CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PART IV
Criminal Procedure
5.1. General matters
Venue in criminal case
Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. (Isip vs People)
Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts as Special Agrarian Courts; jurisdiction in criminal
offenses for violation of RA No. 6657 is excluded from the power of DAR
Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]." The provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering
cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A.
No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a
reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. (LBP vs. Belista)
Jurisdiction to issue hold-departure orders within the RTC
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically
provides that "hold- departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." (Mondejar vs. Buban)
Venue in Libel Cases
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneous or separately with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense. (Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant
City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013)

Venue in Estafa
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. The prosecution must not only
prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact
that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the prosecution
failed to show that the offense of estafa under sec. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Other
than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which
even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The Affidavit of
Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed, and there is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that
points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. Although the prosecution
alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is
not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. There being no
showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the Regional Trial Court of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case. (Hector Trenas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January
25, 2012)
5.1.1. Distinguish jurisdiction over subject matter from jurisdiction over person of the
Accused
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Foz vs. Fajardo)
5.1.2. .2. Criminal
jurisdiction; What is criminal
jurisdiction?
It is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it
(People v. Marinao, 71 SCRA 600, 604).
Requisites:
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil 484); by virtue
of the imposable penalty or its nature, is one which the court is by law authorized to take
cognizance of; conferred by law.

The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months. When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in
force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
case. ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., G.R. No. 172505, October 01, 2014, J.
Leonen
2. Jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed the offense must
have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; jurisdiction over the
territory; cannot be waived
3. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused the person charged with the offense
must have been brought to its presence for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his
voluntary submission to the court
5.1.3. Jurisdiction of criminal courts
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those
that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. (People
vs. Sandiganbayan)
Powers included in the primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide
latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal
complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether
probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a
criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its
call. (Jesse Philip B. Eijan Santos vs. Special Presidential Task Force 156, represented by Atty.
Allan U. Ventura, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014)
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Office of the Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
Government, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. This means that the power of the Ombudsman to

investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other investigative
bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot
claim equal power. (DOJ vs. Liwag)
Powers of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the court not to interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by
substantial evidence. (Presidential Fact Finding vs. Desierto)
General rule: Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction
Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that indicate otherwise (Antonino vs. Ombudsman)
5.1.4. When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution
General rule:
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
Exceptions
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in
Brocka vs. Enrile, 74 as follows:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,
supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil.
62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.

Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil.
1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-2579S,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R.
No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
Instance of a case of persecution rather than prosecution:
The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone
of contention of petitioners that the instant case in a matter of persecution rather than
prosecution (Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr. Et Al. Vs. Magdaleno M. Pea, Et Al. G.R. No. 143591,
May 5, 2010)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438).
Unlawful arrest may be enjoined by an injunction
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953, cited in REGALADO,
REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
Supreme Court in exceptional cases may resolve existence of probable cause:
In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or nonexistence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation, as it did
in Salonga vs. Pao (187 SCRA 788), Allado and Webb; Paul G. Roberts et al., vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996)
5.2. Prosecution of offenses
Filing of the complaint or information interrupts the prescriptive period
With respect to offenses penalized by special laws, the filing of the complaint or
information in court is the one that interrupts the prescriptive period and not the filing of the
complaint in the proper office for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation
(Zaldivar v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277).

5.2.2. Who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de officio
Who may prosecute cases for abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness
Sec. 5, paragraph 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
rule that criminal cases for seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall be prosecuted
by the private offended party, her parents, grandparents or guardian or in the absence of any
relative the State may prosecute under the principle of parens patriae. It states that:
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents of guardian,
nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known
parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
5.2.3. Criminal actions, when enjoined
5.2.4. Control of prosecution
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the
government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully
executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of
public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies
to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case. (Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R.
No. 190487, April 13, 2011.)
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, the Secretary of
Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he took cognizance of BBBs letter and
treated it as a petition for review from the provincial prosecutors resolution. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE vs. TEODULO NANO ALAON G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014, J. Perez
RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the Go and Dela Rosas right to speedy trial
was violated as they were compelled to wait for five (5) years without the prosecution
completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect. In their petition for certiorari before
the CA, respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because
of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the respondents herein to implead the People
of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on

the petition. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA ROSA G.R. No.
201644, September 24, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a
wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and
the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the
person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can
be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed
against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was
compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions
of the MCTC, the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial
basis to support finding of probable cause against the respondents. Hence, as the Information
was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC
and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned the finding of
probable cause against the respondents. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO
YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014, J. Mendoza
In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary
from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to
refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding when the Information
is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to
review the prosecutor's findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court,
however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before
proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding
on courts. ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO AND
DOLORES V. MOLINA/DOLORES V. MOLINA VS. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QUEZON CITY,
BR. 105 AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION/DOLORES V. MOLINA VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO ORETA/THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION AND
ALBERTO V. REYES VS. DOLORES V. MOLINA AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, ETC. G.R. No.
109645/G.R. No. 112564/G.R. No. 128422/G.R. No. 128911. January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
5.2.5. Sufficiency of complaint or information
When is a complaint or information sufficient?
For complaint or information to be sufficient, one of the requirements is that it must
allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and

essentials of the specified crimes. (People vs. Dimaano)

A complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it
is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the
affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. (Sasot vs. People)
Error in the name of the accused
An error in the name of the accused is not reversible as long as his identity is sufficiently
established. This defect is curable at any stage of the proceedings as insertion of the real name
of the accused is merely a matter of form (People v. Padica, 221 SCRA 362)
Rule in case some of the witnesses are not included in the information
The non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitnesses in the information does not
preclude the prosecutor from presenting them during trial. (People v. Dela Cruz)
Aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information or complaint
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at
trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state
the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court. (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014)
Documents attached to the information or complaint
An information filed in court shall be supported by affidavits and counter-affidavits of
the parties and their witnesses, other supporting documents and the resolution of the case. The
reason for this rule is because the law aims not only to acquit the innocent but to like insulate
the clearly innocent from false charges and from the strong arm of the law. (OKABE VS.
GUTIERREZ)
Test of sufficiency of information
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x
The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during
the trial. (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014)

It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Therefore, Corpuzs
argument that the Information filed against him is formally defective because the Information
does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that
the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant Tangcoy is untenable. LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
180016, April 29, 2014, J. Peralta
The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information does not violate the constitutional rights of appellants Feliciano. Every aggravating
circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore,
incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO,
JR. et al G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, J. Leonen
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not
necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules
of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated. As such, the allegation in an information of a date of commission
different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be
considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the
information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even
be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.
However, variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the
information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great
that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to
one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not
deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being
violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAEL DELFIN G.R. No. 201572, July 9, 2014, J. Perez
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise,
the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and
enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused
two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a

ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of
this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely
different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case,
there is no duplicity to speak of. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND
MOISES ALQUIZOLA G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015, J. Peralta
Failure to object in the defect of information is deemed a waiver thereof
Appellants aver that the information filed before the trial court was substantially
defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person when in
fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend
the information read to him. However, appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective
Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash
the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not
guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. Records even show that the
information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants
did not comment thereon. Moreover, objections as to matters of form or substance in the
information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. (People of the Philippines v.
Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012)
5.2.6. Designation of offense
Designation of the offense
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in
such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the
court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is
valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information
will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. (Lasoy vs. Zenarosa)
Moleta filed a case against Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, for the violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices and Estafa before the
Sandiganbayan. Cosigna argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because the crime as
charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa. In
that issue, the Supreme Court ruled that what is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated but
the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. SILVERINA E.

CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
EMERLINA MOLETA G.R. Nos. 17575051, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
Variance doctrine
In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the
information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls (People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271)
Application in rape cases
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape
through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though
it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions
between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second,
and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was
charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014)
When variance between allegation and fact proved is deemed binding
A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he
fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than
what was alleged. While the information clearly states that the crime was committed by
appellant's insertion of his penis inside AAA's vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the
witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed
to register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode of the commission of

the crime of rape. Thus, appellant's conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the
variance notwithstanding. (PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013)
Defect in the complaint court may still acquire jurisdiction
Even when a complaint is defective for being signed and filed by the chief of police and
not by the complainant, the court may still acquire jurisdiction over the case. The complaint
required in Art. 344 of the RPC is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the
prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction in the court to try the case. Art. 344 is
not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over private offenses because the same is
governed by the Judiciary Law and not the RPC. (People v. Yparraguire)
Minority is a special and qualifying circumstance in rape cases
In rape cases, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with
the offender is a special qualifying circumstance which should be both alleged (People v. Cantos)
and proved (People v. Manggasin) with certainty in order to warrant the imposition of the
[maximum] penalty.
Facts alleged in the information is controlling
It is not the designation of the offense in the complaint or information that is controlling
(People v. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573); the facts alleged therein and not its title determine the
nature of the crime
(People v. Magdowa, 73 Phil 512).
The accused may be convicted of a crime more serious than that named in the title or
preliminary part if such crime is covered by the facts alleged in the body of the information and
its commission is established by evidence (Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 701).
An accused could not be convicted under one act when he is charged with a violation of
another if the change from one statue to the other involves:
a. a change in the theory of the trial;
b. requires of the defendant a different defense; or
c. surprise the accused in any way. (U.S. v. Panlilio, 28 Phil 603).
5.2.7. Cause of the accusation
PURPOSE:
1. To enable the court to pronounce a proper judgment;

2. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge as to enable him to make
a defense;
3. As a protection against further prosecution for the same cause. ( U.S. v. Karelsen).
5.2.8. Duplicity of the offense; exception
General rule:
An information or complaint must charge only one offense, unless the law prescribes a
single punishment for various offenses
Exceptions to the rule on duplicity
1. continuing crimes
2. complex crimes
3. special complex crimes
4. crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes
5. crimes of which another offense is an ingredient
Requisites of continuous crimes:
1. Plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time;
2. Unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated;
3. Unity of criminal intent which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united on one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or claim (People v. Ledesma).
Rule on duplicity of offense: Effects:
A defectively crafted information, such as that alleging multiple offenses in a single
complaint or information transgresses Rule 110, 13. A. However, failure to make a timely
objection to such a defect is deemed to be a waiver of the said objection. (People v. Santiago)
Effects of failure to object on the duplicity of offenses
Under Sec. 3, Rule 120, failure on the part of the accused to object on the duplicity of
offense as charged in the information, he may be convicted as many crimes as charged in the
information or complaint.
5.2.9. Amendment or substitution of complaint or information
Preliminary investigation not required in case of amendment
There are also no substantial amendments in the information warranting a new
preliminary investigation. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the

original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge
has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. (Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan)
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended
complaint which changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that
amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal
amendments. DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014, J. Brion
Venue in libel cases
Where the complainant is a private individual, the venue of libel cases is limited to only
either of the 2 places, namely: (1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or (2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. (Bonifacio vs. RTC of Manila)
When amendments to information may be allowed?
a. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription
b. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription
c. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged
d. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the
accused to undergo any material charge or modification in his defense
e. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty
f. it does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment.
5.2.10. Venue of criminal actions
Purpose of venue:
Not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of
the territory where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.
GENERAL RULE:
Penal laws are territorial; hence Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over crimes

committed outside the Philippines.

5.2.11. Intervention of offended party
GENERAL RULE:
Offended party has the right to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the criminal
action where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Where from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil
liability arises in favor of the offended party;
2. Where the offended party has waived the right to civil indemnity; or
3. Where the offended party has already instituted an action.
Sec. 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an
offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil
liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. In this case, the CA found no
such waiver from or reservation made by Chan. The fact that Chan, who was already based
abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and
interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the
petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia
from intervening in the bigamy case as Chan, being the offended party, is afforded by law the
right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil
aspect of the case. LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON vs. AMELIA CHAN G.R.
No. 196508, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
5.3. Prosecution of civil action
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil
action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
(Buntiong vs. Balboa)
When private prosecutor can intervene in the trial

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
*w+hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense
charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal
action. (Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
5.3.1. Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action
Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the rule that
in case a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability resulting therefrom shall be deemed
impliedly instituted in the said criminal action unless there is waiver or a reservation to institute
a separate civil action before the institution of the said criminal case. It states that:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
5.3.2. When civil action may proceed independently
ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT BAR THE FILING OF THE CIVIL CASE WHERE:
1. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, if the civil case has been reserved.
2. The decision contains a declaration that the liability is not criminal but only civil in nature.
3. The civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted. (Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 370)
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. However, even if respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, his guilt was not proven by preponderance of evidence

that would make him liable to civil liability. CRISTINA B. CASTILLO vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR G.R.
No. 191240, July 30, 2014, J. Peralta
An Independent Civil Action Cannot Give Rise to Prejudicial Question
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may
be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the
Court's thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question of the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under
Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant case, Civil
Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar. (Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013)
5.3.3. When separate civil action is suspended
Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the rule on
the suspension of civil action after the commencement of the criminal action. It states that:
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action.
In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal
case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
When suspension of the civil action allowed?

