CONCHITA L. ABELLERA vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Since 1968, petitioner Conchita L. Abellera and her "adoptive" parents, Roberto and Virginia
Acebuche, had resided in a semi-bungalow house at No. 571 A. Bonifacio St., Brgy. Bagong Silang,
Quezon City. In 1990, petitioner became a beneficiary of said lot under the urban housing program of the
Quezon City government. Sometime thereafter, she went to Samar for vacation and left the house and lot
to the care of her elder brother, private respondent Beltran Acebuche. When she returned in 1991, private
respondents refused to vacate the house despite petitioner's demands, the last of which was made in April
1993. As attempts to mediate the dispute between the siblings at the barangay level failed, petitioner sued
private respondents for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 35, Quezon City. On
the basis of the position papers and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the MeTC, on
December 24, 1993, rendered a decision in favor of Conchita.
Private respondent Beltran Acebuche appealed and the case was assigned to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 106, Quezon City, presided by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. Pending appeal, the decision of the
MeTC was executed and fully satisfied as private respondents failed to file a supersedeas bond. On
February 22, 1994, the court required the parties to file their memoranda, which petitioner did on April 15,
1994. On April 18, 1994, private respondents moved for a new trial, but this was dismissed by the court on
April 26, 1994 for failure to prosecute. On May 27, 1994, private respondents moved for admission of
additional evidence consisting of a Contract to Sell between them and the Quezon City government, dated
March 3, 1994, involving the lot in dispute and receipts for payment of said lot for the months of March and
April 1994. This motion was submitted for resolution on May 31, 1994. After private respondents filed their
memorandum on July 5, 1994, the court directed the parties to attend a preliminary conference which was
held on July 26, 1994.
After said conference, the court issued the following order:
When the clarificatory conference was called, the court was confronted with documents presented
by both parties. On the side of [Abellera], a document certifying that she is an awardee of the lot in question
was shown. [Acebuche], on the other hand, is also presenting a document showing that the deed of sale
was executed in [his] favor covering the same lot by the city government of Quezon City.
In the face of this conflict, it is the sense of the court that the two parties, who issued these
documents, should be summoned to the court for further clarificatory hearing, which for that purpose is set
on August 2, 1994, at 8:30 a.m.
As it turned out, seven "clarificatory" hearings were held by the court, during which the parties, in
compliance with the court's directive, presented testimonial evidence in support of their documentary
proofs. At the hearing on August 13, 1994, on motion of private respondents, the court ordered the deputy
sheriff to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed property. The deputy sheriff, after conducting an
inspection, submitted a report to the court on October 14, 1994.
On December 15, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the MeTC, the
pertinent portion of which states:
All told and painstakingly reviewed, sedately examined and objectively analyzed, this Court is
inclined to believe that the plaintiff/appellee cannot claim any right over the property in question, since there
is no evidence on records to show that she has any interest thereon, not even any right being transferred to
her. A fortiori, plaintiff's claim that defendants-appellants are unlawfully withholding possession of subject
premises in violation of her rights and interest as occupant and owner of the property in question, cannot be
accorded the court's conformance, as the evidence on record does not sustain that claim.
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the
decision rendered by the Court a quo, and in lieu thereof, another is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the ground that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it, in effect, conducted a trial de novo and ordered an ocular inspection of the property. Before the
court could act on her motion, however, petitioner filed, on February 14, 1995, a motion seeking the
inhibition of Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. Her motion was granted and the case was raffled to Branch 80 of the
court, presided by Judge Agustin S. Dizon. In his order dated March 17, 1995, Judge Dizon declared all
pending incidents in the case submitted for resolution.
Again, before the new judge could resolve her motion for reconsideration and other incidents in the
case, petitioner, on April 4, 1995, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals raising substantially
the same grounds cited in her motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition.
Issues: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE

COVERED BY THE REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE TO CONDUCT CLARIFICATORY

HEARINGS AND ALLOW A PARTY TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT TO ISSUE AN ORDER FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN OCULAR
INSPECTION.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Courts could not, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, hear the case de novo in the guise of clarificatory hearings, during which additional
evidence was presented by the parties and an ocular inspection was conducted. It held:
The extent of jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court on appeal is established as follows:
Section 22, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 -Mis-oedp
SEC. 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases
shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when
the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. (underscoring ours).
Section 21(d), Interim Rules of Court Section 21. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts. (d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph,
they may submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the regional trial court to do so. After the
submission of such memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the
regional trial court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may have been filed. (underscoring ours)
Section 45, Republic Act No. 6031 Section 45 x x x "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit
memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested: Provided, however, That if the case was tried in
a city or municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then on appeal the case shall proceed
by trial de novo." (underscoring ours)
Thus, there can be no trial de novo. The appellate court must decide the appeal on the basis of the
records and memoranda/brief (Herrera, Oscar M. Remedial Law, Volume Two-Civil Procedure, Rules 2456, 1990, p. 216, citing R.A. 6031, Section 22 (d), B.P. 129, Rule 21 (d), IRC).
Nevertheless, it ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming that the trial court acted in excess
of jurisdiction as she herself had participated in the trial de novo and failed to object, through counsel, to
the issuance of the order to conduct an ocular inspection.
Indeed, although Regional Trial Courts should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely of the
record of the proceedings in Municipal Trial Courts and other courts of equal rank, nonetheless, the
principle of estoppel may bar a party from questioning the reception of additional evidence, as in this case.
Upon the principle stated in Sibonghanoy, we hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to question at
this stage the reception of additional evidence and ocular inspection of property after she participated but
eventually lost in what she now calls the irregular proceedings of the trial court. During the seven hearings
conducted by Branch 106 of the RTC, Quezon City, petitioner presented no less than seven witnesses in
addition to several documentary evidence to support her case.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents' motion for
execution pending appeal. For, indeed, the case was not with said court on appeal but on a petition for
certiorari. Thus, the appellate court's jurisdiction was only to pass upon the validity of the orders of the RTC
in the conduct of clarificatory hearings and ocular inspection. Since the RTC has yet to act on private
respondents' motion for execution pending appeal, this matter should have been left for resolution by the
trial court, not by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 26, 1996, is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denies petitioner's petition for certiorari, but REVERSED insofar as it grants private respondents' motion to
be placed in possession of the disputed property.
SO ORDERED.

THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) and THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION
BUREAU (EIIB) vs.NELSON OGARIO and MARK MONTELIBANO
Facts: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant
of Seizure and Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan"
shipped on board the M/V "Alberto", which was then docketed at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was
issued on the basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII
that the rice had been illegally imported. The report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign
vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN," Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu
City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu,
docketed as Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98.
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his
buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City.
In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu and the EIIB, as well as
the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction, but their motions were denied. In its resolution, dated January 11, 1999, the RTC said:
The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot divest this court of
jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as it was anchored merely on suspicion that the items in
question were imported or smuggled. It is very clear that the defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove
that the goods were indeed imported or smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs have very vigorously protested
against the seizure of cargoes by the defendants. In fact, as revealed by defendants' counsel, the Warrant
of Seizure and Detention was issued merely to shift the burden of proof to the shippers or owners of the
goods to prove that the bags of rice were not imported or smuggled. However, the court feels this is unfair
because the settled rule is that he who alleges must prove the same. Besides, at this time when our
economy is not good, it would be a [dis]service to the nation to use the strong arm of the law to make things
hard or difficult for the businessmen.
The 25,000 bags of rice were ordered returned to respondents upon the posting by them of an
P8,000,000.00 bond.
Petitioners BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its order
dated January 25, 1999.5 In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of respondents' bond to
P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained.
Accordingly, on April 26, 1999, upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in
respondents' possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu (Cebu Seizure
Identification Case No. 17-98), a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and decreed that
the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks bearing Plate
Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner prescribed by law while the seven (7) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY
874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are RELEASED in favor of their respective owners upon proper identification
and compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Since this decision involves the release of some of the articles subject matter of herein case which
is considered adverse to the government, the same is hereby elevated to the Commissioner of Customs for
automatic review pursuant to Republic Act 7651.
The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable, and convincing evidence" that the 25,000
bags of rice were smuggled. Said evidence consisted of certifications by the Philippine Coast Guard, the
Philippine Ports Authority, and the Arrastre Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had never
docked in Palawan since November, 1998; a certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo of the
National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature in NFA Grains Permit Control No. 00986,
attesting that the 25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan, was forged; and the result of the laboratory
analysis of a sample of the subject rice by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) stating that the
sample "does not compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."
Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the District Collector of Customs
despite due notice sent to his counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the forfeiture
proceedings.
On April 30, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 15, 1999, upholding the resolution of the RTC denying petitioners' motions to
dismiss.

Issue: I. SINCE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS HAD
ALREADY EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE EXERCISE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW AND IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RESOLUTION
DATED JANUARY 11, 1999 AND ORDER DATED JANUARY 25, 1999 IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-23077.
II. SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PROVIDED
FOR BY LAW, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
DENIALS OF PETITIONERS' SEPARATE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
Ruling: In Jao v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No.
1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora
and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings.
Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there
to the Court of Appeals.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the
policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and
other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import
and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been
instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that
such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as
in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles
under Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings" 11 They overlook the fact, however, that
under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is
not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be
shipped abroad before they may exercise the power to effect customs' searches, seizures, or arrests
provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings. 12 As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v.
Vinuya: 13
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority.1wphi1
Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly
imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion
conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first
instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit
to do so. The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of
Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate
petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first
instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of injunction, the Supreme Court issued
on June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled EXERCISE OF
UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The circular states in part:
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA
734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the
Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts
cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately disseminated and shall
monitor implementation thereof. STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby
enjoined.

WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby made permanent. The
decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI vs JUDGE RASAD G. Balindong
Facts: Civil Case No. 06-2954 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the
Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus
Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for
damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision
and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made.
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to
comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment
on the MSUs depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of
MSU. The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the
denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the
LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by
respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009.
After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing
P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion
and dismissed the case.
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the
TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC.
He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the
proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction. It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is the
respondent Judges second offense.
The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter and to require the
parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings/records on file.
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010, stating that he learned
from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is basically a good Judge, and an admonition will probably
suffice as reminder to respondent notto repeat the same mistake in the future. The respondent Judge filed
his manifestation on September 28, 2010.
Issue:
Ruling: The Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought
by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion
of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered
as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[25] A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of
its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in
issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The
remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the
action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing
a TRO to temporarily restrain[36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal
court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90
from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was
acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court
since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no
application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the
judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with
another court which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this
case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor.
If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper
recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued
the decision, not from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In
this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial,
proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an
erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ
itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not
discretionary. As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ
before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition before the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied
this opposition.
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition
before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use. His lack of familiarity
with the rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary
through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that the kind of
interference he exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC
can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining
lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent Judge is
basically a good Judge, and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges liability. This
liability and the commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal opinion but on the
facts he alleged and proved, and on the applicable law and jurisprudence.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of
Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the
attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolonged deliberations holds that a fine of
P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for
the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the respondent Judges second offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and FINED in the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be
dealt with more severely.

FELICISSIMA GALINDO, NESTOR GALINDO, BEATRIZ GALINDO, CATALINA GALINDO, DANILO

GALINDO, LIBRADA GALINDO, CESAR GALINDO, JUANITA GALINDO RIVERA and/or THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANO A. ROXAS
Facts: When Marciano A. Roxas died intestate on June 4, 1950, he was survived by his widow, Cirila Roxas
and their nine children, namely, Maximiano, Virginia, Benjamin, Eleazar, Elisa, Prescilla, Fortunato, Lydia
and Uriel, all surnamed Roxas; and the children of their son Vicente, who predeceased Marciano, namely,
Rosalinda, Vicente, Jr. and Sergio, all surnamed Roxas.
On April 14, 1955, the said heirs filed an action for specific performance against the heirs of
Gregorio Galindo, namely, Florencio, Felisa, Mercedes and Urbano, all surnamed Galindo, including his
grandson Federico de Guzman, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan to compel the latter
to execute a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1048 located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The said lot had an area
of 48,089 square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2145. After the trial,
the following facts emerged:
Lot 1048 which formed part of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate was possessed by the late Gregorio
Galindo who, during his lifetime, had been paying rentals thereon to the government. On July 5, 1911, the
Government of the Philippines, through the then Acting Director of Lands, agreed to sell to Gregorio
Galindo the said Lot 1048 for the sum of P859.50 payable in annual installments of P42.00 (Exhibit F). On
July 4, 1916, Gregorio Galindo died intestate leaving as his only heirs his children Florencio, Felisa,
Mercedes and Urbano, all surnamed Galindo, and a grandson Federico de Guzman. Subsequently on
December 1, 1916, Florencio, Felisa, Mercedes, all surnamed Galindo, and Federico de Guzman,
represented by his father Luis de Guzman, sold whatever rights and interests Gregorio Galindo had in Lot
1048 in favor of Marciano A. Roxas (Exhibit B, deposition). Urbano Galindo, being then a minor, did not
sign the document. In the said document, the signatories thereto obligated themselves to transfer the land
to Marciano A. Roxas as soon as it would become feasible to do so, and as security that Urbano Galindo
would ratify the same upon reaching the age of majority, Florencio Galindo ceded to Marciano A. Roxas title
to Lot 833. Since the execution of the document Exhibit B-deposition, possession and enjoyment of Lot
1048 were immediately transferred to Marciano A. Roxas but the possession and enjoyment of Lot 833,
although given as security by Florencio Galindo, remained in the latter. On May 23, 1931, Urbano Galindo,
who was a minor at the time of the execution of the first document, executed an affidavit signifying his
conformity to the sale executed by his brother and sisters. Since Marciano A. Roxas took possession of Lot
1048 he had been religiously paying the installments due to the government (Exhibits G, G-1 to G-10).
While the receipts for payment of the installments due to the government were issued in the name of
Gregorio Galindo, yet the property had been declared for tax purposes in the name of Marciano A. Roxas
who paid the real estate taxes thereon during his lifetime. On February 13, 1948, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-2145 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the
name of the legal heirs of Gregorio Galindo. This, on account of the fact that the sale of the right of
Gregorio Galindo made by his heirs in favor of Marciano A. Roxas was not registered with the Bureau of
Lands because of the minority of Urbano Galindo at the time.