Kaya nalugi manila rail road company eh haha

1. PNCC vs. C.A., GR No. 159270, Aug. 22, 2005-Test to determine the existence
of negligence

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.[35]
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway
were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground.[36] The highway was
still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes.[37] The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or
in the wee hours of the morning.
PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps,
and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive
negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagans injuries.
Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint
tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the New Civil Code.
May mga bagay tlga na akala mo okay n pero di p pla. Marerealize mo lng pg
nasaktan ka na.

2. Mandarin Villa Inn vs. C.A., 257 SCRA 538,543 Test to determine the existence of
negligence
We note that Mandarin Villa Seafood Village is affiliated with BANKARD. In fact, an
"Agreement"i[6] entered into by petitioner and BANKARD dated June 23, 1989, provides inter
alia:
"The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cards presented by their
corresponding holders in the purchase of goods and/or services supplied by it provided that the
card expiration date has not elapsed and the card number does not appear on the latest
cancellation bulletin of lost, suspended and cancelled PCCCI credit cards and, no signs of
tampering, alterations or irregularities appear on the face of the credit card."ii[7]
While private respondent may not be a party to the said agreement, the above-quoted stipulation
conferred a favor upon the private respondent, a holder of credit card validly issued by

BANKARD. This stipulation is a stipulation pour autri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code
private respondent may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the
petitioner before its revocation.iii[8] In this case, private respondent's offer to pay by means of his
BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said stipulation but also an
explicit communication of his acceptance to the obligor.
We find this contention also devoid of merit. While it is true that private respondent did not have
sufficient cash on hand when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact alone does not
constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that the same was the proximate
cause of private respondent's damage. We take judicial noticeiv[16] of the current practice among
major establishments, petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of
cash.
Basta ka kasi nag assume, ayaw mo munang iconfirm
3.

Yamada vs. Mla Railroad Acts or omissions held negligently by the

Supreme Court

Under this assignment the appellant's main effort is being to the demonstration of
the fact that there was a custom established among automobile drivers of Manila by
which they habitually drove their cars over railroad crossings in the manner in which
the automobile was driven by defendant's servant on the occasion in controversy. To
prove that custom counsel presents the evidence of the president of the defendant
company, Mr. Bachrach, who testified on the trial that all of his drivers, including the
one in charge of the car on the night of the accident, operated cars in that manner
and that it was the custom among automobile drivers generally. Counsel also cites
the testimony of the witness Palido, living near the scene of the accident, who
testified that, as a general rule, automobiles passed over the railroad crossing
without changing speed. This testimony was corroborated by the defendant
company's driver who had the automobile in charge at the time of the occurrence.
Basing himself on this alleged custom counsel contends that "When a person does
what is usual and customary, i. e., proceeds as he and others engaged in a like
occupation have been accustomed to proceed, the action cannot be characterized
as reckless, nor, strictly speaking as negligent." To this the obvious reply may be
made, for the moment admitting the existence of the custom, that a practice which
is dangerous to human life cannot ripen into a custom which will protect anyone
who follows it. To go upon a railroad crossing without making any effort to ascertain
the approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so dangerous to life, that no
one may be permitted to excuse himself who does it, provided injury result. One
who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take
refuge behind the plea that others have performed the same act safely
Walang kasalanan sina yamada
With this contention we cannot agree. We think the better rule, and one more
consonant with the weight of authority, is that a person who hires a public
automobile and gives the driver direction as to the place to which he wishes to be
conveyed, but exercise no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for
injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the

