Chuaquico Jett I.

1A
Article 2: Effectivity of Laws
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

FACTS
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette various laws.
Solicitor Generals contention: publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE
WON, laws should take effect after 15 days of their publication at the official gazette
or should take effect upon the date stated in the law itself.

RULING
Yes, they should be published at the official gazette for their effectivity.
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient

importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required

so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people
to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The
Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Taada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446

FACTS
A motion for reconsideration/clarification of the previous decision which questions: (1)
what is meant by law of public nature or general applicability? (2) Must there be a distinction
between laws of general applicability or not? (3) What is meant by publication? (4) Where? (5)
When?
RULING
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. The clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge
of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole. We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
However, internal instruction of administrative agencies and municipal ordinances are not
covered by the requirement.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a
wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.

De Roy vs. CA. 157 SCRA 757

FACTS
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of
the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al: (1) first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. (2) the second Resolution dated
27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
The case involves the death of Marissa Bernal (private respondent) due to the collapse of
the weak firewall owned by the petitioners when it fell and hit the tailor shop owned by the
private respondents. RTC held that the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and ordering them
to pay for damages.
The CA then affirmed the decision of RTC. Last day for filling a motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners filed a motion for extension which the court denied which was
denied due to resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
ISSUE
WON, CA commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
RULING
No, CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner to their
motion.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
The rule contends: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial

Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending
with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested.
Petitoners claim that the Habaluyas rule should not apply for failure to publish it at the
official gazette, holds no basis.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Vega 360 SCRA 33

FACTS
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the
liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter,
the PVB Employees Union filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by
then Pres. Corazon Aquino and was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This
law sought the rehabilitation of the PVB which means that Congress mandated that the PVB be
not dissolved. However, Judge Vega (liquidation judge) continued the proceeding of liquidating
PVB.
Petitioner contends that since the enactment of R.A. 7169, the liquidation of the court is
functus officio.
Judge Vega contends that the effectivity of the law is after fifteen days of its publication
at the Official Gazette pursuant to Art. 2 of the NCC.
ISSUE
WON, Judge Vega, the liquidation judge, can continue the process despite the
enactment of R.A. 7169 which rehabilitates PVB and not to dissolve it.
RULING

No, Judge Vega cannot continue the liquidation process because R.A. 7169 terminates its
function to liquidate PVB.
As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise
provided. Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately
upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon
C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same
was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments
has rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been
stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.
It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to
the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the
liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.
WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED

Rieta vs. People 436 SCRA 273

FACTS
On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson received information about a smuggling
activity of illegal cigarettes somewhere in the port of Manila. Around 4am October 14, 1979.
They arrested the petitioners after a car chase along Bonifacio drive, at the foot of Delpan bridge.
Petitioners contention that they have no idea of Boys operation of smuggling, they only
have the knowledge that he is a businessman hauling slippers, fish and vegetables from
Divisoria.
They claim that there arrest was a set-up, that the evidence presented to them is
suspicious given the fact that the truck was not open in their presence which contained the
alleged smuggled cigarettes. That the truck is different from what they boarded to what was held
at the camp crame. And the escape of Boy is suspicious given that the situation, escape is remote.
RTC held them guilty for smuggling and the CA affirmed the decision. CA noted that
while petitioner and his co-accused had mainly raised questions of fact, they had nonetheless

