Florin Grecu, The Authoritarian Constitution Versus The National Renaissance Front

South-East European Journal of Political Science, Vol. I, No.
2, 2013
CONTENTS
Editorial
Sabin DRGULIN, Romanias Constitutions and their Dependence on Political Factors .......... 3
Articles
Florin GRECU, The Authoritarian Constitution versus the National Renaissance Front .......... 13
Cristian-Ion POPA, Elements for a Theory of Decentralized Governance ................................. 30
Drago COSMESCU, The Institutional Design of Democracy ...................................................... 40
Cristian ANDREI, Perceptions on the Political System and the Constitution Reform .............. 58
Saa GAVRI, Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Unicameral Parliamentary
Political System as a Solution for the Implementation of the Ruling in the Case Sejdi and Finci
vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina? ............................................................................................................... 75
Ilia ROUBANIS, Three Ends, Two Transitions, One Crisis: The Quest for the Lost Transition
in Balkan Normative Order ................................................................................................................... 93
Fulco LANCHESTER, Terremoto con Liquefazione e le Prospettive della Riforma
Istituzionale in Italia ............................................................................................................................ 110
Florin MITREA, Constitutional Reform and Political Regime in Interwar Portugal.
A Challenge for Political Theory ........................................................................................................ 122
Essay
Silviu Gabriel BARBU et al., Notes and Proposals Regarding the Changes and Amendments to
the Romanian Constitution 2013 .................................................................................................... 136
Book Reviews
Ion IANOI, Internaionala mea. Cronica unei viei (Emanuel COPILA) ....................................... 155
Joerg FORBRIG, Pavol DEME (eds.), Reclaiming Democracy. Civil Society and Electoral Change in
Central and Eastern Europe (Alexandra PANAIT) .............................................................................. 157
Paul MAGNETTE, Europa, statul i democraia. Suveranul mblnzit (tefania NEAGOE) ......... 160
Bichara KHADER (dir.), Le printemps arabe: un premier bilan (Sonia CATRINA) ..................... 163
Lutgard LAMS, Xavier L.W. LIAO (eds.),The Role of Discourse as the Interface
between Various Disciplines Studying Chinese Society (Viorella MANOLACHE) ............................... 168
Philip J. ELDRIDGE, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia (Ioana-Bianca BERNA) .... 172
Event
Filip STANCIU
.................................................................................................................... 176
Signals
Florin-Ciprian MITREA
....................................................................................................... 179
Notes On Contributors
...................................................................................................... 184
South-East European Journal of Political Science, Vol. I, No. 2, 2013
EDITORIAL
Romanias Constitutions
and their Dependence on Political Factors
Sabin DRGULIN
Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University
Abstract: In this study the author makes a short presentation and analysis of the
relationship between political factors and Romanias various constitutions. Starting
from the historical reality according to which the Romanian state is a creation of recent
history, the author has presented the succession of constitutional changes. The authors
working hypothesis is that along a century and a half of state history, the influence of
politics was directly reflected in constitutional provisions. These frequent changes or
adjustments of different articles from the constitutional text were caused by the fact that
the political elites of the Romanian state did not succeed in shaping a common vision of
the Romanian state.
Keywords: Constitution, reform, revision, politics.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Romanian state and nation are realities of recent history. The specificity of
the space inhabited by the Romanized population, subsequently entitled Romanians,
was given by the following elements: the migration phenomena (6th-11th centuries),
Orthodoxy, the Byzantine influence over these territories until the conquest of
Constantinople by the Turks (1453), their constant invasions into the heart of Europe
(the siege of Vienna 1529, 1683), the important strategic interests manifested by the
Great Powers at the mouths of the Danube (18-19th centuries). These realities of our
medieval history did not enable the making of a centralized state according to the French
or the English classical models. The occurrence and maintenance of an administrativeterritorial unit until the unification of Moldova with Wallachia (1859), delayed the
creation of a nation within a unique centralized state. Consequently, the medieval forms
of institutional organization were maintained until the half of the 19th century.
All these elements have been mentioned without being analyzed, since they are
known to specialists, but their effect was the creation of a delay phenomenon. This
refers to the concept of modernity that was identified at the European level as: variants
of a historical model of identity, structured according to a vertical hierarchy and not
horizontally, in a network, endowed with a unique center and various peripheries,
chronologically structured, having as mandatory criteria the arguments of progress and

delay1.
Compared with this historical model, the Romanian space has been in a state of
delay or, according to the critics of the Braudelian concept, a lag from the ideal and
original model created by the Western civilization. This reality has been expressed not
only at the level of the historical delay involved in the creation of the Romanian state and
nation, but also at the level of the emergence of the fundamental law, commonly known
as Constitution.
Interestingly, at the level of the geographic and civilization space identified by the
terminological triad as Carpathian-Danube-Pontic, the birth of the Constitution had an
unnatural direction. The state occurred first, the Constitution was introduced after that,
and the nation was the last to emerge. The state was formed in the aftermath of the Little
Unification, as the Romanian historiography named the consequence of the election of
Alexandru Ioan Cuza as ruler on the throne of Moldavia and Wallachia (5-24 January
1859). The second stage was the introduction of The Statute expanding the Paris
Convention (1864) and constitutive elements of the Romanian nation were
subsequently identified2. From this perspective, the normal process characterized by the
emergence of a national consciousness, of belonging to an ethno-linguistic group,
continued by the process of centralization of the territories inhabited by it, finalized
through the emergence of the state and subsequently, as a consequence of socioeconomic transformations, was replaced in the Romanian state by form without
substance3, to quote Titu Maiorescu.
However, the Romanian modernizing elites desire to integrate us in the WestEuropean type of civilization space entailed a process of missing out stages. One of
the main mechanisms used in the making of this political project was the introduction of
those principles that shaped society and individual mentality according to the Western
model of civilization, in the paragraphs of the various constitutions adopted along
approximately a century and a half of existence (without the Communist parenthesis).
2. ROMANIAS CONSTITUTIONS. A BRIEF HISTORY
One may consider that the Romanian state has known three different historical
periods when constitutions were introduced. These reflected the political, economic and
social realities of the periods in which they produced effects:
A.
The period of the modernization of the Romanian state in accordance
with the Braudelian paradigm of the concept of modernization (1848-1948):
Luigi Mascilli MIGLIORINI, Mediterana unei Europe plurale, in Sabin DRGULIN, Florin MITREA
(eds.), Modelul mediteranean i regiunea extins a Mrii Negre. Confluene politice, economice i culturale, Editura Ars
Docendi, Bucureti, 2013, p. 11.
2 Sabin DRGULIN, Istoria gndirii politice romneti 1848-1948, Editura Pro Universitaria, Bucureti, 2010, pp.
30-32.
3 Titu MAIORESCU, n contra direciei de astzi n cultura romn, Critice, 1874, p. 328.
1
1.
The first linguistic construction that comes close to the model of a
modern constitution was, as stated above, the Statute expanding the Paris Convention.
Its most important principles were:
a)
The imposition of a bicameral model of the Romanian Parliament, by
founding the Moderating Assembly, which made up the legislative power together with
the Elective Assembly.
b)
The introduction of a highly up-to-date principle, i.e. the incompatibility
principle, according to which persons who occupied high ranks or administrative
functions, could not obtain the deputy mandate.
2.
The second Constitution of the Romanian state was adopted on 1 July
1866 and it had the Belgium Constitution from 1831 as its reference model. This
established a series of important principles that derived from the principles listed in the
Declaration of the Human and Citizens Rights (26 August 1789). These were: the
principle of sovereignty, hereditary monarchy, ministerial responsibility, the principle of
representative government, the separation of powers within a state, respect for the
human and citizens rights, etc. Starting with the becoming effective of this Constitution,
our state had the official name of Romania.
3.
The Third Constitution was adopted on 29 March 1923. Article 1
stipulated for the first time that The kingdom of Romania is a national, unitary and
indivisible state. One of the most important institutional reforms found in the new
Constitution was the extension of the right to vote by the introduction of the universal
vote system, but only for the masculine gender. Women could benefit from this right
only after 1945. Article 5 stipulated that Romanians irrespective of ethnic origin,
language or religion enjoy the freedom of consciousness, freedom of education, freedom
of the press, freedom of association and all the freedoms and rights established by
laws.1 This article has its own relevance as it promotes the acknowledgement of the
natural rights for all the citizens of the country, removing the elements of ambiguity
from the Constitution of 1866 and maintaining the paradigm of reducing the delay in the
process of modernization.
4.
The fourth constitution of this period in the history of the Romanian
state was adopted on 20 February 1938. Its characteristic was that it introduced
corporatist principles, being executed via King Charles IIs initiative. The Constitution
from 1938 tried to limit individualism and promote the social dimension, aiming to
transform the individualist state into a communitarian, corporatist state. In the new
Constitution, the power was concentrated into the kings hands.2
B.
The totalitarian communist period (1948-1989). In this historical period,
given the alignment with the communist ideology, the Romanian state left the
Braudelian paradigm of Western modernization as it tried to accomplish a different type
of modernization, founded on anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist principles. In this
period, three constitutions were edited in Romania (1948, 1952 and 1965).
1
2
See http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1517 (accessed 22.06.2013).

See http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=9206 (accessed 22.06.2013).
1.
The first constitution of Romania in the communist period was adopted
on 13 April 1948. One may consider that this is a law that operates the transition from a
model of society (bourgeois, capitalist, democratic) to a different type (communist,
statist, totalitarian). The most important articles were: art.1 stipulating that The Peoples
Republic of Romania is a unitary, independent and sovereign Popular State; art. 2, The
Peoples Republic of Romania is the creation of the peoples fight lead by the working
class, against fascism, reaction and imperialism; art. 3, In The Peoples Republic of
Romania the entire state power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.
The people exerts its power via representative organisms, chosen by universal, direct and
secret vote; art. 11, that stipulated the confiscation of all private means of production
by the state when the general interest requires it; art. 14 established the state control over
the foreign and international trade and of course art. 15 that stipulated the introduction
of the concept of planned national economy1.
It is interesting to notice that in 1948, the new power instituted by fraud and
imposture tried to invent a sort of legitimization that no longer originated from the
Declaration of the Human and Citizens Rights, the constitutive act of the model of
bourgeois society, but claimed its origin from a hypothetical fight led by the people and
the working class against (art. 1). The moral fraud was obvious and article 2 that
instituted the representative organisms chosen by universal, direct and secret vote
forgot to maintain the fourth fundamental feature of the exertion of the political right to
vote, i.e. freely expressed. At the level of relations between state powers, the principle
of their separation was abandoned.
2.
The second Constitution of this period was adopted on 24 September
1952. This new fundamental law established the new political realities, i.e. the Romanian
spaces dependence on the Soviet communist ideology. The preamble and art. 3
stipulated that: The Peoples Republic of Romania was born and consolidated as a
result of its being freed by armies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the
joke of fascism and imperial domination, as a result of the downthrow of the landlords
and capitalists power by the masses from cities and villages lead by the working class,
under the supervision of The Romanian Communist Party. Another interesting principle
was introduced by art. 86, alin.4 that establishes the Partys leading role.
3.
The third and the last Constitution from the communist period,
however amended in 1974, when the function of the president of the republic was
introduced, was published in the Official Monitor on 21 August 1965. This Constitution
continued the principle established in 1948 that no longer acknowledged the principle of
the separation of powers within a state, which proved the totalitarian character of the
communist regime. Art. 3 established that in The Socialist Republic of Romania the
leading political force of the whole society is the Romanian Communist Party.
Interestingly, the title of The Peoples Republic of Romania disappears and The Socialist
Republic of Romania is established. Another particularity of this Constitution is that
besides the listed rights and liberties, two categories of citizens are founded for the
first time in the Romanian constitutional history: those who are members of The
See http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/const_1948.php (accessed 22.06.2013).
Romanian Communist Party and those who are not. Art. 26 stipulated that the most
advanced and most aware citizens among workers, peasants, intellectuals and other
categories of the working class are united in The Romanian Communist Party, the
highest form of working class organization, its avant-garde squad1. This article clearly
illustrates that the communist power divided the Romanian society into two categories of
citizens, depending on their membership in The Romanian Communist Party. This did
not consider the qualitative criterion, but especially the one expressing obedience to the
regime.
C. The post communist period (1990-present):
Romanias Constitution became effective after its publication in The Official
Monitor on 21 November 1991. It was subsequently revised, and the new version
became effective once it was published in The Official Monitor Ulterior on 29 October
2003.
The first constitution of Romania adopted after the fall of the communist regime
and of the Soviet Eastern Bloc was a turning point for the post-December democratic
regime. This happened because during the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, the
Expertise Commission and civil society raised several issues solved more or less
satisfactorily by the final form.
The first theme referred to the form of government. The monarchists stated that
the Kings abdication act from 30 December 1947 was null and therefore they argued for
the reenthronement of the monarchy. Interestingly, the arguments regarding this theme
were pro and cons but what is extremely important is that the adoption of the republican
form of government for the Romanian state was not the result of a referendum. This
type of popular consultation meant to illustrate the Romanian citizens opinion regarding
the form of government has not been organized so far, which is why the problem itself
persists.
The second theme referred to the separation of powers within a state. During the
communist period this principle was not respected. The totalitarian vision of governing a
society was clearly imposed in this field. Moreover, the principle of the separation of
powers within a state is not enough and one must also consider the one regarding the
mutual control between them as well as the balance in political practice. As a result of
the discussions between the founding fathers of the Constitution one opted for a light
separation of the functions of power and for the supremacy of the legislative.
The third theme referred to the guarantee of the private property. This principle is
a part of the natural rights and was not guaranteed by the constitutional text that
employed the expression protected. This notion enabled the critics of the Constitution
to state that the mentality of a part of the post-December political elites preserved
totalitarian conceptions that were included in all the constitutions of the communist
period.
The fourth and last theme referred to the nature of the state. Art. 1 from the
Constitution states that Romania is a national, sovereign and independent, unitary and
indivisible state. Political representatives of the Magyar community of Romania
See http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/const_1965.php (accessed 23.06.2013).
(UDMR) contested: the concept of national state claiming that there are more
nationalities in the territory of the state, the concept of unity, demanding the
federalization of the state and the organization of administrative units considering ethnic
criteria and the criterion of a single national language (Romanian), demanding the
institutionalization of the Magyar language as the second official language1. In all these
respects the law-maker was inflexible, maintaining the initial formula.
Romanias Constitution underwent the process of revision becoming effective on
29 October 2009. The most important changes were: free education is no longer
guaranteed unconditionally, but in compliance with the legal provisions, national
minorities have the right to use their mother tongue in administration and justice, the
presidential mandate was extended from 4 to 5 years, property was guaranteed and
protected, the level of parliamentary immunity was limited. As a result of the Romanias
joining the EU one guarantees the right of all EU member citizens to elect and be
elected in local elections if they are residents of a particular locality. Romanias joining
the EU and NATO will no longer be decided by referendum, but by the Parliament 2.
3. CONSTITUTION AND EPOCH,
EPOCH AND CONSTITUTION
In the 154 years of its existence, the Romanian state had 8 constitutions (1864,
1866, 1923, 1938, 1948, 1952, 1965 and 1991). The last of them underwent an important
revision in 2003. The fundamental characteristic of all these constitutions is that each has
represented or represents the political model of the period in which it produces its
effects. One may argue that in the Romanian case we cannot state that we have had a
Constitution maintained along a century and a half of the existence of the Romanian
state. Instead, we can speak of Constitutions that were modified in accordance with the
political realities of a certain moment. This is a fundamental difference as it demonstrates
that major changes have occurred in the political life of this period and they have been
reflected in the creation of the Romanian nation. Nine constitutional texts, without
considering the revisions, is a lot. The average is approximately 15 years for each
Constitution. One notices that they had short durations. Normally, a Constitution
represents the written form of political agreements reached by political elites. These
frequent changes demonstrate that there werent cooperating, but rather cannibal elites in
the Romanian political space. Therefore, the elites attacked and destroyed one other. An
illustrative example is provided by the moment of 1948 that marked a violent change of
political, economic and social regimes, which generated a huge change of the Romanian
mentalities.
Cristian BOCANCEA, Experienele constituionale ale Romniei i posibilele modele. Povestea

