DA - Japan

1nc

generic
China is pushing the US-Japan alliance to the breaking point, how we react now is
key
Tatsumi 2016 - Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center
Yuki, "China: Pushing the Envelope in the East China Sea?," Jun 10,
thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-pushing-the-envelope-in-the-east-china-sea/
There is no question that China

is testing the resolve of Japan and the United States with its heightened
activities in the East China Sea. Against Tokyo, Beijing is pushing the envelope to see if their activities
would trigger a Japanese overreaction, which China then can use as a reason to justify its
enhanced activities in the East China Sea. Vis--vis the United States, it is testing Washingtons
will to uphold its defense commitment toward Japan. The United States and Japan can counter
these moves by doing a few things. First, they should continue to conduct and even expand the opportunities
for joint exercises with other partners in the region to demonstrate the strength of the security
partnership that upholds international norms and principles, including freedom of navigation. The trilateral
exercises between the United States, Japan, and Australia including Southern Jackaroo (completed last month) and the U.S.-JapanIndia trilateral exercise Malabar (which began June 10 off the coast of Okinawa) are excellent examples. By conducting these
trilateral exercises, the

U.S. and Japan together send the message that Beijing is up against a group of
countries that are opposed to its approach to territorial disputes. Secondly, Japan should intensify its efforts
to counter Chinese military maneuvers in the vicinity of its territory by ensuring that Chinese ships and/or aircraft will be met by
Japanese vessels and jets every time they get too close to Japanese territory. Japan has been doing this all along when it comes to
airspace. The recent behavior by the PLAN can be a blessing in disguise, as it now provides a justification for Japan to increase the
activities by the Japan Self Defense Forces in the name of intelligence gathering and monitoring. By doing so, Tokyo can send an
unambiguous message to Beijing that the Japanese government does not tolerate the unilateral move to change the status quo.
Finally, the

United States must continue its reassurance to allies in the region that Washington
will stay engaged and be supportive of the countries that try to settle these disagreements
peacefully through diplomacy. Whether it is called the rebalance to Asia or a principled security network, U .S.
allies and partners need to know that the United States will stay engaged in the region, and be
supportive of their response to Chinas unreasonably risky behavior . Washington can provide
such assurance by using all elements of national power, from calling out Chinese misbehavior in
public forums, as Carter did, to more coordinated assistance in Southeast Asia, which can contribute to capacity-building
efforts throughout Asia. Chinese behaviors in the East China Sea over the last week pose a difficult challenge to both the United
States and Japan. Their response needs to be strong and coordinated to demonstrate they are unified in their unwillingness to bend
to Chinas assertion, while these responses need to be carried out in such a way that China cannot point it finger at either of them as

Given both
Tokyo and Washington are in a political season, Chinas behavior in the East and South China
Seas for the next several months may be an important test of the resilience of the coordination
mechanism within the U.S.-Japan alliance, which both sides have spent the last several years
strengthening.
the reason for rising tensions. In order to strike this fine balance, close consultation will be more critical than ever.

Japan views US engagement with China as a signal of abandonment, weakening

the alliance
Novak 2014 - graduate student at the National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU) in Kaohsiung,
Taiwan, in the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies (ICAPS) and the Center for Japanese
Studies Nathan, "PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON WHY DO THE JAPANESE FEAR
ABANDONMENT?: A (POTENTIALLY NEW) PERSPECTIVE FROM WHICH TO EXAMINE
SINO-U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS," Mar 12,
https://eastasiaobserver.wordpress.com/2014/03/12/preliminary-reflections-on-why-do-thejapanese-fear-abandonment-a-potentially-new-perspective-from-which-to-examine-sino-u-sjapan-relations/

A discussion of what amounted to, although no one used the term extended deterrence, a discussion of the creditability of both the
conventional and nuclear elements of the U.S. policy of extended deterrence ensued. One could, had one listened closely, noted a bit
of a gulf between the American (with the exception of this writer) and Taiwanese (with the exception of the Chief Executer of the
CJS) scholars on one side, who believed that the JIIA scholar was being too pessimistic about U.S. commitments and capabilities,
and the Japanese scholars, who were far more skeptical of said capabilities and commitments. Indeed, during the climax of the
discussion, the well-known American scholar asked the JIIA scholar point blank: Why

do the Japanese fear

abandonment? This question followed several comments by this particular American scholar about the continuous
strengthening of the alliance especially since the mid-1990s. It is a difficult question, one which the JIIA scholar handled in a typical
way but which, I think, needs further historical background if one is to drive the real point home. The JIIA scholar responded that
the United States had throughout the history of the alliance given mixed signals to the Japanese government
about its preferences and intentions on a plethora of issues. There was no reason to believe that this would
suddenly stop because now China was perceived by many as the external threat binding the two allies (and, by way of inference,
other allies as well as security partners) together. In effect, Japans

pursuit of a limited first-strike capacity was at

once both a demonstration to its senior alliance partner that Japan had the will to possess and
use such capabilities if necessary (enhancing the credibility of Japans own commitment as the junior member of the
alliance) and ahere comes the watchwordhedge against potential U.S. nonintervention in, or even an
altogether abrogation of the alliance due to, a regional conflict that pitted Japan against another regional
power. (The obvious reference here was to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, although the JIIA scholar did not mention China
or that dispute in particular.) After the question was asked and before the JIIA scholar answered, the Chief Executer of the CJS, who
is also one of my co-advisers, turned to me, and we both said the same thing to each other quietly: It [the alliance dilemma
mentioned in the question] is structural. Thati.e., the structural element of abandonment and entrapmentis certainly one, and
admittedly a major, factor. But as I have revisited this question, thought deeply about my own academic work, and read much more,
I have come to the conclusion that not

only are there structural (the one briefly mentioned between my co-advisor and
myself, above); postwar-alliance (discussed by the scholar from the JIIA in the previous paragraph); and political,
economic, and sociocultural (as discussed at length in the Calder book, referenced in f.n. 1) factors involved; there
are also deeper historical (pre-1945) and very important long-term strategic factors with historical
antecedents that play into these fears, warranted or not, of Japan passing, a Sino-U.S.
condominium (or a so-called G2) basically at Japans expense, and an abrogation of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty in order for the United States (and potentially Japan) to seek closer relations with
China at the expense of Japan. The logic behind this, too, is partly structural, but it is also historical
and often overlooked because many scholarly works on Japan and U.S.-Japan relations , since they
focus on either the nature of Japans political system or on the post-1945 U.S.-Japan relationship (i.e., the alliance), either
purposely or inadvertently leave out the competitive influences that drove the United States and Japan towards total war. And as
perhaps the best single-volume work on the broader history of the U.S.-Japan relationship, a study which spans nearly a century and
a half of these two nations relations, put it, one of these competitive influences rested on the role Japan and the United States (as
well as other powers) would play in China and their competing views regarding what China would ideally resemble and whose
interests it would ultimately serve. Hence,

it is no mistake that as China develops, seeks greater amounts of

foreign capital, sees its domestic market grow numerically and with regard to purchasing potential, and becomes a major
regional and even global strategic player, both Japanese and Americans are concerned not only with how
China itself will behave but also how the two (Japan and America) will behave towards each other. The
competing discourses in both countries on China the threat and China the opportunity
clearly factor in here as well, and these competitive influences make it ever easier for Chinese strategy to exploit, or at
least probe, these areas of intra-alliance weakness. Simply put, both allies, for both structural and deeper
strategic reasons (which can be traced throughout their prewar and even postwar historical interactions), view each
others approaches toward China with incredulity , uncertainty, and, at times, open
cynicism . These sentiments further heighten the security dilemma in alliance politics .
However, the contextual and historical background as well as particular features of the U.S.-Japan relationship itself suggest not
only that these structural factors will be more acute but that, beyond these structural variables themselves, policy, strategic thinking,
and strategic behavior will increasingly, and ultimately, be at odds.

A weak alliance causes Japan to seek nuclear weapons and trigger an arms race
Hunt 2015 - postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand
Corp

Jonathan, "Out of the Mushroom Clouds Shadow," Aug 5,

foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/
The U.S. explosions that devastated Hiroshima and, three days later, the city of Nagasaki, seared an aversion to nuclear weapons
into the Japanese psyche, embodied by people like Sumiteru Taniguchi. But although Japan never developed nuclear weapons, this
aversion has not kept Japan out of the business of nuclear weapons altogether: Its advanced civilian nuclear program helped it

With the average age of the hibakusha

now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind , however,
the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are
increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments to nonprolif eration and disarmament.
Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons,
it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of
any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation.
Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency the
global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing . In
recruit the United States and its nuclear deterrent as its guardians in the 1960s and 1970s.

1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and
onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its
Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons
of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture and
politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki
in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of
the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American Hbomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese
fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and
anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans
parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese

leaders renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been

absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance
their countrys national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower
insisted that he saw no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.)
After Chinas first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons,
the Japanese also should have them. He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-

Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the
United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing
Nuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did

rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test,
Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a
crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan

These
reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended
needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.

nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: The Japanese were
well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato
announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister
Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President
Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the
Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to
coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will
prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida who hails from Hiroshima
renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings. And yet,

Japan is becoming

increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new
arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his
first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal would
not necessarily violate the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing
medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even

called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is
even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical
step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT,
which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export
restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough
weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if

Japan wanted to, it

could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three
to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo
fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in
regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should
expand to include South Korea trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more
on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a
half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be
called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and
humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes
facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia,
it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter
Chinas rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of
American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership
with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them.

With Japans nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the
nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential .
That escalates quickly into a global war
Tan 2015 - Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales
Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31
East Asias arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that
is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results
in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby
destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asias sustained
economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many
into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo
2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have
remained. Japans imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past
continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea . In additions, t he
divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong as intractable as
ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula . The situation is compounded by
the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate
relations, build trust and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during
the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party
Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Koreas open
brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is
dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception .
Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism
(Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there

is also a perception within China that given its growing

strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the
East and South China Seas. Thus, Chinas nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory
emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan,
on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional . As a key player in East Asia,
the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to
Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in.

The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact ,
it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key
players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

uniqueness

at: Cooperation Now

Current cooperation is priced in, but if the US further engages with China now it
sends the signal of abandonment to our allies
Kazianis 2016 - senior communications manager for foreign policy and legal studies at the
Heritage Foundation
Harry, "Is the United States and China Destined for a Deadly Collision in the Sky?," May 19,
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-united-states-china-destined-deadly-collision-the-sky16282?page=2
To say the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China is complex might just be the ultimate
of understatements. Consider the facts: Beijing and Washington enjoy rich historic and cultural ties that date back generations. Over
300,000 Chinese students today attend American universities, only adding to the richness and cultural diversity of these important
intuitions. And most important of all, the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship is worth over $591 Billion and rising. Bearing in
mind how much both sides gain from a productive and strong partnership ,
around the worldhoped

many in Washingtonand certainly many

that strong ties would serve as a springboard towards Beijings peaceful

rise. Indeed, Chinas economy is now the second largest by measure of gross domestic product (ranked number one if you
consider purchasing power parity) and has only fueled hopes of Beijing becoming what is popularly termed a responsible
stakeholderthat China, with a stake in the stability of the international system thanks to strong global economic ties, would
follow widely accepted international relations norms and practices. Cooperation

on areas of shared and mutual

interest would be emphasized with a clear hope any areas of competition with a clear understanding
that there would be competition in multiple domains would not derail or weaken what had been
accomplished. Sadly, such hopes have not transcended into reality. Unfortunately for
the United States and its allies in Asia, it seems Beijing has decided to undertake a very different
direction in its foreign policy and security goals over the last several yearsone that very well undermines the
very peace and security Asia has known for decades, the very bedrock of the regions awe inspiring economic
transformation. In what can only be described as an arch of instability stretching North from the Japanese
administered Senkaku Islands all the way to the very southern edges of the South China Sea and now
moving west to what is commonly referred to the Second Island Chain , Beijing has decided that an aggressive policy
of slowly but surely weakening the status quo serves its interests. And Chinese actions clearly
demonstrate the above approach. In just the last several years (and far from a comprehensive list), Beijing
has sought to enforce lines drawn over vast expanses of the South China Sea along with building
islands in this hotly contests area, declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea without any prior
warning along with booting regional allies like the Philippines out disputed reefs far closer to the Philippines than China. The
goal, many would argue , is to dominate Asia, but more importantly, displace the U nited S tates as
the preeminent power in the region. In fact, it now seems America, along with its allies and partners, are
slowly moving towards a much more intense security competition with China in the months and years
to come, the consequences of which cannot be simply swept asideespecially considering Washington and Beijing both have nuclear
weapons. Sadly, recent

headlines only prove Beijings aggressive actions throughout the region could
spark a superpower clash that has not been seen in decades. On Tuesday, a U.S. EP-3 Orion aircraft flying in
international airspace over the South China Sea was approached by two Chinese advanced J-11 fighter jets. While close monitoring
of a military aircraft or naval vessel in international space is certainly a standard practice this interaction was anything but normal.
Chinese aviators came within 50 feet of the U.S. plane, prompting the pilot to descend several thousand feet out of safety
considerations. Sound familiar? It should, as China has utilized this playbook before. In 2014, a Chinese fighter jet came dangerously
close to a P-8 U.S. surveillance plane and preformed a barrel roll over it. According to reports, the Chinese J-11 fighter passed the P8 Poseidon at 90 degrees, with its belly toward the U.S. aircraft to show off its weapons. Thankfully, recent incidents like the ones
described above have not led to any injuries or deathsbut that has not always been the case. Back in 2001, an American EP-3
aircraft collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet. The pilot of the J-8 was killed while the U.S. aircraft was forced to undertake an
emergency landing in China on Hainan Island. A tense standoff ensued. Thankfully the U.S. crew was released weeks later. When
one considers carefully incidents like the above combined with Beijings clear attempts to alter the status quo, it is vital that
Washington respond accordingly to not only reinforce Americas commitment to the region but demonstrate clear American
leadership. There

are two clear ways to ensure China understands American resolve despite its
constant testing of the international order in Asia. First, Washington must ensure and forge

deeper relations with other nations in East Asia especially important allies. As explained in The
Heritage Foundations recent Solutions 2016 report: The U.S. has five treaty allies in the AsiaPacific region
(Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand ). The U.S. should be unequivocal in its
commitment to mutual defense under these treaties. The U.S. should engage these and other, non-ally nations in
the region so that they do not perceive China as the sole game in town. Also, considering that China is using military instruments of
power to push back against Americas place in the region, maintaining a strong U.S. military presence is vitalin fact, it should be
only strengthened: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding and modernization programs should be fully funded. The U.S. should
also invest in long-range power projection systems (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, bombers, and nuclear attack submarines) and
other systems that would counter efforts to deny U.S. forces access to the region or interfere with the freedom of the seas. In
addition, the U.S. should maintain robust bases in the region to support U.S. forces. Clearly the above only serves as a down

It is clear
that only Washington has the power to balance Beijing and keep its increasing assertiveness in
check. While America will certainly work with China in areas of cooperation which are certainly
vast, Beijing must know Washington will resist any attempts to alter the s tatus-quo
while preserving the peace, security and freedom of the Asia-Pacific region.
payment in what can only be part of a comprehensive strategy to ensure Chinas rise does not become Asias nightmare.

at: Okinawa Strains Alliance

The January election takes out their arg
Pollman 2016 - Conducted research on Japan as an Ellsworth Bunker Fellow with the
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, as well as participating in the Georgetown-Japan 2020
Initiative
Mina, "Supporters of Okinawa Base Relocation Plan Claim a Win in Local Elections," Jan 26,
thediplomat.com/2016/01/supporters-of-okinawa-base-relocation-plan-claim-a-win-in-localelections/
Sundays mayoral election in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture will reverberate far beyond the local level,
impacting national politics and even the U.S.-Japan alliance. The incumbent, Atsushi Sakima, defeated
rookie challenger, Keiichiro Shimura, for a second four-year term and clinched Tokyos victory in what Kyodo News
called a proxy battle between the central and prefectural governments. At stake is the Futenma relocation
plan, which would move the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station from crowded Ginowan to the Henoko area of Nago. The relocation
is important for the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but fiercely opposed by Okinawans
because of the unfair burden that the U.S. bases place on the prefecture, especially relative to the rest of
Japan. Starting with Susumu Inamines victory in the January 2014 Nago mayoral election and Takeshi Onagas victory in the
November 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election, candidates backed by the ruling bloc and central government have suffered a series
of defeats at the local level at the hands of politicians running in opposition to the Henoko relocation plan. Okinawans are not
opposed to the idea of moving the Futenma air base from Ginowan per se after all, the bases close proximity to a residential center
is a dangerous nuisance for the locals but they want the base to be relocated outside of Okinawa all together. Tokyo welcomed
Sakimas win, of course, and central government officials hope that this will reverse some of the recent political setbacks in the
prefecture. This

victory is also considered key to building momentum for the Futenma base
relocation. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe characterized Sakimas victory as significant. The importance the
central government attached to this election was made evident by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Sugas degree of personal
involvement. His efforts to support Sakima included talks with U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy last December to accelerate the
return of lands to Japan and discussions with executives of Oriental Land Co. for cooperation in fulfilling one of Sakimas key
campaign pledges hosting a Disney Resort facility on the returned lands. Sakimas campaign was also backed by visits to the
prefecture by popular lawmakers and senior party officials from both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and their coalition party,
the Komeito. Even Abe himself paid a call to a member of the Okinawa prefectural assembly, though the most public figures in the
Abe government sought to work their influence behind-the-scenes. Governor Onaga was personally involved in the campaign on
Shimuras side because he, too, had a lot riding on the election. A Shimura victory in Ginowan would have helped maintain the antirelocation movements momentum. Because of this loss, with Sakima winning 27,668 votes to Shimuras 21,811, pro-relocation
elements can criticize Onagas stubbornness, saying the residents of Ginowan want the relocation to take place. The LDP hopes that
this will help turn the tide in their favor in the Okinawa prefectural assembly elections and national Upper House elections this
summer. As LDP Election Strategy Committee Chairman Toshimitsu Motegi commented: The victory in the Ginowan mayoral
election, which was the run-up to the upper house election, was quite significant. However, it is unclear how accurate this reading
of local sentiment might be. After all, Sakima never clarified his position on relocating the U.S. base to Henoko specifically. Sakima
called for the closing and removal of the base as soon as possible, but did not provide a vision for what would happen to the U.S.
base thereafter. Given that, it is hard to argue that Ginowan residents were voting for moving the bases to Henoko; they were, rather,
voting against keeping the bases in Ginowan. There was also much maneuvering to underplay ties between Sakima and Abe
clearly, Sakimas victory is not a ringing Okinawan endorsement of Abes security agenda. Furthermore, in an exit poll conducted by
Asahi Shimbun, 57 percent of 1,263 respondents said they oppose the Henoko plan while only 34 percent back it. Of the 57 percent
who oppose the Henoko plan, 76 percent voted for anti-relocation Shimura suggesting that Sakima won not because voters
support the Futenma relocation plan, but because not enough voters cared enough about to vote solely based on that issue. Indeed,
48 percent of responders answered that Futenma was an issue they considered when voting, while 19 percent looked to the
candidates past achievements and another 19 percent saw economic and welfare issues as important issues. Perhaps Sakimas
record as a mayor and the voters belief that Sakimas economic and social policies would be better (or that Sakimas willingness to
cooperate with the LDP would bring greater economic and social benefits to Ginowan) was the decisive factor. It is too soon to
conclude, as LDP officials have, that Ginowans do not share the same antipathy to the Henoko plan that most Okinawans do. Abes
obvious determination to proceed with the relocation regardless of the outcome of the elections may also have disincentivized voters
from casting a vote for Shimura. For now, even

though Onaga continues to pursue his goals through legal

means, the relocation is set to move full-steam ahead. On Monday morning, Defense Minister Gen
Nakatani affirmed that construction work will continue in Henoko, though he also paid lip service to reducing
the Okinawans burden of hosting U.S. bases.

at: Trump thump

Trump doesnt thump--a) Actions outweigh rhetoric --- Japan cares more about a hardline stance on
China than Trumps ranting --- US actions shape their future in the region, Trump
merely hurts their feelings
b) Their ev is speculative about Japanese perceptions --- 1nc Mann cites empirics
about US-Japanese interactions the region whereas their ev is
c) Trump isnt president! --- political leaders check and send a stronger signal than
a former reality TV show host
The US Japan alliance is at a turning point, only full-fledged commitment by the
US can ensure it weathers the storm
Walker 2016 - Ph.D., leads the Japan work at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., teaches
security policy at George Washington University
Joshua, "A resonant US-Japan Alliance," Jun 10,
asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Joshua-W.-Walker-A-resonant-US-Japan-alliance?
page=2
TOKYO -- Traveling outside the DC bubble has always been important for policy wonks to appreciate the widening gap between
realities within the Beltway and outside it. This has never been truer than during the current U.S. presidential election cycle. Last
year,

a visit to Japan for the second annual Mount Fuji Dialogue served to reassure me that
despite the rise of Donald Trump and the shifting contours of the Republican Party, the American
system of checks and balances would ensure a strong U.S.-Japan alliance under any U.S.
President. This week, I returned for the third dialogue having to remind my Japanese friends of their previous assurances now
that Trump is the Republican nominee and has turned traditional U.S.-Japan foreign policy orthodoxy on its head. As expected,

Trump loomed large over all aspects of the premier U.S.-Japan forum as leading experts from
both sides of the Pacific denounced his foreign policy pronouncements and "policies " on Japan as
dangerous to the cornerstone of American power in the Asia-Pacific region. Particularly in light of the U.S.-Chinese tensions on
display at the Shangri-La Dialogue, which took place concurrently in Singapore, the importance of Japan's role in global peace and
security has never been more important but also more disconnected from American politics. After

successfully hosting
the Group of Seven summit and President Barack Obama's historic visit to Hiroshima, Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe looked more confident and relaxed than at the two previous Fuji gatherings as he greeted participants and
thanked the experts assembled for their help in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Despite having recently announced a delay in

Abe
reveled in the present state of the U.S.-Japan alliance, repeatedly described by American and
Japanese leaders alike as the best ever. Yet, rather than dismissing the disconnect between the
state of U.S.-Japan relations and how Trump sees things, it is an important moment to engage
beyond the Beltway and clearly articulate the benefits of this critical alliance to the average American
voter who fears international trade and is suspicious of global engagement more generally. Soberingly, Trump and Bernie
Sanders captured the imagination of the majority of the American electorate -- a powerful indictment of
a scheduled consumption tax hike and while preparing for a busy campaign season ahead of upper house elections on July 10,

a foreign policy elite that has failed to make its case forcefully or simply. Secretary Clinton's foreign policy speech in San Diego and
new line of attack on Trump for his misunderstandings of international affairs along with his temperament reverberated with many
in attendance who echoed her speech. A bipartisanship rarely experienced in Washington bloomed on the mainstage of the Mount
Fuji Dialogue as Democratic and Republican former deputy secretary of states, Thomas Nides and Richard Armitage, took turns
praising the U.S.-Japan alliance on the merits of U.S. national interests and criticizing Trump for attempting to poison the waters of
such a valuable relationship after Obama's historic visit to Hiroshima. The

importance of Japan within the

framework of a rising Asia-Pacific region that clearly represents America's future was articulated
by every speaker and expert breakout group in different ways. Discussions ranging from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea emphasized the need not
only for greater burden-sharing among historic allies but also subsequent power-sharing . The

silver-lining for the next generation of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that Japan

seems prepared and poised to assume a

greater share of leadership in the 21st century , even as Trump questions assumptions
that have rarely been challenged. The thought of Japan being a more forward-leaning security provider
throughout the Asia-Pacific region used to be controversial domestically in the same way becoming a nuclear power still is. Despite
the taboo, Trump has openly advocated for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons. There is a tangible shift in Japanese attitudes
toward global engagement, thanks largely to China's aggressive posture, which seems to be pushing America in a similar direction.
The need for U.S. forces in Japan to protect regional stability needs to be clearly articulated. There are no alternatives, other than
isolationism, which would come at a high price to American consumers who are used to reasonably priced goods that, thanks to the
U.S. forces in Japan, come to them from the Asia-Pacific region with particular speed. Japan will pass the TPP this fall, hoping that
its actions spur America to do the same ... after the politics of 2016 plays out. Even in areas of tactical divergence -- such as RussoJapanese rapprochement, reflected in the Abe-Vladimir Putin bromance -- the U.S. has shown a greater appreciation for the
independent role that Japanese foreign policy can play. Particularly in discussing areas of mutual interests from cybersecurity to
confronting China in the South China Sea or Eurasia, the U.S.-Japan alliance offers an important avenue for greater cooperation.
Ironically, having created and led the global order for over 70 years since the end of World War II, the

U.S. has never

needed its allies like Japan in international affairs from Eurasia to the Middle East, but in
domestic affairs prefers to take them for granted. As one sage American participant noted, Donald Trump as a
thought-experiment is an opportunity that should not be wasted by a foreign policy elite that
must learn to balance good policies with political realities. A clear and full-throated defense of
America's role in the Asia-Pacific region, bolstered by the U.S.-Japan alliance, must be made to
resonate beyond Washington. With the presidential and other elections coming up in November, hopefully U.S.Japanese relations will not just weather political storms but come out stronger with a bipartisan
consensus on the enduring nature of this alliance.

U - low threshold
The election sends the signal to allies that we will abandon them within the year,
link threshold is low
Nikkei 3/31
"Editorial: US election campaign shows worrying trend of isolation,"
asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160331-ASIA-S-ACCELERATING-ARMSRACE/Viewpoints/Editorial-US-election-campaign-shows-worrying-trend-of-isolation
Asia looks on with growing
concern. There is a fear that American voters are being wooed by isolationist rhetoric, eerily reminiscent
of the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th century, and the country's political interest in Asia is quickly fading.
Republican front-runner Donald Trump's speeches have been peppered with remarks critical of Japan,
China and South Korea, which display a shallow understanding of international affairs. His claims that Beijing's currency
With the candidates in the U.S. presidential contest having made their positions clear,

manipulation is robbing Americans of jobs may not be entirely off the mark. His descriptions of security alliances with Japan and
South Korea, on the other hand, have been a lot more disconcerting, describing the relationships as "unfair" and claiming that
America should not be defending its allies "for free." Having

been involved in the U.S. efforts to establish the

Trans-Pacific Partnership during her tenure as secretary of state, Democratic Party favorite Hilary Clinton has come out
against the deal. The TPP is the strongest pillar of the Obama administration's "pivot
to Asia" policy , a bid to build a new economic order based on common rules under U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific
region, now a growth center of the world economy. Clinton's U-turn is further evidence of the swing to
isolationism. INWARD-LOOKING POLITICIANS The comments made during the election campaign need not all be taken at
face value. The worry for Asia is the climate in which anti-Asian comments appeal to such a broad range of voters. The mistaken
perception that Asia's economic development is a threat to employment in the U.S. appears to have spread among Americans. The
more acute the criticism of Asian countries, the more support it seems to gain. In reality, many U.S. companies have benefited
hugely from expanding into Asia and the advanced international division of labor has underpinned the U.S. economy. The principle
of free trade, which is essential for raising the competitiveness and earning power of American companies, should therefore be the
foundation of America's national interests. As

Trump and Clinton battle for their respective party

nominations, both appear compelled to sharpen their language in order to compete with
inward-looking rivals. Conservative Republican Ted Cruz enjoys the support of the Tea Party, while self-proclaimed socialist
Bernie Sanders has focused his campaign on inequality in the U.S. In many respects, the way the front-runners have had to
respond to their rivals has itself served to accelerate American isolationism .