failed to point out specific errors committed by the trial court in upholding the credibility of the
prosecutions witnesses. The defense of denial proffered by petitioner was considered weak and
incapable of overturning the overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent.
Further, the appellate court ruled that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue-seal
cigarettes was not fatal to respondents cause, since the crime had sufficiently been established by
other competent evidence. The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was
irregular. It ruled that the alleged defect could not be raised for the first time on appeal,
especially in the light of his voluntary submission to and participation in the proceedings before
the trial court.
ISSUES
1. WON, the respondent trial and appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they convicted the petitioners
guilty for the act of smuggling
2. WON, the evidence against the petitioners are inadmissible on the grounds that they
were arrested without any search warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure
order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this
Honorable Supreme Court.
RULINGS
1. No, the respondent courts did not commit grave abuse of discretion in their
conviction of guilt.
Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained. It is the fact of the commission of
the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses not necessarily by physical
evidences.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
respondents evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods. Col. Panfilo Lacson and
Customs warehouse storekeeper of the bureau testimonies are enough for conviction.
However, the colonels positive and categorical testimony pointing to him as one of the
passengers of the cargo truck, as well as petitioners own admission of his presence therein,
dispelled the need for a courtroom identification. In-court identification of the offender is
essential only when there is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed
the crime is the same person who is charged in the information and subject of the trial.

There is an exception to the general rule requiring the prosecution to prove a criminal charge
predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment constituting an essential element of a
crime. It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative
averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue,
could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the
defendants knowledge or control.
Petitioners contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are
presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. To rebut this
presumption, it is not enough for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the
unlawful source of the cigarettes. He should have presented evidence to support his claim and to
convince the court of his non-complicity.
2. NO, the evidences adduced against them by virtue of ASSO is valid
In Tanada vs. Tuvera: The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its
invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination.
There is an imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative
fact negating the acceptance of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. Whatever was done
while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and
presumed to be valid in all respects.
The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision
in Taada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or
simply ignored.
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED and decision AFFIRMED

Commission of Internal Revenue vs. San Roque Power Corp. 707 SCRA 66

FACTS
G.R. No. 187485, the case is all about San Roque Power Corp a domestic corporation
duly authorized in power-generating and selling electricity to the government. It is registered as a
VAT taxpayer. It asked for tax credit for its excess input VAT at BIR but due to its the bureaus
inaction it elevates its prayer to CIR which denies their claim. However, CTA partially granted
its prayer. Thus, CIR elevates the case to SC which grants San Roque its claim for its excess
input VAT.
G.R. No. 196113, the case revolves at Taganito Mining Corporation, a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of PH, requesting a tax credit for its excess input VAT at
BIR but was denied. It went to CTA ruling partially of its tax credit. CTA en banc reverse the
decision of CTA division on the grounds that Taganitos claim was filed prematurely: The
judicial claim was filed after the lapse of only 92 days from the filing of its administrative claim
before the CIR, in violation of the 120-day period prescribed in Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax
Code.
G.R. No. 197156, Philex Mining Corp was also asking for tax credit for its excess input
VAT at BIR but was denied, both the CTA and CTA en banc, affirmed the decision on the
grounds that: Philex filed its Petition for Review only on October 17, 2007, which is 426 days
way beyond the 30- day period prescribed by law.
ISSUE
1. WON, the CTA en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in its decisions to the
cases cited.
RULING
1. YES, the CTA committed a grave abuse of discretion on three cases
The ATLAS, MIRANT AND ACHI ruling: which held that claims for refund or credit of
input VAT must comply with the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229, should be
effective only from its promulgation on 8 June 2007 until its abandonment on 12 September
2008 in Mirant. The Mirant ruling, which abandoned the Atlas doctrine, adopted the verba legis
rule, thus applying Section 112(A) in computing the two-year prescriptive period in claiming
refund or credit of input VAT.
The application of the 120+30 day periods was first raised in Aichi, which adopted the
verba legis rule in holding that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. The
language of Section 112(C) is plain, clear, and unambiguous. When Section 112(C) states that