Constituiei la romni, in Sorin BOCANCEA (coord.), Constituia Romniei. Opinii eseniale pentru legea
fundamental, Editura Institutul European, Iai, 2012, pp. 23-25.
2 See http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/const_2003.php (accessed 23.06.2013).
1
Another element that must be discussed is that each of the three epochs that
produced constitutions reflects the way in which the state or rather the empowered
political elites related to the citizens.
The first period (1859-1938) had a progressive politics of liberalization of the
power relations from the elites to the people, which had the most important moment in
the Constitution from 1923. In this period, the process of delegating civil responsibilities
was tortuous, but it illustrates the process of nation-creation once the citizens appeared
and subsequently multiplied. I do not use the notion of citizen because in 1859 one
cannot talk about an important category of citizens, i.e. individuals who are aware of
their rights and obligations and who live on the basis of a social contract symbolically
signed with the state. One can talk about subjects, who had very few rights and a lot of
obligations according to the social model of the feudal age. This situation is explicable
given that the emergent Romanian state of 1859 represented the political-territorial
union of two medieval states. The process of modernization in the Braudelian sense had
not penetrated the extra-Carpathian space. One may say that it had just reached its
borders. The constitutional changes reflect the degree of evolution of the Romanian
society where elites started to grant the citizens more and more political decisions.
Unfortunately, this process was interrupted abruptly.
The second historical period (1948-1989) reflected the realities of a totalitarian
political regime that deviated from the citizens will. One may argue that the process of
modernization supervised by the communist political elites brought citizens to the
level of subjects. The three constitutions (1948, 1952 and 1965) revealed a type of
regime within which political legitimacy did not spring from the peoples will as
defined by the values of the French Revolution (1789), but from the individuals
obedience. This social reality was changed by the burst of the Revolution of
December 1989.
The third historical period (1990-present) is characterized by a continuous search
for answers. These refer to the form of government, the relation between state
institutions and citizens, the nature of the state, the type of administrativeterritorial
organization, etc.
4. CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
This year (2013) the issue of Constitution revision has been reopened. This was
the second revision, while the first took place in 2003, as previously stated. In this case,
too, the local political elites had to meet contemporary demands and they initiated the
modification of the Constitution. .
In the number dedicated to this event, South-East European Journal of Political Science
publishes articles and studies by scholars and academics from Romania and abroad. The
topics analyzed are diverse, which suggests that the theme of the reform of the states
fundamental law can be approached from specialists in constitutional law but also in
political science, sociology, history, political communication, etc.
An interesting article is presented by Cristian Andrei. The author focuses on the

perception shaped by individuals and citizens who have the right to vote, as a
consequence of their interaction with providers of ideas, public opinions and services. In
a democratic society, the political right to vote that belongs to citizens, turns them into
political decision makers, in every election, referendum, etc. Hence, observing the
citizens reactions to the politicians decisions is highly important as it explains the
complex relations between citizens and their elected representatives.
The article published by researcher Cristian Ion Popa is a short critical analysis of
the objectives proposed by the Government within the administrative reform that refers
to regionalization, relying on a part of the relevant specialized literature dedicated to
decentralized government.
Another article presented by Drago Cosmescu argues that the constitutional
model is fundamental for the consolidation of a democratic regime. The article presents
and analyzes presidential, parliamentary and mixed systems in order to identify the
impact of different election rules on the configuration in the political arena.
Florin Grecu presents an interesting study about the Romanian Constitution from
1938. Starting from a critical analysis of the historical period discussed, the author
identifies the theoretical and ideological bases of the authoritarian regime lead by King
Charles II. The author identifies the interwar process by which the crisis of liberal
democratic regimes enabled the emergence of political concepts that promoted
principles that envisaged the increase of the state role at the expense of individual rights.
The section dedicated to foreign authors contains three extremely interesting
presentations that deal with constitutional themes from the Balkans, Italy, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Ilia Roubanis analyzes the concept of transitology in the constitutional texts
from the Balkans. The authors approach is worthy of praise at is analyzes the process of
transition undergone by many states from the level of non-democratic to democratic
regimes. The process of institutional transformation renders the institutional differences
between different state realities in the Balkans. Hence, the author suggests that the term
Balkans should exit the narrow geographical sphere and extend its significance as a space
of convergence.
Fulco Lanchester makes an overview of the last four decades of the Italian
constitutional history, considering that since the parliamentary elections of 2013, there
have occurred the first elements that will trigger the third institutional earthquake after
the ones in 1975/1976 and 1994.
Saa Gavri presents a case study about Bosnia and Herzegovina. Starting from
The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights from Strasbourg from
December 2009, (Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina) the author suggests
practical solutions such that the local political elites make an institutional reform that
clearly brings under regulation the relation between state institution and their powers.
10
5. CONCLUSION
In the first place, the Constitution represents the vision of the type of society
imagined by the founding fathers. Its maintenance for a long period of time can be
done if two conditions are met: it must represent a vision that is shared by a large part
of the present political elites and it must demonstrate its present relevance in relation to
the social changes of specific times. In the Romanian case, the frequent procedures of
changing the Constitution demonstrate that neither of these conditions has been met.
11
Bibliography
BOCANCEA, Cristian, Experienele constituionale ale Romniei i posibilele modele.
Povestea Constituiei la romni, in Sorin BOCANCEA (coord.), Constituia Romniei.
Opinii eseniale pentru legea fundamental, Editura Institutul European, Iai, 2012.
DRGULIN, Sabin, Istoria gndirii politice romneti 1848-1948, Editura Pro Universitaria,
Bucureti, 2010.
MIGLIORINI, Mascilli Luigi, Mediterana unei Europe plurale, in Sabin DRGULIN,
Florin MITREA (ediie ngrijit de), Modelul mediteranean i regiunea extins a Mrii Negre.
Confluene politice, economice i culturale, Editura Ars Docendi, Bucureti, 2013.
MAIORESCU, Titu, n contra direciei de astzi n cultura romn, Critice, 1874.
Online resources
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1517
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=9206
http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/const_1948.php
http://www.rogoveanu.ro/constitutia/const1952.htm
12
ARTICLES
The Authoritarian Constitution versus
the National Renaissance Front
Florin GRECU
Hyperion University, Bucharest
Abstract: On February 27th, 1938 the Constitution laid the ideological and theoretical
foundations for the birth of the sole party, called by the new regime The National
Renaissance Front (NRF) and proclaimed as the only political entity in the state. The
NRF was strongly militarized in all its management structures starting with the
Directorate to the Superior National Council, because of its corporate-like structure
according to constitutional principles and because people were only allowed and granted
positions in the party, state or Parliament if they actually had a job. The constitutional
order of the monarchy overwrote the stately European or native authoritarian theories by
overestimating the state and minimalizing individual rights and freedom. At that time one
would not know what regime people who voted for the new regime consecrated by the 27th
of February 1938 Constitution had been living in and some of the parliament
declarations of the regimes representatives, when analysed critically, would try to bring
light on the article ahead.
Keywords: Constitution, the State, sole party, dictatorship, authoritarian, new regime.
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this article goal is to analyse the constitutional order of the 1938
authoritarian regime and the ideological principles of the one party, The National
Renaissance Front. The proposed scientific methodology is based on the quality method,
specific to the social sciences area1. Our hypothesis is that the more the ideological
principles of the one party were theorised and substantiated, the more the February 27th,
1938 constitutional order was made official and politically legitimate. As such, were the
1938 Constitution principles the source of the sole political structure? This is the
question I shall try to answer in this article.
Since the citizens who voted and formed the majority for the new authoritarian
Constitution did not know the kind of regime they were living in, I shall resort to
analysing parliamentary discourses of the new regime and sole party to understand
Septimiu CHELCEA, Metodologia cercetrii sociologice. Metode cantitative i calitative, 2nd edition, Editura
Economic, Bucureti, 2004, p. 72.
1
13
whether the regime was or was not a totalitarian/authoritarian one and whether it was
based on the constitutional order established by popular vote. The plebiscite for the
validation of the new constitution took place on February 24 and the results coincided
with what the party was expecting - that is 4.297.581 votes for and 5843 against, which
means that the plebiscite was accepted by 99% in favour of the new Constitution and
Carols (Romanian for Charles) regime and 0.13%1 against. Voting the Constitution
meant the acceptance of royal dictatorship. The new regime did not allow any sort of
official political action, by means of making society and public life nuclear and uniform.
As a consequence, by taking part in political life one recognised and accepted the
authoritarian monarchy and implicitly that of the sole party.
The new Constitution was promulgated by King Carol II on February 27th, 1938
in a ceremony attended by all the members of the government. On this occasion,
Patriarch Miron Cristea, President of the Council of Ministers, gave an ample speech
about political parties. He thought that by the new Constitution the old regime could not
see itself as part of the current state organisation. The Patriarch claimed that today we
also destroyed agitation, fights, electoral competition and killings and in their place we
will have quiet, work, peace and the sense of unity, sealed by brotherly embraces by the
folk, as was in ancient times2. The Patriarchs anti-democratic message against parties
and democratic systems was found in almost all the Carlingian political speeches of those
days. Elements such as establishing order and removal of anything politically oriented
became clichs in the two and a half years of this regimes expanse.
The new Constitutions title as God Given was based on the fact that it was
given to the country by the King by Gods grace. The vote on the plebiscite day was not
done by democratic ways, as requested by the democratic method, but by raising hands
in a public meeting or by verbal declaration at the workplace. The ballot boxes were
manufactured by the Internal Affairs Ministry and their caretaking was entrusted to local
judges3. The Royal decree by which people were asked to decide on the new Constitution
was also published in the Universul newspaper. Article V of this new Decree specified
that the vote will be made by verbal declaration in front of the voting bureau. There will
be different lists for those who vote for and for those who vote against. [] Those
entrusted with the preparation and progress of this plebiscite were the Internal Affairs
and Justice ministers, as specified by the 10th article4.
Since parliamentary democracy was undermined, the fundamental law turned
monarchy into an authoritarian unconstitutional one. As such, the vote was not secret,
but public. Voting was compulsory and absence was fined by 1000 lei. Electors would
bear the consequences of voting against. There was even an official regime procedure
regarding those who voted against the Constitution and it meant monitoring those
people. As a consequence, those who troubled the unanimity, the so claimed harmony
Ioan MURARU, Gheorghe IANCU, Constituiile romne, Actami, Bucureti, 2000, p. 119.
Constituiune: promulgat cu naltul Decret Regal, Nr. 1045 din 27 februarie, Monitorul Oficial, No. 48,
part I bis, Bucureti, 27 February 1938, p. 2.
3 Anteproiect de lege electoral al Corpurilor Legiuitoare (Camer i Senat), A.N.I.C, Fond Casa Regal,
Dosar 89/1938, f. 27.
4 Plebiscitul va fi joi, Universul, the 55th Year, No. 52 of 22 February 1938, p. 5.
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and national salvation were asked by the organisers to sign a paper in which they were
obliged to explain their choice.
The lawful age for voting was raised to 30 by the Constitution and as a
consequence the young were excluded from political life. The premeditated purpose was
the annihilation of the legionary movement and its political share. The disaster of
democratic political parties in the December 1937 elections (the party All for the
Country getting 16% of the voices) made the monarch resort to manufacturing a new
regime by suspending political parties and suppressing the main citizen rights and
freedoms consecrated in the previous Constitutions of 1866 and 1923. Actually, the
constitutional plebiscite meant the agreement given by the citizens of the Romanian
Kingdom to the monarch and to the regime to suspend their own rights and freedoms.
The natural consequence of this plebiscites success was the unification of all political
forces under the royal sceptre, in fact under the new ruling political organisation, the
Front of National Renaissance, officially accepted by the nation. The sole party, as in fact
all other institutions, had a so claimed legitimacy given by the monarchs symbolic power
which he got as a consequence of the vote during the plebiscite for the new
Constitution.
2. THE MAKING OF THE SOLE POLITICAL ORGANISM
Based on art. 98 of the Constitution, they decreed the law for the foundation of
the political organism The National Renaissance Front1. Law 4321/1938 by which the
Front of National Renaissance was founded was published in the Monitorul Oficial
(Official Journal of Romania) No 293 on December 16th 1938 and put Romanian
democracy in front of a fait accompli, because it was considered the only organisation
in the country and any political activity outside of NRF was outlawed. The NRF
supreme leader was the King and its leaders were nominated by royal decree. According
to the foundation decree, the NRF became the only political organisation in the state,
which confirms the authoritarian nature of the regime. The Front was nothing but the
emanation of the February 27th 1938 Constitution, and the fundamental law of the
Romanian authoritarian state represented the royal will, which was subjected to the
plebiscite vote, thus legitimising, the monarch and legalising the regime. On June 22nd
1940 under Gheorghe Ttrescus Government, the law-decree was proclaimed
regarding the conversion of the NRF to the Party of the Nation, on the very day of
Frances surrender to the German army; the decree was signed by the minister of Justice,
Aurelian Bentoiu2.
Who were the political players that created the NRF? We will try to answer this
question making use of the era newspapers and archive documents. Therefore, at the
designation of senators, appointed by the King, in the Universe journal, a list of the
founding members of the NRF was published, as follows: 1) Gen adj. G. Manu, 2) N.
1
2
Infiinarea organizaiei politice F.R.N, Monitorul Oficial, No. 293 of 16 December 1938, pp. 1-2.
A.N.I..C., Fond FRN, Dosar 850/1940, f. 25.
15
Samsonovici, 3) Gen. I. Sichitiu, 4) Dimitrie Gusti, 5) N. Karpen, 6) N. Miclescu, 7) Gen.

