Session No.

704

A Method for Identifying Human Factors Concerns

During the HAZOP Process
Dennis Attwood, Ph.D, CPE
Human Factors Engineering Specialist
Risk Reliability and Safety Engineering Limited
League City, TX
Bernd Froehlich
Process Safety Engineer
ExxonMobil Chemical Central Europe GmbH
Koln, Germany

ABSTRACT
The process Industry in the US is currently evaluating a new tool to help HAZOPs
teams identify and mitigate Human Factors issues during the HAZOPs of existing
and new facilities. Previous experience with the implementation of Human Factors
in a HAZOP process has pointed out the following issues:
Current HAZOP protocols are not as systematic in evaluating the Human
Machine Interface issues (HMI) as they could be.
The principle objective of the HAZOP is to identify process hazards, especially
those that affect containment integrity. Some of these hazards are a result of
human factors
HF issues are not typically being highlighted at each node as an integral part of
the HAZOP but at the end of the HAZOP when the team has completed the
review.
The new tool is based on the concept of identifying HF issues at each node of the
P&ID. The identification is accomplished by the use of "screening lists" that are
unique for different types of equipment (e.g. valves, vessels, pumps etc).
In this paper, the developers of the tool will describe how the Human Factors
process works during the HAZOP review and will illustrate how it is applied.
INTRODUCTION
Previous experience with the implementation of Human Factors in a HAZOP process has pointed
out the following issues:

To address HF concerns such as Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) problems in the current

HAZOP protocol is less systematic than required. It relies on the use of a checklist without
recommending a process for applying it. Since, Human Factors is not the prime reason to
perform a HAZOP review, the HAZOP leader will often elect not to review the checklist
during the HAZOP proceedings especially during a HAZOP for major capital projects. More
likely, the checklist will be reviewed at the end of the HAZOP study resulting in a less
critical and systematic approach.

The principle objective of the HAZOP is identifying process hazards, especially those that
affect the containment integrity. Some of these hazards are a result of human factors i.e.
either with the process equipment itself or with instrumented process control. Other tools are
available that focus on HF issues such as Critical Task Analysis.

The HAZOP is a sequential process line by line equipment by equipment review. It requires
that each line and/or process system of the P&ID be followed and checked and that the
hazards associated with the equipment that is located at each node is being identified and
discussed. The HF issues need to be highlighted at these nodes as an integral part of the
HAZOP and not at the end of the HAZOP when the team has passed over the equipment or
the entire PID (s).

METHODOLOGY
The new tool has been developed to identify Human Factors issues at each node of the P&ID. The
identification is accomplished by the use of "screening lists" that are unique for different types of
equipment (e.g. valves, vessels, pumps etc).
The objective of this tool is to:
Assist the HAZOP team in the identification of Human Factors (HF) concerns associated with
particular pieces of equipment while conducting the HAZOP
The tool should also:
Quickly target the major items of HF concern
Be user friendly
Require minimal training for its use
Not duplicate those design issues covered by any Human Factors design guidelines or
standards.
This HAZOP process that is introduced herein has the following characteristics:
Utilizes Human Factors in a very targeted manner
Determines the difference between HF relevant and HF irrelevant systems quickly so the
team can move through the P&ID in a timely fashion
Considers only the pieces of equipment/systems that have a Human Factors interface
Focuses attention on the operations that can be hazardous to the process, operators or
maintenance workers
Allows the HAZOP team to use the process with little previous knowledge and minimal
practice with the tool. After a short introduction to HF and a brief exposure to the tool and its
use, the team should be able to quickly make the distinction between relevant and irrelevant
systems and to pinpoint the HF concerns with the relevant systems.

Recognizes that the procedure will identify HF issues beyond those covered by a design
specification i.e. issues specific to the particular process and engineering design reviewed by
the HAZOP team.

Human Factors Engineering is seen as an integral part of the HAZOP Process. The following
paragraphs outline the process of implementing HF during HAZOPs.
i.

