Conflict of Interest: An Axiomatic Approach

Author(s): Robert Axelrod

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 1, Law and Conflict Resolution (Mar.,
1967), pp. 87-99
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/172933 .
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aConflict
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of
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the
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92
CONFLICT
parallel
properties
bargaining
uses
contained
such
outcomes.
The
sure
conflict
The
social
Figure
feasible
The
punch
to
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exists
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welfare
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Stated
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CONFLICT
impossibility
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point
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ain
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athe
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unique
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bargaining
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unit
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solution
certain
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area
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individual
ROBERT
games
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allowing
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outcomes,
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VOLUME

XI

N 'U 1VI]3 E

CONFLICT
promise,
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utility
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gion
--concession
The
SITUATIONS
CONFLICT
between
area
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exercise
the
limited
need
game
which
situation.
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measure
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and
of
Ademands
In
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volume
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on
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lines
size
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94
area
Conflict
Prisoner's
bargaining
ment
ticular
ing
to
matrix
listed
CONFLICT
that
measure
game,
tion
defection
choose,
less
offs
better
DILEMMA
The
ahas
games.
shown
(10,-10)
3.
are
with
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matrix
four
most
NATURE
of
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two
so
a(a)
more
area
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Prisoner's
Figure
However,
other
strategies,
chooses
outcomes
Example
of
famous
game
(o)
Dilemma
shown
In
people
RESOLUTION
other
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situation
been
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cooperative
readily
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deciding
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applied
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the
rather
note
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Games
row
Without
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generalized
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arequired
cooperation
definition
interest
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appropriate
chooser's
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conflict
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Dilemma.
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region
make
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and
notation
game
Dilemma
5,
CONFLICT
both
cooperating.
T.
here
cooperation
The
were
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Schanged
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values
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inequalities
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sample
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to
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CONFLICT
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measured
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dilemma
Prisoner's
well
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outcomes,
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Examples
same
pose
example
Rapoport
the
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since
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(-10)]
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96
CONFLICT
value
less
V
Taking
ma
decreases
meters.
parameter
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This
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RESOLUTION
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define
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Table
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54
73
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three-person
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porates
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16
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DEFECTION
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NUMBER
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er's
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behavior,
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%
RAPOPORT,
2 vidual
and
ence,
tors
Dilemma
tion,
129-52.
been
Rank
D
amount
the
Dilemma,
suggested
as
Competition,"
an
to
Decisions.
LESTER.
R.
V
Affecting
9,
conflict
10
.59
1.33
by
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an
.93
Prisoner's
generalized
Values.
Conflict
.99
will
.86
be
STUART,
axiomatic
1DUNCAN,
the
MORTON.
bargaining
that
of
3(1965),
Game,"
variable
the
explanatory
Value
more
superior
(Sept.
2.10
F.
2.07
goals
measure
"Factors
follow.
and
the
axiomatic
by
REFERENCES
"The
18
likely
such
of
Cooperation
V"A
1965),
Human
(1950),
Dilemma,"
greater
interest
VIII
approach
Rank
Social
DANIEL
to
York:
Bargaining
"Some
York:
to
conflict
24
Theory
games.
Affecting
ROBERT
hypothesis
its
formal
apply
Relations,
variable
indices
358-74.
conflict
approach
predicting
48
or
24
is
48
32
Wiley,
Choice
the
Wiley,
has
own
Behavioral
Conflict
that
amore
This
to
is
VII-VIII
approaches.
unique
aconflict
been
Cooperation
COoperation
which
right.
Problem,"
of
Prisoner's
important
Rank
and
21951.
has
actors.
measure
interest
Prison(1949),
develResoluactual
Games
"Facas
Indibeen
have
SciBy
a

AXELROD
TABLE

PRISONER'S

AND--4 IN T}n~-PERsON

CONFLICT,

DrLEMMA
EXPERINIENT

BY

Er AL. (1962)
RAPOPORT
-4
Value

-1
-1

I
I
I

13
12

15

I
II
III
IV

-2
-4
-4

-4

Value

1.53

-6

all six

I
IV-VI
II-III

II-III
32,
IV-VI
VII-VIII
IV-VI

of two

patibility

P,

of
of

VI
IV
VII

VI
VII-VIII
VII-VIII

-1

16

I
III
II

of

of-i
in

of
fact

the

mea-

P has
of
for

of
all. If for

not

the

for
the

for
the

of
conflicfful

of
it
In
of

two-person
would
to
would

of
but

less
of

the three-person

of
in

and

Atmow, KENNETH
J.
New
DEUTSCH,

of

it

of

two
in
of conin
of

LAVE,
in
26-38.
and HowAm~RAIFFA.
1957.
New

LucE,

of
justiof
of

NASH, JOHN
Econometrica,
OSKA~P,

155-62.
and

PERLMAN.
in

Journalof
ANATOL.