C. tefnescu-Amza, 8) Gen. Mihail Ionescu, 9) Gen. C.C Briescu, 10) Ion Pelivan, 11)
Gen. Gh. Rusescu1. The NRFs political architecture reflects its military nature. Thus,
Vasilescu-Karpen who held the position of rapporteur, was the rector of the Polytechnic
University of Bucharest, General Ioan Sichitiu was general and former Chief of the
General Staff, General Mihail Ionescu, former Minister and Chairman of the CFR Board.
The presence of the military body, of judges, members of the gendarmerie and police
structures, in the sole party structure, shows its desire to supervise and control
everything and embodied the way the new regime was led. We find that, from the
beginning, the entire leadership was militarised, the purpose was the keeping of public
order and safety, which confirms that the royalist policy architecture consisted of
militarisation of state institutions2. Although attempts were made to militarise the party
and the regimes institutions, the NRF remained a hybrid political organism, a
conglomerate of groups, currents, guidelines and trends, united under the same
company3. However, the "Decree-Law of 16 December 1938 conditions in the public
life area, an institutional reality specific to national revolutions4. In the struggle of the
parties for power pluralism was abolished for the benefit of the king and for a greater
political stability. The purpose of the new political organization was to mobilize the
national consciousness in order to fulfil a political action.
Except for the founding members, also in the Universe Journal, led by Stelian
Popescu, they published also the lists of the sole party leaders, the NRF, corporately and
professionally organised, according to the 1930 constitutional principles. The structure of
the Directorate highlights the eclectic nature of the persons named by royal decree. For
agriculture and manual labor 1) Armand Clinescu, 2) Flondor Gheorghe, 3) Gherman
Iftimie, 4) Jebeleanu Ioan, 5) Ionescu Siseti, 6) erban Mihail, 7) Secioreanu
Constantin. For commerce and industry 1) Angelescu Constantin, 2) Bujoi Ion, 3)
Const. Miti, 4) Gafencu Grigore, 5) Gigurtu Ion, 6) Savu Eugen, 7) Slvescu Victor.
For intellectual metiers: 1) Petre Andrei, 2) Cancicov Mircea, 3) Cazalciu Grigore, 4)
Ghelmegeanu Mihai, 5) Haieganu Iuliu, 6) Iamandi Victor, 7) Ralea Mihail5. We also
want to point that the Directorate was meant to be the leading decision-making body of
the party. In this sense, the political elites, who formed this body, were figures of the
traditional political parties, predominantly from those parties which were banned by the
decree of March 1938.
The NRF Supreme Council was made up of 150 members, 50 members for each
of the three trades stipulated in the Constitution. The royal advisors and founding
members would take part anytime in the National Supreme Council meetings. The
members of the Directorate and the National Supreme Council were appointed by royal
Membrii fondatori ai FRN, Universul, the 56th Year, No. 153 of 7 June 1939, p. 11.
Florin GRECU, Construcia unui partid unic: Frontul Renaterii Naionale, Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti,
2012 (see chapter III, Ministerul Frontului Renaterii Naionale versus partidul-stat, pp. 96-130).
3 Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, Paradoxul roman, Editura Univers, Bucureti, 1998, p. 119.
4 Ioan STANOMIR, Constituie, Coroan i ar. Constituionalism i monarhie autoritar n intervalul
1938-1940, Studia Politica, Revista Romn de tiin Politic, Vol. III, No. 1, Bucureti, 2003, p. 92.
5 Regulamentul legii pentru nfiinarea FRN, Universul, the 56th Year, No. 4 of 6 January 1939, p. 9.
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decree on a 2 year term on the ministers council proposition1. The decisional

architecture of the sole party was composed of a small number of members. The
president of the Superior Council was Armand Calinescu, the prime minister, and the
president of the sole party, and since the 23rd of January 1940, Alexandru VaidaVoevod, was elected. Vaida-Voevods choice as president of the sole party, the head of
the Superior NRF coincided with the initiative of King Carol II, to reorganize the front.
The President led the Executive Board and the Superior Council of the NRF.
By reorganizing the National Renaissance Front, on January 20, 1940, it was
agreed that the elected ruling bodies be no more nominated by royal decree, and instead
be approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and proposed by the Council of
Ministers. Gheorghe Ttrescu, the prime minister, was appointed as vice-president of
the sole party. The vice-presidents of the royal party were also vice-presidents of the
executive body of the Front. C.C. Giurescu was designated as general secretary of the
NRF. Nicolae Corneanu, former rapporteur of the Assembly of Deputies, was
appointed first secretary for agriculture and manual labour, and served as minister of the
Agriculture and president of the Council of Ministers headed by Armand Clinescu. Ion
Bujo, prime Secretary for Trade and Industry. Victor Moldovan - prime Secretary for
intellectual professions, and General Peter Georgescu was appointed National
Commander of the NRF Guard2. The construction of the central leadership of the sole
party emphasizes that the appointees originated from three different political groups and
it was hoped that by designating them we will be able to intercede resolution
agreements with opposing political parties3. Trying to achieve national reconciliation, to
offer a real political support, that came also from Manius and Brtianus parties, PNT
(National Peasant Party) and respectively PNL (National Liberal Party), Carol resorted to
the three nominations, portraying an image of the three-headed sole party, offering
some support, possibly a democratic one.
What did the National Superior Council do? It defined the Fronts political
directives, it presented the governments wishes, showed the observations on the course
of public administration, approved proposed candidates for parliamentary elections. The
National Superior Council was that kind of political office which follows the directions
of the party. This body was empowered to organise corporate elections for the
parliament. The elections were supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and study
circles, the partys political body.
Besides organizational issues, we can understand the political directions of the sole
party from the explanatory memorandum of Patriarch Miron Cristea, President of the
Council of Ministers, of the Superior Council and the Directorate. The Patriarch- Prime
Minister suggested that the sole party organs are meant to educate the masses, imbuing
them with the belief in the superiority of the front. The manner in which the sentiment
of superiority was pervading was relevant as to the education of youth. Education could
be achieved by employing the youth in the structure of the new regime. On the other
Ibidem, p. 9.
A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, Dosar 10/1939-1940, f. 104.
3 Ioan SCURTU, Carol al-II-lea, Vol. III, Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2004, p. 286.
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17
hand, advisers, managers and leaders of the Front were meant to know their troubles,
deprivation, hardship and the conditions of life. The aim was to find and recommend
those who were competent, the means to remove the evil1. The allusion to remove the
evil refers to the legionnaires, for they were destabilizing elements in the new
constitutional order. The stated goal of the movement was to change the shape of the
political regime of King Carol II, and the Iron Guard movement was campaigning
against the multiparty parliamentary system and parliamentarism. Knowing the strides
and shortcomings were in fact ways through which the sole party regime wanted to
establish order and discipline, through surveillance and control.
The decree to found the NRF was consistent with the principles of the
authoritarian Constitution promulgated by the monarch on the 27th of February 1938,
which stated that all Romanians who have reached the age of 21, except for active
military and members of the court order, have the right to require registration in the
NRF, provided they met the conditions of operation and discipline. By the decree of
March 3rd, 1938, the political parties were abolished, which created the opportunity for
the sole party to organise the elections. In the spirit of the state of siege, a decree was
issued meant to dissolve political parties, and the article I stated that all organised
associations, existing groups or parties, that spread political ideas or their
implementations, are to remain dissolved.2 The decree was meeting the constitutional
intentions of the regime. By abolishing the system of political parties the Romanian
democracy was confronted with a fait accompli. The personal dictatorship of King Carol
II was born. The consequence of the abolition of the multiparty regime led to the birth
of the sole party called the National Renaissance Front, which filled the power vacuum
created after the disappearance or abolition of the political parties. Therefore, the text of
the law concerning the NRF reminded that in the future the sole party was entitled to set
and submit candidacies for the parliamentary, administrative and professional elections.
The parliamentary elections were designed to strengthen the parliamentary political
regime created by the Constitution and to complete the work of reconstruction of the
State, through a policy that was meant to be uniform, but undemocratic, under
constitutionalised, institutional, plebiscite and enacted authoritarianism.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA AND IDEOLOGICAL
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SOL POLITICAL PARTY
The authoritarianism of the regime was defined by means of an antidemocratic
legislative formula which mystified the political party era, that is any political activity
other than that of the NRF shall be viewed as illegal and its authors shall be punished
with loss of civic rights for 2 to 5 years. The natural consequence was the elimination of
political parties, especially the banishment of Codreanus Garda de Fier (Iron Guard),
1 ara Nou prin Munca Tututror Cuvntarea Patriarhului Miron Cristea cu ocazia nfiinrii Frontului
Renaterii Naionale (Patriarch Miron Cristeas speech at the establishment of the National Renaissance
Front), p. 30; A.N.I.C, Fond Preedinia Consiliului de Minitri, Dosar 41/1938, ff. 456-461.
2 Decretlege de desfiinare a partidelor politice, Monitorul Oficial, No. 75, 31st March 1938, p. 6.
18
which was the mainly targeted political entity after the elections of December 1937.
Historian Armin Heinen reminds us that the new regimes and NRFs actions were
directed against the legionnaires accused of having endangered the state order1. On the
other hand, the monopolisation of the states political life in favour of a sole party
created the legislation frame for the application of the kings authoritarian policies. To
this effect, we can remind the references of the minister of Justice, Victor Iamandi, made
during parliamentary debates, who expressed his opinion about the NRFs role. He
believed that by the creation of a sole party, the countrys political life had been
monopolised in favour of a single mass political organisation, as most of this countrys
citizens who joined this party are determined to work for the consolidation of the new
regime2. The principle of work becomes the incentive of public addresses delivered by
the representatives of the regime. This phenomenon was present in both central and
local public addresses. Consequently, both apparatus aim to apply what was enounced as
the constitutional principle of labours reign. To this effect, the Constitution of 27th of
February 1938 established the state on a communitarian and nationalist basis, instead of
individualism, and enshrined the principle of Romanian ethnical precedence.
G.G. Mironescu stated in his Inovaiile constituiei din 1938 (Innovations of 1938
Constitution) that the truly fundamental idea of the States organisation in the newly
adopted constitution was not represented by the principles of individualism or
corporatism or by the dismissal of individualism, but by the natural obligation to use the
nation through actual work. Mironescu considered that only those who actually work in
various professions have the right to play a role in the States governance, as, according
to the new constitution, the organisation of the State is based on what might be
designated as the Labours Reign. The principle of actual work resides in the fact that, for
someone to be elector or to be elected, beside other considerations, he must effectively
carry out one of the following occupations: manual occupation and agriculture, industry
and commerce and intellectual occupations3. This principle had a political dimension in
it, and the decision was directed against the former political parties of the former
regime, who were accused of the disorder they had provoked on the political scene
following the elections of December 1937, namely that they had supported the principles
of clientelism rather than the principles of work, working had meant collecting votes for
parties through electoral agitators and bullies, so that such elements would no longer be
present in the newly configured constitution of the new regime, nor in parliament. Such
ideas aimed at building a negative image of the former representative democratic regime
and forging a new one for the new regime and the NRF. During the interwar period,
with the help of mayors, by means of pressure made by the government, the
administration stopped the electors from reaching the polling stations. The ballots came
1 Armin HEINEN, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail, O contribuie la problema fascismului internaional, Humanitas,
Bucureti, 1999, p. 352.
2 Victor IAMANDI, Desbaterile parlamentare, Senatul, edina din 28 iunie 1939, Monitorul Oficial, No. 9,
Part III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939, p. 13.
3 George G. MIRONESCU, Inovaiile Constituiei din 1938, Analele Facultii de Drept din Bucureti, No. 23, Tipografiile Romne-Unite, Bucureti, 1939, p. 31.
19
into the possession of the governments electoral agents, who voted instead of those
entitled to do it1, as Alexandru Marghiloman observed.
During that time, the sole political party was the subject of the authoritarian and
unconstitutional kingship that aimed at becoming the societys catalyst by rallying around
itself all political, economic and social forces. King Carols party aimed to educate the
behaviour and the state of mind of the citizens. The citizens could find ways to express
themselves within the framework of the royal mono-party political system. The common
good is thus considered to be the result of the personal ethics of the prince, and not of
the political nation2. The wellbeing of the society was used as propaganda at various
government and party levels. Hence, the National Resurrection Front had to consolidate
the state by everyones work and contribution, as only under a strong state could the
citizens lead a peaceful life. The Front was the sole political party representing the
aspirations of the citizens and created the political frame everyone could join to express a
certain opinion, and thus was built the peace that the regime and the state needed in
order to be able to govern and apply the established policies.
The catalyst binding the Front and the society resided in the fabrication of an
imaginary mission uniting the rulers and the people, and which was intended to be
permanent. Thus, the state crafts itself a totalitarian tool by which it would spread
through the society ultimate values, which are essential for its survival. The crown ceases
to be a neutral actor and a guarantor of the rule of law, as it suffers a symbolic and
constitutional statute change itself.3The National Renaissance Front was considered to
be the instrument by which all the leaders of the country would understand what was
going on, as no other political activity could be legal but within and through the Front.
Although all the representatives of Carols governments after 1938 had such a will,
the situation in the NRF showed the opposite, as the sole party was even sabotaged from
the inside, and the NRF representatives were not new, as the recent ideology with
authoritarian valences required. The representatives of the former parties did nothing
else but carried on the endless fight for positions within the state apparatus, which
demonstrates that nothing was achieved, but, on the contrary, everything was amplified.
The political conflicts continued under the umbrella of the authoritarian monarchy, as
everyone took as much advantage as possible of the new regime, which demonstrates
that the members led a political life which was contrary to and outside the NRF.4
The exposure of the NRFs doctrinal authoritarianism reveals the capacity, or the
lack of capacity, of the regime to mobilise the progressive elements around Carol II for
the purpose of offering an ideological solution able to captivate the spirit of the masses
according the new partys vision, and also to provide it with legal support in order to
legitimate it. The constitutional order of the new regime and sole political party was
based on the fact that:
Sorin RADU, Electoratul din Romnia n anii democraiei parlamentare (1919-1937), Editura Institutul European,
Iai, 2004, p. 259.
2 Alexandra IONESCU, Le bien commun et ses doubles: deux rencontres roumanines entre morale et politique, Editura
Universitii din Bucureti, Bucureti, 2001, pp. 196-197.
3 Ioan STANOMIR, Constituie, Coroan...cit., p. 93.
4 Ioan SCURTU, Carol al-II-lea, Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti 2004, p. 180.
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[...] individualism has as effect the undermining of the idea of society, whilst the
community doctrine provides spiritual and dynamic force, and, by the solidaristic
structure of the society, the participation of all society members is ensured. As a
consequence, in the view of the Communitarian State, the isolated activities of the
individuals are considered as being inferior to associated activities, as the individual
must integrate its activity into social groups and the state itself, and this is the only
way that the activities of all individuals shall be taken into consideration and
harmonized.1
The nationalization of politics, the underestimation and exclusion of the

