Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Industrial Marketing Management

How companies strategise deliberately in networks using strategic initiatives

Debbie Harrison a,, Elsebeth Holmen b, Ann-Charlott Pedersen b
a
b

Department of Strategy and Logistics, Norwegian School of Management, BI, Nydalsveien 37, N-0484 Oslo, Norway
Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Alfred Getz vei 1, N-7491 Trondheim, Norway

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 27 May 2009
Received in revised form 4 April 2010
Accepted 19 May 2010
Available online 6 July 2010
Keywords:
Network strategizing
Strategic initiatives
Industrial networks
Network strategy
Interactive strategizing

a b s t r a c t
In this paper we contend that there is little idiographic empirical research that considers the issue of
deliberate networking action in full-faced network contexts. We address the issue through the use of
strategic initiatives as a form of deliberate networking action. IMP research argues the ability of an
organisation to manage in a network context that involves the pull of the network and the action of the
individual organisation (Hkansson & Ford 2002; Mller & Halinen 1999; Mller & Svahn 2003; Ritter,
Wilkinson & Johnston, 2004; Zolkiewski 2007). Yet the paradox logic reminds us that a rm still needs to act,
to try and control and inuence, to suggest ideas and initiatives, to set limits and to seek opportunities.
Strategic initiatives allow for conscious strategising at the same time as ongoing adaptations in activities and
resources occur. Based on two complementary case studies we suggest ve approaches for deliberate
strategising in full-faced network contexts. These are i) strategising based on network pictures in the
absence of direct interaction, ii) strategising in the presence of a network audience, iii) strategising among
deliberate equals, iv) strategising among imaginative equals, and v) strategising as open and absorptive
bystander. The ve approaches can be used separately or in combination.
2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

2. Managing in networks: the importance of connectedness

It is fair to say that IMP research typically considers that the actions
of the organisation in a network are incremental and emergent over
time (Hkansson & Ford, 2002), and in this vein is similar to the
emergent strategy school of thought (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). As a
result, there are relatively few studies focused on the issue of
deliberate networking action in network contexts. The purpose of the
paper is to conceptualise and discuss how rms strategise deliberately
in a network setting. The paper is based on two complementary case
studies, one in the construction industry and one in the food
processing industry.
In the next section, we review literature on managing in relationships and networks, with a specic focus on how deliberate strategic
action in a network context has been addressed. Then, we describe
our research design and give a brief presentation of the two cases.
Based on the case studies, we suggest that deliberate strategising in
full-faced network contexts can take ve different forms, and that
these forms can be used separately or in combination in planned
strategic initiatives.

In an IMP perspective the network in which an organisation is

embedded is as important as managers in that organisation in terms of
being able to act. Interactions within the network context both restrict
and enable action and therefore the network sets the freedom of
action just as much as the manager does (e.g. Ford et al., 2003;
Hkansson & Ford, 2002; Johanson & Mattsson, 1985). The network
context incorporates both direct and indirectly connected or interdependent relationships which are full-faced (Axelsson 1992; Easton
1992). This has implications for the extent of control possible by a
single organisation as a network is not a one-way, directed entity
(Hkansson & Snehota, 2006; Ritter et al., 2004; Wilkinson & Young,
2002)1 and it highlights that networking actions are concerned with
management in networks, not managing of. That is, all rms are
simultaneously involved in the ongoing management of the network,
and the resulting structure and performance is coproduced by their
actions (Ritter et al. 2004:177).
The ability of an embedded organisation to manage in a network
context involves the three myths of action, limits to discretion and
completeness (Ford et al. 2003; Gadde et al., 2003). This leads to a

Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 46 41 04 71.

E-mail addresses: debbie.harrison@bi.no (D. Harrison), holmen@iot.ntnu.no
(E. Holmen), pedersen@iot.ntnu.no (A.-C. Pedersen).
0019-8501/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2010.06.014

1
This is in contrast to literature concerned with directed networks, such as those
around Toyota and Benetton, which have one rm as a strategic centre (Iansiti &
Levien, 2004; Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995). See Baraldi (2008) for a more detailed
comparison.

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D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