U AIIB Specific
Abe uses stance on AIIB to demonstrate strong Japan commitment to U.S.
Gang, 15 (articled updated on 6/18/15, An op-ed contributor to Beijing Review, Who Is
America's Closest Ally Whether U.S.-Japan defense cooperation benefits them is questionable,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2015-06/15/content_692433.htm, article downloaded
on 6/12/16, JMP) ***note --- this article ultimately concludes that U.S.-China
relations cant take a backseat to U.S.-Japan relations
Undoubtedly, the hegemony of the U nited S tates in global affairs cannot be supported without a
strong pillar--the U.S.-led alliances that have held control of crucial areas worldwide since the
end of World War II (WWII). Today, the United States maintains military alliance with as many as 60 countries, including
the mighty NATO military bloc in Europe, Israel and a string of Gulf countries in the Middle East, Japan and South Korea in East
Asia, and Australia in the South Pacific. It may be interesting to ask, who is the closest partner of the United States today? With
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paying an official visit to Washington earlier this year, the answer may be more obvious than
one might think. During

his visit from April 26 to May 3, Abe received the warmest possible welcome from
his hosts. More importantly, Japan's relations with the U nited S tates were lifted to a new height
by renewing their defense cooperation agreement. U.S. President Barack Obama addressed Japan as
"one of America's closest allies in the world," when he met with Abe at the White House on April 28. The clout that
the United States enjoys in global affairs has been on the decline since Obama's presidential inauguration in 2009. Correspondingly,
the Obama administration has made a number of adjustments to its global strategy and its network of alliances, with a focus being
put on boosting U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the superpower and its close friends in Europe and the
Middle East have shown different policy priorities on a variety of issues. For example, a rift between the United States and Israel is
growing owing to their disagreements on an Iranian nuclear deal. German Chancellor Angela Merkel maintains a certain amount of
room to maneuver and she did not follow the White House's hardline trade embargo policy toward Russia as Obama did during the
Ukrainian crisis. Spying scandals revealed by former U.S. intelligence analyst Edward Snowden has also harmed trust between the
United States and its European partners. Even Britain, typically the most intimate of the United States' allies, has been criticized by
its bosom buddy for joining the China-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in March. Britain was the first
Western country to apply for the founding membership of the AIIB, which caused a chain reaction of other major European
countries, such as France, Germany and Italy, joining. Previously, the United States reportedly had lobbied its allies to boycott
China's proposal to establish the AIIB, as Washington regarded it as a potent challenger to U.S.-led institutions such as the World
Bank. In fact, Britain's decision reflects a consensus among a majority of Western countries in dealing with the United States and
China. Most continue to maintain allied relations with the United States, but they are not willing to miss any opportunities to engage

only Japan has taken a negative

attitude toward the AIIB, which has been used as an evidence by Abe to illustrate
that Japan is the closest ally of the U nited S tates.

in the lucrative and potential-heavy Chinese market either. As a result,

links

l: AIIB
U.S. and Japan are in lock step now over the AIIB and Abes reforms are currently
designed to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance --- mutual distrust runs deep
between China and Japan
Pollack, 16 (Jonathon D, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center,
Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Changes and prospects for the structure of regional stability
in East Asia: A U.S. perspective, Jan 25,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2016/01/25-regional-stability-east-asiapollack, CMR+JMP)
China and Japan
More than four decades after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, bilateral

ties between China and Japan

are increasingly fraught with tension and public animosity. There is now deep mutual
wariness between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships and plummeting levels of
public support for bilateral relations in both countries. These conditions create the possibility of longer-term
estrangement between East Asias two major powers that would seriously undermine the prospects for a stable regional order, which
would also entail pronounced implications for the ROK. There has been some modest improvement in recent months in working
relations between Beijing and Tokyo, but it is closer to a truce than a major shift in policy direction. Although there is a partial
recognition in both capitals of the risks of a deeper estrangement, neither leadership seems overly exercised by prevailing
circumstances. If anything, both seem to feel that heightened security tensions advances the bureaucratic interests of security
constituencies in both countries. The immediate trigger for the Sino-Japanese estrangement was the 2012 decision of former Prime
Minister Noda to initiate governmental purchase of the Senkakus/Diaoyus long held in private hands; Chinas decision to
appreciably increase its maritime and air activities near the islands in response to Japans decision; and the political exploitation of
these developments in both countries.[vi] But these events emerged in the context of prior incidents and episodes, with leaders in

The return of
Abe Shinzo to leadership in Japan and the accession of Xi Jinping to leadership in China exacerbated
these growing differences. However, the sources of increased estrangement run much deeper. Since
the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate among Japanese leaders about the
countrys political identity, centering on the question of its quest for normal country status. [vii]
both capitals far less prepared to devote appreciable energy or political capital to protecting bilateral relations.

Sharp declines in support for the political left in Japan removed a principal impediment to advancement of this goal. But it has only

Prime
Minister Abes convictions about elevating Japans geopolitical status derive from multiple
sources. Abe is determined to reinterpret and ultimately revise the post-war constitution drafted
during the American occupation, including the no war clause that severely limited Tokyos involvement
in international security beyond missions associated directly with the defense of Japan .[viii] He
has sought to put the most positive gloss possible on these shifts in policy, emphasizing Japans
efforts at economic revival and the parallel pursuit of what he terms proactive pacifism. Abe
has also embedded these policy initiatives in the context of the U.S.-Japan
alliance , asserting that constitutional reinterpretation (in conjunction with redrafted U.S.-Japan Defense
Policy Guidelines) will enable Tokyo to buttress the alliance within a collective security framework. His
been with the return to power of a deeply nationalistic Prime Minister that this objective has advanced in definitive ways.

reelection as president of the Liberal Democratic Party until 2018 affords him time and political opportunity to advance all these

Abes behavior is animated primarily by his growing anxieties about Japans

longer-term economic, political and security prospects in relation to a much more
powerful China. By tethering Japanese strategy to that of the U nited S tates, he hopes
to preclude any erosion in Japans position in U.S. regional strategy, and to
ensure that the U.S. remains equally identified with Japanese security concerns .
Japans decision not to seek founding member status in the A sian I nfrastructure I nvestment
B ank also put Tokyo and Washington on the same page , even as other close U.S. allies across Europe

goals.

and in the ROK and Australia made a different decision. For many years, leaders in Tokyo contended that Japanese security
planning was directed principally against threats from North Korea rather than threats from China, a claim that Chinese analysts
long insisted was a convenient rationale for building capabilities against Beijing.[ix] Regardless of the credibility of these competing
arguments, there is no longer any ambiguity about the underlying rationales for Japans long-term military development: it is Chinadirected. Japans latest Defense White Paper makes these arguments explicit. Though North Koreas fourth nuclear test reaffirms
Tokyos strong opposition to Pyongyangs actions and its decided preference for enhanced U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation (including
on ballistic missile defense), its eyes are increasingly cast on Beijing, seeking wherever possible to consolidate relationships across
the region to counterbalance Chinese power. It also seems increasingly apparent that the only U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region
that truly perturbs Chinese defense planners is a deeper and more expanded security relationship between the U.S. and Japan
defined primarily by an anti-China rationale.[x] Though China routinely depicts U.S. bilateral alliances as artifacts of the Cold War
and it routinely objects to most enhancements of the U.S. regional security role, these issues matter to China only insofar as they
seek to constrain Chinese security objectives, especially along Beijings maritime and air periphery. These circumstances highlight
the competing assumptions underlying strategic thinking on the part of the Japan and the ROK. Though the U.S. deeply values both
of these bilateral alliances, the predominant calculations of Park Geun-hye and Abe Shinzo are very different with respect to China.
Even acknowledging Seouls dissatisfaction with Beijings equivocal responses to North Koreas fourth nuclear test, President Park
sees China as an ever more important economic and political partner, and (prospectively) the key to ultimate unification of the
Korean peninsula. The ROK sees itself in a bridging role in relation to China, and it does not see its growing ties with Beijing as
detrimental or undermining of alliance ties with the United States. Abes

strategic calculation relative to China is

very different, and tilted in much more adversarial directions.

Japanese opposition helped drive U.S. policy on AIIB --- preserves ADB
predominance and Japanese leadership
Harris, 15 --- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last
modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank, http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded
6/1/16, JMP)
The Japanese governments opposition to AIIB may also have shaped the U.S.
governments defensive response. Both because the Japanese government wants to
ensure that ADB , in which Japan is the largest shareholder along with the United States, remains Asias
preeminent development bank , and because the Japanese government is acutely
sensitive to the contest with China for influence in Southeast Asia, the Abe government
was, if anything, even less favorably disposed to AIIB than the Obama administration. As noted previously,
Tokyo may have been even more explicit than Washington in urging Canberra to stay out, leveraging Prime Minister Abes personal
rapport with Prime Minister Abbott. This is not to say that the U.S. government simply followed Japans lead on AIIB, but

opposition from the leading U.S. ally in Asia likely made it more difficult for
officials in favor of a more accommodating response to win the debate . After all, by
trying to limit the influence of AIIB and preserve ADBs predominance, the U.S. government
would not just be defending ADB, it would be upholding a leadership role for Japan .

U.S. and Japan are united in opposition to the AIIB --- ensures strong U.S. backing
for Japan
Fackler, 15 (3/31/15, Martin, New York Times (Online), Japan, Sticking With U.S., Says It
Won't Join China-Led Bank, Proquest database, JMP)
TOKYO -- Japanese

leaders indicated on Tuesday that their nation would not become a founding
member of a new Chinese-led Asian development bank but instead remain loyal to the U nited

S tates, which has urged its allies to refrain from joining. The officials cited concerns about the management of
the new lender, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, that echoed objections raised by Washington, which sees the bank as a
Local news reports quoted Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe as saying it was important for strategic reasons that Japan stick with the U nited
S tates even when other allies like Britain and Germany have announced they will join the new bank. "The U nited S tates now
knows that Japan is trustworthy," Mr. Abe was quoted by Kyodo News as telling a meeting of his governing Liberal
Democratic Party. The finance minister, Taro Aso, told a news conference that Japan would not contemplate
challenge to American-led institutions like the World Bank.

joining until the new bank demonstrated that it had strict lending standards, including assessments of the environmental and social
impacts of development projects.

"We have no choice but to be very cautious about

participation," Mr. Aso said. Despite American objections, dozens of nations signed up ahead of the March 31 deadline set
by China to become founding members of the new bank, to be based in Beijing. The most recent countries to join included Australia
and South Korea, two of the United States' closest military partners in the region. South Korea's decision reversed earlier
expressions of agreement to American requests to avoid the bank. The decisions by so many allies to break with Washington have
been seen as a sign of the growing financial clout of China , which has become the largest trading partner of many countries in the
region. The new bank will confirm its founding members in April and aims to begin operating by the end of this year. While there
have been calls in Washington for the United States to join, the Obama administration is thought unlikely to reverse its opposition.
Many American officials appear concerned that the new lender will undermine the World Bank and also the International Monetary
Although China has
become Japan's top trading partner, Tokyo has compelling security-related reasons for
siding with the U nited S tates. Foremost among these is an intensified confrontation
with China over control of uninhabited islands in the E ast China Sea that are claimed
by both nations. Eager to ensure that his nation has American backing in the
standoff , Mr. Abe has tried to bind Japan more closely than ever to the U nited S tates, its
Fund, two pillars of the global financial order established by the United States after World War II.

postwar military protector. He is expected to emphasize Japan's close friendship, and also its growing willingness to assume a larger
military role in the region, when he visits the United States in late April.

Plan triggers Japanese concerns --- several reasons

--- Race to the bottom on lending standards
***note when prepping file --- this evidence also proves why the permutation (to the laundry list
cp) doesnt resolve the link.
Dr. Kawai, 15 --- Professor at the University of Tokyos Graduate School of Public Policy (last
modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK:
CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the
Evolving International Financial Order, http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIBReport_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)
Concern over Governance and Lending Policies and Standards Finance Minister Aso has expressed his concerns over AIIBs uncertain
nature of bank governance, environmental and social standards associated with infrastructure projects and considerations for debt sustainability in
borrowing countries, which should follow internationally established best practices. While not stated as directly, he seems

to be
concerned that AIIB might be controlled by China through its dominant voting powers and the
absence of a resident board of directors, that AIIB might adopt low environmental and social
safeguards, and that it might extend loans without sound appraisal of projects and countries. In
addition, Japan is concerned that, by adopting a lenient stance towards the financial viability of
projects and environmental and social standards, AIIB could put itself in an advantageous
position relative to the existing major MDBs, particularly the World Bank and ADB, as potential
borrower countries would prefer fewer requirements and lower standards. Thus, potentially

bankable projects developed by the World Bank and ADB might be taken away by
AIIB , thereby putting pressure on the former to reduce their own standards. Japan does not
want to see such a race-to-the-bottom competition on lending standards. One way
to push AIIB to adopt high standards would be for Japan to join AIIB and influence its decisionmaking from within. The problem is that Japan is not sure if it would have a sufficient voice to
do so, given an estimated voting share of only 9%. Thus, Japan does not seem to wish to
join AIIB unless it is confident that the bank will be well governed, financially
sound and ready to adopt high environmental standards and social safeguards .

--- Geopolitical factors

Dr. Kawai, 15 --- Professor at the University of Tokyos Graduate School of Public Policy (last
modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK:
CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the
Evolving International Financial Order, http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIBReport_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)
Geopolitical Concerns
A potentially more serious concern for Japan is that China may use AIIB as an
instrument for realizing its own economic and geopolitical objectives , including
expanding Chinas sphere of influence westward through the New Silk Road initiative. AIIB
may serve to create a Sino-centric economic and political sphere of influence ,
particularly in Central Asia and part of South Asia. Japans concerns have been reinforced by Chinas
aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas in recent years. In the East China Sea, the territorial issue
surrounding the Senkaku Islands has made bilateral security relations unstable. In November 2013, China introduced the East China
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, covering the airspace of the Japanese controlled Senkaku Islands, and imposed new air traffic
restrictions. The new restrictions require any foreign aircraft in the zone to identify its flight plan, maintain radio communication
with the Chinese authorities, display its nationality, and follow the authorities instructions. Japan views this as an attempt to
impede freedom of flight in international airspace. In the South China Sea, Beijing has taken a firm stance on reclaiming land on
disputed reefs and building military facilities. Despite increasing concerns expressed by the United States, the Philippines and other
countries, China has not slowed its reclamation efforts. Many observers believe that Chinas behavior is an attempt to change the
status quo through coercion. The

aggressive behavior has created mistrust and apprehension about

Chinese geopolitical intentions. There is a growing sense in the region that China is not
interested in resolving territorial issues in a peaceful manner, and that it will pursue its strategic
interests regardless of views held by neighboring countries. Through AIIB, China could direct its
rising economic and financial power to help strengthen infrastructure development, crossborder connectivity and economic integration. But Chinas aggressive behavior on
territorial issues has led Japan to suspect that Chinas true intention in
establishing AIIB might be to expand Chinas economic, political, security and
even military spheres of influence in Asia.

--Link Uniqueness
Japan is taking a careful wait-and-see approach now to the AIIB
Dr. Kawai, 15 --- Professor at the University of Tokyos Graduate School of Public Policy (last
modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK:
CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the
Evolving International Financial Order, http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIBReport_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)
To summarize, if

China provides international public goods through AIIB, rather than pursue its
own policy objectives, and if the bank is run in a financially prudent manner with sufficiently
high environmental and social standards, Japan should join. 15 However, if China uses AIIB
mainly as an instrument to realize self-interested economic and geopolitical objectives, Japan
should refrain from joining. If Japan cannot adequately assess these issues, it should
wait and see how AIIB operates , while encouraging the World Bank and ADB to help AIIB
become operationally sound. Japans Recent Infrastructure Assistance Initiative Prime Minister Abe is, indeed,
taking such a wait-and-see approach . At the same time, Japan has launched a new
infrastructure assistance initiative in collaboration with ADB to increase funding for highquality infrastructure projects in developing Asia to $110 billion over the next five years (20162020), which would be a 30% increase relative to the previous five years. In addition to working closely with ADB, Japan will
mobilize all forms of development cooperation and strengthen the role of JBIC. The Japanese government will also expand its
assistance for infrastructure development in Asian countries in partnership with the private sector, providing more than JPY4
trillion ($33 billion) over the five-year period. JICA, in cooperation with ADB, will establish a new funding mechanism for private
sector infrastructure projects. JBIC will actively take greater short-term risks associated with infrastructure financing, without
requiring recipient governments sovereign guarantees.

ADB is engaging in co-financing with AIIB now but U.S. and Japan are not
planning to join
Bangkok Post, 6/10/16 (Pakistan project gets first ADB, AIIB co-financing scheme,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/1006885/pakistan-project-gets-first-adb-aiib-cofinancing-scheme, JMP)
MANILA - The

A sian D evelopment B ank and the newly established A sian I nfrastructure I nvestment B ank are
embarking on their first co-financing scheme, with the former approving on Friday a $100 million
loan for a highway construction project in Pakistan. The Manila-based ADB said the China-led AIIB, which
started operations in January, is expected to provide a loan of the same amount later this month, while Britain's International
Development Department has committed $34 million in grant. "This

is a historic milestone for ADB and AIIB as

we jointly aim to meet the pressing infrastructure needs in Asia and the Pacific region," ADB
president Takehiko Nakao said in a statement. The project involves building the remaining 64-kilometre-long, four-lane
stretch of the M-4 National Motorway that connects Shorkot and Khanewal in Punjab province, the ADB said. "The project has
strategic value to Pakistan as it supports north-south connectivity, new trade and business opportunities, which will boost jobs and
cut poverty," Nakao added. Amid speculation that the AIIB was established to rival the 50-year-old ADB and erode its role in the
region, Nakao said earlier that he and AIIB president Jin Liqun have discussed since last year plans for co-financing as they
acknowledge the huge requirement for infrastructure investment in the region. With an authorised capital stock of $100 billion, the
AIIB was formally established in December last year by more than 50 founding member countries including Thailand. The ADB, on
the other hand, was established in 1966 and is currently owned by 67 members, of which 48 are from the region. It said that in 2015,

Japan and the U nited

S tates -- major contributors to the ADB -- have chosen not to join the AIIB yet , saying its
operation lacks transparency.
the bank's assistance through loans, grants, technical assistance and co-financing totaled $27.2 billion.

l: Generic Engagement
U.S. allies in the region would view the plan as a decrease in U.S. commitment
theyll perceive over-concern for Chinese interests as weakness on the part of the
U.S.
Lohman 2016 - director of The Heritage Foundations Asian Studies Center
Walter, After the Rebalance to Asia, Mar 31,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/03/after-the-rebalance-to-asia
This spectrum of response from the most willing of facilitators to the most nervous of hedgers is
very sensitive to signals from Washington. Strong signalsfor example, heathy defense budgets,
statements for support for alliances, Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), and well-conceived
push back on Chinese aggressiveness reassure them to push back in favor of a U.S.-led regional
order. U.S. support for Taiwan is another critical signal. Not because most of the region shares Americas concern for Taiwan, but
because the region knows that a lessening of American commitment can only be attributable
to concern for Chinese interests . ASEAN members in particular also view the personal involvement of the
President and U.S. participation in regional diplomacy as signs of strength. Signs of weakness, the ill-fated deal that the U.S.
made with China over Scarborough Shoal in 2012, for instance, have the opposite impact. Hedgers like Malaysia, when
faced with dilemmas over their own maritime claims, will be more timid in response for fear of provoking backlash from China.
Presently, all are watching very closely indications that the Chinese may reclaim and build on Scarborough Shoal in a fashion similar
to what they have done in the Spratlys. If it happens with no more than a diplomatic rebuke from the U.S., do not expect hedgers to
step out in support of U.S. commitments. This is similar with regard to FONOPS. T he

region expects the U.S. to

continue pressing its interest in freedom of the seas. A ratcheting back of this effort , another drawn
out public handwringing or hedging on the part of the U.S. will dampen support for its presence. Finally, the region is
looking for the parts of the rebalance that have been announced, arrangements with Australia
and the Philippines, for instance, to be made good on
The plan undermines relations by leaving Japan hanging out to dry
Fackler, 15 (3/31/15, Martin, New York Times (Online), Japan, Sticking With U.S., Says It
Won't Join China-Led Bank, Proquest database, JMP)
TOKYO -- Japanese leaders indicated on Tuesday that their nation would not become a
founding member of a new Chinese-led Asian development bank but instead remain loyal to
the United States, which has urged its allies to refrain from joining.
The officials cited concerns about the management of the new lender, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, that echoed objections raised by Washington, which sees the bank as a
challenge to American-led institutions like the World Bank. Local news reports quoted
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as saying it was important for strategic reasons that Japan
stick with the United States even when other allies like Britain and Germany have
announced they will join the new bank.
"The United States now knows that Japan is trustworthy," Mr. Abe was quoted by Kyodo News
as telling a meeting of his governing Liberal Democratic Party.
The finance minister, Taro Aso, told a news conference that Japan would not contemplate
joining until the new bank demonstrated that it had strict lending standards, including
assessments of the environmental and social impacts of development projects.
"We have no choice but to be very cautious about participation," Mr. Aso said.

Despite American objections, dozens of nations signed up ahead of the March 31 deadline set by
China to become founding members of the new bank, to be based in Beijing. The most recent
countries to join included Australia and South Korea, two of the United States' closest military
partners in the region. South Korea's decision reversed earlier expressions of agreement to
American requests to avoid the bank.
The decisions by so many allies to break with Washington have been seen as a sign of the
growing financial clout of China , which has become the largest trading partner of many
countries in the region. The new bank will confirm its founding members in April and aims to
begin operating by the end of this year.
While there have been calls in Washington for the United States to join, the Obama
administration is thought unlikely to reverse its opposition. Many American officials appear
concerned that the new lender will undermine the World Bank and also the International
Monetary Fund, two pillars of the global financial order established by the United States after
World War II.
Although China has become Japan's top trading partner, Tokyo has compelling securityrelated reasons for siding with the United States. Foremost among these is an intensified
confrontation with China over control of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea that are
claimed by both nations.
Eager to ensure that his nation has American backing in the standoff, Mr. Abe has tried to bind
Japan more closely than ever to the United States, its postwar military protector. He is
expected to emphasize Japan's close friendship, and also its growing willingness to assume a
larger military role in the region, when he visits the United States in late April.

l: Korean Unification
Unification absent US presence causes Japan to prolif
Whyte 2015 - graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
Leon, "Evolution of the US-ROK Alliance: Is There a Post-Unification Future? Pt. 2," Sep 9,
thediplomat.com/2015/09/evolution-of-the-us-rok-alliance-is-there-a-post-unification-futurept-2/
Japans difficult relationship with both Koreas will shape its views of any post-unification U.S.ROK alliance. In both South and North Korea, strong feelings of ill will, and even outright hostility, are part of the legacy of
Japans colonial history. For Tokyo, the vision of a unified Korea, possibly with nuclear weapons, as a
dagger pointed towards Japan is a nightmare scenario, especially if in the aftermath of
reunification Seoul aligns with Beijing instead of with Washington. For this reason, Japan has a
strong incentive to want the U.S.-ROK alliance to remain strong after any reunification scenario. The
president of Japans National Defense University, Masashi Nishihara, articulated this view, saying, Japan seeks a united
Korea that is friendly to Tokyo and Washington, that is economically viable and politically open,
and will allow token U.S. presence to remain. Beyond fear of a unified Korea hostile to Japan, the possibility of a
nuclear powered Korea is a major concern. If a unified Korea inherited North Koreas nuclear weapons, or
developed new capabilities, Japan would be strongly incentivized to develop its own nuclear
deterrent rather than become the only power in the region without one. If Korea remained under the
nuclear umbrella of the United States, it would have less incentive to maintain any nuclear weapon capability, and the U.S. would
likely not tolerate Seoul having nuclear weapons and remaining an ally.

Reunification kills Korea-Japan cooperation

Kydd 2015 Prof of Political Science at UW Madison
Andrew H, Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?, The
Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 2, 2015, p 63-77
Second, in losing the DPRK, China would lose its buffer against South Korea. Given how close South Korea is to the United States
and Japan, this is a serious consideration. However,

geopolitical alignments are not fixed in stone. A unified

Korea next to a friendly China would almost certainly grow more distant from the United
States and even more so from Japan. 20 KoreanJapanese cooperation is a product of
strategic necessity, one that papers over deep animosities resulting from a half
century of colonization and war. In that regard, Korea shares much more with China than
Japan. An intelligent Chinese policy toward a unified Korea could draw it away from its Cold
War friends and toward China, securing China's northeast flank much better than a bankrupt DPRK could.

l: Zero Sum
Theres a inevitable trade-off between U.S.-China relations and other U.S. alliance
relationsJapan would perceive the plan being done against them
Denyer 2014 - Washington Posts bureau chief in China
Simon, The Washington Post, Obamas Asia rebalance turns into headache as China, Japan
relations spiral down, January 23, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obamas-asiarebalance-turns-into-headache-as-china-japan-relations-spiral-down/2014/01/23/b0a158b87f5b-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html
Obama had hoped his foreign policy pivot toward Asia would shift U.S. government attention
away from trouble spots like Afghanistan and Iraq and toward a region brimming with economic
opportunities. It aimed to strengthen longstanding alliances in Asia and bring new resolve to
managing the relationship with China. But experts say the U.S. effort to deepen relations with
both China and its traditional Asian allies could become an impossible balancing act . In a
perfect world you could do both simultaneously without conflict, but in practice, whatever
you do with one side, the other side sees it as being done against them, said Ely
Ratner at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

l: US-Sino Relations
Increased U.S.-China strategic competition pushes China towards diplomacy with
Japan nowplan would remove that incentive and hurt China-Japan relations
Takahara 2015- Professor in the Faculty of Law at The University of Tokyo
Akio, Are JapanChina relations sweetening or souring?, Sep 9,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/09/are-japan-china-relations-sweetening-or-souring/
Are JapanChina relations on a collision course? The two thorny issues between Japan and
China are history and security. But despite these problems, there is a case for cautious optimism
for the time being. 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. Prime Minister Shinzo Abes remorseful anniversary
statement was received with scepticism in China, while President Xi Jinpings statement at the commemorative military parade did
not touch on post-war efforts for cooperation and reconciliation at all. Chinese patrol boats continue to intrude into the territorial
waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands three times a month. Meanwhile, the Japanese Diet is discussing new security
legislations that would allow Japan to implement its right of collective self-defence. The government hopes this will strengthen its
alliance with the United States and its security ties with other friendly countries, but the move has been met with concern in China.

the two
countries have not lost the momentum to improve their relations. But how long is it going to
last? Simply put, the momentum should continue while Xi stays firmly at the helm. The four factors
that brought about the rapprochement between the two countries since 2014 have not been lost. First,
Abe also did not visit China to commemorate the end of WWII on 3 September. Despite all these events, it seems

although strategic competition is intensifying due to Chinas rapid military build-up and active maritime advancement, neither of
the two countries wishes to go to war. In May and June 2014, there were two consecutive near-miss incidents between military
aircraft over the East China Sea. One such incident would have been concerning enough, but to have two near-miss incidents was
very alarming indeed. Both Japan and China realised that they must resume active dialogue to avoid any accidents that would
escalate the situation. Second, Chinas economic slowdown is a reality and many localities are suffering from accumulated bad loans
and fiscal deficit. Japan remains an important economic partner for China, especially in these times of need. But after Japan
nationalised the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012, violent anti-Japanese demonstrations led to Japanese businesses being destroyed,
burned and looted. It was estimated that the damage to Japanese businesses in China amounted to 10 billion yen (US$80 million).
The Chinese leadership realised that tension in the political relationship was one factor discouraging Japanese enterprises from
investing in China. Third, China

is facing difficulties promoting its new type of major country relations

with the United States. The two countries agree to cooperate and expand their mutual interests
in economic, environmental and other areas, but strategic competition is intensifying in the
Western Pacific and extending into areas such as cyberspace and space. The tense relations with
the US helped prompt China to refocus on neighbourhood diplomacy and rebalance toward Japan.
Fourth, Xi Jinping has consolidated his domestic power base through his anti-corruption campaign and by heading newly
established policy-making institutions. He has no reason to worry about domestic criticism if he adjusts his attitude towards Japan.
While a soft policy toward Japan has traditionally been an easy target for political rivals to criticise the Party leadership, Xi has
already established his power and authority, and his image of a tough leader. All

the above factors still remain in

place. The two governments continue to seek the next opportunity for their leaders to meet. But there are some signs that
promoting relations further will not be an easy process.

l: Assurances
Plan abandons reassurances for Japan, causes militarization and adventurism
Drezner 2015 - Prof of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @
Tufts
Daniel W, Just how entangling are America's Alliances, Aug 4,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/04/just-how-entangling-areamericas-alliances/
Allies that can rely on their own resources should be less insecure, and therefore less in need of reassurance, thereby reducing the
risk of U.S. military entanglements. There is a but, however. One

of the other hypothesized effects of alliances is

that they constrain the smaller state. Countries in need of U.S. security reassurances will be less
likely to engage in risky foreign policy behavior if it puts those reassurances at risk . The big
question going forward is whether countries like Japan or Saudi Arabia, after being encouraged to
build up their own capabilities, also feel less constrained to use those capabilities against
adversaries. The Saudi campaign in Yemen is an example of this kind of more aggressive behavior. Reassurance is a
necessary but tricky part of diplomacy. Too little reassurance, and allies freak out that
they are being abandoned. Too much reassurance, and allies believe they have a blank check to do what they want. It seems
that Carter is walking the fine line between these two extremes. One wonders if his successors will be as adept.

l: Japanese Abandonment
Japan will feel abandoned by the plan, spurs even more militarism
Auslin 2016 - Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute
Michael, "Japan's New Realism," Foreign Affairs March/April Issue
REMAKING ASIA By slowly eliminating its restraints

on security cooperation, by deepening its

relationship with the United States, and by emphasizing more muscular, liberal rhetoric, Abes Japan has
positioned itself as a sort of anti-China in Asia and beyond. Yet many of the other restrictions on Japans military
remain in place, and these will not be revoked anytime soon. Japans society would not allow its military to play a more normal role
in dealing with foreign crises; the Japanese also remain highly wary of entangling alliances. Yet many

of Japans eliteswho
are worried about the threats from China and North Korea and who fear that the U nited S tates is
distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine have embraced the countrys new realism .
Leading thinkers, including the journalist Yoichi Funabashi, the former diplomat Kuni Miyake, the political scientist Koji
Murata, and the former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto, are among those writing and speaking about the need for a
more muscular Japanese posture. Indeed, there is a growing community of academics, policy
analysts, and politicians who believe that Japan must do more to ensure its own security, as well as
to help support the global system that has protected it since the end of World War II. As Abe expands Japans global role, his policies
will include new activities abroad and entail deeper security cooperation with existing partners .