individualism and liberalism principles represented the official nature of the authoritarian
regimes politics. This regime theorised the collectivist concepts in order to politically
and legally legitimate the NRF in the eyes of the crowd and political parties. The
emergence of the NRF did not surprise a political actor, and, in this context, it is
important to know that political parties were abolished in March 1939, and the next step
was the creation of the sole political party for all individuals.
The sole political party and the new look of the doctrinal state which, as defined
by Millon Chantal Delsol, is based on ideology, were focused on the adhesion of masses
to the new regime.
Typically, the doctrinal state considers itself the sole trustee of the common
project and political and social ethics.2 The regime was directed against the Iron Guard,
and the way the latter could be eliminated or at least diminished in influence and
adhesion was to determine young people to join the NRF. The way young people were
to be drawn into the NRF structures consisted in organising a political life which could
be modelled on the spirit of the new constitution, which had been put to referendum on
the 24th of February 1938.3
The rhetoric of the new regime, which was legitimised by demonising the former
regime and was based on representative party democracy, is used by Armand Clinescu
as well, who considered that the political expression of the new regime is represented
by the creation of the NRF. It is not a party such as those of the past. This is why no
agent of this Front was seen making demagogic promises, nor shall any representative of
this Front be seen on the halls of ministries and in the offices of administrations asking
for all sorts of favours.4
The possibility of the former regime to flirt with the practices of the former
political parties, of the party and multiparty regime, was unconceivable since the NRF
never aimed to be a party of morality, spirituality or in accordance with the political
fashion of that time, that is totalitarian-authoritarian. Although it did not succeed to
mobilise the youth in order to prevent it from being influenced by the legionnaire
ideology, the NRF was infested with ex-members of former political parties, and this
Paul NEGULESCU, Curs de drept Romn. Dup principiile Constituiei de la 27 februarie 1938. inut la Facultatea
de Drept n anul colar 1938-1939, ed. by Ion. I. Boran, Bucureti, 1939, p. 241.
2 Ibidem, p. 116.
3 Universul, No. 344, 17th December 1938, p. 2.
4 Armand CLINESCU, Solemnitatea depunnerii jurmntului comandanilor de inut ai grzilor
naionale, Universul, 56th Year, No. 119 of 4 May 1939, p. 11.
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became a camouflage, an umbrella for the illegality of democratic political parties,

unofficially legalising their activities and meetings.
4. AUTHORITARIANISM VERSUS TOTALITARIANISM
IN PARLIAMENT DEBATES
The governments representatives had different opinions and theories about
defining the new constitutional order as being authoritarian or totalitarian. Parliament
debates revealed the existence of unanimity regarding the rejection of the authoritarian
or totalitarian nature of the regime. Consequently, the definition of the regime of Carol
II raised numerous interrogations, even among the deputies of the corporatist
parliament, which would start to function on the 9th of June 1939, after the Chamber
and Senate elections of the 1st and 2nd of June.
Asked in Parliament how he would define the post 1938 regime, Ion Gigurtu,
engineer and manufacturer, reminded to his contemporaries that:
[] we live under a monarchic regime, not a dictatorship, as dictatorship involves
power usurpation and a dictator. Dictatorship is not permanent, as it has no time
restrictions, whilst monarchy is. Dictatorship can be mixed with the reign of the
whim, whilst monarchy is legal in its essence. The authoritarian regime involves a
dictatorship that is a small minority imposing its view on all citizens. The totalitarian
regime results as a consequence of dictatorship, consolidating it and ensuring it in
time. Monarchy needs not such a regime; it governs the country by consensus of all
participants, and has an older right for such obedience. Monarchy does not govern
as a political party, nor in the immediate interest of a category of citizens or for
electoral success, it governs not only for the present, but for the future
generations.1
Deputy Ion Gigurtus speech is adopted by the regimes doctrine maker, Professor
of Public Law, I. V. Gruia. According to him, with the enactment of the constitution on
27 February 1938, we are within the limits of the authoritarian Romanian state, on one
hand. On the other hand, the authoritarian state is not a totalitarian or dictatorial state,
nor is it inconsistent with the law and the principles of freedom and lawfulness. In a
dictatorial state there is no legal rule regardless of its source restricting the rights and
obligations of state authorities towards its individuals or of its individuals towards the
state2. Furthermore, Ion Gruia tries to put forward arguments supporting the theory
according to which dictatorial state summarises absolutism. The authoritarian state is
based on law, equality, the control of legal acts as far as it is legally allowed, enshrining
and underpinning individual rights and liberties, the actual individual freedom,
Ion GIGURTU, Desbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor, edina din 23 iunie 1939, Monitorul
Oficial, No. 5, Part. III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939, p. 19.
2 I.V. GRUIA, Statul romn n limitele legii constituionale din 27 februarie 1938, Parlamentul romnesc. Zece
ani 1930-1939, Xth Year , No. 311/20, 31st of December 1939, p. 10.
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22
conditioned by the fulfilment of all fundamental obligations towards the state. The
authoritarian states organisation leans on the limit of states rights and obligations.1
Armand Clinescu, legal expert by profession, didnt agree with the definition of
the regime as being dictatorial. He tries to respond to the provocation regarding the
character of the regime, as nobody actually knew exactly in what kind of regime the
people who had voted in favour of Carols regime, which was in place from 24 February
and institutionalised by the Constitution of 27 February 1938, lived. Thus,
in the place of demagogic tolerance, which yesterday hid the satisfaction of state
interests in favour of personal ones, we devoted authority to state interests.
Consequently, the restoration of order, the consolidation of the idea of authority, the
rehabilitation of the state was the first task needed to be carried out by the new
regime.2
Invoking the need for authority as a state attribute was also supported by Victor
Vlcovici, royal resident and senator appointed by the King from the intellectual
environment, considered that the times the politicians lived was an extension of the
social phenomenon, as it represented a natural corollary of the coup dtat from 10
February.
This coup dtat is not only a political revolution, but also a moral revolution. The
coup dtat of last February is the Kings command to take a stand against the parties
and, at the Kings command, we all stood aligned, determined to shake off the
immoral state the sins of the political parties had plunged us into.3 The aim of the
coup dtat was to regain the prestige the state needed. This is not a totalitarian state,
not an Italian statocracy, but a serious understanding of the Romanian States
vocation, and for this noble purpose the state needs authority.4
Defining the provisions of the act adopted on 27 February 1938, which

inaugurated the new regime, as less authoritarian, seemed in the opinion of the regimes
representatives to be totally integrated into the ideological current, in the European
context, and in accordance with the political current of its time. The representatives
refused to state that the democratic principles of political pluralism and fundamental
rights of the citizens had been destroyed, rights which were also guaranteed by the
previous constitutions of 1866 and 1923. The constitutional legislators of 1938
recognised the need for a political organisation which should replace the old parties and
consolidate the authoritarian regime. The project was drawn by Armand Clinescu, who
Ibidem, p. 10.
Armand CLINESCU, Cuvntare cu privire la rezultatetele noului regim i la convocarea noului
parlament, Dezbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor, edina din 28 iunie 1939, Monitorul Oficial,
No. 7, Part III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 10th of July 1939, p. 11.
3 Victor VLCOVICI, Dezbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor, edina de miercuri 28 iunie
1939, Monitorul Oficial, No. 7, Part III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, June 28, 1939, p. 2.
4 Ibidem, p. 3.
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envisaged the creation of a sole party as an instrument meant to mobilise and channel
the support of the masses for the newly created regime.
The speeches of the ministry of Interior and future President of the Council of
Ministers laid the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the National Resurrection
Front and became reference documents for the study of the authoritarian phenomenon
in regimes with sole political parties. Through his speeches in parliament and radio
interventions, Armand Clinescu raised a few interrogations about the nature and the
role of the new party, which was the result of the Constitution of 27 February 1938.
Why was a sole political organisation needed? The answer is provided by Armand
Clinescu himself during a radio conference about the Purpose of the National Renaissance
Front. It was needed out of the necessity to defend the Nation and the State against
outer and inner perils. For this reason, union, and not division should be aimed at, and it
should consolidate, and not share the authority, it should concentrate, and not disperse
ideals.1
The creation of the sole political party was directed against the Iron Guard, which
threatened the political order. The invocation of kind and homeland was also directed
against the Iron Guard and, implicitly, against political parties, which were accused of
splitting the political spectrum and, above all, against the very nature of Romanian
politics. The alliance hinted at in the speech is between the party Totul pentru ar
(Everything for the Country), run by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, and the National
Peasants Party, run by Iuliu Maniu. This alliance led to the establishment of the new
regime, which considered that the political parties were culpable for the destruction of
the authority by violence during election campaigns caused by the parties, which were
believed to divide the society, the individuals and the state, and, last but not least, the
electorate.
A strong state was therefore considered to be the one where the authority reigned,
where parties and citizens united with the states interests. The theorisation of such a
concept aimed to destroy the democracy and to establish a regime which is based on the
values of state authoritarianism and sole political party. The authoritarianism had the
National Renaissance Front as its leading edge, which was supposed to bundle ideals
together and reestablish social unity.
What is the Front? The answer is given also by the minister of the Interior, under
the government run by the Patriarch Miron Cristea. He believed that it is first of all a
Romanian formula, as no common elements with a foreign regime, but similar form
details in political matter can be found2. The Front wasnt aimed to be the copy of the
sole political party, as the German and Italian models are. The Front was meant to be an
original one, because the people and the nation required it. The constitutional
referendum, the creation of the sole party, the organisation of elections which were won
by the NRF proved that the organisation was one of the masses and the exponent of the
political interests of King Carol II. If Armand Clinescu considered that the Front was a
1
2
Armand CLINESCU, Noul Regim, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939, p. 105.

Ibidem, p. 95.
24
Romanian party, then the ideology meant nothing else than a copy of the authoritarian
and totalitarian ideological currents of that time.
What does the Front aim at? It aims at the rehabilitation of the state, as the state
was the victim of politicking. The state surrendered to such extent that its servants, its
ministers negotiated with the criminals. The glorification of the state as a concept, its
rehabilitation to its natural status meant not only the restoration of the authority and
prestige, but also the recognition of ideals the state has the mission to formulate1.
Victimization of the state due to politicking aligns with the rhetoric against the former
system of political parties accused of having destroyed the states authority by various
political cartels, especially the above mentioned one, between the legionnaires and the
National Peasants Partys members. The only solution to restore the prestige and the
unity was the creation of a sole political party, which should bundle all ideals and
interests together under the protection of a single man, King Carol II, who was
considered to be the guarantor of unity and statehood, the saviour of the nation.
During the Kings dictatorship, politics did no longer include disputes over what
should be done. Politics consisted in governing, taking into account the public interest
and preventing the private interests from damaging the public interest. This is why
dictatorship needs no conflicts. Delsol states that dictatorship goes in no politics, whilst
the corporate dictatorship wants to be the only politics that doesnt want to go in for
politics2. The main goal of the corporate state is social peacefulness3, whilst dictatorship
puts an end to economy conflicts by creating the corporate system. The creation of
workers guilds had as end the conservation of political power to the detriment of
extremist political currents which advocated the change of social and political order.
Especially Carols regime and Armand Clinescu in particular embraced both
European and local statism and authoritarian theories overestimating the state and
minimalising individual rights and liberties in favour of the greater public good, which
was considered to be superior to narrow group or party interests. Putting an end to
political romanticism era as well as inversing the individual-state relationship under the
Constitution of 27 February 1938 were the main goals. Consequently, in the view of the
Front, according to authoritarian constitutional order, the individual should be
subordinated to the state. Thus, the personal interest is to be overlooked, unless it
coincides with the collective interest. The personal interest cannot be fulfilled, unless it is
part of a professional activity, which is useful for everybody. Therefore, promoting the
general interest of the community was the first mission of the National Renaissance
Front4. A natural consequence of the Individual-State relationship reversal based itself
on remodelling the individual profile as citizen, and was the ultimate stake of the
Constitution and New Regime5.
The Front forged itself missions and hoped to reach the goal of teaming up
around the regime and the King. The mission of promoting collective interests was
Ibidem, p. 95.
Chantal Millon DELSOL, Ideile politice ale secolului XX, trans. Velica Boari, Polirom, Iai, 2002, p. 117.
3 Ibidem, p. 118.
4 Armand CLINESCU, Noul Regimcit., p. 96.
5 Ioan STANOMIR, Constituie, Coroan...cit., p. 95.
1
2
25
directed against the private interests of the political parties, whose main goal was the
takeover of power. Under the new regime, the power was to be the attribute of the sole
political power and monarch. The sole party coordinated the activity of government
policies and the monarch ran the activity of the party. Consequently, the monarch was
the leader of the party and nation, the absolute master, as it is mentioned in the first
article of the NRFs organisation law.
The abstract citizen, who is the creation of the regime and fundamental law,
becomes, according to the Kings own interests, an instrument, and is subordinated to
the monarchs cult of personality, to the cult of work and family. The citizens statute
shall be mixed with that of the member of the sole party, but the citizenship condition
derives from the individuals statute as productive and efficient work factor as provided
in the Constitution of 27 February 1938. Between 1938 and 1940, the citizenship in the
Kingdom of Romania was conditioned by the regimes approval and the participation in
the uninominal elections for a corporate parliament. At that time, the citizenship was
also conditioned by its ethnical character, with xenophobe and anti-Semitic accents. The
exclusion of Jews from public services, the minimisation of their civil and political rights
and freedoms, the application of the numerus clausus principle, the application of antiSemitic laws transformed the monarchy of Carol II into a state which was founded on
the criterion of totalitarian states that made from their anti-Semitic law an authentic state
policy with catastrophic results. The application of anti-Semitic laws was incorrectly
founded by the monarchic authority regime on principle of the Romanian ethnical
precedence. Article 4 of the Constitution of 27 February resulted in the enshrinement
of racism, and especially of anti-Semitism1 and excluded the participation of Jews in the
political and social life during the last months of existence of the sole political party and
authoritarian regime under the rule of Carol II.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The Constitution of 27 February 1938 eliminated the liberal democratic regime,
which was instituted through the enactment of the 1866 and 1923 Constitutions. The
infringement of the Constitution and the absolute powers granted to the head of the
state were the ways by which the principles of interwar democracy were disposed of and
then replaced by those of the institutionalised authoritarianism, and constitutionalised by
the countrys fundamental law.
Tudor Drgan considered that:
[through] []the constitution of 1938, in clearly rare terms, the abolishment of the
parliamentary regime was enacted, providing political responsibility towards the King
for the ministers. In doing so, as well as by removing the right to investigation and
interpellation, the legislative assembly and other rights and freedoms, this constitution
Idem, Geneza unui regim autoritar: Constituia din 1938, Studia Politica. Revista Romn de tiin Politic,
Vol. I, No. 2, 2001, p. 370.
26
actually abolished the control over the political actions of the executive and allowed
the arbitrary application of the law in society, to groups and individuals.1
The separation of powers principle became the concrete concept of concentration

