Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
_____________ Division
ABC SOFTWARE, INC.,
Petitioner,
CA-G.R. SP NO. ________________

-versusHON. JUDGE HUKOM, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 888,
Makati
City,
and
XYZ
(PHILIPPINES), INC.,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Petitioner, ABC SOFTWARE, INC., by counsel, respectfully
submits this Petition under Rule 65 questioning the Omnibus Order dated 17
February 2012 issued by Hon. Judge Hukom, and respectfully avers:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
This is a simple case of enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, evidenced by Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, had long ago been accepted by our legal
system into its jurisprudence and procedural rules. While there may be
distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, they all prescind
from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for,
however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The limitation on the review by our local courts of foreign judgments is in
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise stated, if every
judgment of a foreign tribunal were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation1.

1 Priscilla C. Mijares, et al. vs. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, 12 April 2005
1

Pre-trial is a procedural tool designed to uphold the unqualified policy

of promoting a just and speedy disposition of cases. Without any ambiguity,
the rules of court provide that a pre-trial order shall explicitly define and
limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the
subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice2.
Also, well-settled is the rule that defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived 3. Defenses
conjured subsequent to the answer, must be set up accordingly, otherwise,
they will not be allowed.
The various modes of discovery are meant to serve as a device, along
with pre-trial hearing, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties. Justice, later on Chief Justice, Panganiban said that courts are given
wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to enable the parties
to prepare for trial or otherwise settle the controversy prior thereto4.
One may ask: Exactly how wide is this wide latitude? Does it
encompass a situation where a party moves for the availment of a mode of
discovery only after seven (7) years from the inception of a case? Does it
cover a case where the alleged purpose of availing these modes of discovery
was in support of an affirmative defense that was not alleged in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer? Does it include a situation where the mode of
discovery availed of addresses an issue that is found outside the triable
issues set forth in the pre-trial order, and was clearly a mere afterthought?
Should a party be rewarded a relief that he prays for despite his obvious and
deliberate efforts to impede the proceedings?
For the sake of the orderly administration of justice, one can only
hope that the answer to all of these questions is in the negative.

TIMELINESS
On 24 February 2012, petitioner received a copy of the Omnibus
Order dated 17 February 2012 handed down by the Regional Trial Court
Makati City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. 03-1341 entitled ABC
Software, Inc. vs. XYZ (Philippines) Inc., effectively DENYING the
following:
2 Section 7, Rule 18, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
3 Section 2, Rule 9, Id.
4 Security Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135874, 25 January 2000
2

(a) Petitioners Comment and Countermanifestation to the

Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and Motion to Cancel the
25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing filed on 11 November
2011;
(b) Petitioners Objection to the Notice of Taking Deposition with
Motion to Expunge filed on 22 November 2012;
(c) Petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
dated November 10, 2011) with Motion to Suspend the Taking
of Deposition filed on 25 November 2011; and
(d) Petitioners Countermanifestation to private respondents
Manifestation on the Taking of the Deposition of Mr. Seong Ang
Kang dated 15 December 2011 filed on 26 December 2011.
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 5,
petitioner has sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution, or sixty (60) days from denial of a motion for reconsideration or
new trial, within which to file a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner has
sixty (60) days from 24 February 2012, or until 24 April 2012, within which
to file a petition for certiorari.
Consequently, petitioner is deemed to have timely filed the instant
petition.

NATURE OF THE PETITION

Petitioner, having no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, files this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Omnibus
Order rendered by the public respondent with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on 17 February 2012, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
DENIES plaintiffs Urgent Motion For Reconsideration of the
Order issued by the Court on November 10, 2011 for lack of
merit and CONSIDERS the deposition of Mr. Seong An Kang
upon oral examination to be in harmony and rhyme with the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. ACCORDINGLY, the Court
ORDERS defendant to furnish plaintiff with a copy of the
Questions which were propounded to Mr. Seong Ang Kang
upon oral examination within three (3) days from receipt
of this Order.
5 As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, effective 27 December 2007
3

SO ORDERED.

THE PARTIES
Petitioner ABC Software, Inc., is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, U.S.A., with principal
office at 1234 Five Six Boulevard, Suite 11111, Broomfield, Colorado
80021, U.S.A. It is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, and
selling computer-related products.
Petitioner may be served with court processes through the
undersigned counsel at the address stated below.
Private respondent XYZ (Philippines) Inc., is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with principal
office at 88th Floor, Corporation Building, 1111 Ayala Avenue, Makati City,
Philippines where it may be served with court processes.
Public respondent, Hon. Judge Hukom, is the incumbent Presiding
Judge of Branch 888 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. On 18 November 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint for Enforcement of
Foreign Judgment entitled ABC Software, Inc. vs. XYZPhilippines), Inc.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1341, and raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 58.
2. On 5 January 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint, which was subsequently denied by the court a quo in an Order
dated 6 October 2004.
3. On 5 January 2006, exactly two (2) years after it filed its Motion to Dismiss,
private respondent filed its Answer.
4. Pursuant to an Order dated 17 March 2006, the case was set for pre-trial
conference on 18 April 2006.
5. On 3 December 2007, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order.

