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CIR vs. UNION SHIPPING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-66160 May 21, 1990
FACTS: CIR assessed against Yee Fong Hong, Ltd. and/or Union
Shipping Corporation, the sum of P583,155.22 as deficiency income
taxes due for the years 1971 and 1972. Private respondent protested
the assessment. Without ruling on the protest, petitioner issued a
Warrant of Distraint and Levy served on November 25, 1976. Nov. 29,
respondent reiterated its request for reinvestigation. Again, without
acting on the request for reinvestigation and reconsideration filed a
collection suit before CFI of Manila. Summons was issued on December
28, 1978. On January 10, 1979, respondent filed with CTA Petition for
Review. The latter court ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE: Does the CTA have jurisdiction over the petition since there was
already a finality of the decision of the CIR?
HELD: Yes, the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the
finality of an assessment because it is the most drastic action of all
media of enforcing the collection of tax, and is tantamount to an
outright denial of a motion for reconsideration of an assessment. There
appears to be no dispute that petitioner did not rule on private
respondent's motion for reconsideration but contrary to the above
ruling of this Court, left private respondent in the dark as to which
action of the Commissioner is the decision appealable to the Court of
Tax Appeals. Had he categorically stated that he denies private
respondent's motion for reconsideration and that his action constitutes
his final determination on the disputed assessment, private respondent
without needless difficulty would have been able to determine when
his right to appeal accrues and the resulting confusion would have
been avoided.
Under the circumstances, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not
having clearly signified his final action on the disputed assessment,
legally the period to appeal has not commenced to run. Thus, it was
only when private respondent received the summons on the civil suit
for collection of deficiency income on December 28, 1978 that the
period to appeal commenced to run. The request for reinvestigation
and reconsideration was in effect considered denied by petitioner when
the latter filed a civil suit for collection of deficiency income. So. that

on January 10, 1979 when private respondent filed the appeal with the
Court of Tax Appeals, it consumed a total of only thirteen (13) days well
within the thirty day period to appeal pursuant to Section 11 of R.A.
1125.

OCEANIC WIRELESS NETWORK v. CIR

G.R. No. 148380 December 9, 2005
FACTS: On March 17, 1988, Petitioner received from the BIR deficiency
tax assessments for the taxable year 1984. Petitioner filed its protest
against the tax assessments and requested a reconsideration or
cancellation. Acting in behalf of the Commissioner, then Chief of the
BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division, Mr. Severino B. Buot,
reiterated the tax assessments while denying petitioners request.
Upon petitioners failure to pay the subject tax assessments within the
prescribed period, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection, acting for
the Commissioner, issued the corresponding warrants of distraint
and/or levy and garnishment. Petitioner filed a Petition before the CTA
to contest the issuance of the warrants. The CTA dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction since petition was filed beyond the thirty (30)day period from the time when the demand letter of January 24, 1991
by the Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division was
received by petitioner. Petitioner argued that said demand letter
cannot be considered as the final decision on its protest because the
same was signed by a mere subordinate and not by the Commissioner
himself. CA denied petition.
ISSUE: Is the demand letter issued and signed by a subordinate officer
acting in behalf of the CIR deemed final and executory, thus
appealable to CTA?
HELD: Yes, Republic Act No. 8424, Section 7 of the Code authorizes the
BIR Commissioner to delegate the powers vested in him under the
pertinent provisions of the Code to any subordinate official with the
rank equivalent to a division chief or higher. Section 6 further provides,
After a return has been filed as required under the provisions of this
Code, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative
may authorize the examination of any taxpayer and the assessment of

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the correct amount of tax; Provided, however, That failure to file a
return shall not prevent the Commissioner from authorizing the
examination of any taxpayer.
The tax or any deficiency tax so assessed shall be paid upon notice
and demand from the Commissioner or from his duly authorized
representative. . . ."
Thus, the authority to make tax assessments may be delegated to
subordinate officers. Said assessment has the same force and effect as
that issued by the Commissioner himself, if not reviewed or revised by
the latter such as in this case.
NOTE: It is a general rule that reiteration of demand to pay tax
deficiency after a protest is deemed a denial of that protest, and thus
constitutes a decision subject to appeal. 30 day period to appeal
commences from the time the demand letter was received by the
taxpayer.

