Civil

Law

MUST READ CASES (CIVIL LAW)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said date, subject to the
requirement of publication. The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted.
LA BUAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882, January
27, 2004
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for
its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation," is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Taada held,
mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section
1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant
to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the active
practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in advanced reports and the SCRA.
Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985
The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the law as of
the date of its enactment since the courts application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

Civil
Law Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985
Van

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad,
RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)
Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the defamatory words on the
telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected his business as well as because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela.
Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to article 21 of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but was later on
prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who fails to
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not
only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
only to residences.
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION

G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961
It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the abortion of appellees wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of marriage license is
enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA 446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a non-resident invalidates
the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day
because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated
under said provisions must be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract and characterized by
exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that
is unbroken.

Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958

The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the marriage license.
Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit,
such irregularity will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the
parties.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780. October
16, 2013
A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely
given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA 637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989

Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001

Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in the Philippines.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as a
ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their marriage on May 22,
1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517

In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many military officials. In
view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577,

February 12, 2014
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16
Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less
prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine
Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection
and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause
of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological
incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.
Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)
If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272

Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a valid defense for the
crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity.

Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code
of the Philippines] shall apply." Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London,
a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of
her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08 OCTOBER 2014
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for

legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year.

Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal separation case amounts to
grave abuse of discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the
husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.
BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No.
171904 August 7, 2013
The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during
marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged
to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the
property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively
to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property.
All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of
redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by
right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property.
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570

The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is
sold by the owner- spouse.

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687 SCRA 414
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of
those assets is required.
MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal
Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired
before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation
and partition of the partnership.
Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case. The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay"
has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property
acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples
joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut
this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221

Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN
G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014
As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision
governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. In
Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal
partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court
further ruled that the view that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the
husbands consent is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required
are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September
22, 1986, one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Aurora as one
of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate, had the right therefore to
seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of
Leonardo of their hereditary rights.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666

Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to
the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,

applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code.
If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40
The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the same.
Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code;
by itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof.
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
on the information of a third person.

DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014
An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly recognized their
filiation. However, the child is under no compulsion to use his fathers surname. When Antonio
recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the
surname of Antonio. However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to use the same. The
law uses the word may, which dictates that it is merely permissive.
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal impediment to marry
each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite
his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,

A.K.A. MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO AND JAYROSE M. CASTRO vs JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children
to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.

In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA
98

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage
still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176
Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and the putative father,
made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity
must first be shown between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to
declare its existence or absence.
Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the
wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to
the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be
assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative.
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473
The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA 253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits
according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a
father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO,

RUBEN

D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO

BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)

The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband
and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man.
However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the
purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by
law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of
burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be
no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, 14 April
2014
There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
PROPERTY
Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009
International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication
services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308
of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls,
telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law.
Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as Real Estate Mortgage and
Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their intention is to treat all
properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate LIST
OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that
the parties intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels.

Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or
shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to
the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which
have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable
improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property
Tax Code.
MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered
as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is
undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles
for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514
Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and cannot be acquired
by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law
and be the subject of a torrents title.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of
any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession,
and not when possession has already been lost.
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P-- 07-- 2399, Jun. 18, 2008
When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into
his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession.
In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its
owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found
something.
Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which
he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that he be unaware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)

The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection
of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits
the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person
who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and
useful improvements made by him on the things possessed.
BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014
The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the townhouses and
other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or the
intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has been built on the
property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of
the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within thirty (30) days
from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of
the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair
market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe
that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary
intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the
two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable
and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the
indemnity.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber
Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of
the public domain.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another
person through prescription.
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is subject
thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without need of any
formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the

owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even without any formal act of his will
and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser.
Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable requisites in an action to
quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is
claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper
remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the lots. The
petitioners status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory
December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP
affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the
lots.
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others, hence, the
relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join,
even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for
recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier
case should not be barred by prior judgment.
Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011. April 15, 2013
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an
action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the coowners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y.
GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314,
November 13, 2013
Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for legal
redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the co-owner of a land
subject of a compromise agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the
compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the agreement, he is not
indispensable for the agreement to materialize.

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary, is not
qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.
Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, possession can be acquired by
juridical acts.
EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No.
194336, March 11, 2013
Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they
may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same
in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same
character throughout their occupancy.
Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and
egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a
van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement.
Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up
a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an

artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."
Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and
property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make
that structure a nuisance.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330,
September 11, 2013
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if
they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to
expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive
and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its
intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes
a nuisance.
Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or (b)
where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the
donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I
die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else
than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her
death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition,
the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a
reasonable period. Only then - when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought

to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as
provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude
the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. Mere reliance
therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the
subject properties' locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.
Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the
general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to
land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or
implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership
through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.
SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R.
No. 176043. January 15, 2014
Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not
cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or register
such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and
incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim.
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen J.)
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference between
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the
basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the
basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No.
1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D.
No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil

Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461

Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands.
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec. 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or only to individuals or entities
qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.
Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465
A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme, 146 SCRA 509
The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it
is acquired and not the time to register ownership.
Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15, 2013
It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its
certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would

put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him,
such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued

piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants. The burden
of proving good faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by
simply invoking the ordinary presumption of good faith. After an assiduous assessment of the
evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as they
failed to discharge their burden of proof.
SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception
thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles
from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there
must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the
original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the
forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public domain begin to run.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or entities.
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the
State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established.
Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial
cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA
YBAEZ
G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014 FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin J.)
Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between the
parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the registered deed or instrument on the
theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e.,

the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for
unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty
was located.

The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or instrument
affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of a third party with a better right. This
exception is provided in Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the
registration shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right; and
in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that any recording made under
this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION

In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should be governed by
Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers back to the Philippine Law. Edward
is domiciled in the Philippines hence, Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes
natural children legally acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA 755
A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect
after his death."
Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524
The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA which is the
national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the wills as provided for by article 16 and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply.
Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483
The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will should include those
who are born after the testators death. To construe it as referring to the nearest male relative at
any time after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to
the disposition of the estate.
De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972
There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately after such death, even
if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the
vendor heir.
Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976

The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before the judicial
declaration of their being declared as heirs. When Fortunata died, her claim or right to the parcel
of land in litigation in civil case number 856 was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171
The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract. The heirs
acquire a right to succession from the moment of death of the decedent. In this case, the
purported waiver of hereditary rights cannot be considered effective.
Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012
It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the
court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although
they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."
Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010
An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence
of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed
embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are
aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to
the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself.
Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free

act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the
manner that he intends it to be done.

Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written
in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator.
Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim
of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and
understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is
evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice,
by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator's)
other senses.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of
the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5
November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of
securing his conformity to the draft.
Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly
acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the

testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her
witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption. 37

Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear
before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents
since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text
of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not
expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly
inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within
the execution of the will.
Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209
The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of
the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394
The issue in this case whether the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfies the
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? Outside the place of his commission, he is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the
limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the number of pages of
the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be
noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. 38
Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16
The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333

The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory."
Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change
of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date "FEB.,61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172
Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in
the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator.
Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. But, reprobate or re-authentication of
a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the
will is presented for the first time before a competent court.

Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case
at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially
the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature,
practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451
Revocation under this condition to be effective must have complied with the two requirements:
the overt act as mentioned under the law; the intent to revoke on the part of the testator. The
document or paper burned by one of the witnesses was not satisfactorily established to be the
will at all, much less the will of Adriana.
Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451
For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was
not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was
not in her presence.
Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator,
when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same
was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such
will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37
The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of
the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will
not render the destruction conditional.

Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509

The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will
is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In case of holographic will if oral
testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way.
Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator. But a
photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator.
Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not required to produce more
than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the holographic will were contested, article 811
cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having denied the probate.
Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law requires that three
witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. A visual examination of
the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator.
Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res
judicata with respect to private respondents complaint.
Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and
the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should hearing the two cases.
Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. Where practically considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue.

Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590

To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and complete, such that nothing must be
given to the compulsory heir.
Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
are concerned.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Legitime and Simulated Contracts; Spousal Marital Estrangement
Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at
the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.
Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere
estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of
the deceased spouse.
VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR.,
G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property
to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The reservor has
the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that

such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary
of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the

survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when
the reservees predecease the reservor.
Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition
that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the
vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch
much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The
reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.
Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that
the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the
Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704
The word degree means generation and the present code has obviously followed this
interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted. The code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and
one generation from the first heir.
Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491
In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first heir to preserve and
transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the
happening of a particular event.
Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69

The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouses parents. There is no provision in the
civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.

Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555

In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate in the inheritance with
the surviving nieces and nephews because the existence of the latter excluded the more distant
relatives. In the collateral line, the right of representation does not go beyond the children of
brothers and sisters.
Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567
Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita was the
legitimate child of Tomas, himself was a legitimate child, appellant Tomas has no cause of
action to recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his daughter, Juanita as a legal heir, in
Yangcos estate.
Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563
If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse since they shall equally, one-half
of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law
refers to children or descendants, the rule in the statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular.
Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986
A decedents uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. In this case, the nephews and nieces
were not inheriting by right of representation because they only do so if they concur with the
brothers and sisters of the decedent.
Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321
The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted
child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567

In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their
natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and

sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had
no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142
Petitioners argument that the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives
of a decedent does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and
her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition
for letters of administration.
Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general
and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.
Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or
spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.
Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986
Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with the
brothers or sisters of the deceased which is provided in article 975 when children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive with their uncles and aunts but if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826, October 14, 2013

Degaos claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with them
from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. The incompatibility

in novation must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object,
cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT
G.R. No. 163654, 08 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)
The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that
is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms
and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages
may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not
always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or
bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross
negligence.
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FIL-ESTATE NETWORK, INC., v. SPOUSES
CONRADO AND MARIA VICTORIA RONQUILLO, , G.R. NO.185798. January 13, 2014
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis cannot be said to be unforeseeable and beyond the control of a
business corporation, especially a corporation engaged in real estate enterprise. Such corporation
is considered a master in projections of commodities and currency movements and business risks.
It has the ability to foresee such situation. Thus, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is not an
instance of caso fortuito.
ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960
Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus,
contending that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on
moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New
Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to
compel their performance, while Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on
equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or
rendered by reason thereof".
SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960
Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante arising from the
criminal act committed by the latter. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them

in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" .
SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008

Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a case for damages against it after
he was shot by one of the security guards on duty at the school premises. When an academic
institution accepts students for enrollment, there is a established contract between them, resulting
in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with but which FEU failed to
perform when it did not provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124378, March 8, 2005
The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its dams has
been satisfactorily and extensively established. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages, which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of and it is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, G.R.
NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
Petitioners argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts because the fire is a fortuitous
event. If the obligation is generic in the sense that the object thereof is designated merely by its
class or genus without any particular designation or physical segregation from all others of the
same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind even without the debtors fault
and before he has incurred in delay will not have the effect of extinguishing the obligation, based
on the principle that the genus of a thing can never perish, (Genus nunquan perit) and an
obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific
property of the debtor.
TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook
to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram but which petitioner did not do,
despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges.
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469 July 25, 1991
Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The failure of the owners to
collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses, since consignation under such
circumstances, is necessary, and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance with the
specific requirements of the law therefor.
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON, G.R. NO.
149338, July 28, 2008

Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation under the Memorandum
of Agreement but due to respondents failure to increase the capital stock of the corporation to an
amount that will accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform

their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the other party to perform the
obligation renders the other party to demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the
rescission of the contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R. NO. 178610
November 17, 2010
Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to pay the monthly
amortizations of their respective loans, which were suppose to be paid through salary deduction,
to the petitioner because of their dismissal. Loans secured by their future retirement benefits to
which they are no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations and the
absence of a period within which to pay the obligation, the fulfillment of which is demandable at
once.
JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and effectivity can take place only
if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled, and if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation
had never existed.
PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926
Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the donation and the same
not having been complied with, the donation never became effective. The characteristic of a
condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not
complied with or is not deemed complied with, consequently, when a condition is imposed, the
compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such
condition cannot be a condition precedent but a condition subsequent.
ALILEO A. MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 188986,
March 20, 2013
The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party is implied in
reciprocal obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA correctly applied Article 1191,
which provides thus: the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one
of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may
choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages
in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter
should become impossible. The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

EDS MANUFACTURING, INC. v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC. G.R. No.

162802, October 9, 2013

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,
but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. It must be pointed that in the absence of a stipulation, a party
cannot unilaterally and extra judicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary
before a valid rescission can take place.
Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to automatic
rescission. Under Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal obligations, is
deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what is incumbent upon
him. But that right must be invoked judicially. Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made
available to the injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the other
party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party entitled to rescind should apply to
the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot be exercised solely on a partys own
judgment that the other committed a breach of the obligation. The operative act which produces
the resolution of the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor.
UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29,
In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the "Acknowledgment of Debt
and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP)
has "the right and the power to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as rescinded without the
necessity of any judicial suit."
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and act
accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the final
judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action
taken was or was not correct in law.
AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984
Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation in reciprocal ones
are alternative remedies, and plaintiff having chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot
now seek rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to rescind the
obligation has prescribed. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment
and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of
fulfillment, if the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured party to
seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment.
OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007
The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this recourse, and the Invitation
to Bid sent out to implement said resolutions, all have a common subject: the Shares the 187.84

Million EPCIB common shares, which, as a necessary consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger
which saw EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO, have been transferred to BDO and
converted into BDO common shares under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan
of Merger. As thus converted, the subject Shares are no longer equity security issuances of the

now defunct EPCIB, but those of BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally separate and
distinct entity from what used to be EPCIB.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a determinate thing is
extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the Civil
Code, a thing is considered lost when it perishes or disappears in such a way that it cannot be
recovered.
ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558 May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side streets on the sides of the
land which were sold to the PSE due to the presence of squatters, questions the decision of the
lower court ordering him to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process, the
Court must first determine that "the obligation does not fix a period", or from the nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, because courts can not fix a period
merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the complaint not having sought
that the court should set a period, but must set the time that the parties are shown to have
intended.
RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984
Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in a collection case praying for
the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and severally." In the
absence of a finding of facts that the defendants made themselves individually liable for the debt
incurred they are each liable only for one-fourth of said amount, the obligation being described
as "individually and jointly".
SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11, 2012
Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not made to the creditors
themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a certain Losloso who was the authorized agent
of petitioners. Respondents obligation consists of payment of a sum of money, and in general, a
payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person,
thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or
implied, to receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent authority to
receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its
receipt. If payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as
a discharge.
TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993
Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in the
payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the creditor.

SPS. NAMAEL AND LOURDES BONROSTRO v. SPS. JUAN AND CONSTACIA LUNA,
G.R. No. 172346. July 24, 2013

Tender of payment "is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an
obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the
obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with
the proper court." Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority in
accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or because
of circumstances which render direct payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. To have the effect of payment and the
consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of
tender of payment and consignation.
Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298. April 15, 2013
Consignation is necessarily judicial. Article 1258 of the Civil Code specifically provides that
consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial
authority. The said provision clearly precludes consignation in venues other than the courts.
DALTON vs. FG.R. and DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. NO. 172577 January 19, 2011
The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was subject to the express reservation
of assailing the validity of the consignation. In such case, the creditor is not deemed to have
waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. When the amount consigned does not cover the
entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance.
FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988
Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal compensation and
claims that the government owed him when a portion of his land was expropriated, hence, his tax
obligation had been set-off by operation of law.
The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no set-off admissible
against demands for taxes levied for general or local governmental purposes because taxes are
not in the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow out of duty to, and are the
positive acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the personal consent of
individual taxpayers is not required.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., G.R. NO.
147950. December 11, 2003
There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the restructuring agreement since it
merely provided for a new schedule of payments and additional security giving Delta authority to
take over the management and operations of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay installments
equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, this Court has

consistently applied the well-settled rule that the obligation is not novated by an instrument that
expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not
incompatible with the old ones, or where the new contract merely supplements the old one.

SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R. 167874. January 15,
2010
A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002
Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellees letter-offer of a parcel of land but appellee
made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered amounts within two years in quarterly
amortizations. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not
qualify the terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer and is a
rejection of the original offer and such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent.
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L67742 October 29, 1987
The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be considered as a valid
instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registerd under the
Torrens System. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in
whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity
are present, except when the law so requires requiring a contract to be in some form for validity
or enforceability.
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound
by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, and pending notice of its withdrawal, his
accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in
a perfected contract of sale.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28, 2007
Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement clause in petitioners
contract of employment was reasonable and needed since her job gave her access to the
companys confidential marketing strategies. A non-involvement clause is not necessarily void
for being in restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and
place.
CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013

Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing additional compensation for easement fee,
the CA ruled that Cabahug's attempt to collect further sums by way of additional easement fee
and,or just compensation is violative of said contract. It is settled that a contract constitutes the
law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and

plain language, should be applied according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot supply
material stipulations, which contradict the intent of the parties.
SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771 December 17, 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the parties,
there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality, hence, a contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled
will of one of the contracting parties, is void.
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118248 April 5,
2000
Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the deceased, hence, heirs are
bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and
obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)
provision of law.
PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ABASOLO, G.R. NO.
September 27, 2010

186738,

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, and if a contract should
contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, the contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon the third person.
FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September 30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating
parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited
by the stipulation.
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being subversive to
public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.
URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011
Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and
enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his
creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his
title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in this case,
Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to
transfer ownership over the subject lands.

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984

Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the
"kabit system", whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows
another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the
petitioner prays that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner for whatever amount the
latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of in pari delicto that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them.
CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR.
G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)
The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception
arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public
policy has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.
The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State.
CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069, February 7, 2003
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their
inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of
the subject property by their mother. Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
sanction would not be binding on him , hence, an alleged silence and inaction may not be
interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.

YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981

Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements of perfection of a contract are
present in a contract which involves payment in installments, the Statute of Frauds would no
longer apply as long as the total price or consideration is mentioned in some note or
memorandum and there is no need of any indication of the manner in which such total price is to
be paid. In any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of Frauds read together with the
perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and applied in the
sense that the idea of payment on installments must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum
therein contemplated.
ORDUA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29, 2010
Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the purchase price payable
on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of some partial payments
but after his death, his son questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita,
and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. The

Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing
and subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal contract of sale, however, has been

partially executed through the partial payments made by one party duly received by the vendor,
as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute.
AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234 June 30, 1995
Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground of unsatisfied
judgment against respondents and It likewise moved to declare the sale to a third party of a
parcel of land in the name of the private respondent as one in fraud of creditors which was
granted by the lower court. Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective
until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title, and an action for rescission may not be
raised or set up in a summary proceeding through a motion, but in an independent civil action
and only after a full-blown trial.
LAW ON SALES
PEALOSA vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23, 2001
Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the consideration stated
in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when the deed was notarized; c) seller did not
surrender a copy of the title; d)real estate taxes were not paid. The elements of a valid contract of
sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain
in money or its equivalent which are present in the second Deed of Sale hence there is already a
perfected contract of sale.
FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES,
INC.
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015
Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no obligation to make
payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money to petitioner in
order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, there must
first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest money. Where the parties
merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give
their consent to such offers. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale.
MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013
The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to register the
contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not result to the
nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The contract to sell
remains valid and subsisting. The intrinsic validity of the contract to sell is not affected by the
developers violation of Section 5 of PD 957.Nevertheless, the respondent in this case is entitled
to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.

SPOUSES DELFIN O. TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET AL. v.

SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013

In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid the price
in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property prior to the full
payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the
breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in entering into
the contract to sell. In the case at bar, the court finds that respondent Rowenas act of transferring
the title to the subject land in her name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and
despite non-payment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of
the contract to sell.

HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES vs SOCCO-BELTRAN, G.R. 176474 November 27, 2008

It was unmistakably stated in the Contract to Sell and made clear to both parties thereto that the
vendor was not yet the owner of the subject property and was merely expecting to inherit the
same. The law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the
time of delivery hence, there was no valid sale from which ownership of the subject property
could have been transferred.
DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG et al., G.R. NO. 159578, February 18, 2009
Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the action is based
on an implied or a constructive trust. However, since respondents' action for reconveyance was
based on fraud, the action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Respondent's action for reconveyance was not even subject to prescription, since the deed of sale
that was executed in favor of petitioners was null and void because the seller was not the owner
of the land, nor has the authority when she sold it to petitioners, hence, being an absolute nullity,
the deed is subject to attack anytime because an action to declare the inexistence of a void
contract does not prescribe.
NOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116635 July 24, 1997
Petitioners contend that they could repurchase the property that they "sold" to private
respondents when they allowed the respondent to redeem the properties for them from DBP but
DBP certified that the mortgagors' right of redemption was not exercised within the period.
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that "where goods are sold by a person who is not the
owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by
his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell.", hence, petitioners "sold"
nothing, it follows that they can also "repurchase" nothing.
DAROY vs. ATTY. ABECIA, A.C. NO. 3046, October 26, 1998
The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to
satisfy a judgment in his favor to his counsel as long as the property was not the subject of the
litigation.

ARCENIO vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-89-270 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO.

MTJ-92-637 July 5, 1993
The respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic to tow the jeep in custodia legis and to
place the jeep in good running condition, spending in the process her own money and also
registered the same in her brother's name. The act of respondent judge is not unlike the
prohibited acquisition by purchase described in Article 1491 of the New Civil code and is in fact,
even worse when she did not acquire the said vehicle from it's owner but instead whimsically
spent for its repairs and automatically appropriated the jeep for her own use and benefit.
VALENCIA vs. ATTY. CABANTING, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
Paulino alleged that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house and
while the petition for certiorari was pending the trial court issued an order of execution stating
that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory". While it is true that Atty.
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari
proceeding, and a thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge.
FABILLO vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L68838 March 11, 1991
After the court declared with finality that the petitioners are the lawful owners, they refused to
comply when the respondent lawyer proceeded to implement the contract of services between
him and the petitioners by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said
properties which are the subject of litigation. A contract between a lawyer and his client
stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only
after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.
MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. NO. 2430 August 30, 1990
Complainant alleges that for over a period of 20 years, respondent counsel allowed lease
contracts to be executed between his client and a partnership of which respondent is one of the
partners, covering parcels of land of the estate, but respondent claims that he is only acting as an
agent. Even if the respondent signed merely as an agent, the lease contracts are covered by the
prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in
which he takes part.
BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. GONZALES, A.M. NO. 1625 February 12, 1990
The Solicitor General found that respondent counsel transferred to himself one-half of the
properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved.

Persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property
mentioned therein because of the existing fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as
well as with the client.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF

GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004
Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his
clients property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in
payment of his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high
fee for handling his clients case. The prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption and such
prohibition is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the
expense of his client.
PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, G.R. NO. 170115,
FEBRUARY 19, 2008
The City of Cebu was no longer the owner of the lot when it ceded the same to petitioner under
the compromise agreement and at that time, the city merely retained rights as an unpaid seller but
had effectively transferred ownership of the lot to Morales. A successor-in-interest could only
acquire rights that its predecessor had over the lo which include the right to seek rescission or
fulfillment of the terms of the contract and the right to damages in either case.
HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. L-46892 September 30,
1981
By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, appellants declared themselves to be owners of one-half
(1,2) interest thereof and contend that the deed of assignment of one-half (1,2) interest thereof
executed by said Custodio in their favor is strictly personal between them. Notwithstanding the
lack of any title to the said lot by appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of sale in
favor of appellee, the said sale may be valid as there can be a sale of an expected thing.
JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48194 March 15, 1990
The efficacy of a deed of assignment is subject to the condition that the application of private
respondent for an additional area for forest concession be approved by the Bureau of Forestry
which was not obtained. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed subject
to the condition that the thing will come into existence, which did not happen, hence the
agreement executed never became effective or enforceable.
DEL PRADO vs SPOUSES CABALLERO, G.R. NO. 148225, March 3,2010 7
The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m,
more or less, but when the OCT was issued, the area was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an
excess of 10,475 sq m. Petititiomer, however, claims that respondents are, therefore, duty-bound
to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase in the

price. Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception and the use of more or less
or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency, and
clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity.

SEMIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 76031 March 2, 1994

Private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not
merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area circumscribed
within its boundaries.
If besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate,
its area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all
that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the
contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion
to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does
not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.
DANGUILAN vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-69970 November 28, 1988
Respondent admits that she did not take physical possession of property but argues that symbolic
delivery was effected through the notarized deed of sale. The thing is considered to be delivered
when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee," and in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such
control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale, but if there is no impediment to prevent the
thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic
delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient.
CHUA vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003
Petitioner insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but withheld payment
because he required that the property be registered first in his name before he would turn over
the check to the private respondent. 8
The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the thing sold, but in the sale
of a real property, the seller is not obligated to transfer in the name of the buyer a new certificate
of title, but rather to transfer ownership of the real property, because as between the seller and
buyer, ownership is transferred not by the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the
buyer but by the execution of the instrument of sale in a public document.
VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83851.
March 3, 1993.
The seller gave access to the buyer to enter his premises, manifesting no objection thereto but
even sending people to start digging up the scrap iron. The seller has placed the goods in the
control and possession of the vendee and such action or real delivery (traditio) transfered
ownership.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-31189

March 31, 1987

Respondent discovered that a parcel of land she owns is being used by Petitioner, Municipality
of Victorias, as a cemetery for 29 years and when the Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the
land from her grandmother, she asked to be shown the papers concerning the sale but petitioner
refused to show the same. Where there is no express provision that title shall not pass until
payment of the price, and the thing sold has been delivered, title passes from the moment the
thing sold is placed in the possession and control of the buyer.
DE LEON vs. ONG, G.R. NO. 170405, February 2, 2010
Petitioner sold three parcels of land to respondent which were mortgaged to a bank, hence
petitioner and respondent executed a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of
mortgage, but petitioner some time thereafter paid the mortgage and sold the properties to
another person. Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer title over the properties and
deliver the same to the buyer, and as a rule, the execution of a notarized deed of sale is
equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold.
PUROMINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEAL, G.R. NO. 91228. March 22, 1993.
Petitioner argues that the sales contract does not include the contract of carriage which is a
different contract entered into by the carrier with the cargo owners.
As worded, the sales contract is comprehensive enough to include claims for damages arising
from carriage and delivery of the goods. As a general rule, the seller has the obligation to
transmit the goods to the buyer, and concomitant thereto, the contracting of a carrier to deliver
the same. Art. 1523 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1523. Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller in authorized or required to send
the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for
the purpose of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer,
except in the cases provided for in article 1503, first, second and third paragraphs, or unless a
contrary intent appear.
"Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must take such contract with the carrier on
behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other
circumstances of the case. If the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost or damaged in course
of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself,, or
may hold the seller responsible in damages."
xxx xxx xxx
The disputed sales contact provides for conditions relative to the delivery of goods, such as date
of shipment, demurrage, weight as determined by the bill of lading at load port.
BOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125088, April 14, 2004
Petitioner sold the subject property to respondents as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale, but contends that the respondents have no right to material possession of the property since
the respondents have not paid the property in full. Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary,

when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract.

SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

November 20, 2003

126376.

Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the Deeds
of Sale to their respondent father and assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly
inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as
to the price, the contract of sale is valid and gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract
of sale, except if there is a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other contract.
HO, JR. vs TENG GUI, G.R. NO. 130115, July 16, 2008
RTC considered that although the sales of the properties on the lot were simulated, it can be
assumed that the intention of Ho in such transaction was to give and donate such properties to
the respondent. The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article
1471 of the Civil Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the
respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on a mere assumption when the law
requires positive proof, which the respondent was unable to show.
HYATT ELEVATORS vs. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS, G.R. NO. 173881 December 1, 2010
As revealed by the records, it was only Hyatt who determined the price, without the acceptance
or conformity of CHBCAI. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the
contracting parties, but a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other,
gives rise to a perfected sale.
CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003
On the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the purchase price as required by the
contract to sell, the signed Deeds of Sale, and imposes another condition. The vendee is bound to
accept delivery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the time and place stipulated in the
contract.
FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112212, March 2, 1998
While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable
to petitioner, its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar
the transfer of ownership and possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that their
contract is silent as to when it becomes due and demandable.
Neither may such failure to pay the balance of the purchase price result in the payment of interest
thereon. Article 1589 of the Civil Code prescribes the payment of interest by the vendee "for the
period between the delivery of the thing and the payment of the price" in the following cases:
(1) Should it have been so stipulated;
(2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce fruits or income;
(3) Should he be in default, from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand for the payment of the
price.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ALFONSO, G.R. NO. 131074,
March 27, 2000

Respondents aver that they are entitled to cancel the obligation altogether in view of petitioner's
failure to pay the purchase price when the same became due, while Petitioner claims that the
respondent failed to comply with their contractual obligations hence it was entitled to withhold
payment of the purchase price. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of
the thing acquired, he may suspend the payment of the price until the vendor has cause the
disturbance or danger to cease. This is not, however, the only justified cause for retention or
withholding the payment of the agreed price, but also, if the vendor fails to perform any essential
obligation of the contract.
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 179594.
September 11, 2013
Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A. No. 6552
applies to contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act,
applies to the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law) recognizes in conditional
sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller to
cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an event
that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI FAMILY
BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO
G.R. No. 160107, 22 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The protection of Republic Act No. 6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act) does not
cover a loan extended by the employer to enable its employee to finance the purchase of a house
and lot. The law protects only a buyer acquiring the property by installment, not a borrower
whose rights are governed by the terms of the loan from the employer.
SPOUSES MICHELLE M. NOYNAY AND NOEL S. NOYNAY vs. CITIHOMES
BUILDER AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014
In Pagtalunan v. Manzano, the Court stressed the importance of complying with the provisions of
the Maceda Law as to the cancellation of contracts to sell involving realty installment schemes.
There it was held that the cancellation of the contract by the seller must be in accordance with
Section 3 (b) of the Maceda Law, which requires the notarial act of rescission and the refund to
the buyer of the full payment of the cash surrender value of the payments made on the property.
The actual cancellation of the contract takes place after thirty (30) days from receipt by the buyer
of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and
upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
SKUNAC CORPORATION AND ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ vs. ROBERTO S.
SYLIANTENG AND CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG

G.R. No. 205879, 23 April 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are: (a) The two (or more sales)
transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership
of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more)
buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought
from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not
by just one but two vendors.
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, G.R. No.
181359 August 5, 2013
Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to
state that the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale
is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to
the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner
is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Act No. 3344 applies to sale of
unregistered lands. What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for
the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly
declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 66140, January 21, 1993 21
Respondent alleges that it cannot be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which were not used
for packing cement as originally intended invoking it's right of return. Article 1502 of the Civil
Code, has no application at all to this case, since the provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an express
written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return" or a "sale on approval", which
is absent in this case.
Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an invoice or
bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale without condition
or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a
stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the contract
was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and reject the rest of the goods since
this falls outside the normal intent of the parties in the "on approval" situation.
LO vs. KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 149420 October 8, 2003
The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the existence and legality of the credit at the
time of the sale, unless it should have been sold as doubtful; but not for the solvency of the

debtor, unless it has been so expressly stipulated or unless the insolvency was prior to the sale
and of common knowledge.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008

The seller, in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the Deed of
Absolute Sale, is giving an implied warranty of title which prescribes six months after the
delivery of the vehicle.
PNB vs MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 173454,
October 6, 2008
MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. PNB, G.R. NO. 173456,
October 6, 2008
In a contract of sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is an implied warranty on the part
of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when the ownership is to pass, and that
the buyer shall have a peaceful possession of the thing and it shall be free from any hidden faults
or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
The seller, in pledging that he will defend the same from all claims or any claim whatsoever
[and] will save the vendee from any suit by the government of the Republic of the Philippines,
is giving a warranty against eviction. A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of these
four requisites:(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; (2)
This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale
made by the vendor; and (4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit
for eviction at the instance of the vendee.
DE YSASI vs. ARCEO, G.R. NO. 136586, November 22, 2001
Petitioner admitted that he inspected the premises three or four times before signing the lease
contract and during his inspection, he noticed the rotten plywood on the ceiling which in his
opinion was caused by leaking water or "anay" (termites), yet he decided to go through with the
lease agreement. The lessor is responsible for warranty against hidden defects, but he is not
answerable for patent defects or those which are visible.
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
52267, January 24, 1996
The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written contract - and not a
suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects. The remedy against violations of the warranty
against hidden defects is either to withdraw from the contract (redhibitory action) or to demand a
proportionate reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with damages in either case.
DINO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 113564, June 20, 2001 23
Respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on September 28, 1988
and the action to recover the purchase price of the goods petitioners returned to the respondent
was filed on July 24, 1989, more than nine months from the date of last delivery. Actions arising

from breach of warranty against hidden defects shall be barred after six months from the delivery
of the thing sold.

LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA, G.R. NO. 137552, June 16, 2000

A MOA has this stipulation "....SELLER-LESSOR hereby agrees to sell unto BUYER-LESSEE
the property described within six (6) months from the execution date hereof, or upon issuance by
the Court of a new owner's certificate of title and the execution of extrajudicial partition with sale
of the estate of Francisco Laforteza, whichever is earlier;...". Petitioner contends that since the
condition was not met, they no longer had an obligation to proceed with the sale of the house and
lot. The petitioners fail to distinguish between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the
contract and a condition imposed on the performance of an obligation, failure to comply with the
first condition results in the failure of a contract, while the failure to comply with the second
condition only gives the other party the option either to refuse to proceed with the sale or to
waive the condition.
INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 115117, June
8, 2000
There is no dispute that the agreement provides for the delivery of printing paper on different
dates and a separate price has been agreed upon for each delivery. When there is a contract of
sale of goods to be delivered by stated installments, which are to be separately paid for, and the
seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or more installments, it depends in each case
on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is
so material as to justify the injured party in refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for
breach of the entire contract, or whether the breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for
compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as broken.
VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 83851. March 3, 1993.
The petitioner agreed to deliver the scrap iron only upon payment of the purchase price by means
of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit, which the respondent failed to obtain, thus,
there was no actual sale. Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer
has repudiated the contract of sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his obligations,
thereunder, or has committed a breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract of sale
by giving notice of his election to do to the buyer.
DIAMANTE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-51824 February 7, 1992
A right to repurchase was granted subsequently in an instrument different from the original
document of sale which caused the cancellation of the permit or lease by the Secretary of
Fisheries. An agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when made after the sale,
because when the sale is made without such an agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing sold
absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract
entered into by the purchaser, as absolute owner already of the object.
VASQUEZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83759 July 12, 1991

Respondents sold the lot to the petitioners under a Deed of Sale, On the same day and along with
the execution of the Deed of Sale, a separate instrument, denominated as Right to Repurchase
was executed by the parties, Later, petitioners resisted the action for redemption. The transaction

between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with right to repurchase, the
second instrument is just an option to buy since it is not embodied in the same document of sale
but in a separate document, and since such option is not supported by a consideration distinct
from the price, said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them.
BAUTISTA vs UNANGST, G.R. NO. 173002, July 4, 2008
Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in possession, as a lessee or
otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage because in a contract of
sale with pacto de retro, the legal title to the property is immediately transferred to the vendee,
subject to the vendors right to redeem and retention by the vendor of the possession of the
property is inconsistent with the vendees acquisition of the right of ownership under a true sale.
ABILLA vs. ANG GOBONSENG, JR., G.R. NO. 146651, January 17, 2002
The legal question to be resolved is "May the vendors in a sale judicially declared as a pacto de
retro exercise the right of repurchase under Article 1606, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, after
they have taken the position that the same was an equitable mortgage?" No, where the proofs
established that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties intention, that the transaction
was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro, the vendor a retro is not entitled to the
benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606.
AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA, G.R. NO. 155018, December 11, 2003
The lower court's dispositive position states: "However, the vendors can still exercise the right to
repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision pursuant to Article
1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code." Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty (30) days
from the time final judgment was rendered, not from the defendants receipt of the judgment,
"final judgment must be construed to mean one that has become final and executory.
Spouses CRUZ vs. LEIS et al., G.R. NO. 125233, March 9, 2000 26
The lower court rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607
of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a
retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property. A judicial order is necessary in order to
determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good
faith while the determination is being made, however, notwithstanding Article 1607, the
recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a
condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is
merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. SPS. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 141974, August 9, 2004
The respondents offer to redeem the foreclosed properties and the subsequent consignation in
court were made within the period of redemption, but the amount consigned did not include the
interest and was also way below the amount paid by the highest bidder-purchaser of the
properties during the auction sale. The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal

tender or else validly consigned in court because only by such means can the auction winner be
assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.

LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

104114 December 4, 1995
Petitioner questions the ruling of the Court of Appeals which concluded that a prior tender or
offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of the action for legal
redemption. To avail of the right of redemption what is essential is to make an offer to redeem
within the prescribed period. There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be
properly effected. It can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by filing a
complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed
period.
VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, G.R. NO. L-33158, October 17,
1985
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed redemption because it
considered the vendee, Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion Villanueva. The term
"third person" or "stranger in Art. 1620 refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession,
either by will or the law or any one who is not a co-owner.

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 150060. August 19,
2003
Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants to an adjoining
owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the buyer or grantee
does not own any other rural land.
G.R. NO. 134117. February 9, 2000
SEN PO EK MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MARTINEZ
Petitioner invokes its right of first refusal against private respondents, when Teodora sold the
property that petitioner has been leasing. Article 1622 of the New Civil Code only deals with
small urban lands that are bought for speculation where only adjoining lot owners can exercise
the right of pre-emption or redemption. It does not apply to a lessee trying to buy the land that it
was leasing, especially when such right was never stipulated in any of the several lease contracts.
CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 162421, August 31, 2007
Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses, but they must do so
within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In requiring
written notice, Art. 1623 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of (a) the sale
and (b) the date of such notice, as the date thereof becomes the reckoning point of the 30-day
period of redemption.
SPOUSES SI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122047, October 12, 2000
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a
formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them

to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the coowners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a

fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.
FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. NO. 137677, May 31, 2000
Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from
the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. Since the vendor of an undivided
interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified
of the sale, and is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of
selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the vendee has been given.
LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 149040, July 4,
2007
An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a
credit (known as the assignor), by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or
donation - and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights
to another (known as the assignee), who acquires the power to enforce it, to the same extent as
the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor.
TEOCO, JR.,vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G.R. NO. 162333,
December 23, 2008
Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the properties in question be
precluded by the fact that the assignment of right of redemption was not contained in a public
document? NO, the phrase "effect as against third person" in Article 1625 of the Civil Code is
interpreted as to be damage or prejudice to such third person, hence if the third person would not
be prejudiced then the assignment of right to redeem may not be in a public instrument.
HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE
SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, vs. MARIO A. BATONGBACAL, IRENEO
BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND
LOURDES BA TONGBACAL
G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality, or form or words,
or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to
charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that the
parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an
existing debt by way of mortgage.
CEBALLOS vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO MERCADO, G.R. NO. 155856,
May 28, 2004 30