number of network paradoxes, all of which centre around the tension

between individual action and collective interaction (Awaleh 2008;
Hkansson & Ford, 2002; Hkansson et al., 2009). The three paradoxes
(Ford et al. 2003; Hkansson et al., 2009) are in terms of (i) how existing
relationships enable and constrain development, (ii) inuencing counterparts and being inuenced in order to maintain and develop existing
network positions and (iii) the extent of control and co-operation within a
network. In sum, business-as-island type isolated networking action is
essentially denied by IMP (Hkansson & Snehota, 1989, 2006).
In this paper we argue there is a paucity of longitudinal research
centred upon the issue of deliberate networking action. Further, in
acknowledging the importance of the full-faced environment, the agency
of individuals and teams within organisations has been downplayed in
favour of emphasizing the importance of network embeddedness (see
also Baraldi et al., 2007). As detailed above, there are two sides to the
ability to manage in a network the paradox logic which can contain
both proactive and reactive elements (Ritter et al., 2004). In other words,
the individual rm still needs to act, to try to control, co-ordinate and
inuence, to suggest ideas and initiatives, to set limits and to seek
opportunities.
One form of networking or managing in networks is strategising. ...
Strategising is a fundamental issue in IMP research (Gadde et al.,
2003:358). That is, the strategising task is about identifying the scope for
action, within existing and potential relationships and about operating
effectively with others within the internal and external constraints that
limit that scope (Hkansson & Ford, 2002: 137). As a result networking
actions in exploring the scope for action by managers in an organisation
are typically considered to be incremental and emergent over time
(Hkansson & Ford, 2002:137), and embedded in activity and resource
links within key relationships (Gadde et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, as the second and third network paradoxes suggest,
managers in organisations do attempt deliberate action in attempting
to mobilise from their existing network position2. That is, there are
processes of intended strategising in network contexts whilst still
retaining the myth of independence3. Deliberate networking action
in this paper is therefore the actions rms take in consciously
developing strategies in a network setting. Section 2.1 below focuses
on one form of strategising deliberately in full-faced environments,
the use of strategic initiatives.
2.1. Deliberate strategising/networking action via strategic initiatives
Collective strategy, relational strategy, strategic networks,
strategic nets and more recently network strategy are commonly
used terms in discussing strategic action at the inter-organisational
level (e.g. Baum & Rowley, 2008; Blumberg 2001; Dyer & Singh,
1998; Gulati et al., 2000; Mller & Svahn, 2003). IMP provides an
understanding of strategising at both the relationship and network
levels with customers and suppliers as key counterparts (Gadde et
al., 2003)4.

2
The erce debate between the planning school and the learning school, and
between deliberate planning and emergence, has been curtailed by, for example,
Goold (1992), Brews and Hunt (1999), and Grant (2003). In particular, Goold
(1992:170) argues that there is no contest between planning and learning, rather a
collaboration, and in line with this Grant (2003) suggests that in practice, companies
combine elements from both, resulting in processes of planned emergence in their
strategic planning systems.
3
Ford et al. (2003:6) argue that it is a myth to suppose that a company is able to
take strategic action independently: companies...have limited freedom to act
independently and the outcomes of their actions will be strongly inuenced by the
attitudes and actions of those with whom they have relationships.
4
Relationships with customers and suppliers in inter-organisational strategy and
strategising have also been considered by Lwendahl and Revang (1998), Vaara,
Kleymann and Seristo (2004), and Ambrosini et al. (2007). For example, Lwendahl
and Revang (1998) highlight the importance of customers in strategising , whilst
Ambrosini et al. (2007) discuss how interaction across internal boundaries inuences
the level of customer satisfaction.

Baraldi et al. (2007) compared the IMP approach with ve schools

within strategic management, with a particular emphasis on processes
of strategy development with customers and suppliers. Gadde et al.
(2003) contrasted strategising in IMP research with relational strategy
and strategic networks. They argued that a company's strategic
orientation can only be considered via the three dimensions of
connected networks actors, resources and activities and therefore
strategising involves ongoing actor bonds, resource ties and activity
links. The ARA model was also used by Harrison & Prenkert (2009) in
analysing how the effects of network connections are considered in a
planned strategy process.
Other recent work is focused on network strategy, which is dened
as the intersection of strategic management and social network
research (Baum & Rowley, 2008: 2). The key themes are for an
emphasis on agency (following DiMaggio 1998), to move from static
conceptualisations of network effects towards processes/dynamics, and
the use of longitudinal data in investigating the development of network
position. Network strategising in an IMP sense provides a different
perspective than the developing network strategy literature, beyond the
somewhat obvious point that IMP argues for the substance of business
relationships rather than social actors (Baum & Rowley, 2008),
alongside the importance of interaction and connectedness. On the
one hand, networking actions in exploring the scope for action in a
network context of active counterparts imply acting and doing, which
also emphasize processes and dynamics. However, if strategy is
something that organisations do rather than something they have, as
argued in the strategy as practice perspective (Johnson et al., 2003;
Whittington 1996), it is network strategising, rather than network
strategy, which is fundamental. In this way IMP offers some clear
suggestions as to the division of labour in strategising and organizing...
(Whittington 2002:122).
Network strategising can be categorised as cognitive, positioning
and adaptive respectively (Harrison & Prenkert, 2009). The rst two
categories assume conscious efforts to strategise (Ibid., p. 663) in
network contexts. Cognitive strategising incorporates representing
and drawing boundaries via network theories, pictures and horizons,
while positioning strategising relates to mobilising and inuencing
actions involved with changing or maintaining a current network
position. The adaptations as strategising category emphasizes how
.ongoing adaptations to a specic customer or supplier may have
signicant consequences for strategy (p. 663).
In this paper we assume the co-existence of the three strategising
types. In particular, we argue that managers in organisations use
network pictures and horizons (Henneberg et al., 2006; Holmen et al.,
2008; Holmen & Pedersen, 2003) and attempt positioning strategising
in mobilising (Hkansson 1992; Lundgren 1992; Mouzas & Naud,
2007) or inuencing (Gadde et al., 2003; Hkansson & Ford, 2002) from
their existing network position, alongside adapting resources and
activities in ongoing interactions. That is, there is a co-existence of
deliberate strategising and the incremental approach of adaptations as
strategising.
Positioning strategising can occur through joint projects. Awaleh
(2008) and Baraldi (2008) discusses how strategising in this form is a
way to inuence others. For example, Awaleh's case illustrates how a
relationship project can be utilised in order to develop new ways to
co-ordinate and organise within a dyad. Another form of deliberate
positioning strategising is the use of strategic initiatives.
We adopt the work of Birkinshaw (1997) from the entrepreneurship literature in dening a strategic initiative as ...a discrete,
proactive undertaking that advances a new way for the corporation
to use or expand its resources (p 207). A strategic initiative typically
requires proactive behaviour on the part of some operational level
staff or middle managers, which may be championed by middle or
corporate strategists depending on the t with existing strategies
what Burgelman (1991) refers to as variation, selection and retention.
Furthermore, initiatives that are outside the scope of current strategy