of powers. The Constitution granted the King the right to possess both executive and
legislative power. On the other hand, the Constitution granted the King the conventional
rights, which were enshrined in the previous fundamental laws, namely the right to
initiate, promulgate and sanction laws. The separation of powers into executive,
legislative and judicial, did not divide, but concentrated the power. The precedence of
the executive over the legislative, the appointment of the King as head of the state, the
application of the it is my government dictum, while the ministers had no
responsibilities but towards the King, turned the institutions of parliament and ministries
into monarchical instruments. The political system of the sole party represented the
definition of Carols new authoritarian regime. The elimination of political parties, the
instauration of curfew, the creation of the sole political party, the proclamation of the
King as absolute head of the NRF, administration, government and parliament,
transforms Romania into a ministerial monarchy between 1938 and 1940.
Antidemocratism and antiparliamentarism were the constitutional principles on which
the architecture of the Romanian monarchical authoritarian regime was founded.
1 Tudor DRGANU, Drept Constituional i Instituii politice. Tratat elementar, Vol. II, Lumina Lex, Bucureti,
1998, p. 271.
27
Bibliography
ALEXANDRESCU, Sorin, Paradoxul Romn, Editura Univers, Bucureti, 1998.
CLINESCU, Armand, Noul Regim, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939.
CLINESCU, Armand, Cuvntare cu privire la rezultatetele noului regim i la
convocarea noului parlament, Desbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor,
edina din 28 iunie 1939, Monitorul Oficial, No. 7, Part III, Imprimeria Central,
Bucureti, 1939.
DELSOL, Millon Chantal, Ideile politice ale secolului XX, trans. Velica Boari, Polirom, Iai,
2002.
DRGANU, Tudor, Drept Constituional i Instituii politice- Tratat elementar, Vol. II, Editura
Lumina Lex, Bucureti, 1998.
GIGURTU, Ion, Desbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor, edina din 23 iunie
1939, Monitorul Oficial, No. 5, Part III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939.
GRECU, Florin, Construcia unui partid unic: Frontul Renaterii Naionale, Editura
Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2012.
GRUIA, I.V., Statul romn n limitele legii constituionale din 27 februarie 1938,
Parlamentul romnesc Zece ani 1930-1939, Xth Year, No. 311/20, 1939.
HEINEN, Armin, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail, O contribuie la problema fascismului
internaional, trans. Cornelia Esianu i Delia Esianu, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2006.
IAMANDI, Victor, Desbaterile parlamentare, Senatul, edina din 28 iunie 1939,
Monitorul Oficial, No. 9, Part III, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939.
IONESCU, Alexandra, Le bien commun et ses doubles: deux rencontres roumanines entre morale et
politique, Editura Universitii din Bucureti, Bucureti, 2001.
MURARU, Ioan, Gheorghe IANCU, Constituiile Romne, Editura Actami, Bucureti,
2000.
NEGULESCU, Paul, Curs de drept Romn. Dup principiile Constituiei de la 27 februarie 1938.
inut la Facultatea de Drept n anul colar 1938-1939, ed. by Ion. I.Boran, Bucureti,
1939.
RADU, Sorin, Electoratul din Romnia n anii democraiei parlamentare (1919-1937), Editura
Institutul European, Iai, 2004.
SCURTU, Ioan, Carol al-II-lea, Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti 2004.
STANOMIR, Ioan, Constituie, Coroan i ar. Constituionalism i monarhie
autoritar n intervalul 1938-1940, Studia Politica. Revista Romn de tiin Politic, Vol.
III, No. 1, Bucureti, 2003, pp. 85-112.
STANOMIR, Ioan, Geneza unui regim autoritar: Constituia din 1938, Studia Politica,
Revista Romn de tiin Politic, Vol. I, No. 2, Bucureti, 2001, pp. 367-385.
VLCOVICI, Victor, Desbaterile parlamentare, Adunarea Deputailor, edina de
miercuri 28 iunie 1939, Monitorul Oficial, No. 7, Part III, Imprimeria Central,
Bucureti, 1939.
Newspapers
Universul, the 55th year, No. 52, of 22 February 1938.
Universul, Nr. 344 of December 17, 1938.
28
Universul, No. 153 of 7 June 1939.

Universul, No. 4 of 6 January 1939.
Universul, No. 119 of 4 May 1939.
Archival documents
A.N.I.C, Fond Casa Regal, Dosar 89/1938.
A.N.I..C., Fond FRN, Dosar 850/1940.
A.N.I.C., Fond FRN, Dosar 10/1939-1940.
29
Elements for a Theory of Decentralized Governance

Cristian-Ion POPA
Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations Romanian Academy
Abstract: This year the Romanian Government has triggered a wide-ranging political
process in order to revise the existing Constitution and, in this context, an ambitious
program of decentralization-regionalization of the Romanian state administration. The
article proposes a brief critical analysis of these generous objectives of the Government, and
the means of achieving them, using a part of the academic literature devoted to decentralized
governance. The two main sections of the article will attempt to address, in turn, and as
realistic as possible, (1) the potential advantages of decentralized governance, and (2) some
risks of this type of government, as they are described in the relevant literature of public
economy.
Keywords: decentralization, regionalization, public good and services, public debt.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Romanian Government has triggered this year a wide-ranging political
process in order to revise the existing Constitution and, in this context, an ambitious
program of decentralization-regionalization of the Romanian state administration.
Through this program, the Government expects to bring citizens closer to policy
decisions, to allocate the national resources more efficiently, reduce existing regional
inequalities and also prevent new ones, including by decentralized absorption of
European funds all these according to higher principles of subsidiarity, accountability,
transparency, efficiency, equity and democratic participation1.
The article proposes a brief critical analysis of these generous objectives of the
Government, and the means of achieving them, using a part of the relevant academic
literature devoted to decentralized governance.
Indeed, decentralization is one of the most important current political reforms,
which is experienced in a growing number of countries, more or less developed, on all
continents. Everywhere, the main objective is to turn government in self-government
characterized by more participation and cooperation, transparency and accountability.
To this end, political power and resources were devolved to the sub-national (regional
and local) levels of government, which has reached to spend about 50% of overall public
revenues in some countries2.
MEMORANDUM. Adoptarea msurilor necesare pentru demararea procesului de regionalizaredescentralizare n Romnia [http://www.mdrt.ro/userfiles/Regionalizare_memorandum_1902_13.doc].
2 Jean-Paul FAGUET, Decentralization and Governance, A Special Issue of World Development, 2013.
1
30
This quiet revolution1, as Tim Campbell called it, has generated a new model of
governance, more participative and responsible, that attempts to rewrite the
Constitutional-Fiscal Contract between government and citizens. As Tony Blair stated
over a decade ago, in the UK the Labour governments devolution was aimed at rebalancing power between citizen and government in order to move us away from a
centralised Britain to a more democratic, decentralised, plural state.2 As a more general
evaluation, Jonathan A. Rodden points out that: [] other than transitions to
democracy, decentralization and the spread of federalism are perhaps the most important
trends in governance around the world over the last 50 years.3
At the same time, there are an increased number of academic studies and policyreports of great international organizations (the World Bank, IMF or OECD) focused on
the consequences of decentralization on some policy-relevant outcomes such as the
macroeconomic stability, public and private investment levels, efficient provision of
public goods and services, education, healthcare, school enrolment, etc.
My analysis is based on a general observation: the decentralized governance, as it
is practiced today in the world, coexists with quite different levels of economic
prosperity, which casts serious doubts on the existence of a simple, linear and universale
causal relationship between administrative decentralization and economic prosperity,
as official documents of the Romanian Government optimistically assumes. It is too
obvious, however, that some decentralized countries (USA, Switzerland) are rich, while
others are relatively poor (Russia, Brazil, Argentina); some recorded rapid economic
growth (China) and other relatively weak one (Mexico).
Therefore, the two main sections of my article will attempt to address, in turn, and
as realistic as possible, (1) the potential advantages of decentralized governance, and (2)
some risks of this type of government, as they are described in the relevant literature of
public economy. The article ends with some Conclusions (3).
2. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES
OF DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE
From the perspective of current public economy, the central argument in favor of
administrative and financial decentralization, and an enactement in Constitutions of
some sub-national (regional) levels of governance, lies in more efficient provision of
public goods and services4. Decentralized and differentiated provision from one region
to another is likely to increase overall, national welfare, more than if they are offered in a
Tim CAMPBELL, The Quiet Revolution, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001.
Anthony
BLAIR,
Speech
to
the
Welsh
Assembly,
2001
[http://www.totalpolitics.com/speeches/devolved-politics/devolution/33433/tony-blairs-speech-to-thewelsh-assembly.thtml].
3 Jonathan A. RODDEN, Hamiltons Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 1-2.
4 Wallace E. OATES, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVII,
September 1999, pp. 11201149.
1
2
31
centralized and uniform manner. Why? Because an efficient provision (i.e. the sum of
marginal benefits is equal to the sum of the marginal costs of inhabitants) of local public
goos and services is geographically variable, as result of different needs and costs of
production from one region to another. Therefore, if the government wants to increase
(maximize) national welfare, it is necessary to decentralize its administration so that it can
provide differentiated local goods and services1.
The increase of national welfare via decentralization was first and systematically
argued in public economy by Charles Tiebout, in his famous study A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures2. He started from the positions expressed by other great public
economists like Richard Musgrave3, Paul Samuelson4 and others according to which, in
principle, there is no economical way, of market type to determine the efficiency of
resource allocation devoted to public goods and services that the government provides.
As a practical matter, will note in his turn John F. Due:
[] there is no way in which the marginal social costs and benefits of activities
which benefit the community as a whole can be measured; the MSB-MSC rule offers
no actual guidance for policy determination In other words, the optimum levels of
each activity are determined by the collective estimates of the community regarding
relative desirability of particular degrees of attainment of various specific goals.5
This general evaluation has particularly important implications, for it presupposes

that a substantial proportion of gross domestic product (the taxes collected in the state
budget) would be inefficiently (non-optimal) managed by the government, compared
to the private, market economy. As Tiebout argues, however, if this theory may be valid
for national public expenditure, it is not necessarily valid for local public expenditure.
Citizens of a free and democratic society, he noted, often vote with their feet,
choosing to live and work, to educate their children and so on in the region that offers
the tax package (tax-and-public spending system) that best suits their needs and
possibilities. The aggregate outcomes of this fully rational behaviour of citizens, as
consumers and voters, requires regional authorities to provide, sooner or later, public
goods and services in an efficient manner, such as those provided by private, competitive
markets:
The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies
his preference pattern for public goods. This is a major difference between central
and local provision of public goods. ... The greater the number of communities and
the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully
Ibidem, p. 1120.
Charles TIEBOUT, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, No. 5.,
1956, pp. 416-424.
3 Richard A. MUSGRAVE, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LII, February, 1939.
4 Paul A. SAMUELSON, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.
36, No. 4, 1954.
5 John F. Due, Government Finance: An Economic Analysis, Homewood (Illinois), Irwin, 1963, p. 22.
1
2
32
realizing his preference position. [...] Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods
counterpart to the private markets shopping trip.1
This general view, widely accepted today in the literature, was formalized later by
Wallace E. Oates in the so-called Decentralization Theorem:
[] in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a [local public]
good and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least
as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in
each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across
all jurisdictions.2
In other words, if it were a single central Planner, both omnipotent and

benevolent towards citizens and perfectly informed, it could decide to produce public
goods and services, central and local, properly differentiated, i.e. effectively, relative to
the needs of each and all, and according to different circumstances from one region to
another, thereby maximizing the overall welfare. But how such berindividuelle entity there
was not and there is not in no real, history-existing society, we must admit that regional
administrators, being closer to the people and the circumstances of their lives, may have
a better knowledge and understanding of the needs and costs of meeting them than any
central government.
On the other hand, in todays society there is certain political and constitutional
constraints Equality Before the Law!, for example that prevents the central
government to programmatically provide differentiated levels of public goods and
services. These two types of constraints informational and constitutional limits
central governments ability to provide local public goods and services in the
differentiated and therefore economically efficient manner.
Thus, administrative-financial decentralization and, consequently, strengthening
regional levels of government can help increase national economic welfare. Spectrum of
citizens migration from one region to another obliges the authorities to provide public
goods and services in the quantity and quality considered effective by the citizens
themselves. Moreover, significant property rights holders, as well as profitable private
enterprises owners, systematically choose between competing tax jurisdictions those that
offer them the best fiscal package of local tax-and-services. As a corollary of this analysis,
free choice of residences by citizens, and of fiscal jurisdictions by local, domestic and
foreign entrepreneurs push regional administrators to adopt wise and balanced policy
decisions on taxes and public spending.
As the responsibilities of the central government in decentralized governance,
public economy has established long time ago a general normative framework. In
principle, the central government bears responsibility of macroeconomic and monetary
stability, but also of interpersonal and interregional redistribution of national income.3
Charles TIEBOUT, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures cit., pp. 418, 422.
Wallace E. OATES, Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972, p. 54.
3 Richard A. MUSGRAVE, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1959.
1
2
33
The first responsibility necessarily derives from the monetary prerogative,

