36 ROYONG v OBLENA

FACTS:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape
case against the latter.
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to
have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident
because Oblena threatened to kill her family.
As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong
had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently
removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong
before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a
sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the
incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and
deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a
person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous
relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also
has a legal husband in the province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged
are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the
court overruled his petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used
his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any
criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously
cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a
lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character
in his application to take the bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation
with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause
Oblenas disbarment
HELD:
YES!
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction
or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment
enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the
enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude
unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident
to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even

without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited

by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or
disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as a
ground of disbarment.
Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with
good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar
examination is wrong. Ones own approximation of himself is not a
gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what
the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having
carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his
taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed
moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust
on him.
Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from
the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law
requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same
offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is
that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied
by the evidence introduced in his investigation.

December 7, 1920
In re CARLOS S. BASA
Pedro Guevara for respondent.
Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and
the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of
Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by
the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of
the Supreme Court. 1
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is
whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpitude.
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.)
Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of
doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins
[1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185;
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by
the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal

law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are
willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a
career may not be utterly ruined.
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.

lawphi1.net

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for
the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar
in 1975) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused
to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted
in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino
Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970
at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the
Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the
San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when
Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentines Day party in the
following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner
one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and
Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on

vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena

why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse
with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and
that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that
even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very
much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started
telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur.
He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in
Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her
(Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant,
she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise
Magdalenas parents that they were married although they were not
really so. Segundino convinced Magdalenas father to have the church
wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage
license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he
expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalenas womb. He
reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed
the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth
to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital.
He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on
April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena
also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that
there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to
contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married
for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him
there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because
he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was brokenhearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She

reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station

and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers
and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he
repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that
promise because of Magdalenas shady past. She had allegedly been
accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate
child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his
opinion, respondents cohabitation with the complainant and his
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral
character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community (7
C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was
the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of
immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

There is an area where a lawyers conduct may not be inconsonance

with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary
action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude
is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyers behavior
to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly
immoral conduct, will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality
still prevailed, observed that the legislator well knows the frailty of the
flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor
and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone
with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An
occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying A fair booty
makes many a thief or An open door may tempt a saint has become
general. (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the
following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he
refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and
despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse;
he married another woman and during Virginias pregnancy, Lopez
urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he
tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree.
(Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that
they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila,
and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth
to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child (Toledo vs.
Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous
marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion
Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished
his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand

money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and

persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latters
discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a
member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual
congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to
have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get
married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry
her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28,
1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting
that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a
marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to
Josefina: You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world.
I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony. Through
thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine
you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life. (Mortel vs.
Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous
relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman
separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who
became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases.
This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil.
1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with
Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They
indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual,
tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to
impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between
the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever
in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a
consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she
filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondents refusal to marry the complainant

was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See
Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975,
62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January
29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs.
Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
106 SCRA 591 Legal Ethics Gross Immoral Conduct
In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship
with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a
sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then
went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy.
They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married
but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until
Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth
certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped
communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she
found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted
Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries
upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross
immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas
child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke
those promises because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga
had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different
from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases

therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was
provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it
is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

A.C. No. 561

April 27, 1967

IN RE: ATTY. ISIDRO P. VINZON, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.

Isidro P. Vinzon for and in his own behalf as respondent.
DIZON, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon of Cavite City referred to Us by
the Solicitor General on January 7, 1963 pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 02243-CR promulgated on October 1, 1962 affirming the one rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila convicting said respondent and his wife, Filomena D.
Vinzon, of the crime of estafa. The pertinent portion of the former reads as follows:
In an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, that spouses Isidro
P. Vinzon and Filomena B. Vinzon were charged with the crime of estafa for having
failed to deliver and for misappropriating the sum of P7,000.00 which represented a
portion of the total amount of P9,621.60 of U.S. Depositary check numbered 685891
belonging and payable to Felicidad M. Bagtas as unremarried widow of the deceased
veteran Maximino C. Bagtas. After the prosecution had rested its case the defense,
filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, which motion was however,
denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, the accused waive the right to present their
evidence and instead submitted the case for decision. Thus decision was rendered
below finding both accused guilty as charged and sentencing them, each to undergo
an indeterminate penalty of from 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor, to 1 year, 8
months and 21 days ofprison correccional with the accessory penalties; to indemnify
the offended party Felicidad M. Bagtas in the amount of P7,000.60, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and each to pay one-half of the costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. The attention of the Solicitor General
is invited to decision herein for the purpose of instituting disbarment proceedings
against the appellant Isidro P. Vinzon, who, it appears from the record, is a member
of the Philippine Bar.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The evidence on record reveals that Felicidad M. Bagtas was found to be mentally
incompetent, suffering from schizophrenic reaction, hebephrenic type, upon
examination by a psychiatrist of the U.S. Veterans Administration (U.S.V.A.) in the
course of the investigation conducted in connection with her application for benefits
as the unremarried widow of the late veteran Maximino C. Bagtas (Exh. E). In the
same application Felicidad M. Bagtas was assisted by the herein appellant Atty.
Isidro P. Vinzon, who on various occasions had asked her to thumbmark serial
papers in connection with the application. On April 22, 1955, the appellant above
named, as attorney for the widow Bagtas and through a letter which he had
thumbmarked by the latter, caused the alteration of the applicant widow's address on
record with the U.S.V.A., from San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, to 41 Interior, P.
Burgos St., Cavite City (Exh. A-2). Actually, Bagtas continued to reside in Paraaque,
the new recorded address was really that of the herein appellants.
Sometime in June, 1955 the appellant Filomena B. Vinzon fetched the widow Bagtas
and her mother, Susana Osio, together with one Juliet Oliva, from their abode in