VOLU1M[E

XI

Self-Organizing

CONFLICT
equivalent
bargaining
maximum
must
in
that,
dependence,
sures
same
0equivalent
(1,Parameters
Dilemma.
in
The
"Three-Person
Game,"
STERN.
Systems,
Games:
sity
2.
Theorem.
1.
by
bargaining
only
have
value.
1)
Michigan
By
NEUMANN,
Response
where
Now
-proof
,Press,
and
equivalent
1,
Cambridge,
conflict.
any
measure
A
conflict
straight
A
Princeton,
consider
Behavioral
games,
5normalized
satisfy
Ann
The
Review,"
(1,
Then
will
in
given
(1960),
continuity,
Press,
games
to
APPENDIX
isby
Arbor,
measure
212-20.
INTEREST:
aan
Go
line
proceed
bargaining
By
Class
E.,
proposed
Mass.'
integer.
will
M.
Conflict
129-43.
has
Behavioral
Science,
game
game
between
preceding
satisfies
Michigan:
and
and
minimum
game
be
(0,
thus
by
and
properties
whose
Princeton
conflict
Harvard
Groups,"
Strategy
Race
represented
Resolution,
1game,
demonstrating
the
7AXIOMATIC
"Experimental
)Economic
symmetry,
this
sentence
/negotiation
Science,
convexity
Differences
University
conflict
(JOHN
Prisoner's
--this
1,
Univergive
paper
General
Univerinterest
(0,
points
0)mea9,
game
and
BeAlso
inhas
by
isby
7APPROACH
be
mated
must
metric.
by
w.
so
series
game
The
set
tion
to
normalized
5,
times,
uniquely
tiation
step
amount
in
= 9.
4.
8.
5.
3.
6.
7.
The
the
so
The
the
algebra.
times
latter
game
the
process
includes
the
sets
6,
times
Irrational
(0,
Now
have
Any
For
the
Now
A
conflict
by
demonstration
limit
reader.
n
conflict
extension
reasoning
conflicts
each
conflict
the
game
By
are
games
the
are
determined
the
step
in
former
normalized
ax--1.
conflict
consider
form
the
is
game
conflict
step
times
normalized
described
integers,
determined.
satisfies
normalized
conflict
straight
game
Therefore
conflict
a7.
conflict
Using
same
straight
can
has
these
thus
smooth
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numbers
has
Consider
(0,
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such
conflicts
shows
the
w),
the
be
such
its
conflict
step
this
conflict
that
by
amount
1line
equivalent
the
games
game
devised
any
game
)ith
form
curve
kinked
since
continuity
conflict
that
game,
form,
the
ith
are
is
There
astep
/4,
games
five
game
means
use
the
segments.
the
a(game
bargaining
(0,
game
whose
where
game
five
this
line
series
the
segments
the
can
properties
measure
general
and
H,
isbe
whose
(by
conflict
is
)/(
properties.
determined
Therefore
-must
conflict
be
kinked
segment
awhose
negotiation
easy
be
the
any
By
then
1,
unique
conflict
step
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1)/(1,0)
1approxiintercept
)/(
negotiahave
form
continubargainproposed
(m/n).
conflict
game
between
)/(
to
then
by
is
games,
where
negodetergames
as
given
1,
3)
symwith
hanmust
step
left
(1(0,
the
99
By
in
is
0).
isa

OF
Three-Person
and ALBgaT
of
~,
Games,"

C(Gx)--(1/n)(%-0)

CHa_~AH.

1965.
GYa.
JoHN DwYEa, and
Non-Zero-SumNonnegotiable
(1962), 38-

58.
and CarOL OaWaNT.

(1902),1--37.
EDwa~ro
KAlaMAltCELLIg
DUSH."Age, Sex,
and
Two-Person,Non-Zero-Sum
2
Journal of
(June 1965),
SCHELLINC,
Tao~as C. The
of Conflict.
1960.
OSKaa MORGENJOHN,
VON
Theory of Games
hay/or.
N.J.:
1947.
SA2VIPSON,

of
which

boundedness,
reducibility.
Proof.
set is the
(x~,
y~)
(x~, 1)/( y~).
the five

(l/n)[

1- l/n),
1
must
%
also
dle. If
game is (0,1)/(1,1-w),
of
of the
lim (m,/n,)-1)/(1,1-m,/m)
of
%(m,/n!), and
of
is just %1im(m,/n,)- %w.
of
(1-w,
of
conflictis
1)/(1, I
4,
the
%w.
the
(xs,
ys).
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in
of
1,
y~)
(xs,
%( 1- xs)
%( 1- x~)( 1- y~).

two

~ C(G,)-C(G,-~)l

the

of H

by

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ity,
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and
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of the
of the

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of
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the paper
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ing
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the
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of
reducibility and
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1)/
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conflict
has
of
reducibility and
boundedhess. C(G1)- C(Gt_s) C(Gs)C(Go) -- C(Gs)
equivalent reducibility.
C(C~)

of

of

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for
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k
line
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the
(x,, y,) and (x~+~, y,+~), let a,
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a0--1.
(x,,1)/[1,1-(a~_~-a,)]
of
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%(1reducibiity k
xi)(a~_~-a~).

of
in

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%(l/n).
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8.