Sunteți pe pagina 1din 8

In the study of Golosov and King (2002) the main focus concerning forecast errors were

the ones around the forecast of the GDP growth rate. However, and recognizing that
having accurate revenue data is fundamental in order to elaborate a good budget,
countries and authorities have made efforts to obtain reliable numbers for expected
revenues (Buettner & Kauder, 2010), and so the discussion around this issue has
increased. Nevertheless, the majority of the existing literature about revenue forecasting
concerns the USA (Buettner & Kauder, 2010; Golosov & King, 2002).
In studiul Golosov si King (2002), obiectivul principal n ceea ce privete erorile de prognoz
au fost cele din jurul prognoza ratei de cretere a PIB-ului. Cu toate acestea, i recunoscnd
c au date exacte de venit este fundamental pentru a elabora un buget bun, rile i
autoritile s-au fcut eforturi pentru a obine un numr de ncredere pentru veniturile
estimate (Buettner & Kauder, 2010), i aa mai departe discuia n jurul acestei probleme a
crescut. Cu toate acestea, cea mai mare parte a literaturii existente cu privire la prognozarea
veniturilor se refer la SUA (Buettner & Kauder, 2010; Golosov & King, 2002).
On the other hand, it was not the first time that revenue forecast errors was used as an
attempt to explain a crisis. According to Auerbach (1995) economists were trying to
explain the ongoing fiscal crisis on the USA by looking at tax changes in the 1980s and
early 1990s. Based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) annual budget
forecasts, the author explained the deviations of revenue using an unusual approach, by
trying to explain the determinants of technical errors. The results supported the idea
that overly optimistic revenue forecasts from the 1980s were partially caused by
unforeseen reactions from taxpayers.
Pe de alt parte, nu a fost prima dat c erorile de prognoz a veniturilor a fost utilizat ca o
ncercare de a explica o criz. Potrivit lui Auerbach (1995), economitii au ncercat s explice
criza fiscal n curs de desfurare asupra SUA prin uita la schimbrile fiscale din anii 1980 i
nceputul anilor 1990. Bazat pe Oficiul de previziuni bugetare anuale Management i Buget
(OMB), autorul a explicat abaterile veniturilor printr-o abordare neobinuit, ncercnd s
explice factorii determinani ai erori tehnice. Rezultatele au susinut ideea c previziunile de
venituri prea optimiste din 1980 au fost parial cauzate de reacii neprevzute de la
contribuabili.
Potrivit studiului realizat de Auerbach (1995), economistii au incercat sa explice criza fiscala
din SUA prin cautarea unor schimbari dramatice in randul taxelor din anii 1980 si inceputul
anilor 1990. Bazandu-se pe previziunile bugetare anuale ale Oficiului de Management si
Buget, autorul a explicat abaterile veniturilor printr-o abordare mai putin obisnuita, incercand
sa explice factorii care au determinat aceste erori tehnice. Rezultatele au sustinut ideea ca
previziunile veniturilor din anii 1980 au fost prea optimiste, iar erorile au fost de asemenea
partial cauzate de reactiile nepreavazute venite de la contribuabili.
Indeed, according to Auerbach (1999) and Breuer (2013), uncertainty surrounding
forecast errors was driven by economic, policy and technical errors. Economic errors
were associated to unpredicted changes in macroeconomic variables like GDP. Policy
errors may be caused by changes in the tax rates or in the law, e.g. Finally, technical
errors are the remaining part and they are frequently connected to various changes that
were not considered, neither political nor economic.
ntr-adevr, n conformitate cu Auerbach (1999) i Breuer (2013), incertitudinile privind
erorile de prognoz a fost determinat de economic, politic i erori tehnice. Erori
economice au fost asociate cu modificri neprevzute ale variabilelor macroeconomice cum

ar fi PIB. Erori de politic pot fi cauzate de modificri ale ratelor de impozitare sau n lege,
de exemplu, n cele din urm, erorile tehnice sunt partea care rmne i ele sunt n mod
frecvent conectate la diferite schimbri care nu au fost luate n considerare, nici politic, nici
economic.