Petitioner argues that Mercados delay in registering the Deed of Absolute Sale and transferring
the land title shows that the real agreement was an equitable mortgage. Delay in transferring title
is not one of the instances enumerated by law in which an equitable mortgage can be presumed.
DEHEZA-INAMARGA vs ALANO, G.R. NO. 171321, December 18, 2008
The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale,
and in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed
as an equitable mortgage in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of
property rights.
EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 109404, January 22, 1996
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?
P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof
had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further payment
to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
PNB vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 104528, January 18, 1996
A buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale cannot disposses prior purchasers on installment of
individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought
from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer on the theory that P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage
contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957.
Moreover, the SC held that, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner
Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private
respondents. Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly
grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the
mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding
portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for.
HULST vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008
Petitioner contends that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent involved a
condominium unit and did not violate the Constitutional proscription against ownership of land
by aliens. The law expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in
condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital stock of
a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation, since under this set up, the ownership of the land is
legally separated from the unit itself.
CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ASSET RECOVERY AND
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 149696, July 14, 2006

Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, provides:

Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered
declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is
made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs
(including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of
restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the condominium assessed when the management
body causes a notice of assessment to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where such condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such
assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions,
a description of the condominium unit against which the same has been assessed, and the name
of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized representative of
the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions. Upon payment
of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to
be registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of said
notice of assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration of restrictions
may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Such liens may
be enforced in the same manner provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure
of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the
management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall
have the right of redemption as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such assessment could be considered a lien upon
Marual's two condominium units. Clearly, pursuant to the above provisions, petitioner's claim
can not be considered superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of sale
wherein Marual conveyed to respondent his two condominium units, was registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Manila.
CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES MORENO, G.R.
NO. 186271, February 23, 2011
The petition sought to prohibit the scheduled extrajudicial sale for lack of a special power to sell
from the registered owner. Under RA 4726 (the Condominium Act), when a unit owner fails to
pay the association dues, the condominium corporation can enforce a lien on the condominium
unit by selling the unit in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and a special authority from the
condominium owner before a condominium corporation can initiate a foreclosure proceeding is
not needed.
Pagurayan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 154577, July 23, 2008

A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the
owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another who undertakes to pay the rent.
Being a consensual contract, it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the
thing and the cause and consideration which are to constitute the contract. Without the agreement

of both parties, no contract of lease can be said to have been created or established. Nobody can
force an owner to lease out his property if he is not willing.
CA-AG.R.O-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO.
90027, March 3, 1993
We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is
not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It cannot be
characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute
possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters the
petitioner and the Pugaos.
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R.
136448, November 3, 1999

NO.

A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow money to pursue a
business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise therefrom, even if it is shown that they
have not contributed any capital of their own to a "common fund." Their contribution may be in
the form of credit or industry, not necessarily cash or fixed assets.
ROSARIO U. YULO vs. YANG CHIAO SENG, G.R. NO. L-12541, August 28, 1959
The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund; (2) intention on the part of the
partners to divide the profits among themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.).
HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs .COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET LUMBER
COMPANY, G.R. NO. 126881; October 3, 2000
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not
partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such coowners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons
sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property which the returns are
derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he is
a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in
payment:
(a) As a debt by installment or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;

(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.
ALFREDO N. AGUILA, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE
ABROGAR, G.R. NO. 127347, November 25, 1999
Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot be held liable for the obligations of the
partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being
used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes, hence it is the partnership, not its officers or
agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in its name,
violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint.
Villareal vs. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 144214. July 14, 2003
Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the shares of the
partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other words, it
can only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before the
partners can be paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After
all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes available for
the payment of the partners shares.
Angeles vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. NO. 142612, July 29, 2005
The Angeles spouses position that there is no partnership because of the lack of a public
instrument indicating the same and a lack of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) holds no water for the following reasons: first, the Angeles spouses
contributed money to the partnership and not immovable property; and second, mere failure to
register the contract of partnership with the SEC does not invalidate a contract that has the
essential requisites of a partnership. The purpose of registration of the contract of partnership is
to give notice to third parties. Failure to register the contract of partnership does not affect the
liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons. Neither does such failure to
register affect the partnerships juridical personality. A partnership may exist even if the partners
do not use the words partner or partnership.
Ortega vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109248, July 3, 1995
The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the very foundation and
essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is, in turn, dependent on the constancy of that
mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for
dissolution provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his sole pleasure,
dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not that the
attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a

liability for damages. Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus
personae allows them to have the power, although not necessarily the right, to dissolve the

partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject him to a possible action for
damages.
Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. NO. 114398, October 24, 1997
Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa and advances the theory that the intention of the
parties was to enter into a contract of partnership, wherein Rosales (private complainant for
Estafa) would contribute the funds while she would buy and sell the cigarettes, and later divide
the profits between them But even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered
into by and between the parties, SC ruled that when money or property have been received by a
partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later
misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa.
Moran, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-59956, October 31, 1984
The rule is, when a partner who has undertaken to contribute a sum of money fails to do so, he
becomes a debtor of the partnership for whatever he may have promised to contribute (Art. 1786,
Civil Code) and for interests and damages from the time he should have complied with his
obligation (Art. 1788, Civil Code). Thus in Uy v. Puzon (79 SCRA 598), which interpreted Art.
2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, we allowed a total of P200,000.00 compensatory
damages in favor of the appellee because the appellant therein was remiss in his obligations as a
partner and as prime contractor of the construction projects in question.
Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. NO. L-55397 February 29, 1988
Petitioner being a partnership may sue and be sued in its name or by its duly authorized
representative. Thus, Chua as the managing partner of the partnership may execute all acts of
administration including the right to sue debtors of the partnership in case of their failure to pay
their obligations when it became due and demandable.
Catalan vs. Gatchalian, G.R. NO. L-11648, April 22, 1959
Catalan and Gatchalian as partners mortgaged two lots together with the improvements thereon
to secure a credit. Catalan redeemed the property and he contends that title should be cancelled
and a new one must be issued in his name. Under Article 1807 of the NCC every partner
becomes a trustee for his co-partner with regard to any benefits or profits derived from his act as
a partner. Consequently, when Catalan redeemed the properties in question, he became a trustee
and held the same in trust for his co partner Gatchalian, subject to his right to demand from the
latter his contribution to the amount of redemption.
Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, G.R. NO. L-31684 June 28, 1973

Respondent industrial partner has the right to demand for a formal accounting and to receive her
share in the net profit that may result from such an accounting.

ISLAND SALES, INC. vs. UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-22493, July 31, 1975
Defendant company, a general partnership purchased from the plaintiff a motor vehicle on an
installment basis with the condition that failure to pay any of said installments as they fall due
would render the whole unpaid balance immediately due and demandable. Having failed to
receive the installment, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the unpaid balance with
Benjamin C. Daco, Daniel A. Guizona, Noel C. Sim, Romulo B. Lumauig, and Augusto Palisoc
were included as co-defendants in their capacity as general partners of the defendant company.
In this case, there were five (5) general partners when the promissory note in question was
executed for and in behalf of the partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the
liability of the appellant Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth of the obligations of
the defendant company. The fact that the complaint against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig
was dismissed, upon motion of the plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general
partner in the defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff merely
condoned Lumauig's individual liability to the plaintiff.
ELMO MUASQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-39780, November 11, 1985
There is a general presumption that each individual partner is an authorized agent for the firm
and that he has authority to bind the firm in carrying on the partnership transactions. The
presumption is sufficient to permit third persons to hold the firm liable on transactions entered
into by one of members of the firm acting apparently in its behalf and within the scope of his
authority.
ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY, ET AL. vs. WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, ET AL, G.R. NO. L11840, December 10, 1963
Where the partnership business is to deal in merchandise and goods, i.e., movable property, the
sale of its real property (immovables) is not within the ordinary powers of a partner, because it is
not in line with the normal business of the firm. But where the express and avowed purpose of
the partnership is to buy and sell real estate (as in the present case), the immovables thus
acquired by the firm from part of its stock-in-trade, and the sale thereof is in pursuance of
partnership purposes, hence within the ordinary powers of the partner.
J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP. vs. Ang, G.R. NO. 174149, September 8, 2010
Petitioner cannot avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way privy to the Contracts to
Sell executed by PPGI and respondents. As correctly argued by the respondent, a joint venture is
considered in this jurisdiction as a form of partnership and is, accordingly, governed by the law
of partnerships and under Article 1824 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all partners are
solidarily liable with the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership, including loss
or injury caused to a third person or penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of

any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority
of his co-partners.

PRIMELINK PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LAZATINMAGAT, et.al, G.R. NO. 167379, June 27, 2006
On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed. Winding up means the administration of the assets of the
partnership for the purpose of terminating the business and discharging the obligations of the
partnership.
MARJORIE TOCAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127405, October 4, 2000
An unjustified dissolution by a partner can subject him to action for damages because by the
mutual agency that arises in a partnership, the doctrine of delectus personae allows the partners
to have the power, although not necessarily the right to dissolve the partnership.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. WILLIAM J. SUTER, G.R. NO.
25532, February 28, 1969

L-

A limited partnership, named "William J. Suter 'Morcoin' Co., Ltd.," was formed on 30
September 1947 by herein respondent William J. Suter as the general partner, and Julia Spirig
and Gustav Carlson, as the limited partners. The thesis that the limited partnership, William J.
Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd., has been dissolved by operation of law because of the marriage of the
only general partner, William J. Suter to the originally limited partner, Julia Spirig one year after
the partnership was organized is not tenable. The subsequent marriage of the partners does not
operate to dissolve it, such marriage not being one of the causes provided for that purpose either
by the Spanish Civil Code or the Code of Commerce. The appellant's view, that by the marriage
of both partners the company became a single proprietorship, is equally erroneous. The capital
contributions of partners William J. Suter and Julia Spirig were separately owned and
contributed by them before their marriage; and after they were joined in wedlock, such
contributions remained their respective separate property under the Spanish Civil Code.
Country Bankers Insurance Corp.. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R. NO.
166044
In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent another, the principal,
with the latters consent or authority. Thus, agency is based on representation, where the agent
acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of the authority conferred upon
him. Such acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally done by the principal. By
this legal fiction of representation, the actual or legal absence of the principal is converted into
his legal or juridical presence.
SALLY YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA, INC., G.R. No. 174978.
July 31, 2013