D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

are ...probably quite often triggered by ideas or events external to the

organization... (p. 246). In this paper, strategic initiatives have some
extent of deliberate intent, but at the same time are played out in a
full-faced network context. Furthermore, it requires that counterparts
are active or directly involved in this conscious network strategising.
The assumption of direct involvement of customers and/or
suppliers is in contrast to recent strategic management literature on
the involvement of external actors in deliberate strategy development. For example, strategy workshops are one form of intentional,
formal strategising that has strategy development as a central purpose.
Hodgkinson et al. (2006) reported that customers and suppliers are
often not included in such strategising efforts. However, strategic
initiatives are likely to be less formal in nature and indeed include others
in the organisation than top managers. This latter point also expands the
typical denition of who is the strategist to include the corporate,
middle and not least operational levels of staff involved in a relationship.
That is, the strategy of a company is based on its interactive behaviour
with major counterparts, which makes the individuals involved in key
business relationships at least as important as the top management in
shaping a rm's strategies (Baraldi et al., 2007, citing Hkansson &
Snehota, 1989)5.
Therefore in terms of a strategic initiative, there are likely to be
variations in terms of which counterparts to involve and in what
ways, and the degree of deliberate intentions versus emergent actions
that characterise the strategising efforts. One feature could be the
extent of external counterpart inclusion/exclusion, a term inspired by
what Hodgkinson et al. (2006) refer to as stakeholder inclusion.
Counterpart inclusion could occur at different time periods and could
be both direct and indirect in nature. It would be likely to inuence
how others' strategies were included, i.e. whether the strategies of
some customers and/or suppliers were compared, discussed and
altered alongside that of the focal rm. This would involve some
extent of co-development taking place. The indirect inclusion of
counterparts would suggest a more directed rather than co-operative
process. By adopting a longitudinal perspective, a focus on strategic
initiatives could develop beyond the planning stage of the limited
amount of work within IMP focused on deliberate strategy development (Baraldi et al., 2007; Harrison & Prenkert, 2009) to consider the
ongoing challenges of implementation, such as the role of the
operational layer (Awaleh 2008; Awaleh & Harrison, 2009; berg &
Brege, 2009).
3. Complementary cases
3.1. Research design
The research methodology used in the paper is that of two
complementary case studies. Case studies embed an object in context,
allow depth, detail, and richness of data, are longitudinal by default
(Easton 1987; 1992; 2009) and are process-oriented. Case study
research has become a popular research method in business
marketing research. It provides the opportunity to study organisations
and relationships which are complex in structure, and offers
considerable insights into the nature of the phenomena in question
(Easton 2009).
Halinenand and Trnroos (2005) and Dubois and Araujo (2007)
encourage case researchers to explicitly consider and justify the
choices made in the selection of cases, the data collected and how
analysis takes place. Furthermore, Halinen and Trnroos (2005) and
Quintens and Matthyssens (2009) explicitly discuss the notion of time

5
There is also an extensive debate regarding who is the strategist within the
strategy as practice arena. Authors such as Balogun et al. (2003) Jarzabkowski et al.
(2007) and Mantere (2005) argue that managers other than top management teams
and non-managerial staff should be incorporated as practitioners, alongside outside
actors such as consultants.

949

in case study research. They claim that a longitudinal approach to case

study research is recommended, and that there is a lack of such
research in the marketing and management elds.
The rst case in this paper is part of a longitudinal study of how a
main contractor within the construction industry, Scancon, manages
its purchasing and supply, and how it initiates different strategising
projects to develop the interaction with key subcontractors. The
empirical material for the case study was gathered in real-time over a
period of approximately ten years. Multiple sources of evidence were
used. For example, we have taken part in the main contractor's two
supply network initiatives, carried out 60 semi-structured interviews
with people from the contractor as well as from the subcontractors,
taken part in various internal seminars, workshops and eld trips to
construction sites, read various company documents, and supervised
a number of (master) students writing their theses with the contractor
as the core rm.
The second case is also part of a larger, ongoing research project
concerned with planned strategy processes in network contexts6. Full
access was granted, in order that one of the authors could attend strategy
meetings and view the associated secondary materials. Time boundaries
were put in place to focus the case around a single strategy project which
was part of a longer-term strategy process. The project was conducted by
the organisation between June and December 2007. In total, 22 meetings
occurred, most of which were observed by one of the authors. A number
of interviews with the strategy team also took place, and secondary data
(e.g. planning documents) were referenced in order to support and
complement the interviews and observations of meetings. The multiple
data sources were utilised to put in place a chronology of the strategy
process, based on the principles of longitudinal process research (Huber
& Van de Ven, 1995; Langley 2007).
Both cases are being used to build theory about how deliberate
networking action occurs in network contexts. The basis of generalisation beyond the boundaries of the case is to theory (Bonoma 1985;
Mitchell 1983). Indeed, it can be claimed that theory development is
the main reason for using case study research (Easton 2009).
3.2. Case one: The main contractor, Scancon
3.2.1. The rst strategy project
This process started in 1997 when Scancon organised a strategic
sourcing project (and a project group) with the aim to create a supply
network within the Building Division of the rm. The project was
called; Network with technical subcontractors, and the supply
network consisted of subcontractors of three types of technical
services: electrical services, ventilation services and plumbing
services. One of the aims of the project was to utilise advantages
stemming from co-operative relationships.
The rm started with classifying all the suppliers into a catalogue
called the supplier library. In the library, all the business unit's
current preferred suppliers were classied according to the materials
they produced and/or the services they delivered, for example timber
frames, steel, plumbing services, etc. The reason for developing this
library was a desire to reduce the number of suppliers used by the
rm. To select among the preferred suppliers, the purchasing
department discussed each supplier with foremen, site managers,
and project managers within the rm. The selection was based on the
following criteria: (i) that the supplier was nancially viable, (ii) that
the rm had good experiences from working with the supplier in all
phases of building projects, and (iii) that the supplier was willing to
co-operate with the rm on several organisational levels.
Since the sourcing project mainly focused on creating a supply
network of technical subcontractors, the subcontractor subset was
singled-out, i.e. suppliers delivering electrical services, ventilation