Cimadomo (2011), in his literature survey about real-time data and fiscal policy
analysis, identified that frequent and sizeable revisions of fiscal data, as well as large
deviations of fiscal outcomes from the initial forecasts, are factors that endanger the
EUs surveillance mechanism. Model uncertainty or unexpected shocks, are pointed out
as the main reasons for fiscal outcomes deviations from government plans. Upcoming
political elections are also mentioned as possibly inducing over-optimism in fiscal
projections.
Cimadomo (2011), n studiul su literatura cu privire la datele n timp real i analiza politicii
fiscale, identificate c revizuirile frecvente i nsemnate de date fiscale, precum i abaterile
mari ale rezultatelor fiscale din previziunile iniiale, sunt factori care pun n pericol
mecanismul de supraveghere a UE . Modelul de incertitudine sau ocuri neateptate, sunt
evideniate ca fiind principalele motive pentru rezultatele fiscale devieri "de la planurile
guvernamentale. Alegerile politice viitoare sunt, de asemenea, menionate ca, eventual, care
induce supra-optimism n proiecii fiscale.
Buettner and Kauder (2010) studied the performance of revenue forecasts for 12 OECD
countries. They argued that cross-country differences in revenue forecasting
performance were mainly caused by the uncertainty about macroeconomic variables,
corporate and personal income tax structures, the elapsed time between the forecast and
the observation of the variables, and the independence of forecasts from possible
government manipulation.
Buettner i Kauder (2010) a studiat performana previziunilor de venituri pentru 12 ri
OECD. Acetia au susinut c diferenele ntre ri la performana de prognoz a veniturilor
au fost cauzate n principal de incertitudinea cu privire la variabilele macroeconomice,
structurile de impozit pe profit i personale, timpul scurs ntre previziunile i observarea
variabilelor, precum i independena previziunilor posibile de manipulare a guvernului .
Golosov and King (2002), assessed one year-ahead forecasts of tax revenues in the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for a group of low income countries. The
authors mentioned that the latest studies (at the time) did not found any link between
forecasting errors and political factors. They also report that underestimates of next
years fiscal deficit would be much more expensive than overestimating by the same
value. As a consequence, it was suggested that since the fiscal deficit underestimation is
more expensive then overestimation, the deviation should occur on the cheaper side. In
the context of an IMF program, major changes to the tax system may take place and
those changes may introduce additional uncertainty to the forecasts of tax revenues.
Golosov i King (2002), au evaluat previziunile pentru anul urmator a veniturilor fiscale n
cadrul programelor Fondului Monetar Internaional (FMI) pentru un grup de ri cu venituri
mici, intre anii 1993-1999. Autorii au menionat c in cele mai recente studii nu a fost gsita

nici o legtur ntre erorile de previziune i factorii politici. De asemenea, ei au raportat c


subestimarea deficitului fiscal pentru anul urmator va avea repercursiuni mult mai grave
dect supraestimarea lui. Ca si consecin, deoarece subestimarea deficitul fiscal are
repercursiuni mult mai grave decat supraestimarea lui, s-a sugerat ca, abaterea s apar pe
partea mai pozitiva. n cadrul unui program al FMI, schimbri majore ale sistemului fiscal
pot avea loc, iar aceste modificri pot introduce incertitudini suplimentare la previziunile
veniturilor fiscale.
Completari cu concluzii
Using data from the annual Stability and Convergence Programs, for the EU-15
countries, Hagen (2010) studied the deviations between projected and actual outcomes
for several variables, namely GDP growth, general government budget balance,
revenues and expenditures relative to GDP. The author found both problems in the
forecasting performance of the EU country governments and bias and inefficiency
regarding the projections. As a consequence, Hagen (2010) says that these facts lead us
to wonder about the capability of governments to carry out accurate forecasts, as well as
their availability to reveal all the detained information.
Utilizarea datelor din anuale de stabilitate i de convergen, pentru rile UE-15, Hagen
(2010) a studiat abaterile dintre rezultatele estimate i cele reale pentru mai multe variabile, i
anume creterea PIB, soldul bugetar general, venituri i cheltuieli n raport cu PIB. Autorul a
constatat c ambele probleme n performana de prognoz a guvernelor UE de ar i
prejudecat i ineficiena n ceea ce privete proieciile. Ca o consecin, Hagen (2010)
afirm c aceste fapte ne conduc s ntreb despre capacitatea guvernelor de a efectua
previziuni exacte, precum i disponibilitatea acestora de a dezvlui toate informaiile reinute.
Pina and Venes (2011) studied the general government budget balance forecasts for the
EU-15 countries, based on the information reported in the Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP). They found that forecast errors are sensible to growth surprises, fiscal
institutions and opportunistic motivations, namely the proximity to an election may
induce over-optimistic forecasts. On the contrary, commitment, mix forms of fiscal
governance and numerical expenditure rules are frequently linked to higher carefulness
when it comes to forecasts.
Pina si Venes (2011) au studiat previziunile guvernamentale generale de echilibru bugetar
pentru rile UE-15, pe baza informaiilor raportate n procedura de deficit excesiv (PDE). Ei
au descoperit c erorile de prognoz sunt sensibile la surprize de cretere, instituiile fiscale i
motivaii oportuniste, i anume apropierea de alegeri poate induce previziuni prea optimiste.
Din contra, angajamentul, se amestec forme de guvernan fiscal i normele de cheltuieli
numerice sunt frecvent legate de migal mai mare atunci cnd vine vorba de previziuni.
Brck and Stephan (2006) used the bi-annual forecasts of the EC between 1995 and
2003 for the EU-15, Japan and USA. Their aim was to explain the deviations in the
existing budget deficits, using political, electoral, and institutional variables. They
concluded that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) influences the quality of budget
deficit forecasts, especially in the period prior to elections.
Brck i Stephan (2006) a folosit previziunile bianuale ale CE ntre 1995 i 2003 pentru UE15, Japonia i Statele Unite ale Americii. Scopul lor a fost de a explica abaterile n deficitele
bugetare existente, folosind variabile politice, electorale i instituionale. Ei au ajuns la

