Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2014
Without
a
doubt,
in
the
right
situations
activist
investing
can
deliver
meaningfully
superior
returns.
Anecdotal
evidence
abounds,
both
in
terms
of
success
at
individual
activist
targets,
and
for
investment
returns
at
specific
activist
funds.
The
best
recent
evidence
comes
in
the
form
of
rigorous
academic
studies:
Brav/Jiang/Partnoy/Thomas
found
that
activist
investing
delivers
700
basis
points
of
higher
relative
return
at
time
of
announced
activism,
relative
to
a
benchmark,
with
no
subsequent
reversal
over
time.
In
this
study,
activists
succeed
in
full
or
in
part
in
two-thirds'
of
their
campaigns.1
Klein
and
Zur
found
that
activist
investing
produces
21.6
percentage
points
higher
relative
return
one
year
after
the
announcement
of
an
activist
campaign.
In
this
study,
activists
succeed
in
60%
of
their
campaigns.2
On
the
other
hand,
activist
investing
has
a
cost.
Direct
expenses
include
legal
fees
and
proxy
solicitors.
It
can
extend
to
public
relations
efforts
including
extensive
print,
Internet,
and
even
broadcast
advertising.
For
our
purposes,
based
on
our
experience
we
assume
that
the
activist
effort
at
an
average
small-
or
mid-cap
company
would
cost
$1
million.
Is
there
a
way
to
achieve
activist
results,
with
greater
certainty
in
the
outcome
and
at
less
cost
to
investors
and
managers?
1
Alon
Brav,
Wei
Jiang,
Frank
Partnoy,
and
Randall
Thomas;
"Hedge
Fund
Activism,
Corporate
Governance,
and
Firm
Performance",
Journal
of
Finance
LXIII
No.
4
(August
2008),
p.
1729-1775.
2
April
Klein
and
Emanuel
Zur;
Entrepreneurial
Shareholder
Activism:
Hedge
Funds
and
Other
Private
Investors,
Journal
of
Finance,
LVIX
No.
1
(February
2009),
p.187-229
September
2014
2.
Investors
can
exploit
a
little-used
element
of
SEC
regulation
to
pursue
lower-cost,
more
effective
activist
strategies.
Current
regulations
exempt
an
activist
from
filing
proxy
materials
with
the
SEC
if
the
activist
solicits
proxies
from
ten
or
fewer
investors
in
a
given
company3.
This
merely
means
that
the
activist
need
not
file
any
proxy
documents
with
the
SEC,
as
long
as
they
confine
their
communication
to
ten
or
fewer
investors
in
that
company.
For
all
its
simplicity,
an
exempt
solicitation
has
wide-ranging
implications,
and
yields
many
benefits.
With
an
exempt
solicitation,
an
activist
investor
can:
1. Avoid
the
expense
of
a
formal
proxy
solicitation,
including
legal
fees,
proxy
solicitor
costs,
and
public
relations
costs.
2. Coordinate
support
from
a
small
number
of
larger
blockholders,
and
assert
confidently
that
the
activist
in
fact
represents
the
predominant
views
of
most
investors.
3. Conceal
discussions
with
other
investors
from
management
and
the
board
of
directors,
since
they
do
not
file
any
materials
publicly
with
the
SEC.
4. Tailor
proxy
materials
to
the
individual
needs
of
a
given
investor.
5. Communicate
with
investors
according
to
the
activists
schedule,
rather
than
according
to
SEC
deadlines.
6. Act
quickly
and
nimbly,
since
they
dont
need
to
file
documents
with
the
SEC
every
time
they
communicate
with
investors.
7. Exert
quiet,
discreet
pressure
on
the
company,
which
can
help
encourage
the
company
to
negotiate
a
prompt
response
and
resolution
to
the
activists
agenda.
An
activist
investor
can
undertake
an
exempt
solicitation
in
a
straightforward
manner.
While
specific
tactics
vary,
in
most
cases
the
activist
need
only
notify
the
company
of
its
intent
to
nominate
candidates
pursuant
to
the
companys
bylaws.
The
activist
can
then
request
votes,
ask
to
serve
as
proxy,
and
otherwise
campaign
for
election,
free
of
interference
from
the
SEC.