The case is also reported in Harrison and Prenkert (2009).

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D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

services and plumbing services. In total, nine suppliers were selected,

three for each type of technical area. The selection process was carried
out by a team including the purchasing manager, project managers,
site managers and foremen. After the selection process, the suppliers
were interviewed regarding internal matters (i.e. organisation
structure, routines, market strategies, focus in technological development), the supplier's co-operation partners, mainly other customers
and suppliers, competitors (rms which the suppliers would
recommend as co-operation partners), ability and willingness to cooperate with the main contractor, and further strategic plans in
relation to the main contractor.
After the selection process Scancon organised a number of seminars
and discussions. Top management, project managers and foremen
from the subcontractors as well as top management, the purchasing
manager, project managers, site managers, and foremen from the
contractor attended the meetings. During these seminars there were
mostly unstructured discussions about what could become joint
goals and joint plans for the future? and what advantages could be
gained from closer relationships for Scancon as well as for the different
subcontractors?
The supply network was to be tried out in a number of actual
construction projects. For these projects, the contractor divided the
subcontractors into various sub-networks with different combinations
of electricians, plumbers and ventilation installers. From the interaction
in the different sub-networks, the contractor expected that a supply
network would materialise, with more substantial relationships as well
as more connections between relationships among the involved
companies.
In each pilot project the following joint activities were carried out:
(i) a kick-off meeting (setting aims and expectations), (ii) a midterm
evaluation (lling out evaluation forms and discussing negative and
positive experiences), and (iii) a nal evaluation (same as midterm
evaluation, but carried out after each of the pilot projects had ended).
One positive outcome of the project was that in 1999 (when the
rst part ended), approximately 95% of purchases of technical services
were from the new supply network. After the chosen construction
projects had been carried out, a summary report of the sourcing
project was written. The intention was that the report and the actual
experience gained would enable maintenance and further development of the supply network over time.
3.2.2. The second strategy project
The intentions from the rm's rst strategic sourcing project were,
however, not followed up properly. After several years Scancon once
again became displeased by the way in which they collaborated with
technical subcontractors. In particular, Scancon was dissatised with
the fact that in many projects many new experience curves were
climbed, that is, experience curves related to the collaboration
between the rm and individual technical subcontractors as well as
the experience curves related to collaboration between the technical
subcontractors. Therefore, Scancon wanted to establish mechanisms
which could facilitate joint learning and mutual adaptations among
Scancon and their technical subcontractors, and among the technical
subcontractors. In particular, the rm wanted to establish a small
network of technical subcontractors which could train as a team
across a number of construction projects which would function as
pilot arenas for the strategic collaborative efforts.
As a result Scancon started a second strategic sourcing project in
2005. The rst part of the new project was a process of mapping their
present technical subcontractors in order to identify suitable candidates
for the initiative. Among the important features of the relationships,
Scancon stressed that the technical subcontractors should have worked
with Scancon for several years, that the collaboration had been
satisfactory, and that there were good personal chemistry among the
individuals from the different rms which were most heavily involved
in the relationships to Scancon.