concluzia c Pactul de stabilitate i de cretere (PSC) influeneaz calitatea previziunilor de


deficit bugetar, n special n perioada de dinainte de alegeri.
A literature survey by Leal, Prez, Tujula, and Vidal (2008) regarding the main issues
and challenges about fiscal forecasting, finds that in the worst periods budget balance
projections appeared to be more optimistic whereas, negative projections emerged in
times of better budget balances.
Un studiu literatura de Leal, Prez, Tujula, i Vidal (2008) cu privire la principalele probleme
i provocri legate de prognoz fiscal, constat c, n cel mai ru buget perioade proiec ii de
echilibru pare a fi mai optimiste ntruct, previziunile negative, au aprut n perioade de
soldurilor bugetare mai bune.

Study

Data

Goal

Auerbach

OMB

forecast

Explain

(1995)

errors

between

forecast errors.

Golosov

and

King (2002)

Conclusions

technical

Overly optimistic revenue forecasts from


1980s were partially caused by unforeseen

1982-1993
IMF's Monitoring

Study

of

reactions from taxpayers.


Since fiscal deficit underestimation is more

of

revenue forecasts for

expensive then overestimation, deviation

countries under an IMF

should occur to the cheaper side

Fund

Arrangements
database;

45

countries

under

precision

program.

IMF programs
Bi-annual
EC

Find political, electoral

SGP influences the quality of budget deficit

Stephan

forecasts

and

forecasts, especially in the period prior to

(2006)

1995 to 2003, for

determinants of budget

EU-15, USA and

deficit forecasts.

Brck

and

from

institutional

elections.

Japan
Leal,

Prez,

Access main issues and

Worst periods of budget balance projections

Tujula, and

challenges about fiscal

appeared to be more optimistic whereas,

Vidal (2008)

forecasting.

negative projections emerged in times of

Hagen (2010)

Buettner

and

of

good budget balances.


Found problems in forecasting performance

on

of the EU country governments as well as

projection errors.
Study cross country

bias and inefficiency on projections


Cross-country differences in revenue
forecasting caused by: uncertainty around

SPG, for the EU-

Study

15 countries

institutions

Official

tax

the

Kauder

revenue forecasts

revenue

(2010)

for

performance.

12

OECD

role

forecast

countries

macroeconomic variables; tax structures;


elapsed

time

between

forecast

and

observation of the variables; independence


Pina

and

Venes (2011)

Based on EDP for

Study the determinants

of forecasts
Forecast errors are sensible to growth

EU-15

of EDP forecast errors.

surprises,

fiscal

institutions

and

opportunistic motivations; proximity to an


election

may

induce

overoptimistic

forecasts; Commitment, mix forms of fiscal


governance and numerical expenditure rules
Cimadomo

Literature survey about

are frequently linked to higher carefulness


Early estimates are biased values of final

(2011)

real-time

data

and

fiscal policy.

values; Upcoming elections may induce


over-optimism

projections;

model

uncertainty or unexpected shocks cause


fiscal

outcomes

deviations

from

government plans.