"the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents," the law clearly gives the
Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayers claim.
Resort to the courts prior to the expiration of the 120-day period is a patent violation of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a ground for dismissing the judicial suit
due to prematurity.
When Section 112(C) states that "the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day
period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals," the law does not
make the 120+30 day periods optional just because the law uses the word "may." The word
"may" simply means that the taxpayer may or may not appeal the decision of the Commissioner
within 30 days from receipt of the decision, or within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period.
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03 (RMC 49-03) dated 15 April 2003: the mere
filing by a taxpayer of a judicial claim with the CTA before the expiration of the 120-day period
cannot operate to divest the Commissioner of his jurisdiction to decide an administrative claim
within the 120-day mandatory period, unless the Commissioner has clearly given cause for
equitable estoppel to apply as expressly recognized in Section 246 of the Tax Code.
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 Effective 1 January 1996 : by its own express terms,
applies only if the taxpayer files the judicial claim "after" the lapse of the 60-day period. Under
Section 4.106-2(c), the 60-day period is still mandatory and jurisdictional.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on
the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the
taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim
or after the expiration of the hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals.
WHEREFORE (1) GRANTS the petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R.
No. 187485 to DENY tax refund or credit claim of San Roque Power Corporation; (2)
GRANTS the petition of Taganito Mining Corporation in G.R. No. 196113 for a tax refund
or credit; and (3) DENIES the petition of Philex Mining Corporation in G.R. No. 197156
for a tax refund or credit

Article 3: Ignorance of the Law

People of the Philippines vs. Balbar 21 SCRA 1119

FACTS
On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room
where schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without
warning and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly
placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed
Balbar away and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and
pursued complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant
embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a
result of which complainant sustained slight physical injuries.
Two informations were filled: (1) Direct Assault. (2) Acts of Lasciviousness. The
petitioner then move for the information to be quashed. The information on direct assault for,
that it does not charge a sufficient cause of action on the grounds that the accused do not know
that the victim is a school teacher thus lacking of the primordial element of person in authority.
For the acts of lasciviousness, the accused would be placed under double jeopardy
because it is already stated on the first information filed.
The lower court, quashed the second information and affirmed that the accused is not
guilty of direct assault but rather, unjust vexation or physical injury due to the absence of such
element in direct assault.
ISSUE
1. WON, ignorance of the accused that the victim is a person in authority is an
ignorance of fact or law to free him from criminal liability
2. WON, he is acquitted from acts of lasciviousness
RULING
1. No, he cannot be free from criminal liability because such ignorance is ignorance of
the law.
Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . .
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance."
(See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of law teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be
deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148."
This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal and whether
substantive or remedial for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It
matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a
person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse
non-compliance on his part
2. Yes, he is acquitted from acts of lasciviousness
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and
lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of demarcation
lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves
and the environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time
under which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd
designs can hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence
of complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion
that the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or
lascivious. It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not
necessarily bring the case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, quashing direct assault is SET ASIDE

Morales vs. Skills International Company 500 SCRA 186

FACTS
Godofredo Morales claims that he was illegally dismissed from his service by his foreign
employer Wallan al Wallan. In his complaint, petitioner sought the payment of the following:
unpaid salaries for one and one-half months; refund of his plane fare; illegal deductions;
attorneys fees and litigation expenses; and moral and exemplary damages, the six and one-half

months unexpired portion of his contract; refund of the amount of 5,000.00 Saudi Riyals
allegedly deducted from his salary; unpaid overtime pay and medical care.
Respondents contention: that petitioner did not have any cause of action against it
because as a recruitment agency, it could only be held solidarily liable with the employer if the
latter is an accredited principal of the agency. Wallan Al Wallan being the new employer of the
petitioner does not mean that he is the principal of the agency.
The labor arbiter along with NLRC dismissed his case for lack of merit stating that if
there was anyone liable for petitioners illegal dismissal, it was none other than his foreign
employer, Wallan Al Wallan not the respondent.
CA also dismissed petitioners appeal on the grounds that petitioners arguments were a
mere reiteration of those he earlier presented before the NLRC and which were already passed
upon by the latter. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner failed to present any basis to
support his argument that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the case in
favor of respondent Skills International.

ISSUE
WON, the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
NLRC dismissing the case of the petitioner
RULING
No, the CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact was comprehensively
discussed in the case of Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.: A question of law exists when
the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact
exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts There is a question of law
if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the
issue in that query is factual.
In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective evaluation of the same.