The more unstable the

global environment becomes, the more Japan will need to play a global role commensurate with
its size and economic strength. That role should take advantage of multilateral organizations, but it will, realistically,
privilege Japans security. After decades of stagnation in Japans foreign and security policies, the new posture will contribute to the
maintenance of Asias liberal postWorld War II order over the coming decade and beyond. Abes policies, which build on some of
those of his predecessors, are a series of small yet interlinked steps that will enhance Japans security, diplomacy, and economy. In
focusing primarily on stemming the growing threat from China, Abe is attempting a tricky balance: to prevent the souring of
relations between Beijing and Tokyo but also to keep Asias balance of power from tilting too far toward China. Abes plans are
controversial, but a healthy democratic tension between a largely pacifistic populace and an elite that worries about emerging
threats to Japans security will likely help Tokyo avoid the extremes of isolation, on the one hand, and intervention, on the other. In
openly advocating liberal values,

Abe is making clear that he recognizes Japans responsibility to

preserve stability. Japans new policies are particularly important in ensuring that the U.S.Japanese alliance, which remains perhaps the key guarantor of regional peace, will remain a credible
and robust instrument in the coming decades. Seven decades after the end of World War II, Japan is once again becoming a military
player of some significance in Asia, as well as a political force. Yet unlike during the 1930s, when ultranationalism propelled Japan
onto a disastrous path of invasion and war against its neighbors, today Japan is shedding old restraints so as to strengthen and

In a world where resurgent

authoritarian powers threaten global peace, Japans new realism will help shape the next decade
in the Pacific and ensure that no one power dominates Asia.
defend the open, liberal system that has enriched Asia and led to decades of general stability.

l: US Withdrawal
China will have to step up in the vacuum, heightens tension
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 31-32
As discussed earlier, China's expanding role in the world has resulted in new vulnerabilities its leaders must mitigate. Regarding
China's maritime interests in the Pacific, the first among these vulnerabilities is China's reliance on the Strait of Malacca to provide
energy for its economy. Although China is attempting to develop alternate pathways for oil imports, including a pipeline through
Burma, pipelines from central Asia, and perhaps a canal through Thailand's isthmus, these alternatives come with their own
vulnerabilities and, in any case, will not remove China's dependence on the massive flow of tankers and merchant ships through the
Strait of Malacca (China receives 85 percent of its crude oil imports through the strait, a quantity that pipelines from Central Asia
will not be able to replace).67 It is disturbing to note that while China has settled eleven land border disputes with six of its northern
and western neighbors since 1998-in many cases ceding more than half of its original claims-it has accelerated its demands for its
maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. 68 China is thus not opposed on principle to settling territorial claims. If, for
example, China's main interest in the Near Seas was the exploitation of their vast hydrocarbon potential (an important strategic
interest for China), it would seem a straightforward matter to set aside sovereignty questions and instead negotiate deals with Japan,
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others to develop and share the seas' oil and gas. The fact that China has done little to pursue
this course indicates its unwillingness or inability to achieve mutually advantageous agreements with its maritime neighbors.
Instead, China has chosen to build up its naval, air, and land-based missile power, aimed at maritime dominance (see more about
this in chapter 4). It is alarming that China has chosen a confrontational path, backed by increasing military power, rather than a

China's
leaders undoubtedly conclude that they must hedge against uncertainty over America's future
position in the region. The first concern of China's military planners is the potential for military-technical breakthroughs
negotiated path that would be mutually beneficial and that China has used for disputes with other neighbors. Finally,

that could suddenly expose China to unforeseen danger. Like other observers, China's leaders were stunned by the technical and
tactical efficiency displayed by U.S. military forces in Iraq in 1991, in Afghanistan in 2001, and again in Iraq in 2003.69 Since 1945,
U.S. military-technical breakthroughs-nuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles and bombers, stealth technology, and precisionguided munitions-have appeared to have stunning geopolitical consequences, at least to military planners responsible for countering
U.S. military capabilities. These

and other technical breakthroughs gave U.S. military planners and

policymakers the freedom to fashion competitive military strategies that overcame adversary
advantages and allowed the United States to achieve its geostrategic goals at reasonable costs .70
With the United States thus viewed as a source of frequent strategic surprise, China's leaders undoubtedly view energetic military
modernization as the least risky course of action. China's

leaders must also hedge against the possibility of a

precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the region. A U.S. withdrawal would lead to a scramble for
security by the other powers in the region, with unpredictable consequences (discussed in chapter 2).
For China's leaders, the natural hedge to this contingency is the same: broad-based military
modernization, with an emphasis on the high-technology components of modernization, such as missiles, aircraft, warships,
electronics, and space systems. From the perspective of Beijing, the purpose of this modernization is to allow
China to peacefully expand its zone of security, especially in the maritime domain, while
continuing to enjoy the benefits of the open global economic and financial system.

l: Yes Japan Perceives the Plan

Japans number one fear is US abandonment in the face of Chinese aggression
Glosserman 2016 Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu
Brad, Peak Japan and its implications for regional security,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/peak-japan/SR86_Peak_Japan.pdf
While the Sankei Shimbun is one of Japans most conservative newspapers, it isnt alone in concluding that the ever-increasing
defence budgets reflect Chinas dangerous intentions and moves to seize the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa by force.23 Especially

worrisome for Japan are the steadily growing capabilities of the PLA Navy. A nation that depends
on sea lines for its survivalfor both imports of basic raw materials, including food and energy, and for exports is
going to be acutely sensitive to any threats to those lifelines. Yutaka Kawashima, a former vice foreign minister of
Japan, concluded that an obsession about the scarcity of key natural resources in Japan seems to have
deeply embedded in the national psyche.24 This focus renders even more worrisome Chinas
claims to the South China Sea, its creation of artificial islands and the militarisation of that territory. Speaking after
reports that Chinese missiles had been deployed on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Island group, Minister of Defense Gen
Nakatani said: Construction of a stronghold in the South China Sea, the use for military purposes, and unilateral
actions that increase tensions by changing the status quo are a common concern of international
society, and our country takes the position that it is important for international society to coordinate to protect an open, free,
peaceful sea.25 The impact of Chinese actions is magnified by two concerns. The first is the historical rivalry between Tokyo and
Beijing for regional leadership. Japan was the leading country of Asia for most of the 20th century and has long assumed that was its
rightful place. The rise of China and its overtaking of Japan have unnerved many Japanese; JapanChina relations during the past
120 years and the humiliations

inflicted on China by Japan in the first half of the last century create anxieties
a fear that scores will be settled.
The anti-Japanese sentiment that surfaced in China in recent years when tensions rose between the two
countries is proof that such fears arent paranoia . The second concern is related but nevertheless distinct: the
prospect of a shift in the regional balance of power. The 2015 Defense White Paper
discussion of US security policy noted the severe financial situation, deep cuts in spending and the impact of the
2013 congressional sequester.26 It concluded, laconically, that Much attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration
about the readiness of the Chinese to let the past remain history. To be blunt, theres

cuts in defense spending will impact the US defense strategies and security policies outlined in the [Quadrennial Defense Review]
and other documents.27 These straitened circumstances are a stark contrast to the largesse enjoyed by the PLA; not surprisingly,
the Defense Ministrys assessment of the AsiaPacific regional security environment focuses on shifts in the balance of power and

Worries about US defence spending

are compounded by fears that Washington will be distracted by crises elsewhere in the world. Chaos

the rising influence of China and Russia on the international community.

in the Middle Eastthe civil war in Syria, the emergence of ISIS, the deterioration of Iraq and Libyaalong with Russias muscle
flexing on its European periphery have prompted concern that Obamas rebalance to Asia may yet prove to be a pivot and that US
attention will shift once again to more traditional theatres. Japanese efforts contribute to its own defence, parry US complaints
(typically voiced during election campaigns) that Japan isnt pulling its weight as an ally, and thicken the weave of ties to make any
disengagement more difficult.

2nc misc blocks

overview
DA outweighs and turns case:
a. Magnitude Japanese nuke acquisition causes Chinese attacks--that draws in
global allies and sparks nuclear war
[miscalc escalates --- traditional checks on accidental launches dont solve because Japan lacks
expertise]
b. Timeframe political conflict and historical tension mean tension are high
the plan removes the US as a check on conflict emboldens China and scares
Japan that ensures lashout is immediate. Thats tan
Turns SCS conflict--Japanese prolif spillsover to broader arms race China has maritime disputes with
Japan now. they perceive Japanese nukes as a threat which makes SCS regional
conflict more probable than the US refusing to join the AIIB thats novak
Turns Korean war Japanese nuclear acquisition inspires north korea to compete
regionally bc of east asia competition thats tan.

AT: Alliance inev

AT: Interdependence Checks

Interdependence theory is wrong on Asia, geoeconomic competition makes war
more likely
Bajpaee 2016 - doctoral candidate in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London
Chietigj, "Japan and China: The Geo-Economic Dimension," Mar 28,
thediplomat.com/2016/03/japan-and-china-the-geo-economic-dimension/
There was a time in the not too distant past when the realm of economics and geopolitics were mutually
exclusive domains in Asia. Despite historical baggage and geopolitical rivalries among regional powers, economic
integration and inter-dependence went from strength to strength as the end of the Cold War removed
ideological constraints on economic interactions. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Sino-Japanese relationship, where
despite historical animosities rooted in the legacy of the Second World War, bilateral trade and investment relations flourished.
Sino-Japanese trade grew to $340 billion in 2014, with China emerging as Japans leading trade partner and Japan becoming
Chinas second-largest trading partner. Japanese investment in China followed a similar trajectory, growing to more that $100

a newer phenomenon is the

growing complementarity between the realm of economics and geopolitics. More specifically, contrary to
the neo-liberal narrative that growing economic integration will eventually give way to a lessening of geopolitical tensions , we
have instead witnessed the spill over of geopolitical rivalries into the realm of economic
interactions. To be sure, this development is not unique to Asia but rather forms part of a broader global trend in which
billion in 2014, making Japan the leading source of foreign investment for China. However,

globalization is increasingly challenged by neo-mercantilism, and in which economic interdependence fails to act as a brake on
conflict. The strain on Europes economic relationship with Russia following Moscows annexation of Crimea in 2014 is evidence of
this. In Asia the rise of geo-economics the correlation of geopolitical considerations with economic interests can be traced to
Chinas abandonment of Deng Xiao-pings mantra of biding time and maintaining a low profile in international relations. Coming
on the heels of the trans-Atlantic financial crisis of 2008, China

has demonstrated greater assertiveness in the

geopolitical domain. In doing so, it has not shied away from using its economy as a tool of
geopolitics. Early evidence of this was Chinas weaponization of trade through a ban on the
export of rare earths in 2010 and restrictions on the import of bananas from the Philippines in 2012, both of which
followed tensions over maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas , respectively.
This trend has only grown in prominence under the more assertive leadership of President Xi Jinping in China. In
part, this can be attributed to Chinas economy moving up the value-chain towards more highend manufacturing while its outbound investments have moved away from resource extraction
towards exporting capital goods and construction services (areas that increasingly overlap with Japan).This
comes amid the re-balancing of Chinas economy toward a new normal of slower growth, which has resulted in a proclivity by
Chinese companies to seek overseas growth opportunities and export excess industrial capacity through overseas infrastructure
projects. This has been facilitated by initiatives such as One Belt, One Road (also known as the 21st Century New Maritime Silk Road
and Silk Road Economic Belt) and the drive to improve the efficiency of Chinas state-owned enterprises in order to create national
champions that can more effectively compete on the world stage. The numbers speak for themselves: Chinas outbound investment
has surged from $2 billion in 2004 to over $80 billion in 2014 and almost $120 billion in 2015. In many ways, the Chinese outbound
investment story echoes what happened in Japan in the 1980s when the re-valuation of the yen against the U.S. dollar following the
1985 Plaza Accord prompted many Japanese companies to go global to compensate for Japans slowing growth and rising
production costs at home. With respect to Japan, Japanese companies have increasingly pursued a China Plus strategy of
diversifying their investments in Asia beyond their traditional focus on China. This has been fuelled by both commercial
considerations (such as rising labor costs and poor enforcement of intellectual property rights in China) but also by political factors
such as the potential for Japanese brands to come under scrutiny and even attack during periods of deterioration in the SinoJapanese relationship. It has been complemented by a more proactive and omni-directional foreign policy under Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, which has entailed stepped up engagement with the regions other fast-growing economies, including Vietnam,
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Myanmar. In doing so, Southeast Asia has now emerged as Japans leading investment destination in
Asia. Railway Rivalries In this context, China

and Japan have increasingly emerged as regional economic

competitors, as evidenced by their nascent rivalry in securing lucrative infrastructure contracts. The most visible sign of this has
been in the railway industry: In October 2015 a Japanese consortium lost a $5 billion contract to China Railway Group to build
Indonesias first high-speed railway connecting Jakarta and Bandung. The same year, Japan leveraged its burgeoning relationship
with India to secure a $15 billion deal to construct a high-speed line between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. Japan is also due to begin
construction of a high-speed rail link in Thailand while Chinese companies have begun work on a railway project in Laos. Both
countries along with South Korea are also engaged in a bidding war over a high-speed rail link between Singapore and the Malaysian
capital, Kuala Lumpur. To counter Chinas cost advantage Japan has pledged better technology and safety standards and operational
support over the full lifecycle of its projects. It has also offered more benefits to local economies through hiring and training local

workers, as opposed to the common Chinese practice of importing labor for Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. This

competition to sell high-speed rail infrastructure has emerged as microcosm of a broader SinoJapanese rivalry for industrial supremacy in Asia, with power generation, nuclear power,
telecoms, and port and road infrastructure also emerging as areas of potential competition. In this
nascent rivalry, the regions multilateral lending bodies could emerge as new platforms of competition in the bilateral relationship.
To be sure, it would be an exaggeration to characterize the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) as purely Japan or China-led organizations, with the ADB maintaining 67 member states and the AIIB having 57
founding members. Moreover, the relationship between these bodies is unlikely to be purely competitive, as evidenced by efforts by
the AIIB to adopt the best practices of the more well established ADB with respect to labor, environmental and anti-corruption
safeguards while both organizations identify opportunities for co-financing projects. However, China and Japans overwhelming
influence in the AIIB and ADB (with both countries holding the largest voting share in their respective organization) ensures a
degree of rivalry in their activities. Furthermore, this

rivalry is unlikely to be confined to East Asia. For instance,

both countries are seeking to strengthen economic connectivity in the Eurasian region through
such initiatives as the Central Asia Plus Japan dialogue and Chinas Silk Road Fund and
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has also concluded an agreement to provide financial support to Iran
to build the countrys high-speed rail network, which came on the heels of Xis visit to the country in January following the lifting of
international sanctions on the country the same month. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will follow this up with a visit to Iran in
August, the first official visit by a Japanese leader since 1978, which aims to strengthen economic ties with the country. Winners and
Losers The recipients of these investments will be the main beneficiaries of this competition as they seek to leverage the SinoJapanese rivalry to secure the best investment terms. For instance, the Indonesian government was able secure a loan from the
China Development Bank for the high-speed rail project with minimal financial burden. Similarly, a plethora of deals were
concluded during Xi Jinpings visit to India in September 2014, including a five-year economic and trade development plan that
entails the development of industrial parks and the upgrading of Indias rail network. The fact that Xis visit to India came on the
heels of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modis visit to Japan the same month demonstrates the Modi governments ability to
leverage the latent rivalry in the Sino-Japanese relationship to maximize investment commitments from both countries. However,
this competition may also prompt companies from both countries to cut corners and make irresponsible investments that face
greater financial, operational or political risk. The Chinese high-speed rail project in Indonesia is already running into difficulties,
which has raised concerns that it could follow in the footsteps of an infamous contract for the Northrail project in the Philippines
that China won in 2004 but ultimately shelved in 2012. This alludes to a persistent gap in the rhetoric and reality of Chinas overseas
investment commitments. Even once these projects have got off the ground some have them have been mired in controversies
related to social, environmental, commercial and/or security risks. For instance, Australias Foreign Investment Review Board has
recently increased scrutiny of sales of critical infrastructure, such as ports and utilities, which has been partially fuelled by concerns
over Chinese investment. Chinas deteriorating relations with Myanmar and Sri Lanka in recent years have also been ostensibly
linked to concerns over the terms and nature of Chinese investment in these states (although controversial Chinese-funded
infrastructure projects that have been suspended such as the Myitsone dam and hydroelectric power project and Letpaddaung
copper mine in Myanmar and Port City project in Sri Lanka have subsequently been resumed). These investments could also create
problems back home through a surge in toxic debt and defaults, fuelled by the risk of expropriation and concerns over the absorptive
capacity of such massive financial commitments in recipient countries. Questions are also being raised about the actual need for the
technologies being flaunted by China and Japan, including high-speed rail, which requires a particular distance and population
demographic to be lucrative and effective. In this context, it may make more sense for both countries to develop intra-city railway
systems, such as the Japan-funded Delhi Metro in India, rather than long-distance high-speed inter-city rail. Meanwhile, despite the
hype of the Sino-Japanese railway rivalry, this nascent competition may be cut short by the economic challenges that confront both
countries. For China, Xis anti-corruption campaign has created a more risk-averse outbound investment climate. The slowdown in
Chinas economy has also led to a growing discussion of a replay of the late 1990s, when the Chinese economy underwent a massive
restructuring amid rising unemployment and debt levels and the privatization and consolidation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
The concern in China is not so much that of a hard-landing (given the strong buffer provided by Chinas massive foreign exchange
reserves) but rather slow progress in structural reforms, such as supply-side reforms aimed at cutting excess industrial capacity
and overhauling SOEs, which includes the possibility of allowing them to fail if necessary. Similarly, in Japan, despite the hype of
Abes three arrows reform agenda (comprising fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms), the Japanese economy
remains in the midst of deflationary pressures. Ultimately however, these developments are likely to merely delay rather than deter
the competition for industrial primacy in Asia. The recent bid by Chinese SOE Chemchina for Swiss agricultural company Syngenta,
if approved, will be the single largest Chinese foreign acquisition to date. This demonstrates that despite concerns over a slowdown
in outbound investment and more risk-averse investment climate, China will remain an important economic player on the world
stage. The structural reforms that China underwent in the late 1990s were facilitated by the countrys admission to the World Trade
Organization in 2001. Similar external pressures such as Japans admission to the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade
agreement may force both countries out of their complacency and prompt them to enact necessary but painful reforms. Should they
do so, new

avenues of geo-economic competition are likely to present themselves. There are

already signs of this with both countries building up their defense export industry .

Having lifted a 70-year ban on military exports in 2014, Japan is vying for a contract to export its Soryu-class submarines to
Australia while securing a deal with India for its ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft. China has a clear lead in this race, having
emerged as the worlds third largest exporter of arms, with shipments growing by 143 percent in the last five years, according to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Moreover, as the rate of increase in Chinas defense budget slows to single digit

levels, a growing space has emerged for private sector companies in competitive tenders for military procurement, with the PLAs
General Armaments Department announcing 505 open tenders so far. Military Dimensions Finally, there

are also
possibilities for this largely economic rivalry to spill over into the military arena as
China and Japan build up their power projection capabilities to protect their overseas
investments. The reinterpretation of Japans pacifist constitution to permit collective self-defense has
already given its Self-Defense Forces the mandate to expand overseas operations, as evidenced by
participation in anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and regular air patrols, port calls and joint naval exercises in the South China
Sea. Chinas 2015 defense white paper also makes specific reference to the need to protect Chinese institutions, personnel and
assets abroad. In operationalizing this objective China passed a new counterterrorism law in December 2015, which lays the
groundwork for the PLA to be sent abroad on counterterrorism operations with the consent of the country where it is intervening, in
contrast to its long-standing position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Interdependence assumes a period of calm, not a period of heightened tensions

Ayson and Ball 2014
Robert A [prof of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington] & Desmond [Emeritus
Professor at the Australian National University ], Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?,
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014, p. 135-166
Not everyone is convinced that even a limited North Asian war is especially plausible. But some of the arguments that such a conflict
is unlikely, including those made in these pages by Richard Bitzinger and Barry Desker just a few years ago, are being tested.2 There
is growing support for the view that war between Japan and China is a possibility that needs to be taken seriously. As 2014
approached, ominous comparisons were being drawn between contemporary tensions in North Asia and the guns of August in
Europe 100 years earlier.3 The analogy itself became a matter of contention between the two major North Asian powers, when
Beijing angrily rejected Abe's suggestion, made at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, that the Sino-Japanese relationship
resembled that of Germany and Britain in the lead-up to the First World War. Given the unceasing academic debate over the causes
of that conflict, the analogy is imperfect. Nonetheless, the

centenary served as a reminder of the possibility of

catastrophic conflicts that owe as much to misadventure and miscalculation as they do to wilful
aggression and war by design. Such a comparison seems especially apt because few observers of North Asian
affairs believe that Japan and China desire a war of any sort. This is partly because they are so
economically intertwined with each other, and so dependent on overseas supply, that hostilities would be likely to
have high costs for both countries. Beijing and Tokyo are also aware that a serious conflict would harm the peaceful, defensive
reputations that they each seek. But

these arguments assume that the leaders of Japan and China will
have the opportunity to make rational decisions in a period of calm, rather than face desperate
choices in a more heated moment. A war may occur if one side pushes the other too far due to
misplaced confidence that provocative acts can be continued without crossing the threshold into
actual hostilities. It is tempting to believe that Japan and China's pushing and prodding of each other in the East China Sea,
along with their rhetorical competition, are theatrical games of bluff and brinkmanship designed to achieve their goals without the
use of violence. In this mode, China may be emboldened by the knowledge that it appears to have displaced the Philippine presence
from Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea without firing a shot.

AT: Japan Following U.S. Opposition

Japan opposition actually played a role in forming the U.S. policy response to AIIB
--- threatens Japanese leadership and ADB dominance. Thats Harris.
U.S. & Japan concerned by Chinese aggression regarding the AIIB --- and
independently, the perception of growing U.S-Sino relations ignites fears in Japan
Terada, 5/25/16 --- professor of international relations at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan
(Dr. Takashi Terada, U.S.-Japan Partnership and Geo-Economic Regionalism in Asia: The Rise
of TPP and AIIB, http://www.us-jpri.org/en/voice/voice14.pdf, article downloaded 6/14/16,
JMP)
Prime Minister Abe and TPP After Shinzo Abe

returned to power in December 2012, Japan became more

motivated to strengthen its alliance with the U nited S tates, as exemplified in Abes effort to pass new security
legislation in the Diet in September 2015, which has promised to widen the role and scope of the overseas activities of Self-Defence
Forces. Abe

viewed the U.S.-led TPP as essential for not only its economic benefits, but also its
geopolitical impact, and has often stressed the TPPs role in sustaining U.S. regional
engagement toward promoting regional security . The U.S.Japanese commitment to
the TPP conclusion in October 2015 illustrated their direct concern for Chinas aggressive
economic and strategic moves in the region, especially regarding the AIIB and the
South China Sea. Abes special interest in the TPP relates to interest in the universal values of
freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as elements of a political foundation for
economics-oriented rule making, thereby implying that TPP members will take collective action
both economically and politically against countries that do not share those values, especially
China . With this foreign policy orientation, Abe seems to view the exclusion of China as a major feature in the TPP.
According to Shotaro Yachi, Abes chief foreign policy advisor, the significance of these common
values originated during the first Abe administration in 20062007 due to Japans anxiety
that the U nited S tates and China were becoming more closely tied , as insinuated by thenDeputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellicks responsible stakeholder statement that indicated a
possible G-2 within the U.S.-led international institution . The concept of common values was thus originally
designed to arouse U.S. awareness that Japan, not China, shared Americas primary political and social values as part of a
foundation for forging a more robust political and strategic partnership. In that light, Abes stress on universal values in Japans
commitment to the TPP stemmed from his strong view that the U.S.Japan partnership is vital for the successful launch of the TPP,
which Abe expected to serve as not only an important instrument for accessing Asian-Pacific economic growth and for putting
Japans economy back on track, but also for checking Chinas rise.

***note when prepping file --- a version of this evidence is also in the link block for
the fragmentation net benefit
U.S. and Japan both decided to not join because they shared similar concerns
about AIIB
Terada, 5/25/16 --- professor of international relations at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan
(Dr. Takashi Terada, U.S.-Japan Partnership and Geo-Economic Regionalism in Asia: The Rise
of TPP and AIIB, http://www.us-jpri.org/en/voice/voice14.pdf, article downloaded 6/14/16,
JMP)

The U nited S tates and Japan also came to share the same basic stance on the AIIB,
according to their reasons for not joining . For one, the AIIB will undercut existing
institutions and could loosen lending standards . Furthermore, given the requirement
for fair governance, some infrastructural projects may be unsustainable, particularly in posing
too much of a burden on the environment. Lastly, the AIIB may not prevent taxpayers money
from being used without restriction due to the lack of transparency. The often highlighted $ 8 trillion of demand
for infrastructure projects in Asia can be questionable as China dominates the figure (nearly 4.5 trillion dollars) as seen in the Figure 1 below.

China can theoretically manipulate the AIIB to help Chinas own infrastructure
demands with the money coming from more experienced other nations and financial
institutions with skilful expertise. This moral hazard problem should also be clearly presented. In
sum, since the AIIB will not mitigate these undesired effects that contradict current US and
Japanese rules and norms concerning foreign aid and infrastructure investment, neither country
has sought participation in the organisation. This assessment seemed to be sustained by Chinas
Finance Minister, Lou Jiwei, who indicated that China has little appetite for rules that the
U nited S tates and Japan have cherished , given his claim that the West puts forward some
rules that we dont think are optimal. [graph omitted] Having Japan on board would show
regional solidarity and allow the AIIB to secure multilateral credit functionality, which it would
otherwise lack. In short, high credit standards reduce the cost of fund procurement, and most
AIIB members are politically unstable and have problems with their national creditthat is,
lower credit ratingsnot to mention with their legal systems and their enforcement. In fact,
Chinas state-owned financial institutions, including the China Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank of China, have only AA- ratings, while the World Bank and the ADB hold
AAA ratings. It is part of their shared tactics that the AIIB can be kept as a lower-rating financial
institution by their non-participation in it.