As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be written when the law
requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of

agency must be written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein.
Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states that
special powers of attorney are necessary to convey real rights over immovable properties.
Further the special power of attorney mandated by law must be one that expressly mentions a
sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the authorized act. Such power must be
must express in clear and unmistakable language. In the present case, the pieces of documentary
evidence by Sally did not convince the Court as to the existence of agency. Necessarily, the
absence of a contract of agency renders the contract of sale unenforceable. Joy Training
effectively did not enter into a valid contract of sale with the spouses Yoshizaki.
Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006
It bears stressing that in an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is
extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the
principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship
can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled
by law or by any court.
Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. Cuizon, G.R. NO. 167552, April 23, 2007
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another with the latters consent. The underlying principle of the
contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others to do a great variety
of things like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the
personality of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives
the authority to act. It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for
and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the
same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. By this legal fiction, the
actual or real absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence qui facit
per alium facit per se. The elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied,
of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent
acts within the scope of his authority.
Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006
An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal, from his silence or lack of
action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf
without authority. Acceptance by the agent may be expressed, or implied from his acts which
carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances. Agency may
be oral unless the law requires a specific form. However, to create or convey real rights over
immovable property, a special power of attorney is necessary. Thus, when a sale of a piece of

land or any portion thereof is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing,
otherwise, the sale shall be void.
Naguiat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 118375, October 3, 2003

The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an agency by estoppels citing Article 1873 of
the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a consequence of the
interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was
the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaos impression. In that situation,
the rule is clear. One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out
to the public as such, cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent,
to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the honest
belief that he is what he appears to be. The Court of Appeals is correct in invoking the said rule
on agency by estoppel.
Siasat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. NO. L-67889, October 10, 1985
A general agent is one authorized to do all acts pertaining to a business of a certain kind or at a
particular place, or all acts pertaining to a business of a particular class or series. He has usually
authority either expressly conferred in general terms or in effect made general by the usages,
customs or nature of the business which he is authorized to transact. An agent, therefore, who is
empowered to transact all the business of his principal of a particular kind or in a particular place,
would, for this reason, be ordinarily deemed a general agent. A special agent is one authorized to
do some particular act or to act upon some particular occasion, acts usually in accordance with
specific instructions or under limitations necessarily implied from the nature of the act to be done
Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 102737, August 21, 1996
There was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since the general power of
attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject
property. The special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it is specified
therein the act or transaction for which the special power is required. Whether the instrument be
denominated as general power of attorney or special power of attorney, what matters is the
extent of the power or powers contemplated upon the agent or attorney in fact. If the power is
couched in general terms, then such power cannot go beyond acts of administration. However,
where the power to sell is specific, it not being merely implied, much less couched in general
terms, there cannot be any doubt that the attorney in fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument
may be captioned as special power of attorney but if the powers granted are couched in general
terms without mentioning any specific power to sell or mortgage or to do other specific acts of
strict dominion, then in that case only acts of administration may be deemed conferred
Orbeta vs. Sendiong, G.R. NO. 155236, July 8, 2005
A special power of attorney simply refers to a clear mandate specifically authorizing the
performance of a specific power and of express acts subsumed therein, and there is a specific
authority given to Mae Sendiong to sign her name in behalf of Paul Sendiong in contracts and
agreements and to institute suits in behalf of her father. Neither would the fact that the document

is captioned General Power of Attorney militate against its construction as granting specific
powers to the agent pertaining to the petition for annulment of judgment she instituted in behalf

of her father. As Justice Paras has noted, a general power of attorney may include a special
power if such special power is mentioned or referred to in the general power.
Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R. NO.
166044
Our law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority. The scope of an agents
authority is what appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted upon him. Under
Article 1878(11) of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to obligate the
principal as a guarantor or surety.
Mercado vs. Allied Banking Corpporation, G.R. NO. 171460, July 24, 2007
Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The
instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may
neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. Where powers and duties are specified
and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties are limited and are confined to those
which are specified and defined, and all other powers and duties are excluded. This is but in
accord with the disinclination of courts to enlarge the authority G.R.anted beyond the powers
expressly given and those which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as being usual and
reasonably necessary and proper for the performance of such express powers.
Angeles vs. Philippines National Railways, G.R. NO. 150128, August 31, 2006
A power of attorney is only but an instrument in writing by which a person, as principal,
appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts
on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney, and this is
clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a letter of attorney. Its primary purpose
is not to define the authority of the agent as between himself and his principal but to evidence the
authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals. Except as may be required by
statute, a power of attorney is valid although no notary public intervened in its execution.
SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. EFREN P.
ROQUE, G.R. NO. 148775, January 13, 2004
Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is necessary to lease
any real property to another person for more than one year. The lease of real property for more
than one year is considered not merely an act of administration but an act of strict dominion or of
ownership. A special power of attorney is thus necessary for its execution through an agent.
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF , G.R. NO. 117356, June 19, 2000
One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; one
person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or direction of another - the principal. Indeed,

the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal. The control factor, more
than any other, has caused the courts to put contracts between principal and agent in a separate
category.

Republic vs. Evangelista, G.R. NO. 156015, August 11, 2005

A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation based on
trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the agent to act
depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the agent ceases
when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be
revoked by the principal at will. However, an exception to the revocability of a contract of
agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency.
The reason for its irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or
agreement. It is not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons
which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked at
the sole will of the principal.
Lim vs. Saban, G.R. NO. 163720, December 16, 2004
Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract
depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner
is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency is deemed as one coupled with an
interest where it is established for the mutual benefit of the principal and of the agent, or for the
interest of the principal and of third persons, and it cannot be revoked by the principal so long as
the interest of the agent or of a third person subsists. In an agency coupled with an interest, the
agents interest must be in the subject matter of the power conferred and not merely an interest in
the exercise of the power because it entitles him to compensation. When an agents interest is
confined to earning his agreed compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest,
since an agents interest in obtaining his compensation as such agent is an ordinary incident of
the agency relationship.
RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS vs. FELIX
GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-24332, January 31, 1978
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is
extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Although a revocation of a
power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, yet a
revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously
effective inasmuch as "by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an
execution of the principal's continuing will. With death, the principal's will ceases or is the
authority is extinguished.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
BONEVIE vs CA, G.R. NO. L-49101 October 24, 1983

Petitioner assails the validity of the mortgage between Lozano and PBCOM arguing that on the
day the deed was executed there was yet no principal obligation to secure as the loan of

P75,000.00 was not received by the Lozano spouses, so that in the absence of a principal
obligation, there is want of consideration in the accessory contract, which consequently impairs
its validity and fatally affects its very existence. A contract of loan being a consensual contract,
said contract of loan was perfected at the same time the contract of mortgage was executed, and
the promissory note is only an evidence of indebtedness and does not indicate lack of
consideration of the mortgage at the time of its execution.
SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968, April 27, 1972
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was a perfected contract
between the parties when the application of Saura, Inc. for a loan was approved by resolution of
the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage was executed and registered and that the
defendant was guilty of breach thereof.
An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding
upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perferted until the
delivery of the object of the contract.
FRANCISCO HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO.
December 29, 1986

L-48349,

Pursuant to a contract, the defendant-appellee paid to the plaintfff-appellant advance rentals for
the first eight years, subtracting therefrom the amount of the interest or discount for the first
eight years, Plaintiff-appellant insists that the lower court erred in the computation of the interest
collected out of the rentals paid for the first eight years; that such interest was excessive and
violative of the Usury Law.
The contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan since the provision for the
payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a repayment of a loan because there was no
grant or forbearance of money as to constitute an indebtedness on the part of the lessor, hence
usury law will not apply.
PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75223, March 14, 1990
An escalation clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that (1) the increased
rate imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling fixed by law or the Monetary Board; (2) the
increase is made effective not earlier than the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing
such an increase; and (3) the remaining maturities of the loans are more than 730 days as of the
effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an increase.
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO vs BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R.
175490, September 17, 2009

NO.

In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty charges at the rate
of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum which was declared as unconscionable by the lower
courts for being clearly excessive, and was thus reduced to 2% per month or 24% per annum but
which the CA modified increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum based on the Terms

and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, which governs the
transaction between petitioner Macalinao and respondent BPI.
The courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, for stipulations demanding
interest excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant interest rates are void for being
contrary to morals, if not against the law.
ECE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. HAYDYN HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 212689, August 11, 2014
Since July 1, 2013, the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality of the judgment
until satisfaction has been brought back to six percent (6%). Section 1 of Resolution No. 796 of
the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas dated May 16, 2013 provides: "The rate
of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent
(6%) per annum." Thus, the rate of interest to be imposed from finality of judgments is now back
at six percent (6%), the rate provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC CHURCH vs. CA, G.R. L-80294-95, September 21,
1988
When respondents allowed the free use of the property they became bailors in commodatum and
the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the
bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the
property subject matter of commodatum. Hence, an adverse claim could not ripen into title by
way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BAGTAS, G.R. NO. L-17474, October 25, 1962
The appellant had been in possession of the bull even after the expiration of the contract. He
contends, however, that since the contract was commodatum the appellee retained ownership or
title to the bull. Hence, it should suffer its loss due to force majeure.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a
compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil
Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she
had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be
commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a
bailee in a contract of commodatum
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation
exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event; xxx
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-46145 November 26, 1986

The disputed property is private land and this possession was interrupted only by the occupation
of the land by the U.S. Navy which eventually abandoned the premises. The heirs of the late

Baloy, are now in actual possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by the U.S.
Navy. The occupancy of the U.S. Navy partakes of the character of a commodatum, and one's
ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's possession if such
possession be under claim of ownership, not where the possession is only intended to be transient,
in which case the owner is not divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in the
meantime.
HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-48349 December 29, 1986
The difference between a discount and a loan or forbearance is that the former does not have to
be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to repayment and is therefore governed by the laws
on usury.
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the
principal debt, which is the cause of the contract is not illegal. The illegality lies only as to the
prestation to pay the stipulated interest. Hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed
void, since it is the only one that is illegal.
INTEGRATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.
NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OBM contends that it had agreed to pay interest only up to the dates of maturity of the
certificates of time deposit and that respondent Santos is not entitled to interest after the maturity
dates had expired, unless the contracts are renewed. When respondent invested his money in time
deposits with OBM they entered into a contract of simple loan or mutuum, not a contract of
deposit.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66826 August 19, 1988
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the
bank for safekeeping. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same, but if the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit
but some other contract.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. 104612, May 10, 1994
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans because they earn
interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a bank is one of creditor and debtor, and
the deposit under the questioned account was an ordinary bank deposit; hence, it was payable on
demand of the depositor.