negligence either of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver. (Little vs.
Hackett, 116 U.S., 366.) The theory on which the negligence of the driver has in
some instances been imputed to the occupant of the vehicle is that, having trusted
the driver by selecting the particular conveyance, the plaintiff so far identified
himself with the owner and his servants that, in case of injury resulting from their
negligence, he was considered a party thereto. This was the theory upon which the
case of Thorogood vs. Bryan (8 C.B., 115) was decided, which is the leading case in
favor of the principle contended for by appellant. The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, in Little vs. Hackett (116 U.S., 366), had this to say concerning the
ground on which the Thorogood case was decided: "The truth is, the decision in
Thorogood vs. Bryan rests upon indefensible ground. The identification of the
passenger with the negligent driver or the owner, without his personal cooperation
or encouragement, is a gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The parties
are not in the same position. The owner of public conveyance is a carrier, and the
driver or the servant of the passenger, an
Maingat ang tren
There is evidence in the record showing that the locomotive engineer gave due and
timely signals on approaching the crossing in question.
It is not negligence on the part of the railroad company to maintain grade crossing,
even in populous district; nor is it negligence not to maintain a flagman at such
crossing. It is true that a railroad company is held to greater caution in the more
thronged streets of the densely populated portions of the city than in the less
frequented streets in suburban parts or in towns; but this does not mean that it is
negligence to maintain grade crossing in such densely populated portions or that it
is negligence not to maintain a flagman at crossings located in such districts. It
simply means that the company in operating its trains over such crossings must
exercise care commensurate with the use of crossings in any given locality.
We, therefore, see that taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it
furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It
failed to comply with one of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in
this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of
proper rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and
instructions are necessary. To repeat, it was found by the trial court, and that finding
is fully sustained by the record, that it was the custom of the driver who operated
the machine on the night of the accident, to approach and pass over railroad
crossings without adequate precautions, and that such custom was known to and
had been sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab company, the president of the
company testifying that none of its drivers, especially the one who operated the car
on the night of the accident, were accustomed to stop or even reduce speed or take
any other precaution in approaching and passing over railroad crossings, no matter
of what nature, unless they heard "the signal of a car." He testified that he himself
had ridden behind several of his drivers, among them the one who handled the
automobile on the night of the accident, and that it was settled practice, to which
he made no objection and as to which he gave no instructions, to approach and
pass over railroad crossings without any effort to ascertain the proximity of a train.
These facts and circumstances bring the case within the doctrine enunciated in the
Litonjua case to which reference has already been made, and, at the same time,
remove it from that class of cases governed by Johnson vs. David. Not only has the
chanroblesv irtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual la

defendant taxicab company failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising

from the carelessness of its servant, but it has, in effect, made those negligent acts
its own by having observed and known the custom of its drivers without
disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed to supersede it.
chanroblesv irtualawlibrary

Ikaw nakasakit s iba mo isisisi

4. La Mallorca vs. De Jesus
Luma na

Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus
was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire
which exploded was not new petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo,"
or not so very worn out the plea of caso fortuito cannot be
entertained.1wph1.t
5. wright

Elecric Acts or omissions held negligently by the Supreme Court

GENERAL RULE
It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care
or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If
one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he
is drunk or sober.
HINDI NEGLIGENT
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is
not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen
from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only
the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing
and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be
sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that,
under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a
conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
2. SAMSON
In the present cause it has not been proved that the Magos Creek formed a part of the land and fish
pond of the defendants, and in spite of their denial that the said creek was located at the side of their
land and fish pond, the evidence furnished by the plaintiff clearly contradicts them and shows the
contrary, in an unquestionable manner, that is, that the Magos Creek existed in said locality and that
it was utilized by the public in general; that it was a passage for the public traveling in small craft to
and from the lands alongside the river; that fish passed in and out by it and that through the said
creek the waters coming from the adjoining estates during the rainy season flowed into the river until
it was closed by the appellants.
Hence, upon the theory already proven, that the creek in question was of public ownership, and not
the property of the defendants, it is clear that the latter had no right whatever to construct the said

dams, closing its entrance into and communication with the Bocaue River; and, inasmuch as they
did it without any authority and to the loss and prejudice of the plaintiff, they are under obligation to
indemnify the latter for reasons alleged by him in his complaint, in accordance with the provisions of
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
6. Rodriguez vs mnila railroad
Distinct

In this connection it will be observed that the right of action of each of these plaintiffs is totally
distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so much so that each might have sued separately,
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood upon this
ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no
proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of building
his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company, upon making this extension,
had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be
considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of
the defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed position, he
undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the
defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to
have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the
defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of
another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent
man. (Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182; 21 Am. Rep., 97.)
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that
occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that
Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore
in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have
made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory
negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not created by
himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore
with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be
improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. (Grand
Trunk Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs.
Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net
Di lahat ng sparks mgnda ung iba nakakasunog

7. Culion Ice Fish v Phil Motors Acts or omissions held negligently by the
Supreme Court
Ano daw

A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was
apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, with the result that when the fuel line
was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the
carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the
result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already
saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the
highly inflammable material near-by. Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be
followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the
carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this
nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact
that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
Wala siya experience
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar
work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and
the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of
fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently
warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against
the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the
part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a
sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
Pinagpapasawalang bahala ksi ntin mga maliliit n bagay kaya tyo nasasaktan
8. Corliss vs. Mla Railroad Acts or omissions held negligently by the Supreme Court

