REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On
December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified
of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition
for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married.This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to
the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A reely givenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS VS GLORIA GOO-ABBAS
Family Code Bigamy Void Ab Initio Marriage Lack of a Marriage License
FACTS: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to
participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the
ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who
celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search
for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was
to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor
of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to
him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.
GRACE POE VS COMELEC
GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even
afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and
was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI
granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot
be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The
COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices,
however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
HELD: No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized
proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule,
and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures
would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the
same case for cancellation of her COC.
ISSUE 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

HELD: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents
nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the
intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
ISSUE 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
HELD: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
ISSUE 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC
HELD: No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency
because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a
prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC
may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there
cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex
from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a
male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining
that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of
name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis
of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.

The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex
on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the
child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code,
she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her
middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name.
RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname
Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother.
ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT V. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805, 23 March 2015
FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat were married on September 16, 1965.

During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought on November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.

One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis Tambuyat, who signed therein as Rosario Tambuyat. All
this time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.

When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to
Rosario E. Banguis.

When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that
she was the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Rosario E. Banguis. That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the
TCT be cancelled. That a new certificate of title be made out in Adrianos name, with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be
ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and thereafter lived together as married
couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a
summary proceeding considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or
exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case.


The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the TCT of Banguis and in lieu thereof
to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda Winnie Balcom Tambuyat. RTC
justified its decision by using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: court authorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title.

The CA sustained the trial courts decision, noting that Banguis name was included in the TCT by error or mistake. It held
that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda and not Banguis is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and subsisting
marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court; and
that Banguiss opposition to Wenifredas petition for cancellation of TCT is not real and genuine as to place the latters title to the
subject property in doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.
HELD: YES

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be
resorted to in seven instances, included are (1) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
The present case falls under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the
name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda and not Banguis is
Adrianos lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is
the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even
be said that they have a common law relationship at all.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife
in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it
is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a spouse contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse.
CALIMAG VS HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR
The Facts: Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz
(Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of
Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo,
Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim
of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.6
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title,
TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra
allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of
cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was
stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City,
making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.10
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.12

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said
civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate

pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children
and relatives of their father and mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September 28, 2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of [the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;
Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466 issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been
issued on the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the
petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]
Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery
considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the
execution of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of
[Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The
name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela
signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the
name of the father.17 (Emphasis ours)
RULING OF THE CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the respondents are without legal personality to
institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio,
Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.18
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with modification as to the amount of damages. The
fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated September 28,
2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.19
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the
petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the
legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother
[Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.
The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in the Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.

Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery was indeed committed to effect the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner
continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the
Civil Code,23 the petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for being illegitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents failed
to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not
sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage contract24 presented by the respondents is not admissible under the Best
Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the
concerned Local Civil Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever received by said office.
Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the
marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a
marriage ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.27cralawred
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on
considering that one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former
either by consanguinity or affinity.29
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
RULING OF THE COURT
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in
Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as
to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue
as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the
marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without
running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that:
"When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain
requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the
predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its nonproduction in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the
due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.32
(Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the case of United States v.
Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.34 They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance
with the rules of evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate
of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.37
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office38 where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents their father's name is Anastacio
Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May
25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."39
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any
evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate
filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they were
not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to
establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it was held that a
birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.41
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry)
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."42 Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates
of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.43
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient
to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient."44
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate
filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that what
was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the
registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the
birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge
the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after
the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality
of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of
parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother
if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses
to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and
wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three
years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated
February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage,
viz:
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal

certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.48 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage."50
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be
disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated
April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica
Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudiced to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern, Samar for proper registration of this decree
of nullity of marriage.
So ordered.
KHO VS REPUBLIC
Subjects/doctrines/digest:
Osg argues that the issues are factual in nature and therefore not proper for sc to resolve these issues. Is osg correct?
No.
The issues involve a determination and application of law and jurisprudence intertwined with a question of fact: whether a marriage
license was obtained by the parties prior to marriage.
What are the exceptions to the rule that sc shall not entertain questions of fact?
There are 10:
( 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
( 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the court of appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; /d.atl5. T?1
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;

And
(i 0) when the findings of fact of the court of appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on rccord.11
Is this present case an exception to the rule?
Yes.
Because the findings of the rtc and the ca on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license are conflicting.
What is the applicable law on marriage license?
Article 53 of the civil code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract. It reads:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) their consent, freely given;
(3) authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13
What are marriages of exceptional character?
These marriages are:
(i) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places;
(3) consular marriages;
( 4) ratification of marital cohabitation;
(5) religious ratification of a civil marriage;
(6) mohammedan or pagan marriages; and
(7) mixed marriages. Petitioners and respondents marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Suppose a marriage is performed without marriage license. Is it valid
It is void per art. 80 of the civil code.
Why is marriage license necessary?
Because it is the authority granted by the state to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the states demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage,
in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Osg argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such
validity. Is their argument correct?
Yes but not applicable because there is no doubt. Evidence is clear that no marriage license was obtained by the parties.
The presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a certification issued by the municipal civil registrar of arteche, eastern samar attesting
that the office of the local civil registrar has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of raquel g. Kho
[petitioner] and veronica m. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on june 1, 1972.21