Having singled-out 56 technical subcontractors, Scancon visited

the respective subcontractors. Prior to these meetings, the rm had
asked each of the subcontractors to give a presentation of their rm
which would enable Scancon to assess whether the subcontractor had
the intention as well as the ability to partake in efforts aimed at joint,
continuous improvement and learning. Based on these meetings,
Scancon chose three subcontractors (covering the respective specialist areas of plumbing, ventilation, and electrical services).
After having selected the subcontractors, Scancon established a
steering committee for the sourcing project consisting of the top manager
of Scancon and the top managers from the three subcontractors. Furthermore, an external consultant was brought into the project. The consultant
developed a management tool for ensuring proper coordination among
the different types of participants (project managers, site managers,
foremen, etc.) in a construction project.
This tool was rst implemented internally by Scancon. During the
strategy process, Scancon wanted to transfer this tool to the subcontractors in order that it could be used in joint construction projects.
Furthermore, the steering committee (supplemented by other relevant
employees from the four rms) developed clear objectives that were to
be achieved during the strategy project. These were goals related to
(i) the number of accidents at the construction site, (ii) safety, heath and
environment issues, (iii) tidiness at the site, (iv) the absence rate, (v) the
amount of unproductive hours at the site, (vi) the number of quality
defects, etc. These goals were to be followed up closely in the joint
construction projects.
3.3. Case two: Nordic Food
3.3.1. Background
Nordic Food processes both red and white meat. They have 43
facilities throughout the Nordic region. The company is formally
organised as a corporation while being owned by several thousand
farmers in a co-operative. Therefore the central actors on the supply
side are the farmers which supply raw materials. Four large food
retailers are Nordic Food's most important customers. In June 2007 a
strategy project was initiated by Nordic Food's corporate strategists in
order to expand beyond the current market boundaries and to be
proactive regarding the then-ongoing World Trade Organisation
negotiations. A rm of external consultants, MJF, was invited to be a
part of the project and to outline a plan for organising the project over
a period of seven months. MJF is a specialist in the food sector and has
a particular competence in model-based analysis. The plan outlined
that the project would have ve main steps and would build on
existing in-house tools for nancial analysis.
3.3.2. Initial meetings
The rst project meeting was held on the 17th of August. There was a
concrete deadline already in place: recommendations must be ready for
the nal board meeting on the 10th of December. The purpose of this
meeting and others held in August was to obtain a shared perspective on
what needed to be done, the sources of information required and the
level of detail necessary for developing a simulation model from the
existing company nancial model7. Four strategic options were outlined: internationalisation, acquisition/merger, strengthen/reinforcement and wait-and-see. The project group recognised that it may be
difcult to incorporate an internationalisation strategy.
Meeting were dominated by discussions about how to supplement
the current nancial model in order that it could become the basis for a
simulation model. There was a general view that the credibility of the
recommendations of the strategy project group would be improved by
quantifying both current operations and the effects of possible strategic
options. Unsurprisingly there were varied interpretations of the most

Interview with Strategy Director, October 2007.

D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

interesting simulations to be conducted. Discussions centred upon

identifying parameters for market conditions and shares, volumes for
each product category in terms of customers and suppliers, and price
tariffs.
3.3.3. Gap analysis
By September 2007 the strategy project group was focused on
conducting a gap analysis. First, the in-progress simulation model was
utilised to operationalise Nordic Food's current position. This was then
compared to an ideal preferred position 58 years into the future. An
additional type of gap analysis was also conducted, which was later
referred to as the base line scenario/wait-and-see strategy. The strategists
simulated the effects of maintaining the current strategy, with no changes,
from 20072014. This gave a clear indication as to where a wait-and-see
strategy would take the company; it would not be a protable future.
3.3.4. Discussing and modelling three scenarios
By September, the project group was considering possible new
markets, products and brands. This led to discussions regarding the
data required by the consultants in order to build several scenarios.
That is, data about investments, productivity, price for raw materials,
etc. Furthermore, the time horizon in the simulations model was
extended from 2014 to 2020. This was the groundwork for the
development of three strategic scenarios: reinforcement, wait-andsee/basis and move operations abroad during October.
The wait-and-see scenario would require a 70 million euro investment, and the reinforcement scenario an investment of 100 million
euro. The reinforcement scenario included the consolidation of
operations (from 43 to 24 facilities), investments between 2009 and
2015 (for extending market shares and re-organising facilities, systems
and transportation). The discussions held within the project group were
explicit and line-by-line. This caused a number of clashes between
individuals that wished to discuss the broad strategic questions based
on the simulation model, and others that concentrated on nalising the
inputs to each of the scenarios within the model itself. Afterwards, the
strategists began to consider the move operations abroad scenario. The
consultants warned that considerably more data would be required in
order to qualify this within the model.
During the end of October the project group presented their work
in progress to the board of directors, where the suppliers are
represented. The MJF consultants outlined the simulation model
that had been developed, the scenarios and the consequences of each
scenario. A general discussion of the three strategic options, the actual
and planned investments in place and the assumptions built into the
model occurred. Several board members comment that the discussions were overly focused on raw materials and facilities, rather than
brands. The participants then discussed the possibility of an
international acquisition as a fourth possible strategic option. This
would require a huge nancial input that was not considered to be
feasible.
3.4. Choice of strategic option
The board members had a formal vote regarding the most
appropriate strategy in the nal board meeting of the year in December.
The MJF consultants again presented the scenarios and the model. The
recommendation was to vote for the reinforcement scenario. Overall,
the board members were positive towards this scenario, and this option
received the majority vote. This decision solidied the work of the
strategy project group into what is now referred to as Nordic Food's
strategy plan8.