We
would
be
remiss
in
omitting
one
caveat,
related
to
what
constitutes
ten-or-
fewer
investors.
An
individual
that
holds
shares
of
a
company
in
separate
accounts
counts
as
one
investor.
But,
an
investment
firm
that
has
several
different
funds,
each
holding
shares
of
a
company,
counts
as
multiple
investors,
so
that
each
fund
within
the
firm
is
one
investor.
3
SEC
Rule
14a-2(b)(2)
September
2014
3.
We
analyzed
the
prospective
impact
of
an
exempt
solicitation.
We
identified
likely
companies
at
which
activists
can
exploit
this
exemption,
and
evaluated
the
potential
investment
returns.
First
screen:
value
We
identified
highly-undervalued
companies
among
the
8,500
or
so
publicly-traded
equities
in
the
U.S.
We
looked
for
companies
with
two
attributes:
High
current
net
worth
(current
assets
minus
current
liabilities)
relative
to
market
capitalization.
High
book
value
relative
to
market
capitalization.
These
companies
have
valuable
assets,
including
quality
liquid
assets
and
business
assets,
which
do
not
translate
to
current
share
price.
Second
screen:
activism
We
looked
for
good
activist
candidates,
meaning
companies
whose
current
ownership
would
allow
an
activist
to
influence
management
meaningfully.
These
companies
have:
Insider
ownership
under
20%
of
outstanding
shares.
Top
ten
institutions
owning
greater
than
40%
of
outstanding
shares.
So,
insiders
have
much
less
voting
control
over
the
company
relative
to
investors,
and,
most
important,
an
activist
can
reasonably
obtain
the
support
of
a
majority
of
shares
pursuant
to
the
exempt
solicitation.
Third
screen:
return
We
looked
for
companies
that
would
generate
a
reasonable
return
relative
to
the
current
share
price.
Using
a
simple
free
cash
flow
valuation
model,
we
estimate
a
target
price
for
the
company,
and
identify
those
companies
whose
current
price
represents
at
least
a
10%
discount
to
the
target
price.
2010-2013:
73
companies
In
the
previous
versions
of
this
analysis,
we
identified
a
total
of
73
companies
that
fit
this
profile,
with
averages
for
the
portfolio
as
follows:
Market
capitalization
of
$415
million
Current
net
worth
of
104%
of
market
capitalization
Book
value
of
110%
of
market
capitalization
Insiders
own
4%
of
shares
Top
ten
institutions
own
55%
of
shares.
The
average
discount
to
the
target
price
was
39%,
thus
producing
an
average
potential
appreciation
in
share
value
of
58%.
September
2014
4.
Among
the
73
companies,
almost
one-third
became
subjects
of
an
activist
investor:
activist
subject
-
23
companies
acquired
or
buyout
-
7
companies
bankrupt
-
one
company
no
activity
-
42
companies
On
average,
these
73
companies
have
increased
in
value
48%
since
identified
as
possible
activist
subjects.
2014
Results:
31
companies
We
used
the
same
criteria
to
identify
29
new
companies
(Table
1),
with
the
same
interesting
and
unexpected
attributes:
Market
capitalization
of
$368
million
Current
net
worth
of
144%
of
market
capitalization
Book
value
of
133%
of
market
capitalization
Insiders
own
4%
of
shares
Top
ten
institutions
own
53%
of
shares.
market
capitalization
($
mil.)
56
178
29
253
132
42
485
208
230
75
91
74
1,004
699
142
498
18
866
1,112
719
1,119
675
232
206
341
312
357
330
180
368
insider
ownership
2%
7%
2%
1%
6%
6%
2%
3%
8%
5%
4%
9%
2%
1%
3%
1%
7%
3%
1%
4%
5%
6%
6%
1%
2%
4%
8%
3%
4%
4%
top
ten
institutions
ownership
43%
48%
45%
50%
49%
54%
48%
55%
54%
53%
50%
54%
51%
43%
46%
48%
45%
42%
70%
45%
56%
58%
63%
79%
55%
54%
72%
52%
52%
53%
current
net
worth/
market
value
575%
459%
472%
185%
150%
134%
354%
112%
126%
134%
98%
64%
144%
55%
97%
86%
65%
32%
110%
86%
64%
52%
81%
59%
57%
82%
85%
96%
56%
144%
book
value/
market
value
456%
134%
265%
297%
176%
169%
50%
72%
74%
282%
98%
109%
91%
247%
114%
45%
242%
68%
96%
85%
50%
59%
93%
134%
69%
78%
60%
68%
81%
133%
discount
to
target
price
96%
92%
82%
81%
70%
66%
62%
53%
52%
51%
50%
48%
44%
42%
40%
29%
28%
27%
24%
24%
23%
23%
20%
18%
18%
16%
13%
12%
10%
42%
September
2014
5.
The
average
discount
to
the
target
price
is
42%.
This
is
a
slight
improvement
over
the
39%
from
the
73
companies
analyzed
in
previous
years.
This
discount
implies
a
potential
average
share
price
appreciation
of
72%
Once
again,
these
are
not
micro-cap
companies.
The
average
market
capitalization
is
$368
million,
ranging
from
a
low
of
$29
million
to
a
high
of
$1.1
billion.
This
size
of
company
provides
ample
liquidity
for
an
investor
to
accumulate
a
reasonable
investment,
and
to
sell
if
and
when
appropriate.
September
2014
6.
The
estimated
average
42%
discount
to
target
price
is
one
way
to
think
about
the
potential
return
on
investment.
Of
course,
we
estimate
the
potential
average
72%
return
on
an
investment
in
the
31
companies
before
expenses,
including
the
expenses
associated
with
the
activism
needed
to
achieve
that
return.
Effective,
cheap
activism
makes
that
potential
72%
return
possible.
The
problem
with
activism,
for
fund
investors
and
portfolio
managers
alike,
is
that
the
costs
of
an
activist
program
consume
all
of
the
fees
that
a
fund
manager
would
earn
on
the
investment.
An
exempt
solicitation
lowers
dramatically
the
cost
to
the
manager,
and
makes
the
potential
72%
return
more
likely
than
under
a
conventional
approach.
We
estimate
the
net
impact
of
the
costs
of
activism
under
a
conventional
and
an
exempt
solicitation,
using
a
few
simple
assumptions:
Investment
of
3%
of
market
capitalization,
comfortably
under
the
5%
SEC
reporting
threshold
Fee
structure
of
1%
of
assets
under
management
and
10%
of
profits.
Activism
costs
of
$1
million
for
a
conventional
approach
and
$100,000
for
an
exempt
solicitation.
Compare
the
two
approaches
(figures
in
$millions):
Exhibit
1
Activist
Approaches
conventional
exempt
investment
3%
11.0
11.0
appreciation
72%
7.9
7.9
value
to
manager
administration
1%
0.1
0.1
profit
10%
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.9
activism
cost
(1.0)
(0.1)
net
fees
(0.1)
0.8
The
average
investment
is
about
$11
million
(3%
of
the
average
market
capitalization
of
$368
million).
The
cost
of
a
conventional
activist
strategy
overwhelms
the
additional
fees
that
the
manager
would
earn
from
the
investment.
In
this
example,
it
generates
nothing
to
the
manager.
Its
no
surprise
that
most
managers
eschew
an
activist
approach.
But,
the
much
lower
cost
of
an
exempt
solicitation
leaves
reasonable
fees
for
the
manager.
In
this
example,
the
manager
earns
$800,000
after
the
costs
of
activism.
September
2014
7.
Michael
R.
Levin
m.levin@theactivistinvestor.com
847.830.1479
www.theactivistinvestor.com
We base this information in this document on data from sources we consider to be reliable. We do not guarantee the
accuracy or completeness of this information. We do not intend anyone to use this information as the sole or primary
basis of investment decisions. Because of individual requirements of specific investors, an investor should not interpret or
understand this information as advice designed to meet the particular investment needs of any investor. We do not
represent this information an offer to buy or sell any security. Further, a security described in this document may not be
eligible for solicitation in the states in which the investor resides. Any opinions expressed are subject to change. From
time to time, Michael R. Levin may own the securities mentioned and may purchase or sell those securities in the open
market or otherwise.
September
2014
8.