RCBC v. CIR
G.R. No. 168498 April 24, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner reiterates its claim that its former counsels failure to
file petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals within the period
set by Section 228 of the NIRC was excusable. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. Other than the issue of
prescription, which is raised herein for the first time, the issues
presented are a mere rehash of petitioners previous arguments, all of
which have been considered and found without merit in our Decision
dated June 16, 2006. Petitioner maintains that its counsels neglect in
not filing the petition for review within the reglementary period was
excusable. It alleges that the counsels secretary misplaced the
Resolution hence the counsel was not aware of its issuance and that it
had become final and executory.
ISSUE: Is it correct for petitioner to argue that there is no final decision
because of the inaction of the CIR?
HELD: NO, in the instant case, the Commissioner failed to act on the
disputed assessment within 180 days from date of submission of
documents. Thus, petitioner opted to file a petition for review before

the Court of Tax Appeals. Unfortunately, the petition for review was
filed out of time, i.e., it was filed more than 30 days after the lapse of
the 180-day period. Consequently, it was dismissed by the Court of Tax
Appeals for late filing. Petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration or make an appeal; hence, the disputed assessment
became final, demandable and executory.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot now claim that the disputed
assessment is not yet final. After availing the first option, i.e., filing a
petition for review which was however filed out of time, petitioner
cannot successfully resort to the second option, i.e., awaiting the final
decision of the Commissioner and appealing the same to the CTA, on
the pretext that there is yet no final decision on the disputed
assessment because of the Commissioners inaction.
After its petition for relief from judgment was denied by the Court of
Tax Appeals for lack of merit, petitioner filed a petition for review
before this Court without raising the issue of prescription. It is only in
the instant motion for reconsideration that petitioner raised the issue
of prescription which is not allowed. The rule is well-settled that points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal

DBP v. CA & COMMISIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. 86625 December 22, 1989
FACTS: DBP imported IBM computer equipment from USA, and paid to
the Bureau of Customs duties, compensating taxes and import
processing fees. It thereafter asked for a refund of the amount paid but
the Customs Commissioner refused to grant the refund, maintaining
that the taxes and fees had been correctly imposed. DBP appealed to
the CTA, which ordered the commissioner to refund.
Upon appeal by the Commissioner by certiorari, the SC referred the
same to CA for the reason that "such cases emanating from CTA now
fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA under Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129."
CA set aside the CTAs decision. The Appellate Tribunal thus held that
the controversy between the DBP and the Commissioner of Customs

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was not within the jurisdiction of the CTA and should have been
decided in accordance with the mode of settlement and adjudication
set forth in Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 242, viz:
SEC. 2. In all cases involving only questions of law, the same shall be
submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, as
Attorney General and ex officio legal adviser of all government-owned or
controlled corporations and entities, in consonance with section 83 of
the Revised Administrative Code. His ruling or determination of the
question in each case shall be conclusive and binding upon all the
parties concerned.
SEC. 3. Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only
factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by:
(a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims or
controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and
other agencies of the National Government;
(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or
claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or
controlled corporations or entities being served by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel; and
(c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or claims
or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in
paragraphs (a) and (b).

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, DBP appealed to SC

praying for reversal, stating that said Court had no jurisdiction to
review decisions of the CTA and it erred in applying P.D. No. 242 in
resolution of the controversy.
ISSUE: Did the CA possess appellate jurisdiction over CTAs decision?
HELD: Yes, (in this case only) By virtue of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129

PNOC v. CA and CIR

G.R. No. 112800 April 26, 2005
FACTS: Through his sworn statement, private respondent Savellano
informed the BIR that PNB had failed to withhold the 15% final tax on
interest earnings and/or yields from the money placements of PNOC
with the said bank, in violation of P.D. No. 1931 which withdrew all tax
exemptions of government-owned and controlled corporations. PNOC