This indubitably raises a question of fact which is not a proper subject of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. It is axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be
reviewed
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED

In Re: Petition To Sign in the Roll of Attorneys 706 SCRA 264

FACTS
Michael A. Medado, a graduate of UP Law batch 1979, passed the bar at the same year.
He was scheduled to sign in the roll of attorney on May 13, 1980 but failed to do so because he
has lost the sheet containing such information when he went home to his province for a vacation.
It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed
at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation
practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath,
the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";
and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."
On 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys.
The office of the bar recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit
ISSUE
WON, Medados honest mistake precludes is petition in signing in the roll of
attorney.
RULING
No, this mistake does not preclude his petition though he cannot escape penalty
Petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called

this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law for this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his
years of inaction. While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the
legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
At first, it may count as mistake of fact when he believes that he already signed the roll of
attorney when in fact it was just an attendance sheet. The moment he knew that he could have no
longer claim him of an honest mistake, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission
to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
While it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of
'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
His penalty is imposition of a fine of 32k, that he within one year after receipt of the
decision he is precluded from practicing law.
WHEREFORE petition GRANTED

Article 6: Waiver of Rights

Gatchalian vs. Delim 203 SCRA 126

FACTS
On 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger,
respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for
Bauang, of the same province. While traversing, a snapping sound was heard and shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were
injured.
Injured passengers were rushed to the hospital and the wife of the respondent, Adela
Delim, payed for all the medical expenses. While visiting the passengers, she presented a joint
affidavit containing that the passengers waives their right in suing the respondents. All of the
injured passengers, also the petitioner, signed the waiver.
Regardless of the waiver, petitioner filed a case praying for the payment of damages
resulting from the injuries she had sustained and the effects of it.
Respondent claim that such suit should be dismissed on the grounds of the waiver and
that the incident was based on force majeure.
The trial court, dismissed the petition on the grounds that petitioner already waives her
right in filling the suit. However, CA reversed the decision of the lower court, yet affirmed the
decision on the dismissal of damages.
ISSUES
1. WON, there is a valid waiver in the joint affidavit signed by the petitioner thus
precluding her right to sue the respondents.
RULINGS
1. No, there is no valid waiver
The relevant language of the Joint Affidavit: That we are no longer interested to file a
complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was
an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping
us to be treated upon our injuries.
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or

benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when
the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
such person
Applying the Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint
Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal"
terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner
Gatchalian need to be considered. Having been treated at the hospital for a couple of days, she is
still dizzy from medications given to her when she signed the joint affidavit, and given that she
saw fellow passengers signing the affidavit, she also signed it. This clearly shows that she is not
able to understand fully the waiver.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or
good. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable. To uphold such is contrary to public policy.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE

Thomson vs. CA 298 SCRA 280

FACTS
Petitioner Marsh Thomson the executive VP of The American Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines Inc., received the proprietary share of the AmChams president. Not knowing that
respondent had bought the shares and placed it under the name of petitioner.
Upon receiving titles to the share, petitioner had failed to execute a document recognizing
private respondents beneficial ownership over said share.
When petitioners employment contractual was up for renewal, negotiations were made
between petitioner and private respondent. During negotiation, private respondent issued a
release and quitclaim stating that AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns, employees
and/or representatives do hereby release, waive, abandon and discharge J. MARSH THOMSON
from any and all existing claims that the AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns,