In Gandiongco vs. Penaranda [155 SCRA 725], it was held that suspension is allowable
only if the civil action arises from the criminal act subject of the criminal case. The civil action
must be intended to enforce civil liability arising from the offense charged.
5.3.4. Effect of death of the accused or convict on civil action
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect of the death of
Eddie Malogsi during the pendency of this case. Considering that no final judgment had been
rendered against him at the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that he did incur criminal liability and
civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v. Bayotas. Therefore, the present
criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the deceased Eddie Malogsi. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO, et al., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)
It is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not
based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based, and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao and Dr. Clenio Ynzon vs. People of the Philippines and
Spouses Roldolfo M. Palma and Rosario F. Palma G.R. No. 163879, July 30, 2014, J. Peralta
5.3.5. Prejudicial question
Prejudicial Question meaning; rationale
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction
to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid conflicting decisions. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. SEC. Hernando B. Perez, et al., GR No.
166836, September 4, 2013)
Elements of Prejudicial Question
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (San Miguel

Properties, Inc. vs. SEC. Hernando B. Perez, et al., GR No. 166836, September 4, 2013)
Action for specific performance is a prejudicial question
in criminal case for violation of Sec. 25, PD No. 957
BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB
posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Section 25 of the PD No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
Raising prejudicial question is hypothetical admission of sufficiency of the information
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that
all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the
indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. SEC. Hernando B. Perez, et al., GR
No. 166836, September 4, 2013)
Action for Rescission of Contract not a prejudicial question to violation of BP 22
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the
criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without
funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is
whether or not the breach in the fulfillment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of
the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he
had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His
obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should
not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale
through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless
check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for

the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action
for rescission of the conditional sale. (Teodoro A. Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi, GR No. 159823,
February 18, 2013)
5.3.6. Rule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action
Payment of filing fees in case civil aspect is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action
The amendments were deliberated on and adopted by this Court after the
Manchester doctrine has been enunciated. Yet, observe that the last two (2) paragraphs
prescribe a rule different from that in Manchester, and in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the 1985 Rule, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the
criminal had to be paid first to the Clerk of Court where the criminal action was commenced,
without regard to whether the claim for such damages was set out in the information or not.
Under the 1988 Rules however, it is only when the amount of damages, other than the actual,
is alleged in the complaint or information that the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. In any other case i.e., when the
amount of damages other than actual is NOT alleged in the information the filing fees for the
civil action to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate,
or exemplary damages x x x shall merely constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages. This Courts plain intent to make the Manchester doctrine,
requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to
impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when the amount of damages
other than actual is alleged in the complaint or information has thus been made manifest by
the language of the amendatory provisions.
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity
and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil action
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action the
rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; and (2) in any other case, however i.e.,
when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court the
corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first lien on the
judgment, except in an award for actual damages. (Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes
Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623)
5.3.7 Extinguishment/Maintenance of civil liability despite acquittal
The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may

arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
(Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
Civil liability in case of estafa
An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. (People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert Reyes
Wagas, GR NO. 157943, September 4, 2013)
5.4. Preliminary investigation
Nature of Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that
crime. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence, which needs to be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof (Community Rural
Bank vs. Judge Telavera)
The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate
that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to
establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the
presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims need for medical
attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or during the
preliminary investigation. GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs. HON. DANILO
A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin
Resolution on the motion for reinvestigation
We rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accuseds
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and
defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing
the investigating prosecutors finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof
that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of
Justice. (Serag vs. CA)
Preliminary investigation not part of the trial

It is not part of the trial of the criminal action in court. Nor is its record part of the
record of the case in the RTC. The dismissal of the case by the investigator will not constitute
double jeopardy and will not bar the filing of another complaint for the same offense, but if
re-filed, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation (U.S. v. Marfori, 35 Phil
666).
Reply is not mandatory in preliminary investigation; hence, no deprivation of due process if
denied
There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or
requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit.
To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3
(d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint
even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. On
the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by
Aguillon. (P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25,
2012)
Nature of right of preliminary investigation
Agdeppas assertion that he had been denied due process is misplaced, bearing in mind
that the rights to be informed of the charges, to file a comment to the complaint, and to
participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to Junia. Clearly, the right to preliminary
investigation is a component of the right of the respondent/accused to substantive due process. A
complainant cannot insist that a preliminary investigation be held when the complaint was
dismissed outright because of palpable lack of merit. It goes against the very nature and purpose
of preliminary investigation to still drag the respondent/accused through the rigors of such an
investigation so as to aid the complainant in substantiating an accusation/charge that is evidently
baseless from the very beginning. RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN et al G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
5.4.1. Nature of right of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) does not make any distinction. Any illegal act or
omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee. Such grant of primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving
public officers and employees cognizable by the other courts (Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.

105965-70(2001)
5.4.2. Purposes of preliminary investigation
Probable cause meaning and determination
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the
facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean actual and positive cause nor
does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief.
Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. (Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19,
2013)
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The prosecution evidence
fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers. (P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe,
P/C Insp. Joell. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., P03
Fernando Reys. Gapuz, Po2 Eduardo G. Blanco, Po2 Edwin Santos And Po1 Josil Rey I. Lucena,
G.R. No. 203605, April 23, 2014)
Evidence required in finding of probable cause
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed
by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over
the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. The term does not mean actual
and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. (Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11, 2012)
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.28 As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute
or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the
exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. (Century Chinese Medicine Co., et al. vs.
People of the Philippines and Ling Na Lau, GR No. 188526, November 22, 2013)

5.4.3. Who may conduct determination of existence of probable cause

The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an
executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the
Secretary of Justice. As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch; the public
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in
filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of
discretion can be shown. In this case, the Supreme Court found no error in the public
prosecutors determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal
complaint. (Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et
al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012)
While the determination of probable cause charge a person of a crime is the sole
function of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the prosecution of ones fundamental right to
liberty, dismiss the case, if upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the
evidence does not establish probable cause. Hence, while the information filed by the
Prosecutor was valid, Judge Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether
probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial. ALFREDO C.
MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC. G.R. No. 197293, April 21,
2014, J. Leonen
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence which would justify conviction. However, Agdeppas accusations were
mere suspicions that do not support a finding of probable cause to criminally charge JarlosMartin, Laurezo, and Junia under Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 RODOLFO
M. AGDEPPA vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN et al G.R. No. 146376, April 23,
2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondents assailed the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause and the filing of
plunder case against the them. People maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman is an executive, not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that
respondent Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and determination of
probable cause in their preliminary investigation. People is correct. It is well settled that courts
do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the presence or absence of
probable cause believing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR. et al. G.R. No. 170046, December 10,
2014, J. Peralta

The OMB, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an
information against respondents. For purposes of filing a criminal information, probable cause
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. Thus, unless it is shown that the OMBs finding of probable cause was done in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not interfere with the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR. ET. AL. G.R. No. 170046, December 10,
2014, J. Peralta
Authority of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation
The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in
relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not
give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers
and employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage,
from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. (Alfredo
Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013)
5.4.4. Resolution of investigation prosecutor
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides for the duties of
the investigating officer in resolving the case under preliminary investigation in which he may
either dismiss the case or file it in court together with the proper information. It states:
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted

against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise,
he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
5.4.5. Review
Principle of non-interference in the review of the DOJ Secretary
In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in line with
the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the
resolutions of the public prosecutor in the determination of the existence of probable cause.
The Secretary of Justice found sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately
established by DBP and found by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been
released pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no sub-borrowers/Investment
Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the collaterals submitted inexistent, all
the purported sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In
fact, the signatures of the sub-borrowers and the supporting documents submitted to DBP by
petitioner and her co-respondents were all forged. The findings of probable cause against
petitioner was based on the document showing that petitioners opinion was instrumental in
the deceit committed against DBP. (Cruz v. Hon. Gonzales, et al, G.R. No. 173844, April 11,
2012)
Non-interference of the court in finding probable cause by prosecutor; Exceptions; Remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the
DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
information, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of
separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of
indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting
principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of
certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No.
182130, June 19, 2013)
The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a
clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion, thus means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ
Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of

passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. (Rosalinda Punzalan vs. Michael Plata, GR No. 160316, September 2,
2013)
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question
is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court, and that, absent any misapprehension of
facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be dismissed. (People
of the Philippines vs. Marcelino Dadao, et al., GR No. 201860, January 22, 2014)
Trial Court not bound to adopt resolution of DOJ Secretary
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the DOJ Secretary since it is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. In other words, the
dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other than the judges own personal
individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. (SAMUEL LEE AND MAYBELLE
LIM VS. KBC BANK)
Remedy to assail determination of DOJ Secretary pertaining to existence or non-existence of
probable cause
Contrary to respondents claim, Rule 65 provides the proper remedy to assail the DOJs
determination of the presence or absence of probable cause instead of a petition for review
under Rule 43. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in a preliminary investigation
and by making an independent assessment thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that
extent, performing functions of a quasi-judicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. However, since he does not make a determination of the rights of any party in
the proceeding, or pronounce the respondents guilt or innocence (thus limiting his action to
the determination of probable cause to file an information in court), an investigating
prosecutors function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule
43. Additionally, there is a compelling reason to conclude that the DOJs exclusion from the
enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is deliberate. However,
the petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting or denying the petition for review. (PCGG Chairman Magdangal B. Elma and
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Reiner Jacobi, Crispin T. Reyes, et al., G.R. No.
155996, June 27, 2012)
5.4.6. When warrant of arrest may issue
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;

(2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and

(3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. (People vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, G.R.
5.4.7. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation
Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for a situation
where preliminary investigation is not required. It states that:
Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed with
the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section,
the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally
evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss
the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days
from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no
probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the
accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
5.4.8. Remedies of accused if there was no preliminary investigation
Right to Bail Pending Preliminary Investigation
A person lawfully arrested may post bail before the filing of the information or even
after the filing without waiving his right to PI, provided that he asks for a PI by the proper officer
within the period fixed in the said rule. (People v. Court of Appeals, May 29, 1995).
Remedies of the accused in case of denial of his right to preliminary investigation: Waiver

a) The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to
enter a plea upon arraignment and to object to the continuation of further proceedings based
on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads without objection, he cannot raise the issue on
appeal. (People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274)
b) Although it is entirely possible that the investigating fiscal may erroneously exercise
the discretion and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. (Hegerty vs. Court of Appeals, 409
SCRA 285 [2003])
Habeas Corpus not proper remedy in case of denial of preliminary investigation: Remedies
available
a) A petition for habeas corpus is not a proper remedy if the accused was not accorded
preliminary investigation which he did not waive. The remedy is a motion to quash the warrant
of arrest and/or information or to ask for an investigation/re-investigation of the case. (Ilagan
vs. Enrile 139 SCRA; Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464)
5.4.9. Inquest
A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. An inquest is a summary inquiry
conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a
person was based on probable cause. (Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006)
5.5. Arrest
Arrest is defined under Sec. 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as:
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense.
5.5.1. Arrest, how made
Section 2, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the manner,
time and conduct of arresting a person who committed a crime. It states that:
Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to
be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested
shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.
Arrest in Summary Procedure when available
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that
the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required.
In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused
in the Librando case was justified because of the accuseds failure to appear during her
arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis order
requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses
within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued
the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and
given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. (Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013)
5.5.2. Arrest without warrant, when lawful
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. (People vs. Laguio)
Warrantless arrest under the Rules on Environmental case
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
Warrantless search
The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search
of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. (Valdez vs.

People)
5.5.3. Method of arrest
By officer without warrant
A person may be arrested lawfully even without a warrant of arrest, under any of the
circumstances provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Circumstances in a valid warrantless arrest:
An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the
police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of
contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort
in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting
police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that
they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accusedappellants who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a

white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended is valid. (People of the
Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.)
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. In this case, the arrest of appellantwas effected under paragraph (a) or what is
termed "in flagrante delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delictounder paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, vs. REYMAN ENDAYA y
LAIG G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014, J. Perez
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted
as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In such an instance, the violator is
caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may
have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. Hence, a warrant of arrest is not
needed to make a valid buy-bust operation. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWARD ADRIANO
y SALES G.R. No. 208169, October 8, 2014, J. Perez
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an
actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. In light of the discussion
above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for
a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined
from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the
existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for
purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests. Hence,
for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied
with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent
person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the

petitioners? We rule in the affirmative. JOEY M. PESTILLOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, ET AL vs.

MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014, J.
Brion
Warrantless arrest by private person: Citizen arrest
Moreover, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a citizens arrest when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense. Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Anchetas act of arresting accusedappellant (after the latter offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified,
not only because it is his duty as a law enforcer but also by Section 5 of Rule 113, which
authorizes instances of warrantless arrest or citizens arrests. (People of the Philippines vs. Jose
Rayray Areola, 241 SCRA 1)
A private person may effect an arrest under any of the circumstances provided
Section 9, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. It states that:

under

Section. 9. Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private

person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the cause of the
arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person
making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (Emphasis supplied)
5.5.4. Requisites of a valid warrant of arrest
Determination of probable cause for issuance of warrant of arrest
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
What is probable cause?
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or
testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However, great deference is to
be accorded to the Judges determination. (Spinelli vs. US, 393 US 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 [1969]; US

vs. Leon, supra, note 61) The affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant
is presumed to be valid. (Eliza T. Abuan vs. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006)
Distinguish probable cause of fiscal from that of a judge
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a
criminal information in court. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. (De Los Santos-Dio vs. CA, GR No.
178947, June 26, 2013)
5.5.7 Waiver of Objection on Irregularity of Arrest
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on
this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if
appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not
provide salvation to appellants cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. (People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco,
G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013)
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search. DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199042, November 17, 2014, CJ. Sereno
An accused cannot assail any irregularity in the manner of his arrest after arraignment.
Objections to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be manifested prior to entering his plea. Otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMMEL ARAZA y SAGUN, G.R. No.
190623, November 17, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Objection should be made before plea:
We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was illegal.
The CA correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his
plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. It has been ruled time and again
that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to

raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
his arraignment. In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and
instead freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. Thus, he was
estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on
appeal before the CA or this Court. (RODRIGO RONTOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR
188024, June 5, 2013)
Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion to
quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing which, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the regularity of his arrest. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL
CUNANAN Y DAVID ALIAS PAENG PUTOL G.R. No. 198024, March 16, 2015, J. Del Castillo
5.6. Bail
The definition of bail is clearly spelled out under Sec. 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended by S.C. A.M. 05-8-26 dated August 26, 2005. It states that:
Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
5.6.1. Nature
When a matter of right? exceptions In MTC/MCTC Before or after conviction In RTC
Before
conviction
Except:
Those offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher
Right to bail not available to military officers or personnel;
The right to bail is not available to military personnel or officer charged with a violation
of the Articles of War. (Aswat v. Galido, 204 SCRA 205)
Brita asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the
prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "A grant of bail
does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the
evidence after full trial on the merits." It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused

person granted bail is convicted in due course. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR D.
BRITA G.R. No. 191260, November 24, 2014, J. Del Castillo
When a matter of discretion?
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
Exceptions to the grant of discretionary bail
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
Power of the appellate court to review
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Burden of proof on bail hearing:

In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong pursuant to 8 Rule 114. In bail proceedings, the prosecution must
be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While the proceeding is
conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of the bailability of the
accused. It should be brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered
nugatory. (People v. Singh, et. al., G.R. No. 129782 (2001)
Sale, etc. of shabu a capital offense
Regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation of shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death. Being a
capital offense, it is incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the
petitions/motions for bail filed by the accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is
strong. To grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called
for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross
ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence. (MABUTAS vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO)
Rule on bail pending appeal
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach. However, if the appellate court determines the existence of any of the
circumstances, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely,
if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed (LEVISTE V. CA)
5.6.4. Hearing of application for bail in capital offenses
The manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any witness to prove
that the prosecutions evidence against the accused is strong, is never a basis for the outright
grant of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter. A hearing is required even when the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail
(Domingo vs. Pagayatan)
Judge is not allowed to receive bail of the accused
It is undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the
accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may
be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash

be kept in his office. (TRINIDAD LACHICA V JUDGE ROSABELLATORMIS)

Conduct of hearing on bail discretionary
The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail
filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial
against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise by the SB of its discretion (SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN)
5.6.5. Guidelines in Recognizancel
The following are cases where the court may order the release on recognizance of any
person under detention
a. when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light, or a criminal
offense, the imposable penalty of which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P2000
fine, under the circumstances provided in RA No. 6036
b. where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum
of the imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or
any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow his release on
his own recognizance
c. where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no
bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one d. in case of a youthful offender held for
physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under
circumstances envisaged in PD No. 603 as amended. (Espiritu v. Jovellanos, A.M. No. MTJ-971139 (1997)
5.6.6. Bail when not required
Instances when bail is no longer required
No bail shall be required in the following instances, to wit:
a) When the law or these Rules so provide;
b) When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal;
c) If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment;

d) A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
e) Those offenses punishable by fine
f) Cases falling under Summary procedure
5.6.7. Increase or reduction of bail
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The
obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the
right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the
accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the
same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the
person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.
Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the
SC found that the setting of the amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an
effective denial of As right to bail (Yap v. CA and the People, G.R. No. 141529 (2001)
5.6.8. Forfeiture and cancellation of bail
Section 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given
date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared
forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to
show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail.
Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate
the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (Erlinda
P. Varcas vs. Judge Rafael P. Orola, Jr., et al. A.M. MTJ-05-1615 February 22, 2006)
Bail may be cancelled upon application of the bondsmen in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114
based on the following grounds:
a) Surrender of the accused;
b) Proof of his death;
c) Acquittal of the accused;
d) Dismissal of the case;

e) Execution of judgment of conviction.

5.6.9. Application not a bar to objections in illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
investigation

preliminary

Sec. 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure gives us the rule that
application for bail by the accused shall not be a bar to question the validity of arrest, or the
legality of the warrant, or the absence of preliminary investigation. It provides that:
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the
matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
5.6.10. Hold departure order & Bureau of Immigration watchlist
Jurisdiction to issue hold-departure orders within the RTC
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically
provides that "hold- departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." (Mondejar vs. Buban)
5.7. Rights of the accused
The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved, they shall be prima
facie evidence of the existence of guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided
there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that
the inference of the one from proof of the other is not unreasonable and arbitrary experience.
People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil 856 (1953)
An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint
or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166
(2003)
The accused may waive his right to be present during the trial. However, his presence
may be compelled when he is to be identified. Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546
(1975)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC denying in due course its appeal

with respect to the criminal aspect of the case which is estafa. The basis of the ruling is that the
dismissal of the RTC is based on failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Bonsubre contends that
the CA erred in renderings such decision because there was a compromise agreement entered
into. The Supreme Court ruled that at the outset, it must be borne in mind that a dismissal
grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that
would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. ATTY. SEGUNDO B.
BONSUBRE, JR.vs. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO AND RITCHIE YERRO, G.R. No. 205952, February
11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Right to a speedy trial peculiarly a criminal concept
It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the
accused's right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious
difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case:
Section 16 All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly
criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in
any proceedings conducted by stage agencies. (Danilo Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 178193, January 24, 2012)
Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether
the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the
entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay;
(b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in
a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy
of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to
fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. WILLIAM
CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY
G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014, J. Peralta
5.7.1. Rights of accused at the trial
An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on
his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses that have testified against him.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)

Non-appearance of the accused on the hearing constitute a waiver

Non appearance of an accused on a day set for hearing would result to the waiver of his
right to present evidence only for the particular day or until he has appeared for hearing.
There is no reason for the Sandiganbayan to totally foreclose Crisostomos right to present
evidence merely on an absence of 1 day in view of (1) the provision just cited and (2) the fact
that Crisostomo may possibly face a death sentence. Given the gravity of the penalty, it
behooved the Sandiganbayan to have given Crisostomo the opportunity to present evidence.
Besides, this was the only time Crisostomo absented himself as he was always faithful present
during the prior hearings. (Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan)
Inadmissibility of Hearsay Evidence a manifestation of the right to cross-examination
Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains
why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also
aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant
claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the
right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the
right to cross-examine the adverse party's witness, being the only means of testing the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
(Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012)
5.7.2. Rights of persons under custodial investigation
If during the investigation the assisting lawyer leaves, comes and goes, the statement
signed by the accused is still inadmissible because the lawyer should assist his client from the
time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing
of the extrajudicial confession People v. Morial, 363 SCRA 96 (2001)
Right to remain silent during Custodial Investigation
Appellant claims that his silence should not be used againts him as he was just
exercising his constitutional right to remain silent. We agree with the appellant. It should be
borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect
to the crime of rape. As such, he was already under custodial investigation. Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz: Any person under investigation for the comission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when
confronted by the accusation of AAA at the police station, he was exercising his basic and
fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him.

Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant's silence should be
deemed implied admission of guilt. (People of the Philippines vs. Jonas Guillen, G.R. No. 191756
November 25, 2013)
5.8. Arraignment and plea
When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. Arraignment of the accused prior to
the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal
(BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS)
Purpose of Arraignment
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of
an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose
of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why
the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. As an indispensable requirement of
due process, and arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.
Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial
court. (Estrella Taglay vs. Judge Marivic Daray, G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012)
Arraignment and plea, how made?
The following rules shall be observed in the conduct of arraignment and plea of the
accused in criminal proceedings:
a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading
the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.
b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the
validity of the proceedings.
c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.
d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall
be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its

records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the
filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from
the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days
after arraignment.

f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for
purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his
presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may
allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone.
g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in
computing the period.
Withdrawal of plea discretionary
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not a matter of right to the accused but of sound
discretion to the trial court. People vs Lambino, 103 Phil 504 (1958)
5.8.2. When should plea of not guilty be entered
5.8.3. When may accused enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
Requirements in case the accused would plead to a lesser offense
During the arraignment, the court may allow the accused to make a plea to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged, subject to the following rules:
a) The plea to a lesser offense must be to be made by the accused with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor; and
b) After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to
said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.
5.8.4. Accused pleads guilty to capital offense, what the court should do
Duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
This Court, in People v. Oden, laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused

pleads guilty to a capital offense.

