The Territorial Question in The Naga Nat

Article
The Territorial Question

in the Naga National
Movement
South Asian Survey

20(1) 2243
2013 ICSAC
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0971523114559818
http://sas.sagepub.com
Madhumita Das
Abstract
The article concerns itself with the current phase of the Indo-Naga peace talks,
seemingly rendered intransigent on the contentious issue of administrative integration of contiguous Naga-inhabited areas. It historically examines the ethnoterritoriality of the Naga national movement in the states of Nagaland, Manipur,
Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. This article finds that notwithstanding the soundness of the claims, Naga territoriality is not a non-negotiable given but an active
construction of the changing politics of the movement. The findings suggest that
any proposed federal arrangement should balance ethno-territorial urges with
historical peculiarities. A substantial measure of non-territorial autonomy, in a
mutually binding federal arrangement, would necessitate a redefinition of both
Naga ethno-national aspirations and the post-colonial Indian states insecurities.
However, it holds the potential for sustainable peace in the region.
Keywords
Naga national movement, ethno-nationalism, territoriality, Nagaland, Assam,
Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, India, peace process, federalism, non-territorial
autonomy
Introduction
The six-and-a-half decade long Indo-Naga conflict has seen paradigmatic changes
of perception and priorities on both the part of the Indian state as well as the Naga
national movement. The latter no longer struggles for absolute sovereignty in the
sense of being a legally recognised state in the international state system. Based
upon the recognition of the unique history and situation of Nagas,1 its ethnonational aspiration is instead centred on the integration of contiguous Nagainhabited areas in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.2 News of an
early conclusion to the 15 years of peace talks between the GoI and the NSCN(IM)
faction is currently doing the rounds. However, significant constituencies in the
Madhumita Das is Doctoral Candidate, International Politics, School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. E-mail: madhumita13@gmail.com
Downloaded from sas.sagepub.com at JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY on July 23, 2015
The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement
23
three states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have not agreed to the
territorial re-drawing of their boundaries, and nor has the NSCN(IM) scaled down
its demand for integration (Sangai Express 2012). The resulting political climate is
one of intransigence, suspicion, anxiety and heightened communal tension between
the Nagas and their adjoining communities.
This article seeks to make an intervention in the current debates on Naga
integration by examining the Naga ethno-territorial claims in each of these areas
individually. It progresses through eight sections. In the second section, Naga
nationalism and its territorial aspect is conceptually and historically revisited; to
throw light on, in the words of Bhushan (2004), why and in what perspective the
Nagas seek a settlement. Sections three, four, five and six historically deal with
the territoriality of the movement in the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and
Arunachal Pradesh, respectively. Factionalism, tribalism and reconciliation are
identified as the primary influencing factors on the territoriality of the movement
and are examined in the seventh section. In conclusion, a case is attempted for
substantial non-territorial federal devolution, involving a redefinition of aspirations
and insecurities, for both the Naga national movement as well as the post-colonial
Indian State.
Ethno-nationalism and Territoriality in the

Naga National Movement
As a collective of 4244 tribes each with its own distinct language and culture, the
Naga territorial expanseas maintained by the NSCN(IM) and backed by many
other Naga organisationsspans over an area of 120,000 km2. It is located
between 9330 E and 9515 E and 2430 N and 27 N (Shimray 2007: 16).
Apart from the state of Nagaland, the contiguous areas consist of the districts of
Ukhrul, Tamenglog, Senapati, Chandel and 26 villages in Churachandpur in
Manipur, parts of Dima Hasao, Karbi-Anglong, Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar in
Assam, and the districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh
(Shimray 2007: 16). While the census of India estimates the Naga population to
be around 1.98 million, estimates by both Naga civil society and Naga underground put the figure between 3.5 and 4 million.
The political expression of Naga national consciousness is of comparatively
recent vintage, kindled in the years between the two World Wars, and consolidated only in the protracted and violent struggle against the newly independent
Indian state. Thus, the primordial claim of the many disparate tribes forming a
Naga nation since time immemorial needs to be seen through Walker Connors
understanding of the nation as a self-differentiated ethnic group (1994), wherein
the self-view of ones group, rather than tangible characteristics, is of essence in
determining the existence of the nation (Connor 1972: 337). Further, the ethnonational character of Naga self-determination is also brought to the fore through
South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243
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Madhumita Das
Stanley Tambiahs argument. He sees such movements uniting the semantics of