8
Internal company records, Nordic Foods Strategic Plan 20082011 So what?,
December 2007.

951

4. Analysis
In this section we analyse the two complementary cases by
addressing the issue of how the rms went about their strategising
efforts in two very different network contexts.
4.1. The main contractor, Scancon
4.1.1. The rst strategy project
In the rst strategy project, Scancon tried to develop and organise
a supply network for the three areas of technical subcontracting. Nine
different subcontractors participated in the strategic sourcing project
for a period of almost two years. During that period a number of
seminars, discussions, visits at different construction sites, etc. were
organised. The subcontractors took an active part in all these
activities, allocating representatives from different parts of the
rms, e.g. top manager, project manager, etc. During discussions, a
few of the subcontractors stressed that they had strategies of their
own and informed the others what were their strategic focus areas.
However, the majority of the subcontractors did not have (or at least
did not voice) explicit strategies of their own.
Scancon had internally made a decision to select some technical
subcontractors and to work closer with these to develop mutual and
protable relationships. This was part of a new purchasing and supply
strategy for the business unit. However, this rst part of the process was
quite fuzzy and emergent when it came to involving the subcontractors.
It was driven by the belief that bringing together a number of
subcontractors would be sufcient to drive the process forward and
generate the relational changes aimed for. Scancon had not developed
any co-ordination tools or methods that they would like the
subcontractors to use. Furthermore, there was no conscious thinking
about which type of objectives the subcontractors should achieve, and
as a consequence, how to achieve them. Scancon expected that the
strategy would develop through working with the subcontractors. Thus,
in the rst part of the strategy process there were few deliberate
intentions towards the subcontractors. In retrospect, Scancon viewed it
as problematic that they did not have explicit ideas and tools to suggest
to the subcontractors during the rst sourcing project.
4.1.2. The second strategy project
The second part of the strategy process for Scancon started a few
years after the rst supply network initiative ended. Then the rm
organised a new strategy project with the same overall aim, i.e. to
intensify the relationships with and among subcontractors and
thereby to develop a strong supply network. As described in the
case, this time Scancon only selected three technical subcontractors,
one for each discipline. Similar to the rst part of the strategy process,
a number of seminars, discussions, visits at different construction
sites, etc. were organised. A steering committee was established for
the strategy project containing the top manager for Scancon and the
top managers for the three subcontractors. Thus, the subcontractors
also played an active role in the second strategy project. However, in
this strategy project much more attention was paid to the subcontractors having their own strategies and how these strategies affected,
and were affected by, the second strategy project.
One issue that was very different in the second attempt to create a
supply network was that the process was much more structured.
Indeed, the focal rm had some explicit suggestions as to how the
changes should be brought about. They also had a clear vision of the
outcome of the strategy project even though they realised that this
could be somewhat changed during the process. Scancon had hired an
external consultant who had developed a coordinating management
tool between different types of employees in a construction project.
As described in the case, Scancon wanted to transfer this tool to the
subcontractors during the strategy project, so that it could be used in
mutual construction projects. Furthermore, unlike the rst strategy

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D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

project, the four parties together developed clear objectives that were
to be achieved. These were goals related to safety, health and
environment issues, the number of accidents at the construction site,
the amount of unproductive hours at the site, etc. Hence, the second
part of the strategy project was characterised by a more deliberate
orchestration of the external counterparts which were involved in the
project, and the themes to interact on were much clearer.
4.2. Nordic Food
In the beginning of the strategy project of Nordic Food, there was
no direct involvement of counterparts in the strategising, or indeed no
representatives of purchasing or marketing functions within the
company were included within the strategy project format. However,
there was a deliberate intent to formulate a new strategy and to
attempt to nd a relational solution. At the start of the process several
of the corporate strategists had several ideas regarding potential
horizontal network partners with whom a merger/acquisition could
be achieved. However, the project group did not undertake any
preliminary discussions with any of the potential actors.
Moreover, part of the motivation for an internationalisation strategy
was to expand the current network of customers (supermarket
retailers), though this is considered an aggregate grouping of actors,
rather than separate, individual potential relationships. This way of
thinking was further supported by the use of the simulation model, in
which all options have to be modelled. This serves to encourage thinking
of other actors as aggregations, i.e. our suppliers or our customers.
Nevertheless, the traces of network connections are contained within
the model and both provide opportunities and constrain what actions
are possible9.
In the last part of the process the project group presented their work
several times to the board of directors where the suppliers were
represented. In this way representatives for the suppliers were informed
about the strategic options and alternatives that were discussed, and
they could give some feedback on the different alternatives. This
resulted in a situation where the board and the project group became
more aware of the contributions of the raw material suppliers in a direct
way.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The two cases show that the rms are formulating and implementing strategy (at both corporate level and functional level) in a
somewhat deliberate way and at the same time more or less explicitly
taking key counterparts into account. Furthermore, the cases reect
different forms of strategising, with different types of external
counterparts, and in different periods of development/time. The use
of the two complementary cases suggests that the type of deliberate
intentions for the strategy initiative may vary over time, and between
different strategy initiatives. Furthermore managers in a rm may or
may not involve different external counterparts in the strategy
initiatives; they can involve the counterparts directly or more
indirectly and/or include them as individual actors or consider them
aggregates (our customers). Based on these distinctions we suggest
the following matrix.
5.1. Strategising based on network pictures in the absence of direct
interaction
In this strategy initiative type, the focal rm explicitly considers its
key counterparts, but it does not involve them directly in the strategy
project. Based on the understanding of the key counterparts which the
focal rm has built up over time, the focal rm contemplates how the

See Harrison and Prenkert (2009) for more details.

