1.

History of the Correspondence Theory

The correspondence theory is often traced back to Aristotles well-known definition of truth
(Metaphysics 1011b25): To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false,
while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is truebut virtually
identical formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b). It is noteworthy
that this definition does not highlight the basic correspondence intuition. Although it does
allude to a relation (saying somethingof something) to reality (what is), the relation is not
made very explicit, and there is no specification of what on the part of reality is responsible
for the truth of a saying. As such, the definition offers a muted, relatively minimal version of
a correspondence theory. (For this reason it has also been claimed as a precursor of
deflationary theories of truth.) Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence
theorist in the Categories (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of underlying things that make
statements true and implies that these things (pragmata) are logically structured situations or
facts (viz., his sitting and his not sitting are said to underlie the statements He is sitting and
He is not sitting, respectively). Most influential is Aristotles claim in De
Interpretatione (16a3) that thoughts are likenessess (homoiomata) of things. Although he
nowhere defines truth in terms of a thoughts likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a
definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind. (Cf. Crivelli 2004; Szaif 2006.)

1.1 Metaphysical and Semantic Versions

In medieval authors we find a division between metaphysical and semantic versions of
the correspondence theory. The former are indebted to the truth-as-likeness theme suggested
by Aristotles overall views, the latter are modeled on Aristotles more austere definition
fromMetaphysics 1011b25.
The metaphysical version presented by Thomas Aquinas is the best known: Veritas est
adaequatio rei et intellectus (Truth is the equation of thing and intellect), which he restates
as: A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality. He tends to use
conformitas and adaequatio, but also uses correspondentia, giving the latter a more
generic sense (De Veritate, Q.1, A.1-3; cf. Summa Theologiae, Q.16). Aquinas credits the
Neoplatonist Isaac Israeli with this definition, but there is no such definition in Isaac.
Correspondence formulations can be traced back to the Academic skeptic Carneades, 2nd
century B.C., whom Sextus Empiricus (Adversos Mathematicos, vii, 168) reports as having
taught that a presentation is true when it is in accord (symphonos) with the object presented,
and false when it is in discord with it. Similar accounts can be found in various early
commentators on Plato and Aristotle (cf. Knne 2003, chap. 3.1), including some
Neoplatonists: Proklos (In Tim., II 287, 1) speaks of truth as the agreement or adjustment
(epharmoge) between knower and the known. Philoponus (In Cat., 81, 25-34) emphasizes
that truth is neither in the things or states of affairs (pragmata) themselves, nor in the

statement itself, but lies in the agreement between the two. He gives the simile of the fitting
shoe, the fit consisting in a relation between shoe and foot, not to be found in either one by
itself. Note that his emphasis on the relation as opposed to its relata is laudable but
potentially misleading, because xs truth (its being true) is not to be identified with a relation,
R, between x and y, but with a general relational property of x, taking the form (y)(xRy &
Fy). Further early correspondence formulations can be found in Avicenna (Metaphysica, 1.89) and Averroes (Tahafut, 103, 302). They were introduced to the scholastics by William of
Auxerre, who may have been the intended recipient of Aquinas mistaken attribution (cf.
Boehner 1958; Wolenski 1994).
Aquinas balanced formula equation of thing and intellect is intended to leave room for the
idea that true can be applied not only to thoughts and judgments but also to things or
persons (e.g. a true friend). Aquinas explains that a thought is said to be true because it
conforms to reality, whereas a thing or person is said to be true because it conforms to a
thought (a friend is true insofar as, and because, she conforms to our, or Gods, conception of
what a friend ought to be). Medieval theologians regarded both, judgment-truth as well as
thing/person-truth, as somehow flowing from, or grounded in, the deepest truth which,
according to the Bible, is God: I am the way and the truth and the life (John 14, 6). Their
attempts to integrate this Biblical passage with more ordinary thinking involving truth gave
rise to deep metaphysico-theological reflections. The notion of thing/person-truth, which thus
played a very important role in medieval thinking, is disregarded by modern and
contemporary analytic philosophers but survives to some extent in existentialist and
continental philosophy.
Medieval authors who prefer a semantic version of the correspondence theory often use a
peculiarly truncated formula to render Aristotles definition: A (mental) sentence is true if
and only if, as it signifies, so it is (sicut significat, ita est). This emphasizes the semantic
relation of significationwhile remaining maximally elusive about what the it is that is
signified by a true sentence and de-emphasizing the correspondence relation (putting it into
the little words as and so). Foreshadowing a favorite approach of the 20th century,
medieval semanticists like Ockham (Summa Logicae, II) and Buridan (Sophismata, II) give
exhaustive lists of different truth-conditional clauses for sentences of different grammatical
categories. They refrain from associating true sentences in general with items from a single
ontological category. (Cf. Moody 1953; Adams McCord 1987; Perler 2006.)
Authors of the modern period generally convey the impression that the correspondence
theory of truth is far too obvious to merit much, or any, discussion. Brief statements of some
version or other can be found in almost all major writers; see e.g.: Descartes 1639, ATII 597;
Spinoza, Ethics, axiom vi; Locke, Essay, 4.5.1; Leibniz, New Essays, 4.5.2; Hume, Treatise,
3.1.1; and Kant 1787, B82. Berkeley, who does not seem to offer any account of truth, is a
potentially significant exception. Due to the influence of Thomism, metaphysical versions of
the theory are much more popular with the moderns than semantic versions. But since the

moderns generally subscribe to a representational theory of the mind (the theory of ideas),
they would seem to be ultimately committed to spelling out relations like correspondence or
conformity in terms of a psycho-semantic representation relation holding between ideas, or
sentential sequences of ideas (Lockes mental propositions), and appropriate portions of
reality, thereby effecting a merger between metaphysical and semantic versions of the
correspondence theory.