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo 12 and United
States v. Barias. 13 Cooley' formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias
decisions. Thus: "Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to
be: "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person
suffers injury." There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. 14 Thus:
"Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not

an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of
care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances."
The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the
crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still
was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili,
who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident. For one cannot just
single out circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance.
Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment
different in character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence
suffice to alter the result. The quantum of proof required still not been met. The alleged errors
fail of their said effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it had not been improved. There
is no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower court.
"A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and
who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same
almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a
collision occurs and injury results. Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for
the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a
railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad
crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably
prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track." The Mestres doctrine in a suit
arising from a collision between an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: "It
may be said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car is
approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust
himself to the exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the
motorman has a right to presume that such duty will be performed."
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action
of plaintiff-appellee must necessary fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion
that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.
9. Umali vs bacani Acts or omissions held negligently by the Supreme Court

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part
of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim
by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall
banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were
about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric
line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered

by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of
the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May
14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life
and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an
act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been
cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident
because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the
foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he
should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the
live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind
was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger
life and property.
Di sapat negligence ng parents
10. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in
this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to
all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that
the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order
being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
This conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given such an act of
contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to be
taken only in reduction of damages?
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the
event giving occasion for damages that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of
place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where
he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover

the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage
incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we
deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his negligence
Minsan ksi parehas kayong may kasalanan kaya di mgwork out

3 TENCHAVEZ
PEDE DAMAGES FOR NOT PERFORMING WIFEY DUTIES
It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our
law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
WALA KASALNAN PARENTS
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife,
the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of

strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to
his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has
been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
4. barredo
Pede mgcivil khit may criminal na
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides
when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.

ITO TLGA HAHA

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state

of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

6. yu
Expert testimony was also introduced by the plaintiff to the effect that it is but natural that, after
several transhipments of more than 8,000 cases of gasoline and 2,000 cases of petroleum there is
bound to be a leakage, on an average of 1 to 4 cases per hundred, due to the fact that the loading is
effected by means of straps supporting from 10 to 12 cases at a time which, quite frequently, receive
violent bumps resulting in damage to the cans and the consequent leakage of either gasoline or
petroleum, as the case may be.
LIABILITY ANG OWNER
In American law, principles similar to those in force in the Philippines and contained in the Code of
Commerce above cited, are prevailing:
Vessel owner's liability in general. The general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses
by fire arising from other than a natural or other excepted cause, whether occurring on the
ship accidentally, or communicated from another vessel, or from the shore; and the fact that
fire produces the motive power of a boat does not affect the case. Such losses are not within
the exceptions either of act of God, or peril of the sea, except by local custom, unless
proximately caused by one of these events. In jurisdictions where the civil law obtains,
however, it has been held that if property on a steamboat is destroyed by fire, the owners of
the boat are not responsible, if it was being navigated with proper diligence, although the
accident occurred at night. The common law liability extends even to loss by fires caused
entirely by spontaneous combustion of the cargo, without any negligence on the part of
master or crew. (R.C.L., vol. 24, pp. 1324-1325.)
7. lilius
Guily ung tren
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person
liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary
that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, contributed to the accident, inasmuch as
nobody is a guarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and property, but everybody should look after
them, employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family should apply to his own
person, to the members of his family and to his property, in order to avoid any damage. It appears

that the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence
of his wife and child suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might be enjoyable and have a
happy ending, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances
and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn
upon seeing persons on the road, in order to warn them of his approach and request them to get out
of the way, as he did when he came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the road seven or
eight meters from the place where the accident occurred, and upon the persons who appeared to
have alighted from the said truck. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing,
in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it
was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the
crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing about it
beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the impending danger, was two short
blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the accident
had already become inevitable.
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties presented at
the trial in support of their respective contentions, and after taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the
part of the defendant-appellant company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the
crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take
the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees the
flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn
passers-by of the approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and
switchman to his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions to
avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed
and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. Although it
is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work
and the discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the
crossing and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and switchman
would have always been at his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a
good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the
careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the defendant the Manila
Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence and that of its
employees, for not having employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
the said employees in the discharge of their duties.
Ung wife mganda
Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the plaintiff Aleko E.
Lilius is in the language of the court, which saw her at the trial "young and beautiful and the big
scar, which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the
accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity
which renders it very difficult for her to walk", and taking into further consideration her social
standing, neither is the sum of P10,000, adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way of indemnity
for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. In the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez(56 Phil., 177),

the right leg of the plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez was fractured as a result of a collision between the
autobus in which he was riding and the defendant's car, which fractured required medical attendance
for a considerable period of time. On the day of the trial the fracture had not yet completely healed
but it might cause him permanent lameness. The trial court sentenced the defendants to indemnify
him in the sum of P10,000 which this court reduced to P5,000, in spite of the fact that the said
plaintiff therein was neither young nor good-looking, nor had he suffered any facial deformity, nor did
he have the social standing that the herein plaintiff-appellant Sonja Maria Lilius enjoys.
1vvphi1.ne+