constitutional attributed, to central government and central bank. And the second, which
seems less obvious, is supported by the argument that free territorial mobility of
economic enterprises and labor severely limited the financial means that regional
authorities can have to redistribute income among citizens of their jurisdictions. A bold
regional policy to support low-income residents, for example, would generate in time an
influx of poor people from other regions and an exodus of persons with high income,
which bear the related tax burden, endangering this entire policy.1
Therefore, the tax-assignment problem concerns the adequacy of different
types of taxes at different levels of governance, given the inter-jurisdictional mobility of
people, goods and capital. Level and number of taxes decisively influence the overall
efficiency of resource allocation, (more) taxed goods being bought less, as private
enterprises usually choose the most favorable tax jurisdictions. As ordinary buyers may
have to incur additional costs for travel and transportation to purchase goods and
services from jurisdictions with lower levels of taxation, etc.. Thus, regional authorities
should avoid an increased taxation of highly mobile entities like capital or final goods
and to provide instead public infrastructures able to increase local productivity of
profitable investments.
As the territorial delimitation of the regions, public economy starts from the
following general observation: The existence and magnitude of beneficial spillover
effects between regions depend on their geographical extension. And an economic,
efficient way to enhance these beneficial effects is to increase the size of designed
regional jurisdictions. But excessive geographic extension may involve considerable
welfare losses due to lower capacity to differentiate local production of goods and
services, which is an important source of economic efficiency. Finally, we must find a
right balance so that to enhance the benefits of spillover effects, without diminishing
those arising from decentralized and differentiated provision of public goods and
services.
For example, lets suppose for a moment that we would start from a tabula rasa,
ignoring the history, geography and local and national culture, and would design de novo
some regions of the country according to the single criterion of economic efficiency.
From the perspective of effective management of the environment (an important public
good today) internal rivers, for example, which in the past could delineate certain
territories, are the most inappropriate kinds of natural boundaries.2
If it is not possible that such an important natural resource to be placed within a
single region, residents and authorities in neighboring regions must find appropriate,
private and public, forms of association, in order to catch as many of the economic,
mutual beneficial spillovers, but also to prevent any damage, equally mutual, of its
improper or even fraudulent exploitation. In general, a rational map of regionalization
should be designed to enhance, not decrease the substantial potential benefits that can be
Wallace E. OATES, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVII,
September 1999, p. 1121.
2 Ibidem, p. 1130.
1
34
derived from complete internalization within the same administrative jurisdiction of large
natural resources like mountains, river basins, mineral deposits etc.
3. RISKS OF DECENTRALIZATION
In the last decades, decentralization policies in industrialized countries, but also in
developing, including post-communist countries has no obtained beneficial results in all
cases. Based on these heterogeneous experiences, current academic literature devoted to
this area has already identified certain types of risks, dangers1 or traps2 of
decentralization which, if known and properly understood, can be largely avoided by a
government that aims to initiate this type of reforms.
First of all, decentralization should be viewed and designed as a part of a broader
strategy to improve the administrative capacity of the state through increased
transparency and accountability of its actions and decisions, by mobilization and
increased participation of citizens in the political process as a whole.
As Joseph E. Stiglitz3 reveals, some uncertainty about the consequences of
reforms generates skepticism, so that the proposed measure be regarded as exclusively
would benefit some at the expense of others. Lack of transparency decredibilises
government commitments and jeopardizes the citizen consensus for its policies. But
there are strong incentives to keep and even cultivate the secrecy in politics. Secret
produces substantial rents those in proximity of political decision centers, information
being a valuable, scarce commodity. And according to economic reasoning, wherever
and whenever there is a scarce commodity, emerges a market in which the parties
sellers and buyers trying to exploit and even to conserve this scarcity artificially created.
In todays society, the content of this valuable information typically refers to business
opportunities with the state, either at central or local level. More specifically, it provides
to initiates or insiders (in Romania they are commonly called smart guys) an
asymmetrical and discriminatory access to the huge flows of financial funds for the
production of public goods and services at all levels of government.
As a political process, decentralization involves many stakeholders and interest
groups within and in proximity of government, so it is necessary to renegotiate their
control over public resources (both income and expenditure sides). And uncertainties
about the attributions of different levels of government and on the sharing of public
resources can generate corresponding long political debates that can delay the reform
process as a whole.4
1 Rmy PRUDHOMME, On the Dangers of Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper 1252, The
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 1-36.
2 Harold FUHR, The Seven Traps of Decentralization Policy, International Journal of Administrative Science &
Organization, Vol. 18, No. 2, May 2011, pp. 88-93.
3 Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Interests, Incentives an Institutions, Policy, Spring 1998.
4 Roy BAHL, Jorge MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ, Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization, World Bank, Washington,
D.C., 2006.
35
Regions can use the political process to request and obtain a growing share of
public resources without necessarily assume new public responsibilities. In turn, large
Ministries (Health, Education, Transport, etc.) do not easily give up to influence the
investment policies and central coordination in favor to new regional administrators.1
From fiscal point of view, decentralization may jeopardize macroeconomic
stability at national level in three main areas: the assignment and sharing of tax bases and
expenditures; the matching of tax and expenditure decisions; and the regulation of subnational borrowing levels.2
In the early 90s of last century, administrative decentralization in Argentina, for
example, has assigned more fiscal levers to provincial governments. These have ignored
in large measure the efforts of tax collection at national level, which has contributed
significantly to the countrys overall indebtedness and economic crisis of the early 2000s.
In China, instead, regional governments are forbidden by law to accumulate deficits and
finance them through borrowing. But Brazilian states have accumulated since the late 90s
a debt of over 100 billion U.S. $, exceeded only by the higher level of the federal debt
and the central bank.3
Indeed, one of the major risks of decentralization is that of excessive public
indebtedness, particularly if there are soft budget constraints and strong politicallyinduced expectations of regional authorities to be helped and even saved in cases
of default. It is about so-called too big to fail mentality. In David E. Wildasins
terms:
A local governments ability to extract abailout from a central government depends
on how big it is. Larger localities may rationally expect bailouts and thus operate
under softer budget constraints. Effective fiscal decentralization requires an
institutional structure that minimizes these adverse incentives.4
According to the International Monetary Fund, in many OECD countries in

recent decades decentralization has led, among other things, to a significant increase of
the contribution of regional, sub-national levels of governance at national public
indebtedness, as is the case of Regioni in Italy, Communidades Autonmas in Spain or
German Lnder, the last becoming in recent years the largest sub-national public debtors
in Europe.5
From the perspective of public economy, excessive public debt accumulated at all
levels of government means however a massive transfer of wealth, both unfair and
Kent EATON, Kai KAISER, Paul SMOKE, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for
Aid Effectiveness, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 20.
2 Robin BOADWAY, Anwar SHAH, Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multiorder Governance, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
3 Octaviano CANUTO, Lili LIU, Subnational Debt Finance and the Global Financial Crisis, Economic
Premise, World Bank, Washington, D.C., No. 13, May, 2010, pp. 1-7.
4 David E. WILDASIN, Externalities and Bailouts. Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations, Policy Research Working Paper 1843, The World Bank Development Research Group,
November 1997, p. 1.
5 International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Balancing Fiscal Policy Risks, IMF, Washington, 2012, p. 46.
1
36
inefficient, between citizens, regions and even between successive generations of the
same nation1. In this respect, the old David Humes evaluation on public credit and debt
remains valid: a practice which appears ruinous, beyond all controversy either the
nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation, because
brings with it poverty, impotence, and subjection to foreign powers2
The remedy is the adoption of a Balanced Budget Rule in current Constitutions,
tried and failed in the U.S. in 1995, but with chances of success in the European Union,
by the Fiscal Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2013. The Treaty requires signatory
states (including Romania) to provide sound and sustainable public finances so that
public administrations deficits do not become excessive, so that Member States budgets
deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP at market prices and public debt does not exceed
the threshold of 60% of GDP at market prices. To this end, the Treaty stipulates the
formal commitment of Member States to adopt the Balanced Budget Rule as
mandatory and preferably permanent constitutional provision.3
Public economists recognize that public administration, at all levels, can and
should spend, including by credit, to provide public goods and services which the private
economy cannot provide, such as national defense, justice and police services, as well
basic infrastructure of society, but warns that high administrative costs or increased
expenditure devoted to social assistance may become unsustainable on long-term,
undermining the economic growth and national prosperity.
But in the absence of a legal, even constitutional strong constraint, the elected
politicians at all levels of government easily approve public borrowings and expenditures
for all kinds of real and imagined needs, because they are always appreciated by some,
others or even all citizens. This easy approval ignores, however, basic economic
reasoning according to which these resources are extracted from alternative uses,
sacrificing material goods, usually more valuable, that can no more be produced, and
human needs, usually more basic, which can no more be satisfied, now and in the future.
By spending without taxing, covering deficits by continuous borrowings,
politicians create societal, general undesirable, unjust and inefficient outcomes. It is
obvious that these results would be different, much improved in a constitutional
framework constraining politicians to collect taxes and then spend them.
The imposition of budget balance rule does not mean however to
constitutionalize a particular political philosophy (say: liberal, not socialist) or a
particular conception of macroeconomic policy. From the perspective of public
economy, there is a irreducible conceptual difference between the rules establishing
procedures for making decisions and the rules that expect outcomes of adopted
decisions. In fact, the most existing constitutional rules are formal, procedural,
prescribing modalities by which political activity takes place voting rights, regular
1 James M. BUCHANAN, The balanced budget amendment: Clarifying the arguments, Public Choice 90,
1997, pp. 117138.
2 David HUME, Of Public Credit (1742), Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, E.F. Miller (ed.), Liberty Fund,
Indianapolis, 1987, par. II. IX.2.
3 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in The Economic and Monetary Union [www.europeancouncil.europa.eu/.../treaty-on-stability,-coordination...].
37
elections, majoritarian government, etc. , but they cannot anticipate anything substantial
about the outcomes that may be obtained from the application of these procedures. In
effect, a game whose rules determine par avance the winners is not a genuine game. As
James M. Buchanan reveals:
When viewed in this perspective, a constitutional rule for budget balance is procedural
rather than substantive. Such a rule does not constrain either the overall size of the
public sector (the budget) or the composition of the activities within that sector
(emphasis added).1
4. CONCLUSION
Some critics of the Fiscal Treaty which requires budget balance often accuse the
fiscal flexibility limitation of public administration. And, indeed, the rule constrains to
some extent the tax choices of policy-makers at all levels of government. But the
important issue here is that of the model for understanding and predicting their
behavior, both individually and in their interaction within institutional structures they
inhabit. From this perspective, the most elementary prediction that logically follows
from the fundamental assumptions of public economy is that, in the absence of effective,
strong constitutional constraints, the current States based on representative democracy
finance their public expenditure rather by borrowing than by (increased) taxation of the
taxpayers, creating in this manner permanent deficits2.
Finally, some European and Romanian critics of balanced budget rule imposed
this year by the Fiscal Treaty claim that it will ultimately undermine the European social
model of expanded assistential state. But this argument is incorrect and even specious.
Anywhere in the world, including Europe, public administrations must finance their
social expenditures mostly by income redistribution of current taxpayers for the sake of
high ethical principle of solidarity between members of the same nation and not by
excessive public borrowing burdening future generations.
One answer to this problem is real, fiscal decentralization. As recent theoretical
research reveals, higher decentralization (measured as the sub-national governments
share of own source tax revenues) is associated with improved public budget balances.
James M. BUCHANAN, The balanced budget amendment...cit., p. 126.

Idem, The Ethics of Debt Default, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 14, Liberty Fund,
Indianapolis, 2000, pp. 519533.
1
2
38
Bibliography
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Washington, D.C., 2006.
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and Brazil, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1999.
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Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1987.
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Journal of Economics, LII, February 1939.
MUSGRAVE, Richard A., The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1959.
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XXXVII, September 1999.
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1252, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1994.
RODDEN, Jonathan A., Hamiltons Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
SAMUELSON, Paul A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1954.
SMITH, Adam, The Wealth of Nations (1776), Modern Library, New York, 1994.
STIGLITZ, Joseph E., Interests, Incentives an Institutions, Policy, Spring 1998.
TIEBOUT, Charles, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 64, No. 5, 1956.
WILDASIN, David E., Externalities and Bailouts. Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, Policy Research Working Paper 1843, The World Bank
Development Research Group, November 1997.
***International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Balancing Fiscal Policy Risks, IMF,
Washington, 2012.
39
The Institutional Design of Democracy

Drago COSMESCU
Independent Researcher
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that institution building is essential for the success of
the democratic transition and consolidation. Upon setting out to establish a democratic
regime, there are various constitutional designs available. Although all appear equally
suitable for building a stable democracy, I demonstrate that particular traits of certain
political systems can allow political actors to weaken the quality of democracy in that
state, if not do away with it all together. As such, I have observed the main differences
between presidential, parliamentary and mixed systems, and I have also examined the
impact of various electoral rules on the configuration of the political arena. The
conclusion shows that parliamentary regimes with proportional electoral systems have
the strongest democratic features.
Keywords: democracy, presidentialism, elections, transition.
The institutional design of a regime is essential to the degree to which it is able to