Study

Data

Goal

Conclusions

Auerbach

Erori de prognoz

Explice

(1995)

OMB ntre 1982-

prognoz tehnice.

din 1980 au fost parial cauzate de reacii

1993
Monitorizarea

De studiu de precizie a

neprevzute de la contribuabili.
Din moment ce deficitul fiscal subestimarea

FMI a bazei de

previziunilor

este

date Aranjamente

venituri pentru rile n

abaterea ar trebui s apar la partea mai

Fondului; 45 de

curs n cadrul unui

ieftine

ri

program al FMI.

Golosov

and

King (2002)

cadrul

erorile

programelor FMI
Bi-anuale ale CE

Gsi

Stephan

previziunile

determinani

(2006)

1995

Brck

and

din

pn

de

de

scump

dect

supraestimare,

SGP influeneaz calitatea previziunilor de

politice,

deficit bugetar, n special n perioada de

electorale

instituionale

15, Statele Unite

previziunilor de deficit

ale

bugetar.

mai

factorii

2003, pentru UEAmericii

Excesiv previziunile de venituri optimiste

dinainte de alegeri.

ale

Japonia
Leal,

Prez,

Principalele probleme

Cele mai rele perioade ale proieciilor de

Tujula, and

de acces i provocri

echilibru bugetar pare a fi mai optimiste

Vidal (2008)

legate

prognoz

ntruct, previziunile negative, au aprut n

SPG, pentru rile

fiscal.
Studia rolul instituiilor

perioade ale soldurilor bugetare bune.


S-au gsit probleme n performana de

UE-15

cu privire la erorile de

prognoz a guvernelor rilor UE, precum i

Prognozele

proiecie.
Performana de studiu

prejudecat i ineficiena de proiecie


Diferenele ntre ri n prognozarea

ncruciat prognoz a

veniturilor cauzate de: incertitudinea n

veniturilor rii.

jurul

Hagen (2010)

Buettner

and

Kauder

oficiale

de

(2010)

venituri

fiscale

pentru

12

de

ri

and

Venes (2011)

macroeconomice;

structurile fiscale; timp ntre previziunile i

OECD
Pina

variabilelor

observarea variabilelor trecut; independena

Bazat pe EDP

Studierea

factorilor

previziunilor
Erori de prognoz sunt sensibile la surprize

pentru UE-15

determinani erorilor de

de cretere, instituiile fiscale i motivaii

prognoz EDP.

oportuniste; proximitatea unei alegeri poate


induce

peste

previziuni

optimiste;

Angajamentul, forme mix de guvernan


fiscal i normele de cheltuieli numerice
Cimadomo

sondaj despre literatura

sunt frecvent legate de chibzuin superior


Estimrile timpurii sunt valori subiective

(2011)

de date n timp real i

ale valorilor finale; Alegerile viitoare pot

politica fiscal.

induce proiecii supra-optimism; model de


incertitudine

sau

ocuri

neateptate

cauzeaz rezultate ale abaterilor de "fiscale


de la planurile guvernamentale.

