x3 m1 (1 x ) 3 m 3
(7)
x3 m 2 (1 x ) 3 m 4
fm2
(8)
where,
3 m1
D( Pj )( Pj [ik C j ) U j
(9)
3m2
D ( Pj )( Pj C j ) U j B
(10)
3 m3
D( Pj )( Pj wik C j ) U j
(11)
3m4
D( Pj )( Pj C j ) U j
(12)
Equations (9) to (12) depict the payoff functions of a manufacturer who takes
different strategies. Facing the suppliers strategies, a manufacturer purchases the raw
materials from the suppliers have the normal price and obtain profit m1. If the
procurement is executed with the wholesale price, that is, the purchasing contract is
broken, the manufacture gets the profit m2 with the penalty (B). In Equation (11), the
manufacturer can buy the wholesale materials with the profit m3. If both players are
unwilling to cooperate, the manufacturer gets the profit m4.
Based on the above fitness payoff analysis, the average fitness payoffs of the
suppliers (fs) and of the manufacturers (fm) can be defined, respectively, as follows:
fs
xf s1 (1 x ) f s 2
(13)
fm
yf m1 (1 y ) f m 2
(14)
According to the research work by Friedman (1991) and Xiao et al. (2006), in a
replicator dynamic system, the growth rate of a strategy selected by the players should
be equal to its fitness less the population average fitness among each player. So, the
<
x ( f s1 f s )
f2
y ( f m1 f m )
(16)
Equations (15) and (16) are the continuous frequency dynamic systems for the
supplier and the manufacturer population, respectively.
In the above replicator dynamic system, the equilibrium points ( x , y ) [0,1] u [0,1]
make the replicator dynamic equations equal to zero. From equations (15) and (16),
two theorems can be derived as follows.
Theorem 1. For the replicator dynamic system represented by Eqs. (15) and (16),
(i) The four fixed points, (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), are its equilibrium conditions.
(ii) If wik <ik < wik B/D(Pik), let (x*, y*) be the equilibrium point on [0,1] u [0,1] , then
x*
wik
, y*
k
k
D ( Pj ) ( wi [i ) B
(17)
Proof
The fixed four points in (i) are clear. According to the stability theorem of
differential equations, the equilibrium point of the replicator dynamic system
represented by Eqs. (15) and (16) should satisfy
f1 ( x, y )
0, f2 ( x, y )
0
(18)
wik
, y*
k
k
D ( Pj ) ( wi [i ) B
y
(1
y
)
x
[
D
(
P
)(
w
[
)
B
]
(1
2
y
)
x
[
D
(
P
)(
w
[
)
B
]
w
^
`
j
i
i
j
i
i
i
The determinant (det) and the trace (tr) of J are as follows. det J < 0 and tr J= 0,
when x = x*, y = y*.
Theorem 2.
(i) The equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ESS, if Rik > ik.
(ii) The equilibrium point (0, 1) is an unstable point, if ik > Rik.
(iii) The equilibrium point (1, 0) is an unstable point, if Rik > ik and D(ik) > (wik
B)/(wik ik).
(iv) The equilibrium point (1, 1) is the ESS, if ik > Rik, D(Pj) < (wik B)/(wik ik),
and (ik wik)[ D(Pj) D(ik)] + D(ik) eik(Rik - ik)+ wik < 2B.
(v) The equilibrium point (x*, y*) is a saddle point when wik < ik < wikB/D(ik).
Proof
(i) When Rik > ik, x = 0, and y = 0, det J > 0 and tr J < 0, the equilibrium point (0,
0) is an ESS.
(ii) When ik > Rik, x = 0, and y = 1, det J > 0 and tr J > 0, the equilibrium point (0,
1) is an unstable point.
(iii) When Rik > ik and D(ik) > (wik B)/(wik ik), x = 1, and y = 0, det J > 0 and
tr J > 0, the equilibrium point (0, 1) is an unstable point.
(iv) When ik > Rik, D(Pj) < (wik B)/(wik ik), (ik wik)[ D(Pj) D(ik)] + D(ik)
eik(Rik ik) + wik < 2B, x = 1, and y = 1, det J > 0 and tr J < 0, so, the equilibrium
point (1, 1) is an ESS.
(v) When wik < ik < wik B/D(ik), x = x*, y = y*, det J > 0 and tr J < 0, so, the
equilibrium point (x*, y*) is the saddle point.
Theorem 1 includes all the equilibrium points on [0, 1][0, 1] based on the
replicator dynamic system. Another equilibrium point (x*, y*) is found if wik < ik < wik
B/D(ik), besides the four fixed points. Theorem1 provides the basis for the
following analysis, and Theorem 2 further analyzes the ESS under the different
conditions. The above ESS is obtained theoretically. In each period, the procurement
parameters (wik, ik, eik, Rik, ik, B) of supplier i directly determine his/her strategy. So,
the suppliers who adopt a green development strategy can benefit the downstream
manufacturers in the supply chain. In the further evaluation phase, the two players
should identify the rationality of these parameters. If the ESS of the suppliers tends to
be zero, that is, more suppliers select the no-recycling strategy; the manufacturers
have the responsibility to negotiate with the suppliers and to encourage them to select
the sustainable recycling strategy. Otherwise, the manufacturers should develop new
partners. The above results also indicate that the recycling capability of the suppliers
directly influences the achievement of sustainable supply chain management.