SERRANO vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-30511, February
14, 1980

All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to
be covered by the law on loans because it can use the same. Failure of he respondent Bank to
honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising
from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. 130886. January
29, 2004
Petitioners liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability under the law.
There is no question that as a surety, petitioner should not be made to pay more than its assumed
obligation under the surety bonds. However, it is clear from the above-cited jurisprudence that
petitioners liability for the payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship agreement itself
but because of the delay in the payment of its obligation under the said agreement.
THE MANILA INSURANCE CO INC vs SPOUSES AMURAO, G.R. NO.
January 16, 2013

179628,

Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA in treating petitioner as a solidary debtor instead of
a solidary guarantor and argues that while a surety is bound solidarily with the obligor, this does
not make the surety a solidary co-debtor. A suretys liability is joint and several and although the
contract of suretyship is secondary to the principal contract, the suretys liability to the obligee is
nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute.
THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28030, January
18, 1982
Imperial Insurance, Inc. bound itself solidarily with the principal, the deceased defendant Reyes.
In accordance with Article 2059, par. 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, excussion (previous
exhaustion of the property of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the guarantor) has bound
himself solidarily with the debtor," hence the petitioner cannot escape liability on its counterbonds.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. vs. ALMEDA, G.R. NO. L-27249 July 31,
1970
There is no question that under the bonds posted in favor of the NAMARCO in this case, the
surety company assumed to make immediate payment to said firm of any due and unsettled
accounts of the debtor-principal, even without demand and notice of the debtor's non-payment,
the surety, in fact, agreeing that its liability to the creditor shall be direct, without benefit of
exhaustion of the debtor's properties, and to remain valid and continuous until the guaranteed
obligation is fully satisfied. In short, appellant secured to the creditor not just the payment by the
debtor-principal of his accounts, but the payment itself of such accounts. Clearly, a contract of
suretyship was thus created, the appellant becoming the insurer, not merely of the debtor's

solvency or ability to pay, but of the debt itself. Under the Civil Code, with the debtor's
insolvency having been judicially recognized, herein appellant's resort to the courts to be
released from the undertaking thus assumed would have been appropriate.

RCBC vs. ARRO, G.R. NO. L-49401, July 30, 1982

The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique and private respondent, is an
accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal one which, in this case is the loan
obtained by Daicor as evidenced by a promissory note. By the terms, it can be clearly seen that
the surety agreement was executed to guarantee future debts which Daicor may incur with
petitioner since a guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is
not yet known; there can be no claim against the guarantor until the debt is liquidated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAL-FOX LUMBER CO., INC., G.R. NO. L26473, February 29, 1972
On whether the surety's liability can exceed the amount of its bond, it is enough to remark that
while the guarantee was for the original amount of the debt of Gabino Marquez, the amount of
the judgment by the trial court in no way violates the rights of the surety. If it (the guaranty) be
simple or indefinite, it shall comprise not only the principal obligation but also all its accessories,
including judicial costs, provided with respect to the latter, that the guarantor shall only be liable
for those costs incurred after he has been judicially required to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710 October 3, 1985
The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, no consideration was
then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any
release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for lack of consideration. It is
not necessary that any consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the contract of
real mortgage, it may either be a prior or subsequent matter, but when the consideration is
subsequent to the mortgage, the mortgage can take effect only when the debt secured by it is
created as a binding contract to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985
Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sum named
in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due.
INTEG.R.ATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.
NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-60907 June 28, 1989
The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of assignment, has satisfied the
requirements of a contract of pledge (1) that it be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation; (2) that the pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged; (3) that the
persons constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence
thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. The further requirement that the thing

pledged be placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person by common agreement
was complied with by the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of PNB.

YULIONGSIU vs. PNB, G.R. NO. L-19227, February 17, 1968 67

The defendant bank as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual possession of the vessels, and
while it is true that plaintiff continued operating the vessels after the pledge contract was entered
into, his possession was expressly made "subject to the order of the pledgee." On the other hand,
there is an authority supporting the proposition that the pledgee can temporarily entrust the
physical possession of the chattels pledged to the pledgor without invalidating the pledge. In
such a case, the pledgor is regarded as holding the pledged property merely as trustee for the
pledgee.
MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION vs. WEAREVER TEXTILE
MILLS, INC., G.R. NO. L-58469, May 16, 1983
A house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a
chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third
party will be prejudiced thereby. There is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is
movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying
the existence of the chattel mortgage.
BUNDALIAN vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-55739, June 22, 1984
The contract also provides that "it is agreed that the vendor shall have the right to possess, use,
and build on, the property during the period of redemption." When the vendee acknowledged the
right of the vendor to retain possession of the property the contract is one of loan guaranteed by
mortgage, not a conditional sale or an option to repurchase.
TIOSECO vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66597, August 29, 1986
When the respondents chose to enforce their right of redemption thru a court action they were
well within their right as the action was filed within one year from the registration of the
foreclosure sale of the real estate. The law does not even require any previous notice to the
vendee, nor a meeting between him and the redemptioner, much less a previous formal tender
before any action is begun in court to enforce the right of redemption.
PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-60208, December 5, 1985
When the foreclosure proceedings are completed and the mortgaged property is sold to the
purchaser then all interest of the mortgagor are cut off from the property Prior to the completion
of the foreclosure, the mortgagor is liable for the interests on the mortgage. However, after the
foreclosure proceedings and the execution of the corresponding certificate of sale of the property
sold at public auction in favor of the successful bidder, the redemptioner mortgagor would be
bound to pay only for the amount of the purchase price with interests thereon at the rate of one

per centum per month in addition up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase and interest
on such last named amount at the same rate.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985

Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sum named
in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due.
RAMIREZ vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-38185, September 24, 1986
The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by
the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in
possession of the land by its owners, thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring
dominion.
OCAMPO vs. DOMALANTA, G.R. NO. L-21011, August 30, 1967
A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It is based on a
personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific property of a person named party
defendant. And, its purpose is to have the property seized and sold by court order to the end that
the proceeds thereof be applied to the payment of plaintiff's claim.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided among the successors
in interest of the debtor or creditor. Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt
can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is
not completely satisfied, neither can the creditor's heir who have received his share of the debt
return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid.
PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014
The Pledge Agreement secures, for the benefit of PMO, the performance by PIC of its
obligations under both the ARDA and the Pledge Agreement itself. It is with the execution of the
Pledge Agreement that PIC turned over possession of its certificates of shares of stock in PPC to
PMO. As the RTC pertinently observed in its Order dated June 19, 2003, there had already been
a shift in the relations of PMO and PIC, from mere seller and buyer, to creditor-pledgee and
debtor-pledgor. Having enjoyed the security and benefits of the Pledge Agreement, PMO cannot
now insist on applying Section 8.02 of the ARDA and conveniently and arbitrarily exclude
and/or ignore the Pledge Agreement so as to evade the prohibition against pactum
commissorium.

More importantly, the Court, in determining the existence of pactum commissorium, had focused
more on the evident intention of the parties, rather than the formal or written form. In A.
Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, therein petitioner similarly

denied the existence of pactum commissorium because the proscribed stipulation was found in
the promissory note and not in the mortgage deed.

680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014
The remedy provided under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to the debtor becomes available only after
the purchaser acquires actual possession of the property. This is required because until then the
debtor, as the owner of the property, does not lose his right to possess. However, upon the lapse
of the redemption period without the debtor exercising his right of redemption and the purchaser
consolidates his title, it becomes unnecessary to require the purchaser to assume actual
possession thereof before the debtor may contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute
right of the purchaser, as this is merely an incident of his ownership. The debtor contesting the
purchasers possession may no longer avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but
should pursue a separate action e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of
mortgage and/or annulment of foreclosure.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Ylarde vs. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697
Teacher Edgardo Aquino, after bringing his pupils to an excavation site dug by them, left them
all by themselves, and one of the pupils fell into the pit. A teacher acted with fault and gross
negligence because a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that
the children are protected from all harm in his company.
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 100727,
March 18, 1992
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association, a group of drivers, took over all jeepneys of a
transportation company, Lungsod Corporation, as well as the operation of the service in the
companys route without authority from the Public Service Commission. The act was in violation
of Article 21 of the Civil Code [Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages] because the constitutional right of the drivers to redress their grievances with the
company should not undermine public peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of
other persons.
F.F. Cruz and Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731
A fire that broke out in the furniture shop of the petitioner spread to an adjacent house because of
the shop owners failure to construct a firewall as required by a city ordinance. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which is applied by the Court in this case, may be stated as follows: Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the

defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable

evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353
The driver of a dump truck parked it improperly at night near his residence and it was bumped by
the driver of a car, who suffered damages. The proximate cause of the accident was the improper
parking of the dump truck.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
A fire broke out at a gasoline station while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted, as a result of which several houses were burned. Under the principle of res ipsa loquitor,
the employees negligence was the proximate cause of the fire which in the ordinary course of
things does not happen.
Gabeto vs. Araneta, 42 Phil. 232
Araneta stopped a calesa with passengers aboard on the street and seized the rein of the horses
bridle, by reason of which the driver brought the carromata to the adjacent curb and alighted to
fix the bridle, and while the driver was engaged at the horses head, the horse moved forward
bringing down a police telephone box, and because of the noise caused thereby, the horse was
frightened and it ran away and one of the passengers jumped and was killed. Araneta's act in
stopping the horse was held as not the proximate cause of the accident because the bridle was old,
and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
Gregorio vs. Go, 102 Phil. 556
Go ordered his cargador, who had only a students permit to drive his truck, but a policeman
who boarded the truck took the wheel, and while driving the truck, it hit and ran over a
pedestrian. There was no direct and proximate casual connection between the defendants
negligence and the death because the proximate immediate and direct cause of the death was the
negligence of the policeman.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353
Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the
injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio
may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353

Petitioners sought the application of the doctrine of "last clear chance". The Supreme Court said
that the common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff

who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common
law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours?
We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or proximate cause of the
injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.
The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that
increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck
driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping
out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of
his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens
of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695
Respondent entrusted companys cash for deposit to his secretary who defrauded the company
by depositing the money, not to the companys account, but to her husband who maintained
similar account with the bank, made possible because the duplicate slip was not compulsory
required by the bank in accepting the deposits. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, an
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, could have avoided, the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that the respondent company was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee,
thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure.