The trial court is mandated:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires.
Rationale
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of
such a sentence is irreversible.
Primordial purpose
The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused
where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus
forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.
Taking of further evidence as requirement
Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate
review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent
reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence and thus, adopts the same.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
searching inquiry, we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations.

This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the
duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper
but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by
the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the
trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did
in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses
legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y
AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and

JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)

Searching inquiry
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent
reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence and thus, adopts the same.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
searching inquiry, we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations.
This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judges intimidating robes. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL
GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA,
RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA
PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
5.8.6. Improvident plea
Accused may at anytime before the judgment of conviction becomes final may be
allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty and be changed to a plea of not guilty. Sec. 5, Rule 116
provides that:
Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. At any time before the judgment
of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be
withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
5.8.7. Grounds for suspension of arraignment
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are (a) The accused appears to be suffering
from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his

mental examination and, if necessary his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a
prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office (Section 11, Rule 116 OF THE Rules of Court). x x x In Samson v. Daway, G.R.
Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits
the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned form the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. (Spouses
Alexander Trinidad Vs. Victor Ang, G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011)
Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of
the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for
review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. FELILIBETH
AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No.
176033, March 11, 2015, J. Peralta
5.9. Motion to quash
A motion to quash the information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. It is the hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence alliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information
which is evident on its face. (People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo V. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566,
July 17, 2013)
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order the amendment to be made. In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed
the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the
Informations. Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its
evidence in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to
due process. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG
YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO

LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA and RAMON NAVARRO, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014, J.
Peralta
5.9.1. Grounds
The grounds for the quashal of the information are clearly spelled out under Sec. 3, Rule
117. It states that:
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification;
i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
5.9.2. Distinguish from demurrer to evidence
5.9.3. Effects of sustaining the motion to quash
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. (People of the
Philippines vs. Edgardo V. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)
Remedy in case of denial of motion to quash
The denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for

certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion
to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not
the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
crime defined in law. (Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan)
Order of denial of motion to quash an interlocutory order
An order denying a MTQ is not appealable because such order is merely interlocutory.
However, if the court, in denying the MTQ, acts with grave abuse of discretion, the certiorari or
prohibition will lie. Newsweek Inc. vs IAC, 142 SCRA 443 (1986)
5.9.5. Double jeopardy
If a single act is punished by two different laws, but each requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not require, conviction or acquittal in one will not bar a prosecution
for the other. Perez vs. CA, 163 SCRA 236 (1988)
Double jeopardy shall not attach when the court that declared the revival of the case has no
jurisdiction to the same. When the court does not have jurisdiction over the case, all subsequent
issuances or decisions of the said court related to the pending case shall be null and void. CESAR T.
QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ADERITO YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C.
SUMBILLA, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, J. Brion

Requisites
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for double jeopardy
to set in: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted,
or the case be dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Philippine
National Bank vs. Lilian S. Soriano, G.R. No. 164051, October 3, 2012)
5.9.6. Provisional dismissal
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution
with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal
(sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional
dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4)
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
(LOS BAOS V. PEDRO)

5.10. Pre-trial
What is pre-trial?
It is a procedural device used prior to trial to narrow issues to be tried, to secure
stipulations as to matters and evidence to be heard, and to take all other steps necessary to
aid in the disposition of the case. Such conferences between opposing attorneys may be called
at the discretion of the court. The actions taken at the conference are made the subject of an
order which controls are the future course of the action.
Matters to be considered during pre-trial
The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e)Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditioud trial. (Rule 118, Section 2;
1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PHILIPPINE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, BY JOSE AGATON R. SIBAL,
p.765)
5.10.2. What the court should do when prosecution and offended party agree to the
offered by the accused

plea

During the pre-trial, except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, the trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining arrangements. Where the prosecution and
the offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court shall.
a. Issue and order which contains the plea bargaining arrived at;
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case; and
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability or damages
duly established by the evidence. (Sec. 5, B)
5.10.3. Pre-trial agreement
Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.

Non-appearance during pre-trial

The court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur : (1)
counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an
acceptable excuse. (Atty.Emelita Garayblas & Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz, Vs. Hon. Gregory Ong.
Et Al,M G.R. Nos. 174507-30, August 3, 2011)
5.10.5. Pre-trial order
The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten (10) days after the termination of
the pre-trial setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated,
the admissions made, evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and the
schedule of trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of the action during the trial. (As amended. A.M. No. 03-1-09 SC) [Sec. 10, B]
5.10.6. Referral of some cases for court annexed mediation and judicial dispute resolution
Criminal cases which are mediation-able under the court annexed mediation
To overcome the problem, the Supreme Court in 2001 authorized the use of courtannexed mediation (CAM) as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for the following in
criminal cases:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The civil aspect or claim for damages for violation of B.P. 22 (bouncing checks)
Simple theft
Libel
Estafa

Offenses not mediatable

However, (a) acts of violence against women and their children; (b) criminal violation of
tax laws; and (c) civil forfeiture under the Anti Money Laundering Law (R.A. No. 9160) cannot be
referred to mediation. The prohibition for compromise extends to (d) civil status of persons;
(e)validity of marriage; (f) legal separation (counselling is more appropriate), (g) ground for
legal separation; (h) future support; (i) legitime; and (j) jurisdiction.
5.11. Trial
Is hearing and trial the same?
A hearing does not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or documentary evidence
in open court but that the parties are afforded an opportunity to be heard. Republic v.

Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 133 (2003)

Time limit of trial
Time limit within which trial must commence after arraignment see Sec. 6 Rule 119,
ROC
The time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be 80 days.
SC ruled that 111 days have elapsed from the time the accused were arraigned on June 15, 2001
up to the filing of their Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001.
When is the right violated?
The right is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. SC held here that the cancellation of hearings by the prosecution w/o any
valid ground is certainly vexatious, capricious and oppressive. A dismissal by the court based on
this ground is not tantamount to GADLEJ. (PEOPLE vs. JUDGE HERNANDEZ (Pasig RTC), ATTY.
SALAYON and ATTY. LLORENTE (2006)_
5.11.1. Instances when presence of accused is required by law
5.11.2. Requisite before trial can be suspended on account of absence of witness
5.11.3. Trial in absentia
The purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases. People v.
Agbulos, G.R. No. 73907 (1993)
5.11.4. Remedy when accused is not brought to trial within the prescribed period
Sec. 9 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the remedy of
dismissal of the action in violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial in case he is not
brought to trial within the time prescribed. It provides that:
Section 9: Remedy where the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. If
the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and
Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of
the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden
of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the
evidence to establish the exclusion of time under Section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be
subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismiss under this section.