4. An Application
Although the theoretical results have been analyzed in section 3.4, to aid
understanding, a simulation of the model is conducted to further clarify the meaning
of the model. The main objective of this section is to observe the cooperation
tendency of the procurement relationship by considering the green procurement
strategy (recycling strategy). To improve revenue and reduce the waste during
manufacturing, more and more companies have realized the importance of recycling.
In Hong Kong, the government has developed an environmental protection program
to help and encourage manufacturing companies to implement recycling. ABC
Company is a traditional toy manufacturing company who has joined a
government-funded environmental program. According to their report, recycling
helped them to reduce toxic emissions reduced with financial saving.
4.1 Parameters Setting
In this simulation model, the manufactureing player is the company while the
supplier player has five groups of suppliers, each group being responsible to supply
one type of raw material (components). Thus, five different groups of simulation
experiments were conducted, each group for one raw material, as shown in Figures 2
and 3. In these two figures, the dotted lines represent the cooperation tendency of the
manufacturer by selecting the cooperation strategy, while the solid lines represent the
proportion of suppliers who willing to select the recycling strategy. The results from
the simulation experiments can be classified into two categories.
different convergence tendencies with the same initial settings (x = 0.40, y = 0.35). In
Figure 2(a) for material 2, the cooperation tendency of the manufacturer, y, drops to
zero in the first 10 simulations, then it grows rapidly and converges to the ESS. The
main reason is that the suppliers continuously improve the level of raw material
recycling. It can be seen from Figure 2 that when the solid line is increasing, that is,
more suppliers choose the environmental strategy (the recycling strategy), the
manufacturer chooses cooperation. Finally, the ESS (1, 1) is achieved.
techniques and skills and implement green purchasing to an industry, especially the
metallurgical and manufacturing industries, etc.
(3) Based on the results of the final selection, further evaluation can provide
visions more clearly for multi-stakeholders in the following cooperation. Stakeholders
can place emphasis on cooperators with lower cooperation tendency, such as, the
selection of new cooperators or driving the bilateral cooperation. The above
simulation results show that the manufacturer should focus on selecting new suppliers
who supply raw material 1 and 5 in the following purchasing cycle. As to the other
three types of raw materials suppliers, their cooperation tendency is relatively stable.
In short, green purchasing relationships among multi-stakeholders will influence
the payoffs of the suppliers and manufacturers (buyers) in a two tier supply chain. The
model, which is based on the EGT, developed in this paper was successfully applied
to observe the cooperation tendency among multi-stakeholders. The observation
results can provide better suggestions for the coming purchasing cycle.
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the useful comments and suggestions made by two peer
reviewers. The authors acknowledge The Hong Kong Polytechnic University for the
financial support of the project (G-RTES). The work described in this paper was also
supported by one grant from the National Nature Science Foundation of China
(Project No. NSFC 61174171)
References
Bai C. and Sarkis J. 2010. Green supplier development: Analytical evaluation using
rough set theory. Journal of Cleaner Production, 18(12):1200-1210.
Blome C., Hollos D., Paulraj A. 2014. Green procurement and green supplier
development: antecedents and effects on supplier performance. International Journal
of Production Research, 52(1):32-49.
Bloemhof-Ruwaard J. M., van Beek P., Hordijk L. and Van Wassenhove L.N. 1995.
Interactions between operational research and environmental management.
European Journal of Operational Research, 85(2):229-243.
Bhattacharya, A. Geraghty, J. and Young, P. 2010. Supplier selection paradigm: An
integrated hierarchical QFD methodology under multiple-criteria environment.
Applied Soft Computing, 10(4), 10131027.
Bhattacharya, A. Mohapatra, P., Kumar, V., Dey, P.K., Brady, M., Tiwari, M.K. and
Nudurupati, S.S., 2014. Green supply chain performance measurement using fuzzy
ANP-based balanced scorecard: a collaborative decision-making approach.
Production Planning & Control: The Management of Operations, 25(8), 698-714.
Bykzkana G. 2012. An integrated fuzzy multi-criteria group decision-making
approach for green supplier evaluation. International Journal of Production Research,
50(11):2892-2909.
Chaabane A., Ramudhin A., Paquet M. 2012. Design of sustainable supply chains
under the emission trading scheme. International Journal of Production Economics,
135(1):37-49.