Japan opposes AIIB --- sees it as a challenge to its regional economic leadership
Terada, 5/25/16 --- professor of international relations at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan
(Dr. Takashi Terada, U.S.-Japan Partnership and Geo-Economic Regionalism in Asia: The Rise
of TPP and AIIB, http://www.us-jpri.org/en/voice/voice14.pdf, article downloaded 6/14/16,
JMP) *** note --- JBIC = Japan Bank of International Cooperation
Japans institutional responses
Following American views on the AIIB, Japan under Prime Minister Abe

did not join the AIIB, which it conceived

as a challenge to the prominence of both it and the U nited S tates in the regions
economic order-creating . Indeed, Abe sceptically described it in the following manner: a company that borrows
money from a so-called bad loan shark may overcome immediate problems, but will end up losing its future. The [AIIB] should not
turn into something like that.. The

AIIBs ascendance with the participation of major EU member states ,

provided Japan with a new incentive to renovate its policies regarding infrastructure .
In May 2015, Abe quickly responded by announcing a plan to increase investment in
infrastructure in Asia by 30% to $110 billion during 20162020. Moreover, Japan promised to offer $6.2
however, has

billion of new ODA to the Mekong region, where Chinas economic and political presence is dominant, by expanding the financial
basis of domestic agencies, including the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), by supplying funds from the private sector. In terms of fiscal investment and loan programs in 2016, JICA will take
$4.1 billion and JBIC $11 billion, up by 20% and 70%, respectively, compared to the previous year. Another incentive to beef up
Japans Asian infrastructure-oriented policy also came from China, when Indonesia decided to offer China the JakartaBandung
high-speed rail project contract in September 2015, despite Japan having been involved in the project since 2008 and China for
hardly more than half a year. Key components of the Chinese proposal include funding that does not require the Indonesian
government to provide any guarantee or state budget and a completion timeframe of only three years, which means the project will

conclude while President Joko Widodo is still in office. Moreover, China has agreed to jointly produce train cars not only for highspeed trains, but also electric and light rail, all of which would be used in the local train system. To support the program, China has
even agreed to build an aluminium plant to provide raw materials to manufacture train cars. Overall, Chinas offerperhaps only to
win the bidseems to be overkill for only 150 km of railway. From one angle, Chinas generous approach to Indonesias high-speed
railway contract is a reflection of its eagerness to realise its OBOR initiative, a strategy in which Indonesia forms the eastern edge.
Yet, the land acquisition cost is expected to rise 3 trillion rupiah (227 million dollars), a huge financial burden possibly causing the
delay in the construction. The United Kingdom, another state to which China has promised massive investments in infrastructural
development, including the construction of nuclear power plants, serves as the western end of this policy. Japans loss to Chinas bid
was a blow to the Abe governments policy aim to attain economic growth by expanding infrastructural projects overseas and Japan
responded swiftly by shortening the application process from three years to one and by simplifying the implementation process by
aligning paperwork needed for multiple steps, for infrastructure projects, especially those involving high-speed rail, which focused
on improving quality. Japan has also become more expeditious in executing infrastructural projects in Asia by reducing funding
guarantees by the recipient government from 100% to 50% in the case of yen loans, as well as by reforming the JBIC law to make
risky infrastructure investments possible. Importantly, changes

in quantity and quality in its aid policy, all in

pursuit of Asian infrastructure, were decided without any clear decision on potential
participation in the China-led AIIB. Hiroshi Watanabe, the Governor of JBIC, welcomed the AIIB
which can bring more funds to finance regional infrastructure projects but he did not expect
JBIC to cooperate with the AIIB on loans and investment because of the latters
looser governance criteria . Japan also became more committed to the partnership with the ADB by establishing a
trust fund within it financed by the JICA to support the infrastructure projects led by private sectors. This approach is also designed
to help the JICA provide its funds towards more risky projects beyond its traditional manners.

AT: Japan Will Follow On & Join

Japan wont join --- lack of trust and communication
Dr. Kawai, 15 --- Professor at the University of Tokyos Graduate School of Public Policy (last
modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK:
CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the
Evolving International Financial Order, http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIBReport_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)
5. OPTIONS FOR JAPAN (1) Reasons for Japans Decision Not to Join AIIB Japan

decided not to sign the

Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the AIIB, stayed away from Articles of
Agreement negotiations, and did not consider signing the Articles of Agreement for at least three
reasons: lack of trust and communication, concerns over governance and geopolitical
misgivings. Lack of Trust and Communication The two countries leaders Japans Shinzo Abe and Chinas Xi Jinping
have never held a bilateral summit since they assumed office in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
Relations between the two countries have been poor since 2012 when Japan nationalized the Senkaku
Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China). The history issue has also been a negative factor. The two leaders met only briefly
and informally in November 2014 at the Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and in May 2015 at the
Bandung Conference, and Xi reportedly invited Abe to join AIIB in Bandung. But they

have not had an opportunity to

discuss details of AIIB, Asias development issues, the challenges Asia and the two countries face or their visions for the
future of Asia. The two countries finance ministers Japans Taro Aso and Chinas Lou Jiwei have not held
frequent meetings to exchange views on either AIIB or how the two countries can work together
on economic and financial issues. It was in early June 2015 that the two ministers met for the first time to discuss issues
of mutual interest and possible cooperation. They agreed to promote infrastructure investment in Asia, including through
development financial institutions, and Lou reportedly said to Aso that the door was open if Japan wanted to join the new bank.
However, the

two seem not to have exchanged views over Japans deep doubts over the functions
and roles of AIIB. The lack of trust and communication has led the Japanese to believe that
China might want to exclude Japan from AIIB. If there was any invitation from China at
the ministerial level or higher, it came too late . Japan doubts whether AIIB will
maintain transparency in its decision-making and operations or in its capacity to conduct
adequate due diligence of loan projects. These concerns have also contributed to Japans
indecisiveness about joining the bank.

AT: Link Turns

Any turn doesnt assume unilateral action of plan
Obe, 1/18/16 (Mitsuro, Dow Jones Newswires Chinese (English), U.S. Should Join China
Infrastructure Bank, Former Envoy to ADB Says, Factiva, JMP) ***Note --- Robert Orr is
former U.S. ambassador to the ADB
Both Japan and the U.S. opted to stay out of the AIIB, voicing concern about its governance
structure. Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso emphasized Friday that "there is no change" to
Japan's position . Many key U.S. allies, including Britain, France and Australia, joined the AIIB, to the embarrassment of
Washington. Mr. Orr, who was brought in to the Manila-based ADB by the Obama administration in 2010, said
the U.S. will probably join the AIIB "at some point." "The best thing we can do is to figure out how to manage this
thing, how we work with these guys, how we point them in a direction that is consistent with our interests," he said. But he said that

"it is absolutely necessary that any kind of action taken with the AIIB will have to
be undertaken in coordination with the government of Japan."

AT: Plan solves Japanese Militarism

Abe already scrapped constraints, plan wont miraculously end his nationalist
commitments
Auslin 2016 - Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute
Michael, "Japan's New Realism," Foreign Affairs March/April Issue
Abes next movepushing through laws to allow Japans military to mobilize abroadsparked even more public outcry. Japans

constitutional prohibition on collective self-defense had created various awkward problems for the country
over the years; among other things, it required the Diet to pass a special law every time Japan wanted to deploy its forces overseas.
Now, under

Abes reform (which was passed by parliament last September), the government has the right to
assist allies whose forces or territory are under attack and provide logistical support to countries
engaged in military operations that do not directly concern Japans security. Abe has also begun to boost
Japans military capabilities. After a decade of military stagnation, he has gradually increased the defense
budget: by 2.9 percent in 2014 and 2.8 percent in 2015. In December 2015, the Diet passed an increase of 1.5
percent for 2016, which would bring Japans total annual defense spending to a record $42.4 billion. These additions pale in
comparison to Chinas $132 billion defense tab in 2014 and double-digit budget hikes in recent years. Yet they are nonetheless
significant. Abe

has reaffirmed Nodas plan to buy 42 F-35 fighters and has announced his
intention to purchase 17 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and 52 amphibious assault vehicles. He has
also pledged to build two new destroyers and to increase Japans submarine force to 22 modern
diesel boats. Japans Ministry of Defense also intends to buy three top-of-the-line surveillance
drones and around 20 new maritime patrol planes to replace old models, as well as to upgrade Japans
ballistic missile warning systems and satellites. Tokyo has already bolstered its defenses in the southwestern
island chain, building radar sites on Yonaguni Island, near Taiwan , and constructing bases on three more
key islands in the area. By 2020, Abe intends to place up to 550 troops on Amami Oshima, the largest island between Kyushu and
Okinawa; he has also started setting up bases on Ishigaki and Miyako, near the Senkaku chain, to facilitate the quick deployment of
military personnel in a crisis. All

told, nearly 10,000 Japanese troops will be stationed on islands in the

East China Sea, along with a network of antiship and antiaircraft missiles there . And in August 2015,
Abe launched the countrys second Izumo-class helicopter carrier, which has dramatically strengthened Japans ability to project
force in its territorial seas.

Those actions are bringing Japan and China closer to war

The Guardian 3/28
"Japan extends military reach in disputed East China Sea,"
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/28/japan-extends-military-reach-yonaguni-disputedeast-china-sea
Japan has switched on a radar station in the East China Sea, giving it a permanent intelligencegathering post close to Taiwan and a group of disputed islands, in a move that will antagonise Beijing. The
new base on the island of Yonaguni is at the western extreme of a string of Japanese islands in the East China Sea, 150km (90 miles)
south of the disputed islands known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. China has long claimed most of the
South China Sea, though some areas are also claimed by Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. Japan has been mired
for many years in a territorial dispute with China over the East China Sea islands. Until

yesterday, there was no

coastal observation unit west of the main Okinawa island. It was a vacuum we needed to fill , said
Daigo Shiomitsu, a lieutenant colonel who commands the new base on Yonaguni. It means we can keep watch on territory
surrounding Japan and respond to all situations. Shiomitsu on Monday attended a ceremony at the base with 160 military
personnel and about 50 dignitaries. Construction of some buildings, which feature white walls and traditional Okinawan red-tiled
roofs, is still unfinished. The 30 sq km (11 sq mile) island is home to 1,500 people, who mostly raise cattle and grow sugar cane. The
base contingent and family members will increase the population by a fifth. This radar station is going to irritate China, said

In addition to being
a listening post, the facility could be used a base for military operations in the region, he added.
Nozomu Yoshitomi, a professor at Nihon University and a retired major general in the Japanese military.

impacts

Japan Aggression

! China-Japan War
Any sign of Japanese aggression will cause a security dilemma in the region,
means a war with China
Amako 2016- Waseda University
Satoshi, "Japan must carefully evaluate China's strategic intentions," Jan 23,
www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/23/japan-must-carefully-evaluate-chinas-strategicintentions/
Abe cited the threat of China in justifying the security-related bills which the Japanese Diet passed on 19 September 2015. But a
closer look into the Abe governments defence policy reforms reveals that a lot of it is not addressing Chinas military build-up. This
seems to hint that Abe

is pointing to the threat of China not so much in response to its expansionary

strategy but as a means of expediency in helping to realise his pet policy of allowing Japan to
exercise the right to collective self-defence.China has so far responded with a restrained attitude, precisely because it
is seeing through all the subterfuge. Beijing probably judges that stronger criticism of Japan would only give more persuasive power
to Abes argument. Now

that Abes security legislation has passed, allowing Japan to exercise limited
forms of collective self-defence, Japan should ensure that in practice this remains only a possibility. The exercise of
the right to collective self-defence would be best keep as a diplomatic bargaining chip for the
future. This is because the United States remains far ahead of China in terms of military capabilities, and there is a deep-rooted
argument in China that the JapanUS alliance poses a threat. Simply touting a stronger JapanUS alliance
would allow Japan to achieve sufficient deterrence. China would be likely to build up its military
power with a vengeance if Japan were to indicate any possibility of teaming up with the United
States and exercising the right to collective self-defence or staging an attack above and beyond
merely strengthening the alliance. That would invite a security dilemma , whereby military
build-up on one side fuels build-up on the other. Japan should not emphasise the threat of
China any further.
A Chinese-Japan war is only an incident away and goes nuclear
Kazianis 2016 - Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National
Interest as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation
Harry, "Get Ready, America: Are China and Japan Destined for War?," Jan 22,
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-are-china-japan-destined-war-14991?
page=2
While your Twitter and Facebook feed these days might be filled with stories about Iran, North Korea and ISIS, as well as the South
China Sea, 2016 could be the year of a deadly clash between China and Japanand the stakes could not be any higher for the United
States. A recent article in Foreign Policy sets the stage for such a clashand shows how America could get sucked in. After a
relatively peaceful yearif such a thing exists in the East China Sea Beijing

and Tokyo are once again warning

each other to back off claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands . With the rhetoric heading up, Foreign Policy
reporters Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson headed over to the Rand Corporation for a war game that pitted China vs. Japan and
eventually the United States. In the simulation, Tokyos treaty ally pledged to defend the island nation, including the disputed
islands, from attack. The scenario for the wargame was frighteningly realistic to say the least: A

group of renegade
Japanese ultranationalists wade ashore on a barren islet they call Uotsuri-shima. Its the largest of a
cluster of uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks known as the Senkakus, or the Diaoyu in Chinese, the unlikely locus of a longrunning territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. The

activists plant the Japanese flag, declaring that the

islands are inalienable Japanese territory; their YouTube video threatens the Chinese navy with destruction if it
dares to seize the islands. Caught off guard, Tokyo is slow to respond, but eventually disowns the ultranationalists and their stunt.
By then, though, China

has condemned the move as a hostile act and has dispatched armed coast
guard and naval vessels to the relatively shallow waters around the Senkakus. Chinese marines arrest
the 14 activists and vow to bring them back to China for prosecution. The next day, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
is dispatched to the area, accompanied by a squadron of Japanese F-15 fighters. China maintains its naval
ships around the islands and insists that it will not withdraw from the area. As the two militaries appear headed on a collision

course, Tokyo

informs Washington that it is finally invoking the mutual defense treaty the two
nations have had since 1951. Now the White House has a decision to make. While it is well worth your
time to read all the twists and turns, here is the ultimate of spoilers: The United States sends humanitarian aid and disasterresponse teams to Japan to bolster its homeland defense and dispatches the carrier at a safe distance in flight range of the Senkakus.
It also launches targeted, precision strikes on a handful of Chinese missile sites on the coast, clearly explaining to Chinese leadership

into hell we descend : U.S. missiles rain down on the Chinese

homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas; Chinas shiny new navy is quickly
shrinking under relentless undersea attacks. In reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on
the limited nature of the measures. And

Okinawa and take a potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the George Washington, damaging it and forcing it out of the area. The
casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead. Feel a sense of dj vu, National Interest readers? It seems good minds
think alike, as I explored a very similar scenario back in June of 2014: Picture it: It's March 1, 2015. Tokyo and Beijing are headed
towards what was once the unthinkable. Over the last several months China has instituted daily non-naval maritime patrols around
the hotly disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Beijing is even sending fully-fledged naval assets within the islands' 12 mile exclusion
zone while its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, exercised only 50 miles away from the islands back in February truly the end of
Beijing's small-stick diplomatic strategy. But on 1 March the plot thickens. Two Chinese SU-27 fighters come within 25 feet of a
Japanese P-3 Orion surveillance plane just 10 miles west of the Senkakus (sound familiar?). The Japanese pilot gets nervous. A
slight tweak at the controls and the Japanese plane collides with one of the Chinese fighters. Both aircraft crash into the ocean, with
no survivors. "Naturally each side blames the other. Beijing accuses the Japanese pilots of violating Chinese sovereign airspace and
violating its Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Japan claims the Chinese pilots acted recklessly, flying so close. The media in
both countries fan the flames of nationalism. Just 72 hours later, a group of twenty Chinese nationals land on one of the disputed
islands under the cover of darkness. Rumors swirl that Beijing knew of the voyage but did nothing to stop it. A Japanese naval task
force carrying a small detachment of soldiers is dispatched. Their goal: remove the only residents of the disputed five-island chain.
Beijing threatens force if its citizens are harmed. As Japanese naval forces come within 20 miles of the islands a Chinese J-10
fighter jet buzzes the task force. On its second pass it comes dangerously close to a Japanese destroyer. In a perceived act of selfdefense, the destroyer shoots down the aircraft. Hours later, as Japanese forces begin operations to remove the Chinese nationals
from the Senkakus, Beijing fires a warning shot, a DF-21D or carrier-killer missile which hits the ocean just 10 miles away from the
Japanese task force. Undeterred, Japanese forces press ahead. Domestic pressure on Chinese leaders becomes intense. They feel
they have no choice but to escalate, launching a massive saturation strike with ballistic and cruise missiles against the Japanese task
force. Three vessels are hit with heavy loss of life. Global media coverage of the burning hulks and bodies in the water reaches a fever
pitch. Prime Minister Abe urgently phones President Obama formally requesting America's help under the terms of the US-Japan
alliance a 3am call no president would ever wish to receive. War in Asia seems imminent. So what to make of all this crazy block
quoting? Simple: a conflict

in Asiawhich would make problems like ISIS seem like mere child's play is only an
incident away . And make no mistake about it, such a conflict, considering that the United States and
China are armed with nuclear weapons, would be a frightening affair. Food for thought as we contemplate
other pressing national security challengesfor if Asia was ever to be engulfed in the flames of great power
war only bad things would result, with millions of lives in the balance.

! SCS War
Japan gets combative because of abandonment, goes to war in the SCS
Rothkopf 2015 - CEO and Editor of the Foreign Policy Group
David, Does America Need New 'Special Relationships,' Aug 4,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/04/does-america-need-new-special-relationships-israelunited-kingdom-egypt-saudi-arabia/
In Asia, China has executed a careful plan of extending its influence: via active investments in
neighboring countries, the ballyhooed expansion of military capabilities, an Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank initiative that ran circles around hapless U.S. opposition, and the execution of a One Belt, One Road policy that
has already borne fruit in Central Asia (where the U.S. presence even awareness is minimal), Pakistan, Afghanistan (where
China has been welcomed as an observer in talks with the Taliban), and Iran (where China will become buyer No. 1 for Iranian oil).

While the United States has sought to counterbalance this expansion with modest moves redeploying
a couple of thousand Marines in Darwin, Australia; reopening ties with Myanmar; investing more in the relationship with India; and
accepting the remilitarization of Japan it

has lost more relative influence than it has gained in recent

years. Further, the modalities of balancing Beijings ambitions while maintaining the good ties that our economy requires are still
unclear. That is why China has tested the United States and our allies much as Putin has, determining
where the red lines actually are in the South China Sea. How this might play out with a rearmed
and combative Japan (that will lean into conflict almost to the same degree our primary European ally, Germany, will
lean away from it) should be a source of grave concern. So too should be scenarios involving possible
upheaval in North Korea. The growing importance of China and the Asia-Pacific region suggests that the United States
ought to devote as much or more attention to rethinking and rehabilitating alliances there as required in
Europe. (Remember the pivot to Asia? It was a good idea whose hype may have come and gone, but whose merits remain clear.)
One key to this might be in the cultivation and embrace of new special relationships to supplant or augment those of the past that
are in decline.

! Probability of SCS
Probability errs for us
Gault 2016 Contributing editor @ War is Boring
Matthew, "The Coming War in the South China Sea: The Contested Territory is a Powder Keg,"
May 21, https://warisboring.com/the-coming-war-in-the-south-china-sea1ca12cb1d696#.qfh69wiom
Of all the potential powder kegs on earth, none is more precarious than the South China Sea .
Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines all have claims there. China builds artificial islands to
reinforce its claims and the U.S. Navy patrols nearby. The various militaries have brushed by each other in the
water and in the air. The Chinese people do not want to have war, Chinese vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin
said Thursday. We will be opposed to [the] U.S. if it stirs up any conflict if the Korean War or
Vietnam War are replayed, then we will have to defend ourselves.

! China War
South Korean/Japanese prolif cascades, increasing tensions with China and
running the risk of war
BMI Research 2015
Increasing Geopolitical Tensions across North East Asia, Apr 20, www.bmiresearch.com/newsand-views/increasing-geopolitical-tensions-across-north-east-asia
North Korea's refusal to denuclearise has raised the spectre of a nuclear arms race in the region. Although China and Russia have
long been nuclear powers, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan remain non-nuclear. Seoul briefly had a nuclear programme in the 1970s
but gave this up under US pressure. However, in the early 2000s its scientists conducted experiments with nuclear materials. Tokyo
is believed to have had technical abilities to go nuclear for some time, but has refrained from doing so due to its strong commitment
to its 'three non-nuclear principles' of not producing, possessing or introducing nuclear arms to Japanese territory. Nonetheless, as
North Korea has become more aggressive, there

have been growing calls in South Korea and Japan to

develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is no longer taboo for Japanese politicians to raise the subject.
We believe that regional tensions will push South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear
arsenals by the mid-2020s. However, this will probably be in a low-key fashion and not necessarily publicly confirmed, in a
similar vein to Israel's nuclear policy. The governments in Seoul and Tokyo will probably conclude that Washington would not risk
sacrificing Honolulu or Los Angeles to defend South Korea and Japan from a putative North Korean attack. Even

if Seoul and
Tokyo refrain from nuclearisation, they will retain the technical ability to go nuclear at short
notice (ie months) should the security or political circumstances require this. A nuclear arms race,
whether open or covert, would substantially raise regional tensions. China, which is suspicious of Japan's
expanding military capabilities, does not wish to see a nuclear Japan that could become more assertive
towards Beijing. Although China's relations with South Korea are cordial, Beijing would also be wary of a nuclear-armed
government in Seoul, mindful that a reunified Korea could become a major regional power. However, China's biggest
concern is that a nuclear South Korea and Japan might encourage Taiwan to build nuclear
weapons. This would increase the island's confidence in declaring formal independence from the
mainland, something Beijing has stated it would go to war to prevent.

AT: Abe not nationalist

Strong alliance keeps the right in check Abe wants to change but lacks
popular/political momentum plan changes it
Curtis 2013 - Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University
Gerald l. Japan's Cautious Hawks, Foreign Affairs, March/April,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-03-01/japans-cautious-hawks
Yet the

strategy that Yoshida designed so many years ago continues to constrain Japanese policy.
Japan still lacks the capabilities needed for offensive military operations, and Article 9 remains
the law of the land. Meanwhile, Tokyo's interpretation of that article as banning the use of force in defense of another country
keeps Japan from participating more in regional and global security affairs. Abe has indicated his desire to
change that interpretation, but he is proceeding cautiously , aware that doing so would trigger
intense opposition from neighboring countries and divide Japanese public opinion. The durability of Yoshida's foreign policy has
puzzled not just observers; the architect of the strategy was himself dismayed by its staying power. Yoshida was a realist who
believed that the dire circumstances Japan faced after the war left it no choice but to prioritize economic recovery over building up
its military power. Yet he expected that policy to change when Japan became economically strong. The Japanese public, however,
saw things differently. As Japan boomed under the U.S. security umbrella, its citizens became content to ignore the left's warnings
that the alliance would embroil the country in the United States' military adventures and the right's fears that Japan risked
abandonment by outsourcing its defense to the United States .

Yoshida's strategy, crafted to advance Japan's

interests when the country was weak, became even more popular in good times. And that remains true today: in
a 2012 survey conducted by Japan's Cabinet Office, for example, a record high of 81.2 percent of respondents expressed support for
the alliance with the United States. Only 23.4 percent said that Japan's security was threatened by its having insufficient military
power of its own. It

is worth noting that Japan's opposition to becoming a leading military power

cannot be chalked up to pacifism. After all, it would be an odd definition of pacifism that included support for a military
alliance that requires the United States to take up arms, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Japan. Most Japanese do
not and never have rejected the use of force to protect their country; what they have resisted is the unbridled use of force by Japan
itself. The public fears that without restrictions on the military's capabilities and missions, Japan would face heightened tensions
with neighboring countries and could find itself embroiled in foreign wars. There is also the lingering concern that political leaders

the
Japanese public and Japan's political leaders are keenly aware that the country's security still
hinges on the United States' dominant military position in East Asia. Some on the far right would
like to see Japan develop the full range of armaments, including nuclear weapons, in a push to regain its autonomy
and return the country to the ranks of the world's great powers. But the conservative mainstream still believes
that a strong alliance with the United States is the best guarantor of Japan's security .
might lose control over the military, raising the specter of a return to the militaristic policies of the 1930s. Furthermore,

Abe has pocketed his nationalistic agenda due to a lack of moderate support
external changes to Japans perceived security will provide Abe with enough
moderate support to unfold his nationalistic agenda
Thomas U. Berger 2014 (associate professor of international relations at the Pardee School of
Global Studies at Boston University) Abes Perilous Patriotism Why Japans New Nationalism
Still Creates Problems for the Region and the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, October, CSIS
The relationship between the different components of the Japanese discourse on nationalism have evolved considerably over time. It
is possible to discern a cyclic pattern where an apparent rise in Right-wing nationalist discourse was followed by a rejection of the
conservative agenda and an extended period of ideological quiescence. These cycles occur with a frequency of every five to ten years
and tend to follow a similar pattern.10 The

initial trigger for an upsurge in nationalist rhetoric often comes

from outside of Japan. Shifts in the international environment would emerge that created a widely
shared sense that Japan needs to adapt its security policy in response . In the late 1950s, Japans
reemergence as a major, independent international actor against the backdrop of a highly
volatile East Asian security environment created a ground swell of support for revising Japans

security arrangements, beginning with the original, highly unequal Mutual Security Treaty imposed by the United States at
the end of the Occupation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, growing concerns regarding the U.S. security
commitment in light of the Vietnam War and American domestic political disarray provoked a
serious debate over whether Japan should continue to rely on the United States or develop a
more independent defense capacity. In the late 1970s, the Soviet military buildup in the Far East
seemed to pose a direct threat to Japan. After the Cold War, the emergence of new regional security threats in the
shape of a nuclear North Korea and an increasingly powerful and assertive Peoples Republic of China stimulated Japan to reforge its
security relationship to the United States. In

each instance, Japanese conservative nationalists formed a de

facto alliance with more pragmatically minded centrists to push through much-needed changes
in Japanese defense policy. Since for Right-wing nationalists, ideological issues are part and parcel
of any effort to reform Japanese defense, changes in national security policy were
always paired with highly nationalist rhetoric and changes in other policy domains. So for instance, in
the late 1950s, the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty was accompanied by changes in educational policy aimed at clamping
down on the influence of the powerful, Left-wing Japanese teachers union. The 1978 guidelines on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation
was paired with the reintroduction of the Imperial calendar system and the old national anthem, Kimi ga yo. Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone famously linked increasing the Japanese defense budget with reevaluating Japanese history when he visited the
Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. Hashimoto Ryutaro did much the same when he visited the shrine in 1995, while at the same time setting
into motion the political process that led to the revision of the guidelines in 1998. In each and every instance, these nationalist
gestures and policies provoked howls of protest. The Japanese Left would warn that the conservatives were undermining the
foundations of postwar Japanese democracy. The Left, as well as many critics abroad, would warn that Japan was about to
remilitarize and become once again a threat to the rest of Asia. The Japanese public and centrist elites, however, would go along with
the Right-wing, old-style nationalist agenda because they viewed it as the price that had to be paid to push reform through. Once
necessary changes to defense policy had been made, and if the Right seemed to go too far in pressing for a nationalist revival,
popular opposition would mount and Centrists would cease their support. Right-wing leaders then had two choices. They could tone
down their nationalist rhetoric and satisfy themselves with having pushed the national debate a step further toward the right. This is
what happened with Prime Minister Nakasone, who abandoned plans to visit Yasukuni after 1985. Or they could be forced out and
be replaced with a more moderate figure, as occurred with Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1960. Some significant changes would
be made in terms of defense policy, although those changes generally proved less dramatic in retrospect than they were typically
portrayed as being at time. Ties with neighboring Asian countries would be mended and even improved. And the Japanese people
would relapse into their semi-somnambulant, post-nationalist slumber. Prime Minister Abe today seems

to fit very much

the pattern described above. The confrontation with China over the disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands
in the East China Sea, which spiked up sharply since the summer of 2012, has provoked a profound sense of crisis in
Japan. Chinas relentless stance on the islands, combined with emotional anti-Japanese riots in major Chinese cities, created a
perception of threat in the Japanese public greater even than at the high point of the Cold War. In 2007, Abe had been forced to step
down as prime minister when his nationalist agenda led to a devastating defeat in elections for the Japanese Upper House. In the fall
of 2012, however, Conservatives inside the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were convinced that Japan needed a strong, pro-defense
leader to face up to the Chinese challenge. They gave Abe another shot at the prime minister-ship, choosing him as party leader over
other, more moderate figures. Having learned his lesson from his first term in office, Abe took pains to reassure Centrists in the
party, as well as the Japanese public, that his top priority was economic reform. Abe also put many prominent pragmatists such as
Kishida Fumio, Yachi Shotaro, and Kanehara Nobukatsu in key foreign policy posts. Abes

nationalist instincts, however,

could not be denied. Inevitably, whether out of deep personal conviction or in order to appease his own Right-wing
supporters, Abe combined his efforts at defense reform with all the elements of the postwar
Japanese conservative agenda: constitutional revision, educational reform, and a revisionist stance of history as
signaled by his trip to the Yasukuni Shrine and a reopening of the debate over the thorny issue of the comfort women.

