IN PERSPECTIVE

Syrias CBWs: Clear

and present danger
The dangers will not
melt away in a postAssad scenario. In
fact, they could get
much worse.
By Arun Vishwanathan

he 16-month-old civil war

in Syria led by a motley of
opposition groups to
overthrow the Bashar al-Assad
regime has seen several ups and
downs. On July 18 the Syrian
regime suffered a serious setback when a powerful bomb
blast in the Syrian national security council premises killed
three members of Assads inner
coterie which included his brother-in-law Gen Assef Shawkat
and minister of defence Dawoud
Rajha. Given the increasing levels of attrition from the higher
echelons of the Syrian army in
recent weeks, the deaths led to
predictions of impending collapse of the regime.
While the collapse theory
has a ring of truth to it, it will be
preceded by a protracted and
bloody conflict. What complicates the matter further is the
fact that Syria possesses the
largest stockpile of chemical
weapons (CW) in the Middle
East with the means to deliver
them. It is also suspected that
Damascus has an active bioweapons (BW) programme.
The active involvement of jihadi
groups like Hamas, Hezbollah,
al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Syrian
civil war is a cause for concern
particularly with regard to the
security of the chemical and biological weapons.
Pubic broadcast
On July 23, the Syrian foreign
ministry spokesperson Jihad
Makdissi made a public broadcast where he tried to allay
fears about the safety and security of the Syrian CBW stockpile. Makdissis broadcast is important for several reasons.
Apart from being the first ever
public admission of Syrias
chemical and biological
weapons stockpile, the statement reiterated the Syrian policy of not using these weapons
against its own population.
The Syrian programme is
believed to have begun in 1973
with initial CW capability from
Egypt in the run-up to the October 73 war with Israel. Currently, Syria has the largest CW
programme in the Middle East
with over 50 suspected chemical and bio-weapon storage
and production facilities. It operates four large CW production facilities at al-Safir, Hama,
Homs and Latakia and has
over a dozen storage sites
spread across the country.
The Syrian BW programme
is believed to be centered on the
Syrian scientific research council (SSRC) near Damascus, and
is suspected to be fairly advanced in terms of weaponisation and dispersal techniques.
Syria is not a member of the international conventions which

outlaw the possession and use

of Chemical and Biological
weapons. Damascuss chemical
weapons stockpile is believed
to run into several hundred
tones of mustard blistering
agents. Syria is also believed to
possess large stockpiles of the
deadly nerve agents like Sarin
and VX. In addition, Syria also
runs a chemical weapons research facility near Damascus.
The fact that Syria possesses
an effective means of delivering
these weapons make the situation more dangerous. Syria possesses an estimated 700 scud
missiles and its variants in addition to the short-range solid
fuelled SS-21. The missiles are
believed to be capable of carrying warheads filled with sarin
nerve agents.
The advanced state of Syrias
chemical and bio-weapon and
missile capability pose several
dangers. One apparent fear is
the possibility of the CBW
weapons falling into the hands
of the jihadi groups in case the
Assad regime collapses.
In the light of recent statements, the possible use of these
weapons against foreign troops
in case of international intervention also cannot be discounted. Another danger if the
current trends continue could
be the use of these weapons
against the insurgents by the
Assad regime in case its very
survival is at stake. Though
Russia and the United States
have warned the Assad regime
against use of chemical and
bio-weapons, it might not be
Assads decision to take or prevent if the survival of the
regime is under question.
The dangers will not melt
away in a post-Assad scenario.
In fact, they could get much
worse. With the lack of a central
authority security the weapons
could also be used by the Sunni
terror outfits against the Shiite
(Alawaite) and Christian minority. Also, it is not a given that
the new regime that replaces
Assad would give up the chemical and bio-weapon capability
as it could view them as a bargaining chip to be used in any
future negotiations with Israel.
The international community has definitely been on the
overdrive to put in place plans
to safeguard the Syrian WMD
stockpile. Israeli leaders like
Prime Minister Netanyahu
have even spoken of plans to
destroy Syrias capability in
case of a collapse of the Assad
regime. The situation in Syria
is unprecedented. A WMDarmed country has never before witnessed civil strife. The
active involvement of terror
groups like Hezbollah and the
al-Qaeda make the situation extremely dangerous as the collapse of the regime could result
in these weapons and the
means of delivering them,
falling into the hands of these
groups. These are dangerous
times in the Levant.
(The writer is an assistant professor in the international strategic and security studies programme at NIAS, Bangalore)