employees and/or representatives may have against J. MARSH THOMSON. The quitclaim,
expressed in general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share.
Private respondent then asked petitioner to return and deliver the MPC shares to them,
failing to get a favourable response, AmCham filed a case which it was decided against them on
the grounds that the articles of incorporation and by-laws of MPC prohibits juridical entity from
acquiring membership. Both parties elevate it to CA which reversed the decision and ordering
petitioner to return the MPC share to AmCham on the grounds that: AmCham purchased the
shares and conformed it to petitioner. Petitioner was bound to recognize AmCham as the owner.
ISSUE
WON, the release and quitclaim of AmCham covers their waiver on the MPC thus
making petitioner the rightful owner
RULING
No, the waiver of AmCham does not include waiver of its ownership over the MPC
shares.
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when
the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
such person
If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms,
then clearly the general terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance
from general accountability, not specifically a waiver of AmChams beneficial ownership of the
disputed shares.
Additionally, the intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be
so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily relinquish the particular
right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. Considering
the terms of the quitclaim executed by the President of private respondent, the tenor of the
document does not lead to the purported conclusion that he intended to renounce private
respondents beneficial title over its share in the Manila Polo Club. We, therefore, find no
reversible error in the respondent Courts holding that private respondent, AmCham, is the
beneficial owner of the share in dispute.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED

Article 8: Judicial Decisions: Stare Decisis

Choy vs. Republic 25 SCRA 24

FACTS
During the hearing, the petitioner admitted that he was fined P25.00 for violation of the
Price Tag Law. He explained that at that time all the articles he was selling were properly tagged
as to its prices, but it so happened that the tag of a certain article fell and when the inspector
came the tag was not on the article. In order to avoid any more discussion, he paid the fine.
He is also applying for citizenship.
ISSUE
WON, the violation of Price Tag Law bars him from applying citizenship
RULING
Yes, it bars him from applying for citizenship
The lower court committed a grave abuse of when discretion when it absolves petitioner
from liability for the violation of Price Tag law on the basis of his scrupulous defence and its
failure to apply the Tio Tek Chai vs. Republic ruling.
What this Court has ruled is binding on inferior tribunals. The lower court, instead of
exhibiting deference and respect for a decision of this Court, would in effect overrule the same. It
did not have such a power. What this Court had decreed must be obeyed. The lower court's duty
was plain. It failed to do it. Its decision is tainted with the corrosion of substantial legal error. It
cannot stand.
In Tio Tek, the petitioner also violated the price tag law which he pleaded guilty amidst
his petition for citizenship. The absence of price tags could obviously serve as a means to
facilitate profiteering; and the law was enacted precisely to protect the buying public therefrom.
The ruling is that although he has none of the disqualification of law in application for
citizenship, he must also possess all qualification to become one. Certainly, violation of such law
renders his conduct anything but proper and irreproachable which is a qualification that one
needs to possess for one to become a citizen.
WHEREFORE, decision of the lower court granting his petition is REVERSED

People of the Philippines vs. Jabinal 55 SCRA 607

FACTS
September 5, 1964, Batangas city, accused was arrested on the grounds of possession of
illegal firearms and ammunition without the necessary documents and licenses.
He pleaded not guilty on the grounds: (1) that he was appointed as a secret agent of the
provincial governor and confidential agent of the provincial commander, therefore it is necessary
for his appointment to carry firearms without the needed licenses. (2) the ruling of Macarandang
and Lucero applies to his case thus acquittal is proper.
The lower court however convicted him guilty on the grounds that the ruling of
Macarandang and Lucero is reversed by the new ruling of People vs. Mapa
ISSUE
WON, the doctrine of People vs. Mapa applies to the case thus making the accused
guilty for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
RULING
No, the doctrine does not apply, therefor he is acquitted.
The cases of Macarandang and Lucero applies thus, acquitted the accused based on the
grounds that there appointment as secret agent and battalion commander to catch the Huk leader,
respectively, gives them the safeguard to carry firearms without the necessary license.
While it is true that the doctrine of the two cases was reversed by the doctrine of People
vs. Mapa nevertheless it is not applicable to the case at bar making Jabinal guilty, when appellant
was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by
Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as
of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate.

The legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

Ting vs. Velez-Ting 582 SCRA 694

FACTS
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed
on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of
Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time
of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is
a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social
and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. He provides financial
aid it is his wife that squander the money by playing mah-jong.