wrote to BIR and made an offer to compromise its tax liability,

proposing to set-off its tax liability against a claim for tax refund/credit
of the NAPOCOR, then pending with the BIR. The amount of the claim
for tax refund/credit was supposedly a receivable account of PNOC
from NAPOCOR.7
BIR sent a demand letter to PNB, for the payment of the final tax on
the interest earnings and/or yields from PNOC's money placements
with the bank, and on the same date, it also informed PNOC of the
demand against PNB.
PNOC, reiterated its proposal to settle its tax liability through the setoff of the said tax liability against NAPOCOR'S pending claim for tax
refund/credit. BIR refused the set-off since it is premature. PNOC
proposed a compromise by paying P91,003,129.89, representing 30%
of the P303,343,766.29 basic tax, in accordance with the provisions of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 44. This time the Commissioner accepted
the compromise. The BIR received a total tax payment on the interest
earnings and/or yields from PNOC's money placements with PNB.
Private respondent Savellano, through four installments, was paid the
informer's reward and through his legal counsel, wrote the BIR to
demand payment of the balance of his informer's reward.
Commissioner Tan that Savellano was already fully paid the informer's
reward pursuant to its compromise agreement with PNOC. Savellano
questioned the legality of the compromise agreement entered into by
the BIR and PNOC and claimed that the tax liability should have been
collected in full. While his motion for reconsideration was pending, he
filed petition for review with CTA alleging grave abuse of discretion
against the Commissioner. He prayed for the enforcement and
collection of the total tax assessment against taxpayer PNOC and/or
withholding agent PNB; and the payment to him by Commissioner of
the 15% informer's reward on the total tax collected.
Despite the oppositions of PNOC and PNB, the CTAresolved to allow
Savellano to withdraw his previous Motion for Suspension of
Proceeding and to admit the supplementary evidence being offered by
the same party. CTA considered the case submitted for decision as of
the following day, 04 June 1991.36
On 11 June 1991, PNB appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the
BIR assessment, dated 16 January 1991, for deficiency withholding tax
in the sum of P294,958,450.73. PNB alleged that its appeal to the DOJ

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was sanctioned under P.D. No. 242, which provided for the
administrative settlement of disputes between government offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.37
Three days later, on 14 June 1991, PNB filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings before the CTA since it had a pending appeal before the
DOJ.38 On 04 July 1991, PNB filed with the CTA a Motion for
Reconsideration of its Order, dated 03 June 1991, submitting the case
for decision as of 04 June 1991, and prayed that the CTA hold its
resolution of the case in view of PNB's appeal pending before the DOJ. 39
On 17 July 1991, PNB filed a Motion to Suspend the Collection of Tax by
the BIR. It alleged that despite its request for reconsideration of the
deficiency withholding tax assessment, dated 16 January 1991, BIR
Commissioner Ong sent another letter, dated 23 April 1991,
demanding payment of the P294,958,450.73 deficiency withholding
tax on the interest earnings and/or yields from PNOC's money
placements. The same letter informed PNB that this was the BIR
Commissioner's final decision on the matter and that the BIR
Commissioner was set to issue a warrant of distraint and/or levy
against PNB's deposits with the Central Bank of the Philippines. PNB
further alleged that the levy and distraint of PNB's deposits, unless
restrained by the CTA, would cause great and irreparable prejudice not
only to PNB, a government-owned and controlled corporation, but also
to the Government itself.40
Pursuant to the Order of the CTA, during the hearing on 19 July 1991, 41
the parties submitted their respective Memoranda on PNB's Motion to
Suspend Proceedings.42
On 20 September 1991, private respondent Savellano filed another
Omnibus Motion calling the attention of the CTA to the fact that the BIR
already issued, on 12 August 1991, a warrant of garnishment
addressed to the Central Bank Governor and against PNB. In
compliance with the said warrant, the Central Bank issued, on 23
August 1991, a debit advice against the demand deposit account of
PNB with the Central Bank for the amount of P294,958,450.73, with a
corresponding transfer of the same amount to the demand deposit-intrust of BIR with the Central Bank. Since the assessment had already
been enforced, PNB's Motion to Suspend Proceedings became moot

and academic. Private respondent Savellano, thus, moved for the

denial of PNB's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for an order
requiring BIR to deposit with the CTA the amount of P44,243,767.00 as
his informer's reward, representing 15% of the deficiency withholding
tax collected.43
Both PNOC and PNB opposed private respondent Savellano's Omnibus
Motion, dated 20 September 1991, arguing that the DOJ already
ordered the suspension of the collection of the tax deficiency. There
was therefore no basis for private respondent Savellano's Motion as the
same was premised on the erroneous assumption that the tax
deficiency had been collected. When the DOJ denied the BIR
Commissioner's Motion to Dismiss and required him to file his answer,
the DOJ assumed jurisdiction over PNB's appeal, and the CTA should
first suspend its proceedings to give the DOJ the opportunity to decide
the validity and propriety of the tax assessment against PNB. 44
The CTA, on 28 May 1992, rendered its decision, wherein it upheld its
jurisdiction
HELD: SECTION 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided (1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; . . . (Underscoring
ours.)
In his Petition before the CTA, private respondent Savellano requested
a review of the decisions of then BIR Commissioner Tan to enter into a
compromise agreement with PNOC and to reject his claim for additional
informer's reward. He submitted before the CTA questions of law
involving the interpretation and application of (1) E.O. No. 44, and its
implementing rules and regulations, which authorized the BIR
Commissioner to compromise delinquent accounts and disputed
assessments pending as of 31 December 1985; and (2) Section 316(1)
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC of 1977), as
amended, which granted to the informer a reward equivalent to 15% of
the actual amount recovered or collected by the BIR. 54 These should