Paraaque and brought them to the appellants' residence in Cavite where they were
supposed to meet an investigator of the U.S.V.A. While there, Osio and Bagtas were
asked to sign several papers, the contents of which they did not know, but which the
appellants said were in connection with the widow's benefit claim. Then Osio and
Oliva were invited by, the appellant Isidro P. Vinzon to go to the municipal building,
leaving Bagtas in the company of Mrs. Vinzon. From their tour of the municipal
building, Osio and Oliva were brought by Isidro P. Vinzon to a restaurant before they
returned to the Vinzon residence. Upon their arrival thereat Osio and Oliva noticed
Felicidad Bagtas wiping ink from her thumb, and upon their inquiry, the widow
informed them that Mrs. Vinzon had asked her (Bagtas) to thumbprint several times.
Shortly thereafter, Bagtas and her companions went home, because the alleged,
investigator did not arrive.
Later in that same day Mrs. Vinzon reappeared at Paraaque, and told Osio that they
would proceed to Manila in order to "get the benefits as early as possible." So once
again, Osio and Bagtas went out with Mrs. Vinzon, and in front of the U.S.V.A.
building on the Escolta they met a man whom Osio and the widow took to be an
agent of the U.S.V.A. This man inquired of Mrs. Vinzon if Felicidad Bagtas was "the
one," and upon an affirmative answer the same person brought them to an eatery
where Osio was asked to sign something, after which the amount of P2,421.00 and
some centavos' were delivered to her. Upon Vinzon's suggestion Osio gave that
unnamed man P50.00, and when they were already at the bus terminal on their way
home, Osio gave Mrs. Vinzon another amount, making her total disbursement for
that afternoon P200.00.
In his answer filed on April 22, 1963, respondent alleges the following:
1. That he admits that there is a final decision of the Court of Appeals, a portion of
which is quoted in the letter of the Solicitor General dated Dec. 28, 1962;
2. That he, however denies, that a conviction for any crime per se is sufficient ground
following suspension or disbarment:
3. That while the decision of the Court of Appeals became final for lack of appeal to
the Supreme Court, it does not necessarily follow that the said conviction is
absolutely binding on this Hon. Supreme Court if upon hearing of the instant
proceedings, turns out to be not legal nor valid under the law and facts, for, in
parenthesis, we state that the records of the Hon. Supreme Court can attest to the
fact that there is quite a number of Court of Appeals decisions which have been
reversed for being illegal and contrary to law by the Supreme Court, which is the
highest Tribunal;
4. That the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and its stand on the legal
questions raised, are not in accordance with the doctrines cited in Appellant's Brief;
5. That the testimonies of prosecution witnesses viewed in their proper light do not
prove any estafa, for nowhere in their evidence to the effect that this respondent had
ever cashed the check in question, on the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution
simply pointed to an unknown person who delivered certain sum of money to the
offended party in the presence of the wife of respondent, and there is even no proof
that respondent and said unknown person knew each other at anytime before or after
the alleged delivery;

6. That it is respectfully submitted that respondent is innocent of the alleged estafa

for (1) there is no evidence that he ever received and cashed the US check involved;
(2) no evidence that he ever received the proceeds thereof; (3) no evidence that he
had any connivance or connection with the unknown person who according to
prosecution evidence was the one who gave a sum of money to offended party; (4)
and finally assuming that there was such a check and respondent received the
proceeds, in the absence of demand; estafa does not lie.
The case has set for hearing at 9:30 A.M. on June 21, 1963 but neither the Solicitor General
nor the respondent appeared notwithstanding notice served upon them. Consequently, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
The only point to be determined is whether upon conviction for the crime of estafa the
respondent may be disbarred.
In his answer to the petition for disbarment, respondent prayed that a proper hearing be
held, but this notwithstanding he failed to appear at the hearing scheduled to be held on
June 21, 1963. This amounts to a waiver of his right to be heard (Arellano Toledo, Adm.
Case No. 266, April 27, 1963).
1wph1.t

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question
that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral
turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In
re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt can not now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable.
Wherefore, respondent Isidro P. Vinzon is hereby disbarred.

Legal Ethics: Good Moral Character

CARMEN E. BACARRO, Complainant,
vs.
RUBEN M. PINATACAN, Respondent.

Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Legal Ethics: Good Moral Character
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral
turpitude and immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named
Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of respondent's betrayal,
her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and,
that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of
the Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even admitting
the truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their
relationship with each other, does not justify him for disqualification to
the practice of law.
Issue:
WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a
case involving his good moral character
Holding:
Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that
respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's
child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken
to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized
the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over
a new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and
continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his
compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
Ratio:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar
is that the applicant must be of good moral character. This requirement
aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity
of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who
are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a
man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his fellow citizens not
only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. Thus,
becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and
passing the Bar examinations.

VILLASANTA

April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,

vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.
Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.
PARAS, C. J.:
G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated from a
criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the
respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent
was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The
appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from
being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of
Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with
him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake
marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951.
A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed
by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two
witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and
wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and
on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of
said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because
of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned
to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered
that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the
criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court..
Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral
turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making
love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is
hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
Facts:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo,
the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court
received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a
examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and recorrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the
Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or
re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or rechecked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has
the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.
Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of
Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects
namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical
Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar
Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one
subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which
he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including
that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his
declaration of assets and liabilities.
Issue:
WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang
passed the Bar? YES
Held:
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before

the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five

(5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers
of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the
appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice
of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and
the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.

A.C. No. 244

March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao
was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination
in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required prelegal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of
the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year
high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now,
asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he
was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests,
because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under
oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

CANON 7by Roseanne De Jesus

LEDA v. ATTY. TABANG
(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)FACTS:
Evangeline Leda (complainant) challenges Atty. Trebonian Tabangs (respondent) good
moral character in two complaints she filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No.
78instituted on January 6, 1982 and the case at hand. It appears that complainant and
respondent contracted a marriage in Tigbauan, Iloilo on October 3, 1976 under as one of the
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The parties agreed to keep their
marriage a secret until respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar
examinations. Complainant admits that they have not lived together as husband and wife.
After respondents law studies and bar examinations, complainant blocked his oath-taking
(by instituting Bar Matter No. 78)claiming that respondent had acted fraudulently when he
filled out his application declaring he was single and is thus unworthy to take the lawyers
Oath for lack of good moral character.
Respondent filed his explanation claiming that he was legally married to complainant but
the marriage was not yet made and declared public so that he may finish his studies as well
as take the bar exams and he therefore believed that he was still single. Respondent also
alleged that he and the complainant has reconciled and prayed that the case be dismissed
(on the ground that complainant confirmed with his explanation as evidence by the affidavit

of desistance made by complainant) which was granted by the Court on August 20, 1982.
However, on February 14, 1983, complainant filed an Administrative case and prayed for
respondents disbarment on the grounds that: Respondent used his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage; he mirepresented himself in his application to take the bar
exam; lack of good moral character; and that complainant was deceived into signing the
affidavit of desistance and that the only reason why he reconciled with her is so that she
would withdraw the complaint against him. Complainant also claimed that respondent sent
her a letter which proves all of her allegations where the respondent states that their
marriage was actually void form the beginning. Respondent denied that he had sent such
letter. On March 26, 1984, the Bar Confidants report recommended indefinite suspension of
respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Trebonian Tabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The court held that Atty. Trebonia nTabangis guilty of violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is thus suspended from the practice of law until further
notice.The Court held that respondents declaration in his application for Admission to the
1981Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact
made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7,
Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been
known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and

as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was
not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to

the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and
of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant
has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as

counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the
moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and
for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private
and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy
applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like
the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the

due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having
had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid
in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is
more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling
a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless
it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any
evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission
to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that
entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission
to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath
of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student
to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

Footnotes
1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of permission
to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of this Court
dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof:

"The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following

candidates with dismissed charges or complaints, to take the
1993 Bar Examinations:

xxx xxx xxx

3349. Al C. Argosino

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then
paroled.

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI,

Complainant
, vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES,
Respondent
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979.
Facts:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon
City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S.
Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of
moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before
Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested
by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the CityJ udges.
Issue:

Whether or not respondents acts constitute grounds for dismissal from

the service.
Held:
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A.
Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated that I am a person
of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative,
criminal or police record. This claim is not true because the respondent
had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April28, 1967.
This prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious
disciplinary action. That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212
which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits having
acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal
advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of
law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such
persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to
examinations lawfully established in the practice of law. The
respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of
others as reflected in his letter to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then
Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which contains
defamatory and uncalled for language.es virtual law library The
handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending
in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the
complainant, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in
the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. Respondent, Diosdado
S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City
Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and
with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments,
as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including
government owned or controlled corporations.