The contention of Carmen is corroborated by the testimony of Wasawas that confirmed the
violent tendencies of Benjamin and Dr. Oates finding that Benjamin suffers from psychological
incapacities.
The lower court declared their marriage void ab initio, Benjamin then appealed at CA which
reversed the decision of the lower court on the grounds that proof of psychological incapacity
was contrary to Santos vs. CA and Molina doctrine.
Carmen filed for a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that CA erred in their decision
for it would run counter with stare decisis. Molina could not run retroactively, since the petition
is more than five years from the original date of her complain. The CA then granted her petition,
thus case at bar.
ISSUE
WON, the CA erred in their decision for it runs contrary to the principle of stare
decisis
RULING
Yes, the CA did erred in their decision
We explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part
of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith,
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues. Necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code.
It gave a thorough discussion of stare decisis:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm.
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires
that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical

stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional
stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED

Castro vs. Deloria 577 SCRA 20

FACTS
On May 31, 2000 petitioner was charge by the ombudsman before the RTC with
malversation of public fund, to which petitioner pleaded not guilty.
August 31, 2001 Petitioner move to quash the information on the grounds that the
ombudsman has no prosecutorial powers with the RTC only at sandiganbayan, on the basis of Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan. However, the RTC denied its motion on the grounds that because of the
motion of clarification of the ombudsman, it reversed the decision of the Uy case on March 20,
2001.
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court thus case at bar.
ISSUE
WON, ombudsman has only prosecutorial powers limited at sandiganbayan on the
basis of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan
RULING
No, the ruling of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan of 1999 is no longer applicable due to
resolution decision issued on March 31, 2001

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman
has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information
filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the
issue.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that
law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but
construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of
that law. Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman
Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal
interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the
impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently
held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity
of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application. But
where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon
by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as
expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by
the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

Virtucio vs. Alegarges 679 SCRA 412

FACTS
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application for a 24-hectare
tract of unsurveyed land situated in Baas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. Approved on January 23,
1952.
In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three (3) lots Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140
Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio), Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio (Virtucio).
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming
that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. The

director of lands, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and the president dismissed her
claim.
May 11, 1989 ordered petitioner to vacate the premises however they did not comply,
thus Virtucio instituted for recovery of possession and ownership at RTC to which it approved.
Alegarbes then appealed to CA which grants the appeal on the grounds that the true
owner of the lot is Alegarbes not Virtucio by manner of acquisitive prescription. The CA did not
entertain the argument of Virtucio that its decision in CA-GR. C.V-26286 should be the basis of
its decision based on stare decisis principle.
ISSUE
WON, CA committed grave abuse of discretion for not following their decision on
the given CA-GR.
RULING
No, they did not err in their decision.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent.
"The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. "
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was
erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls
upon this Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is not
legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered precedents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Article 9: Duty of the Court to Decide

Chu Jan vs. Bernas 34 Phil 631

FACTS
June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay,
between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said
persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared the
defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the
justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the winner.
The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the
defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal,
the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant
to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated
wager of P160; to return the other like amount
The court then dismissed the case to which the plaintiff went to this court.
ISSUE
WON, the lower court erred in dismissing the case on the grounds that there is no
law governing the case at hand
RULING
Yes, the lower court did err.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a
case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a
certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing
where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for
terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is
the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly
applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the
place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
WHEREFORE, petition REVERSED and proceedings shall be REMANDED to the court
whence they came

Floresca vs. Philex Mining 136 SCRA 141

FACTS
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet
on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine.
Their complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives
of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also
filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already
claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.
Respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground
that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23,
1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and
ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for workconnected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
ISSUE
WON, the respondents are liable for the death of the employees for their culpable
negligence.
RULING
Yes, they are liable for the death of the employees, though the laws (Sec. 5 of WCA
and Art. 173 of LC is silent)
Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly
termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article
173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by
his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for
the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173,
the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment
or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the
safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
It explains the quasi-legislation of the judiciary system: Hence, even the legislator
himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court,
in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because
the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to
anticipate all situations.
Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " In the language of Chief
Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge"
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.
NO COSTS.