Persons and Family Relations

MARRIAGE:

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699

(1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials
obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
declaring
"the
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify anyone of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infedility. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or
her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

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EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to
Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the
former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his
last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996
when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months
after their meeting, the two got married through a civil
wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge
of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their
marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when he married
him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against
Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his
declaration of single in his marriage contract with
Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing
him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral
damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he
alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent.
The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification
on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years,
months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of
the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in
fact and in law.
HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner
is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general
rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone
is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite
period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus,

Persons and Family Relations

even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy
if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of
fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and
with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court
thus declares that the petitioners acts are against
public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Because the private
complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case,
the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.

Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on
January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up
developed secondary male characteristics and
eventually diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003,
respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in
her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was
discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years
old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or
menses. For al intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim,
respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent, is genetically female
but her body secretes male hormones, has two organs of
which the female part is undeveloped.
RTC granted respondents petition.
ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly
male person request for change of name and gender?

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE:
Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his
birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for
reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a
male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks
and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are
allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of
entry as of sex and first name through the intervention
of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil
Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law),
together with Article 412 of the same Code,
change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed
by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors
are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and
public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed
by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. Second, there will be major changes in
statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to
women.

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RULING: The Court ruled that the governing law with

respect to change of name and gender is RA 9048.
Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is
characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male
characteristics, although are genetically female. CAH
people also have ambiguous private parts, appearing
more male than female but have internal female
reproductive organs which may become undeveloped.
These individuals are commonly referred to as inters ex,
and respondent, having reached the age of
majority, and having decided to be male,
considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones is a preponderant biological
support for considering him male.
Republics petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is
affirmed.

Perido v.Perido,
63 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first
wife was Benita Talorong,. After Benita died Lucio
married
Marcelina
Baliguat.
The
children
and
grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido
executed
a
document
denominated
as
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"
The heirs from the first marriage opposed the
declaration of the CA that Lucios children in the 2 nd
marriage are his legitimate chiidren.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five
children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The
petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on
the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock
even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while
the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that
Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three

Persons and Family Relations

children were born, as testified to by petitioner
Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora
Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a
widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title
issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner
Leonora Perido.
Issue: Whether or not Lucio is actually married with his
2nd wife.
Held: Petition cannot be sustained.
This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of
review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no
legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the
birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated
in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the
Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was
not conclusive to show that he was not actually married
to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living
together husband and wife are married to each other.
This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the
issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only
by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1
this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure
is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage."
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err
in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

LOURDEZ RAMIREZ-CUADERNO V CUADERNO

12 SCRA 505

As a consequence of a complaint for support filed by

Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno on August 14, 1957, against
her husband Angel Cuaderno, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment
ordering the latter to give the plaintiff-wife a monthly
support of P150.00, from the date of the filing of the
complaint, plus attorney's fees, and to pay, the costs.
On appeal by the husband to the Court of Appeals, said
decision was reversed and set aside "so that (in the
language of the court) appellant and appellee may again
resume cohabitation which they are hereby admonished
to do as their duty as husband and wife." The wife filed
the instant petition for review of the aforesaid ruling of
the Court of Appeals.