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undoubtedly be considered as matters arising from the NIRC and other
laws being administered by the BIR, thus, appealable to the CTA under
Section 7(1) of Rep. Act No. 1125.
P.D. No. 242 is a general law that deals with administrative settlement
or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or
among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Its coverage is broad
and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies. It
has been incorporated as Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O. No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the
Philippines.62 On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1125 is a special law
dealing with a specific subject matter the creation of the CTA, which
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the tax disputes and
controversies enumerated therein. P.D. No. 242 should not affect Rep.
Act No. 1125. Rep. Act No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the
jurisdiction of the CTA, constitutes an exception to P.D. No. 242.
CIR v. JOSEFINA LEAL
G.R. No. 113459 November 18, 2002
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 116 of NIRC of 1977, as amended providing
for percentage tax on dealers in securities; lending investors. The
Commissioner
issued RMO No. 15-91 imposing 5% lending investors tax on
pawnshops, an offshoot of petitioners evaluation that the nature of
pawnshop business is akin to that of "lending investors," as defined
under the Tax Code. RMC No. 43-91 was subsequently issued
subjecting the pawn ticket to the documentary stamp tax as prescribed
by the Tax Code. Josefina Leal, owner and operator of Josefinas
Pawnshop in San Mateo, Rizal, asked for a reconsideration of the
issuances but the same was denied with finality. Consequently,
respondent filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition against the RMs.
Petitioner, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to review and since it is in connection with the
implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, case falls
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, citing Section 7
(1) of Republic Act No. 1125. The RTC, denied the motion. Petitioner
appealed to CA alleging that the RTC Judge acted without or in excess

of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the

petition.
ISSUE: Should Josefina Leal, have filed her petition with the Court of
Tax Appeals and not the RTC?
HELD: Yes, while this Court exercises original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari (as well as the writs of prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus), such power is not
exclusive to this Court but is concurrent with the Court of Appeals 15 and
the Regional Trial Courts.
Such concurrence of original jurisdiction does not mean that the party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs has the absolute freedom to file
his petition in the court of his choice. The hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system determines the appropriate forum for these petitions.
While the Court of Appeals correctly took cognizance of the petition for
certiorari, however, let it be stressed that the jurisdiction to review the
rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to the Court
of Tax Appeals, not to the RTC.
The questioned RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are actually rulings
or opinions of the Commissioner implementing the Tax Code on the
taxability of pawnshops. This is clear from petitioners RMO No. 15-91,
pertinent portion of which reads: "A restudy of P.D. 114 (the Pawnshop
Regulation Act) shows that the principal activity of pawnshops is
lending money at interest and incidentally accepting a pawn of
personal property delivered by the pawner to the pawnee as security
for the loan (Sec. 3, ibid.). Clearly, this makes pawnshop business akin
to lending investors business activity which is broad enough to
encompass the business of lending money at interest by any person
whether natural or juridical. Such being the case, pawnshops shall be
subject to the 5% lending investors tax based on their gross income
pursuant to Section 116 of the Tax Code, as amended." 19
Under Republic Act No. 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals
[CTA for brevity]), as amended, such rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue are appealable to that court, thus:
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided -

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(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
"SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association
or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or the Commissioner of Customs or
any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal
in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such
decision or ruling.
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
"SEC. 18. x x x. No judicial proceedings against the Government
involving matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code,
the Customs Law or the Assessment Law shall be maintained, except
as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously
filed with the Court of Tax Appeals and disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
This Court, in Rodriguez, etc. vs. Blaquera, etc.,20 ruled:
"Plaintiff maintains that this is not an appeal from a ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, but merely an attempt to nullify General
Circular No. V-148, which does not adjudicate or settle any controversy,
and that, accordingly, this case is not within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
"We find no merit in this pretense. General Circular No. V-148 directs
the officers charged with the collection of taxes and license fees to
adhere strictly to the interpretation given by the defendant to the
statutory provisions abovementioned, as set forth in the Circular. The
same incorporates, therefore, a decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue (now Commissioner of Internal Revenue) on the manner of
enforcement of the said statute, the administration of which is
entrusted by law to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. As such, it comes
within the purview of Republic Act No. 1125, Section 7 of which
provides that the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal x x x decisions of the
Collector of Internal Revenue in x x x matters arising under the