satisfy its political body, which will allow the regime to survive, hence stabilise and then
consolidate. If institutions are created coherently and harmoniously, they will work
effectively together, which will provide at least in terms of governance and
administrative bureaucracy positive results that are felt and appreciated as such by the
populace.
In the case of the democratic regime as well, the institutional design is essential for
the stability of the regime and its strengthening. The institutional structure provides the
framework within which the political actors rise to power and the means available to
them in order to govern effectively (from the economic, social, administrative, etc.
viewpoint). The effectiveness of governance arrangements directly affects the level of
satisfaction of the citizens (who form the political base of support and recruitment).
Their satisfaction is essential to the perpetuation of the regime. Larry Diamond
summarises the causal link: democracy requires popular support. Support comes from
legitimacy. Legitimacy requires [executive policy] performance1.
The democracys constitutional design is also the one that enables citizens to
express their opinions concerning the performance of the regime and to express their
satisfaction by supporting the regime. For democracy, the regime support manifests itself
through the citizens participation in the democratic game, through elections. These can
Larry DIAMOND, Marc PLATTNER, The Global Resurgence Of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1993, p. 97.
40
bring to power another executive, but, obviously, this does not change the nature of the
regime.
The strengthening of democracy depends on political and economic factors
both depending on the institutional design which generate satisfaction amongst
political actors. Thus, a good design of democratic government maximises these results,
while, in the opposite case, the democratic regime may be perceived as inefficient, even
corrupt.
In contemporary democracies, the rule of law requires institutionalised and
coherently articulated organisations. The choice of the states political institutions is
essential. These will create incentives for the political actors, and the political actors will
define identities and determine how the decision making works in a system. The design
of political institutions is very important during the transition to democracy. (Obviously,
in the consolidation phase of the democratisation process, they already exist and
function properly, otherwise it would not be a successful transition to democracy). In the
transition phase, these are just being built, and their design is largely at the discretion of
political actors. They are interested in building them in such a way as to maximise their
potential political gain.
The type of institution building must be close to the plurality of political options
available in a democracy, it is important to allow every voice to be heard.1 At the center
is a set of rights and liberties, because it would be impossible to build institutions, by the
political elite, with the lack of support provided by the citizens. The Parliament is the
place for debate and enactment of laws, while the judicial system is where conflicts of
interests are discussed and decided. Together, the parliament and judicial institutions are
perceived as organizations providing the social efficiency of the laws.
The democratic regime must also meet the expectations of organised political
actors. Since they strive to gain access to political power, their expectations are related to
the possibility of taking the power. Democracy provides the opportunity for all political
actors, at regular intervals, regardless of the results of the previous government to rise to
power. Since elections are free and regular, all political forces have the legal opportunity
to reach the highest levels of power, hence their interest in supporting democratic
regimes to the utmost of their capacities. Since democracy is the regime which ensures
the chance to come to power at regular (and relatively short) intervals, the political actors
have a much higher cost for the total seizure of power and perversion of the democratic
system, than to accept it.
Institutions stimulate the support for the regime by the political class, through the
possibility of reaching the government by peaceful means and participating in the
redistribution of resources, and, in turn, the performance of the political elite while in
power will draw public support for the democratic institutions implemented during the
transition. The legitimacy of a democratic regime is embodied by the democratically
elected representatives of the political body (the citizens).
As we will later see, this condition is best fulfilled in parliamentary democracy, with proportional electoral
system.
41
In a democracy, the political system structure addresses directly the citizens, since
political parties are made up of groups of individuals with common political goals. The
political class is representative of the citizens of those parties, and so the political body is
reflected indirectly in the government.
Once in power, the politicians must provide citizens with effective leadership,
responsive to their needs and demands. These may be demands expressed by the
governing party supporters and promises made in the victorious electoral campaign, or
the expressed or perceived needs of a wider part of the political body of that state. In any
case, whether meeting prior or anticipating existing demands, considering the future
electoral performance, the political elite must demonstrate that it is able to govern
efficiently. The principles of democracy are found in the institutional construction, so
government efficiency depends largely upon the quality of state institutions. In this way,
citizens are able to sanction not only the parties in government, but also the entire
institutional system. An effective democratic governance, based on functional and
effective institutions, attracts public support, which in turn substantiates the stability of
the regime. Similarly, government failure can easily be blamed on new institutions and
mechanisms implemented in the transition to democracy, resulting in a citizen lack of
trust and regime instability.
Institutional structure defines the rules of government and the path to power
very important conditions for the political class. The latter, organised in political parties,
is interested in the opportunities to participate in government and in the regulations
concerning the management of state resources. This is ensured by a broad inclusion in
the political body, and the broader political inclusion as far as possible all political
forces, although there are cases of anti-system groups excluded is guaranteed by the
democratic regime. Democracys institution building does not guarantee the presence in
power of all political forces, but the possibility of reaching the power; to the same extent
that the institutional structure of other forms of government limits the access to power
to a small group of political forces and limits the scope of the political body.
Consequently, we will see the major characteristics of democratic institution
building. We will see what structural design offers more satisfaction on the political
market and what features make certain democratic subtypes more suitable for democratic
consolidation, while others have inherent conflicts that make them unstable and prone to
fall into formal democracy and authoritarianism.
There are three types of constitutional design, corresponding to three subtypes of
democratic regimes: parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism (a
combination of the first two). Any contemporary democracy is either parliamentary
(almost all European democracies) or presidential (U.S., Latin America, Africa) or mixed
(France, Romania).
Arend Lijphart has a different approach in his Models of Democracy (1999), where he
identifies two subtypes of democracy: the majoritarian one and the consensual one.
Although the source of this conceptualization is undoubtedly the electoral system used
to elect the supreme executive function (plurality, proportional), his subtypes describe a
political culture based either on the winner-takes-all principle, or on the negotiations
needed to reach a decision acceptable to all stakeholders (consensus).
42
Even within the same subtype of democratic system there are differences of
nuance1. For example, both the U.S. and Mexico are presidential regimes, but the
American Congress is more powerful than the Mexican one. Also, Russia and Romania
are both called semi-presidential regimes, but in Russia the Parliament has a very small
role, after the constitutional changes forced by Boris Yeltsin, while in Romania it is
important for the government of the Prime Minister to maintain its power, and this is
important even for the President.
In the parliamentary system, the executive is composed of ministers voted by the
parliament, led by a prime minister appointed on the basis of negotiations between
political parties, represented in parliament after a direct election. The government
depends on the support of the parliament.
Parliamentary systems are those in which the head of state and the Prime Minister
are two different functions. The head of state in these systems has a largely ceremonial
function, for the real power belongs to the chief of the executive. The latter is not
directly elected by the citizens, but by the legislature (based in its turn on direct popular
vote). There are also constitutional monarchies, where the head of state is succeeded
mostly on natural causes. To be invested and maintain in power, a prime minister needs
the support of the parliamentary majority.
In a presidential system, the executive power is held by the President, who
appoints a cabinet responsible only before him. Presidents cannot propose legislation,
but has the right to veto it. The head of state is elected directly by the voters (most
presidential democracies), or indirectly, by MPs (South Africa, Moldova).
The presidential system is centred on the figure of the President, elected directly
by the voters and effectively independent of the legislature. In a presidential system, the
head of the executive is elected by direct popular vote (the U.S. is an exception, but on
the other hand, the Electoral College has little independence as to the vote of the federal
states). Executive power is not influenced by the results of elections and is not
determined by post-election negotiations, as in parliamentary democracies. In
presidential systems, the president is the head of the executive.
In mixed, semi-presidential systems, the executive is double, with a president
elected directly by the electorate and a prime minister (and his cabinet) voted by the
legislature and resulted from negotiations between parliamentary parties. The President is
head of state and but not head of the executive. Semi-presidential systems are found in
France, Finland and Romania.
The semi-presidential system appeared in the Weimar Republic (1919), in order to
avoid the dangers of personalisation of the presidential power. It was considered that the
presence of a strong parliament in the institutional construction will restrain the
concentration of power.
The mixed regime is complicated and unnecessary. The existence of two centres
of power only hinders the work of the government and creates unnecessary tensions.
Since the president is elected by the citizens, he runs the campaign with a governing
For the comparative details of all democratic structures, see Steven FISH, Matthew KROENIG, The
Handbook of National Legislatures. A Global Survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
43
program. But obviously there is no way to implement such an election platform, because
the president lacks both the legal means and the executive and administrative powers.
The only one able to implement an economic, social and political program is the
government with its prime minister, because they are endowed with the respective
powers. Since the President does not control the ministries and their subordinate
administrative units, he cannot decide on any such issues. Thus, in reality, his electoral
program can be put into practice only if the government wants to. In order for the
presidential institution to be effective and to justify its position, there should actually be a
government ally of the President, to implement his political proposals (though not
constitutionally required to do so). Otherwise, the systems dualism merely complicates
the work of the executive and reveals the inefficiency, and even futility, of the two power
centres simultaneously. The president either has a friendly government which
implements his policies or has a hostile government, which effectively prevents all his
initiatives to come true. In both cases, it is revealed that the real centre of power in the
mixed system is still the Prime Minister, without which the president is powerless or
obstructive at most. What emerges is actually the futility of presidential powers, as well as
the inefficiency of mixed system.
In terms of presidential offices position as impartial mediator, it should be
required that the president be not the leader of the party who nominated him, because he
would always remain tied to the partisan structure he controlled. A more real impartiality
would be obtained if the candidate were a secondary party politician, like the presidents
in parliamentary republics.
This again reveals the importance of building harmonious institutions.
Institutional design is very important for the success of the transition and the subsequent
consolidation of the democratic regime. Even in a country which started the transition
under ambiguous auspices, effective institution building a strong parliament despite a
semi-presidential regime has stimulated democracy: Favourable institutional choices
have facilitated the democratisation of Mongolia. Of particular importance are the shape
regime included in the new constitution and electoral rules that organise access to public
office.1
The most common democratic systems are the parliamentary and presidential
ones; subsequently, the main problem in institution building in transition to democracy is
the choice between parliamentary assembly or presidential seat. As we shall see, this
choice is crucial to the chances of success of the transition and of the democratic
consolidation.
The choice between these types of government is essential to the success of
democratic transition and the strengthening of democracy. We shall present now the
differences between parliamentary and presidential power.
Presidentialism presents inherited institutional flaws, such as executive-legislative
deadlock, fixed term (impossible to curtail ahead of schedule) and, especially, exhibits the
authoritarian tendencies of the personalisation of the presidential office.
Ibidem, p. 131.
44
A fundamental difference between presidentialism and parliamentarism is the

relationship between the head of state and the representative assembly. The first is a
system of mutual independence between the executive and the legislature, and the
second is one of mutual dependence.
The parliamentary system is one of mutual dependency: the executive must be
supported by a parliamentary majority, otherwise it risks falling to a non-confidence vote.
On the other hand, a presidential system is a system of mutual independence: the
executive is headed by the President, regardless of the composition of the parliament,
which cannot alter the policies of the President (he was elected for a fixed period,
independently of the parliament). Since in a parliamentary regime governments risk
losing legislative support, they pay more attention to the content of their legislative
proposals. In a presidential system one cannot solve the conflict between the majority
and the president, because of the independence of the two institutions and their
relatively equal power: there is no democratic principle to determine which of the
President or Parliament truly represents the will of the people.1
Institutional conflicts so common in presidential and semi-presidential systems
are avoided in parliamentary systems, because the government is not independent of
the legislature. Thus, if the parliamentary majority wants a policy change, it can replace
the government through a vote of non-confidence, without creating a political crisis.
The data show that a strong legislative is undoubtedly a good thing for
democracy and democratisation. This power of the Parliament was best measured by
Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, who measured the power of national legislatures
through the Index of Parliamentary Powers (PPI). It is based on 32 elements that cover
the parliaments ability to monitor the bureaucracy and the president, freedom from
presidential control, the parliaments authority in specific areas and resources available
for its work, etc. Their study shows that the relationship between the parliament and
democracy is strong and positive.
Presidential political systems are designed so that the parliament might not hinder
the work of the executive, except in rare situations (very large majorities). Obviously, the
electoral system used for the direct election of the president is plurality, not
proportionality. We confront here with the practical situation in which a politician, even
if elected by a small margin, decides and executes the policies of a state, without
significant opposition. The quality of such a democratic constitutional design is limited.
Studies show2 that the separation of the presidential from the general election, as
well as the fixed and rigid term of office of the president, generate inter-institutional
conflicts that make it difficult, if not impossible, to solve political crises.
This hypothesis of the difficult combination between presidentialism and certain
institutions, or rather the different configurations of institutions (mainly a minority
parliament) is complemented by other variables, such as limiting the number of
Juan LINZ, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. I, No. 1, Winter 1990, p. 63.
Alfred STEPAN, Cindy SKACH, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation:
Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism, World Politics, Vol. 46, 1993; Arturo VALENZUELA, Latin
American Presidencies Interrupted, Journal of Democracy, Vol. XV, No. 4, Oct. 2004, pp. 5-19; Juan LINZ,
The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. I, No. 1, 1990, pp. 51-69.
1
2
45
presidential mandates, and, especially, the degree of concentration of the decisionmaking process in the hands of a single person, and converge to explain the poor
performance and the fragility of democratic presidential regimes: The executive power
is formed by post-election agreement between the parties [...] while a president can serve
their mandate with as little parliamentary support. 1
Mainwaring and Shugart show that presidentialism is particularly problematic
when the multiparty system is highly fragmented, and parliamentary elections are held
more frequently than presidential ones. 2 They believe that the most fragile institutional
combination is that of presidentialism and multipartism (because multi-party system
would increase the likelihood of a minority government). A very elaborate study
prepared by Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh3, and conducted on democracies existing
between 1946 and 1999, shows that coalition governments were formed in 50% of the
cases where the presidential party has the majority in congress. Also, minority
governments are as effective as majority governments, in both democratic systems
(presidential and parliamentary). Moreover, the stability of the coalition government had
no impact on the survival of democracy in both types of democratic government.
However, Mainwaring and Shugart were mistaken when they recommended single
round presidential election4, instead of choosing the two-turns system, because, in this
case, although candidates are discouraged from electoral arrangements between rounds,
there is a risk that victory goes to a candidate who meets a minority of the voters
support. Although Allendes case is not one that fits the situation of direct election
(being ultimately elected by a vote in parliament), the reality is that its actual support, of
only 33% of the population, has created serious problems of legitimacy, while the lack of
cohabitation with political forces representing the remaining two-thirds of the society
radicalised their united opposition. In a parliamentary system, Allende would have simply
been replaced by the representatives vote.
Presidentialism makes it hard to cope, democratically, with a political crisis. Some
presidents have stepped down in the face of acute crises (Argentina, 2001), but the
resignation is a personal act of a president, that is a non-institutional way of solving the
crisis. Very rigid presidential terms make almost impossible to replace an incompetent or
unpopular head of state (situation easily solved in a parliamentary system, by the loss of
confidence and support of the legislature).
This deadlock is sometimes solved only through a coup (either against the
president, or an autogolpe by the president). Moreover, the defining nature of this
deadlock - which excludes constitutional and institutional means of replacing the
president makes a coup to appear as the only viable way of replacement, which,
Scott MAINWARING, Timothy SCULLY (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin
America, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, p. 33.
2 Scott MAINWARING, Matthew SHUGART, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 449-471.
3 Jose Antonio CHEIBUB, Adam PRZEWORSKI, Sebastian SAIEGH, Government Coalitions and
Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No.
4, 2004, pp. 565-587.
4 Scott MAINWARING, Matthew SHUGART, Juan Linz, Presidentialismcit., p. 23.
1
46
however, destabilises the democratic system and is most likely to replace it (Chile, 1973).
Here lies the fragility of presidentialism and explains the short duration of existence of
presidential democracies: The danger of the presidential election - zero sum game - is
amplified by the rigidity of fixed term presidential term. Winners and losers are defined
in the most emphatic manner for the duration of the presidential term. Losers have to
wait at least four or five years without access to executive power.1
In a presidential system, the government cannot be replaced, even if the majority
wants it. The deadlock arises precisely from the power of the president and its privileged
position in relation to parliament. In the parliamentary system, a coalition can be formed
by a minority party, if it provides sufficient ministerial portfolios to convince other
political forces to join it, otherwise you can return to running elections and the coalitionmaking process is repeated.
In a parliamentary system, the government must have the support of a
parliamentary majority, so the legislature can dismiss the government, if it chooses so.
The prime minister may be changed at any time, with or without elections. Jose Antonio
Cheibub shows that 163 of the 291 prime ministers of countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the period from 1946 to 1995,
left their office in between general elections2. In a presidential system, however, the
executive can change very rarely between elections, regardless of its political
performance.
There is a rich literature in this field (Linz, Shugart, Mainwaring, Cheibub), which
examines the fragility of the presidential regime faced with the authoritarian tendencies
of the president and which, in turn, demonstrates the parliamentary regimes insulation
from such real risks.
In his well-known The Perils of Presidentialism (1990), Juan Linz argues eloquently
in favour of parliamentary democracy, showing that the presidential system has two
major flaws: they have rigid and inflexible terms, because of the constitutional powers of
their office, and promote a winner-takes-all mentality, that excludes other groups from
power sharing, and might even exclude them from political dialogue, negotiation and
compromise. Linz demonstrates that in presidential systems institutional weaknesses
make them less conducive to the maintenance of democracy than parliamentary systems.
He finds that in 1993, only four of the 31 stable democracies - defined in this case as
having a life of more than 25 consecutive years - had presidential systems: USA,
Venezuela, Costa Rica and Colombia. The only presidential democracies that have
experienced a long period of stability were constitutional USA, and Chile that
experienced a consolidated democratic regime from 1930 to 1973.
Shugart and Careys approach in Presidents and Assemblies (1992) is different. They
try to prove that presidential systems are not more vulnerable to nondemocratic threats
than parliamentary democracies, even proposing the solution of the mixed republics, to
eliminate the extensive presidential powers from the presidential republics. However, this
Juan LINZ, The Perils of Presidentialismcit., p. 56.