5.11.5. Requisites for discharge of accused to become a state witness

The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG
When an accused did not have any direct participation with the killing of the victim, he
may be discharged as a state witness. The basis of the phrase not most guilty is the
participation of the person in the commission of the crime and not the penalty imposed such
that a person with direct participation shall be considered as the most guilty. MANUEL J.
JIMENEZ, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014
Application of subpoena
Even if the witness has been cited to appear before a court sitting outside of the
province in which he resides and the distance is more than 50km (now 100km) from his place of
residence by the usual course of travel, he is still bound by the subpoena. Rule 23 applies only in
civil cases. People v Montejo, 21 SCRA 722 (1967)
Absence of trial judgment is void
The trial judge gravely erred in rendering a judgment of conviction against both accused. Since
the trial of B did not take place, the trial court should have rendered a decision only against A.
People v. Ellasos and Obillo, G.R. No. 139323(2001)
5.11.6. Effects of discharge of accused as state witness
Sec. 18, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the
discharge of the accused as a state witness is tantamount to his acquittal. It provides that:
Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the
proceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be bar to
future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his coaccused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.

5.11.7. Demurrer to evidence

A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out the case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of
the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Sufficient evidence
for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount
as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To
be considered sufficient thereto, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and
(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. (Gregorio Singian, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan 3rd Division, GR No. 195011-19, September 30, 2013)
Respondents were charged with a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
documents. After the prosecution presented its evidence, the respondents filed a motion for
leave to file demurer to evidence alleging that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence that
the crime was committed by the respondents. The prosecution contends that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion when it granted the motion for demurer to evidence filed by the
respondents. The Court ruled that the power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should
be exercised with great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the
offended party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is
acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of
demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent
deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and
delicately evaluating the evidence on hand. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C.
DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case
which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario,
however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because it
was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of
the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to
evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer
to evidence as there was no proper acquittal. ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA
DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH
166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014, J. Mendoza
Effect of grant of demurrer to evidence
A grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed
on appeal otherwise, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is offended. A

demurrer must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. It entails and appreciation of the
evidence of the prosecution and when the same if found insufficient to support a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, the demurrer is proper. DAYAP v SENDIONG
Presentation of evidence on the civil aspect in case of granting of demurrer
Once granted, the court must enter a partial judgment of conviction but must continue
with the trial for the reception of the defense evidence on the civil aspect. This is because at
the moment the demurrer is granted, only prosecutions evidence (both as to the criminal and
civil aspect) is on record. However, the grant of a demurrer may still be reviewed by the courts
but only on grounds of GADLEJ under rule 65. In this case, there being not finding of GADLEJ on
the part of the MTC, the demurrer stands DAYAP v SENDIONG
Remedy of the accused if demurrer to evidence is granted
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue
Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240)
5.12. Judgment
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their
veracity or the weight of their testimony. In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance
the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized falsities.
Minor inconsistencies not fatal
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecutions evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. The test is whether the
testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus,
inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)
Effect of acquittal
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the
extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b) of the same Rule, also quoted
earlier, provided in part: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. NICDAO VS CHING

5.12.1. Requisites of a judgment

What is judgment?
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines and sets forth the
requirements for a valid judgment:
Section 1. Judgment; definition and form. Judgment is the adjudication by the court
that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the
proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and law upon which it is based.
Requirements for a valid judgment
Thus, a judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by the
judge, and duly signed by him. Corollarily, a decision or resolution of the court becomes such,
for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation. Promulgation of
judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or judges who signed the
decision continued to support it. If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or member of a
collegiate court has already vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn. In criminal
cases, promulgation of judgment is made by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court
only when the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
Effects of death of the judge who penned the judgment
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died during
office cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In fact, decisions promulgated
after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in another office are
null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional
trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated after the
ponente has vacated his office.
The respondent judge cannot, likewise, claim that his only participation in the
promulgation of the questioned decision was merely an exercise of a ministerial duty to
enforce the said decision which was already long rendered by the judge who actually and
completely heard the above-mentioned criminal cases on the merits. It must be stressed that
the respondent judge had earlier inhibited himself from the cases in question, and that Judge
Calderon was designated to hear and try the cases in his stead. The mere fact that the
respondent judge was designated as Presiding Judge of Branch 26 following the death of Judge

Calderon does not necessarily mean that his previous inhibition in relation to the criminal cases
in question has been lifted. That would be an absurdity, as a valid designation presupposes that
the judge so designated has not inhibited himself from the cases assigned/raffled to the said
branch. (Peter Bejarasco, Jr. and Isabelita Bejarasco, complainants vs. Judge Alfredo D.
Buenconsejo, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete, Cebu, Secundino Piedad, Clerk of Court, and
Leonisa Gonzales, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu, respondents)
5.12.2. Contents of judgment
It is well settled that acquittal, in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon
its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy Barbers vs Laguio, Jr., 351 SCRA 606 (2001)
5.12.3. Promulgation of judgment; instances of promulgation of judgment in absentia
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to
assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for
proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel,
and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. Section 6, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it
was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. There is nothing in the rules that
requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be
valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latters absence during the
promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no
substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel
when the sentence was pronounced. (Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No.
185960, January 25, 2012)
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that it is incumbent upon the accused to
appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible
remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial
or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). It is among
the rules of procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making
power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. As such, said rules do not take away, repeal
or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still exists. The Supreme Court
merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases
when the accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation.
Clearly, the said provision does not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented. Hence, it does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to
appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction

that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment. Moreover, it also
provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the
forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. REYNALDO H. JAYLO,
WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO
MANGUERA, G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015, C. J. Sereno

5.12.4. When does judgment become final (four instances)

Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a)
Finality of judgment vs. Entry of judgment
Thus, it was held that the finality of the judgment was entirely distinct from its entry and
the delay in the latter does not affect the effectivity of the former which is counted from the
expiration of the period to appeal. (Munnez, et al., vs. CA, et al., L-46040, July 23, 1987)
5.13. New trial or reconsideration
What is new trial?
It is a proceeding whereby errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the record,
or new evidence is introduced, or both steps are taken. (People vs. Tamayo, 86 Phil. 213)
A new invention to temper the severality of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. (Jose
vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257)
When available?
Sec. 1, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the remedy of
new trial which may be availed of by the aggrieved party within the period to appeal. It provides
that:
Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
5.13.1. Grounds for new trial
There are two requisites for a Motion for New Trial to be granted.
1. It is filed on time