Thus, on the basis of such certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it
becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the rtc,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
Respondent on the other hand failed to present copy of the alleged marriage license.
But petitioners motive which is to legitimize his illicit affair with another woman is not pure. Will this fact not be considered?
No.
The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the civil code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void
ab initio
NOVERAS V NOVERAS GR NO 188289
FACTS: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children,
Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further, she states that
David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the Philippines. After
learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the
judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation
of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a
petition for liquidation of property since the spouses marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as
absolute community because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial
notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the childrens legitimes. Upon Leticias appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the
Philippine properties be divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the
Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in
the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.
ISSUES
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper
HELD:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section
24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a
consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
xxxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been
living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio,
who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in
the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in
June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.

DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM

FACTS: Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their
son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250)
Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu City, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent with the RTC-Cebu.
The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien,
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation to support their child under
Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in
the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under our Philippine Law?
RULING: A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code
in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.
In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondents failure to
prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and

proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be
of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
VILLAGRACIA VS. FIFTH (5TH) SHARI' A DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meterparcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,
Maguindanao, from one Ceres Caete. On March 3, 1996, a TCT No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldans
name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng
Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. It was only on
October 30, 2006, when Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed, found out that Vivencio occupied the said parcel of land. Failing to
settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay
damages as well as attorneys fees. A notice of writ of execution was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and argued that
Sharia District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian,
hence the respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldans action for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land. However, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court denied Vivencios petition for relief from judgment for lack of
merit. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ
of execution issued against Vivencio. Roldan argued that since respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had jurisdiction to decide the
action for recovery of possession, he argued that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Sharia District Court] and he cannot argue that his
rights were prejudiced.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not a Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.

2.
Whether or not proceedings before respondent Sharia District Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Vivencio.

RULING:
1.
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with existing civil courts over
real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the parties involved are Muslims.
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If the owner is dispossessed of
his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its possession from the dispossessor. When the property involved is real,
such as land, the action to recover it is a real action; otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions, the parties involved
must be Muslims for Sharia District Courts to validly take cognizance of them. In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for
recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is
not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim. When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldans action because not all of the parties
involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldans action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in
SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
2.
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession
of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. Thus, Roldans action for recovery of possession is an
action in personam. This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencios person. However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent
Sharia District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN
September 12, 2008 (G.R. No. 166676)
PARTIES:
petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to Jeff and her gender to male.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name Jennifer Cagandahan. While growing up, she was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and
female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.
HELD: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is
preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.
BALOGBOG VS. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle
Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by
the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso
and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the
validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police
investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old
then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and
wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by
Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate
from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and
54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the
memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be
considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as
valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the
Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came
into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance
with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the
rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take
place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to
prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and
that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
GO VS CA
No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family.[1]
In our society, the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the family and, therefore, an
occasion worth reliving in the succeeding years.
It is in this light that we narrate the following undisputed facts:
Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video
tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon,
and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon
private respondents return.
When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and
therefore, could no longer be delivered.
Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23,
1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District,
Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby granted:
1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Go;
2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the
following sums:
a) P450.00, the down payment made at contract time;
b) P75,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P20,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) P5,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
e) P2,000.00, as litigation expenses;
Defendants are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that they acted only as
agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there is no evidence to show
that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.[2]
The petition is not meritorious.
Petitioners claim that for the video coverage, the cameraman was employed by Pablo Lim who also owned the video equipment used.
They further assert that they merely get a commission for all customers solicited for their principal.[3]
This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which states thus:
ART. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has
contracted; neither have such persons against the principal.
In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own,
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between
private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of
service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the object of the contract was the video
equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of another person is of no consequence.
It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below, petitioners did not even present Lim to corroborate their
contention that they were mere agents of the latter. It would not be unwarranted to assume that their failure to present such a vital
witness would have had an adverse result on the case.[4]
As regards the award of damages, petitioners would impress upon this Court their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure of
the tape. They insist that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days, as agreed upon in their contract,
the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to minimize losses.[5]
We are not persuaded.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners
are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private respondents were about to leave for
the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the
erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.
In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the
latters wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents
with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for
damages.
The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the downpayment paid by
private respondents to petitioners.[6]
Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not among those enumerated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-delict.[7] Consequently, moral
damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or
abusive.[8]
Petitioners act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents wedding was precisely the cause of the
suffering private respondents had to undergo.
As the appellate court aptly observed:

Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a
significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in
awarding the appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75,000.00, which was a great reduction from plaintiffs demand in the
complaint, in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and
which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.[9]
Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar, the award of exemplary damages by the trial
court is justified[10] to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their
affairs.
The award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are likewise proper, consistent with Article 2208[11] of the Civil Code.
Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife
Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she
was acting alone for her sole interest.[12]
We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only
petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private
respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them.[13]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex
Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the
judgment award. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.