IV.

LEGAL PROFESSION
1. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and
Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as
possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor
of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to
the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration
for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in
the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability
and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions,
sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted
by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is
thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or
not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on
Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population
of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a
national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of
Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to
the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in
order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power
nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission
on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts
have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

 Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that
the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there
can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available
to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control.
Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a
tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the
Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he
wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member
is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar
to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech"
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that
have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement
to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system
which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive
benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a
more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement
to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally
to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a
new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as
the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of
the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive
profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored
public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total
of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a
total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for
Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite
ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14
per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per
cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,"
within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance
with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,
has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he
has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)

Annex
A.......-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
Br. 224, QC

Annex
B.......-

"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November

13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Paraaque, MM

Annex
C.......
-

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to

File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January
17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides

that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on
the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and
with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he
does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as
shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case
No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which
is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP
Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995,
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of
the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside
and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City
to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787
was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal
as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of
conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent
in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return,
up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income
Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares
orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt,
he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but
only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his
rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and
if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as
again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him
to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6]adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but

this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the
proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of
the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in
1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return
up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in
his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he
is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections

from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of
the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12
of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No.
7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.

2.

UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE

PROFESSION

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at
San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with
her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere
joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990,
she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together
with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli
Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live
Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel
Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on
1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial
support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same
affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not
only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x
xx
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way
of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all
his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.
Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together,
they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty.
Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.4 Atty. Garrido
alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of
Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before
he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido.
She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido
with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship
between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.
Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his
second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit
because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her.
Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view of the criminal
complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an
absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents
argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents

also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty.
Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is
the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied
this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents
disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board
of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under
Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks
the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby
DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He
submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would
warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the
IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain
his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an
upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty.
Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the
petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand,
advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty.
Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors
against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in
a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly
his or her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and
the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when
he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As
we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental
or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary
authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's
exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of
this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of
the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have
the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated,
Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further
that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her
evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her
affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely
becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.21 We
make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an
unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society
looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage
with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the
second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good
moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission
to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the respondent
secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found
that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that
demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and
during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to
represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage
and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was
already married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a
woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison,
but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by
his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the
death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not
then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was
not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another
marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and
had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He
also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared
void after the present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules
of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed
the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he
violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he
discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools
of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and
desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.33Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia
should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when
they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is
required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private
life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve
respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct
which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.36 To
have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good.
It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained
about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where
she is known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as
important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia
already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea),
and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the
moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with
him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married
Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These
circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character;
even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential
advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not

aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice,
thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and
family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and
void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children.
Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a
married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison
with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias
presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a
third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.
1avvphi1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second
marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this
may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the
nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine
marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family.
Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their
marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in
Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note
that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the
surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did
not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another
woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral
values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a
man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her
actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty.
Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him
during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias
conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys
sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the
second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to
sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not
only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty.
Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after
she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by
law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of
lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena
P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of
them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that
demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them
for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting
his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of
his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of
character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside
without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of
the administration of justice into question.
She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation
of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

3. COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL

COLLEAGUES
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN
MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE
B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17, 19941 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively, located
in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint2 before the
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B.
Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for
"annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages."
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of
adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous
owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his
name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them.
Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several heirs of
Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of

the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be
reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and
that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be
annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,3 which covered Lot
Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404,respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or
transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of
Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three separate
occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.4 All these
motions were denied.5
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision6 dismissing petitioner's
complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of
action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal7 on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco filed a
motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens8 dated December 21, 1993; this was denied
in an Order dated January 10, 1994.9 He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"10 which
was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.11 Displaying remarkable tenacity,
respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."12 This time, however, his
arguments proved persuasive. In an Order13 dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge
ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof" so
that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal
and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which
finding is based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered
way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if
not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco
based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the
ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly
paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much
less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was
declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at
all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots consisting only a
total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title
covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect
of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon further

review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so
holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the
defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights,
if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.14 On March 4, 1994, the public
respondent issued an Order15 reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the
notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration16 against the Order dated
March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this
petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had already
been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a
matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the appellate
court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation
of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area
of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be
taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.17
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special
civil action forcertiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose
of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation.18 The notice of lispendens is an announcement to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who

acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over said property.19
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure20 and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,21otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory
bases for notice of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper
only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the building thereon.22

Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property
to put the property under the coverage of the rule.23 It is not necessary for her to prove
ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure24 or substance,25 the rule is that a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.26
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto27 that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,28 thus:

xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court,
and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate
Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the
latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorarisought
against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no discernible special
and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and guidance
of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy.
As we noted inSantiago v. Vasquez,29
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,

in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,30 Aleria v. Velez, 31 and Tano
v. Socrates.32Only the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of
the rule.33
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or
non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition
could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals34 we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in
an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal
with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on
the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.
1wphi1

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with
and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference
only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional
remedies. [emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and
would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of the
said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be incomplete
without a reference to the improper and unethical language employed by respondent Jose B.
Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both
before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma,
"a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and

who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her
faulty grammar,"35 is impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the
readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"36a retired police major described by respondent Tiongco
as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"37 an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for
being houseless"38 who rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by
petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously
described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin
defendant alive for not being a bastard,"39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and
female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure
defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply
desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh
at her behind her back."40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to
be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-mate who
simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to
catch him by sheer brass and audacity."41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a
"marriage bureau for her own benefit.42 Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will
come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no
happiness."43
1wphi1

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal
darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he does
nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays
only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson
in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the
courts.
In Romero v. Valle,44 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or
oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language
invites the disciplinary authority of the court.45 We are aghast at the facility with which
respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and her
counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,46 we dismissed as

totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner,
Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty.
Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience
in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui
auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.47
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.