Predictably, Abes moves have provoked a storm of protest. Japanese liberal media outlets have accused the
prime minister of opening the door to becoming embroiled in overseas military adventures and have been especially critical of what
they portray as his undemocratic political methods. Beijing

has sounded the alarm that Japan is once again turning to

in
Seoul the newly inaugurated government of Park Gyeun He has expressed intense displeasure with Japan,
militarism and has tried unsuccessfully to convince Washington that Japan could be a threat to the region. Meanwhile,

suspending cooperation across a broad range of diplomatic and national security areas and making common cause with China in
condemning Japans historical revisionism. Will

the Abe administration today follow the pattern of previous

conservative administrations? There are some signs that this is in fact taking place . Public opinion
data shows that support for the administration is declining despite signs of continued economic improvement.11 Opposition
from within the government, in particular from his Buddhist coalition partnersthe Clean Government Party has

forced Abe to water down parts of his agenda. He has abandoned for now pressing for
constitutional revision and satisfied himself with merely reinterpreting the constitution. And even then, he has
attached conditions under which the right to collective self-defense can be exercised.12 If the current cycle of Japanese
nationalism holds true to past form, we can expect that Abe will either have to give up his nationalist
rhetoric or be forced out of office, as his centrist allies and supporters abandon him and public support ratings plummet.
In so doing, he will be replicating the fate of his grandfather and political role model, Nobosuke Kishi, who was forced out of power
in 1960 as a result of the storm of controversy over the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. History would
repeat itselfas Marx one put itnot so much as tragedy but as farce. History

does not necessarily repeat itself,

however, and there are reasons to fear conditions have changed in such a way that the
outcome this time around will be far more tragic than it has been in the past.

AT: Militarization Inevitable

Japans new defense guidelines still single reliance on U.S. for securitynot a step
towards militarism
Lind 2016 - associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at
the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University
Jennifer, Japans Security Evolution, Feb 25, http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/japans-security-evolution#full
Japans constitution prohibits the country from having or using a military, but over the past
several decades governments have passed laws to reinterpret constitutional restraints. The 2015
legislation, the most recent in this longtime evolution, enables Japan to participate in collective security operations. For the first
time, Japanese personnel from its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can engage in combat to support the United States when it is defending
Japan, or to support other security partners under attack. In such instances, the legislation stipulates that the situation must
threaten Japans survival, that no other appropriate means of defense exist, and that the use of force will be restrained to what is
minimally required. For example, according to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other proponents of security reforms, Japanese
forces could defend an American ship that is attacked while evacuating Japanese citizens from a conflict. As

news of the
legislation spread around the world, headlines announced the end of Japanese pacifism . Before the
vote, CNN declared, Assertive Japan poised to abandon 70 years of pacifism. The Japan Times said that the new
legislation marked a significant departure from Japans postwar pacifism .2 Newsweek heralded it as
the most significant shift in Tokyos defense policy since World War II.3 As Andrew Oros notes, there is a palpable fear among
many that Japan is on the verge of a major break from the past sixty years of peaceful security practice.4 Such

pronouncements, however, exaggerate both the extent of Japans previous pacifism and the
magnitude of the changes. The legislation permitting engagement in collective security activities
is indeed a significant moment in Japans 70-year evolution in national security. But it does not mark Year
Zero of a new era in which Japan is becoming increasingly militarist. Japans reforms represent
continuity, rather than change, in a pattern in which Japan relies upon the United States for its
security, but contributes more to the alliance when its security environment worsens. From Washingtons
standpoint, Japans greater activism and burden-sharing within the alliance is welcome news .

AT: Japan -> Multilateralism

Japanese leadership fails and triggers conflict
Hughes 2015 Prof of Japanese Politics, Chair of the Department of Politics and International
Studies at Warwick
Christopher W, Japans decline and the consequences for East Asian conflict and cooperation,
Security and Conflict in East Asia, Routledge, p. 138
In addition, Japan's

interactions with regional multilateral institutions and networks may not

promote cooperation. Japanese policymakers have often promoted certain multilateral
frameworks in quiet opposition to those preferred by China, in particular the EAS which includes the USA, Australia and India,
against the more East Asian-exclusive framework of the APT favoured by China (Yahuda 2014: 82-96). In recent years Japan has in
vested increasingly in supporting the TPP framework, which is in essence US-led and - designed, in order to establish a set of liberal
economic values that differ from the most state- centred model of Chinese development. In this way ,

multilateralism may
not always deliver absolute gains but actually become a vehicle for pursuing more neo-realistoriented relative gains. Japan's commitment to forms of regional frameworks that diverge from those supported by China
may militate against cooperation, and domestic institutions may also encumber the search for better ties. Japanese domestic
political regimes, whether led by the LOP or the DPJ, have been under extreme stress in recent years to attempt to demonstrate their
competence and thus legitimacy to govern in the ace of economic stagnation and the 3/ 11 disaster. Japan remains fundamentally
democratic, but the fluidity of its political direction, with frequent changes of administration, and now the

return to the
political mainstream of 'revisionist' conservative politicians such as Abe, have posed questions
about how this will impact on regional cooperation (Samuels 2007). Japan's conservative politicians have felt
emboldened to attempt to revise interpretations of colo nial history, symbolized by their highly controversial visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine, and such actions have clearly sparked concerns in China, South Korea, and other East Asian countries of possible Japanese
revanchism (Hughes 2008). Hence, there

are concerns that altho ugh Japan may be democratic now, it is

drifting towards a return to nationalism and even militarism. Meanwhile, Japan's emphasis on its
democratic status may actually be a source of contention in the region if it becomes part of an
effort to promote certain values that do not yet match the ambitions of other states . Prime Minister
Abe's self-proclaimed 'values-oriented' diplomacy, and attempts to encourage collaboration among other regional
states on the basis of democracy, human rights, liberal market economy and the rule of law, appears to clash with Chinese
values, and thus is seen as a tool to encircle China (Hughes 2009a). In this instance, Japan's wish to
emphasize its democratic status as an antidote to its declining economic influence actually
becomes a source of potential conflict with China which has yet to even accept domestic pluralism as a basis for
international relationships. The lesson, therefore, is that even if Japan portrays itself as a liberal power, it is engaging with a power
that is predominantly non- liberal in nature politically, and 'liberal peace theory' would not necessarily view this relationship as one
that is bound to be cooperative.

AT: Plan -> Diplomacy

Litany of alt causes to Japanese Diplomacy
Chen 2015 - has served in French diplomatic missions in Japan, the United States, Singapore
and China
Yo-Jung, "Japan's Tangle of Ideology and Diplomacy," Dec 10,
thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-tangle-of-ideology-and-diplomacy/
Nationalists in Japan seem to have discovered only recently that the outside world does not
share many of their views, especially those related to Japans wartime deeds, such as Imperial Japans invasion
of Asia, the practice of comfort women by its military, or the Rape of Nanjing. On these topics, the
hawkish ideologues of the ultra-conservative wing of the ruling LDP party have started pushing
their diplomats to actively challenge what they see as erroneous perceptions of Japan, and to
advocate instead a jingoistic version of history aimed at whitewashing wartime
misdeeds . Never mind if their jingoism struggles to convince anyone outside of Japan. Recent events have shown how Japan
has stunned the world by attempting to sell this ideological version (which is not generally shared in the nation) of history to various
partners abroad. This ideological drive to advocate the ruling conservatives revisionist version of history took a surprising new turn
when Tokyo took the fight out of the usual bilateral context (with China and South Korea) to the very international stage of the
United Nations. For some 20 years, Japan has unsuccessfully sought to have the UN Human Rights Commission retract a 1996
report condemning it for the wartime practice of comfort women (women in Japan-occupied territories who were coerced into
Japanese military brothels). Japan argued that the report contains unreliable information, but the UN decided nevertheless that
these details were not sufficient to retract the Coomaraswamy Report because the actual fact of comfort women it depicts remains
unshakable. On the same comfort women issue, as I have written previously, Japan is also fighting an uphill battle for its image in
the U.S., where a growing number of municipalities are erecting embarrassing statues in commemoration of what are known locally
as Japans sex slaves. Lacking convincing arguments to dismiss the issue, Japan was unable to stop these municipalities, including
San Francisco, from building statues, nor could it prevent Congress from maintaining its 2007 resolution condemning Japan for the
shameful wartime practice. So much for its American friends. Another case of challenging the UN on its interpretation of history
occurred in October. Japan celebrated UNESCOs decision to include three Japanese documents in its Memory of the World
Register. So far so good. Japan has always loved being recognized by UNESCO, either in the World Heritage Sites program or in the
Memory of the World program. But this time, Tokyo objected angrily when the UN body also registered in the same program Chinas
documents about the Nanking Massacre. Up in arms, furious conservative politicians, who refuse to admit that any massacre was
committed by Japanese forces, started pushing their government to protest to UNESCO, threatening to cut off its funding in
retaliation. Regardless of who is right about Nanking, the de facto intimidation of the UN body was far from an elegant response and
hardly likely to burnish Japans reputation. And while Japan claims China is politicizing the UNESCO process with the Nanking
Massacre documents, it has found itself accused of the same sin by Russia regarding one of Japans own successful entries in the
Memory of the World Register, involving the decades-long detention in Siberia of hundreds of thousands of Japanese prisoners after
the end of World War II. In another case involving the UN this time not involving the history issue the UN rapporteur on
freedom of expression, who was scheduled to visit Tokyo in early December to investigate accusations of violations of press freedom,
was asked by the Japanese government to cancel his trip. In the view of critics, this is a tacit admission that Japan had something to
hide regarding violations of freedom of expression and political pressures on the media. If the allegations were true, this is certainly
not the best way to halt Japans embarrassing fall down the rankings of the World Press Freedom Index (from 11th in 2010, to 53rd
in 2013, 59th in 2014, and 61st out of 180 countries in 2015. This heavy-handed approach to the United Nations is difficult to
reconcile with Japans years of hard campaigning to win permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Press Dealings
Japans

ruling Liberal Democratic Party is regularly accused of applying pressure on the liberal
media. Foreign journalists in Japan are also occasionally targeted , mostly because, unlike their polite
Japanese colleagues, they tend to ignore the tacit local rule of not asking embarrassing questions or reporting embarrassing topics.

In April 2015, the German correspondent in Japan for Frankfurter Allgemeine revealed that,
because of his articles criticizing Abes revisionism, he has made himself a Japan basher in the
eyes of Japanese officials. According to his account, in a surprisingly undiplomatic move, an angry
Japanese diplomat even went to the dailys head office in Frankfurt to denounce the journalist
directly to his editor, going as far as insinuating, without proof, that he was secretly working for China. Following this
diplomats visit, it is easy to imagine what reputation the Japanese government now enjoys with the German daily. One thing is
clear: Dont bet on Japan improving its ranking in next years World Press Freedom Index.

Prolif

Impact -- NPT
Kills the NPT
Santoro and Warden, 15senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS AND used to debate
David and John, Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age, The Washington
Quarterly 38:1
U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied
anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United Statesrightlydoes not deem worthy of risking war.
But if

the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in
U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States,
Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still
deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would
likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of
confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send
reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan
or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop
weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their
countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as
a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization . After
North Koreas third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted
nuclear weapons.11

Thats an impact filter

Cooper 15 - , Fellow with the Truman National Security Project
Christian H. is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Pride of the Diplomats:
Why the NPT Works Global Policy Journal 5-19-15,
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/05/2015/pride-diplomats-why-npt-works
The review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this month is a once every five years chance to reaffirm and
strengthen one of the strongest international norms : that against the prolif eration and use of
nuclear technology for military means . Representatives of 190 countries are gathered to examine the treaty itself and
discuss new ways to increase global buy-in against nuclear dangers. This time, they might do so in a critical new
way. Israel will be at the table for the first time in 20 years as an observer only (having not signed the NPT), and according to a
senior Obama administration official, has agreed to begin working with Arabs on an agenda for a conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle

This is a dramatic change from 2010, when Israel refused to even consider the idea. Incremental diplomatic wins
like this one lie at the core of the truly transnational strategic interest on the path to complete
nuclear weapons disarmament. This is precisely why ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology must remain a key component of all
East.

nations foreign policy doctrines. Perhaps one reason the NPT, and its review every five years, is often overlooked by the general public is because at face value, everyone agrees

the NPT, and the corresponding diplomatic collaboration surrounding nuclear weapons, go much deeper than
simply halting the proliferation of such dangerous technology. It is through this nearly universal treaty the next
generation of world leaders will likely see nuclear disarmament, avoid an open war with Iran over
its nuclear program, and stop a Middle East nuclear arms race in its tracks. However, it wasn't always clear
the NPT would be the resounding success it is . In 1961 when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told U.S. President John F.
more nukes are a bad thing. However,

Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program at Dimona was for peaceful purposes only, Kennedys National Security Council was simultaneously warning that by the 1970s there could
be 40 nuclear weapon armed states (including Israel). If an America in the future faced rampant nuclear threats and could not believe a face-to-face conversation with a reliable
ally, what could anyone trust? There had to be a better way, and the NPT was the answer: Never trust, always verify. In Israel's defense, the only NPT signatories who have
violated the treaty since adoption Iran, Iraq and Syriahave sworn to destroy the Jewish state. Remaining a non-signatory to the NPT and maintaining an opaque nuclear first
strike nuclear capability was strategically the right choice for Israel (regional de-stabilization be damned), and one that could be revisited given their 2015 decision to consider
an agenda for a nuclear weapons free Middle East. Israel's gambit to wait for the NPT to become as ironclad as it has paid dividends that we can all reap both in June with a
comprehensive agreement between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (including Germany, a group colloquially referred to as the P5+1) and Iran and well
into the future. The defining trait of the NPT is reframing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride circa 1960 to an act contrary to international

law by 1970. Thankfully, today we operate in a world that accepts nuclear power as a scientific pursuit but abhors its use for violence. This is also why Iran's right to domestically
enrich as a signatory to the NPT will be a cornerstone of the P5+1 agreement that will be announced soon and likely ratified by the first of July. This comprehensive agreement
will also implicitly underscore one of the pillars of the NPT: The gradual demilitarization of nuclear technology. And lest critics make the argument that the NPT can only be
used to coerce pariah states like Iran, consider the actions of the major powers. Since the NPT entered into force, the United States has drastically reduced the number of nuclear
weapons in its stockpile by 80 percent and completely removed multiple entry warheads from its nuclear strike capacity. In some respects just as importantly, Washington is
currently targeting the open ocean; there is no longer a single ICBM aimed at the Russian Federation and nuclear-armed, long-range strategic bombers have been removed from
daily nuclear alert. Russia has made similar progress, with both commitments and demonstrated progress in reducing deployed warheads as well as deployed and undeployed
delivery vehicles. Moscow has also taken the lead in other areas where the United States has lagged behind, singing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. To
be sure, complicationsincluding Russias tendency to view their remaining weapons as a counterweight to all NATO stockpiles rather than simply that of the United States

the norm created by NPT has reduced the potential for nuclear disaster
across the globe. And where has all that potential destruction gone? Fully 10% of electric power in the United States over the last two decades came from

still exist, but the fact remains that

down-blended, highly enriched uranium earmarked for Russian megaton nuclear bombs. Over 20,000 warheads (and their associated risk of accidental launches) were removed

The spirit of bilateral cooperation remains strong; despite the tensions

in Ukraine, both the U nited S tates and the Russia n Federation are fully implementing the terms of the
New START treaty , wherein each shares data on the movement of strategic forces and both engage in reciprocal
inspections of military facilities. The NPT is not just about non-proliferation; it is a shift in mindset
that nuclear technology will be shared with those who want it for peaceful purposes in return for de-arming those
who have militarized it. It has been a resounding victory for the idea of internationalism and the fundamental idea that a community of nations can
come together and, through mutually-reinforcing and verifying behavior, make strategic choices that defy the
self-serving nature of states in an anarchic system. Moreover, it has been the bedrock of a norm that
spawned a range of bi- and multilateral measures to protect the world against the terrible risk of nuclear conflict.
Collective continued nuclear demilitarization is a win for the diplomats of the world . Progress
from service all thanks the spirit of the NPT.

on the biggest issues comes in small breaks, such as the Israeli decision to if not pull a seat up to the table, at least pay close attention on the sidelines. Through extraordinary
burdens of verification and disclosure,

the NPT will continue to make the world a safer place.

Impact --Turns China War

Japanese prolif cascades, increasing tensions with China and running the risk of
war
BMI Research 2015
Increasing Geopolitical Tensions across North East Asia, Apr 20, www.bmiresearch.com/newsand-views/increasing-geopolitical-tensions-across-north-east-asia
North Korea's refusal to denuclearise has raised the spectre of a nuclear arms race in the region. Although China and Russia have
long been nuclear powers, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan remain non-nuclear. Seoul briefly had a nuclear programme in the 1970s
but gave this up under US pressure. However, in the early 2000s its scientists conducted experiments with nuclear materials. Tokyo
is believed to have had technical abilities to go nuclear for some time, but has refrained from doing so due to its strong commitment
to its 'three non-nuclear principles' of not producing, possessing or introducing nuclear arms to Japanese territory. Nonetheless, as
North Korea has become more aggressive, there

have been growing calls in South Korea and Japan to

develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is no longer taboo for Japanese politicians to raise the subject.
We believe that regional tensions will push South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear
arsenals by the mid-2020s. However, this will probably be in a low-key fashion and not necessarily publicly confirmed, in a
similar vein to Israel's nuclear policy. The governments in Seoul and Tokyo will probably conclude that Washington would not risk
sacrificing Honolulu or Los Angeles to defend South Korea and Japan from a putative North Korean attack. Even

if Seoul and
Tokyo refrain from nuclearisation, they will retain the technical ability to go nuclear at short
notice (ie months) should the security or political circumstances require this. A nuclear arms race,
whether open or covert, would substantially raise regional tensions. China, which is suspicious of Japan's
expanding military capabilities, does not wish to see a nuclear Japan that could become more assertive
towards Beijing. Although China's relations with South Korea are cordial, Beijing would also be wary of a nuclear-armed
government in Seoul, mindful that a reunified Korea could become a major regional power. However, China's biggest
concern is that a nuclear South Korea and Japan might encourage Taiwan to build nuclear
weapons. This would increase the island's confidence in declaring formal independence from the
mainland, something Beijing has stated it would go to war to prevent.

at: no prolif impact

We have impact about first strikes & miscalc is about an escalating arms race, not
just nuclear weapons
Lewis 2015-director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies
Jeffery, "The Great Asian Missile Race," Oct 22, foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/22/the-great-asianmissile-race-north-korea-china-japan-arms/
So what if

Asia has a big missile race? First, missiles represent one of the fundamental challenges to
stability in the modern age they drastically reduce warning time, forcing decision makers to act under
incredible time pressure and stress. We have an image of August 1914 thanks to Mrs. Barbara Tuchman, the worlds most
overqualified housewife of the European powers driven by rigid mobilization schedules into the abyss of World War I.
Historians still argue about whether the parties would have stopped if they could, but it is easy to catch the first glimpse of the pace
of modern life in those portentous days. The Guns of August starts with a sort of parade too a funeral procession. Its opening lines
are among the most admired in literature: So gorgeous was the spectacle on the May morning of 1910 when nine kings rode in the
funeral of Edward VII of England that the crowd, waiting in hushed and black-clad awe, could not keep back gasps of admiration. In
scarlet and green and blue and purple, three by three the sovereigns rode through the palace gates, with plumed helmets, gold braid,
crimson sashes, and jeweled orders flashing in the sun. After them came five heirs apparent, forty more imperial or royal highnesses,
seven queens four dowager and three regnant and a scattering of special ambassadors from uncrowned countries. The steady
pace of procession sets the narrative on a march through crisis and into the horror of the Great War, into the trenches, the slaughter,
and the gas. Conventional

missiles are so accurate that they make a perfect weapon to kill a foreign
leader in a surprise attack something the United States tried to do with Saddam Hussein in 2003. In this way, they
impose their own rigid demands on leaders. Decisions must be made in the flight time of a missile, or the precious
moments following warning by satellite or radar. It is natural to worry that leaders might come to regret decisions about war and
peace made under this pressure, and to worry about the tendency to beat the clock by delegating the authority to use missiles to
lower-level commanders who might survive. Which leaves us in quite a pickle. We

can keep arming ourselves to the

teeth. We can, along with our friends in South Korea, Taiwan, and even Japan, stockpile thousands of
conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. We can also continue to deploy missile defenses. There is
a growing interest in the United States in more exotic conventional weapons, such as boost-glide systems. The upside
is that these capabilities will scare the bejesus out of leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang . The
downside is that these missiles will scare the bejesus out of leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang .
Whatever we gain in deterrence will also come with a significant helping of paranoia,
miscalculation, and surprise. Whether that works out for us or not will be an interesting question. The other option, of
course, is to think about talking through our problems to attempt to find a common interest in making war less likely and, if
possible, less hostage to short decision times. At the moment, the

countries of Northeast Asia engage in very little

regional security dialogue, with almost no serious discussion of strategic issues like nuclear
weapons and missile proliferation. While there are official dialogues between the United States and
China that do discuss arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, no one thinks this dialogue comes anywhere near what
one would expect for such an important relationship. And even this limited dialogue excludes Taipei, for obvious
reasons, and Japan. Meanwhile, our allies in Tokyo and Seoul dont coordinate with each oth er owing
to historical animosities. And then we have the North Koreans. Talking with Pyongyang is no ones idea of a good time.
The risk of an arms race is enough to make our impact certain
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 40-41
Critics of this line of analysis will note that the region's high degree of economic interdependence would make such a security
competition illogical and therefore unlikely (although high economic interdependence among Europe's belligerents did not prevent
war in 1914). Critics will also point out that awareness of the destructive power of modern armaments should be all that statesmen
need to avoid provoking a conflict and finally note that state-on-state war is widely thought to be passe, an artifact of a thankfully
bygone era. We can hope that these notions are true. However, they don't remove the

serious security concerns that

Japan or the Southeast Asian countries would feel should China and the PLA obtain hegemony
over the western Pacific and the commerce that runs through it . China, Korea, Russia, and others would likewise

become alarmed should Japan, in its perceived self-defense, become a substantial missile and
nuclear weapons state and rebuild its navy to protect its overseas interests . The result would very
likely be several multisided and unstable security competitions that would leave decision makers
in the region with great uncertainty and little response time during crises. One would hope that the
destruction caused by the twentieth century's wars and by the even greater destructive potential of modern nuclear weapons would
provide a deterrent to aggressive behavior by today's statesmen. But

while fear of the modern capacity for

destruction may provide a deterrent to some leaders, for others, this same fear is leverage to be
used against adversaries during a crisis. We may hope that we live in a more enlightened era, but that hope may be a
consequence of the post-World War II Pax Americana era in Europe and East Asia that has lasted so long and that now seems taken
for granted by many. U.S. policymakers will thus have to choose whether to shoulder the costs of maintaining an ever more
expensive forward presence or to take the

risk of allowing the Asia-Pacific region to construct its own selfenforcing stability, with the knowledge that if that effort should fail, the consequences to the United States
and the rest of the world would be ruinous.

Yes Cascading Prolif

If Tokyo attempts to get the bomb, the arms race gets out of control
Sokolski 2016-executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Henry D, "Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future," Strategic Studies Institute
and U.S. Army War College Press, ISBN 1-58487-719-7
Yet, another optimistic view argues that it may actually be in Washingtons interest to let Japan and South Korea go nuclear. Letting
them arm might actually tighten America relations with these key allies while reducing what the United States would otherwise have
to spend for their protection. Implicit to this argument is the hope that neither Seoul nor Tokyo would feel compelled to acquire
many weapons i.e., that like the UK, they would eagerly integrate their modest nuclear forces with that of Americas larger force
and share their target lists with Washington, and Washington would do likewise with them (as Washington already has with
London).129 Again, this is plausible. But it is worth noting that Japan and South Korea are not the UK. Early on, the UK understood
its nuclear weapons efforts ultimately would be subordinate to and in the service of maintaining its special relationship with
Washington (and scaled down its nuclear efforts accordingly). With

the Japanese and South Koreans, though, their

nuclear efforts would unavoidably be seen as a vote of no confidence in Washingtons nuclear
security guarantees. As such, these efforts would have to deal with demands by nationalists eager to build a truly
independent national nuclear force of much more ambitious dimensions.130 More important (and more likely), even if Japan
and South Korea wanted to keep their forces subordinate to those of the United States, they might both still be driven to
acquire very large forces of their own given the likely military reactions of China, North Korea,
and other nuclear states. Consider the action-reaction dynamic Seoul or Tokyo going nuclear might
set into motion with Beijing and Pyongyang. Presumably, in all cases (China included), each state would try
to protect its strategic forces against possible attacks by building more passive defenses (hardening,
mobility, tunneling, etc.). They also would focus on building up their offensive forces (both nuclear and nonnuclear) so they might eliminate as much of each others strategic forces as soon as any war began (this to limit the damage they
would otherwise suffer). Finally, they would increase the number of nuclear weapons assets , missile portals,
and other strategic aim points to prevent any of their adversaries from thinking they could knockout their retaliatory forces. This,
roughly, is what unfolded during the Cold War rivalry between Washington and the Soviet Union. As was the case for Russia and the
United States then, it

could easily drive up East Asian nuclear weapons requirements well beyond
scores or even hundreds of weapons.131 Potentially catalyzing this rivalry further are the actions Chinas
immediate nuclear neighbors might take. As has already been noted, the Russians are unlikely to reduce their nuclear
weapons deployments if the Chinese increase theirs. As for India, it already has roughly 100 nuclear weapons and many hundreds of
bombs worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium it claims it can fashion into nuclear weapons. It is hedging its nuclear bets even
further with plans to build five unsafeguarded plutonium-producing breeder reactors by 2020 and build an enrichment plant that
may double its production of weapons-grade uranium.132 Late in 2011, India announced it was working with Russia to develop a
terminally guided ICBM in response to Chinese medium-range ballistic missile deployments near Indias borders.133 New Delhi has
also pushed the development of a nuclear submarine force, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), missile defenses, longrange cruise missiles, and improved strategic command and control and intelligence systems. India has not yet competed with China
weapon-for-weapon. But if China

were to increase its nuclear weapons deployments significantly, Indian

leaders might argue that they had no other choice but to increase their own nuclear holdings. This
then brings us back to Pakistan. It has done all it can to keep up with India militarily. Since Islamabad is
already producing as much plutonium and highly enriched uranium as is possible, it would likely seek further technical assistance
from China and financial help from its close ally, Saudi Arabia. Islamabad

may do this to hedge against India,

whether China or India build their nuclear arms up or not. There is also good reason to believe that Saudi
Arabia may want to cooperate on nuclear weapons-related activities with Pakistan or China to help Saudi Arabia hedge against Irans
growing nuclear weapons capabilities. It is unclear if either China or Pakistan would actually transfer nuclear weapons directly to
Saudi Arabia or choose instead to merely help it develop all aspects of a peaceful nuclear program, including reprocessing and
enrichment. They might do both.134

Yes Prolif - Japan

Recent actions by Japan demonstrate their breakout capacity
Gilinsky 2015 - former US Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner
Victor and Henry Sokolski [executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center],
"How France is Fueling Japan and Chinas Nuclear 'Race'," Nov 6,
nationalinterest.org/feature/how-france-fueling-japan-chinas-nuclear-race-14271?page=2
While the world is focused on Iran and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, an accelerated round of nuclear plutonium

Areva, the French nuclear export firm, is desperate for

business, and therefore is seeking to sell a large plutonium separation plant to China. It is simultaneously urging Japan
to start commercial operation of its large plutonium recycling complex , despite the unfavorable impact
production is about to get started in East Asia.

this would have on efforts to rein in worldwide production of nuclear explosives. The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun recently
reported that after

an October 5 meeting in Tokyo, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his French counterpart Manuel
Valls agreed to help ensure Japan maintains its longtime policy to recycle spent nuclear fuel . . . Innocent
as this statement may sound, behind it is an effort by nuclear bureaucracies in the two countries to keep alive outdated industrial
nuclear policies that make no economic sense and potentially threaten a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. That longtime
Japanese policy involves producing plutonium, many tons of it for use as fuel. Plutonium, of course, is also used in nuclear weapons,
and just a few kilograms suffice for a warhead. Not surprisingly, China and South Korea take a considerable interest in Japans
plutonium policy.