6. On 1 July 2008, an Amended Pre-Trial Order was issued, setting the maiden
reception of evidence on 11 August 2008.
7. It was only after more than two (2) years, or on 27 September 2010, that
private respondent filed its Motion to Depose Mr. Seong Ang Kang and Ms.
Cher Liang Tan, with a prayer that such taking be set sometime in the third
or last week of October 2010.
8. Despite the lapse of nine (9) months after it filed its Motion to Depose,
private respondent deliberately neglected to move for the resolution of its
own motion. It was petitioner that took the liberty of asking the Court to
resolve private respondents motion when it filed a Motion to Resolve on 17
June 2011.
9. On 27 June 2011, petitioner received a copy of the Order dated 31 May
2011, granting the Motion to Depose, with a directive that the taking of
such deposition be set on the first week of July 2011.
10.On 1 July 2011, petitioner received a copy of private respondents Ex-Parte
Motion to Modify the Order (dated 31 May 2011), requesting that the taking
of the deposition be set on the first or second week of September 2011.
Petitioner filed an Opposition thereto on 11 July 2011.
11.Meanwhile, on 12 July 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Order dated 31 May 2011), reiterating clearly the reasons why
allowing the deposition would result in manifest injustice.
12.On 19 August 2011, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve its Motion
for Reconsideration and its Opposition (to the Ex-parte Motion to Modify).
In its Comment with Manifestation and Motion (to the Urgent Motion to
Resolve) dated 26 August 2011, private respondent claimed that while it
interposes no objection to the Motion for Reconsideration and to the
Opposition, its request for modification of the order to depose had become
moot. Private respondent conveniently reasoned out that it is the trial courts
fault that its motion was not heard because of the semestral inventory. It
went further by asking for another postponement of the taking of the
deposition since it is already the last week of August. Private respondent
requested that the taking of the deposition be set on the first or second week
of October 2011, without offering any justifiable reason why it failed to
take any step in complying with the Order from the time it was issued on 31
May 2011 up to the time that private respondent filed its Comment.
13.On 12 September 2011, the trial court issued an Order denying private
respondents Motion to Modify, which meant that its request to re-set the
taking of the deposition from the first week of July to the first or second
week of September 2011 was denied. This further meant that, at the time the
Order (dated 12 September 2011) was handed down, private respondent had
already lost its right to take the deposition because the original setting of the
5

taking of deposition was in the first week of July 2011. The court a quo
succinctly held that:
x x x
The Court resolve to DENY the same for the reason
that defendant has not shown any semblance of good
faith to make preparations or take initial steps for the
conduct of the deposition. The defense is deemed to
have waived the opportunity to take the intended
deposition.
x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

14.On 26 September 2011, private respondent filed a Motion for

Reconsideration (of the Order dated 12 September 2011), arguing that its
right to avail of deposition as a mode of discovery should not be curtailed.
This time, private respondent pointed its finger at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), because the latter allegedly requires three (3) weeks notice
for the taking of depositions outside the country.
15.As if all of its delaying maneuvers were not enough, private respondent filed
a Motion for Time to File Reply (to the Opposition) on 24 October 2011, the
very same day when the Reply was due.
16.On 25 October 2011, fearful of the consequences of its own negligence,
private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Attached Reply. It thereafter
thoughtlessly filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and Motion to
Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing dated 28 October 2011,
begging the trial court to grant reprieve. Private respondent obviously ran
short of common sense because it sought the cancellation of a hearing that
was scheduled three (3) days earlier.
17.On 11 November 2011, petitioner filed its Comment and
Countermanifestation to the Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and
Motion to Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing, pointing out
private respondents blatant disregard for the rules.
18.To petitioners surprise, private respondent filed a Notice of Taking
Deposition dated 21 November 2011. It was inconceivable at that time for
private respondent to take such a bold move considering that the trial court
had not yet ruled on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners
Opposition, private respondents Motion for Time to File Reply, Motion to
Admit Attached Reply, Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and Motion to
Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing, and petitioners Comment
and Countermanifestation.
19.Nevertheless, on 22 November 2011, petitioner filed its Objection to the
Notice of Taking Deposition with Motion to Expunge, pursuant to Section
29(a) of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

20.It was only on 23 November 2011 that petitioner received a copy of the
Order dated 10 November 2011, granting private respondents Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 12 September 2011), with a directive
that the taking of the deposition be set on the first week of December 2011.
21.On 25 November 2011, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 10 November 2011) with Motion to
Suspend the Taking of Deposition.
22.On 28 November 2011, the trial court issued an Order giving private
respondent 5 days within which to file its Comment/Opposition to the
Objection to the Notice of Taking Deposition with Motion to Expunge.
Petitioner was given a similar period within which to file a Reply.
23.Instead of filing its Comment/Opposition to the Objection to the Notice of
Taking Deposition with Motion to Expunge, private respondent filed a
Manifestation dated 15 December 2011, saying that on 1 December 2011,
notwithstanding the pendency of the Objection to the Notice of Taking
Deposition with Motion to Expunge and of the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 10 November 2011) with Motion to
Suspend the Taking of Deposition, the deposition6 of Mr. Ang Seong Kang
Samuel was taken at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. On 26 December
2011, petitioner filed its Countermanifestation.
24.Finally, on 24 February 2012, petitioner received a copy of the Omnibus
Order rendered by the court a quo dated 17 February 2012, denying
petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with a directive that private
respondent must furnish to petitioner a copy of the Questions which were
propounded to Mr. Ang Seong Kang Samuel.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner respectfully submits that public respondent issued the
Omnibus Order7 dated 17 February 2012 in contravention of settled rules
and existing jurisprudence, amounting to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, for the following reasons:
I