National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of the law

administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. x x x." (emphasis
added)
In the same vein, we held in Meralco Securities Corporation vs.
Savellano,21 thus:
"Respondent judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because the subject matter thereof clearly falls within the scope of
cases now exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, enacted June 16, 1954,
granted to the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal, among others, decisions of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. The law transferred to the Court of Tax Appeals
jurisdiction over all cases involving said assessments previously
cognizable by Courts of First Instance, and even those already pending
in said courts. The question of whether of not to impose a deficiency
tax assessment on Meralco Securities Corporation undoubtedly comes
within the purview of the words "disputed assessments" or of "other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code." In the
case of Blaquera, etc. vs. Rodriguez, etc.(103 Phil. 511 [1958]), this
Court ruled that the determination of the correctness or incorrectness
of a tax assessment to which the taxpayer is not agreeable, falls within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and not of the Court of First
Instance, for under the provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review, on appeal, any decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments and other matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue."
Here, as earlier mentioned, respondent Josefina Leal, being a
pawnshop owner, is assailing the revenue orders imposing 5% lending
investors tax on pawnshops issued by petitioner. Clearly then, she
should have filed her petition with the Court of Tax Appeals, not the
RTC. Indeed, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the RTC order
should have been challenged before this Court.

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COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. MARINA SALES INC.

G.R. No. 183868
November 22, 2010
FACTS: Marina Sales, Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of Sunquick
juice concentrates. It was appointed by CO-RO Food A/S of Denmark,
maker of Sunquick Juice Concentrates, to be its manufacturing arm in
the Philippines. The imports arrived in Manila Intl Container Port and
Marina computed and paid the duties. BOC examiners contested the
tariff classification of Marinas Import Entry. It resulted to the
reclassification of import duty rate of 7% by The Valuation and
Classification Review Committee. Apparently not in conformity, Marina
interposed a petition for review before the CTA on February 3, 2004.
CTA Second Division ruled in favor of Marina holding that its
classification under Tariff Heading H.S. 2106.90 10 was the most
appropriate and descriptive of the disputed importations. The
Commissioner disagreed and elevated the case to the CTA-En Banc
where it dismissed the petition as it showed that petitioner failed to file
before the Second Division the required Motion for Reconsideration
before elevating his case to the CTA En Banc. The Commissioner
argues that the dismissal of his petition is inconsistent with the
principle of the liberal application of the rules of procedure. He points
out that due to the dismissal of the petition, the government would
only be collecting 1% import duty rate from Marina instead of 7%. This,
if sanctioned, would result in grave injustice and unfairness to the
government.
ISSUE: Is the dismissal by the CTA en banc correct?
HELD: Yes, On the procedure, the Court agrees with the CTA En Banc
that the Commissioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions
of Rule 8, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals
requiring that "the petition for review of a decision or resolution of the
Court in Division must be preceded by the filing of a timely motion for
reconsideration or new trial with the Division." The word "must" clearly

indicates the mandatory -- not merely directory -- nature of a

requirement. The rules are clear. Before the CTA En Banc could take
cognizance of the petition for review concerning a case falling under its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the litigant must sufficiently show that
it sought prior reconsideration or moved for a new trial with the
concerned CTA division. Procedural rules are not to be trifled with or be
excused simply because their non-compliance may have resulted in
prejudicing a partys substantive rights. Rules are meant to be
followed. They may be relaxed only for very exigent and persuasive
reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate to his
careless non-observance of the prescribed rules.
CITY OF MANILA v. HON. GRECIA-CUERDO
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
FACTS: City of Manila, through its treasurer, Toledo, assessed taxes
against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,
Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp.,
Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. Pursuant to Section 14,
15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect
under Section 21 of the same Code. Since payment was precondition
to issuance of permit, private respondents were constrained to pay.
Private respondents
filed for refund before the RTC. Such provisions were alleged to be
violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 of the
LGC, and that city's Ordinance No. 8011 had already been declared to
be illegal and unconstitutional by the DOJ.
RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thus they filed
petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the petition for holding
that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. It should have been
filed with CTA.
ISSUE: Is Court of Appeals correct in dismissing the case for lack of
Jurisdiction?
HELD: Yes,

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Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the
instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic. The
issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident
on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become
moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on
the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents
and that the same decision is now final and executory.
A perusal of the provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated
that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders
or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or

resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate

jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as
the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the
RTC in local tax cases filed before it. Based on the foregoing
disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the
CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in
the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.