Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/280064789
READS
112
5 AUTHORS, INCLUDING:
Bruno Verschuere
Evelyne Debey
University of Amsterdam
Ghent University
8 PUBLICATIONS 52 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
SEE PROFILE
Kristina Suchotzki
Maarten De Schryver
University of Wuerzburg
Ghent University
8 PUBLICATIONS 71 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
SEE PROFILE
Acta Psychologica
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/ locate/actpsy
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Department of ExperimentalClinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
d
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
b
c
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 14 January 2015
Received in revised form 23 June 2015
Accepted 29 June 2015
Available online xxxx
Keywords:
Deception
Lifespan
Executive control
Response inhibition
Development
Reaction times
a b s t r a c t
We present the rst study to map deception across the entire lifespan. Specically, we investigated age-related
difference in lying prociency and lying frequency. A large community sample (n = 1005) aged between 6
and 77 were surveyed on their lying frequency, and performed a reaction-time (RT) based deception task to assess their lying prociency. Consistent with the inverted U-shaped pattern of age-related changes in inhibitory
control that we observed in a stop signal task, we found that lying prociency improved during childhood (in accuracy, not RTs), excelled in young adulthood (in accuracy and RTs), and worsened throughout adulthood (in accuracy and RTs). Likewise, lying frequency increased in childhood, peaked in adolescence, and decreased during
adulthood. In sum, we observed important age-related difference in deception that generally t with the Ushaped pattern of age-related changes observed in inhibitory control. Theoretical and practical implications are
discussed from a cognitive view of deception.
2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Executive control and lying
The ubiquity of lies in everyday life does not imply that lying is
child's play. Research has shown that lying considerably challenges
our cognitive capacities (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon,
& Tcholakian, 2013). The cognitive load that accompanies lying is, for
instance, reected in slower response times and a higher number of
errors, compared to truth telling (i.e., lie effects; e.g., Van Bockstaele
et al., 2012; Williams, Bott, Patrick, & Lewis, 2013; but see Suchotzki,
Verschuere, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2013). Furthermore, lying evokes
more activity in the prefrontal cortex, a brain region that is crucially
linked to cognitive or executive control (Abe, 2011; Christ, Van Essen,
Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; Farah, Hutchinson, Phelps, &
Wagner, 2014). Miyake and colleagues distinguished response
inhibition, working memory updating, and shifting as the three main
executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000), and several lines of research
support the involvement of these functions in lying. Evidence has
been found for the notion that the truth response is activated rst,
thereby inducing response conict and an increased need for response
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.06.007
0001-6918/ 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
59
60
1
This research was part of Science Live, the innovative research program of Science
Center NEMO that enables scientists to carry out real, publishable, peer-reviewed research
using NEMO visitors as volunteers.
61
Table 1
Variables of interest from the stop-signal task.
Age (years)
Description
% female
SSRT M (SD)
SSD (ms)
p(r|s)
GoRT (ms)
GoAcc (%)
68
912
1317
1829
3044
4559
6077
677
Early childhood
Midchildhood
Adolescence
Young adulthood
Midadulthood
Older adulthood
Seniors
Total
47
247
89
77
201
119
52
832
43
53
54
69
68
50
67
58
299 (105)
257 (86)
229 (66)
196 (54)
203 (56)
211 (60)
215 (66)
228 (77)
536 (170)
500 (215)
461 (260)
473 (238)
475 (217)
562 (238)
578 (229)
503 (227)
.46 (.06)
.46 (.07)
.45 (.08)
.46 (.07)
.45 (.07)
.43 (.08)
.43 (.09)
.45 (.08)
910 (163)
827 (227)
761 (284)
718 (265)
733 (238)
841 (276)
858 (248)
796 (251)
95.15 (2.89)
97.12 (2.58)
97.23 (2.70)
98.86 (1.74)
98.78 (1.75)
98.68 (1.80)
98.82 (1.33)
97.91 (2.42)
Note. SSRT = stop-signal reaction time (ms); SSD = stop-signal delay (ms); p(r|s) = proportion of responses given a stop signal; GoRT = reaction time on Go trials (ms); GoAcc =
accuracy on Go trials as a percentage of correct Go trials.
62
Table 2
Hierarchical regression analyses predicting global processing speed (GoRT) and response
inhibition capacity (SSRT) by (the linear, quadric, and cubic functions of) age.
Note. Age = linear function of Age; Age2 = quadratic function of Age; Age3 = cubic function of Age.
Cumulative
RR
F for R
R2
p for F
t for
.056
.210
.211
2.61
19.21
12.81
.003
.041
.000
2.61
35.71
0.05
.11
b.001
.82
0.06
1.10
0.15
1.61
5.98
0.23
.037
.315
.374
.374
1.12
45.77
44.83
33.72
.001
.098
.040
.000
1.12
90.30
38.78
0.48
.29
b.001
b.001
.49
0.04
0.31
1.11
0.45
1.06
9.50
6.23
0.69
mean error rate of the age group they belonged to, (3) 71 participants
who had less than 60% truth and lie trials left for the RT analyses after
the RT outlier analysis, and (4) six participants who had an overall RT
that was 2.5 SDs away from the mean RT of the age group they belonged
to. Table 3 shows the distribution of the remaining sample across the
age groups. Based on this sample, SpearmanBrown split-half reliability
(i.e., odd vs. even) was found to be acceptable ( = .68) for the RT lie
effect (see Table 3 for reliability coefcients per age group).
We rst performed an overall analysis to examine potential effects of
age on lying prociency. Mean error rates and RTs were subjected to
repeated measures ANOVAs with Deception (Lie vs. Truth) as withinsubjects variable, and Age (7 age groups) as between-subjects variable.
Irrespective of the presence or absence of Age by Deception interactions
revealing age-related variations in lie effects, we aimed to draw a more
accurate picture of the relationship between age and lying by examining
lying performance after accounting for the age-related variance
explained by truth telling (i.e., baseline) performance. We applied a
similar control procedure as applied in the SSRT analysis: For both
errors and RTs, we tted a hierarchical polynomial regression on the
lie value (e.g., RT on lie trials), in which we rst controlled for baseline
performance by entering the truth value (e.g., RT on truth trials) as a
predictor, followed by the linear, quadratic, and cubic functions of Age
in the subsequent steps. We compared lying performance between
age groups using the estimated lie values after having partialled out
the variance attributable to truth telling performance. Each estimated
lie value was calculated by (1) computing the predicted lie value
based on a model that included the truth value as the only predictor
for the observed lie value (e.g., RT lying = 0 + 1. RT truth telling),
and (2) subtracting this predicted lie value from the observed lie value.
63
Table 3
Error rates and mean reaction times in the Shefeld lie test.
Error rate (%)
Age group
% female
Truth
M (SD)
Lie
M (SD)
Lie effect
M (SD)
Estimated lie
M (SD)
Truth
M (SD)
Lie
M (SD)
Lie effect
M (SD)
SpearmanBrown's
of RT lie effect
Early childhood
Midchildhood
Adolescence
Young adulthood
Midadulthood
Older adulthood
Seniors
Total
62
252
95
79
205
129
51
873
45
54
53
66
68
49
69
58
15.00 (8.50)
11.60 (7.49)
10.82 (6.81)
5.97 (5.00)
4.96 (3.97)
5.77 (5.06)
6.63 (5.74)
8.53 (7.00)
20.20 (9.41)
16.86 (8.61)
14.59 (8.12)
8.55 (6.23)
9.03 (6.52)
10.40 (6.90)
12.65 (6.82)
13.06 (8.52)
5.20 (7.78)
5.26 (7.28)
3.78 (5.87)
2.58 (5.36)
4.07 (5.54)
4.63 (6.20)
6.03 (7.11)
4.53 (6.50)
1.91 (7.40)
1.32 (6.95)
0.31 (5.77)
2.43 (5.18)
1.14 (5.53)
0.42 (6.02)
1.14 (6.68)
0.00 (6.36)
3703 (354)
3331 (333)
3163 (293)
3100 (313)
3229 (260)
3277 (281)
3527 (365)
3298 (340)
3838 (381)
3463 (365)
3301 (321)
3246 (398)
3507 (329)
3584 (350)
3859 (394)
3504 (391)
135 (186)
133 (186)
138 (143)
146 (181)
278 (207)
307 (219)
332 (203)
206 (208)
.38
.51
.52
.68
.72
.74
.73
.68
5.2.2. Errors
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Deception, F(1, 866) = 315.54,
p b .001, f = 0.60, indicating the presence of an error lie effect, with
more errors made on lie trials than on truth trials (see Table 3). The
main effect of Age, F(6, 866) = 49.41, p b .001, f = 0.59, pointed to
age-related changes in the overall error rate. However, these main
effects were subsumed under a signicant Deception by Age interaction,
F(6, 866) = 2.69, p = .01, f = 0.14, suggesting that the error lie effect
differed among age groups. Planned comparisons revealed that the
error lie effect was signicantly different from zero in all age groups,
ts 4.28, ps b .001, 0.48 ds 0.85. Visual inspection of the agerelated error lie effects (see Fig. 2 and Table 3) shows a decrease
between midchildhood and young adulthood, and an increase thereafter. Comparing subsequent age groups disclosed a trend toward a
smaller error lie effect in adolescence than midchildhood, t(345) =
1.78, p = .08, d = 0.21. Further, the error lie effect in young adulthood
was signicantly smaller compared to all other age groups, ts 2.05,
ps .04, 0.27 ds 0.56, except for adolescence, t(172) = 1.39, p =
.17. The error lie effects did not differ between the youngest children
and the seniors, t b 1.
The hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the error rate on
truth trials explained a signicant proportion of variance in the lie
error rate (see Table 4, Analysis A). After accounting for this baseline
effect, both the linear and quadratic function of Age were also found
to be signicant predictors of the lie error rate. The estimated lie error
rates after controlling for truth telling performance (Fig. 2 and
Table 3) showed a similar age-related U-pattern as observed for the
error lie effects. Planned comparisons between subsequent age groups
exposed signicant decreases between midchildhood and young
adulthood, ts 2.04, ps .04, 0.25 ds 0.38. Further, there was a
trend toward an increase between young- and midadulthood,
t(287) = 1.80, p = .07, d = 0.24 (other ts 1.52). However, seniors
had a signicantly larger lie error rate than young adults, t(87.83) =
3.24, p b .01, d = 0.61. The lie error rate of seniors did not differ from
that of the youngest children, t b 1.
Fig. 2. Observed error rates for truth telling and lying, error lie effects, and estimated error
rates for lying after baseline control.
Cumulative F for R
RR
R2
.665
689.12 .442
.672
.682
.683
357.36 .009
252.39 .015
190.03 .001
p for
F
689.12 b.001
t for
0.67 26.25
.847
.868
.869
.870
1328.82 .036
890.85 .001
674.82 .002
3.84
4.87
1.43
0.85 47.04
126.39 b.001
0.19 11.24
4.43
.036
0.21
2.10
7.31
.007 0.88
2.70
Note. Age = linear function of Age; Age2 = quadratic function of Age; Age3 = cubic function of Age.
64
Fig. 3. Observed mean RTs for truth telling and lying, RT lie effects, and estimated mean
RTs for lying after baseline control.
Fig. 4. Lying frequency.
ts b 1. The RT increase between midadulthood and seniors was marginally signicant, t(254) = 1.89, p = .06, d = 0.30.
5.3. Lying frequency
Data from one participant (a 12-year old boy) were removed
because he reported an implausible lying frequency of 315. One additional participant was excluded as data were missing from his Serota
questionnaire. Table 5 displays the remaining sample. As effect sizes
for the Mood's median tests, we calculated Cramr's V, for which values
from .10, .30, and .50 respectively reect small, medium, and large
effects (Cramr, 1999).
Table 5 shows that on average participants told about two lies a day,
whereas the median frequency was one lie a day. A Mood's median test
with Age as predictor showed that the median lying frequency differed
among age groups, 2(6, N = 992) = 24.41, p b .001, V = .06. Based on
the absolute values, one could detect an increase of lying frequency
during childhood with a peak in adolescence, followed by a decrease
during adulthood. Planned comparisons showed that median lying
frequency was higher in midchildhood than in early childhood,
2(1, N = 397) = 6.31, p = .01, V = .13. Adolescents lied signicantly
more than any other age group, 7.84 2s 18.91, p .01, .14 V .31,
except for a trendwise difference with young adulthood, 2(1, N =
184) = 3.21, p = .07, V = .13. The difference in median frequency
between young adulthood and seniors failed to reach signicance,
2(1, N = 144) = 1.31, p = .25. Further, median lying frequency was
not different for early childhood and seniors, 2(1, N = 163) = 1.02,
p = .31.
When examining the distribution of lies based on the entire sample,
we found that nearly half of the participants reported not to have lied in
the past 24 h (see Table 5). The proportion of individuals who reported
to have lied decreased as a function of the number of lies, so that 50.67%
of the lies was told by 8.87% prolic liars (see Fig. 4). This non-normal
distribution was present in all age groups (see Table 5). Though a Chisquare test showed that the proportion of prolic liars did not differ
across age groups, 2 (6, N = 992) = 8.14, p = .23, the age-related
pattern was by and large similar to the reversed U-course found in the
median analysis, with a peak number of prolic liars in adolescence.
5.4. Correlational analysis
We produced a correlation matrix to examine the relationship
between measures of the stop-signal task, Shefeld lie test, and lying
frequency (see Table 6). SSRT was incorporated from the stop-signal
task. From the Shefeld lie test, we included the estimated lie error
rate and estimated lie RT after accounting for the variance explained
by truth telling performance. Because lying frequency was not normally
distributed, we used Spearman's rho () as correlation coefcient.
Evidence for a relation between executive (inhibitory) control and
lying prociency was weak. Participants who had longer SSRTs tended
to have higher estimated lie error rates, but faster estimated lie RTs in
the Shefeld lie test. However, given that values of .10, .30, and .50
respectively reect small, medium, and large correlations, the observed
correlations were very small. Although the analysis showed that
individuals who reported a higher number of lies also lied faster in the
Shefeld lie test, that correlation can also be considered small. Moreover, stop-signal task performance was not related to lying frequency.
6. Discussion
How does lying evolve over life? This was the primary question we
aimed to address in the current study. In a large sample aged 677,
we measured accuracy and speed of lying in the Shefeld lie test as
measure of lying prociency. The number of lies told in the past 24 h
provided a measure of lying frequency. Based on previous studies that
Table 5
Descriptives of self-reported lying frequency.
Age group
% female
Lying frequency
M (SD)
Lying frequency
Mdn
% no lies
% 15 lies
% N 5 lies
Early childhood
Midchildhood
Adolescence
Young adulthood
Midadulthood
Older adulthood
Seniors
Total
102
295
101
83
216
134
61
992
53
54
53
67
67
49
69
58
1.75 (4.82)
2.59 (4.92)
2.80 (3.08)
1.94 (2.62)
2.06 (5.22)
1.82 (3.16)
1.57 (2.47)
2.19 (4.34)
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
1
63.73
42.71
25.74
37.35
49.07
50.75
55.74
45.97
29.41
43.39
59.41
51.81
43.06
38.81
34.43
43.04
6.86
13.90
14.85
10.84
7.87
10.45
9.84
10.99
Note. Age = linear function of Age; Age2 = quadratic function of Age; Age3 = cubic function of Age.
1. SSRT
2. Error % lying
3. RT lying
4. Lying frequency
.08
.09
.01
.02
.03
.10
Note. Error % lying and RT lying represent the estimated values after baseline control.
p b .05.
p b .01.
65
seniors. In contrast, the RT data revealed an unforeseen age-related Sshaped pattern, with RT lie effects that did not signicantly change
from young childhood until young adulthood. The most plausible explanation seems to relate to the reliability of the RT lie effect. As can be seen
in Table 3, the split-half reliability of the RT lie effect is the lowest in
young childhood and systematically increases with age. The relatively
low reliability in childhood reects a low consistency in speed of
responding, which may have masked their true (larger) RT lie effect.
That children had a low response consistency may suggest that the
Shefeld lie test was generally too difcult for them. Another, not mutually exclusive explanation may be that children were too distracted
during the Shefeld lie test. We often observed that children were
able to focus well during the stop-signal task, but that attention continuously dropped when they had to perform the subsequent Shefeld lie
test. Having to perform this second cognitively demanding task, while
knowing that more entertaining attractions were yet to be explored in
the science center, may have lowered their motivation to perform
well. Based on this motivational explanation, one could also argue that
a speed-accuracy trade-off may have further contributed to the small
lie effect in children. Although children were still overall slower than
young adults, one cannot entire rule out the possibility that their motivation to quickly nish the task may have encouraged children to weigh
speed over accuracy. Such a speed-accuracy trade-off may even have occurred apart from motivation, as a few studies have shown that children
often tend to apply a decision rule that is optimized for speed (Carp,
Fitzgerald, Taylor, & Weissman, 2012; Nardini, Bedford, & Mareschal,
2010). Future studies are thus needed to test our research question
again in a context that allows more consistent responding within children, for example, by making the task less difcult (e.g., blocking truth
and lie trials would reduce the need for task switching), and/or by
letting them perform the task in more controlled, less distractible
lab setting, and/or by rewarding them to equally weigh speed and
accuracy.The age-related U-curve of lying accuracy and the decline of
lying speed during adulthood, are in line with the notion that lying
requires executive control. The lack of strong correlations between
stop-signal task and Shefeld lie test performance seems to tone
down such an interpretation, as it casts doubt on the hypothesis that
response inhibition is one of the executive functions at the heart of
lying. Yet, a closer look at the literature on response inhibition suggests
that our ndings do not necessarily contradict the response inhibition
hypothesis of lying. Previous studies that found a correlation between
deception ability and inhibitory control in adult samples used the
Stroop task to assess inhibitory control (e.g., Visu-Petra et al., 2012).
Developmental studies that examined the relation between executive
control and lying administered several inhibition tasks, but only found
a signicant correlation with the Stroop task (Evans, Xu, & Lee, 2011;
Talwar & Lee, 2008). One explanation may be the cognitively and
neurally multifaceted character of response inhibition (Wager et al.,
2005). Different response inhibition paradigms may tap into different
subcomponents of response inhibition that recruit partially distinct regions of the neural inhibition network (Aron, 2011; Eagle, Bari, &
Robbins, 2008; Jahfari et al., 2011; Nigg, 2000; Sebastian et al., 2013;
Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011). The Stroop task and Simon task, for
example, would tap into interference inhibition, as they involve the inhibition of unintentionally activated response tendencies. The Go/No-go
task, on the other hand, where a prepotent response tendency has to be
inhibited on a minority of trials, would engage the action withholding
component. Finally, in the stop-signal task, action cancelation would be
needed to inhibit responses that have already been initiated (Sebastian
et al., 2013). When coupling these insights to our study, the lack of a
strong association between the deception task and the stop-signal task
may be explained by their reliance on different inhibitory subcomponents. Whereas the stop-signal measures action withholding, lying
in our Shefeld lie test may have tapped more strongly into the component of interference inhibition as conict would arise between the
truthful and deceptive response dimension. However, it is possible
66
that with questions that are less trivial and elicit more dominant truth
responses, interference inhibition may be preceded by action withholding or cancelation. Future (lifespan) studies that allow a more elaborate
investigation may test the above-mentioned explanation by a more
extensive assessment of the inhibition network.
6.3. Lying frequency across life
We also aimed to draw a lifespan picture of lying frequency. Three
main ndings resulted from the Serota questionnaire that assessed
participants' lying frequency in the past 24 h. First, the mean lying
frequencies of two lies on average per day reported in adulthood were
in line with the typical nding that adults tell one to two lies a day
(DePaulo et al., 1996; Serota et al., 2010). Second, the unbiased measure
(i.e., median) showed that lying frequency increased during childhood,
peaked in adolescent years, and then decreased into old age to the point
that seniors lied equally often as the youngest children. Third, in each
age group, lies were non-normally distributed around the mean:
(1) Many participants did not lie, and (2) the distributions of lies were
positively skewed, so that most lies were told by a small group of prolic
liars. With these results, we replicated and extended prior ndings
(Halevy et al., 2014; Levine et al., 2013; Serota et al., 2010).
The nding that the age-related changes in lying frequency were by
and large similar to the age-related changes in lying prociency and
SSRT seems to support the idea that better lying prociency due to
better executive skills may boost the frequency to lie. However, the
correlational analysis did not favor such an account: Whereas lying
prociency only modestly predicted lying frequency, stop-signal task
performance proved no signicant predictor. It seems plausible that
the small variety in lying frequency due to the non-normal distribution
made it difcult to nd strong relationships. Irrespective of this explanation, the lack of a relationship with stop-signal task performance may be
explained by the fact that lying would rely on a different inhibitory
subcomponent than measured in the stop-signal task (cf. supra).
It is crucial to realize that some developmental studies have shown
that next to executive control (and closely related: theory of mind
understanding), lying behavior can also be inuenced by one's moral
evaluation of lies (Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & Cauffman, 2004; Talwar
& Lee, 2008; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010). Future research that
assesses lying frequency would therefore do well by questioning participants about the type of lies told, and how they morally evaluate and
justify these lies. The increase of lies told in childhood may, for instance,
reect a surge of prosocial, other-oriented lies as a result of an increasing positive evaluation of prosocial lies (Heyman, Sweet, & Lee, 2009;
Popliger, Talwar, & Crossman, 2011; Xu et al., 2010). The peak lying
frequency of adolescents may reect a large number of lies told to
gain autonomy from their parents (Jensen et al., 2004; Perkins &
Turiel, 2007). Finally, the decrease of lying frequency throughout
adulthood would be consistent with the nding that older adults
become more focused on positive emotional experiences in social
situations and therefore become more sensitive to moral information
(Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Narvaez, Radvansky, Lynchard, &
Copeland, 2011).
6.4. Limitations
Several limitations of the current study can be recognized. First,
shortening the tasks may have sacriced reliability. Second, the Shefeld lie test examines lying in a restricted and articial design, because
(1) it only focuses on lying to yes/no questions, (2) it precludes the
emotional involvement of lying that may characterize lying in real life,
and (3) participants are instructed to lie. Such a design rules out the
role of theory of mind understanding (i.e., lying in real life requires
the understanding that a false belief can be instilled in others) and
moral reasoning that have been linked to lying ability (e.g., Talwar &
Lee, 2008). However, we do think this restricted design was adequate
Is water wet?
Is ice cold?
Can birds y?
Is a crocodile an animal?
Is Amsterdam in the Netherlands?
Are giants big?
Do cars have four wheels?
Is an igloo made of ice?
Is sausage meat?
Is stone hard?
Is re warm?
Is milk white?
Are bananas yellow?
Is grass green?
Does a butcher sell meat?
Is water dry?
Is ice warm?
Can pigs y?
Is a computer an animal?
Is Amsterdam in Switzerland?
Are giants small?
Do cars have six wheels?
Is an igloo made of stone?
Is salad meat?
Is stone soft?
Is re wet?
Is milk green?
Are bananas red?
Is grass blue?
Does a butcher sell bread?
References
Abe, N. (2011). How the brain shapes deception: An integrated review of the literature.
The Neuroscientist, 17, 560574. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1073858410393359.
Abe, N., Fujii, T., Hirayama, K., Takeda, A., Hosokai, Y., Ishioka, T., et al. (2009). Do
parkinsonian patients have trouble telling lies? The neurobiological basis of
deceptive behaviour. Brain, 132, 13861395. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/
awp052.
Ambach, W., Stark, R., & Vaitl, D. (2011). An interfering n-back task facilitates the
detection of concealed information with EDA but impedes it with cardiopulmonary
physiology. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 80, 217226. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.03.010.
Aron, A. R. (2011). From reactive to proactive and selective control: Developing a richer
model for stopping inappropriate responses. Biological Psychiatry, 69, e55e68.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.024.
Band, G. P. H., van der Molen, M. W., & Logan, G. D. (2003). Horse-race model simulations
studies of the stop signal procedure. Acta Psychologica, 112, 105142. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0001-6918(02)00079-3.
Bashore, T. R., & Smulders, F. (1995). Do general slowing functions mask local slowing effects? A chronopsychophysiological perspective. In P. A. Allen, & T. R. Bashore (Eds.),
Age differences in word and language processing (pp. 390425). Amsterdam,
Netherlands: North-Holland/Elsevier Science Publishers.
Bedard, A. C., Nichols, S., Barbosa, J. A., Schachar, R., Logan, G. D., & Tannock, R. (2002). The
development of selective inhibitory control across the life span. Developmental
Neuropsychology, 21, 93111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15326942DN2101_5.
Borella, E., Carretti, B., & De Beni, R. (2008). Working memory and inhibition across the
adult life-span. Acta Psychologica, 128(1), 3344.
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: The self-assessment manikin and
the semantic differential. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 25,
4959. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(94)90063-9.
Bub, D. N., Masson, M. E. J., & Lalonde, C. E. (2006). Cognitive control in children: Stroop
interference and suppression of word reading. Psychological Science, 17, 351357.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01710.x.
Bunge, S. A., Dudukovic, N. M., Thomason, M. E., Vaidya, C. J., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002).
Immature frontal lobe contributions to cognitive control in children: Evidence from
fMRI. Neuron, 33, 301311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(01)00583-9.
Burgess, P. W., & Shallice, T. (1997). The Hayling and Brixton test. Hartcourt assessment. The
Psychological Corporation.
Carp, J., Fitzgerald, K. D., Taylor, S. F., & Weissman, D. H. (2012). Removing the effect of
response time on brain activity reveals developmental differences in conict
processing in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex. NeuroImage, 59, 853860.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.07.064.
Carstensen, L. L., Fung, H., & Charles, S. (2003). Socioemotional selectivity theory and the
regulation of emotion in the second half of life. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 103123.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1024569803230.
Chandler, M. J., Fritz, A. S., & Hala, S. M. (1989). Small-scale deceit: Deception as a marker
of two-, three-, and four-year-olds' early theories of mind. Child Development, 60,
12631277http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1130919.
Christ, S. E., Van Essen, D. C., Watson, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., & McDermott, K. B. (2009).
The contributions of prefrontal cortex and executive control to deception: Evidence
from activation likelihood estimate meta-analyses. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 15571566.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhn189.
Christ, S. E., White, D. A., Mandernach, T., & Keys, B. A. (2001). Inhibitory control across
the lifespan. Developmental Neuropsychology, 20, 653669. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1207/875656401753549852.
67
Coffey, C. E., Saxton, J. A., Ratcliff, G., Bryan, R. N., & Lucke, J. F. (1999). Relation of
education to brain size in normal aging: Implications for the reserve hypothesis.
Neurology, 53, 189196http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/WNL.53.1.189.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155159. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037//0033-2909.112.1.155.
Collette, F., Germain, S., Hogge, M., & Van der Linden, M. (2009). Inhibitory control
of memory in normal ageing: Dissociation between impaired intentional and
preserved unintentional processes. Memory, 17, 104122http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09658210802574146.
Congdon, E., Mumford, J. A., Cohen, J. R., Galvan, A., Canli, T., & Poldrack, R. A. (2012).
Measurement and reliability of response inhibition. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 37.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00037.
Craik, F. I. M., & Bialystok, E. (2006). Cognition through the lifespan: Mechanisms of
change. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 131138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.
2006.01.007.
Cramr, H. (1999). Mathematical methods of statistics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Davidson, M. C., Amso, D., Anderson, L. C., & Diamond, A. (2006). Development of
cognitive control and executive functions from 4 to 13 years: Evidence from
manipulations of memory, inhibition, and task switching. Neuropsychologia, 44,
20372078. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.02.006.
Debey, E., De Houwer, J., & Verschuere, B. (2014). Lying relies on the truth. Cognition, 32,
324334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.04.009.
Debey, E., Ridderinkhof, K. R., De Houwer, J., & Verschuere, B. (2014n). Suppressing the
truth as a mechanism of deception: Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in
lying. (submitted for publication).
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkenol, S. E., Wyer, M. W., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in
everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 979995. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037//0022-3514.70.5.979.
Duran, N. D., Dale, R., & McNamara, D. S. (2010). The action dynamics of overcoming the truth.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 486491. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/PBR.17.4.486.
Eagle, D. M., Bari, A., & Robbins, T. W. (2008). The neuropsychopharmacology of action
inhibition: Cross-species translation of the stop-signal and go/no-go tasks.
Psychopharmacology, 199, 439456. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00213-008-1127-6.
Evans, A. D., Xu, F., & Lee, K. (2011). When all signs point to you: Lies told in the face of
evidence. Developmental Psychology, 47, 3949. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020787.
Farah, M. J., Hutchinson, J. B., Phelps, E. A., & Wagner, A. D. (2014). Functional MRI-based
lie detection: Scientic and societal challenges. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15,
123131http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn3665.
Fullam, R. S., McKie, S., & Dolan, M. C. (2009). Psychopathic traits and deception:
Functional magnetic resonance imaging study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 194,
229235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.108.053199.
Hadar, A. A., Makris, S., & Yarrow, K. (2012). The truth-telling motor cortex: Response
competition in M1 discloses deceptive behaviour. Biological Psychology, 89,
495502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2011.12.019.
Halevy, R., Shalvi, S., & Verschuere, B. (2014). Being honest about dishonesty: Correlating
self-reports and actual lying. Human Communication Research, 40, 5472. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12019.
Heyman, G. D., Sweet, M. A., & Lee, K. (2009). Children's reasoning about lie-telling and
truth-telling in politeness contexts. Social Development, 18, 728746. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2008.00495.x.
Jahfari, S., Waldorp, L., van den Wildenberg, W. P. M., Scholte, H. S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., &
Forstmann, B. U. (2011). Effective connectivity reveals important roles for both the
hyperdirect (fronto-subthalamic) and the indirect (fronto-striatalpallidal)
frontobasal ganglia pathways during response inhibition. Journal of Neuroscience,
31, 68916899. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5253-10.2011.
Jensen, L. A., Arnett, J. J., Feldman, S. S., & Cauffman, E. (2004). The right to do wrong:
Lying to parents among adolescents and emerging adults. Journal of Youth and
Adolescence, 33, 101112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOYO.0000013422.48100.5a.
Jurado, M. B., & Rosselli, M. (2007). The elusive nature of executive functions: A review of
our current understanding. Neuropsychology Review, 17, 213233. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s11065-007-9040-z.
Kaufman, A. S. (2013). Clinical applications II: Age and intelligence across the adult life
span. In E. O. Lichtenberg, & A. S. Kaufman (Eds.), Essentials of WAIS IV Assessment.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Kaylor-Hughes, C. J., Lankappa, S. T., Fung, R., Hope-Urwin, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., & Spence,
S. A. (2011). The functional anatomical distinction between truth telling and
deception is preserved among people with schizophrenia. Criminal Behaviour and
Mental Health, 21, 820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cbm.785.
Levine, T. R., Serota, K. B., Carey, F., & Messer, D. (2013). Teenagers lie a lot: A further
investigation into the prevalence of lying. Communication Research Reports, 30,
211220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08824096.2013.806254.
Levitt, H. (1970). Transformed up-down methods in psychoacoustics. The Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 49, 467477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.1912375.
Lewis, M., Stanger, C., & Sullivan, M. W. (1989). Deception in 3-year-olds. Developmental
Psychology, 25, 439443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.25.3.439.
Loeber, R., & Farrington, D. P. (2014). Agecrime curve. Encyclopedia of criminology and
criminal justice (pp. 1218). New York, NY: Springer New York.
Logan, G. D. (1981). Attention, automaticity, and the ability to stop a speeded choice
response. In J. Long, & A. D. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance IX
(pp. 205222). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop Effect: An integrative
review. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 163203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.
109.2.163.
68
McAuley, T., Yap, M., Christ, S. E., & White, D. A. (2006). Revisiting inhibitory control
across the life span: Insights from the Ex-Gaussian distribution. Developmental
Neuropsychology, 29, 447458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15326942dn2903_4.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D.
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to
complex frontal lobe tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41,
49100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/cogp.1999.0734.
Nardini, M., Bedford, R., & Mareschal, D. (2010). Fusion of visual cues is not mandatory in
children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 107, 1704117046. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1001699107.
Narvaez, D., Radvansky, G. A., Lynchard, N. A., & Copeland, D. E. (2011). Are older adults
more attuned to morally charged information? Experimental Aging Research, 37,
398434. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0361073X.2011.590756.
Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology:
Views from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition
taxonomy. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 220246. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00332909.126.2.220.
Otgaar, H., Verschuere, B., Meijer, E. H., & Van Oorsouw, K. (2012). The origin of children's
implanted false memories: Memory traces or compliance? Acta Psychologica, 139,
397403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.01.002.
Perkins, S. A., & Turiel, E. (2007). To lie or not to lie: To whom and under what circumstances? Child Development, 78, 609621. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.
2007. 01017.x.
Popliger, M., Talwar, V., & Crossman, A. (2011). Predictors of children's prosocial lietelling: Motivation, socialization variables, and moral understanding. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 110, 373392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2011.
05.003.
Raz, N., Lindenberger, U., Rodrigue, K. M., Kennedy, K. M., Head, D., Williamson, A., et al.
(2005). Regional brain changes in aging healthy adults: General trends, individual
differences and modiers. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 16761689. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1093/cercor/bhi044.
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Band, G. P. H., & Logan, G. D. (1999). A study of adaptive behavior:
Effects of age and irrelevant information on the ability to inhibit one's actions. Acta
Psychologica, 101, 315337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0001-6918(99)00010-4.
Rush, B. K., Barch, D. M., & Braver, T. S. (2006). Accounting for cognitive aging:
Context processing, inhibition or processing speed? Neuropsychology, Development,
and Cognition. Section B, Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition, 13, 588610.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825580600680703.
Salthouse, T. A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition.
Psychological Review, 103, 403437. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.103.3.403.
Salthouse, T. A. (2009). When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of
Aging, 30, 507514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2008.09.023.
Salthouse (2014). Why are there different age relations in cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons of cognitive functioning? Current Directions in Psychological Science,
23, 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721414535212.
Sander, M. C., Lindenberger, U., & Werkle-Bergner, M. (2012). Lifespan age differences in
working memory: A two-component framework. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral
Reviews, 36, 20072033. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.06.004.
Schaie, K. W. (2013). Developmental inuences on adult intelligence: The Seattle Longitudinal Study (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Schroeter, M. L., Zysset, S., Wahl, M. M., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2004). Prefrontal activation
due to Stroop interference increases during developmentAn event-related fNIRS
study. NeuroImage, 23, 13171325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.08.
001.
Sebastian, A., Pohl, M. F., Klppel, S., Feige, B., Lange, T., Stahl, C., et al. (2013).
Disentangling common and specic neural subprocesses of response inhibition.
NeuroImage, 64, 601615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.09.020.
Serota, K. B., Levine, T. R., & Boster, F. J. (2010). The prevalence of lying in America:
Three studies of self-reported lies. Human Communication Research, 36, 225.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x.
Span, M. M., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & van der Molen, M. W. (2004). Age-related changes in
the efciency of cognitive processing across the life span. Acta Psychologica, 117,
155183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.05.005.
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F. D., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., & Woodruff, P. W. R.
(2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in humans.
NeuroReport, 12, 28492853. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00001756-200109170-00019.
Stevens, M., Lammertyn, J., Verbruggen, F., & Vandierendonck, A. (2006). Tscope: A C
library for programming cognitive experiments on the MS Windows platform.
Behavior Research Methods, 38, 280286. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03192779.
Suchotzki, K., Crombez, G., Debey, E., van Oorsouw, K., & Verschuere, B. (2014). In vino
veritas? Alcohol, response inhibition and lying. Alcohol and Alcoholism, 50, 7481.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agu079.
Suchotzki, K., Verschuere, B., Crombez, G., & De Houwer, J. (2013). Reaction time measures in deception research: Comparing the effects of irrelevant and relevant