6 Annex A
7 Annex B
7

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH

GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE
TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF MR.
ANG SEONG KANG SAMUEL DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT
WAS
OBVIOUSLY
DESIGNED TO FURTHER DELAY THE
PROCEEDINGS AND WAS A MERE
AFTERTHOUGHT;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE
TAKING
OF
THE
DEPOSITION
DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE DEPOSITION
WAS TAKEN ADDRESSES AN ISSUE
WHICH
IS
OUTSIDE
OF
THOSE
ENUMERATED IN BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER AND THE AMENDED PRE-TRIAL
ORDER;
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE
TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION DESPITE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO
ALLEGE IN ITS MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ANSWER ITS INTENTION OF AVAILING OF
MODES OF DISCOVERY;
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE
TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION BECAUSE
AT THE TIME OF SUCH TAKING, THERE
WERE MULTIPLE MOTIONS THAT WERE
PENDING
RESOLUTION
PRECISELY
QUESTIONING ITS PROPRIETY.
8

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Public respondent should not have
allowed the taking of the deposition
of Mr. Ang Seong Kang Samuel for
it was obviously designed to further
delay the proceedings and was a
mere afterthought.
---------------------------------------------From its inception, this case had been plagued with numerous delays
brought about by private respondents insatiable appetite for stalling the
proceedings. It had been relentless in devising ways to mock our judicial
process. Public respondent, on the other hand, had been remiss in his duty in
the fair and prompt administration of justice. Petitioner had been diligent in
airing its objections, but the trial court was more inclined to accommodate
the delays.
After seven (7) long years from the time of the filing of the
Complaint, and just when petitioner thought that private respondent had run
out of dilatory ammunition, it pulled another trick out of its sleeve and came
up with a Motion to Depose8 on 27 September 2010.
In its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion to Depose 9, filed on 18
October 2010, petitioner took pains in making a chronicle of how private
respondent cleverly and unremittingly protracted the case from the time
petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on 11 February 2009,
notwithstanding the fact that the case had already been running for more
than five (5) years then.
To petitioners dismay, however, the trial court still granted the
motion.
The significance of availing of the different modes of discovery
cannot be gainsaid. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery
(interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party;
production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental
examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material
8 Annex C
9 Annex D
9

and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those
known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses10.
There is no question that discovery measures are well-recognized. But
the mere fact that it is accorded liberal treatment, and that a party has a
recognized right to make discovery, does not necessarily mean that it
should be allowed without exception. In fact, in the case of Isidro T.
Pajarillaga vs. Court of Appeals and Thomas T. Kalangeg 11, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that while discovery measures are generally allowed,
they may be denied to a party who has caused delay to the proceedings.
Thus:

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary

function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any
showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is
accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of
a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from
the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
with leave of court if summons have been served, and
without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and
provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility
exists.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in

jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken
even after trial has commenced and may be used without
the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.
There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the
period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against
10 Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Hon. Ruben T. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, 24 August 1993
11 G.R. No. 163515, 31 October 2008
10

the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid

objection to allowing them during the process of executing
final and executory judgments, when the material issues of
fact have become numerous or complicated.

Such being the case, there is really nothing

objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this
discovery measure after private respondent has rested his
case and prior to petitioners presentation of evidence. To
reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

But when viewed vis the several postponements

made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his
evidence, we are of the view that his timing is, in fact,
suspect. The records before us show that petitioner stopped
attending the hearings after private respondent presented
his first witness. Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his
counsels absences. Moreover, the trial court has set four (4)
hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But
he merely moved for its resetting without invoking the
grounds which he now presents before us.

Besides, even as we scrutinize petitioners

arguments, we think that he has not sufficiently shown an
"exceptional" or "unusual" case for us to grant leave and
reverse the trial and appellate courts.

Under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court,

depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the following
circumstances:

SEC. 4. Use of depositions.

xxxx

11

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a

party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness
resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured
by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity,
or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in
the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance
of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court,
to allow the deposition to be used; and

xxxx

In this case, petitioner invokes distance and illness to

avail of the discovery measure. We agree with private
respondent that the matter of distance could have been
settled had petitioner requested for a change of venue
earlier in the proceedings. Petitioner has attended the pretrial and the hearing where private respondent presented his
first witness. He need not await his turn to present evidence
before realizing the great inconvenience caused by the
enormous distance between his place of residence and the
place of hearing.

xxxx

Finally, we must emphasize that while the rules on

discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth
and to expedite the disposal of cases, the trial court may
disallow a deposition if there are valid reasons for so
ruling. Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation
at petitioners instance coupled with the belated and
unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to
petitioners life, more than sufficient reasons for the trial
court to deny petitioners motion. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

12

In Pajarillaga, the Motion for Leave of Court to Take Deposition was filed
by petitioner Pajarillaga only about two (2) years after the case was filed
with the trial court. Petitioner moved to reset the hearings for the
presentation of his evidence only once12 but on the date on which the hearing
was reset, petitioner and his counsel were absent. Said the trial court:
Considering that the above-entitled case has been pending
since November 24, 1995, the hearings thereof have been
delayed almost always at the instance of the defendant, the
latters motion for leave of court to take said defendants
deposition upon written interrogatories at this late stage of
the proceedings is hereby denied.