Japans example also threatens the worldwide effort to restrain the spread of
nuclear weapons. Japan is on the verge of operating a large reprocessing plant at Rokkasho that is capable of separating eight
tons of plutonium annually from used nuclear fuel. This $20 billion plant was, from the beginning, a triumph of nuclear ideology
over economics. The plutonium fuel it was supposed to produce for Japans power reactors would cost several times as much as the
uranium fuel it would displace. After Japans Fukushima accident and the subsequent closure of its nuclear reactors, only a small
fraction of which will return to operation, the Rokkasho plant lost whatever plausibility it had. Japan already owns about thirty-five
tons of plutonium separated and stored in France and Britain, and has nearly eleven tons on hand in Japan. The public awareness of
Rokkashos unwarranted expense and possible weapon applications has put Japans bureaucratically rigid nuclear establishment on
the defensive. The plants operation, while still likely, is no longer assuredwhich is why France is rushing to help ensure Japan
maintains its longtime policy. France has been involved with Rokkasho through the Areva nuclear industrial group, and is currently
negotiating with China to build a similar reprocessing plant there. A Japanese decision not to operate Rokkasho would reverberate
throughout the tightly connected nuclear world, and might well cause China to rethink its reprocessing project. This would be a
severe blow to Areva, which is in deep financial trouble. Its latest reactor projects are ballooning in cost and encountering technical
difficulties, and its reprocessing business is losing customers. It needs Japan to stick with its longtime policy. There is a larger
dimension to the French-Japanese nuclear connection. The nuclear establishments in both countries embraced, early and
powerfully, the original nuclear dream of using reprocessed plutonium to fuel a new generation of fast breeder reactors that would
then take over the generation of electricity. (These would in principle consume all uranium fuel as opposed to current reactors that
only use about one percent of it, and so would be a power source with an essentially infinite supply of fuel.) Both countries built
prototype breeders but found a commercial shift to these advanced reactors to be technically and economically unrealistic. But both
countries continue to cling to their original aspirations. The French have also learned that you dont need economic technology to
make lots of money: you just need someone to pay for it. The Japanese played that role over the past few decades. The nuclear
authorities had promised the communities around Japans power reactors that the radioactive-used fuel would be removed. The
French were happy to accept it for reprocessingfor a steep price that included an up-front Japanese contribution to pay for
building a French reprocessing plant. Now, France is urging Japan to waste money on its own plant so that France can gain a profit
in China. The trouble is that there is more than money at stake. However much Japan reiterates its Nonproliferation Treaty pledge
to abjure nuclear weapons, and complies with IAEA inspections, China

worries about Japans nuclear weapons

potential. If Japan goes forward with the Rokkasho operation when economic arguments are decidedly against it, Chinas
concerns will multiply many times over. Everyone is aware that if the plant were put to military use, it would be
capable of producing more than a thousand bombs worth of plutonium per year . In these
circumstances, international inspections cannot provide a timely warning of diversion to military
use. Japans argument, that plutonium drawn from power reactors is not useful for bombs, conflicts with what weapon scientists
say. In any case, if Rokkasho enters commercial operation then Chinas reprocessing and fast breeder enthusiasts will likely get the
green light from their government for a reprocessing contract with Areva. Chinas plan is to store plutonium fuel for a fast breeder
prototype, but the project would also give China the option to rapidly increase the size of its nuclear arsenal, a point not lost on some
Japanese strategists. In the wings is South

Korea, which has been pressing the United States to allow it to reprocess plutonium
itself as the equal of Japan and will not stand for being
left behind. We may well end up with a spiraling commitment to reprocessing and plutonium fuel in
Northeast Asia. This would sharply reduce the margin between nuclear energy use and weapons
in the US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement. It sees

in both Japan and Korea. And it would give respectability to adopting reprocessing in countries around the world with
mixed motives.

Yes Prolif Quick Breakout

Plutonium stockpiling now has Japan days away from breakout
Burnie 3/1 - Senior Nuclear Specialist, Greenpeace Germany
Shaun Burnie and Frank Barnaby with Tom Clements, Aileen Mioko Smith and Kendra Ulrich,
"Nuclear Proliferation in Plain Sight: Japan's Plutonium Fuel CycleA Technical and Economic
Failure But a Strategic Success", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 5, No. 2, March 1, 2016
Five years after the March 11th 2001 earthquake and tsunami destroyed four reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi site, Japan's nuclear
industry remains in crisis. Three reactors are operating as of February 1st 2016, a reduction of 94% of reactors since 2011. Prospects
for a restart of even half of the 54 reactors formerly operating are almost zero. For decades the center of the nations nuclear and
energy policy was based on the utilization of plutonium to fuel fast breeder reactors, together with the use of plutonium MOX fuel in
commercial power reactors. The program has absorbed trillions of yen yet has utterly failed to deliver the energy security used to
justify it. The contradictions and technical and financial obstacles, all of which have been evident since the 1970's, have reached a
new critical juncture. Key elements of Japan's plutonium program are on the edge of complete failure from the MONJU fast
reactor to the Rokkasho Mura reprocessing plant. Major developments in the last months would suggest that fundamental change is
on the horizon. However appearances are deceptive. The

nuclear establishment is putting in place mechanisms

to try and save a program that was always much more than 'just' energy security, but also
national security. It is Japan's de facto nuclear weapons status that will increasingly come to the
fore, as the justification for the peaceful use of plutonium is exposed further as a delusion. As
nuclear proliferation and conflict points escalate in East Asia, Japan's stockpiling of thousands
of kilograms of weapons usable plutonium with no credible peaceful use is driving further
proliferation in the region. Two years before the extension of the U.S. Japan nuclear cooperation agreement, the legal basis
for the nations plutonium program, the time for a rethink, long past, is more urgent than ever.

Uniqueness
The plan locks in Japanese prolif
Burnie 3/1 - Senior Nuclear Specialist, Greenpeace Germany
Shaun Burnie and Frank Barnaby with Tom Clements, Aileen Mioko Smith and Kendra Ulrich,
"Nuclear Proliferation in Plain Sight: Japan's Plutonium Fuel CycleA Technical and Economic
Failure But a Strategic Success", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 5, No. 2, March 1, 2016
the
immensely more complicated nuclear and security environment of East Asia today, is the geopolitical context for Japan's vast plutonium stockpiling program . It demands a change of
thinking in Tokyo and proactive engagement from Washington . The U.S./Japan 123
Agreement of 1988 was premised on significant nuclear power growth in Japan. Today the
program is moribund with the only prospects being a much scaled down reactor program over the coming decades. A
strong case can be made that the current agreement is an anachronism given the crisis within
Japan's nuclear industry. As the security environment in East Asia continues to
deteriorate, time is running out for Japan to reverse gear and abandon its
plutonium ambitions.
The diplomatic conflict that existed between the U.S. and Japan over Tokai-mura in the 1970s will not be repeated. However,

AT: No Nuke War

A miscalcated response via use-it-or-lose-it is inevitable in a world of an arms
race
Cimbala 2015 Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine
Stephen J, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, Ashgate
Publishing, p. 154-160
What would a nuclear arms race in Asia look like, after the second decade of the present century? If proliferation in Asia is
successfully contained or rolled back, by politics or by war, speculation becomes irrelevant. Therefore we will assume a more

an
eight-sided nuclear club of states in Asia and/or in the Middle East with the ability to contribute to
nuclear destabilization in Asia, to include: Russia, China, Japan, North and South Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran.
pessimistic future: proliferation is not contained. In that case, the third decade of the twenty-first century might witness

Although proliferation is not contained under this set of assumptions, it does not automatically result in war. The assumption that
nuclear weapons can spread among these states without war will be questioned by some, and with some justification. For example,
the US has declared that an Iranian or a North Korean nuclear capability is presently unacceptable: the former must be prevented,
and the latter, must be rolled back. And some experts would surely argue that China would never accept a Japan armed with nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, the

rollback of North Koreas nuclear program is not a certainty: a

complicated international bargaining process may leave the DPRK as a standing nuclear power,
with a trade-off including more glasnost on the part of the regime , a willingness on the part of Pyongyang to
adhere to some international arms control agreements, and economic assistance from the US and other powers to help rebuild North
Koreas moribund economy. As for the Iranian nuclear case, both Israel and the United States have obliquely threatened preemption
(presumably with conventional weapons) against Irans nuclear infrastructure and against any nuclear capable military forces. But
the costs of carrying out the threat of preemption against Iran must be factored into the equation.27 Iran is a large state and cannot
be conquered and occupied by outside powers: unlike Iraq. Iran could therefore reconstitute any destroyed nuclear power plants or
other infrastructure. An additional consideration is political. An Israeli preemption against Iran becomes a recruitment poster for
another holy war by jihadists against Israel. Iran has been one of the major sponsors of Hezbollah and other groups that have carried
out past terror attacks in Palestine. An Israeli preemption against Tehran might reignite the intifada or otherwise destabilize the
peace process headed toward political devolution and Palestinian self-rule. The point is that many uncertainties loom, and the
exclusion of any specific candidate state from the future nuclear club is not automatic. Therefore, we will include eight current and
prospective nuclear weapons states located in Asia (or in the Middle East but potentially contributory to nuclear instability in Asia)
in the analysis and assign to them notional forces. As a working metric, we assume that the older and newer nuclear forces are
deployed without treaty constraints. Russia, for example, feels free to exceed its New START-limited ceiling of 1,550 operationally
deployed warheads on launchers of intercontinental range. On the other hand, Russias capacity for nuclear force building and
modernization is not unlimited and may fall short of the most ambitious goals set by President Putin and military industry head
Dmitri Rogozin.28 Russia will seek to maintain its perceived status as a nuclear weapons state of the same rank as the United States,
and therefore, Moscow will also want to appear as a singular nuclear military power in Asia, relative to potential regional rivals.
Russia and other states are assumed to have freedom to mix various types of launch platforms among land based, sea based and airlaunched weapons. Cruise missiles are omitted from the present analysis for purposes of simplification, but the reader should be
alerted that, as cruise missiles become smarter, stealthier and more widely available, they could be a preferred weapon for some
states if capped with nuclear charges, compared to ballistic missiles. States in the analysis include: Russia; China; Japan; India;
Pakistan; North Korea; South Korea; and Iran. Some might object to the inclusion of Japan, but others argue that acceptance of

Japan as a nuclear weapons state is plausible for at least three reasons. First, Japan has a post-World War
II history of military pacifism, and some memories of its World War II and earlier aggressions against
regional rivals have faded. Second, in terms of its political objectives with respect to the
international system, Japan is more of a status quo than a revisionist actor. A Japanese nuclear weapons
capability would be no more threatening, from this perspective, than that of Britain or France. Third, a nuclear armed
Japan would assist in the containment of China (along with India and Russia).29 Counter arguments also carry
weight. First, Japan has the extended deterrence protection of the US nuclear umbrella and is sharing technology development for
missile defenses with the United States. Second, public opinion in Japan remains skeptical about the need for a nuclear weapons
capability, and even those political elites in Toyko who favor a more assertive Japanese defense policy in general are burdened by the
recent national tragedy of nuclear accident at Fukushima in March 2011.30 Third, China would, for reasons of historical memory as
well as current politics, regard a nuclear weapons state in Japan supported by the United States as a major threat to its national
security, perhaps increasing Chinas military buildup and adversely impacting upon US Chinese relations. Figure 7.3, below,

It is obviously
impossible to project their future forces in detail. We have taken the heuristic shortcut of
assigning generic kinds of forces by category of launch system : land based missile; submarine launched
summarizes the forces deployed and available to the various state parties in our Asian arms race model.

missile; and bomber. In addition, deployed nuclear capable missiles and bombers are not necessarily assumed to have

intercontinental ranges. Some states in the model will be more concerned with contiguous and regional rivals capable of being
attacked by short, medium and/or intermediate range missiles and aircraft, than they will be about intercontinental or transoceanic
attack capabilities. Each

nation would have to plan for the likelihood that only a portion of its forces
would survive a nuclear first strike, retaliate and arrive at their assigned targets. The numbers of each
states second strike surviving and retaliating forces following notional first strikes are summarized in Figure 7.4. Several findings of
significance are apparent. From

the standpoint of deterrence stability, there is no clear metric by which

one can say that so many additional nuclear powers equate to such-and-such a decline in
deterrence. In theory, it is not impossible for a many-sided nuclear rivalry , even one as regionally robust as
this case is, to be stable. Provided it has the resources and the technical know-how to do so, each state could deploy sufficient
numbers of second strike survivable forces to guarantee the minimum deterrent mission, and perhaps the assured destruction
mission as well. Both minimum deterrence and assured destruction are terms of art that overlap in practice. Assured destruction
(or assured retaliation) forces are second strike forces sufficient under all conditions of attack to inflict unacceptable societal
damage. Unacceptable varies with the recipient of the damage and depends on cultural values and political priorities. But it would be
safe to assume that the decapitation of the regime and the loss of at least 25 percent of its population and/or one-half its industrial
base would satisfy the requirements of assured destruction for rational or at least sensible attackers. Minimum deterrence is a
standard presumably less ambitious than assured destruction: it requires only that the defender inflict costs on the attacker that
would create enough pain to make the gamble of an attack insufficiently appealing.31 For example: during the Cold War, the French
nuclear retaliatory forces were not sufficient by themselves to deter a Soviet attack on NATO, but they might have deterred nuclear
blackmail against France separately by threatening Moscow with the prospect of tearing an arm off, or destroying several Soviet
cities. Some expert analysts have suggested that a minimum deterrent strategic nuclear force for the United States might be
maintained with as few as several hundred operationally deployable weapons.32 Former US National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy put forward the most assertive definition of minimum deterrence in his argument that 10 nuclear weapons on 10 cities would
be a disaster beyond history.33 Although the projection of past events into future scenarios is always perilous, something like the
July 1914 crisis in Europe could erupt in Asia once nuclear weapons have been distributed among eight major states with high
military stakes in Asia and in numbers sufficient to tempt crisis bound leaders. National, religious or other cultural hatreds could be
combined with the memory of past wrongs and the fear of preemptive attack. This could occur not only between dyads of states but
between alliances, as it did on the eve of the First World War. Coalitions might form among a nuclear armed China, Pakistan, North
Korea and Iranlined up against Russia, the US, South Korea and India. This would be an alignment of mostly market democracies
of various stripes against dictatorships or authoritarian regimes of sorts. Another possibility would be conflicts between dyads
within, or across, democratic and dictatorial coalitions: for example, rivalry between the two Koreas, or between India and Pakistan.
Russia might find itself in bilateral competition or conflict with China, or China with India. Iran might use its nuclear capability for
coercion against US allies, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, drawing American political commitments and military power directly into
a regional crisis. Regardless the scenario,

it remains the case that nuclear weapons are in a class by

themselves as instruments of prompt mass destruction. Therefore, what is important about these
differences is not the numbers and percentages, however: but the possible effect of leaders
perceptions that higher alerts and faster launches are necessary in order to avoid catastrophic
defeat, should war occur. There are no winnable nuclear wars depicted here: nor would there be, even if
agreed levels among the powers were reduced to several hundreds of warheads.34 The danger is that a war might
begin, not so much from deliberation, but from desperation: states feeling that their nuclear deterrents
were threatened, and therefore coerced to make a yes-no decision on a time line that permits
neither reflection nor appropriate vetting of the information at hand.

AT: no wildfire prolif

States dont seek the bomb because of US security assurances, plan reverses that
commitment
Moteiro and Debs 2014 - Assistant Professors of Political Science at Yale
Nuno P and Zleandre, The Strategic logic of nuclear proliferation, International Security >
Volume 39, Number 2, Fall 2014
This article has introduced a security-based theory of nuclear proliferation focusing on the strategic interaction between a state, its
enemies, and, where present, allies. We

conclude that only two types of states acquire the bomb: powerful
but highly threatened states; and weaker states whose territory is protected by an ally they deem
unlikely to remain present in the long-term or unwilling to ensure its other core security goals .
The empirical rarity of these strategic situations is responsible for the relatively low number of statesfewer than 5 percentthat
have acquired the bomb during the first seven decades of the nuclear age. This finding questions frequent claims that nuclear
weapons are the weapon of the weak, the great equalizer in international relations.175 No doubt, nuclear weapons would enable
an otherwise weak nation to stand up to more powerful adversaries. So far, however, no weak unprotected nation has ever managed
to obtain them. Today Iran is at the center of U.S. proliferation concerns. As a relatively weak state involved in an adversarial
relationship with the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab states, and in the absence of a powerful ally, Iran is likely to possess the
willingness to build nuclear weapons. A nuclear deterrent would make the Iranian regime virtually immune to foreign threats to its
survival and might boost its bargaining position on other security issues. Yet, at the same time, our theory makes clear why Iran is
unlikely to have the opportunity [End Page 50] to nuclearize. For Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, its adversaries must estimate
the security benefit of Iranian proliferation to be lower than the cost of a preventive strike. Otherwise, a preventive strike is a
rational option, and either Iran internalizes this threat and abandons its nuclear investment or its program is likely to be targeted. It
should therefore come as no surprise that both U.S. and Israeli leaders have refused to take the military option off the table during
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Our theory predicts that, either through a comprehensive nuclear deal or as the
result of a preventive strike, Iran will remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Furthermore, our

theory provides reasons to

doubt the widespread fear that eventual Iranian nuclearization would trigger a proliferation
cascade in the Middle East involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. As the South Korean case
demonstrates, none of these states is likely to pursue nuclear weapons as long as they continue to
possess reliable U.S. security guarantees. At the same time, as the Pakistani case demonstrates, to
persuade its allies to drop their nuclear ambitions, Washington must place nonproliferation at the top of its agenda. In the past, the
United States has consistently succeeded in preventing clients from nuclearizing whenever it shared their security goals and
privileged nonproliferation efforts over other strategic goals. This success is, to a great extent, responsible for the historical absence
of reactive proliferation.176 We have no doubt that U.S. administrations will continue to place great importance on these states
security vis--vis a putative Iranian nuclear threat. Given the evolving nature of the Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish regimes, however,
it is less clear that Washington will be able to continue to prioritize the goal of nonproliferation above all of its other policy goals vis-vis these states. In any case, our

theory highlights an important cost that the United States often pays
to ensure the nonnuclear status of its allies: offering security guarantees to a burgeoning
number of states. Whether the United States will be able to continue to do so will
have a great impact on the odds of future nuclear proliferation.

AT: Budget
Japan can afford it
Easton 2015 - search fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts research on
defense and security issues in Asia
"Japanese Strategic Weapons Programs and Strategies: Future Scenarios and Alternative
Approaches" http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch7_Easton.pdf
Budget. The next

question is how much a Japanese nuclear weapons program , as described above, would

cost the taxpayers of Japan. Here nothing but speculation is available. It is impossible to accurately assess the cost of a notional
Japanese nuclear weapons program because so little unclassified data exists that could be used to make a useful comparison. It must
also be recognized that weapon costs vary greatly between countries. For illustrative purposes, however, Table 1 provides a notional
estimate of what a small nuclear force might cost Japan. Note that these estimates do not include the cost of future conventional
capabilities Japan would also need to acquire in support of its nuclear force. Note also that budget numbers tend to be highly
misleading in even relatively transparent weapons programs. It should be understood by the reader that these estimates, like all
defense budget estimates, may be of little value other than to give a false sense of certainty. Yet there

is no question that
Japan, which is the second most prosperous country in the world after the United States, could very
easily afford a modest nuclear weapons arsenal if it wanted one.8 That much, at least, should be clear.

AT: No Japan Tech

Japan has the tech, their breakout would be quick
Rowberry 2015 - Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow @ Brookings
Ariana Navarro, "Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,"
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventionalweapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrenceand-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry
Outside of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, Japan

maintains one of the worlds largest atomic energy

programs, considered by many to be a strategic hedge. Prior to the 2011 Fukishima disaster, Japan received around 30 percent of
its electricity from nuclear power. While Japan has idled its reactors in response to Fukishima, it hopes to maintain a robust nuclear

Japan has both

uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, as well as vast stocks of separated reactorgrade plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons.16 Right-wing Japanese officials have
referred to the large stocks of weapons-usable plutonium as a deterrent, and some states, including South
energy program. In contrast to most other non-nuclear weapon states with large nuclear energy programs,

Korea and China, have expressed concern that Japan is allowed to possess weapons-usable materials. Japan maintains policy
restrictions on nuclear energy. Japans 1955 Atomic Basic Energy Law states that The research, development, and utilization of
nuclear energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim at ensuring safety, and shall be performed independently under
democratic administration, and the results obtained shall be made public so as to actively contribute to international cooperation.17

In 2012, this article was amended to add national security as a justification for preserving a
civil nuclear energy program. Responses to the amendment are varied. Some Japanese officials argue that the addition of
national security does not conflict with the commitment to only pursue nuclear energy for peaceful reasons. Others are more
skeptical, claiming that this change directly conflicts with the constitution.18 If

Japan were to decide to pursue an

indigenous nuclear weapons capability, some estimates suggest that it could create a nuclear
weapon in two years.19 Given this, Japans nuclear energy program is considered by some to be a hedge against potential
security threats. This hedge is supplemented by Japans investment in space-launch vehicles (SLVs), including the H-11 and Epilson1, which were developed for Japans civil space program.20 The

technology of SLVs is very similar to that of

ballistic missiles, and SLVs could be modified to deliver nuclear weapons.

AT: Australia Prolif Good

Australian prolif unravels the NPT
Clarke 2015- Associate Prof at the National Security College
Michael; Stephan Frhling [Senior Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU];
and Andrew ONeil [Prof and Head of the School of Govt and IR, Griffith University], "6 Reasons
Why Australia Wont get Nuclear Weapons," Dec 1, nationalinterest.org/feature/6-reasons-whyaustralia-wont-get-nuclear-weapons-14470?page=2
Christine Leah

and Crispin Rovere argued in their recent article that In a high-intensity conflict between the United States

and China, it is conceivable that China may target Australia with long-range nuclear missiles as a step up the escalation
ladder, and that [i]n this eventuality, extended nuclear deterrence would hardly be credible. From this tautologybecause in case
of an attack, extended deterrence would of course have failedthey deduce that the most effective means for Canberra to dissuade
Beijing from such an escalatory step, and to assist the United States in Asia, is to develop or acquire its own reliable long-range
nuclear deterrent. They continue that while many would consider this a bad idea (as such a step would potentially have
proliferation knock-on effects with other U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea), the nations in Southeast Asia will see Australia
as a more capable strategic partner and deepen cooperation. Moreover, Leah and Rovere assert that Australia would be legally
entitled to nuclear weapons given its role in British nuclear tests before the signature of the NPT, and assert that if the U.S. would
publicly recognize this, Australia could then leverage its position in present nuclear arms control negotiations, further persuading
countries in the region to exercise nuclear restraint. These

are bold claims, and ultimately neither supported

by sufficient evidence nor persuasive as strategic propositions . Moreover, we find that they ignore the
strategic reasons that have led to Australias bipartisan consensus on nuclear policy since the Fraser Government of the 1970s, which
are the major findings of our recently published history of Australias engagement in the strategic, economic and normative domains
of nuclear policy since 1945. Leah

and Rovere claim that because of the threat of nuclear attack, many Australians
believe entering into conflict with the worlds most populous nuclear power, for any reason and under
any circumstance, is unthinkable but neither extensive public consultation, as part of Australias Defence
White Paper in 2014, nor available polling supports such an assertion. This undercuts their central
argument why Australian acquisition of nuclear weapons might be in the interest of the U.S.,
while others have already challenged the proposition that Australia had a legal right to do so within the NPT. Importantly,
Australian governments did not endeavor to acquire an indigenous nuclear weapons capability at any point in the past; but they did
seek to keep the option open right up until the shelving of the Jervis Bay project (a proposal to construct a plutonium-producing
heavy water reactor) in 1971. Indeed, much of Australias nuclear policy between 1945 and 1972 could be characterized as a strategy
of nuclear hedging, whereby it sought to keep the country out of international commitments that were perceived as having the
potential to constrain Australias nuclear weapons options down the track. The 1950s and 1960s were most challenging decades for
Australian security, including conflict with Indonesia, expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia and nuclear proliferation to
China. Australian policy makers have often been anxious about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (END)
guarantees, particularly at times of strategic or geopolitical flux, such as in the aftermath of French defeat in Vietnam, Britains
retreat east of Suez or the Nixon Doctrine. In the 1970s and 1980s, Australia was very conscious it was under direct nuclear threat
from the Soviet Union. If the world completely changed, Australias nuclear policy might do so as well. But overturning the
arguments against nuclear weapons acquisition by Australia requires more than postulating one scenario where Australia might
come under nuclear attack (and one that is rather at odds with the logic of Chinese nuclear doctrine and force structure, at that)

there
are very good strategic reasons that have led to the high degree of continuity in Australian
nuclear policy, since the Fraser government laid down the parameters for the export of uranium in 1977: strict adherence
to the NPT, a commitment to the application of full-scope safeguards over Australian nuclear
transfers, and diplomatic efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime at all
levels. Despite some inevitable variations in emphasis, governments of all political shades have made this a bipartisan orthodoxy
after all, the possibility of a major threat to Australia, including from nuclear weapons, is hardly a new condition. Rather,

since 1977. Support to U.S. nuclear extended deterrence at the bilateral and global level has also undergirded Australias nuclear
policy under successive Coalition and Labor governments. Rather than damaging or inhibiting Australias credibility with respect to
nuclear diplomacy, extended

nuclear deterrence as part of the bilateral security alliance with the

United States has assured Canberras regional neighbors of its nuclear abstinence and provided
it with the opportunity to develop an activist nonproliferation agenda. How claiming nuclear weapons
status for Australia would help Australia further its arms control agenda, let alone further persuading countries in the region to
exercise nuclear restraint, therefore remains mysterious. It

also ignores that Australias commitment to the

global nonproliferation regime has been crucially shaped by an enduring national security

interest in limiting nuclear proliferation in its immediate region. This interest was a major factor in
Australias deliberations regarding membership of the NPT in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with policy makers focusing on the role
of nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia in presenting arguments both for and against Australian accession to the Treaty. This
genuine concern with the strategic consequences of regional nuclear proliferation stood in contrast to other Western U.S. allies, who
perceived the NPT as a mechanism to manage the Cold War. Australias decision to sign and ratify the Treaty as a nonnuclear
weapons state, and its subsequent support for the development of strict nuclear safeguards and consolidation of the nonproliferation
regime, were seen as important steps to proliferation-proofing Australias region. This remained a major shaper of Australian
nuclear policy and became a major factor in driving Australias activist nonproliferation diplomacy. In other words, Leah and
Roveres claim that the nations in Southeast Asia will see Australia as a more capable strategic partner and deepen cooperation
completely overturns the judgment of successive Australian governments about the regional effect of Australian nuclear weapon
acquisition. Unlike a number of other similarly positioned middle powers, Australia has never seriously questioned the legitimacy of
the nuclear arsenals of the five NWS recognized under the NPT. This tendency reflects the view that nuclear weapons are a
stabilizing factor in international politicsparticularly through the mechanism of deterrenceas long as they are wielded by
responsible great powers. This vision has at times been challenged, most notably during the years of Paul Keatings prime
ministership (1991-1996), by a disarmer vision that sees nuclear weapons as order destroyers rather than order builders and
thus inimical to Australian strategic and security interests. Despite this challenge, successive Australian governments of both major
political persuasions have ultimately structured much of the countrys nuclear policy around this view. While this is not an argument
against Australian acquisition of nuclear weapons as such, it reinforces that Australia

ultimately had confidence in

the stability of nuclear (extended) deterrence, and is very conscious of systemic risks of
proliferationneither of which could be adequately addressed by the nave assumption that
Australia could acquire nuclear weapons without consequences for the NPT regime
as a whole. Ultimately our study suggests that since the late 1970s Australia has maintained a bipartisan consensus that
Australias security would be enhanced, and not limited, by a functioning global nonproliferation regime that helps keep nuclear
weapons from its own region. U.S.

END, while providing an insurance policy in the event of a

deleterious deterioration of the regional security environment, has also enabled Canberra to
pursue an activist nonproliferation diplomacy. Nuclear weapons acquisition, contrary to Leah and
Roveres position, would unravel this to Australias significant detriment.