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384

The driver of a Pantranco bus encroached into the lane of an incoming jeepney and failed to
return the bus immediately to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite
direction, resulting to the death of eight passengers of the jeep. The doctrine of last clear chance
does not take into operation here because it applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762
The passenger ship of William Lines, Inc. caught fire and sank while in the custody of Cebu
Shipyard and Engineering Works to which it was brought for annual repair. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor applies here because the fire that occurred and consumed MV Manila City would
not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been
exercised by Cebu Shipyard.
Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. [RCPI] vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657
Defamatory words were inserted in the telegram sent by respondent Timan, which were not
noticed and were included by the RCPI in the teleG.R.am when delivered. Since negligence may
be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the
thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483
Custodio filed a case for damages because his tenants cancelled their contract of lease due to
adobe fences constructed by adjoining lot owners which restricted passage from and to his
apartment. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom as a wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan Chuan Leong, 42 SCRA 352
Although B&I Trading had knowledge of the simulated sale between Tan Chuan Leong and his
son and had entered into the contract of mortgage pursuant to a design to defraud Leongs
creditors, no damage or prejudice appears to have been suffered by the petitioner thereby. Absent
damage or prejudice, no right of action arises in favor of the petitioner because wrongful
violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action unless it has resulted in
an injury causing loss or damages.
Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 328

House of Mayfair, a foreign manufacturer of wall covering products, with which Yu has had an
exclusive distributorship aageement was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the

FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in
the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other
contracting party to relief therefrom.
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83122, October 19, 1990
Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the P4.4
Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors he obtained for Philippine American General
Insurance (Philamgen) because the Philamgen terminated their agency agreement after
Valenzuela refused to share his commission with the company. Philamgen was found to have
acted with bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency under the principle that
every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and
every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 83
The driver was in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when its vehicle got
involved in an accident that killed three persons. For the driver to be found negligent petitioner
must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto because such negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury.
Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck driver and a car driver Jose Koh, which
resulted in the death of Jose Koh and two others because the Koh avoided hitting two boys who
suddenly darted across the lane. Under the Emergency Rule, Koh was not negligent because his
entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time,
a greater peril of death or injury to the two boys. Under this rule, a person who, without fault or
negligence on his part, is suddenly placed in an emergency or unexpected danger and compelled
to act instantly and instinctively with no time for reflection and exercise of the required
precaution, is not guilty of negligence and, therefore, exempt from liability, if he did not make
the wisest choice of the available courses of conduct to avoid injury which a reasonably prudent
person would have made under normal circumstances.
Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478
An overhead wire of Meralco conducting electricity parted and one of the charged ends fell to
the ground, and a nine (9) year old school child touched the wire and was electrocuted. It is

doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the

ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8
years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 327
A young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he
placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole owned by Meralco. Meralco
was negligent in so placing the pole and wires as to be within the proximity of a place frequented
by many persons, with the possibility of coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively
insulated wire.
Bernardo vs. Legaspi, 29 Phil. 12
Two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears
from the evidence that the drivers were equally negligent and contributed equally to the collision.
Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, neither can recover from the other for the
damages suffered.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534
The ship captain of MT Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by PNOC, was playing mah-jong
when it collided off the Tablan Strait in Mindoro, with M,V Don Juan owned by petitioner
NENACO. The owner of the ship was found equally negligent with the ship captain because of
tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the
ship and failing to keep the ship seaworthy.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94
The jeepney of the respondents fell into an open excavation when the jeep swerved from the
inside lane of the street, respondents being aware of the presence of said excavation. The
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of
his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584
At the time of her admission, patient Erlinda Ramos was neurologically sound but during the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of a gall bladder operation, she
suffered irreparable damage to her brain and was diaganosed to be suffering from diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage. The damage sustained by Erlinda Erlinda in her brain prior to a
scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur in
medical malpractice as it was found out that brain damage does not normally occur in the process

of gall bladder operations, and does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334

A piece of rubber glove was left in the abdomen of a patient after a caesarean section operation.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies because aside from the caesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product
of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin.
Roque vs. Gunigundo, 89 SCRA 178
Atty. Gunigundo was charged by his client Roque with G.R.oss negligence in not seasonably
filing their motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting an appeal from the trial courts order
of dismissal. Atty. Gunigundo's filing of motions for extension on the last day and sending them
by registered mail (thus giving the court insufficient time to act before the extension sought had
expired) and his omission to verify whether his second motion for extension was granted are
indicative of lack of competence, diligence and fidelity in the dispatch of his clients business.
Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734
Adarne was declared in default for failure to appear in the hearing because his one of his lawyers
honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a special purpose and that
the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing
of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. An attorney is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to do.
Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47
Theness, a three-year old child, was killed after she was bitten by a dog while she was playing
with the child of Purita Vestil in the house of Vicente Miranda, the late father of Purita. Spouses
Vestils contention that they cannot be faulted as they are not the owner of the house where the
child was bitten cannot be accepted because under the Article 2183 of the Civil Code the
possessor of animal is liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed
from his control.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315
Amadora was shot dead by his classmate Daffon inside the school auditorium, when the classes
had formally ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities
over the student continues.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410

Yu was inside his car when his driver bumped a carretela in front and at the same time hit
another car coming from the opposite direct. Under [Article 2184], if the causative factor was the

drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could
have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
ANDAMO vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 74761November 6, 1990
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. All the elements of a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
PONCE vs. LEGASPI, G.R. NO. 79184 May 6, 1992
The present case stemmed from the filing before the Supreme Court OF a complaint for
disbarment against respondent by petitioner which was dismissed. Respondent thereafter filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioner. The adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to because one who exercises his rights does no
injury, and if damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
In the present case, MERALCO wilfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by withholding from
him and his tenants the supply of electricity to which they were entitled under the Service
Contract. MERALCO's failure to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of its
obligation to its customer, is tantamount to bad faith hence is entitled to moral damages.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. vs. PHOENIX
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,MCGEE & CO., INC., G.R. NO. 162467, May
8, 2009
The Court ruled that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree of diligence in
loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family.
There is no basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of petitioner since none of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code exists because the present case is
clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff as there is no showing that it was
instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.
AIR FRANCE vs.CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class without his
consent and against his will. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended

with a public duty, and neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
BAYANI vs. PANAY ELECTRIC CO., INC., G.R. NO. 139680, April 12, 2000
The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and
that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal;
(2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
WASSMER vs VELEZ, G.R. NO. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... ", then enplaned to
his home city in Mindanao, and never returned and was never heard from again. This is not a
case of mere breach of promise to marry but unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid and per
express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. vs. ERNESTO V. SANTOS and
RIVERLAND, INC., G.R. NO. 153004, November 5, 2004
The demand letter sent to the petitioner on October 28, 1992, was in accordance with an extrajudicial demand contemplated by law. When the debtor knows the amount and period when he is
to pay, interest as damages is generally allowed as a matter of right.
TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook
to send said private respondent's message overseas by teleG.R.am but which petitioner did not do,
despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges.
The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained
as a warning to all teleG.R.am companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages
of their customers.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 136202,
January 25, 2007
Upon the prompting of Templonuevo and with full knowledge of the brewing dispute between
Salazar and Templonuevo, petitioner debited the account held in the name of the sole
proprietorship of Salazar without even serving due notice upon her. The award of exemplary
damages is justified when the acts of the bank are attended by malice, bad faith or gross

negligence and the award of reasonable attorneys fees is proper where exemplary damages are
awarded because depositors are compelled to litigate to protect their interest.

VELASCO vs.MERALCO, G.R. NO. L-18390, August 6, 1971

It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation of MERALCO and
whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case and
appellant asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages.
Article 2203 clearly obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will alleviate and not
aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places upon him the burden of
explaining why he could not do so.
BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007
The bank froze and later unilaterally debited an amount from the account of A.A. Salazar
Construction and Engineering Services without informing her that it had already done so, which
caused plaintiff-appellee great damage and prejudice particularly when she had already issued
checks drawn against the said account and as can be expected, the said checks bounced, thereby
causing private respondent Salazar undue embarrassment and inflicting damage to her standing
in the business community.
A depositor has the right to recover reasonable moral damages even if the banks negligence may
not have been attended with malice and bad faith, if the former suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
February 18, 1970

L-25499

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, both found that the accident and the death of Policronio
had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its
contract of carriage with the deceased but the only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of
damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of the indemnity to be
awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis and much is left to the
discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been
said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the
measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount
recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
PEOPLE vs. EBAROLA, G.R. NO. L-69666, January 23, 1992
Appellant had been convicted of homicide and the trial court awarded the amount of
P100,000.00 to the heirs of Manahan as indemnity for death. The indemnity for death must be
reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter and aside from
the ordinary indemnity for death appellant is obliged: (1) to compensate the heirs for the latter's
loss of earning capacity; (2) to give support in the form of expenses for education to dependents
of the deceased and (3) to pay the heirs for moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by
them.

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119398. July 2, 1999

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys
fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these
officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, but even if
their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if
they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
PLENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-56505, May 9, 1988
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages and in arriving at
a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that:
There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss.
AREOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 95641 September 22, 1994
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have
been or can be shown.