It bears reiterating that it took private respondent seven (7) years

from the time the Complaint was filed on 18 November 2003, and more
than four (4) years from the time it filed its Answer on 5 January 2006, to
conjure the idea of availing of deposition as a mode of discovery. Petitioner
had already concluded its presentation of evidence when private respondent
first hinted at taking depositions. Private respondent was too preoccupied in
delaying the proceedings that the timing of the filing of the Motion to
Depose is highly suspect, being undoubtedly a mere afterthought. The ruling
of the Supreme Court in Pajarillaga should have been reason enough to
deny the motion. Unfortunately, the public respondent turned a blind eye on
what was right in front of him.
Moreover, private respondent, in its Motion to Depose, alleged that it
would be more prudent to take the deposition in Singapore because it would
be too costly and burdensome on its part to have them testify in Makati City.
Thus, on pages 4 and 5 therein, private respondent averred:
8.
However, as it would be too costly and
burdensome on the part of XYZPhilippines), Inc.
to request and pay for the airfare and other
expenses of the corporate officers of Nera
Telecommunications, Ltd. to have them testify in
the Philippines, XYZPhilippines), Inc. shall instead
cause the deposition of the testimony of the
President and Company Secretary of Nera
Telecommunications, Ltd.
x

10.
Defendant
XYZPhilippines),
Inc.
thus
respectfully requests the Honorable Court to direct the
Department of Foreign Affairs to request the
assistance of the Philippine Consul General of
Singapore in providing an officer authorized to
12 The petitioners presentation of evidence was set on October 28, 29 and 30, 1997. Petitioner
moved to rest to November 17, 1997 but the trial court reset the hearing to December 15, 1997.
On December 10, 1997, petitioner filed the Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of
the Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories.
13

administer oath and a stenographer for the taking of

the deposition of Mr. Seong Ang Kang and Ms. Cher
Liang Tan for the following reasons:
x

c. Mr. Seong Ang Kang and Ms. Cher Liang

Tan are outside of the Philippines and it
would entail a lot of costs to have them
testify in Makati City.

Remarkably, while private respondent did not seem to mind the costs
of paying its lawyers for legal services rendered for a seven-year protracted
litigation, all of sudden when it filed its Motion to Depose in 2010, it
claimed that paying for airfare is too costly. As it eventually turned out, it
intended to take the deposition of only one witness after allthat of Mr.
Seong Ang Kangs.
Contrary to private respondents assertion, it would have been more
cost-efficient, more convenient and less time-consuming had Mr. Seong Ang
Kang been presented in court to testify. The witness could have been flown
into the country from Singapore in the morning, then straight to the trial
court where petitioner could have conducted a cross-examination, and the
public respondent could have personally observed the demeanor of the
witness while testifying, thereby expediting the proceedings and validating
the testimony. Thereafter, he could have taken the next flight back to
Singapore in the evening. But private respondent opted to take the
alternative which was demonstrably malicious and more prejudicial to
petitioner, consequently squandering the time and resources of everyone
involved.
Public respondent should not have
allowed the taking of the deposition
because the purpose for which the
deposition was taken addresses an
issue which is outside of those
enumerated in both the Pre-Trial
Order and the Amended Pre-Trial
Order.
---------------------------------------------In its Motion to Depose, private respondent alleged the following
reasons for the trial court to allow the deposition in Singapore:
10. Defendant XYZ (Philippines), Inc. thus
respectfully requests the Honorable Court to direct the
Department of Foreign Affairs to request the
assistance of the Philippine Consul General of
Singapore in providing an officer authorized to
14

administer oath and a stenographer for the taking of

the deposition of Mr. Seong Ang Kang and Ms. Cher
Liang Tan for the following reasons:
a. Mr. Seong Ang Kang, as President and Chief Executive Officer of
XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd., would have personal knowledge of
the manner, the circumstances and the events which led to and
occurred during XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd.s dealings with ABC
Software, Inc. Mr. Kang would likewise know whether XYZ
Telecommunications, Ltd. did in fact order the goods subject of the
case.
b. Ms. Cher Liang Tan, as Company Secretary of XYZ
Telecommunications, Ltd., would have personal knowledge of the
separate corporate personality of XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd.
and XYZ (Philippines), Inc. Ms. Tan would likewise be in the
position to know whether XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd. did in fact
execute the two (2) purchase orders.
c. Mr. Seong Ang Kang and Ms. Cher Liang Tan are outside of the
Philippines and it would entail a lot of costs to have them testify in
Makati City.

The reasons offered by private respondent are noticeably beyond the

scope of the proceedings because nowhere among the issues recited in the
Pre-Trial Order dated 3 December 2007 or in the Amended Pre-Trial Order
dated 1 July 2008 can we find an issue which the above-enumerated reasons
seeks to address. Allegedly, what private respondent sought to achieve was
to establish the fact that XYZPhilippines), Inc. and Nera
Telecommunications, Ltd. are separate and distinct entities. This objective,
however, is not an issue to be resolved in the case.
In the Pre-Trial Order13, the issues to be resolved were enumerated as
follows:
Whether or not the subject Orders and Issuances of
the District Court may be enforced in the Philippines,
to wit:
1. Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge on Motion for
Entry of Default and Default Judgment dated April 4, 2003;
2. Order on Recommendation of Magistrate Judge dated May 12,
2003;
3. Judgment dated May 13, 2003;
4. Order dated June 17, 2003;
5. Amendment Judgment dated June 20, 2003.