primordial and historical claims with the pragmatics of calculated choice and
opportunism in dynamic contexts of political and economic competition between
interest groups (Tambiah 1989, cited in Lotha 2009: 81).
The standard narrative of Naga nationalismthat of a movement of resistance
against Indian invasion; the occupation of a nation that was never colonised or in
political relationship with any other entitybelies such calculated choice.
Historically, NagaAhom relations embraced the northern and northeastern Naga
tribes. The British foray was primarily into the south and southeastern tracts,
while the kingdom of Manipur had a longer interaction with the southern Naga
tribes. The Nagas in British Burma, and in the Free Tribal Areas beyond the Naga
Hills District (NHD) of Assam, were the ones who had never been subject to outside interaction or interference. It was, therefore, only in these latter areas that the
Indian Armys presence was perceived as occupation. The extremist forces in the
incipient Naga national movement extended this latter narrative of occupation and
subsequent resistance to the entire Naga discourse, vindicating Ernest Renans
observation that forgetting and even historical error are crucial factors in the creation of a nation (quoted in Bhabha 1990: 11). Nonetheless, though coming from
disparate histories, the collective experience of violence at the hands of the Indian
Army post-1950s played a crucial role in forging unity and a common national
consciousness among the various Naga tribes.
As a result, the composite Naga territorial identity today runs on a collision
course with the historical territorial identities of the Meitei and Ahom kingdoms
and contributes to cartographic anxieties (Krishna 1994: 508) of the current day
states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The legitimacy of the Naga
cause is maintained by the logic of ethno-territoriality. According to Zariski, this
consists of the claim that a culture group has patrimonial rights to a territory separate from other groups (Zariski 1989, quoted in Dahlman and Trent 2010: 414). In
the continuously evolving Naga national movement, such ethno-territoriality does
not merely rest on a prior claim, but is sustained through the active process of
strategising to affect, influence or control resources or people by controlling area
(Sacks 1986: 1). Through both coercive and socialising mechanisms (Vollaard
2009: 261), Naga ethno-territoriality consists of boundary-making exercises
aimed at all non-Naga constituencies, as well as movements of territorial bonding
directed towards the Nagas themselves (Herb 2004: 144). The demand for integration needs to be evaluated in perspective of such Naga ethno-territoriality,
manifest uniquely in each area. This is the task of the subsequent sections.
Nagaland
The Treaty of Yandabo, which was inked in 1826 at the culmination of the first
Anglo-Burman War, demarcated Naga territories for the first time (Shimray
2007: 1). Through several cycles of raids and pacification, the boundaries of the
25
NHD were formalised by 1881. Acting as a direct agent of the British Crown, the
governor administered the NHD, though it was attached to the province of Assam.
The territories east to the NHDknown variously as Free Naga Area and
Excluded and Un-administered Areasformed the ambiguous edges of the
boundary with Burma.
The Naga Club, formed in 1918, was the first representative body of the Nagas
to the outside world. It was mainly a conglomeration of the major tribes in the
NHD, with nominal representation from tribes in Manipur Naga and Free Naga
territories. Yet, in presenting a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929,
the Naga Club sought to speak for Naga tribes both within and outside the NHD.
Similarly, the Naga National Council (NNC), time and again, declared that it
stood for the solidarity of all Naga tribes. Its proposal to bring all tribes under a
single administrative roof found mention in the various Plans of Action submitted
to the British Crown, the Cabinet Mission, to Jawaharlal Nehru, and to the
Constituent Assemblys Sub-committee, the Advisory Committee for Tribal
Affairs. It was also a central tenet of the Hydari Agreement of 1947, which was
later discredited by the GoI (Lotha 2009: 38).
The beginning of Naga armed resistance, following the Indian Armys infiltration into the NHD and the Free Naga Areas, saw the first recruits from among the
southern Nagas (Sema, Angami, Chakesang) and subsequently from the eastern
counterparts (Konyak, Chang, Phom, Kheimungan) (Nibedon 1978: 46). The first
formal declaration of sovereignty was made in September 1954 in the Free Naga
Area, followed by the installation of the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN)
on 22 March 1956, in Rengma Naga country in the southern part of NHD (Ao
2002: 51). As the Indo-Burma border was not officially delimited before 1967,
this period also saw the consolidation of bases deep on the Burmese side. In 1957,
the central government introduced the Armed Forces Special Powers (Assam and
Manipur) Ordinance accompanied with the administrative restructuring of the
NHD and the Free Naga Area into a union territory by the name of Naga Hills
Tuensang Area (NHTA).
Later, led by the moderates and mediators, the Naga Peoples Convention
(NPC) demanded integration as the basis for settlement with India in all its resolutions from 1957 onwards. The Nagaland state that was envisaged in the 16-point
proposal of the NPC was to comprise of the contiguous areas of Assam, Manipur,
the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and NHTA. The state subsequently created in 1963 only consisted of NHTA, and was thus in contravention of this
demand. As a result, among the first actions of the newly created Nagaland State
Legislature in December 1964 was the adoption of a resolution wherein it was
unanimously resolved that the Government of India be urged for the integration of
the Naga areas adjoining the state of Nagaland to fulfill the aspirations by the Naga
peoples Convention held at Mokokchung in 1959 (cited in Shimray 2007: 90).
Subsequently, similar resolutions have been adopted in 1970, 1994 and 2003.
Some accounts claim that the plan for Naga integration, at least till the 1970s
could not have embraced Manipur, as the latter had not acceded to India till
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Madhumita Das
1949 and remained a union territory till 1972 (Yonuo 1982: 17785; Paratt
2005: 22021). However, the Nagaland state government is believed to have
made formal representations to the central government to precisely this effect in
1967 and 1969 (Jusho 2004: 29). This claim gains credence by the fact that the
first ceasefire in 1964 between FGN and GoI embraced not just the state of
Nagaland, but also the North Cachar Hills of Assam and the Naga Hills of
Manipur (Nibedon 1978: 116). However, the six rounds of peace talks and their
subsequent failure in 1972 saw FGN concentrating more on the question of
sovereignty than integration. The latter issue, thus, got pushed to the background
of the Naga national question. This played into the strategy of GoI that by now
had started abetting factionalism and tribalism as a means to break the back of
the separatist movement. Therefore, in case of the Shillong Agreement of 1975,
wherein a section of the NNC acquiesced to the Indian Constitution (subject to
the formulation of issues for a final settlement), its territorial writ extended only
to the state of Nagaland.
The dominant narrative of Naga nationalism considered not just the Shillong
Agreement but also the creation of the state of Nagaland as the biggest impediment to Naga aspirations and a final solution (Lotha 2009: 188). By some accounts,
the Nagaland state government and the first Indian political party, the Naga
National Organisation (that subsequently merged with the Indian National
Congress), was tasked by the central government and the intelligence agencies to
convince the Naga populace that statehood was the best deal that the Nagas could