A trained HF practitioner is included on the team. For large projects, this would be a Human
Factors specialist or a person with extensive HF background.
ii. The team members, if not trained in HF, are given a short introduction to Human Factors
which should cover:
capabilities and limitations of operators,
areas where consideration of HF may improve the safety of the system
familiarization with the simple tools that will be used to make a determination between
relevant and irrelevant human-system interfaces
This refresher/introduction training will be retained in the HAZOP training manual.
iii. Human Factors experts on the HAZOP-team, if coming from outside the Engineering
function, must understand the HAZOP process and be able to read and understand the
information on a P&ID. This includes all of the symbology (e.g. valve types) and what
functions the equipment performs, e.g. a "double block and bleed" piping arrangement.
iv. Human Factors "screening" lists are available to the HAZOP team and used by a designated
HAZOP team members. They will be included in the HF training manual and will serve as a
memory jogger.
v. The screening lists are referred to each time a node in the P&ID is reached and considered.
The purpose of the screening lists is to remind the team to determine whether the equipment
requires a HF review and follow-up. The type and format of the HF screening list is given
below.
vi. If a Human Factors concern is identified, it is recorded on the HAZOP worksheet. It is
possible that sufficient information and knowledge is available to resolve the issue during the
HAZOP. However, the resolution of the issue will most likely take place outside the HAZOP.
The screening list is a simple checklist that identifies the most important HF characteristics of the
targeted equipment and /or system so the team can quickly decide whether a potential problem
exists and what action to recommend.
The following equipment and HF issues are discussed in the screening lists:
A. Valves; sequential, critical, frequent
B. Blind and Blanks; weight, lifting, location, frequency, clearing, draining
C. Pumps and Compressors; maintaining, draining, start-up; shut-down
D. Field displays; critical start-up, shut-down
E. Fire fighting and deluge systems; critical, accessing, escaping, directing
F. Field instrumentation; rodding, clearing; critical
G. Sample points; exposure, PPE
H. Reactors/Dryers; critical, switching/regenerating, clearing, entering, catalyst dumping, lifting
I. Vessels (including exchangers); cleaning, exposure, PPE, lifting, entering
J. Furnaces and Fired Heaters; light-off, decoking, flame controlling, switching, PPE, entering
K. Filters; switching, cleaning, clearing, PPE, weight, lifting, entering
L. Loading and Unloading Facilities; height, space, exposure, weight, clearing, disconnecting

An example of a "screening list" for sample points is given in Table 1. Table 2 provides the
reader with a sample of the additional information that the user needs to use the "screening lists".
The data are provided for the "Sample Point" screening list. Column 1 of the Table repeats the
screening list as it was given in Table 1. Column 2 of Table 2 provides example situations where
the answer to the screening question might be positive and action should be taken. Column 3
provides a series of potential solutions if action is required.
The Human Factors concerns for each piece of targeted equipment are captured on the HAZOP
Worksheet. For each concern, there are three basic follow-up actions, which need to be
considered:
1. The HAZOP team assesses the HF concern raised and agrees on a sound solution based on
the team's HF knowledge. The improvement recommendation will be recorded on the
HAZOP worksheet in the comments column for follow-up.
2. The HAZOP team recommends a thorough examination of the human-machine-interface
(HMI) design. The team recognizes the need to assess the HF concern outside the HAZOP
proceedings to ensure the HF issue will be addressed thoroughly using all available resources.
3. The HAZOP team recommends to conduct a critical task analysis (see next section) to assess
in a rigorous (formal-systematic-critical) approach the HF problems and their solutions
All three actions ensure that appropriate HF design and engineering principles are being used in
the design and engineering process so that the chances of a human error and human injury are
eliminated or adequately reduced.
SUMMARY
In summary, the tool that was developed to assist the HAZOP team to identify Human Factors
issues with selected pieces of equipment will ensure that Human Factors is dealt with at the
appropriate time in the process. The tool requires little training and should not unnecessarily
delay the HAZOP process.

Table 1: HAZOP Human Factors Screening List

Sample Points
Check box if the statement is true.
HF follow-up is required for this Sample Point if any of the boxes are checked
X

The product being sampled is in a hazard class where defined

Exposure criteria must be observed
The sample point is located above grade i.e. sample must be carried
to elevated location
The sample system is (is not) using a closed purge system
Operator access to the sample point is restricted

Table 2
Assistance with using HAZOP SCREENING LISTS
Includes Examples of poor design and potential solutions

Screening Question
Sample Points
The product being sampled
is in a hazard class where
defined exposure criteria
must be observed

Example Situation
a. Caustic sample
point

Operator access to the

sample point has not
considering the wearing of
PPE

1. Operator has unobstructed access to

safety showers and eyewash stations
in accordance with standards
1. Sample shall be accessible from a
platform
2. If substance is harmful, two means of
escape shall be provided

The sample point is located

above grade

The sample system is (is

not) using a closed purge
system

Potential Solution

a. Sample bomb in
closed purge
system
b. Open system for
caustic samples
c. Strahman valves

a. Hazardous sample
without a closed
purge system

1. If closed purge, the sample loop

should be long enough to allow
operator to access the sample point
without obstruction
2. If not closed purge, then operator
must have unobstructed access to
sampling station
1. Unobstructed access to sample point
is assured if operator is in ppe
2. Sample point should be at grade