13 Annex E
15

On the other hand, in the Amended Pre-Trial Order14, the issues to be

resolved were:
Reviewing the various issues stated
pleadings, the issues to be resolved are:

in

their

1. Whether plaintiff submitted the dispute to arbitration as required by

the International VAR Agreement prior to instituting Case No. 02WM-0426 against defendant before the District Court of Colorado;
2. Whether Atty. Zayber Protacio was still in the employ of
XYZPhilippines), Inc. as its Corporate Secretary when summons
was allegedly served upon him on 23 August 2002;
3. Whether the Colorado Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Case No. 02-WM-0426 or should have dismissed
the same for lack of cause of action by reason of plaintiffs failure to
previously submit the dispute to arbitration;
4. If Atty. Protacio was no longer in the employ of XYZPhilippines),
Inc. as its Corporate Secretary when summons was served upon
him on 23 August 2002, whether the Colorado Court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant for purposes
of Case No. 02-WM-0426;
5. Whether defendant was deprived of its constitutional right to due
process when it was declared in default and a default judgment
was entered against it in Case No. 02-WM-0426;
6. Whether the judgment rendered by the Colorado Court violates
Philippine public policy favoring arbitration;
7. Whether or not the subject Orders and Issuances of the District
Court may be enforced in the Philippines, to wit:
1. Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge on
Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment dated April 4,
2003;
2. Order on Recommendation of Magistrate Judge dated May 12,
2003;
3. Judgment dated May 13, 2002;
4. Order dated June 17, 2003;
5. Amendment Judgment dated June 20, 2003.

It is very easy to see that the issue of whether or not Mr. Seong Ang
Kang would have personal knowledge of the manner, the circumstances and
the events which led to XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd.s dealings with ABC
Software, Inc.; and whether or not Mr. Kang would know whether XYZ
Telecommunications, Ltd. did in fact order the goods subject of the case are
not issues to be resolved, nor do they pertain to any matter related to
any of the issues to be resolved in the case.
14 Annex F
16

To go beyond what has been determined by the trial court as the issues
to be resolved in a particular case puts at naught the rules on pre-trial. The
provisions of Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are not mere
superfluities. They go to the very reason why the Supreme Court
promulgated the rules of court to begin withto provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. To disregard what
is provided in the pre-trial order defeats the purpose of its issuance.
Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon
justice in the nineteenth century, pre-trial paves the way for a less cluttered
trial and resolution of the case15. The policy behind the pre-trial guidelines is
to abbreviate court proceedings and ensure prompt disposition of cases and
decongest court dockets16.
Section 7, Rule 1817 is crystal clearthe pre-trial order controls the
course of a case. It provides:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in
the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof,
the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the
matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the
agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of
the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial,
the order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues to
be tried. The contents of the order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified before
trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a, R20)" (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The Pre-Trial Order dated 3 December 2007 was indeed modified by

the Amended Pre-Trial Order dated 1 July 2008. Still, there was nothing
mentioned about the alleged separate personalities of XYZ (Philippines),
Inc. and XYZ Telecommunications, Ltd. Neither was there any mention of a
prospective deponent in the person of Mr. Ang Seong Kang.
There was no other modification that followed since the trial had
already ensued. Therefore, there was absolutely no basis for the trial court to
have allowed the taking of the deposition.
While admittedly, a pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed
catalogue of each and every issue that is or may be taken up during the
15 Anson Trade Center, Inc. vs. Pacific Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179999, 17 March 2009
16 Tanjuatco vs. Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2016, 23 March 2009
17 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
17

trial18, an issue which is outside the pre-trial order, in order that it may
be taken up during the trial as being impliedly included in the issues to
be tried, must, at the very least, be inferrable from the issues expressly
enumerated.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the issues defined in
both the Pre-Trial Order and the Amended Pre-Trial Order that would even
remotely suggest that the purpose of the taking of the deposition is an issue
that is inferrable therefrom. Again, the issue of the alleged separate
personalities of XYZ (Philippines), Inc. and XYZ Telecommunications Ltd.
which would have been the basis for the taking of the deposition, is not an
issue to be resolved. Therefore, there was no reason for the trial court to
have entertained the motion to depose.
Besides, it was the public respondent who issued these orders
delineating the issues to be resolved. Therefore, public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the taking of the deposition which
sought to address an issue which he purposely did not include.
Public respondent should not have
allowed the taking of the deposition
since private respondent, in its
Motion to Dismiss and Answer,
never even hinted at availing of
modes of discovery.
---------------------------------------------Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived19. A motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived20. As earlier mentioned,
what private respondent wanted to do, in availing of deposition as a mode of
discovery, was to prove a matter which it never raised in its motion to
dismiss or in its answer.
In its Motion to Dismiss21 filed on 5 January 2004 (which was
subsequently denied by the trial court in an Order dated 6 October 2004),
private respondent alleged the following grounds for the dismissal of the
Complaint:
18 Balatico Vda. De Agatep vs.Rodriguez, G.R. No. 170540, 28 October 2009
19 Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
20 Section 8, Rule 15, Id.
21 Annex G
18