secure (Gokhale 1961: 39). Instead, before long, the need to be relevant to the
Naga population and political survival dictated that all political parties contest
elections by engaging the Naga underground and facilitating a final solution
between the GoI and the underground.
With the formation of the NSCN in 1980 and its subsequent split into the IM- and
Khaplang (K)-led factions in 1988, the underground had secured well-demarcated
spheres of influence in the state of Nagaland. They had also formed tacit alliances
with one or the other political party, symbolising what Baruah (2005: 13) refers to
as durable disorder.3 The ceasefire and peace talks with the NSCN(IM) from
1997 onwards have witnessed the demand for integration superseding complete
sovereignty. Things seem to have come full circle since then. In the current phase,
the state of Nagaland is no longer the biggest impediment to Naga ethno-national
aspirations, but its fulcrum.
Some commentators hold that the NSCN(IM)s biggest worry is not the central
government, but an inconvenient Nagaland state government (Ravi 2012). The
rise of the Nagaland Peoples Front (NPF) since 2003, as the primary party of the
ruling Democratic Alliance of Nagaland coalition is also widely considered to
be the doing of NSCN(IM). In 2010, the NPF changed its name from Nagaland
to NPF and expanded into the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur.
In 2012, the Nagaland State Legislature managed to galvanise a rare show of
unanimity by forging the Joint Legislators Forum (JLF) across party lines.
Comprising of all 60 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), the JLF offered
27
to vacate office in order to facilitate any final solution between the GoI and the
NSCN(IM). However, significant sections of the Naga populace refused to be
moved by the gesture, seeing it instead as a further ploy to use the Indo-Naga
political issue to score points in the absence of substantial developmental work
and rampant corruption (Yhome 2012). Predictably, all talk of Solutions, not
Elections (Morung Express 2012) took a backseat as all parties fielded candidates
in the 12th Nagaland Assembly elections in February 2013. The ruling NPF, in
power since 2003, fought the 2013 elections on the promise of pursuing the integration project and facilitating the Indo-Naga political solution. Its subsequent
victory with an overwhelming majority suggests that the said issues still resonate
powerfully among the people of Nagaland.
From this cursory look at the practice of territoriality in the state of Nagaland,
it clearly emerges that the demand for integration had been on the platter from its
inception. Decades of violent factionalism, added to the territorial nature of Naga
tribalism, have dictated that the state plays both a divisive as well as a constructive role in the integration project.
Manipur
In the Manipur Hills, the appellate Naga was not used to refer to the concerned
tribes till as late as the beginning of the twentieth century (Tarapot 2003: 204).
The 1830s saw the kingdom of Manipur attempt several raids into Angami Naga
territories at the behest of the British. With the failure of such pacification, the
boundaries of Manipur and NHD were delimited at the boundary of Mao and
Angami Naga territories in 1834 (Tarapot 2003: 89). Since then, the territorial
expanse of Manipur, at 22,327 km2, has been more or less constant.
The Nagas of the Manipur Hills shared several formative experiences in common with Naga tribes elsewhere, among them being recruitment into the British
Labour Corps in the First World War and formation of the Naga Club. Yet, in the
1940s, the nascent movement of independence and resistance in this area took a
very different trajectory. Even as the NNC in the NHD was making official representations on behalf of Nagas everywhere, the Zeliang, Rogmei and Kabui Nagas,
under the appellate of the Zeliangrong, came into the fold of a powerful nativist
movement under Jadonang and his disciple Rani Gaidinliu. As one of the largest
conglomerates in the region, the politics of the Zeliangrong Nagas are even today
often at loggerheads with the dominant politics of the ethno-national movement
(Thomas 2012).
Alongside that of Jadonang, a parallel movement was underway in the form of
the Naga National League (NNL). In 1946, the League rejected participation in the
Manipur Assembly Elections, ostensibly the first to be held on the basis of universal adult franchise in the entire subcontinent. Seeking the secession of not just the
Naga but all Hill tribes from the Meitei-dominated valley, the NNL paid taxes not to
Manipur but the district commissioner of the adjoining NHD (Shimray 2007:8287).
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Madhumita Das
With the beginning of Naga armed resistance in 1956, large parts of the Manipur
Hills were immediately under the effective control of FGN (Franke 2009: 71).
The Mao Naga territory of Manipur also formed a base for entry into Burmese
Naga territory. In recognition of this fact, the ceasefire of 1964 embraced four
subdivisions in Manipur alongside the NHD and the North Cachar District of
Assam (Nibedon 1978: 116).
Even as the talks between FGN and GoI teetered, an alternate movement led by
Rishang Keishing took shape in Manipur in 1968. The Naga Integration Council
(NIC) made repeated demands to GoI to append the Naga territory in Manipur to the
newly created state of Nagaland. But for this, it was denounced by NNC and FGN.
As the underground government concentrated exclusively on the attainment of sovereignty, it considered the NIC and the state of Nagaland as reactionary and antinational for indulging in Indian Constitution-based activity (Shimray 2007: 99).
In those days, Naga civil society was not as vocal as at present. Fearing for
their lives and prospects from both the Indian establishment as well as the Naga
underground, most Nagas did not sustain the integration movement. NIC instead
took to electoral politics once Manipur obtained statehood. It merged with the
Indian National Congress in 1972, under the condition that the Congress does not
oppose the Naga Integration Movement, and does not consider (it) as antiparty, anti-state and unconstitutional activity (Shimray 2007: 97). Political compulsions of the time dictated that, thereafter, the NIC keep aside the demand for
integration. Dedicating itself to Manipur state-based politics, Rishang Keishing
went on to become the states chief minister several times.
The question of integration resurfaced in Manipur in the 1990s, but this time
more vocally as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. The Manipur
Legislature adopted several resolutions upholding the territorial borders of the
state: in 1995, 1997 and 1998. It also adopted 4 August 1997 as State Integrity
Day, when the ceasefire between the GoI and the NSCN(IM) took effect. The
dynamics this time lay specifically in the gradual consolidation of power by the
NSCN(IM). With its Prime Minister Thuingaleng Muivaha Tangkhul Naga
hailing from Ukhrul in Manipurthe Manipur Naga Hills emerged as the fulcrum
of the armed resistance. By some accounts, in the 1980s and 1990s, most parts of
Nagaland state were virtually guerrilla free, while the Manipur Hills witnessed
fierce fighting (Lotha 2009: 232). But unlike 1964, when Manipur still had the
status of a union territory, this time around, the ceasefire could not be declared as
officially operative in the state.4
It was the Imphal Valley of Manipur that rose up in massive protest against the
July 2001 declaration that provided for the ceasefire between the GoI and
theNSCN(IM) to be extended without territorial limits. The territoriality of the
ceasefire was now perceived as coterminous with the project of Naga integration.
Many Meitei-dominated organisations reiterated the argument that:
Historically, successive legal and administrative decisions taken between 1826 and
1972 affirmed and reaffirmed the distinct territory and identity of Manipur. Manipur has

29
since been maintaining its distinct territory as sanctified, administratively and legally by
the Manipur Merger agreement of 1949 and the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation)
Act 1971 read with Article 1 of the Constitution of India. (Jusho 2004: 29)
In the event of any change in the territorial borders of Manipur, threats from across
the Meitei civil society and underground were now made to review and revoke the
1949 Merger Agreement altogether.
The communal divide sharpened with the NPC under the aegis of the influential Manipur Hill-based United Naga Council, which insisted that Nagas have
nowhere at any point given their allegiance to the Meiteis, or their Maharaja to
decide their future, orally, or through an agreement. Neither in history were the
Nagas given land by the Meiteis. The Nagas were the first settlers in the land
where they are today (quoted in Jusho 2004: 32). Representatives of all the Naga
tribes across the four states endorsed this Senapati Declaration of August 2001 in
Kohima. While almost all the Naga members of the Legislative Assembly and
Members of Parliament in the state signed the Declaration, many later confessed
to doing so under duress (Oinam 2002: 2684). The confession is an important indicator of compulsions of political survival that animates Naga politics, alongside the
emotional force of ethno-nationalism.5
In like manner, the aspiration for the integration of southern Nagaland with
Nagaland, was thereafter sought to be realised not just through the Indo-Naga
peace talks but also through several other Naga initiatives on the ground. The
foremost amongst them was triggered by the Manipur governments move to pass
the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils (3rd Amendment) Act in 2008. Since
its introduction in 1971, not just the Naga, but also the Kuki, Hmar and Paite bodies
have fiercely resisted the District Councils Act. It is considered as a fig leaf to
maintain the valleys control over the hills by way of quasi-dictatorial powers of
the governor (Franke 2009: 115). The series of blockades of the Imphal Valley
since 2008, imposed by the All Naga Students Association of Manipur, culminated in the United Naga Council (UNC) declaring that all administrative relations with the state government of Manipur stand severed as of July 2010. It
proposed instead an Alternate Arrangement mechanism, for which several
rounds of tripartite talks have been held between the Manipur state government,
the UNC and the central government. Brushing aside large-scale criticism of the
Alternative Arrangement as undercutting the core Naga demand for integration,
the Naga Students Federation President Mutsikhoyo Yhobu described it as a first
step to enable the Nagas to administratively separate and distinguish themselves
from the Meiteis (Manchanda and Bose 2011: 57). He expected also that eventually the Nagas of Arunachal and Assam would follow the same track.
All this has in turn reignited the demand for a Kuki homeland, overlapping
large swathes of territory included in the southern Nagalim project. Historically,
it is alleged that the British settled the Kukis in the Naga-inhabited hills of
Manipur inorder to check Naga raids on the valley (Tarapot 2003: 202). Though
the NNC in all its deputations sought to represent the Kuki population inhabiting
30
Madhumita Das
the so-called Naga territories, with the coming to power of the NSCN(IM), the
Kuki community was allegedly extended secondary treatment in their own lands.
NagaKuki competition over the control of the trade at the border town of Moreh
triggered off the infamous clashes of the 1990s. Three years of fighting left over
1,000 Kukis dead and over 100,000 homeless (Kipgen 2013). The Kukis in turn
have started to agitate for separate statehood through both constitutional as well
as armed means.
The year 2012 saw the entry of the NPF into Manipur, which was then at the
helm of the Nagaland state government. It managed to win only four of the 12
assembly seats contested on the plank of integration in the legislative elections.
While it is difficult to fathom a common Naga verdict on the integration issue on
the basis of the election results, Pradip Phanjoubams observation provides a
deeper perspective. He sees in it an innate understanding among the different
ethnic communities that regardless of politics and polemics, they are the ones who
wouldby the compulsions of geography and economycontinue to be neighbours (Phanjoubam 2012: 16).
The fractured verdict was nevertheless a reason enough for renewed anxiety
and agitation for the Congress government of Manipur and other Meitei-dominated
political parties. The Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh and several MLAs have
been making rounds of the capital, demanding an amendment and revocation of
Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, which provides for alteration of state boundaries (Dholabhai 2013). On occasion, even rejecting proposals of application of the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to the hill areas, the chief minister has demanded
assurance for the long-term protection of the states territorial and administrative
boundaries (Nagaland Post 2013).
It is for the state of Manipur, therefore, that the project of Naga integration
would have the most severe implications. Indias approach to the creation of
states in the northeastern region has often been criticised as the imposition of a
cosmetic federal regional order (Baruah 2005: 37). Divorced from issues of
fiscal viability or compatibility with the constitution, this consisted in the twoway process of empowering grassroots communities from below while imposing
state machinery from above (Biswas and Suklyabaidya 2008: 121). In the case of
Manipur, however, the Meitei majority anxiety over its territorial integrity is
traced back to the roughly 2,000-year old existence of Manipur as an independent
kingdom.
Without territorial or even administrative rights over the hills, Imphal Valley,
which covers 2,200 km2 and is home to 64 per cent of the states population,
would risk losing its statehood, and thus, the last vestige of its composite national
identity.6 Some accounts also hold that, with land as the most crucial resource, the
Meitei threat of disintegration could also have deep economic roots (Shimray
2007: 107, 110). On the other hand, large sections of the hill population nurse
long-standing grudges against Meitei dominance over development, economic
and political participation. Manipur today stands as a cauldron of dysfunctional
governance, the flourishing of insurgent outfits and identity crises, all of which
31
get only compounded by the corrosive experience of living under the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA). In such a milieu, the aggressive ethnoterritorial nature of Naga integration project, along with Meitei and Kuki retaliation, has ended up perpetuating intense communalism in Manipur.
Assam
The project of Naga integration has had a very different history in Assam from
that in Manipur. Here, the claim is to 1,200 km2 of territory primarily in the reserve
forests of the Desoi Valley, Nambor, Rengma, Diphu and Dhansiri (EPW 1972:
968). In addition to the ethno-territorial claim of Nagas being the original settlers
on the concerned lands, the area is also a witness to a long drawn and bitter boundary dispute between the states of Assam and Nagaland.
When the NHD was created in 1866, it included in addition to the present-day
territory of Nagaland state, the current districts of Nagaon, Jorhat and Karbi
Anglong. The imperatives of colonising the district for commercial exploitation
led to denotification of large swathes of the NHD and their transfer to Sibsagar
(856 sq. miles [2,217 km2]) and Nowgong (1,929 sq. miles [4,996 km2]) by 1898.
Dimapur and adjoining areas were retransferred to the NHD in 1930 (Alechimba
1970: 129). The first official Naga claims to the reserve forests are to be found in
the Hydari Agreement of 1947. Later, even the 16-point agreement proposed by
the NPC demanded the constitution of the Nagaland state along the Notification
of 1867 and not 1925. From the time of its inception, the Nagaland state government has pursued the dispute through both legal and political means.
The Naga government has encouraged the settlement of Naga villages and the
collection of agricultural and hut-tax along the disputed border. It must be mentioned that though the lands are ancestrally claimed by Nagas, it is currently home
to large Assamese and migrant Bangladeshi populations. The Nagaland state government has also allegedly encouraged politically influential Nagas to invest their
newly accumulated wealth in land of the region, thus providing patronage to construction, forestry and other economic activity (EPW 1989: 75657). It also
launched the subdivisions of Newland and Kohobotu in 1991, and Uriamghat and
Hukai in 2006. By current estimates, Nagaland is said to have encroached upon
662.4 km2 territory officially in possession of Assam (Hazarika 2011). Attempts at
trying to make good the status quo have been seen repeatedly during Nagaland
Assembly elections, to set up polling stations in the districts of Golaghat and
Sivsagar (Times News Network 2013). In the past, the border issue has also
served as a trump card for the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee. In 1988, it
is believed to have won assembly elections on the canard that the opposition
United Democratic Front, if voted to power, would give up the disputed lands
(EPW 1988: 1869).
In addition, the boundary dispute has frequently taken the form of full-fledged
border wars, requiring ceasefires and third-party mediation. Most notable among
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Madhumita Das
these are the clashes of 1969, 1979, 1985, and similar war-like situations in 2004
and 2007 (Gohain 2007: 3280; Goswami 2007). The Sundaram Commission was
set up in 1972 to look into the dispute. It came out in favour of Assam and was
rejected as a basis for settlement by the Nagaland state government (Misra 1987:
2195). To interrogate the matter afresh, the Variava Commission was set up post
the Merapani violence of 1985. It was plagued by the central and Assam state
governments admission that they were unable to substantiate their claims on
account of the maps being lost (Mohan 2008). Since 2010, in accordance with
another Supreme Court directive, the issue is to be resolved bilaterally between
the two states with the help of centrally appointed mediators.
While Nagaland insists on a dialogue from a political and historical perspective, Assam insists on following a constitutionally defined boundary (Laishram
2005). The Assamese side also invokes Ahom and British records to claim that
while there were occasional Naga raids on the concerned forests and plains, the
Ahoms had not at any point conceded territorial rights to the Nagas (EPW 1972:
968). In response, the Naga insistence is that the ancient NagaAhom relationship
not be understood in a ruler and subject perspective. As elaborated by Elwin
(1961: 18) and Baruah (2005: 101), it had an especially complex, spatial, cultural
and political dynamic. But with political realities like demography constantly in
flux, and the strength of Naga patrimonial claims to these lands weakening, the
efforts of the Nagaland state government have often been overtaken and supplemented by the underground national movement.
As early as 1958, United Mikir, parts of Cachar, and Sibsagar districts were
also brought into the folds of the AFSPA, on account of the Naga Federal Army
being deeply entrenched there (Franke 2009: 73). The North Cachar Hills was
also under the purview of the first Indo-Naga ceasefire of 1964. Since 1988,
the region has seen turf wars between the NSCN(IM) and (K) for control of
economic benefits accruing from agriculture and lucrative mineral and oil
deposits. In this project, the Nagaland state government is believed to have
made common cause with the NSCN(IM) (Gohain 2007: 3283). This had also
pulled in the involvement of the United Liberation Front of Assam. The latter
has continually opposed the maps of Greater Nagalim being circulated in the
region (Anurag 2006).
In tandem with the respective state and underground governments, the students
movements on both sides of the border have been polarised. The Naga Students
Federation has successfully helped in the building up of the issue as an effective
plank for the agitation of Greater Nagaland or Nagalim (EPW 1985: 1061). On
the other hand, the All Assam Students Union and the Asom Jatiyobadi Yuva
Chhatra Parishad have warned repeatedly that in the event that the states borders
are redrawn, a thousand Muivahs would be born in Assam (Misra 2003: 596).
In the midst of such heightened tensions, the larger civil society on both states,
especially along the border areas, have persistently resisted the exploitation of
the border dispute. In the Merapani Joint Declaration of 2004, the setting up of
the joint Border Peace Coordination Committee was proposed, which would
33
foster harmonious relationships between peoples on both sides and attempt to

resolve issues through indigenous methods without involving both governments
(Goswami 2007).
In spite of the mediation processes underway at the governmental and people
level, the contradictory territorial claims are compounded by deep-seated differences in perception of the issue. On the Assamese side, this is discerned from the
stand of the current Congress Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi. Lending full support to
an early resolution of the Indo-Naga political issue, he insists in fully backing the
emotional integration of the Nagas but without a change in the territorial borders
(Dholabhai 2012a). The dominant Naga perspective of the situation on the other
hand is best elaborated by U.A. Shimray: there are certain tracts of land, the
ownership of which lies with the Nagas and present possession with Assam. From
the standpoint of the Nagas, the matter is merely of returning to the Nagas those
Naga areas now occupied by Assam (2007: 129).
Arunachal Pradesh
Designated as a state as late as 1987, Arunachali identity remains a post-facto
development. The bone of contention here lies in the districts of Tirap, Changlang
and Longding, bordering Naga territory in Burma. The Nagas here belong to the
Tangsa, Wakching, Nocte and Singpho tribes and were a part of the Free Naga
areas during Colonial rule. The creation of the NEFA absorbed with it the two
districts, in spite of the efforts of the NNC, who were lobbying hard to have them
included in the NHTA (Ao 2002: 214).
National consciousness had not emerged among these tribes during the early
decades of the movement. According to at least one account, they had maintained
strict neutrality in giving Phizo and his men safe passage through their territory,
when the latter were on their way to China (Nibedon 1978: 160). The low tenor of
the national movement here is also substantiated by the fact that the 1964 ceasefire, which embraced the Naga Hills in Manipur, and North Cachar in Assam, did
not include Tirap and Changlang. It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s
that the districts became the scene of turf wars between the NSCN(IM) and the
NSCN(K). The abundance of petroleum and other natural and mineral resources
added incentive to the underground to intensify their movement in this area.
Successive Arunachali state governments have tried to contain the fast-spreading
movement to be a part of the proposed Nagalim by providing various sops, among
them being the constitution of a separate Department of Tirap, Changlang and
Longding, for the targeted development of the region (Tara 2004).
In their agitation for a separate Frontier Nagaland state, the Eastern Naga
Peoples Organisation (ENPO) also includes the contiguous districts in Arunachal
Pradesh. The demand in this case is primarily for development and basic necessities.
In the year 2012, the long period of relative peace fostered by the ongoing
34
Madhumita Das
ceasefire tempted not just the underground but also the NPF to spread its network
in the districts. This has ignited two contradictory debates: bodies like the
Arunachal Pradesh Students Union hold that there are no Nagas in Arunachal and
that the four tribes in question are of Arunachalese identity. Simultaneously, they
also condemn the NPF for dividing the populaceamong communal lines, claiming, for example, that though the Nyishis are the most populous tribe in the state,
they have not constituted themselves into any Union (Arunachal Times 2007).
Much to their chagrin, official records like the Scheduled Tribe Notifications
continue to list the four tribes as Nagas. Arunachali civil society also expresses
frustration at the state government for turning a blind eye to the growing movement of Naga nationalism, leading to widespread fears that Nagalim would be
overwhelmingly carved out of Assam and Arunachal. They see the Naga national
movement as a more immediate and potent threat to Arunachali territorial identity than the overtures by China (Dorjee 2010). Against this anxiety, therefore,
the current Congress Chief Minister Nabam Tuki discards any talk of Naga integration, maintaining instead that the welfare of the Nagas in Arunachal Pradesh
is the concern and responsibility of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh
(Hanghal 2012).
Factionalism and Reconciliation

Elaborating on the centrality of integration for Naga nationalism, Naga scholars
like U.A. Shimray hold that land itself is Naga history (Shimray 2007: 130). An
examination of the movement in the four states, as undertaken above, lends considerable credence to such a claim. However, the clan and tribal nature of Naga
landholding,7 along with the tumultuous history of inter-tribal factionalism, has
dictated that the Naga integration project is beset by similarly severe internal contestations as external challenges.
It has long been alleged that the initial NNC was influenced by the Ao and
Angami elite, with only a cosmetic representation of the other tribes, and hence
devoid of popular resonance (Shimray 2005: 62). The first time tribalism undercut
the operations of the Naga underground government and divided the movement
was in the 1960s. The Naga Federal Army, working disconnectedly in the jungles
under the distant leadership of A.Z. Phizo, interacted internally for the first time
during the first ceasefire period (Means 1971: 1008). Owing to strategic and operational differences, under the leadership of Kaito Sema and Kughato Sukhai, the
Sumis tore away from Phizo to form the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland
(RGN). Allegedly abetted by the Indian Army (Nibedon 1978: 240), the RGN
helped in the capture of a large number of Naga Federal Army personnel on their
way back from training in China. Later, the RGN was disbandedthe event
staged as a surrenderand was absorbed as a battalion of the Central Reserve
Police Force (Nibedon 1978: 314).
35
It was the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, however, that drove a permanent wedge between the moderates in the NNC and the radicals. The latter were
later to form the NSCN in the eastern Naga tracts in Burma. However, territorial
divisions based upon tribal loyalties came to dominate the Naga national discourse
only post 1988, with the split within the NSCN into the IM and K factions. Turf
wars for territorial control saw a spike in violence, even as external tactical partnerships were being re-aligned. The NSCN(K) rallied several strong insurgent/
resistance outfits in the northeastern region into the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary
Front (IBRF). The NSCN(IM) followed suit with the Self-Defense United Front
of the South East Himalayan Region.
By 1997, with an estimated 6,000 active fighters, the IM faction held sway
over Tamenglong, Senapati and Ukhrul districts of Manipur, over Tirap and
Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh, New Cachar Hills of Assam, and Mokokchung,
Zhuneboto and Wokha districts of Nagaland. The NSCN(K), with an estimated
cadre strength of 3,500, held out in Myanmar and in the Eastern Districts of
Nagaland (Franke 2009: 138).
Though both factions proclaim their commitment to the integration of all Nagainhabited areas, their operational imperatives often discount the cause. One such
instance occurred during the NagaKuki clashes between 1992 and 1995. The
NSCN(K)s alliance with the Kuki National Organisation, as part of the IBRF,
dictated that it take on the NSCN(IM), which was allegedly responsible for the
bloodshed in Manipur. In response, the NSCN(K) served quit notices to the entire
Tangkhul community residing in Nagaland (EPW 1994: 68). Through the years,
even the Nagaland state government has been involved in the turf wars between
the two factions. The Nagaland Congress is believed to be in a mutually cooperative relationship with the K faction, while allegedly, the NPF is the backhanded
creation of the IM faction designed to regain control over Nagaland (Ravi 2012).
Apart from the underground, challenges to the Naga integration project are
posed by inter-tribal grievancesboth real and imaginedover issues of governance and development. Tribal divisions are institutionalised in state structures to the
extent where all government prescriptions and policy decisions are implemented by
paying due consideration to tribal interests. In effect, these considerations recognise
tribal divisions as formal political units (Dev 2003: 1639). One of the stark outcomes of such a state of affairs is the ENPO. Alleging the lack of development and
opportunities for the tribes in the districts of Mon, Tuensang, Longleng and Kiphire,
and Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh, the ENPO has for a decade now
been agitating for the creation of a separate Frontier Nagaland state.
It is in this context, therefore, that reconciliation emerges as an issue at par
with, if not more serious than, the project of integration. The need for reconciliation was spelt out as early as 1957 in the NPC. It also became the plank on which
successive political parties (beginning with the Democratic Party of Nagaland in
the 1960s) contested elections. In the 1990s, when the project of integration superseded sovereignty, for the first time reconciliation went hand in hand with the
emergence of a vocal Naga civil society. The Naga Students Forum (NSF) took
36
Madhumita Das
the lead, coining the term Nagalim and declaring that, Even more than in the
past, there are definite signs blossoming everywhere signalling that a practical
solidarity is workable in the midst of diversified Naga tribes. This is a workable,
practical basis for a unified Naga Lim (NSF 1995 in Lotha 2009: 192). The
NSCN(IM) adopted the nomenclature in 1999.
With the idea of inter-tribal consensus taking centre stage, the NSCN(IM)
encouraged the revival of consultation with the Naga Hoho. This pan-Naga association had been the bedrock of the legitimacy of the earlier NNC and the Federal
Naga government (Nibedon 1978: 26679). Along with many other civil society
organisations, the Naga Hoho forms the Consultative Body of the NSCN(IM) in
its negotiations with the GoI. It has representation from all four states.
The boldest moves were made in 2008, when the Naga Baptist Church
Council (NBCC), the Naga Hoho and many other civil society organisations
founded the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). Through its relentless
efforts, not only has the FNR checked the spurt in factional and inter-tribal violence and saved many lives, it has also encouraged dialogue between the underground factions. The Naga scholar Charles Chasie explains the significance of
the reconciliation project:
We created a Cause, before we could fully become a people. This was alright if it helped
us to become a people. And initially, the Cause did accelerate the process of our tribes
coming together. But the Cause, for various reasons, soon preceded the process of our
becoming a people and seemed to have gone on its own. The building of our nationhood
got neglected and even began to slide backwards. What further accentuated this neglect
was the explanation that our nationhood was already a fact and that our people would
automatically unite and become one, cooperating with each other, once the Cause was
achieved. The logical extension of such thinking process is that only a few traitors
were standing in the way. (Chasie 2004: 135)
Recent pronouncements by the GoI hinted at an early resolution of the talks with
the NSCN(IM). At the same time, the former has also maintained that a final solution would be subject to all Naga underground factions coming together (Dholabhai
2012b). Towards this end, the FNR has been trying to bring all the underground
factions under a single national government. Over 50,000 people attended the
FNR meeting of 29 February 2012. It saw leaders of different underground factions share the stage and communicate their stand on reconciliation to the Naga
public (Lotha 2012a).
The Naga Concordant, that so resulted, has since then adopted several common
official positions. Significant among them is the decision against interference in
the Nagaland Assembly elections of 2013 (Morung Express 2013). Pointing at the
challenging nature of the reconciliation process, Chasie insists, however, that
you simply cant build a nation without massive and continuous nation-building
works (Chasie 2004: 136). For the Naga national movement then, a renewed
attempt at nation-building through reconciliation has become indispensable to the
agenda of integration.
37
Conclusion
As inferred from the historical examination, the goal of Naga integration is not of
recent origin. Nor is it a substitute for the aspiration of absolute sovereignty. The
attempted solidarity of all Naga tribes, and the desire to live under one administration, is constitutive of and indispensable to Naga nationalism. However, the ethnoterritoriality of the movement has played out in varied ways across the different
regions it claims as its own. It faces serious legal, constitutional, economic, political
and demographic challenges. If the legitimacy of the movement is based on the
rhetoric of nationalism, the Naga national movement faces serious challenges of
contending nationalisms in Manipur and to an extent, in Assam.
The intransigence arising from such overlapping claims to land lends itself
primarily to two courses of action. The first involves a resort to power, in order to
assimilate, suppress or eradicate contradictory claims and positions. Under current circumstances, this is the path towards ethnic cleansing between the Nagas
and Kukis, heightened communal sentiments with the Meitei, naked use of force
in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, and civil war-like conditions among the Nagas
themselves. Not only is this option counter-productive to the Naga national
project, it also falls short of the kind of security the Indian State would envisage
for the region, if it wants to fully realise its Look East policy. With the Naga
armed resistance having historically been at the forefront of all insurgencies in the
northeastern region, the issue is also likely to have tremendous demonstration
effect for the future of ethnic struggles, as well as for the flexibility and viability
of the Indian Constitutional framework.
It is in this spirit, therefore, that keen observers of the Indo-Naga talks like
Abraham Lotha make a plea for both sides to revisit their long-held perceptions
about their own roles and demands. According to him:
Both parties are locked in the mindset and structure of governance derived from a
fundamentalist interpretation of the nation-state, thereby reducing their relationship
to one of inevitable antagonism between winner/loser and ruler/ruled reminiscent of
colonialism, instead of making the relationship into one of mutually beneficial postcolonial co-existence. (Lotha 2012b)
It should be added here that the deep-rooted issues with a territorially conceptualised notion of nationalism, or nation-statism, need not obliterate the category of
the nation altogether. Many have lamented the impoverished imaginary of agitating ethno-national movements, in as much as they end up mimicking the same
power structures that they seek to escape (Appadurai 1996: 166; Nag 2001: 4754).
However, speaking especially for indigenous peoples, others see the nation as not
just an obligatory but a liberatory category in the global public sphere that
lends itself to both political realities and subversive political imaginaries (Biolsi
2005: 240). Biolsi also makes a case for treating non-nation-state geographies
not as anomalies or exceptions to the nation-state rule but as concrete realities in
which many people live and think about their rights and interests (2005: 254).
38
Madhumita Das
It is in this sense that GoI can recognise the legitimacy and aspirations of the
Naga nation, and not just on the strength of its armed movements. Equally, this is
also the sense in which the Naga national movement could understand its own
position vis--vis the Indian state, and more importantly that of its neighbouring
communities and peoples. Therefore, the impasse over territorial integration could
lead to an exploration by both parties of the various forms of substantial nonterritorial autonomy.
The anthropologist B.K. Roy Burman has long proposed internal selfdetermination for the Nagas, on the lines of the Saami Council in Scandinavia,
consisting of legislative, judicial, administrative and development-oriented powers
vested in coordinating bodies (Prakash 2008: 890891). Similarly, proposals of a
second legislative chamber for the Nagas of all states (Baruah 2005 in Shimray
2007: 128), non-territorial apex councils (Verghese 1996: 476) and creative use of
Article 258 of the Indian Constitution (Verghese 2010) have also been made.8
Any such move would require considerable political will on the part the GoI to
either reinterpret the Constitution to accommodate robust minority nationalism,
or to open up a further layer of sovereignty through creative amendments to the
Constitution. It is often noted that the Indian asymmetric federal arrangement that
currently exists in relation to Kashmir and the Northeast is more de jure than de
facto (Baruah 2005; Tillin 2006). Therefore, as Miaz proposes, Indias experiment
with its federalism, in this instance, would do well to keep definitions open-ended,
understand federalism not as a fact, but as a process, and base it on the twin pillars
of shared rule and self-rule (Miaz 1999: 5158). A sustainable outcome to the
peace process would also require GoI to demilitarise and share the burden of its
security concerns with the region and not against the region. The Indo-Naga negotiation presents an opportunity for both sides to redefine, and thus realise their
priorities and aspirations.
Notes
1. On 11 July 2002, in a joint communiqu with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(Isak Chishi Swu-Thuingaleng Muivah) [NSCN(IM)], the Government of India (GoI)
led by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee recognised the unique history and situation of
the Nagas. This was considered a breakthrough in the talks, and the NSCN(IM) has
henceforth pressed for its agenda on the basis of this recognition.
2. Cognisant of the fact that the Naga political issue is a trilateral onebetween the Nagas,
India and Myanmarthis article nevertheless concentrates on the developments on the
Indian side of the border.
3. Baruah (2005: 13) defines the phenomenon of durable disorder as ethnic militias,
counter-insurgency operations, state-backed militias, developmental practices and the
deformed institutions of democratic governance together suggest that for analytical
purposes they can be seen as constituting a durable disorder.
4. While it is often alleged that the territorial ambit of the 1997 ceasefire between the
NSCN(IM) and the GoI was not made public, the Manipur state government as well
as the central government have consistently maintained that there are no designated
NSCN(IM) camps in the territory of Manipur (Manipur Update 2013). Unofficially

5.
6.
7.
8.
39
however, the NSCN(IM) maintains three designated peace camps in Manipur

Bonning in Senapati district, Ooklong in Tamenglong district and Phungchong in
Chandel district. It is only with incidents such as the Siege of Shirui (Haksar 2009) and
the assault upon Manipuri Actress Momoko (Newmai News Network 2013), that the
existence of the camps was brought to mainstream attention.
In 1972, the NIC had to sideline the demand for integration in order to survive in
mainstream politics, as well as to escape the wrath of the Naga underground government.
Three decades down the line, the political climate dictated the opposite.
The Manipuri national identity being referred to in this case is to be understood in a
modernist sense. Distinct from features such as an ethnic core and a common culture,
according to Smith (2004: 17), it is the territorial and civil aspects that dominate and
define such a national imagination.
The distinct nature of Naga landholding explains the strength of tribal and clan affinities
till present times. There is hardly any land in forests and villages that is not under
ownership. In some Naga areas, the village and forestland is controlled entirely by
the Village Council (Vashum 1996: 6667). Jusho (2005: 80) informs, The primary
economic requirement of a villager is not that he should be the owner of the land, but
that he should be a member of the local groups in the village.
Clause 1 of Article 258 of the Constitution of India states that, Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the Governor of a
State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers
functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.
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The Territorial Question

South Asian Survey

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

Ethno-nationalism and Territoriality in the

Stanley Tambiahs argument. He sees such movements uniting the semantics of

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

foster harmonious relationships between peoples on both sides and attempt to

Factionalism and Reconciliation

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

however, the NSCN(IM) maintains three designated peace camps in Manipur

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

The Territorial Question in the Naga National Movement

Verghese, B.G. 1996. Indias Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance,

South Asian Survey, 20, 1 (2013): 2243

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