8. Ortaliz
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."

cralaw virtua1aw library

and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable."

cralaw virtua1aw library

Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and those of Article 2176 to the effect that "Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done", there seems to be good reason to support plaintiffs contention that the complaint in question states
sufficient cause of action. Defendant-appellee, however, claims that there is no allegation in the complaint
that "the defendant was engaged in some kind of industry and that the employee had committed the crime
in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry," hence the defendant cannot be held
subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his driver and therefore the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. But paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for it clearly
provides that "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
9. Marquez

This fact decides the question because it clearly shows that the accident did not occur in the course
of the performance of the duties or service for which said chauffeur Mariano Capulong had been
hired. The defendant did not hire him to do as he pleased, using the defendant's car as if it were his
own. His duties and service were confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him, and
the accident did not take place under said circumstances. The subsidiary civil liability of the master,
according to the provisions of article 103 of said Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only
when the servant, subordinate or employee commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual
performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him incapable
of satisfying by himself his own civil liability.
The general rule regarding the obligation to repair the damage done, besides the one established in
article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is that he, who by an act or omission causes the damage
through his fault or negligence, is the one called upon to repair the same (art. 1902, Civil Code). This
rule, which extends only to cases mentioned in articles 1903 to 1910 of said Code, is in no way
applicable to the appellant, all the more so because, as the lower court makes clear in its decision,
neither was he in his car at the time of the accident for which Mariano Capulong was sentenced to
pay an indemnity of P500 to the heirs of the deceased Marquez, nor was he negligent in the
selection of his chauffeur, since he hired in his service precisely one who is duly licensed to drive a
car.

10 bahia

It is a fact proved in the action and undisputed that, although the mother purchased the automobile,
she turned it over to the garage of her son for use therein. The establishment belonged to the son,
Ramon Ramirez, and he had the full management and control of it and received all the profits
therefrom. So far as appears, the contract with Leynes was made without her knowledge or consent
by Ramirez as the owner and manager of the International Garage. While she may have been in one
sense the owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other facts of the case, make her
responsible for the results of the accident.
Hindi siya negligent
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of a law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employees shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable peculiarly of the Spanish law negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is
conclusively the negligence of the master.
In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the automobile
immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligent in selecting a defective automobile or
in his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection, and the burden of proof was on him to
show that he had exercised the care of a good father of a family. As to selection, the defendant has
clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen
were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their
particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few
hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear. From the
commencement of the use of the machine until the accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed
to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and
supervision. While it does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for the
guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions, designed for the protection of the public
and the passengers, the evidence shows, as we have seen, that the death of the child was not
caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the machine as
to which the defendant has shown himself free from responsibility.
The defendant Leynes having shown to the satisfaction of the court that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family is relieved of responsibility with respect to the death of plaintiff's
child.

11 ong

No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all of
them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were

proper safety measures and precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools.
Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper defense in this case. Further,
the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the statements
they have given to the investigators when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into
the water when he was called about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is of no application here. It was not established as to
how Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one
saw him returned not until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last
clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from
going to the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at
least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury.
12 cangco

: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot
of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of
young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the
effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we
find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford
to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place,
as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part
of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the
placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

13vasquez

No. Vasquez is not party to the contract as it was NVSD which De Borja contracted with. It
is well known that a corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality of its
own, separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of its officers who
manage and run its affairs. The mere fact that its personality is owing to a legal fiction and
that it necessarily has to act thru its agents, does not make the latter personally liable on a
contract duly entered into, or for an act lawfully performed, by them for an in its behalf.
The fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was guilty of negligence
in the fulfillment of the contract did not make Vazquez principally or even subsidiarily liable
for such negligence. Since it was the corporations contract, its non fulfillment, whether due
to negligence or fault or to any other cause, made the corporation and not its agent liable.

The fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was guilty of negligence in the
fulfillment of the contract, did not make Vazquez principally or even subsidiarily liable for such
negligence. Since it was the corporation's contract, its nonfulfillment, whether due to negligence or
fault or to any other cause, made the corporation and not its agent liable.
On the other hand if independently of the contract Vazquez by his fault or negligence cause
damaged to the plaintiff, he would be liable to the latter under article 1902 of the Civil Code. But then
the plaintiff's cause of action should be based on culpa aquiliana and not on the contract alleged in
his complaint herein; and Vazquez' liability would be principal and not merely subsidiary, as the
Court of Appeals has erroneously held. No such cause of action was alleged in the complaint or tried
by express or implied consent of the parties by virtue of section 4 of Rule 17. Hence the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the issue and could not adjudicate upon it (Reyes vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754.)

Consequently it was error for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to try and
decide such issue.

14delsan
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in
deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as
12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan[19] that a typhoon was going to hit Manila[20] after 8 hours.[21] This, notwithstanding, he did
nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the
North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be
rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the
transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that
determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate
and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the
typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours
thinking that the typhoon might change direction.[22] He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to
rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of
the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did
not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy[23] and
there was no weather disturbance yet.[24]
Solidarily liable

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasidelict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his

employee.
[28]

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V

Delsan Express, is also the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the
incident acted within the scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner
was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep because the
latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not
only to the selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough
that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the
employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its
employees.
, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance
of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance
therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be held liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
15 mmtc

The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of
their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers directly,
regardless of the solvency of their employees. [13] The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability
has been adumbrated thus:

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy,
a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as
a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employers enterprise, are
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed
upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis
of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and
sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should
bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them,
through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to
society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an
employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to
see that the enterprise is conducted safely.[14]
Managers

Finally, the spouses Rosales argue that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Conrado
Tolentino, Feliciana Celebrado, and the GSIS of liability. The spouses Rosales alleged that
Tolentino, as Acting General Manager of the MMTC, and Celebrado, as a dispatcher thereof,
were charged with the supervision of Musa and should, therefore, be held vicariously liable
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. With respect to the GSIS, they contend that it was the insurer
in a contract for third party liability it had with the MMTC.
Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions managers among those made
responsible for the negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the said provision
in the sense of employers.[55] Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held liable for the tort of
Pedro Musa
Kulang proof ng diligence

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires
that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that matter,
inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere generalities,
we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that
there was observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.Petitioners attempt to prove
its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary,
which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.
18 deguia
On the whole, we are of the opinion that the finding of negligence in the operation of the car must be
sustained, as not being clearly contrary to the evidence; not so much because of excessive speed
as because of the distance which the car was allowed to run with the front wheels of the rear truck
derailed. It seems to us than an experienced and attentive motorman should have discovered that
something was wrong and would have stopped before he had driven the car over the entire distance
from the point where the wheels left the track to the place where the post was struck.
The conclusion being accepted that there was negligence on the part of the motorman in driving the
car, it results that the company is liable for the damage resulting to the plaintiff as a consequence of
that negligence. The plaintiff had boarded the car as a passenger for the city of Manila and the
company undertook to convey him for hire. The relation between the parties was, therefore, of a
contractual nature, and the duty of the carrier is to be determined with reference to the principles of
contract law, that is, the company was bound to convey and deliver the plaintiff safely and securely
with reference to the degree of care which, under the circumstances, is required by law and custom
applicable to the case (art. 1258, Civil Code). Upon failure to comply with that obligation the
company incurred the liability defined in articles 1103-1107 of the Civil Code. (Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 38 Phil. Rep., 768; Manila Railroad Company vs. Compaia Transatlantica, and
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil. Rep., 875.)

From the nature of the liability thus incurred, it is clear that the defendant company can not avail
itself of the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, since that provision has reference to
liability incurred by negligence in the absence of contractual relation, that is, to the culpa aquiliana of
the civil law. It was therefore irrelevant for the defendant company to prove, as it did, that the
company had exercised due care in the selection and instruction of the motorman who was in
charge of its car and that he was in fact an experienced and reliable servant.
At this point, however, it should be observed that although in case like this the defendant must
answer for the consequences of the negligence of its employee, the court has the power to
moderate liability according to the circumstances of the case (art. 1103, Civ. Code):

19 del prado
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the
plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature
acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty. The duty that the
carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as
well as to those alighting therefrom.
1. Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a
breach of positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself,
under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, by providing that
he had exercised due degligence to prevent the damage;
2. whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from
a breach of contrauctual duty (culpa contractual).
It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving
car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the
injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A
person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from
boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held
to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his
peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the
platform. Only mitigate damages
20brito
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reason of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers to safety as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, under these provisions of law, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant appellant in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages
sought for by the plaintiff, for the action initiated therefor is based on a contract of carriage and not
on tort. When plaintiff rode on defendant-appellant's taxicab, the latter assumed the express
obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, supra). This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved, and it was therefore incumbent upon the carrier to
prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
new Civil Code. It is noteworthy, however, that at the hearing in the lower court defendant-appellant
failed to appear and has not presented any evidence at all to overcome and overwhelm the
presumption of negligence imposed upon it by law; hence, there was no need for the lower court to
make an express finding thereon in view of the provisions of the aforequoted Article 1756 of the new
Civil Code.