a. This Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the person of the

DEFENDANT and over the subject matter of the claim.
b. The Complaint states no cause of action.
c. A condition precedent for filing the claim was not complied
with.
d. The claim on which the Complaint is founded is unenforceable.
e. The Complaint failed to attach an actionable document.
In its Answer22 filed on 5 January 2006, on the other hand, private
respondent alleged the following affirmative defenses:
a. This Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
Defendant and the subject matter of the claim, as the District
Court of Colorado was itself bereft of jurisdiction to try and
consequently render judgment on the claim.
In any event, the Defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether this
Honorable Court may properly exercise
jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant or the
subject matter of the claim.
b. The Complaint is premature for failure of the Plaintiff to resort
to arbitration, as required by the Agreement.
In Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration23 (of the Order dated 17
March 2010) filed on 21 April 2010, it pointed out that private respondent is
already deemed to have waived its right to raise as a defense the alleged
separate personalities of XYZ (Philippines), Inc. and XYZ
Telecommunications, Ltd. because of its failure to make the appropriate
allegations in its motion to dismiss and in its answer. Corollarily, private
respondent is also deemed to have waived its right to take a deposition
which is aimed precisely at proving the alleged separate personalities. Thus:
However, the defense of the alleged mistake of law
and fact in the foreign judgment of the Court of Colorado
was waived by defendant when it failed to allege the same in
its Motion to Dismiss dated January 5, 2004 and in its
Answer dated January 5, 2006.
22 Annex H
23 Annex I
19

A perusal of defendants motion to dismiss and

answer will reveal that the following are the
arguments/grounds raised therein:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the alleged lack of the Honorable Courts jurisdiction

over the claim;
plaintiffs alleged failure to comply with a condition
precedent before filing the claim; and
the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant due to plaintiffs alleged improper service of
summons.

Notably, nowhere in defendants motion to dismiss or

in its answer did defendant assert that the Court of Colorado
was mistaken in adjudging the case against XYZPhilippines)
rather than against NERA Telecommunications Ltd.
Yet,
defendant
misleadingly
avers
in
its
Comment/Opposition dated February 19, 2010 that one of its
defenses is that:
Defendant corporation cannot be held liable
as it was NERA Telecommunications, Ltd which
purchased the goods subject of this case. The
Colorado Court therefore issued a void judgment
because it was based on a clear mistake of fact
(mistaking
Nera
Telecommunications,
with
XYZPhilippines), Inc.) and such judgment therefore,
cannot be enforced by the court.
As stated above, no such defense was raised by
defendant in its Motion to Dismiss or in its Answer.
Defendant argues also that the issue of clear mistake
of law and fact was raised on the sixth (6 th) page of its
Answer, which states as follows:
v. The Defendant could not have ordered or
actually purchased the products in question, as it did
not issue a written order for the plaintiff to make
deliveries to it, as required by the Agreement.
However, a perusal of the above allegation would disclose
that the issue raised is whether there was a written order,
and not whether there was another entity which purchased
the products. The statement reiterates defendants position
that there was absence of a condition precedent, i.e. the
issuance of a written order by defendant. Defendant is the
one causing confusion here.
Defendant also claims that it raised the same issue in
its Motion to Dismiss dated January 5, 2004. Defendant
again misrepresents the clear implication of the following
allegation:
The plaintiff failed to establish the act or
omission by which [the DEFENDANT] violate[d] its
20

right. Under the International VAR Agreement

deliveries by the PLAINTIFF may only be made upon
written order issued by the DEFENDANT. As the
Complaint does not allege the existence of such a
written order, there is no basis for concluding that
DEFENDANT violated the rights of the PLAINTIFF
under the Agreement. The Complaint, therefore, fails
to state a cause of action.
Obviously, the above assertion refers to an alleged
non-existence of a condition precedent and not to a clear
mistake of fact and law which the Colorado Court allegedly
committed.

Public respondent should not have

allowed the taking of the deposition
because at the time of such taking,
there were multiple motions that
were pending resolution precisely
questioning its propriety.
---------------------------------------------There can be no confusion as to the facts above-mentioned. It shows
private respondents undisguised penchant for delay and public respondents
tendency to act upon motions and other pleadings in a belated manner. To
summarize, the facts pertinent to the deposition are as follows:
The Motion to Depose was filed on 27 September 2010, with a prayer
that such taking be set sometime in the third or last week of October 2010.
This motion was granted through an Order24 dated 31 May 2011,
with a directive that the taking of the deposition be set on the first week of
July 2011.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Order, while private
respondent moved for its modificationthat instead of setting the taking of
the deposition on the first week of July 2011, it be scheduled on the first or
second week of September 2011.
Without any clear ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the trial court denied private respondents motion to modify in an Order25
dated 12 September 2011, which meant that the directive set forth in the 31
May 2011 Order standsthat the taking of the deposition be set on the first
week of July 2011, which clearly, had already passed, thereby rendering
private respondent estopped from taking the deposition.
24 Annex J
25 Annex K
21

Subsequent to the 12 September 2011 Order, private respondent filed

the following:
a. Motion for Reconsideration (of the 12 September 2011
Order)26 on 26 September 2011;
b. Motion for Time to File Reply (to the Opposition)27 on 24
October 2011, the very same day the Reply was due;
c. Motion to Admit Attached Reply28 on 25 October 2011;
d. Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and Motion to
Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing29 on 28
October 2011three (3) days after the scheduled hearing
sought to be cancelled;
Petitioner, on 11 November 2011, filed its Comment and
Countermanifestation to the Manifestation with Motion to Resolve and
Motion to Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled Hearing30.
On 21 November 2011, petitioner was dumbfounded when private
respondent filed its Notice of Taking Deposition31. There was absolutely no
basis for this notice because the court, at that time, had yet to rule on the
motions and manifestations above-mentioned. Nevertheless, petitioner filed
its objection the following day, or on 22 November 2011.
It turned out, however, that the trial court already issued an Order32
dated 10 November 2011 improvidently granting private respondents
motion for reconsideration, with a directive that the taking of the deposition
be set on the first week of December 2011.
Petitioner received a copy of this order only on 23 November 2011,
or two (2) days after private respondent cleverly filed its notice of taking
deposition.

26 Annex L
27 Annex M
28 Annex N
29 Annex O
30 Annex P
31 Annex Q
32 Annex R
22

Petitioner filed on 25 November 2011 its Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration (of the Order dated 10 November 2011) with Motion to
Suspend the Taking of the Deposition33.
Notwithstanding the pendency of these motions, private respondent
maliciously proceeded with the deposition of Mr. Ang Seong Kang on 1
December 2011a fact which private respondent stated in its 15 December
2011 Manifestation34. Petitioner filed its Countermanifestation35 on 26
December 2011.
Finally, on 17 February 2012, the trial court issued the Order in
question.
Public respondent, in his ruling, said that:
The Court, after a careful review of the arguments of
the parties, finds no cogent reson to disturb its Order issued
on November 10, 2011 (sic) and considers the Taking of
Deposition of Mr. Seong Ang Kang to be in accord with the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
It must be emphasized that the Court in its Order
issued on November 10, 2011 already gave due course
to the taking of deposition of Mr. Seong Ang Kang.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By this pronouncement, the trial court simply acknowledged the 1

December 2011 deposition-taking point-blank. Perhaps, public respondent
figured that since the deposition had already been taken anyway, there would
be nothing wrong if he just lets it be. In other words, public respondent
merely condoned what was a patently unjust and improper act of private
respondent without any regard for the rights of petitioner, who had tirelessly
defended its rights and assiduously deflected every insidious move made by
private respondent to delay the proceedings.
With due respect to public respondent, the 10 November 2011 Order
could not have had a binding effect precisely because it had yet to attain
finality. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this order on 25
November 2011, or two (2) days after its receipt on 23 November 2011.
Therefore, it was erroneous for the public respondent to use the 10
November 2011 Order as a justification for the 1 December 2011
deposition-taking.
33 Annex S
34 Annex T
35 Annex U
23

The trial court went further by saying:

The Court would like to stress that plaintiff is not
deprived of its full right to cross-examine even if the
deposition of Mr. Kang was taken upon oral examination for
the reason that plaintiff is given its full right to cross-examine
Mr. Kang either by proceeding to Singapore and there
conducting the cross-examination orally or by serving crossinterrogatories to Mr. Kang.x x x

Again, with due respect to the public respondent, while petitioner is

well-aware of its rights under the Rules of Court, there should not be any
reason for the latter to avail thereof because the taking of the deposition was
improper to begin with.
Private respondents timing in taking the deposition should have
invited suspicion. When it filed its Motion to Depose on 27 September 2010,
private respondent asked the trial court to schedule the taking of the
deposition sometime in the third or last week of October 2010. Interestingly
enough, it allowed more than one (1) year to elapse since it manifested its
intention of taking the deposition of Mr. Ang Seong Kang without exerting
any sincere effort in taking the necessary steps. Three (3) weeks after the
trial court issued an order granting its motion for reconsideration, it
magically produced the deposition without breaking a sweat, on top of the
fact that a motion for reconsideration and a motion to suspend such
deposition-taking were pending. What is even more unbelievable is how the
public respondent managed to accommodate all the ways offered by private
respondent in circumventing the rules.

CLOSING STATEMENT
What should have been a simple case of enforcement of a foreign
judgment became a full-blown litigation simply because of private
respondents refusal to abide by the rudiments of fair play and public
respondents misplaced sense of leniency.
Inasmuch as petitioner desires to have this case concluded once and
for all at the soonest possible time, it was constrained to file this petition
because of the detestable course that this case had taken. Public respondent
should not have allowed this enforcement of a foreign judgment to be this
oppressive.
This is not an ordinary civil case. The cause of action in this case
arises from the foreign judgment itself and not from the facts or allegations
24

that occasioned such foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of
facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that
are sought to be vindicated. More importantly, the matters for proof are
different. In ordinary litigation, the complainant will have to establish before
the court the tortuous act or omission committed by the tortfeasor. Extensive
litigation is thus necessary. On the other hand, in enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the
facts from which it prescinds36.
The taking of the deposition of Mr. Ang Seong Kang Samuel was a
mere ploy to frustrate the ends of justice. Private respondent masterfully
transformed this case into an extensive litigation contrary to the policy of
preclusion embodied in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
rationale of which is to safeguard against the harassment of parties, and to
insure that the task of courts be not increased by never-ending litigation of
the same disputes, andin a larger senseto promote what Lord Coke in
the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness37.

ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION AND/OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Under Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Petitioner re-pleads and incorporates all the foregoing allegations insofar as
they are relevant and material to support the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Petitioner is entitled to the principal reliefs demanded in this petition
and such principal reliefs consist in issuing an order (a) setting aside the
assailed Omnibus Order issued by public respondent rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (b) annulling
the 31 May 2011 and 10 November 2011 Orders of public respondent; and
(c) restraining public respondent from implementing said Omnibus Order
and from admitting the assailed deposition into evidence in favor of the
private respondent.
The whimsical and capricious manner by which the public respondent
rendered the assailed Omnibus Order warrants the correction by this
Honorable Court of the public respondents error as shown by the following
incidents:
36 Priscilla C. Mijares, et al. vs. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada, supra.
37 Ibid.
25