AT: Lee (Prolif Good)

South Korean prolif cascades globally, undermining the US alliance structure, and
causes Russian & Chinese agression
Kuzminski 3/1- a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon
Frank, "No Nukes in South Korea,"
www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html
In a recent article, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee

argues that the United States should allow South Korea to

obtain its own nuclear arsenal, stating that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering his
nuclear and ballistic missile program. This argument is a false dichotomy and fails to consider, or at least
properly weigh, the global and strategic consequences of such an outcome. First of all, the United States does
not dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and remains committed to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, a

nuclear-armed Republic of Korea (ROK)

will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten to turn the South into a pariah state like its
errant, northern neighbor. Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed
South Korea, the United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended deterrent, and the
strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region.
While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward
and able to attack the South with little or no warning; North Koreas long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and biological
weapons are just as threatening as, if not more destructive than, North Koreas nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does not need
a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. The real
purpose behind Pyongyangs nuclear program is to ensure the regimes long-term survival, and to convince the world that North
Korea be taken seriously. According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, North

Koreas ballistic
missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this
threat. Instead, it will dramatically alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which
already strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China
will likely consider its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the
North Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is South Koreas top
trading partner by far South Korea can only lose in a strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which
forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of
a North East Asian nuclear arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe. These effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where the potential
for nuclear proliferation exists. If countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional power like South Korea,
one can easily envision that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop
their own nuclear weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will
not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept
the total number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which
limits Irans capacity to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on the enduring strength of the
NPT. Controlling the worlds most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international
communitys commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its
long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing. The
subsequent finger-pointing and accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal the growing perception
that Americas global leadership on important matters is waning towards irrelevance. Perhaps the
of the United States allowing South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is

most dangerous impact

the erosion of confidence in Americas

nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrent, which underwrites its seven military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Such a move would represent a striking policy reversal by the United States, as articulated in President
Obamas Prague speech in 2009, and violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. At the 47th ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd, 2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S.
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter affirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the
ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The

United States has led the

global security order since the end of World War II, largely on the premise of a credible,
extended deterrent afforded by its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, NATOs Strategic Concept, adopted in November of
2010, clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a core element of the Alliances overall strategy. Any indication that
Washingtons nuclear umbrella is somehow imprecise, as Major Lee suggests, would raise serious doubts
about Washingtons commitment to its allies. Given Russias revanchism in Ukraine and on NATOs flank in
Eastern Europe, as well as Chinas coercive behavior in the South China Sea, such doubts will
surely invite further aggressive behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and
reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States. Major Lee does correctly point out,
however, that the international community is not doing enough to curb North Koreas nuclear ambitions. Although the recently
announced dialogue on basing a U.S. Army THAAD battery on the Korea peninsula is a positive step, this capability is aimed at
defending both South Korea and the U.S. homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles, and it doesnt really prevent North Korea
from developing more nukes. Its no secret that China, Pyongyangs sole benefactor, has grown weary of Kim Jong-Uns belligerence.
The U.S. and ROK must work together to convince Beijing that a unified Korea run from Seoul is a better alternative to the status
quo. This will require a lot of effort to address the potential for millions of North Korean refugees fleeing north into China in the
event of regime collapse, not to mention U.S. troops presence in Korea post unification, and the disposition of North Koreas nuclear
weapons. China clearly values its relationship with South Korea, and vice versa, and President Park and her government should
work with China on resolving the North Korean issue, rather than isolating themselves with nuclear arms. If South Korea withdraws
from the NPT, it would likely draw stiff opposition from China and the rest of the world, much like North Korea did in the wake of its
own withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The only way South Korea can affect North Koreas nuclear program, short of military
action, is to undermine the Kim regime and precipitate a collapse by penetrating the hermit kingdom with information. Consider
North Koreas panicked reaction when South Korea used loudspeaker broadcasts last summer to blast news and K-Pop music across
the Demilitarized Zone. Kim Jong-Un fears being exposed for the fraud that he is. South Korea should do everything it can to
unravel North Koreas isolation from the outside world. Theres no question that North Koreas nuclear program is a danger to the
entire world, and a more direct approach, which includes China, is needed to counter this threat. Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a
vocal minority, led by Mr. Chong Mong-joon, a South Korean businessman and erstwhile political operative, South Korean nukes are
neither in South Koreas, nor in the United States strategic interests .

South Korea risks undoing years of economic

progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a nuclear arms race in North East Asia, if not
around the world. The United States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must oppose any such
unilateral effort by Seoul. South Koreas greatest advantage over North Korea is its extensive integration in the global economy as
one of the worlds top trading power. For its sake ,

Seoul must resist letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle
and deal with North Korea in innovative ways. Anything else would play right into Kim JongUns hands.

AT: Posen
Posens argument is underdeveloped
Page 2014 - graduate student at the Harvard Kennedy School
Michael, Is Restraint a Realistic Grand Strategy?, Oct 21, ciceromagazine.com/reviews/isrestraint-a-sound-u-s-grand-strategy/
Posen rightly emphasizes the potency of nationalism since World War II and the fundamental role it has played in effectively
mobilizing local populations against foreign forces to extract high costs. The Iraq War demonstrates that this is true even when subnational forces (e.g., the Iraqi Sunni minority) reject the occupying powers, as in a globalized world these groups can also better
exploit transnational networks to augment their manpower and resources. In

the case of East Asia, however, the

dynamics of regional nationalisms function differently, with the U.S. arguably acting as a stabilizing force
between an ascendant China and its concerned neighbors, including, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and India. Will these
powerful regional nationalisms clash to deleterious effect if the U.S. implements Posens call for
a withdrawal of a significant number of U.S. troops from Japan and South Korea ? Could this
threaten to disrupt regional economic relationships that the U.S. economy relies so heavily on ? Posen never fully
examines these risks in detail. But the active U.S. encouragement for countries such as Japan
with troubled histories of militarismto bolster their military capabilities would likely engender similar
military build-ups from regional neighbors, especially if Japan decided to develop a nuclear
deterrent. Since Posen argues this is a distinct possibility and a logical response in the wake of a
U.S. military withdrawal, it would have been useful for these concerns to be addressed in greater detail.

Relations

Relations Good - North Korea

The Japanese alliance is key to maintain stability and dampen North Korean
threats
Schoff 2015 - Senior Associate Asia Program @ Carnegie
James L, Dark Clouds over Asia, Aug 14, carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/14/dark-cloudsover-asia/ietg
The strong U.S.-Japan alliance has played a major role in maintaining peace in the region. But
some dark clouds are forming for the future . East Asia, an emerging powerhouse for the world's economic growth,
is undergoing a transition that could lead to productive harmony or to devastating conflict. Much
depends on how skillfully the United States and its key Asian allies adjust to (and try to shape) the
changing dynamics. Now the relationship has matured, and the two countries have a more equal partnership, spanning the
globe in the fields of security, trade, technology, health and many others. At the same time, conditions throughout East Asia have
changed. China has become a preeminent economic power in the region and is reasserting its influence economically, politically and
militarily. Resurgent

nationalism has reignited smoldering disputes, and North Korea's

unpredictable dictator is threatening the use of nuclear weapons more credibly than before.
These developments call for judicious diplomacy as the United States pursues its priorities,
which continue to be maintaining stability, openness and access in this vital region. We cannot do this on our own.
Japan is currently taking reasonable steps to strengthen its ability to defend itself from coercion and contribute modestly to
multilateral security initiatives by loosening restrictions on how its Self Defense Force can cooperate with partners. Legislation
proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

would allow Japan to plug into the operations of U.S. forces more
effectively, for example, when Japan's security is directly threatened or as part of a broader regional
effort to preserve stability. A stronger foundation for collective action should deter attempts to change the status quo
through force. The Abe proposals would permit the activation of the new Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which Japan and the
United States adopted this spring to integrate their defense efforts. They would allow Japan to play an earlier and more substantive
role in collective action to defeat North Korean aggression, among other possible missions. Making these changes is not easy. The
Abe legislation is meeting loud opposition from the pacifist-leaning Japanese public. Abe's push for the right of his nation to engage
in "collective self-defense" has caused a slump in his once high approval ratings in opinion polls, but in this case it is an unfortunate
price of prudent leadership. A bigger role for Japan's defense force is essential in this new era, in which Japan can no longer delegate
its defense to the U.S. military and when uncertainty about the future can breed instability in the absence of solidarity among
leading nations. Japan is already taking the initiative on the diplomatic front. Abe has reached out to countries in Southeast Asia to
build regional coalitions that balance China's economic dominance and help fend off its attempts at coercion. This opens the door for
the United States to coordinate with Japan and reinforce its own Asia strategy.

A strong alliance is necessary to dampen an inevitable North Korean collapse or

war
Schoff 2015 - Senior Associate Asia Program @ Carnegie
James L, Strengthening US Alliances in Northeast Asia, Jul 16,
carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliances-in-northeast-asia/idhr
Korea-Japan Relations U.S. policy makers should recognize that the historical perceptions gap between Japan and South Korea
regarding Japans colonial era is wide and largely unbridgeable in the near (and possibly medium) term. Political and diplomatic
agreements to paper over this gap in the 1990s sustained gradual progress in bilateral relations since then, albeit in ebbs and flows,
but both sides poked enough holes in this weak fabric by 2014 to set ties back by a couple of decades. The good news is that leaders
in Tokyo and Seoul are making honest efforts to repair the damage, but this is always harder to do the second time around, and there
are groups in both countries that are motivated and mobilized to resist compromise. Current efforts seek to two tracks of dialogue
whereby discussion and claims related to history can continue, but do not halt bilateral communication and cooperation on shared
national security interests. Because any

crisis involving North Korea (or nearly any major regional security, economic, or
require close U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation to manage effectively,
it is important for the United States to work proactively in support of productive trilateralism .
One need only look at the intractability of current challenges in Syria and Eastern Ukraine to see
how limited U.S. options and leverage become when there is a lack of regional unity and
capacity, and then apply this to a North Korean collapse or war scenario to appreciate the value
of U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation. In recent years, the three governments have tended to keep trilateral cooperation
environmental crisis) will

initiatives out of the public limelight, since this was seen as the easiest way to avoid excessive scrutiny (and possible criticism) and
establish habits of operational collaboration. But it is becoming increasingly clear that low public support rates in Korea and Japan
for closer security cooperation (as evidenced by the rejection in late 2013 of required ammunition for a ROK PKO in South Sudan
that was donated via UN channels by a nearby SDF unit, among other examples) could interfere with trilateral cooperation, even if
the need seemed obvious to Americans.14 Thus,

it might be advantageous to publicize existing cooperation

initiatives more actively especially when in support of regional public goods related to security, health, the environment,
and energy as a way to possibly increase public support for trilateral cooperation in Japan and
Korea. The goal over time would be to acclimatize the publics to trilateral cooperation for
national interests as a matter of course, which in no way prejudices issues of bilateral concern.

Relations Good Cyberwar Impact

The alliance is key to global cyber securityits a model for global cooperation
Petretti 15 [5/20/15, Vito Petretti is of counsel in Morgan Lewis's Global Outsourcing,
Technology, and Commercial Transactions Practice. Mr. Petretti's practice focuses on
technology and outsourcing matters. As part of his practice, Mr. Petretti regularly drafts and
negotiates an array of domestic and international outsourcing service agreements for a variety of
business processes, such as information technology, finance and accounting, human resources,
and procurement, United States and Japan Form Cybersecurity Alliance in Hopes of Building
International Norms, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/united-states-and-japan-formcybersecurity-alliance-hopes-building-international-nor#sthash.L1rZKzd0.dpuf]
On April 28, the

United States and Japan reached an agreement to form a cybersecurity alliance

between the countries. Faced with the growth of hacking threats from countries like China and
North Korea and nonstate actors, the White House hopes to leverage the alliance along
with other efforts to encourage the growth of international cyber norms . As Cory
Bennett describes in The Hill article White House Unveils Cyber Part with Japan, U .S. officials have publicly
acknowledged that several countries including Asian power China are sitting on the United
States critical networks, collecting data and possibly waiting to attack . As part of the new alliance,
Japan and the United States have agreed to share cybersecurity data such as threat data
regarding hackers and assistance in strengthening cybersecurity infrastructure . The alliance
also allows Japan to engage in some international cybersecurity initiatives .
Bennetts article describes the alliance as a step toward establishing broader international
cybersecurity norms, noting that the countries agreed to develop peacetime cyber norms and
to coordinate efforts with international organizations like the United Nations. The White House hopes
that building international consensus behind some cyber norms will give the
United States more authority to prosecute bad actors. Although the United States has expressed
grave concern about the growth of hacking threats, particularly from state actors like China, it has been hesitant to retaliate. The
Obama administration indicted five Chinese military servicemen last year on hacking charges,
but this has been viewed as a largely symbolic measure. The new US-Japan cybersecurity
alliance may be a model for future cooperation among other nations that may lead
to new cyber norms and new policing of international cyber threats.

Cyber vulnerabilities cause nuclear war

Gady 15 (Franz Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Article quotes: James
Cartwright, retired US Marine Corps General and eighth Vice Chair[hu]man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greg Austin of the EastWest
Institute in New York, and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/)

Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the risk of
accidental nuclear war , according to Cartwright, while the sophistication of the cyberthreat
[to nuclear weapons] has increased exponentially. One-half of their [U.S. and Russian] strategic
arsenals are continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800
warheads are ready to fly at a moments notice, a policy report compiled by a study group chaired by the
retired U.S. general summarized. At the brink of conflict, nuclear command and warning networks

around the world may be besieged by electronic intruders whose onslaught degrades
the coherence and rationality of nuclear decision-making , the report further points out. The
War Games-like scenario could unfold in one of the following three ways: First, sophisticated
attackers from cyberspace could spoof U.S. or Russian early warning networks into reporting
that nuclear missiles have been launched, which would demand immediate retaliatory
strikes according to both nations nuclear warfare doctrines. Second, online hackers could manipulate
communication systems into issuing unauthorized launch orders to missile crews . Third and
last, attackers could directly hack into missile c ommand a n d c ontrol systems launching the
weapon or dismantling it on site ( a highly unlikely scenario). To reduce the likelihood of such an scenario ever occurring,
Cartwright proposes that Moscow and Washington should adjust their nuclear war contingency plan timetables from calling for
missiles to be launched within 3 to 5 minutes to 24 to 72 hours. Reducing the lead time to prepare nuclear missiles for launch would
not diminish the deterrent value of the weapons, Cartwright, who headed Strategic Command from 2004 to 2007 and was vice
chair[hu]man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before retiring in 2011, emphasized. However, the

Obama White House has so

far rejected the idea, particularly due to the recent deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. Also,
Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, testified in Congress this month
arguing it did not make any great sense to de-alert forces because nuclear missiles needed to
be ready and effective and able to prosecute the mission at any point in time. Cartwrights credibility
may have also suffered among Washington policy circles ever since he has been under investigation for leaking information about
the top secret Stuxnet virus a sophisticated cyber weapon allegedly jointly developed by Israel and the United States to the New
York Times. Nevertheless, a co-authored paper, seen in draft by The Diplomat, argues that cyber

weapons and
strategies have brought us to a situation of aggravated nuclear instability that needs to

be more explicitly and more openly addressed in the diplomacy of leading powers, both in private and in public. The authors, Greg
Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York (and a regular contributor to The Diplomat) and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, have concluded that Russia now sees U.S. plans to disrupt the command and control of its nuclear weapons as
the only actual (current) threat at the strategic level of warfare. Laura Saalman of the Asia Pacific Research Centre in Hawaii has
also warned of the need to look at the impact of U.S. strategies and nuclear force posture on China in a 2014 paper titled Prompt
Global Strike: China and the Spear.

Relations Good Disease Impact

Strong alliance key to solve disease spread
Hubbard, senior associate in JCIEs New York office and former program director for East Asia
at Columbia Universitys Center for International Conflict Resolution, 11
(Susan, Revitalizing US-Japan Collaboration on Global Health,
http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/USJapanPapers/Sase.pdf)
While the high prevalence of life-threatening diseases, unstable governance, and poverty will
inevitably make aid to Africaand particularly subSaharan Africaan ongoing priority, the US-Japan
partnership should also regard Asia as an important region from a political and public health
perspective . President Obama stated in November 2011 that Asia Pacific will be a top priority in US security policy in the coming years given
the militarys withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.30 Likewise, US-Japan partnership in global health should place more emphasis on work in Asia.

HIV
infection rates as a percentage of the population are much lower in Asia than in Africa, but given
the size of the populations in some Asian countries , the total numbers are similarly staggering. The
Southeast Asia, which had about 3.3 million new cases of tuberculosis in 2009, accounts for roughly 35 percent of global incidents.31

number of people living with HIV/AIDS is estimated to be 2.7 million in India, which has a total population of 1.2 billion. Similarly, it is estimated that
700,000 of Chinas roughly 1.3 billion residents are living with HIV/AIDS.32 In addition, the persistence of several fragile states in Asia threatens
regional efforts to fight communicable diseases. In December 2009, nine

cases of H1N1 were reported in North Korea,

which was forced to accept an offer of support from South Korea to provide flu vaccines for its population.33 Communicable diseases
can travel easily across national boundaries , so it only takes one country to jeopardize
regional efforts to fight their spread . Conclusion During a November 2010 speech, President Obama referred to the two
countries 50-year alliance as an indestructible partnership based on equality and mutual understanding and called the United States and Japan
partners in Asia and around the world.34 In todays world, such

an alliance cannot be limited to partnership

on traditional security . Health challenges have the potential to threaten the lives and
livelihoods of large numbers of people throughout the region and around the world . At the same time,
the growing threat of emerging infectious diseases drives home the threat of a possible new pandemic devastating lives and economies. Global
health is, therefore, an essential area for US-Japan partnership . Global health has enjoyed
increasing prominence in both countries development agendas, in part because of the growing
threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases even in high-income countries, as well as
the uncertain impact of the unprecedented double burden of communicable and
noncommunicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries. It is now time for the USJapan partnership to accelerate systematic collaboration and actively promote
global health . As the global health community is increasingly recognizing that we need to
move beyond a debate between emphasizing either disease-specific initiatives or health system
strengthening, there is an opportunity for these two major donor countries to demonstrate how
success in one area can be leveraged for success in the other , creating a win-win
situation . The United States and Japan should continue to support the training of health
professionals, particularly of those working at the community level, in order to build robust
health systems that can deal with both communicable and noncommunicable diseases and
provide adequate health services beyond the 2015 target date for achieving the MDGs. By combining their
efforts, the United States and Japan can take steps to help prevent the
proliferation of serious diseases and public health emergencies at the earliest
possible stage .

Extinction burnout wrong

Kerscher 14Professor, unclear where because every website about him is in German
(Karl-Heinz, Space Education, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens,
multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an
upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly
kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts
more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection , and thus likely out-compete a
more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not
linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission . However, this
assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the
rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is
possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts , with different susceptibilities to
infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains
of pathogens can also alter virulence. There

are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had

a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic
a realistic threat to human civilization.

Relations Good Heg Impact

Alliance key to global heg China rise and global alliance system spillover
Ikenberry 14 - the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princetons Center for International Security
Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea.
In 2013-2014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford.
PhD from the University of Chicago.
(G John, From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand
Strategy in East Asia, October 2014, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014, 4163, International Journal of
Korean Unification Studies)
The American-led order in East Asia provided the foundation for the cascade of
political and economic transitions that have marked the region. But at the same time, these
great transitions have served to transform and undermine Americas old relationship with
the region. If the old order in East Asia was partially hegemonic, the emerging order in East Asia is more
multipolar and shaped by balance of power impulses. With the rise of China, the United States is
no longer the only major great power in the region. The region is in transition to a new sort of order, although the
specific features and organizing logic remains unclear. Indeed, the rise of China is perhaps the defining
drama of East Asia and the global order . The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy and its active
diplomacy and military buildup is already transforming East Asia. Future decades will almost certainly see
further increases in Chinese power and further expansion of its influence on the world stage .
This is a power transition with far-reaching implications for Americas strategic interests
and global position . How the United States responds to growing Chinese power is and will
increasingly be a seminal question of American grand strategy in the years ahead.1 This
essay looks at Americas approach to order in East Asia and asks a series of questions. What has been its vision of East Asian order?
What has been its global and regional grand strategy? How is the rise of China transforming the region and altering Americas role
within it? Can the United States and China find a way to live together in East Asia? If the region is moving away from an Americanled hegemonic order, what will a post-hegemonic East Asia look like? Is the Obama administrations pivot to Asia a shift away from
the older American grand strategy or a continuation of a longer-standing grand strategy toward China, allies, and the region? In
what follows, I argue that the United States has pursued a remarkably consistent grand strategy toward East Asia. It is built around
American power, interests, and ideals. In this sense, it is not best seen as simply a geopolitical strategy of hegemony or balance of
power. Rather, it is infused with distinctive American ideas about order, identity, and community. It is a synthesis of realist and
liberal thinking.

It has guided Americas relationship with East Asia during the long-era of U.S.
hegemonic leadership, and it continues to inform todays efforts by Washington to remain
tied to East Asia and shape the terms of Chinas rise . The United States seeks a regional order that is
open and organized around widely-shared rules and principles of politics and economics. Chinese power and leadership
will grow within the region. The American goal is not to prevent this growth in Chinese power
and leadership, but to make sure it is not used to turn the region into a closed, illiberal Chinese
sphere of influence. The region is moving to a post-hegemonic order that is increasingly defined by balance of power
calculations and logics. Great power politics is returning. But there are constraints on how far the
region will move to a more volatile setting in which security rivalry and Cold War geopolitics will
rule. The American grand strategy in East Asia seeks, in part, to provide a counterweight to a rising China. But the key elements of
this strategy are not simply power balancing and alliance building. The United States seeks to pull China into the liberal
international order at the same time, that is, seeks to restrain Chinas power and influence in the region. I argue that there are
reasons for both the United States and China to restrain their geopolitical rivalry. They will surely struggle and compete, seeking to
be the leading state in the region. But American efforts to contain China and Chinas efforts to push the United States out of the
region will both be self-defeating strategies. The

most optimistic vision of a peaceful rise of China and a

managed U.S.-Chinese rivalry in Asia is one in which Beijing comes to see that the American-led

liberal international order can help facilitate Chinas peaceful rise and not stand as an
obstacle to it. American Global Order Building United States grand strategy toward East Asia has been
part of a larger global order building project, unfolding over the last sixty-five years. It is a fusion of realist
and liberal impulses. In the early postwar decades, under the shadow of the Cold War, the United States began building governing
arrangements within the West and later on within the wider global system. It

was a vision of order tied together

by partnerships , institutions , and grand bargains . It was built around multilayered
agreements that served to open markets, bind democracies and anti-communist authoritarian
regimes together, and create a far-flung security community. Between 1944 and the early 1950s, the United
States undertook extraordinary efforts to build regional and global order around institutionalized partnerships. The United Nations,
Bretton Woods, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, NATO, and the U.S.-Japan alliance were launched. The United States
helped to rebuild the economies of Germany and Japan and to integrate them into the emerging Western system. With the
Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States also articulated more general
global ideas about rights, protections, and progressive change.2 The

core idea of this postwar international order

was that the United States would need to actively shape its security environment, creating a
stable, open, and friendly geopolitical space across Europe and Asia. This required making
commitments, establishing institutions, forging partnerships, acquiring clients, and providing
liberal hegemonic leadership. The United States would seek to shape its environment, using its power advantages to
create new facts on the ground. It was to be a liberal international order, organized around trade and multilateral cooperation. In
the background, an array of alliances and security relationships across Europe and Asia
would provide the stable underpinning of this open and loosely rule-oriented system.3 Three
objectives have been the core of this postwar grand strategy of order building . The United States
has sought to manage its international environment to reduce great power threats to its national
security; to encourage the emergence of a liberal economic order to expand the global economy
and facilitate domestic prosperity; and to work with other states to establish a global
institutional order to facilitate international cooperation and provide a congenial setting for the exercise of American
leadership.4 Rather than staying confined within its hemisphere, the U nited S tates projected
power and tied itself to states across Eurasia. This is a grand strategy that might best be
described, following Joseph Nye, as deep engagement .5 The first objective reducing great
power threats to national security was pursued through a strategy to alliance building and
cooperative security . The grand strategy was to remain connected in close alliance
with other democratic countries. NATO and the U.S.- Japan alliance have been at the
core of this alliance system . In a departure from an earlier era of no entangling alliances, the U.S. would bind
itself to other major non-Communist states to create a global security system. Such a system would ensure that the
democratic great powers would not go back to the dangerous game of strategic rivalry and
power politics. It helped, of course, to have an emerging Cold War to generate this cooperative security arrangement. But a
security relationship between the U nited S tates and its allies was implicit in other
elements of liberal international order . A cooperative security order embodied in
formal alliance institutions ensured that the power of the U nited S tates would be rendered
more predictable. Power would be caged in institutions thereby making American power more reliable and connected to
Europe and East Asia. The second objective creating a liberal economic order was manifest in a commit to trade and economic
openness across the worlds regions. That is, capitalism would be organized internationally and not along national, regional, or
imperial lines. In many ways, this is what World War II was fought over. Germany and Japan each built their states around the
military domination of their respective regions, Soviet Russia was an imperial continental power, and Great Britain had the imperial
preference system. American interests were deeply committed to an open world economy and an open world economy would tie
together friends and allies. The

third objective building an institutionalized order was reflected in

the ambitious agenda of multilateral cooperation. This idea was seen most clearly in the efforts to create the
Bretton Woods institutions. Governments would need to play a more direct supervisory role in stabilizing and managing economic
order. New forms of intergovernmental cooperation would need to be invented .

The democratic countries would

enmesh themselves in a dense array of intergovernmental networks and loose rule-based

institutional relationships. In doing so, the United States committed itself to exercising power
through these regional and global institutions. This was a great innovation in international order. The United States
and its partners would create permanent governance institutions ones that they themselves would dominate to provide ongoing
streams of cooperation needed to managing growing realms of complex interdependence.6 In these various ways, the United States
has laced its grand strategy with both realist and liberal ideas. It has been realist most directly in its Cold War emphasis on
containment of the Soviet Union and global communism. It has been realist in its focus on building centers of power that serve as
counterweights to rival great powers or rival hegemonic projects. It

has been realist in its focus on forging

alliances and building capacities to project military force. But it has also been liberal in its focus
on organizing international order around open trade and institutionalized cooperation among
the liberal democracies. It has been liberal in its focus on encouraging a worldwide movement toward democracy and
Western-style modernization. It has sought to secure its fundamental interests within a liberal international order, organized around
openness and rule-based relations. Indeed,

it is this synthesis of realist and liberal ideas and

strategies that market the American grand strategic orientation . Americas strategy of
deep engagement aimed not just to protect and advance the countrys national interests but to
also shape the overall international system . In this way, it was a milieu oriented grand
strategy rather than a positional grand strategy. A positional grand strategy is one in which a great power seeks
to counter, undercut, contain, and limit the power and threats of a specific challenger state or group of states . A milieu grand
strategy is one in which a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to shape the
international environment to make it congenial with its long-term security and interests. 7 In the
case of the U nited S tates, this has involved building the infrastructure of international
cooperation , promoting trade and democracy, and establishing partnerships.

Japan DA Supplement Neg

UQ
US and Japan Pursuing Closer Ties and Military Cooperation Against China
Fairclough 16- Master of Arts in International Economics and Foreign Policy from John
Hopkins University, Bachelors Degree in History from Yale University, U.S., India, Japan
Begin to Shape New Order on Asias High Seas: The three democracies are pursuing closer ties
and military cooperation to counter an assertive China, Jun 16,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas1466005545
From the waters of the Philippine Sea this week emerged a partial outline of Washingtons vision
for a new Asian maritime-security order that unites democratic powers to contend with a moreassertive and well-armed China. A U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships
from India and Japan jointly practiced anti-submarine warfare and air-defense and search-andrescue drills in one of the largest and most complex exercises held by the three countries. The
maneuvers were being tracked by a Chinese surveillance vessel, a U.S. Navy officer aboard the
carrier USS John C. Stennis said on Wednesday. Last week, Chinas Foreign Ministry
spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing hoped the training will be conducive to regional peace,
security and stability. Washington and Tokyo have long cooperated closely on defense. And the
U.S. has been working to deepen strategic ties with India and to encourage New Delhi to play a
more active role, not just in the Indian Ocean but also in the Pacific, as Chinas rise shifts the
regional balance of power. Americans are looking for those who can share the burden,
said C. Raja Mohan, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peaces
India center. A strengthened three-way partnership among the U.S., Japan and India
is an important strategic shift.