21 belizar

It is apparent from the records that although the Government is the

one operating the ferry boat, from which plaintiffs truck fell,
because of the absence of safety devices, the plaintiff has elected to
sue the defendant employees personally for their negligent acts
under the doctrine of quasi-delict. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides for the liability of an employer for the tortuous acts of his
employees. This, however, does not exempt the employees from
personal liability, especially if there are no persons having direct
supervision over them, or if there is proof of the existence of
negligence on their part. So the injured party can bring an action
directly against the author of the negligent act or omission,
although he may sue as joint defendants such author and the
person responsible for him (7 Salvat 80, quoted in V Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1959 edition, p. 520). The provisions of Article 1733 of
the Civil Code and the decision in the case of the Manila Railroad
Co. vs. La Compania Trasatlantica and Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 38
Phil. 875, cited in the order appealed from refer to an order based
upon a contract of transportation. The present action being based
on torts, said authorities are not applicable thereto.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble s virtual la

2222

22 mendoza

No. Civil action based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the civil action based on Article
103 of the RPC are two independent and separate actions based on distinct causes of
actions therefore res judicata can not lie. Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes an employer
primarily and directly liable for reason of his own negligence, either in the selection or
supervision of his driver. Article 103 of the RPC makes an employer subsidiarily liable for
damages caused by his negligent employee who is convicted from a previous criminal suit.
In other words, Article 2180 of the CC is predicated upon the employers own negligence
while Article 103 of the RPC is predicated upon the a crime committed by an employee of
the employer.
23 cuadra
No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The
basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed
from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference
that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her
and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision
of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

24 mercado
Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody", applies to an institution of arts and traders and not to any academic institution and
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction
and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence
over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher, and so
would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
25 cadano

It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the
acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there

is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability,
for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which
provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal
Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from
some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art.
2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment.

26 merrit
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State
can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government
officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or

agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

27 palafox
NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligentacts of its
employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case,
the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a
governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act.
However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no
duty to pay monetary consideration.(Palafox v. Province of Ilocos
Norte, 102 Phil 1186)
28 repulic

It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, created to promote a specific economic policy of said government, but also that its
activity (of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit or
financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being collected on the balance of the
unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not convert this economic project of the government into a
corporate activity. As previously pointed out, the installment payments and interests receivable from
the farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in furtherance of the operation
of the project.
A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial
complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus
arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its
special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's
regular duties (Merritt vs. Insular Government, supra; Rosete vs. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453).
There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State
nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
29 palisoc

No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde
Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and
Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and
severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their
duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or
other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light
of the factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability.
The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which
prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school

before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their
students.
30. Mercado vs. CA & Quisumbing 108 Phil 414 NAULIT ITO PAK GANERN

Nagapply din s academic

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical
in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads
of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde
where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of
arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils?
It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In
my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated version
of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of
Art. 1903 in someculpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not
the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

31afialda
No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker of
the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the
goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing

damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of
the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the
Workmens Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.

32equitable
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of
the parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to
be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by
Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over
the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin
Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled
that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary
liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is
directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being
considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle
does not use it for public service.
----------------The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can
be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

32 dingcong

Being Jose Dingcong joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top of the
house, you must answer for the damage caused by the things that were thrown or fell from it (article
1910 of the Civil Code).Francisco Echevarria was guest of the hotel and was directly, for his
carelessness, leaving open the faucet, let the water pipe drawing back on the ground and seeps into
the low, wetting the articles and goods of the plaintiffs.Jose Dingcong, on the other hand, do not
practice the diligence of a good father to prevent this damage, however, that knew they could
be caused by then be in repair pipes therefore it must assume that Echavarria could use the tap
does not provided of any container with drainage, and if you only put under it a basin that when
filled, caused the water to spread across the floor.
33 ferrer
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription.
The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused the injuries
sustained by plaintiff Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action
for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries
because of a tort must be filed within four years. 8 The four-year period begins from the day the quasidelict is committed or the date of the accident. 9

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