2. It is based on either of two grounds under Sec 2, Rule 121

Assailing the final judgment with a motion for new trial are reliefs far outside the scope
of habeas corpus proceedings. (Writ of Habeas Corpus of Reynaldo De Villa GR 158802)
Fresh period to appeal after denial of the Motion for new trial or reconsideration
In Neypes vs CA., the court allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice
of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO
What is the fresh period rule?
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied
by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the fresh period
rule should be applied to pending actions. SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO
Grounds for a Motion for Reconsideration
Sec. 3, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure sets forth the grounds for the
reconsideration of the judgment in a criminal proceedings. It provides that:
Sec. 3. Ground for reconsideration. The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of
errors of law or fact in the judgment which requires no further proceedings.
5.14. Appeal
What is Appeal?
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a
higher court authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only and in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. PEOPLE v. ABON
The right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is
therefore the proper party to bring the appeal through the representation of the OSG. Hence,
being mere private complainants, they lacked the legal personality to appeal the dismissal of
such criminal case. It must, however, be clarified that it is without prejudice to their filing of the
appropriate action to preserve their interests but only with respect to the civil aspect. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and HELEN Y. DEE vs. PHILIP PICCIO
et al G.R. No. 193681, August 6, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including

one not raised by the parties, and the accused waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. Thus, when petitioners
appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are
deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed
judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the
ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information
instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries. EDIGARDO GEROCHE, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014, J. Peralta
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the appeal by the accused on the ground of his
failure to submit his memorandum on appeal. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is
a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in
criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal
on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have
been filed" upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration
of the period to file the same. JOSE "PEPE" SANICO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
198753, March 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
Review jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
However, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals
from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital
punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty
to review all death penalty cases. PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO TARUC
Appeal as a Statutory Right; Relaxation of the Rule
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the period
when an appeal from a judgment or final order in a criminal case should be taken, viz:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon
the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins
to run.
In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was
promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days
from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to lift
warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November

2010 or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with
the CA her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has
already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Court has already stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance
with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of
the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
Grounds for relaxation of the period to appeal
In exceptional cases, the Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting an appeal on
grounds of substantial justice or when there are other special and meritorious circumstances
and issues.
Thus, in Remulla v. Manlongat, the Court considered the one-day late filing of the
prosecutions notice of appeal as excusable given the diligent efforts exerted by the private
prosecutor in following up its filing with the public prosecutor. (ANITA RAMIREZ vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 197832, October 2, 2013)
5.14.1. Effect of an appeal
Only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45
petition. As explained by the Supreme Court in People v. Nazareno, the constitutional right of
the accused against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the
remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition. However, the rule against double jeopardy
cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds,
namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and
where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy
does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts
and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial
review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value
of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the
evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly
rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words,
the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional
grounds. (Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No.
171513, February 6, 2012)
Effect of death of accused in appeal
Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the

accused pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. However, a violation of Republic Act
No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. Hence, no civil liability needs extinguishment. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM G.R. No. 206832, January 21, 2015, J. Perez
Matters to be raised in petition for certiorari
Applying these legal concepts to this case, the Supreme Court found that, while the
People was procedurally correct in filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition
does not raise any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what
is clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the case reviewed by the
Court under the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the
petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith committed by the
Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the Peoples
due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. It was also observed by the Supreme
Court that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are
more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The grounds cited in
the petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
on the sufficiency of the Peoples evidence in proving the element of bad faith, and the
sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller. (Arnold James M. Ysidoro v.
Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.)
5.14.2. Where to appeal
Intermediate review of the CA of cases involving death penalty
At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review
in view of the RTC's imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997
Decision. However, with the Court's pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo,
providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the
death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to
remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review. (People of
the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012)
5.14.3. How appeal taken
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided in section 10 of this Rule.
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
5.14.4. Effect of appeal by any of several accused
Petitioner likewise erred in contending that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
prohibits the dismissal of the certiorari petition when appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio. First, said provision only refers to dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. Second, the dismissal of the appeal is conditioned on the appellant's failure to file a
brief. An appellant's brief is a pleading filed in an ordinary appeal. Clearly, Section 8
contemplates an ordinary appeal filed before the Court of Appeals. DEUS V.PEOPLE
5.14.5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal
5.15. Search and seizure
Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, a motion to quash the
warrant/to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. Garaygay v. People, G.R. No. 138758 (2000)
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. People v. Ko, G.R. No. 133254-55 (2001)
5.15.1. Nature of search warrant
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it
must issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge

himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses
as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. CHAN VS. HONDA MOTORS
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers
vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all
applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms. SPOUSES MARIMLA V. PEOPLE
An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a criminal
action. Proceedings for applications of search warrants are not criminal in nature and thus, the
rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the
application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction
because, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts. PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015, J. Peralta
5.15.2. Distinguished from warrant of arrest
5.15.3. Application for search warrant, where filed
Venue for the filing of the application for the issuance of search warrant
The above-cited rule provides for the venue where the application for the issuance of a
search warrant shall be filed, to wit:
a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed;
b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known; or
c) any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced;
d) if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search
warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or
the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges of
these RTCs and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in
the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue
the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

said courts." The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in
this case. As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the
Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous
crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd ViceExecutive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC. RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, Per Curiam
5.15.4. Probable cause
A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only
one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge
and his or her witnesses. Tan cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the
search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident. SY TAN VS SY TIONG
5.15.5.. Personal examination by judge of the applicant and witnesses
The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them. (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
686; Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823)
5.15.6. Particularity of place to be searched and things to be seized
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to
be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only
to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential
abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.
(Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]; Microsoft Corporation, et al. vs. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R.
No. 140946, September 13, 2004)
5.15.7. Personal property to be seized
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Ownership of personal property subject of search warrant not essential

In Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 319], the ownership of personal property is
unessential. The said rule [Sec. 2, Rule 126] does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him. As provided, under sub-section (b) of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at
the time of search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property
sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles
and property seized under the warrants.
5.15.8. Exceptions to search warrant requirement
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule
113, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
(Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012)
a) Search incidental to lawful arrest
Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
It is important to note that the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, and the corresponding testimony of the arresting officers on the buy-bust
transaction, can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either of
two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired
by any improper motive. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS E. TANCINCO, G.R. No.
200598, June 18. 2014, J. Perez
The accused cannot claim that the evidence obtained from a search conducted incident
to an arrest is inadmissible because it is violative of the plain view doctrine. The plain view
doctrine only applies to cases where the arresting officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014, J.
Leonardo-De Castro
b) Consented search

Determination of Voluntary Consent to a Search

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that
has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.(Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
c) Search of moving vehicle
d) Check points; body checks in airport
Airport Frisking
Persons may lose the protection if the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern about airplane high jacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There
is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. (People of the Philippines vs. Hadji Socor Cadidia, GR No. 191263, October 16, 2013)

e) Plain view situation

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a
right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In
the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent. (Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10,
2011)
f) Stop and frisk situation
g) Enforcement of custom laws
h) Remedies from unlawful search and seizure
May non-parties question validity of search warrant?
It is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can
question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it the proceeding for the
issuance of search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation
of his right by another. (Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Rizza G. Mendoza, G.R. No.
170425, April 23, 2012)
5.16. Provisional remedies
5.16.1. Nature
No notice to the adverse party or hearing on the application is necessary before a writ of
preliminary attachment may issue. Mindanao Savings, etc. vs CA, 172 SCRA 480 (1989)
5.16.2. Kinds of provisional remedies
Provisional remedies in civil applicable in criminal cases
Section 1. Availability of provisional remedies. The provisional remedies in civil actions,
insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal action.

Grounds for attachment

Sec. 2. Attachment. When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as
provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused in the
following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of
a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such,
or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about
to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines.