G.R. No.

181132
June 5, 2009
HEIRS
OF
LORETO
C.
MARAMAG,
represented by surviving spouse VICENTA
PANGILINAN MARAMAG, petitioners, vs. EVA
VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE
GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE
GUZMAN
MARAMAG,
TRISHA
ANGELIE
MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
and set aside the Resolution2 dated January 8,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85948, dismissing petitioners appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
The petitioners were the legitimate wife and
children of Loreto Maramag, while respondents
were Loretos illegitimate family. Eva de Guzman
Maramag and her children were assigned as the
beneficiary of Loreto. Eva, however, was a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of
the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation.
The petitioners also contented that the
illegitimate children of LoretoOdessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angeliewere entitled only to
one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children,
thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those
to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie
were inofficious and should be reduced; and
further, they contented that they could not be
deprived of their legitimes, which should be
satisfied first.

proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha

Angelie,
as
the
remaining
designated
beneficiaries; and that it released Odessas share
as she was of age, but withheld the release of the
shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie
pending submission of letters of guardianship.
Insular alleged that the complaint or petition
failed to state a cause of action insofar as it
sought to declare as void the designation of Eva
as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her
designation in a Policy and was disqualified in
another Policy; and insofar as it sought to declare
as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie, considering that no
settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor
had the respective shares of the heirs been
determined. Insular further claimed that it was
bound to honor the insurance policies designating
the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries
pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
On the other hand, Grepalife alleged that Eva was
not
designated
as
an
insurance
policy
beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because
Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a
misrepresentation in his application form that he
was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not
more than 65 years old when he signed it in
September 2001; that the case was premature,
there being no claim filed by the legitimate family
of Loreto; and that the law on succession does
not apply where the designation of insurance
beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie were not known to petitioners,
summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the
illegitimate family of Loreto failed to file their
answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of
petitioners, declared them in default in its Order
dated May 7, 2004.

Petitioner then filed for the revocation and/or

reduction of insurance proceeds for being void
and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction.

During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular

and Grepalife moved that the issues raised in
their respective answers be resolved first. The
trial court ordered petitioners to comment within
15 days.

In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of

preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among
others, that part of the insurance proceeds had
already been released in favor of Odessa, while
the rest of the proceeds are to be released in
favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both
minors, upon the appointment of their legal
guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total
amount of P320,000.00 as actual litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.

In their comment, petitioners alleged that the

issue raised by Insular and Grepalife was purely
legal and that the designation of a beneficiary is
an act of liberality or a donation and, therefore,
subject to the provisions of Articles 7528 and
7729 of the Civil Code.

Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva

as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and
Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that
they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds
of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained
that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the

In reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered

that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to
the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to
the estate or to the heirs of the insured. Grepalife
also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a
beneficiary.
On September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a
Resolution, granted the defendants motion to
dismiss with respect to Odessa, Karl Brian and
Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with

respect to the other defendants Eva Verna de

Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled as
beneficiaries of Loreto Maramag.
HELD:
No, the petitioners are not
beneficiaries of Loreto Maramag.

entitled

as

It is clear from the petition filed before the trial

court that, although petitioners are the legitimate
heirs of Loreto, they were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that
petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code
which expressly provides that insurance contracts
shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the
Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code
states
SECTION53.The insurance proceeds shall
be applied exclusively to the proper interest
of the person in whose name or for whose
benefit it is made unless otherwise specified
in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only
persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds
are either the insured, if still alive; or the
beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased,
upon the maturation of the policy. The exception
to this rule is a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons
who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a
case, third parties may directly sue and claim
from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance

contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are
not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to
petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a
beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification
as such in another are of no moment considering
that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies
remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of
illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of
Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited
by the court in view of the prohibition on
donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or
by the insurers themselves for reasons based on
the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the
said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is
only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the
estate of the insured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005
Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In
the same light, the Decision of the CA dated
January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to
state a cause of action is a question of law and
not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the
first place.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.