counterparts can t into the strategy which it intends to pursue. In

addition, the focal rm may consider how important counterparts
which will not t into the new visions and plans will react to the
change. However, the focal rm's understanding of the key counterparts may be incomplete, incorrect as well as obsolete (Holmen et al.
2008), and since the key counterparts are not actively taking part in
the initiative, it is not possible to adjust for misunderstandings during
the process.
As such, two types of errors may result. Firstly, alternatives which
the counterparts might view as feasible, but which the focal rm
considers to be infeasible given their present understanding of
the counterparts, are disregarded. Secondly, alternatives which the
counterparts may view as infeasible, but which the focal rm views
as feasible based on their pre-understanding of the counterparts, are
also disregarded. Finally the possibility of interactively creating
new alternative visions is absent in this type of strategy initiative.
The rm does not feel any need for, or see any value in, sounding
out their ideas with external counterparts. The counterparts will, at
some later point, be informed about (or nd out) the focal rm's
visions and plans, but the counterparts are not to inuence them
ex ante until the end of the strategy initiative. If the counterparts
should have strategies of their own, they are viewed as inferior to
those of the focal rm, and hence they should be replaced by the
focal rm's plans.
5.2. Strategising in the presence of a network audience
For the second strategy initiative type, the focal rm explicitly
invites some of its key counterparts to partake in the strategy project.
Prior to inviting the counterparts, individuals within the focal rm
have conceived of a clear vision of the strategy to be pursued.
Furthermore, the purpose of inviting the counterparts is mainly to
inform them of the visions and plans of the focal rm. This is in order
that the counterparts can begin their efforts at aligning their own
strategies with that of the focal rm, either on their own (translation)
or with the direct assistance of the focal rm (specied).
The result is that the counterparts are mainly an audience which
is expected to applaud the initiative conceived by managers within
the focal rm. In cases where the counterparts have serious
objections to the visions and plans of the focal rm, it is possible
for the counterparts to object and inform the focal rm of the lack
of t with their respective strategies. Hence, the direct reactions of
the counterparts may result in individuals within the focal rm
revising their network pictures, and the focal rm may undertake
minor modications of their visions and plans. Thereby, alternatives
which the focal rm imagined as possible given their network
pictures prior to the strategising initiative, but which the counterparts during the initiative claim to be infeasible, can be somewhat
corrected during the process. However, the counterparts have very
little room for bringing up their own visions. Thus, alternatives
which the counterparts consider feasible, but which the focal rm
has not imagined based on their pre-understanding of the counterparts, are not points for discussion. In addition, possibilities for joint
creation of new alternative visions and plans are generally absent
here.
5.3. Strategising among deliberate equals
In this way of involving counterparts in a strategising initiative, the
focal rm also explicitly invites some of its key counterparts to
partake in the strategy project. Moreover, as in section 5.2 above, the
focal rm has developed a clear vision of the strategy it wants to
pursue in advance of the strategising initiative. However, the focal
rm is aware that the counterparts have their own visions and plans,
and that these are not necessarily captured by the present network
pictures within the focal rm and therefore may be in need of revision.

D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

Furthermore, mangers within the focal rm are of the opinion that the
counterparts' respective visions and plans are equally valuable and
worthy of consideration.
On the basis of this, the purpose of inviting the counterparts is
to facilitate presentations of the vision and plans of all the different
participants, i.e. the focal rm as well as the invited counterparts.
Hence, the counterparts are viewed as valuable contributors and
through interactions, the managers within the focal rm expect to
modify their own visions and plans, and the counterparts are
also expected to modify their visions and plans. Alternatives which
the focal rm imagined as possible given their network pictures
prior to the strategising initiative, but which the counterparts
during the initiative claim to be infeasible, can be altered. In
addition, the counterparts are explicitly asked to bring up their
own, respective visions. Thus, alternatives which the counterparts
have envisioned and consider feasible, but which the focal rm has
not imagined based on their pre-understanding of the counterparts,
are important points of discussion which the focal rm has explicitly requested as drivers for the strategising initiative. Although
the main focus is on combining the deliberate visions and plans of
the respective participants, possibilities for joint creation of new
alternative visions and plans are possible in this type of strategy
initiative.
5.4. Strategising among imaginative equals
In this strategy initiative type, the focal rm also explicitly invites
some of its key counterparts to partake in the strategising. However,
contrary to the former approaches, the focal rm has no clear vision of
the strategy it wants to pursue in advance of the strategising initiative.
Managers within the focal rm are aware that the counterparts may
have their own visions and plans, and that these are not necessarily
captured by the present network pictures of the focal rm.
Furthermore, the focal rm is of the opinion that if the counterparts
have developed some visions and plans, they may be important to
consider for the focal rm. However, more importantly, the focal rm
expects that the counterparts are able to take part in imaginative
strategising processes by interacting with the focal rm and the other
participants during the initiative.
On the basis of this, the purpose of inviting the counterparts is to
enable joint visioning among all the different participants, i.e. the focal
rm as well as the invited counterparts. Hence, the counterparts are
viewed as valuable contributors, and through interaction during the
process, the focal rm expects to create its own visions and plans, as
well as expecting the counterparts to create visions and plans or, at
the very least, modify the visions and plans they brought with them.
By means of such an approach, the focal rm may arrive at new visions
and plans, while updating their network pictures though the
strategising initiative. The focal rm relies on the imaginative, outof-the-box thinking capabilities of its counterparts as drivers for the