Bias
As Auerbach (1999) argues, if the costs of forecast errors were symmetric (i.e. if positive
errors were as bad as negative errors), the forecasts should present no systematic bias (i.e.
on average the forecast error should not differ significantly from zero). There are, however,
reasons to presume that the loss functions of governments may not be symmetric. For
instance, a government would tend to overestimate a deficit when the loss of an
underestimation is greater (for example for a conservative, stability-oriented government,
Bretschneider et al., 1989). Public authorities may have an interest in presenting a
pessimistic forecast to build in a safety margin that would allow them to meet budgetary
targets, also in case of revenue or expenditure slippages (Keereman, 1999, Jonung and
Larch 2006). The literature in question finds mixed evidence for political economy-based
explanations of this sort.
A second source of bias arises from systematically omitting relevant economic variables, or
from errors in fiscal variables induced by systematic errors in economic variables (output
gap, price variables, GDP volatility) through estimated tax/spending elasticities. This source
of errors is supported by the results in Feenberg et al. (1989), Cassidy et al. (1989),
Keereman (1999), Melander et al. (2007), Artis and Marcellino (2001), or Strauch et al.
(2004).
A series of papers tests for the presence of bias in fiscal forecast errors by adopting a purely
statistical approach, and considering symmetric loss functions on the part of the agencies
generating the forecasts. Following Gentry (1989), unbiasedness can be formally tested by
regressing the outcome on the forecast Rt= + Ft+ ut , where Rt is the budgetary
outcome, is a constant, Ft is the forecast and ut is an error term, through the null
hypothesis that is zero and is one. Under the null hypothesis of unbiasedness the error
term is the forecast error and should then be free of serial correlation (Artis and Marcellino,
2001). Holden and Peel (1990) show the test above provides a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for unbiased forecasts unless the constraint =1 is imposed. Along these lines,
Gentry (1989), Campbell and Ghysels (1995), Artis and Marcellino (1998, 2001), Keereman
(1999), Melander et al. (2007), Pons (2000), Strauch et al. (2004), and Bruck and Stephan
(2006) detect the presence of biases in the track record of fiscal forecasts of various
governmental and international agencies, in particular as regards projections for European
countries.
Efficiency
The key for an assessment on efficiency or rationality lies, firstly, in the available
information at the time the forecast was elaborated (data, policy measures), and secondly in
the (optimal?) use of this information (methods, procedures). The literature on fiscal
forecasts tends to detect lack of rationality. Leaving aside the already-mentioned studies of
bias, this conclusion has been reached through investigating: (i) the presence of serial
correlation in a time series of errors (as in Campbell and Ghysels 1995, Keereman 1999,
Melander et al. (2007), Artis and Marcellino 1998 and 2001, or Gentry 1989); (ii) the
correlation of the forecast errors with information available at the time the forecast was
performed (as in Feenberg et al. 1989, Cassidy et al. 1989, or Strauch et al. 2004).

Nevertheless, from the existing studies it is not possible to decouple the contribution of the
information set from the violations of rationality.
Accuracy
By accuracy, following Musso and Phillips (2002), we refer to two aspects of the forecast as
compared to the actual outcome. The first one is how close both are in quantitative terms,
while the second one refers to the capacity of the forecast to predict the direction of change
in the final outcome. Directional accuracy tends to be less considered in the analysis of fiscal
forecasts than quantitative measures (exceptions are Keereman 1999, Melander et al.
(2007), Feenberg et al. 1989 or Prez 2007). The accuracy of a set of forecasts can be
considered in isolation by means of standard measures such as the Mean Error, the Mean
Absolute Error or the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), or with sign tests. This is an
interesting option when evaluating the record of a given institution (as in Keereman 1999
and Melander et al. 2007 for the EC). Nevertheless, in most cases the objective is the
comparison of the record of several institutions regarding a given set of variables, or the
comparison of a set of forecasting methods (Baguestani and McNown 1992, Grizzle and
Klay 1994, Artis and Marcellino 2001, or Prez 2007). In this case, the RMSE ratio statistic,
the directional test in Pesaran and Timmerman (1992), and non parametric tests to check
the null hypothesis of no difference in the accuracy of two competing forecasts as the one by
Diebold and Mariano (1995) are widely used.
Causes of forecast errors
In addition to the historical examination of forecasting performance along the three
selected fronts of unbiasedness, efficiency and accuracy a real-time forecaster would need
to understand the causes of the errors. Auerbach (1995) distinguishes between three types
of errors: policy errors, economic errors and technical (behavioural) errors. Policy errors are
due to errors on the course of fiscal policy, owing to the implementation of new, not yet
announced by the forecast cut-off date, fiscal policy measures or cancellation of the
previously announced measures. Economic errors are those that can be explained by wrong
forecasts of macroeconomic variables that are used in the budget projections (GDP, interest
rates, inflation). Finally, technical errors would be due to other factors. They might in part
stem from behavioural responses, as signalled by Auerbach, but also from model misspecification on the fiscal side.
Factors like the impact of macroeconomic forecast errors (as illustrated in figures 2 and 3),
data revisions, the occurrence of unexpected revenue collection (the so-called revenue
windfalls) or the inappropriate ex ante impact of tax policy measures, have not been
sufficiently covered in the related literature.
All these factors, and others, are in a sense intertwined with the forecasting procedures and
models developed by a given institution, the treatment of tax assumptions and other
exogenous variables, the forecast horizon, the nature and amount of data used (annual,
quarterly or monthly), and the level of detail (aggregation) a forecaster might want to pursue.
These topics are covered in the next section.