Link

LinkISS/Space Affs
Japan considers China space program a threat, does not want cooperation in
space, means plan would anger Japan
Kosaka 16 February 11, 2016. Eyeing China, US and Japan aim to keep the space station aloft.
http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160211-China-Outbound/Tech-Science/Eyeing-China-USand-Japan-aim-to-keep-the-space-station-aloft
When the U.S. and Japan agreed recently to extend the use of the International Space Station
until 2024, four years longer than initially planned, it was partly out of concern that
mothballing the ISS as scheduled would leave China as the only country with a manned
space station.
The station, construction of which began in 1998, is operated jointly by the U.S., Russia,
Japan, Canada and 11 European countries. Japan has spent roughly 890 billion yen ($7.43
billion) on the ISS so far. For that price, it has been able to conduct tests in the Kibo experiment
module. However, some in Japan have complained that the science performed in the space lab
has not produced results sufficient to justify the massive cost.
Japan's Kibo space lab is one of the modules used by the International Space Station.
Nevertheless, Japan went along with the U.S. on the Dec. 22 decision to extend the life of the
space station until 2024. Russia -- whose rockets ferry astronauts, equipment and supplies to
the ISS -- and Canada, with its expertise on the facility's robotic arms, are both expected to agree
to keep it open.
Although not part of the ISS program, China played a role in keeping it aloft. China launched
its space program by making use of technology from the Soviet Union and later Russia. It put up
its first satellite in 1970 and sent its first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou 5, into orbit in 2003.
Those feats were followed by the landing of a lunar probe in 2007 and the launch of the BeiDou
Navigation Satellite System, a Chinese version of the GPS system, in 2010.
If all goes according to plan, China will put up the main section of its Tiangong space station
as early as 2018. It will send the other sections into orbit in pieces and assemble them, aiming to
open the station by 2020. Construction of the Tiangong is to be completed around 2022. China
says it may then allow astronauts from other countries to stay at the station or dock laboratory
modules there.
Germany is moving toward working with China in space development, and European Space
Agency astronauts have started learning Chinese, according to a Japanese expert in the field.
If the ISS shuts down in 2020, China will become the only country to have a working manned
space station. That would encourage other countries interested in the final frontier to turn to
Beijing for help. A China-led space alliance would be a heavenly analogue to the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank -- and would likely get just as cool a reception from
Washington.
It would both boost China's international influence and raise the possibility that military
technologies from Europe or elsewhere may find their way into Chinese hands. Better
technology, in turn, would enhance China's spacefaring capabilities, creating a positive feedback
loop, attracting more countries to China's space program.

NATIONAL SECURITY ANGLE Major powers rely on communications and surveillance

satellites to ensure their national security by, for example, keeping an eye on the missile
launches and troop movements of potential adversaries. This makes space assets a prime target
in any military conflict between great powers. The U.S. and Japan are thus eager to limit
China's access to space technology with military applications.
Japan is in direct competition with China over space the plan would anger Japan
Moltz 15 January 17, 2015 Its On: Asias New Space Race
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/17/why-china-will-win-the-next-spacerace.html
Since Chinas first human spaceflight in 2003 and its threatening anti-satellite test in 2007, Asia
has seen a surge in space activity, with budgets increasing rapidly across the region. While few
officials admit to the term, a space race is emerging in Asia.
The surge of Asian countries joining the ranks of major space powers mirrors the rise of Asian
economies and their militaries more generally since the end of the Cold War. But following the
political drivers of these trends leads most often to regional rivalries, not a desire to compete
with the United States or Russia. Being first in Asia to do anything in space brings prestige,
lends credibility to governments in power, and helps stimulate Asias young population to study
science and technology, which has other benefits for their national economies.
The responses to Chinas rise have included the sudden development of military space programs
by two countries that previously shunned such activitiesJapan and Indiaand dynamic new
activities in countries ranging from Australia to Singapore to Vietnam. On the Korean Peninsula,
both North and South have orbited satellites in the past three years and both have pledged to
develop much larger rockets. Many of these countries realize that they cant win Asias space
race, but they also know that they cannot afford to lose.
Chinas rapid expansion in space activity has also raised serious concerns within
U.S. military circles and in NASA. But these developments pose an existential
threat to Chinas neighbors , some of whom see Beijings space program as yet another
threatening dimension to their deep-seated historical, economic, and geo-political rivalries for
status and influence within the Asian pecking order. Even more, space achievements affect the
self-perceptions of their national populations, challenging their governments to do more.
How this competition will play out and whether it can be managed, or channeled into more
positive directions, will have a major impact on the future of international relations in space.
The U.S. government has thus far responded with a two-track strategy, seeking a bilateral space
security dialogue with Beijing, while quietly expanding space partnerships with U.S. friends and
allies in the region, adding a space dimension to the U.S. pivot to Asia.
China
Although shocking to some, Chinas space efforts have actually been long in coming. Beijing has
gradually built up a range of scientific, commercial, and military space capabilities since the
1980s that have now put it in a position to compete favorably with any country in Asiaeven
technologically advanced Japanwhile presenting an asymmetric threat to the United States.
Over the past decade China has launched a spacecraft that mapped the Moon (Change 1),
conducted a lunar rover mission (Change 2), and orbited and visited a small space station

(Tiangong 1), with plans for a much larger station within a decade. It is building a new launch
site on Hainan Island with plans for a heavy-left booster.
In the military realm, the Peoples Liberation Army has demonstrated the capability of putting
critical U.S. space assets at risk in a crisis, forcing Washington to think twice about the surety of
its space-enhanced military capabilities. The sheer size of Chinas young scientific and
engineering cadre, its steadily expanding satellite network (including a newly operational
commercial and military GPS system called Beidou), its increasing space budget, and its
investment in military counter-space technologieswith recent tests of possible offensive
systems in 2010, 2013, and 2014presage a broad and formidable set of capabilities. Experts
are divided over whether China has set itself on a course for space dominance or not. Its policies
are likely to be influencedfor better or for worseby its economic status and its evolving
relationship with the United States. But Asian countries are not taking the threat lying down.
Unlike in Europe, where all of the major powers (except Russia) are members of the European
Space Agency and share a cooperative approach to space (including highly integrated cost
sharing), Asias space arrangements are highly nationalistic, sometimes secretive, and mostly
competitive. There are no space security talks currently ongoing among the major powers, no
history of arms control talks linking space and nuclear deterrence (unlike in the U.S.-Soviet
case), and no civil space cooperation in its key political dyads: China-Japan, India-China, and
North-South Korea.
At the regional level, China and Japan have sponsored rival space organizations in an
effort to organize smaller countries in this broader competition and draw them
to their side. China has formed an ESA-like body called the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization (APSCO), which now includes Bangladesh, Thailand, and Mongolia among its
dues-paying members. APSCO benefits include access to Chinese space training, ground
stations, and satellite development projects. Others in the region have opted to participate in the
less formal, Japanese-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, maintaining greater
flexibility.
Japan
At the domestic level, Japan, long Asias technological leader, has also reacted with a range of
new activities. In 2008, the Japanese Diet pushed through revolutionary legislation that ended
Japans previous ban on military activities in space. Despite the high costs of recovery after the
2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, Tokyo has doubled down on its
space efforts with a new launcher and renewed efforts in high-prestige space science and human
spaceflight, including an active program of research on its Kibo module on the International
Space Station (ISS). Japans H-II Transfer Vehicle spacecraft now provides the only non-U.S.
and non-Russian service module able to ferry supplies to the ISS.
In December 2014, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency launched the ambitiousHayabusa
2 mission, which aims to put four landers on an asteroid by 2018 and then return soil samples to
Earth. Japanese officials see an intimate connection between their space accomplishments
and the ability of its economy to export advanced technologies. They fear that Chinas space
accomplishments might put Japans technological reputation into doubt . Therefore,
they believe they cannot fall behind their rapidly advancing neighbor.

Tokyo prefers to continue to stop China from entering the ISS

Hooper 14 January 18th 2014. Cooperation vs. competition in space.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/18/national/science-health/cooperation-vscompetition-in-space/
By most measures, the Americans dont want that to happen. Quite apart from the
scientific and engineering work conducted on the ISS, there is national pride . Or,
put another way: If the U.S. winds down the ISS, the Chinese will take control of space.
Some U.S. politicians view this as a national-security issue. That was one reason the U.S.
blocked Chinas initial approaches to join the ISS project: It feared it would improve Chinas
ability to develop space weapons. Tokyo may also prefer to continue supporting the U.S.
effort in order to stop China making the running.

Japan wants the establish leadership by being sole Asian member in the ISS and
win the battle between APSCO and APRSAFplan undermines that and angers the
Japanese
Du 14 Rong Du, receiver of the 2014 IAC scholarship, doctoral candidate in space law at the
University of Hong Kong. Space Cooperation in Asia: a Mystery.
http://swfound.org/media/187608/rong_du_paper_iac_2014.pdf
The co-existence of different initiatives reflects the underlined complexity in the competition
and cooperation in the space field. The rivalry between different cooperation frameworks
corresponds with traditional political lines that there has almost been no cooperation history
among the leading space players in Asia, there are no major, region wide projects among Asias
leading space players in the scientific or commercial sectors and no significant political,
diplomatic, or military talks on space among the major capitals.36 Meanwhile, the major space
players proactively seek cooperation with states outside Asia that share diplomatic consensus
and have similar goals in the space missions. States are motivated to prioritize spacerelated matters in the national agenda, e.g. space cooperation, considering the
political outcomes produced by space activities .37 In the debate about whether China
and Japan are engaging in a contest for leadership in East Asia, Kazuto Suzuki points out that
China and Japan are competing for leadership in the area of international services or public
goods, using APSCO and APRSAF as the tool to provide technologies and services for developing
countries.38 They are playing the same game with the same rules,39 the aim is not to beat
each other in space, but to utilize their space capability for diplomatic activities.40 China and
Japan are using its space assets to support the program of APSCO and APRSAF respectively. For
instance, the Sentinel Asia project of APRSAF functions through Japans Advanced Land
Observing Satellite Daichi, the utilization of the Japanese Experimental Module Kibo. In the
case of APSCO, China made substantial contributions to the project of APOSOS and SMMS.
China does not have a grand space strategy so that space policies are often inferred from the
space behaviors, the statements made by high-level officials in diplomatic occasions, the white
papers on space activities. According to the most recent white paper, China attaches much
importance to regional space cooperation in the Asia-Pacific area.41 There are different
understandings as to Chinas role in APSCO in relation to the limited membership of APSCO.
APSCO is often seen as Chinas implementation of the soft power approach, which is to use its

space capabilities to gain political leverage and influence over the targeting states.42 It was even
speculated that as the only spacefaring nation in the organization, China deliberately
excluded other spacefaring nations in the region such as Japan and India in order
to manipulate APSCO , which will override the equal partnership of the member states and
the organizations autonomy.43 Another often cited example is the inclusion of Iran and
Pakistan that are undergoing sanctions and cannot obtain space technology elsewhere.44 These
accusations overlook the substance of the APSCO Convention. Chinas support of APSCO should
not be isolated from the fact that it is also proactively cooperating with partners from other
continents.45 The programs carried out by ASPCO so far were proposed not elusively by China,
but also other member states. They have gone through the feasibility study and discussions by
the working groups. There was speculation that the APSCO programs would provide more
launch opportunities for the Chinese launchers.46 It is proved to be inaccurate. The CGWIC
(China Great Wall Industrial Corporation) launched a communication satellite named PALAPAD for Indonesia in 2009 and a communication satellite named 1R for Pakistan in 2011.47 Both
of them were commercial launches and did not take advantage of the partnership in APSCO to
close the deal. With respect to the launching of satellites dedicated to APSCO programs, it is
undoubted that the launching capability and lower cost of the CGWIC will smooth the progress
of the relevant programs.48
On the part of Japan, it has realized the importance of international cooperation. Japans Basic
Space Plan has attached much importance to space diplomacy.49 The role of APRSAF is
summarized as follows, Japan will establish a leadership by utilizing the leading role in the
APRSAF and the position as the only participant of the International Space Station
program in Asia .50 ARPSAF is also expected to change the cooperation approach of space
agency centric and open up the ministerial-level cooperation in space science and technology.51
The bureaucratic adjustment in terms of space-related matters has facilitated international
space cooperation. Before 2012 JAXA played only a scientific role and was restricted in
technology transfer.52 Since 2012 the basic space law modified the mandate of JAXA so that it is
able to carry space programs of dual use nature.53 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has set up an
office of space to specifically deal with the diplomatic aspect of space activities; and it has played
a constructive role in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) space security workshop and the space
security session at APRSAF-19.54 MoFA contends that Japan should play a leading role in
regional space cooperation, in the awake of the socio-economic benefits brought about by the
development of space infrastructure in many developing countries in Asia.55 In April 2014,
JAXA signed partnership agreement with JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency); this
arrangement will combine JAXAs aerospace technology with JICAs expertise to solve
challenges faced by developing countries and other global issues.56

LinkKorea
Best strategy for Japan is to keep Korea dividedplan reunifies and angers Japan
Kendall 15
James, Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Spring/Summer 2015. International
Journal of Korean Studies Vol. XIX, No. 1., Japan and Korean Unification: Ambivalence and
Pragmatism - Finding the Least Bad Option. http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2015SPRING-SUMMER/5.pdf
Faced with the prospects enumerated above, the least bad policy option for Japan to
pursue is maintenance of the status quo while endeavoring to rein in North Koreas
nuclear and missile programs. A divided Korea breaks the Korean dagger aimed at
the heart of Japan at the hilt. This matches historical Japanese strategic concerns
towards Korea and China with modern realities.
Many Japanese concerns over Korean unification due to ChinaUS pushing
unification with China makes Japan even more concerned
Klinger 15
Bruce, former chief of CIA's Korea branch. September 28. Allies Should Include Japan in Korean
Unification Plans. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09/allies-should-includejapan-in-korean-unification-plans
Although Japan is not philosophically opposed to Korean unification, it has concerns over
the manner in which unification is accomplished and the parameters of the end
state. Japan would want a unified Korea that retains South Koreas principles of
freedom, democracy, free markets, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
Japan has a strong trading and economic relationship with South Korea that it would not want
to see change. Sharing these basic values with a unified Korea will help to maintain long-term
stable bilateral relations, to address frictions and disputes between the two countries in a
practical and controlled manner, and to further build confidence and trust between the two
countries.[12]
Tokyo would also seek a unified Korea that does not pose a security threat, pursue nationalist
hostility toward Japan, or significantly shift its foreign and security policy stance away from the
United States in favor of closer relations with China.
Of primary importance to Japan would be the unified Koreas security policy after absorbing
North Korea. The initial indicator would be whether Korea quickly announces that it will destroy
the North Korean nuclear arsenal and dispose of all nuclear weapons production programs
under close international verification.
The initial dismantlement and long-term monitoring of compliance would be expected to
comply with Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency standards. If
unified Korea retained North Koreas nuclear arsenal, it could lead Tokyo to develop its own
nuclear weapons program.
Japan would also not want to see a unified Korea develop offensive weapons that could threaten
Japan, such as medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, or expand its naval

capability and activities without coordinating with the United States.[13] Tokyo would want
unified Korea to remain aligned with the United States with some residual, although possibly
reduced, U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Although the North Korean threat
would have been eliminated, Tokyo would still be worried about China.
Tokyo sees the U.S.South Korean alliance as a critical component of its own security, and
elimination of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) would put great pressure for a reduction or removal of
U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). This pressure could come from the Japanese public as well as from
the American public and the U.S. Congress. Japan might also seek, although never publicly
articulate, USFK as a hedge against future Korean ambitions.
While most assume that a unified Korea would maintain an alliance with the United States and
not alter its foreign policy and security posture, alternative scenarios are possible. A unified
Korea could change its strategic focus to side more with China or choose to
become more independent, both of which would be seen as a serious threat to
Japanese national security.
A unified Korea could become even more nationalistic and susceptible to Chinese
entreaties, particularly if Tokyo was perceived as resistant to Korean unification. There is
already trepidation that Seoul is becoming overly close with Beijing. During their summit
meetings, Presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye played up common historical grievances
with Japan, ignoring Beijings role in fighting against South Korea in the Korean War.
Korean unification is unpopular in Japan
NK News Rob York, 6-21-2016, "No optimism for inter-Korean unification in Japan,"
https://www.nknews.org/2015/12/no-optimism-for-inter-korean-unification-in-japan/
I do not think there is any sizable, meaningful support for Korean reunification in Japan. Japan
does not have any stake in that reunification. If anything, Japan is more negative than positive. A
unified Korea would have a population of 80 million. A nation of 80 million people who harbor painful
memories of defeat with no chance of ever getting even would be a great concern to an
aggressor with a shrinking population on an isolated archipelago. Moreover, some Japanese are
overtly concerned about the North Korean nuclear arsenal becoming an asset of a unified Korea .
I do not think there is any sizable, meaningful support for Korean reunification in Japan I dont
sense any enthusiasm for Korean reunification in Japan. I think this is because of the potential
turmoil and costs a reunification would involve. I dont think there has been enough discussion
in Japan on possible reunification scenarios and the costs they will entail. The costs and I
dont mean just financial costs would obviously be higher the more violent the scenario. I dont
sense any enthusiasm for Korean reunification in Japan For Japan the most important thing would be a peaceful and controllable
unification. Japan is supporting unification under South Korean leadership; that is, democratic, with a free market economy, with a
focus on human rights, with rule of law as the foundation. The most desirable scenario is where Kim Jong Un voluntarily abandons
nuclear weapons as a result of Six-Party Talks. Then, with the help of international community, North Korea would open up and step
on the road to reforms. The North Korea nuclear program would be put under IAEA supervision, resulting in a halt in its
development of nuclear weapons. As a rebuilding of the Korean economy would commence there would be more occasions for North
Korea and the international community to interact with each other, thus bringing more transparency and predictability to Kim Jong
Uns regime. As relations between North and South Korea, America and Japan would improve, North Korea would stop its
belligerent rhetoric. Japan will support South Korean leadership on the issue of unification no matter the scenario on the Korean
Peninsula With relations between the Koreas improving, there would be more dialogue and cooperation, which would result in a
change from a state of cease-fire to permanent peace. In the end, a South Korean-led unification will start. Japan will support South
Korean leadership on the issue of unification no matter the scenario on the Korean Peninsula. In order to create good relations with
unified Korea, Japan has to be trusted by South Korea. After such a unification, Japanese economic cooperation will be very
important, but even more important is for Japan to adjust to Korean peace and play a role in the peaceful unification process. Japan

this is conditional on
North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapons before reunification. But in reality there exists
little visible endorsement or support in Japanese politics or society for reunification. Firstly, at the
political level parties have traditionally been divided on the subject of North Korea. The Liberal
Democratic Party has long been pro-South Korea, while the Socialist Party of Japan was proNorth Korea. Second, actual moves toward North Korea have these days been led by Liberal Democratic Party members, as
could benefit from a Korean reunification in terms of the denuclearization of the peninsula though

seen in (former Prime Minister Junichiro) Koizumis visit to North Korea, the resulting Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of
2002 and (current) Prime Minister (Shinzo) Abes strong effort to resolve the abduction issue. In either case, except on the issue of
abduction, the Foreign Ministry has been always reluctant to participate and cooperate. Furthermore, it

is difficult to see
political will in the conservative party towards the issue of reunification beyond diplomatic
normalization, if any, with North Korea. And at societal levels we have two problems. First, ordinary citizens are
totally indifferent to the unification issue. And even when unification is talked about in the media, it is
typically about the possible size of the national power of a reunified Korea in comparison with
Japan, as Tokyo is concerned about the potential threat or competition towards Japan. There
exists little visible endorsement or support in Japanese politics or society for reunification Also,
the relationship between the (pro-North) General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren) and the (pro-South)
Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) has not significantly improved, though there was momentary reconciliation between
them in 2006. The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan is under the strong control of the North Korean leadership,
discouraging the integration of the Chosun people into Japanese society, while the Korean Residents Union in Japan is rather

It is
difficult to expect them to cooperate with each other for reunification . For the Japanese government the
independent of South Koreas political influence and encourages integration of Koreans in Japan into Japanese society.

potential unification of the Korean Peninsula is the problem of the people living there, so its not an issue if it supports unification or
not. For the government, there are no positive nor negative aspects of unification. If South Korea asks for support, the Japanese
government will support it. For Japan everything is fine, as long as there is no war. There are some people who believe in peaceful
unification, but not many. The

most desirable scenario for many is the implosion of North Korea from
the inside, with unification under South Korean leadership. However, this might lead to a war, so its not a
good solution. The birth of unified Korea would be a good thing for both Japan and China.

LinkAIIB
Japan doesnt want to join the AIIB, sees it as a bank run by China for China
Sidibe 15
Nana. 25th June 2015. Japan unlikely to join China's development bank...for now.
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/25/ely-to-join-chinas-development-bankfor-now.html
Takatoshi Ito, a Japan economist and a professor at Columbia University, said
that because Japan regards the AIIB as a bank run by China, it is unlikely that it
will join.
The AIIB's voting rights structure would give greater weight to Beijing when it
comes to decision-making. The ownership of the AIIB is likely to be determined by
GDP size, making China the largest shareholder. China has previously stated that 75
percent of shares in the bank will be allocated to Asian members and 25 percent to non-Asian
members.
"Japan will not be able to stop what China wants to do," said Ito . In 2013, China had a
GDP of $9.24 trillion compared with $4.92 trillion for Japan, according to the World Bank.
In addition, there will be no resident board of directors to provide a check on power within the
bank. The process to determine how funds will be allocated will follow the lead of
the AIIB's presidenta person most likely to be Chinese.
"Decisions will be heavily skewed toward what China wants," said Ito. " Japan fears that this
will be used for projects China wants to push ."
US and Japan both dont agree with AIIB, joining it would abandon Japan
Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar, The Diplomat, 6-30-2015, "Why US Allies Are Happy to Join
Chinas AIIB," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/why-us-allies-are-happy-to-joinchinas-aiib/
U.S. President Barack Obama

says China may steer AIIB loans to meet political or strategic

considerations rather than economic. So, the AIIB will have lower lending standards than existing
multilateral institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and undercut their
effectiveness. Japan echoes this sentiment . Why have other major donors shrugged away
this objection? Because their diplomats smile at the notion that the World Bank or ADB have
always had the highest lending standards. The U.S. as chief shareholder of the World Bank has
always viewed it as a foreign policy tool. Ditto for Japan, chief shareholder of the ADB. Besides, as a
development institution, the World Bank measures its success by its top linelending volumeand not the bottom line. It has
financed huge public sector undertakings of dubious quality across developing countries. When I first worked for the Bank in 1985,
one staffer explained to me the pressures to lend. In the first quarter of the year, we promise to be really tough. By the second
quarter, we worry that disbursements are behind schedule. By the last quarter, we are shoveling money as fast as possible. If we
dont meet disbursement targets, we risk losing allocations and staff next year. The Economist gave a delightful example of Bank
lending as it really was in its issue of August 19, 1995: Over the past few years, Kenya has performed a curious mating ritual with its
aid donors. The steps are: One, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government begins to misbehave, backtracking
on economic reform and behaving in an authoritarian manner. Three, a new meeting of donor counties looms with exasperated
foreign governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of its hat. Five, the donors are mollified
and the aid is pledged. The whole dance then starts again. During the Cold War, the U.S. happily backed loans to Third World
kleptocrats willing to toe U.S. foreign policy. One U.S. diplomat said of the Democratic Republic of the Congos odious ruler and
kleptocrat, General Mobutu, Hes a son of a bitch, but hes our son of a bitch. Bank projects in the Congo failed consistently. Why?
Because aid to that country mostly ended up in Mobutus Swiss bank accounts. Many Third World dictators stole vast sums, yet in

evaluating project performance, Bank staff were prohibited from mentioning corruption as a reason. Only after the Cold War ended
was this taboo lifted. Bank President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) admitted that corruption had long been a major cause of failed loans,
and pledged to curb it in future. Will China similarly use its dominant position in the AIIB to promote its foreign policy aims, and
wink at the peccadilloes of friendly governments? Of course. But this will be no more distortionary than World Bank behavior during
the Cold War. Thats why so many countries are unworried about the AIIBs lending standards, and have happily signed up. They
acknowledge the emergence of China as a new financial power, and seek a slice of the economic action financed by that new power.

Obama sees the AIIB as a lending rival that will reduce the leverage the United States gets
through domination of the World Bank. Japan has kept out of AIIB for the same reason :
it too will suffer erosion of its leverage as chief financier of the Asian Development Bank. But other
donor countries, long used to playing second fiddle to the U.S. and Japan in these two institutions, are just as willing to play second
fiddle to China in the AIIB. Nothing personal, they will tell Obama, its just business.

Internal Links

Alliance Solves Natural Disasters

Japan- US alliance key to Asias recovery from natural disasters- history proves
Sheila A. Smith 12 Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy; Northeast Asia regional
security; international relations of the Asia Pacific http://www.cfr.org/japan/strategy-us-japanalliance/p28010

On January 5, President Barack Obama initiated the Defense Strategy Review,

identifying Asia as a priority in future U.S. military strategy. North Korea's
nuclear proliferation and China's growing military capabilities suggest new
challenges for Washington . But the United States is now in an era of fiscal austerity. The debt ceiling deal worked
out last August requires that nearly $500 billion be cut from projected defense spending over the next decade. To succeed, U.S.
strategy in Asia will by necessity depend heavily on its allies. None will matter more than Japan.

Yet U.S. strategic dialogue with Japan remains underdeveloped. Although the two
governments produced a set of Common Strategic Objectives in 2005 and again in 2011,
plans to realign U.S. and Japanese forces remain unfinished due to political tensions
surrounding one base, Futenma Marine Air Station, in Okinawa. Political change in Tokyo
not only exacerbated contention over Futenma but also delayed Japan's own national
defense planning process . U.S.-Japan military cooperation after the 2011 earthquake
and tsunami in northeastern Japan demonstrated the strength of this alliance .
However, a sustained and serious conversation between security planners in
Washington and Tokyo about the changing Asian security environment is long
overdue .

The United States and Japan should now look ahead to consider how to leverage their
capabilities. It would be a grave mistake to allow budget cuts to devolve into the tensions
over "burden sharing" that plagued the U.S.-Japan alliance in the past. Washington and
Tokyo cannot afford to sit back and allow fiscal constraints to dictate their alliance
planning . In today's Asia, the strategic challenges are too compelling and complex.
The time has come to set priorities for military missions and to invest in the
capabilities needed to accomplish them. Given the repeated tensions in Northeast

Asia, the United States and Japan should formalize mechanisms for crisismanagement coordination. Finally, the alliance should have a long-term basing
strategy that consolidates U.S. and Japanese facilities.

The United States and Japan should concentrate on recent defense and disaster threats as
they consider alliance priorities. Last year, the U.S. and Japanese militaries deployed
together for the first time in response to the earthquake and tsunami disasters.

While the two forces performed well together, the opportunity for real-time mobilization
revealed areas where greater integration of command and communications systems could
benefit both allies.

Alliance Solves Japanese Defense

US Japan alliance key to Japans defense
Sheila A. Smith 12 Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy; Northeast Asia regional
security; international relations of the Asia Pacific http://www.cfr.org/japan/strategy-us-japanalliance/p28010

Even before last year's natural disaster struck, both countries recognized their
defense readiness deserved greater attention in light of Northeast Asia's changing
security environment . This region has had its share of crises of late, with the

provocations on the Korean peninsula in 2010 and the tensions between Japan and China
over the Chinese fishing trawler in waters close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan's
ability to manage the consequences of Pyongyang's missile and nuclear proliferation are
again being tested with the upcoming missile launch. More broadly, the United States and
Japan should have a better understanding of how China's maritime activities, especially in
the East China Sea, affect the efficacy of alliance defense cooperation.
Three alliance missions should be given priority in a U.S.-Japan strategic review.
The first two derive from the changes ongoing in Northeast Asia and have direct
consequences for Japan's defense: ballistic missile defense (BMD) and maritime
security. Defense against North Korean provocations is already a priority for the
alliance, and it should continue to be so. The BMD mission offers several benefits
for better allied defense cooperation: it has realized the benefits of shared
research and development, it has encouraged a considerable enhancement in
Japan's capabilities, and it has prompted Japanese officials to seriously rethink
their command requirements in the case of an attack . In 2005, Japan passed a law

clarifying the civilian and uniformed roles in the command and control of BMD operations.
In the spring of 2009, Japan's defense minister implemented these new rules of engagement
by giving the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) commander final discretion to respond to the North
Korean missile test. U.S. and Japanese militaries both performed well in this first BMD
operation. April's satellite launch provides the opportunity for developing an alliance crisis
response plan that could strengthen the performance of missile defense in the face of
increasing North Korean conventional and nuclear capabilities.