P a g e | 3 of 6

It has been established that the couple were living

separately since November 17, 1956 when the husband,
after having inflicted bodily injuries on the wife in the
course of a quarrel between them, took her to her
mother's house where the latter stayed until the
institution of the claim for support. The wife claimed
maltreatment and abandonment by the husband as
basis therefor, whereas the husband, in resisting her
demand for maintenance, contended that it was she
who left the conjugal dwelling and, consequently, is not
entitled thereto.
The trial court, in granting the wife's demand, sustained
the theory that she was driven out of the dwelling or, at
least prevented from returning thereto by reason of
defendant's maltreatment. The Court of Appeals, on the
other hand, while adopting the findings of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court as to the husband's role in
the incident that led to the separation, and
notwithstanding the declaration by the husband during
the hearing that "all the trouble she (the wife) has given
me is enough for me to turn my back to her," set aside
the decision of the lower court, on the ground that it
believes that the conditions were such that cohabitation
between the spouses is not yet impossible. Thus, they
were admonished to live together as husband and wife.
We recognize the wisdom of the exhortation that in the
interest of society, and perhaps of the parties, courts
should move, with caution in providing separate
maintenance for the wife, a situation which would be an
acknowledgement of the de facto separation of the
spouses. However, it would be taking an unrealistic view
for us to compel or urge them to live together when, at
least for the present, they specially the husband are
speaking of impossibility of cohabitation.
For while marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation
or consortium, the sanction therefor is the spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent
characteristic and nature of marriage in this jurisdiction.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of
physical injuries on the wife, by the husband gave rise to
their separation. It is likewise shown it was the husband
who took his wife to her parents' home where he left her.
The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from
her husband and desisted from accepting any later,
because according to the latter, she was demanding for
more, only indicates that even before the filing of the
present case, the defendant-husband was already
providing something for the separate maintenance.
Considering that the wife has no income of her own,
while the husband has an employment, the sum of
P150.00 fixed by the trial court for the wife's monthly
support does not seem to be unreasonable. Needless to
state that, as the separation has been brought about by
the husband and under the circumstances established
during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different
situation between the parties shall take place.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is set aside and that of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court is hereby revived, without costs.

Wassmer vs. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

12 SCRA 648
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a
Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was
to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary
preparations were undertaken for the said event.

Persons and Family Relations

However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a
note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not
push through because his mother opposed the union.
The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he
will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up
and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently
sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered
Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment
and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that
the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision
in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of
promise to marry.
Issue: May
Francisco be
held
liable to
pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry?
Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21.

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to

marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding,
the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the
marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the
wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church. The
Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a
ceremony on the same day where the couple took each
other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This
was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack
of marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article
352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what
he did was an act of blessing and was not tantamount to
solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime
are: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself
admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged
"blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the
solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of
the Family Code provides that it shall be
necessary: (1) for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and (2) declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner
admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of
its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any
provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than
one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating
Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

MARRIAGE LICENSE:
RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
BRION, J.:
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Persons and Family Relations

LASANAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BERSAMIN, J.:

In Numerous Cases Of Bigamy, This Court Has

Consistently Held That A Judicial Declaration
Of Nullity Is Required Before A Valid
Subsequent Marriage Can Be Contracted; Or
Else, What Transpires Is A Bigamous
Marriage, Reprehensible And Immoral
The Facts:
Noel Lasanas (petitioner), and Socorro were married by
Judge Carlos Salazar in 1968, without the
benefit of a marriage license or an affidavit
of cohabitation.
They renewed their
marriage vows in a religious ceremony
before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo in Iloilo City, again
without attaching a marriage license or an
affidavit of cohabitation. They separated in
1982, however, due to irreconcilable
differences.
Noel then married Josefa
Esteban in a religious ceremony solemnised
by Fr. Ramon Sequito in Iloilo City. Noels
marriage status was indicated in the
marriage certificate as single. On July 26,
1996, Noel filed a complaint for annulment
of marriages and damages against Socorro,
alleging that the latter employed deceit,
misrepresentation and fraud in securing his
consent to their marriage. Soccoro then
filed a criminal case for bigamy against Noel,
and the corresponding information filed
against him. His complaint for declaration of
nullity was dismissed on November 24,
1998. Meanwhile, in the criminal case for
bigamy, Noel was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court as charged. He appealed to the
CA, but the latter affirmed the RTC
judgment. Thus, Noel filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. He argues that the first
element of bigamy was not duly proved, as
his marriage to Socorro was null and void for
lack of marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation; he acted in good faith; and had
the honest belief that there was no need for
a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage. He argues that the
RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the
provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, asserting that the civil law rule
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code
requiring a judicial declaration of nullity
before one could contract a subsequent
marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution; that even if Article 40
of the Family Code was applicable, he should
still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without
a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage,
as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article
52 of the Family Code; that, consequently,
an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid,
was lacking; and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability.
The Issue: Whether or not Noel should be held liable
for bigamy.
The Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:

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Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor

shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1)
that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he or she contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed
Decision is correct in all respect.2
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the
foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in
view of the absence of a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage between the accused
and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is
found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that
a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his earlier
marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes
a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioners case the complaint was filed
before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following
petitioners
argument,
even
assuming that a complaint has been
instituted, such as in this case, the offender
can still escape liability provided that a
decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in
court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent
upon the ability or inability of the Office of
the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations
in court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading
of the law is against its simple letter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.

Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria Goo-Abbas

Persons and Family Relations

GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Facts:
This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence
of marriage license, as provided for in Article
4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9,
1992. When they arrived in the Philippines
on December 1992, a ceremony was
conducted between them solemnized by
Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of
Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria
signed a document. Syed claim that he did
not know the nature of the ceremony until
Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated
that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR
being issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria
is valid.
Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was
solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family
Code is the applicable law, particularly
Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage.
Article 4 provides the effects of the absence
of the essential and formal requisites. And
Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those
marriages which are solemnized without a
license are void from the beginning in
exception to those covered by the preceding
chapter

against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since

Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct ans suspended him for one year
without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming
that his story is impossible. RTC cited Article 87 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is
valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in
lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of
the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an
action
for
nullity
of
marriage
is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does
not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy

relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the
said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

Republic v. Dayot

G.R. No. 175581/179474, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to
live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his
landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her
to the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a package sent
to her by her brother from Saudi. There, a man bearing
three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. He signed the
papers and gave them to the man. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she
said she does not know of such. Jose claimed that their
marriage was contracted with fraud. Felisa denied Joses
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
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CONSENT:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588. On December 6, 2006, Albios
filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying

Persons and Family Relations

with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio. She stated that in
consideration of $2,000.00, Fringer will help her process
her application for American citizenship.
The RTC ruled that their marriage is one entered into in
jest and therefore void. On appeal by the OSG, the CA
affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether a marriage contracted into by two
individuals for the sole purpose of acquiring Amercian
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent.
Held: The marriage is valid.
Under said Article 2 (of the Family Code), for consent to
be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given"
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

AUTHORITY OF THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER:

EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY

Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M.No.

MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. He submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which exhibit his gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First was on September 27, 1994 when respondent
judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom
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Persons and Family Relations

is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy
claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit sworn
before another judge, attesting that Tagadans wife has
been absent for seven years. Second, it is alleged that
he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
asserted that he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether
jurisdiction.

or

not

Domagtoy

acted

The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the

adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the
adoption, but the petition was already granted by the
court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that
Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is
not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly
support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the
Court.

without

HELD:
Domagtoys defense is untenable and he did display
gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wifes presumptive death rendering his marriage to his
first wife subsisting. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.
Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second
issue, the request to hold the wedding outside
Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the
bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, under Art 7
of FC, marriage may be solemnized by, any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction.
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted
without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent
for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to
the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by
each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written
consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption
to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or
that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent,
the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any
conduct that would forego his parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to,
constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of
love, care and support for his children. The Court find
pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained
regular communications with his wife and children
through letters and telephone, and send them packages
catered to their whims.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO [Article 26;Divorce]

472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

RE: FOREIGN DIVORCE:

HERBERT CANG VS CA

G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon
learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the
trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court
granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna,
reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
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FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two
children. Wife went to US to work and later became a US
citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife
obtained divorce and married another man. Orbecido
filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article
26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur
granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for
review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26
(2).
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but

Persons and Family Relations

later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization
of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the
time of celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is
obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Petitioner must
prove that the spouse is a foreign citizen. He
must prove the foreign divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. That foreign law must also be proved
before our courts. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, the
Petitioner must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former spouse to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that the Petitioner is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.