953

strategising initiative. The main focus is on the joint creation of new

visions and plans, not the combining of pre-conceived visions from
the various participants.
The four types discussed above are derived from the focal rms in
our two cases, but through developing the typology, we have identied
a fth type, which represents the role of the counterparts in type one or
two.
5.5. Strategising as open and absorptive bystander
Here, a focal rm mainly relies on the strategising initiatives
of its counterparts, and on either being tted into the visions
and plans of its counterparts without being aware that such
efforts are taking place, or on being invited to partake in events
where its main role is as an audience. Hence, the focal rm relies
on having active counterparts who develop visions and plans for
the future into which the focal rm expects to t. On the basis
of this, the focal rm can subsequently develop visions and plans
which are aligned to those of its counterparts (which may be
challenging, since the counterparts' plans may point in very different directions). Hence, the focal rm mainly strategises though its
ongoing interaction with key counterparts. The main focus is on giving
the counterparts insight into the focal rm and its network context so
that the counterparts' network pictures are continuously lled-in,
updated and revised, in order that that the pictures form a good point of
departure for the counterparts' strategising initiatives in relation to the
focal rm.
5.6. Summing up
In this paper, we have extended existing research about interactive
and network strategising by discussing the extent and type of
involvement of counterparts in deliberate strategising initiatives.
This is one way to consider the strategising of a focal rm when
embedded within a business network. The two cases show how the
focal rms strategise in a relatively deliberate way while at the same
time more or less explicitly taking into account important counterparts. Table 1 proposed a ve-part typology of the ways in which
counterparts can be involved in strategising initiatives. These
are strategising based on network pictures in the absence of direct
interaction; strategising in the presence of a network audience;
strategising among deliberate equals; strategising among imaginative
equals; and strategising as open and absorptive bystander,
respectively.
These ve types reect different ways of strategising via initiatives,
which involve various types of counterparts over time. This suggests
that any single rm may use all ve strategising approaches at different
points in time, and it may even combine some of them within the same
strategising initiatives. Furthermore, the number of counterparts may
vary, and strategy initiatives may range from dyadic ones with only one

Table 1
Different ways of involving counterparts in strategic initiatives.

Example from the case

Are others invited into the
strategy process?
Has the focal rm a clear
vision of the outcome?
What happens with the focal
rm's strategy during
the process?
How are the counterparts'
strategies handled?

Strategising based on network

pictures in the absence of
direct interaction

Strategising in the presence

of a network audience

Strategising among
deliberate equals

Strategising among
imaginative equals

Strategising as open and

absorptive bystander

Nordic Food
No

Nordic Food
Yes

Scancon
Yes

Scancon
Yes

Subcontractors to Scancon
NA

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Unchanged

Mostly unchanged

Changes on some
issues

Co-designed with the

counterparts

Designed by the counter-parts

Disregarded

Disregarded

Considered

Co-developed

Taken as the point of departure

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D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

counterpart, to complex network strategising initiatives with many

counterparts. That is, the extent to which a focal actor depends on others
would be expected to vary depending upon the network context and
the strategising initiative. In addition, the types of counterparts may
vary, being focused on a single type of counterpart (e.g. suppliers) to
comprising many types of counterparts. Finally, the counterparts may be
unrelated companies, but may also represent other business units of the
corporation of which a focal rm is a part, and the counterparts may
represent owners.
More research is needed on how companies combine planning
and emergence when strategising in full-faced networks. In particular, further research is needed to develop a more extended
matrix and to further outline strategising proles which show
how the different types may be used over time by a focal company.
It is a challenging prospect in terms of time and resources to
empirically study inter-connected strategising from a multi-actor
perspective. The research reported above is obviously based on two
focal companies. Future empirical research should investigate
interactive strategising from a multi-actor perspective. The challenges in so doing will be compounded by the desirability of
undertaking longitudinal, processual research. This may allow the
matrix proposed in this paper to be further developed into a set
of interactive strategising congurations. That is, longitudinal research regarding how interactive strategising emerges over time
could incorporate investigations of which types of counterparts are
involved, for what reasons (or not), and how the role of counterparts
varies over time. For example, how many counterparts are involved,
of which types at various time points in a process, and how different
parties within and external to the rm are involved in forming and
shaping congurations.
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Debbie Harrison is an Associate Professor in the Department of Strategy and Logistics

at the Norwegian School of Management BI, Oslo, Norway. Her research interests are in
the area of inter-organisational relationships and networks. She has published papers
in the areas of network strategising, the role of contracts in business relationships, user
networks and innovation in journals such as Journal of Management Studies, Industrial
Marketing Management and Research Policy.

D. Harrison et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 947955

Elsebeth Holmen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Industrial
Economics and Technology Management, at the Norwegian University of Science
and Technology, Trondheim, Norway. Her research interests are in the area of
industrial networks. She has published papers in the areas of resource development
and innovation, strategising in networks, and supply relationships and networks in
journals such as Journal of Business Research, Industrial Marketing Management,
Journal of Construction Management and Economics and Journal of Business and
Industrial Marketing.

955

Ann-Charlott Pedersen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Industrial

Economics and Technology Management, at the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, Trondheim, Norway. Her research interests are in the area of interorganisational relationships and networks. She has published papers in the areas of
supply networks, purchasing and supply management, strategising in networks and
resource development in journals such as Journal of Business Research, Industrial
Marketing Management, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing and Journal of
Purchasing and Supply Management.