a. It is evident that public respondent erroneously ruled that the

deposition of Mr. Ang Seong Kang Samuel is in harmony and
rhyme with the rules of civil procedure despite the fact that the
antecedents leading towards the taking of such deposition are
characterized by irregularities.
b. It is also patent that public respondent rendered the assailed order
in contravention of the right of petitioner to due process and
against settled jurisprudence.
c. Public respondents tendency to act upon this case in a belated
manner and its unreasonable and lopsided leniency towards the
deliberate dilatory tactics of private respondent caused grave injury
to the rights of petitioner.
This abuse of discretion by public respondent amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction must be corrected by this Honorable Court in order to
restore consistency in jurisprudential precedents.
However, pending the resolution of the present petition, it is
imperative that the proceedings in the court a quo are suspended, otherwise,
petitioner will suffer irreparable damage. Since the proceedings below are
almost at an end (private respondent has manifested in open court that it had
no other witness to present), the next step will be for private respondent to
submit its formal offer of evidence, after which the case will be ripe for
decision. Thus, petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in order to suspend the
proceedings below and preserve petitioners rights in the interim. It is only
after a judicious resolution of the present petition that the main case should
proceed to its conclusion.
Petitioner is willing to post a bond in an amount that this Honorable
Court may fix in favor of private respondent to answer for damages which
the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
order should this Honorable Court decide that petitioner is not entitled
thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully
prayed that this Honorable Court render judgment as follows
1. That upon the filing of this petition, a Temporary Restraining Order
be issued restraining and/or enjoining public respondent from
implementing the Omnibus Order dated 17 February 2012 and
26

admitting the assailed deposition into evidence in favor of the private

respondent;
2. That after due hearing, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued
restraining and/or enjoining public respondent from implementing the
Omnibus Order dated 17 February 2012 and admitting the assailed
deposition into evidence in favor of the private respondent;
3. That after a hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Making PERMANENT the preliminary injunction herein
sought;
b. SETTING ASIDE the trial courts Omnibus Order dated 17
February 2012; and
c. ANNULLING the trial courts Order dated 31 May 2011
granting the private respondents Motion to Depose, and the
Order dater 10 November 2011 granting private
respondents Motion for Reconsideration;
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted. Makati City, 20 March 2012.

ORTEGA, BACORRO, ODULIO

CALMA & CARBONELL
Counsel for Petitioner
Telephone: 818-23-21 to 25
Fax: 810-31-53/750-26-06
th
5 and 6th Floors, ALPAP I Bldg.
140 L.P. Leviste St., Salcedo Village
Makati City
By:
JOHN DOE
PTR NO. XXXXXX, Jan. 3, 2012, Makati City
IBP NO. XXXXX, Dec. 12, 2011 (for 2012) PPLM
Roll of Attorneys No. XXXX
MCLE Compliance No. XXXXXX, Apr. 12, 2010

27

-andRAYMOND P. ROMANO
PTR NO. 3286962, Apr. 2, 2012, Makati City
IBP NO. 893211, Mar. 13, 2012 (CY 2012)
Roll of Attorneys No. 61646
2011 Bar Passer. MCLE Compliance No. III Exempt
(MCLE Governing Board Order No. 1, Series of 2008)

Copy furnished:
ABUGADO LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Private Respondent
8/F Gusali Building
888 Kalye Street, Salcaspi Village
Makati City, Metro Manila
HON. JUDGE HUKOM
Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court, Branch 888
Makati City
EXPLANATION
A copy of this Petition was served upon the other parties through
registered mail because the undersigned counsel do not have sufficient
manpower to personally file and serve all the numerous pleadings they
prepare every day.
ORTEGA, BACORRO, ODULIO
CALMA & CARBONELL
By:
RAYMOND P. ROMANO

28

LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX

DESCRIPTION

No. of
Pages

Certified True Copy of the Deposition of Mr.

Ang Seong Kang Samuel

23

Certified True Copy of the Omnibus Order

dated 17 February 2012

Machine copy of private respondents Motion to

Depose

Machine copy of petitioners Comment

on/Opposition to the Motion to Depose
(including annexes)

31

Machine copy of the Pre-trial Order

Machine copy of the Amended Pre-trial Order

Machine copy of private respondents Motion to

Dismiss

Machine copy of private respondents Answer

31

Machine copy of petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order dated 17 March
2010

15

Machine Copy of the Order dated 31 May 2011

Machine Copy of the Order dated 12 September

2011

Machine Copy of private respondents Motion

for Reconsideration of the Order dated 12
September 2011

19

29

Machine Copy of private respondents Motion

for Time to File Reply to petitioners Opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14
October 2011

Machine Copy of private respondents Motion

to Admit Attached Reply (including the Reply)

10

Machine Copy of private respondents

Manifestation with Motion to Resolve & Motion
to Cancel the 25 October 2011 Scheduled
Hearing
Machine Copy of petitioners Comment and
Countermanifestation to private respondents
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve &
Motion to Cancel the 25 October 2011
Scheduled Hearing

Machine Copy of private respondents Notice of

Taking Deposition

Certified True Copy of the Order dated 10

November 2011

Machine Copy of petitioners Urgent Motion

for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10
November 2011 with Motion to Suspend Taking
of Deposition
Machine Copy of private respondents
Manifestation on the Taking of the Deposition
of Mr. Seong Ang Kang
Machine Copy of petitioners
Countermanifestation to private respondents
Manifestation on the Taking of the Deposition
of Mr. Seong Ang Kang

30