concept of public policy and morality and shall

not be recognized in this jurisdiction."
1) No serious dispute that at the time of divorce to
Vicente, Rebecca was an American citizen and still
remains to be one. Evidences: a) she was born in USA
and jus soli is followed in American territory in granting
American citizenship; b) she was and may still be an
American passport holder; c) in marriage certificate,
birth certificate of Alix and divorce decree in Dominican
Republic, it was declared that she is an American
2) VALID. Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
USA where divorce was valid. Their property relations
were also properly adjudicated through their Agreement
on 1996. Foreign divorce can be recognized in the
Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact and
valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The
reckoning point is the citizenship of parties at the time
the divorce was obtained and not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of marriage.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG

GR 186571, August 11, 2010

Bayot vs. CA

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an American citizen and
born in Agoa, Guam, USA. She married Vicente Bayot at
Greenhills, Mandaluyong on April 20, 1979. On
November 27,1982, Rebecca gave birth to a daughter
named Alix at San Francisco, California. However, as the
marriage turned sour, Rebecca initiated a divorce on
1996 in Dominican Republic. The latter ordered the
dissolution of marriage and remarriage after competing
the legal requirements. However, there must be a joint
custody and guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal
property, particularly the real properties located only in
Manila that they acquired during their marriage be
settled.
However, Rebecca stated under oath on May 28, 1996
that she is an American citizen and she is carrying a
child not of Vicente. Rebecca again filed another petition
in Manila on March 2001 for absolute nullity of marriage
on the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, monthly
support for their daughter and that Vicente is
psychological incapacitated.
Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause and action and filed a case of adultery and perjury
against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the contrary, charged
Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
On the other note, Rebecca became a recognized Filipino
citizen on 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid?
HELD:
"Three legal premises need to be underscored at
the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree
of divorce is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. Second, the reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or
at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And
third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our

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Facts
Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization
He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City
Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned
to the Philippines he found out that his wife was having
an affair with another man
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same
was granted
After two years from the effectivity of the divorce
decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love
Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and
registered the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate
Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce before the RTC
RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy under Art. 26(2) of the
Family Code
Issue
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Ruling
The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26(2) of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to the rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to

Persons and Family Relations

remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree) whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law

HELD No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced.

Edelina failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
When her request for renewal of passport under her
married name was denied, she should have appealed
the denial to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs pursuant
to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239
(Philippine Passport Act).

Remedy Available to Alien Spouse

The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family

Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the
alien spouse of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence in favor of the alien
spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgment (Please see pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)

* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered

the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and
Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate as legally
improper. No judicial order yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto.
Tomas' marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz (Please
see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on
Registry of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)

EDELINA T. ANDO vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014
Foreign Divorce; how recognized
Must be proven as a matter of fact

Facts:
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen
named Yuichiro Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained
a divorce decree against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi
later married someone else.
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen
named Masatomi Ando.
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this
time she wanted to use her married name she wanted
to use Andos name. However, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) told her that same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove by competent court
decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as
she insists that she should be issued a passport bearing
her married name even without a judicial declaration
that her marriage with Ando is valid because, according
to the law, void and voidable marriages enjoy the
presumption of validity until proven otherwise. And also
on that juncture, she prayed that the court recognize her
second marriage as valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief
should prosper.

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Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be

honored is not proper. The proper remedy is for her to
file a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient;
both the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
AFFIDAVIT OF LEGAL CAPACITY

GARCIA vs. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989,
the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce
supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent
acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan
City. In their application for marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino. Since October
1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in
Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998,
petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she
learned of the respondents former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that
he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before
they were married. Respondent also contended that his
first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court
declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the
ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was
forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to
marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts
can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

Persons and Family Relations

In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent
and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an
Australian family court. Although, appearance is not
sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence
regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated,
the decree was admitted on account of petitioners
failure to object properly because he objected to the fact
that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute
divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce
merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not
known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage.
Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows
that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have
been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing
his status. Together with other evidences submitted,
they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage
between the petitioner and respondent cannot be
declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the
court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage
based on two existing marriage certificates.
BIGAMY and AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION

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