Chiou Tzu-Yun, Chan Hing Kai, Lettice Fiona, Chung Sai Ho. 2011. The influence
of greening the suppliers and green innovation on environmental performance and
competitive advantage in Taiwan. Transportation Research Part E, 47(6):882-836.
de Boer L, Labro E. and Morlacchi P. 2001. A review of methods supporting supplier
selection. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 7(2):75-89.
Dickson G.W. 1966. An analysis of vendor selection system and decisions. Journal
of Purchasing, 2(1):5-17.
Dou Y. J., Zhu Q. H., Sarkis J. 2014. Evaluating green supplier development
programs with a grey-analytical network process-based methodology. European
Journal of Operational Research, 233(2): 420-431.
Faris C. W., Robinson P. J. and Wind Y. 1967. Industrial Buying and Creative
Marketing. Allyn & Bacon: Boston.
Ferretti I., Zanoni S., Zavanella L., Diana A. 2007. Greening the aluminium supply
chain. International Journal of Production Economics, 108(1-2):236-245.
Friedman
D.
1991.
Evolutionary
games
in
economics.
Econometrica,
59(3):637-666.
Fu X.Y., Zhu Q.H., Sarkis, J. 2012. Evaluating green supplier development programs
at a telecommunications systems provider. International Journal of Production
Economics, 140(1):357-367.
Gauthier C. 2005. Measuring corporate social and environmental performance: the
extended life-cycle assessment. Journal of Business Ethics, 59 (1):199206.
Genovese A. and Koh S.C.L., Bruno G., and Esposito E. 2013. Greener supplier
selection: state of the art and some empirical evidence. International Journal of
Production Research, 51(10):2868-2886.
Hilbe C. 2011. Local replicator dynamics: A simple link between deterministic and
stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology,
73(9):2068-2087.
Ho W., Xu X. and Dey P. K. 2010. Multi-criteria decision making approaches for
supplier evaluation and selection: A literature review. European Journal of
Operational Research, 202(1): 16-24.
Hollos D., Blome C. and Foerstl K. 2012. Does sustainable supplier co-operation
affect performance? Examining implications for the triple bottom line. International
Journal of Production Research, 50(11): 2968-2986.
Hsu C.W., Kuo T.C., Chen S.H., Hu A.H. 2013. Using DEMATEL to develop a
carbon management model of supplier selection in green supply chain management.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 56:164-172.
Hwang C.L., Yoon K., 1981 Multiple Attribute Decision Making: Methods and
Applications, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Jeremy H. 2000. Environmental supply chain dynamics. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 8(6): 455-471.
Jin C., Jin S.W., Tan H.Y. 2013. Computer virus propagation model based on
bounded rationality evolutionary game theory. Security and Communication
Networks, 6(2):210-218.
Jin M.Z., Lei X., Du J.A. 2010. Evolutionary game theory in multi-objective
optimization problem. International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems,
3(1):74-87.
Kannan D., Jabbour A.B.L.D., Jabbour C.J.C. 2014. Selecting green suppliers based
on GSCM practices: Using fuzzy TOPSIS applied to a Brazilian electronics company.
European Journal of Operational Research, 233(2): 432447.
Kannan D., Khodaverdi R., Olfat L., Jafarian A., Diabat A. 2013. Integrated fuzzy
multi criteria decision making method and multi-objective programming approach for
supplier selection and order allocation in a green supply chain. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 47: 355367.
Kim S. 2011. Adaptive online power control scheme based on the evolutionary game
theory. IET Communications, 5(8):2648-2655.
Kraljic P. 1983. Purchasing must become supply management. Harvard Business
Review, 61(5):109-117.
Klassen R.D., Whybark D.C. 1999. Environmental management in operations: the
selection of environmental technologies. Decision Sciences, 30 (3): 601631.
Kumaraswamy, A.H., Bhattacharya, A., Kumar, V. and Brady, M. 2011. An
Cm
Um
Cs
s1, m1
s2, m2
Us
s3, m3
s4, m4
Suppliers
ik
wi k
eik
Rik
ik
D(ik)
D(Pj)
0.8000
0.5741
0.3023
0.9444
0.6154
1.0000
0.7292
0.2377
0.8889
0.5000
1.0000
0.7500
0.8182
0.5800
0.8571
0.6250
1.0000
0.5455
0.9375
0.5000
0.6250
0.7576
1.0000
0.2377
0.8857
0.5806
1.0000
0.7742
0.8667
0.6571
0.8571
0.6250
1.0000
0.7143
0.1294
0.8750
0.4909
1.0000
0.8286
0.2377
Figure(s)
Figure 1.The updated decision concept model for green supplier evaluation
(a)-Raw material 2
(b)-Raw material 3
(c)-Raw material 4
Figure 2. The evolutionary processes (Raw material 2-(a), 3-(b) and 4-(c))
(a)-Raw material 1
(b)-Raw material 5
Figure 3. The evolutionary processes (Raw material 1-(a) and 5-(b))