Jose Antonio CHEIBUB, Adam PRZEWORSKI, Sebastian SAIEGH, Government Coalitionscit., p.
577.
1
2
47
does not mean that they praise the merits of a semipresidential system per se, but only
suggest that it would be more desirable than a pure presidential system, precisely because
it has a stronger parliament.
These theories reveal causal links starting from the separation of powers
characteristic in these systems, and observe that presidentialism is irreconcilably prone to
conflict and conclude that such conflicts do undermine democratic institutions.
The life expectancy of democracy in a presidential system is less than 24 years,
while it is of 74 years in a parliamentary system1. Most contemporary consolidated
democracies are parliamentary regimes, where the executive power is generated by
legislative majorities and depends on such majorities for its survival in office.
The probability of a democracy to fail in any given year is of 0.0135% in
parliamentary systems, and of 0.0419% in the case of presidential republics.2 The risk of
losing democracy is four times higher in a state with a strong presidential office. Regime
survival is endogenous with respect to the qualities of different institutional systems.
Presidentialism offers a government that depends on the president whose claims
of legitimacy come from the vote of the entire population (although hes usually elected
with results very close to the equilibrium threshold) and who does not need to exercise
the fundamental practice of democracy: the dialogue. The interaction amongst powers,
inevitable in parliamentary systems, is a much better formula than winner-takes-all to
promote efficient and stable democratic regimes.
The most important quality of the presidential executive office is the one that also
contains the basis of personal authoritarian government: election by majority vote,
directly by the citizens. Relying on popular legitimacy, the person who becomes
president may however easily move away from the principles of democratic governance.
In the presidential system, democracy is constantly threatened by authoritarian
tendencies, being saved, in reality, only by the preferences of the office holder. For
instance, based on the same constitutional provisions, but with totally different
interpretations, Giscard dEstaing was a very democratic head of state, compared to his
predecessor as president, General de Gaulle.
Presidential systems often produce presidents who feel they have received a
personal mandate which urges them into adopting a policy speech style imbued of the
popular interest that marginalises organised groups in political life and civil society.
William Riker shows that too much importance is given to the popular vote (and
its size), entrusting it with a moral value, a direct legitimacy from the people, a
manifestation of popular love, rather than perceiving it as a mere decision on the
competence and socio-political programs: The difference between liberal and populist
views is that the populist interpretation of the vote, the views of the majority must be
correct and must be respected, because the popular will represents the popular freedom.
The liberal interpretation there is no such magical identification. The election result is
just a decision and does not require a special moral characteristic.3
Ibidem, p. 580.
Ibidem, p. 579.
3 William RIKER, Liberalism against Populism, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1982, p. 14.
1
2
48
Elections are just a way of determining and controlling officials in public

positions, and do not assign any supplementary legitimacy on the political actors that
occupy that specific position. The legitimation is only that of the office as part of
legitimate institutions working in a legitimate regime an d not of its temporary holder.
A politician is not legitimised by the people, but by the system in which he acts, because
he is supported (through the suffrage), and because he operates within a legitimate
regime, and not the other way around.
The belief that the popular majority will always find the objective truth is very
dangerous and misleading. Accepting the decision of the electorate on any particular
issue is absolutely normal in a democracy, and it is not accompanied by additional
legitimacy for the simple fact that elections are just a way to decide who will occupy
certain high administrative and state offices. The simple respect of the democratic game
has not and cannot have additional qualitative aesthetic judgments.
Democratic legitimacy does not arise from the number of votes obtained by a
particular political actor, but from complying with the democratic characteristics of the
process of succession in office and its functioning. The fact that a citizen holds a political
post in accordance with specific constitutional regulations for that office (election,
appointment) is legitimizing in itself.
Its not the amount of votes that grants an increased right in holding an office, but
the political practices used in that position. For an office occupied through majority vote,
for instance head of state, a citizen is just as legitimate being elected by 70% of the
voters, as is the one chosen by 50.1%. Moreover, it is only natural that it takes much
more votes to elect a president than a parliamentary, but this does not mean that the
legitimacy of the president is different from that of a MP. Not to mention that there are
situations where even controversial characters can win the elections in a constituency
where the majority does not sanction such shortcomings. Democracy is not a popularity
contest. On the contrary, such tendencies hide an authoritative personality: the
replacement of the political representation of values and ideas (centre of liberal
democracy) with the media representation of a false image.
Precisely because many presidents always emphasise that they are elected directly
by the population, in a majority nationwide constituency, it diminishes rather than
strengthens legitimacy. Although he may consider himself representative of the entire
nation, he could only represent his own voters, which might form just over half of the
voters turnout (which also is a percentage of those eligible to vote). On the other hand,
a prime minister dependent on the parliament will always be the leader of a coalition
which in order to stay in power should contain representatives of more than 50% of
the voters. There are indeed cases of minority governments, but these are unstable and
thus short lived, and are also tolerated or even supported by the larger opposition. In the
event that they form another parliamentary majority, this can quickly take over the
administration of the country, without being hindered by the rigidity and lack of
compromise of a presidential term.
Among the 21 states that have experienced democracy for the entire post-war
period, 17 are parliamentary regimes, three are mixed and only the U.S. is a presidential
49
regime1. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach show2 that many different data sources point to
a stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and pure parliamentarism than
between strengthening democracy and pure presidentialism. Undoubtedly,
parliamentarism is synonymous with contemporary democracy.
The form of government influences the survival prospects of the democratic
regime. The political scientists opinion on the new democracies of the late 20th century
seems unanimous: to survive, they should have parliamentary institutions.3 Parliamentary
systems are built on an approach that requires cooperation and compromise.
The survival of a democratic regime relies substantively on dialogue, negotiation
and compromise (the democratic principles) and, procedurally, on the actual chances for
any organised political actor to rise to power. These qualities may be missing in
presidential systems. Studies, such as that of Cheibub,4 show that parliamentary
democracies have a greater capacity than presidential ones to survive a very varied set of
conditions: between 1946-1999, one out of 23 presidential regimes failed (turning into a
dictatorship), while only one in 58 parliamentary regimes underwent a regime change.
Parliamentary regimes provide the opportunity that even the smallest political
representatives in the legislative assembly be included in a coalition government, making
it possible to share power even with very small political forces. This very possible
perspective reinforces the trust of all political actors in the democratic system and,
consequently, their support for it.
Dialogue is the basis of democracy, because it enables negotiation, tolerance and
compromise. The lack of need for political dialogue like in the case of presidential
regimes may take undemocratic traits. The virtually unassailable position of the
presidential administration makes such a head of state far less prone to something else
than the imposition of his own views on almost every topic. Confrontation is always less
costly than negotiation in a regime with a strong president, especially because negotiation
is simply not necessary (the president holds discretionarily the executive power in his
hands).
The presidential system is built around a zero sum game, in which the winner
takes all and the losers have no significant political voice until the next elections. By a
sharp contrast, parliamentary systems provide a positive-sum political game in which
each political actors interest is to participate in government by agreements with others
(negotiation, compromise), and not by exclusion and denial of dialogue (as in the case of
a president with executive powers).
Democracy equals parliamentary system. Democracy means dialogue between
different political opinions expressed by free and equal citizens. Democracy does not
mean a strong personalised government (like the presidential system). The lack of
personalisation of the democratic leadership renders charisma useless, while the victors
1 Arend LIJPHART, Modele ale democraiei. Forme de guvernare i funcionare in treizeci i ase de ri, Polirom, Iai,
2000, p. 38.
2 Alfred STEPAN, Cindy SKACH, Constitutional Frameworks...cit., p. 18.
3 Jos Antonio CHEIBUB, Fernando LIMONGI, Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival:
Parliamentary and Presidential, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5, 2002, p. 151.
4 Ibidem, pp. 151-152.
50
are selected on the basis of policy choices they promise to implement for the benefit of
the constituency they represent.
Since the democratic will of the citizens is expressed through elections, the
electoral systems are very important in democratic institution building. In a democracy,
elections are paramount. Their result is recognised by both winners and losers, and their
effects come into force under the form of a functional administration nationwide. The
elections are crucial for the democratisation process and the dismantling of the former
regime. They are even more important for the installation, legitimisation and
empowerment of the new democratic regime. 1
Regarding the elections as an indicator of democracy, Huntington emphasises that
democracy is truly instituted in a country in transition when its political system goes
through the test of double alternation in power.2
In a democracy, all major policymaking positions are allocated through regular,
free and fair elections. This requires government to be ousted if the majority of voters
prefer another governing coalition. Also, all political actors (parties, candidates) should
be able to mount an effective campaign, which includes freedom of speech, movement
and association.
The elections are institutionalised through electoral laws that determine the
electoral systems, which in turn directly influence party systems.
Electoral laws govern the electoral process, from the viewpoint of the conditions
under which elections are triggered, the nomination of candidates, the organisation and
conduct of the campaign, the vote count and the distribution of seats in the legislature.
Such laws may stipulate who is entitled to vote (according to age, civil rights, census, etc.)
or may establish compulsory turnout (Belgium, Greece, Australia, etc.).
However, in order for the elections to be free, no citizen should be forced to have
a certain choice or attitude towards elections. As such, the case where voting is
compulsory is somewhat controversial.
The electoral system is the mechanism regulating the electoral process itself (the
way to vote, the counting of the votes) and awarding the victory in the elections.
Electoral systems are grouped, mainly, in majority and proportional representation,
according to the rules of the district and national levels. There are indeed other types of
electoral systems, but these are combinations and subtypes of these systems.
The institutionalisation of elections and electoral systems aims, besides a party
system suitable for democracy, at the rallying of citizens to the democratic regime
through their active participation in the political game. This attachment can be observed
by the electoral turnout, an important dimension of the quality of democracy. Pippa
Norris shows a greater popular participation in proportional systems, because, being a
system that is fairer for voting citizens, they are more willing to participate in it. The data
1 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America,
and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. 93.
2 Samuel HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of
Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991, pp. 266-267.
51
shows that the electoral participation in plurality systems is on the average around 65.4%,
while proportional systems turn around 75.7 %.1
The electoral system influences the party system. The electoral system maximizes
or reduces the variety of institutionalised political views. Thus, a proportional model
allows a large number of parties to speak in parliament, while the majority system will
most likely produce a two-party system, the small and medium parties being quickly sidelined. Some types of party systems that are theoretically possible actually become
apparent: there is no three-party system, there are no heavily unbalanced systems.2
The Duverger Law (1955) shows that the plurality vote favours the emergence of a
two-party system, while proportional vote generates multipartidism: simple majority
electoral system with a single ballot favours the emergence of a two-party system.3
Although Duverger does not say it from the start that the electoral system itself causes
the emergence of the two-party system, and its adoption will result in a short time (1-2
general election), in the elimination of virtually all except two of the parties on that
political arena. Consequently, there is a reverse causal correlation: a simple majority
system, with two ballots, and proportional representation favours multipartism.4
The proportional representation increases the number of parties and consequently
the options available for the voters. Furthermore, proportional representation makes
elections more competitive, so parties are strongly motivated to try to maximize support
in all districts.
The only advantage of majority voting and the two-party system is that it reduces
the probability of ideological polarization. Electoral provisions exclude from the party
system radical political actors, and the need to win votes of the centre encourages
moderation. Thus, minimizing the extremist parties and the centripetal forces of the
electoral messages that stimulate competition between parties favours the stability of
democracy.
The distorting effect of majority voting is very noticeable in the British system,
where the Liberal Democratic Partys national voting percentage is consistently quite
close to that of the first two parties, but is strongly penalized in the composition of
parliament.
Pippa NORRIS, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, International
Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 18, No. 3, Jul. 1997, pp. 297-312.
2 Jean BLONDEL, Types of Party System, in Peter MAIR (ed.) The West European Party System, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 310.
3 Maurice DUVERGER, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, Wiley Science Ed.,
New York, 1963, p. 217.
4 Ibidem, p. 239.
1
52
Fig. 1: Evolution of voting and representation Liberal Democrat, UK

27.00%
26.00%
25.00%
24.00%
23.00%
22.00%
21.00%
20.00%
19.00%
18.00%
17.00%
16.00%
15.00%
14.00%
13.00%
12.00%
11.00%
10.00%
9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Percentage
of votes
Percentage of
Representatives
in the Parliament
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
2010
Source: BBC - Election 2010 (www.bbc.co.uk/election/), page consulted on

10.05.2011.
In the general election of 2010, the percentage of citizens represented by the
Liberal Democrats was far lower than the percentage of their voters. The plurality voting
system effectively eliminates a significant percentage of votes, by simply redistributing
them to other parties. In this case, it appears that 15-20% of the citizens were
represented in parliament by politicians against whose parties they voted.
53
Fig. 2: Voting and parliamentary representation in the 2010 elections, United Kingdom
50
45
40
35
Percentage of votes
30
Percentage of
Representatives
in the Parliament
25
20
15
10
5
0
Conservatori
Laburisti
Liberali
Altii
Source: BBC - Election 2010 (www.bbc.co.uk/election/), page consulted on

10.05.2011.
The election system determines the party system. Thus, a proportional system
provides representation to all political forces that have passed a certain threshold, while
the majority system will inevitably lead to the survival of only two relevant parties in
parliament, and elimination of the others, below an estimated threshold of 20-25% of the
popular vote. Mathematically speaking, through this system, a party with 20%, even 25%
votes nationally, although an obviously high percentage, is likely to win fewer
constituencies, which would disproportionately reduce its number of MPs. At the same
time, parties with 30-35% of votes will win the election, virtually eliminating the vote of
as much as one fifth of the electoral turnout.
The majority voting system is based on single-member constituencies, while the
proportional system is based on voting lists. There is no superior democratic value for
the single-member compared to the list system. It would be the same as saying that U.S.
senators are elected more democratically than their German, French or Spanish
counterparts. In reality, the option as to the vote system has little to do with improving
the democratic quality of a regime, but entirely to do with the fact that voting in singleseat districts is the mark of the plurality voting system, which, in turn, will generate a
two-party system. With the establishment of a pure single ballot vote thus a plurality
vote system the result will be the quick elimination of small and medium-sized parties
from parliament and the increase of the seats for the largest ones.
Going back to the theoretical argumentation, the relationship between the
electoral system and the party system works the other way around as well. For instance,
54
Josep Colomer considers1 that the number of parties determines the choice of a
particular type of electoral system, before it had the chance to produce its effects on the
party system. Large parties would prefer small parliaments, small constituencies and
restrictive seat allocation system (eg. simple plurality, high electoral threshold). On the
other hand, where there are several small parties, they would prefer a large parliament,
with large electoral districts and proportional seat allocation, in order to increase the
chances to be included in the parliament. Therefore, as Daniel Barbu highlights, during
the transition, East European political parties preferred multi-partisan system created by
proportional representation and subsequent coalition risk. 2
Also, the political actors, naturally pursuing their own interest, will choose to
establish electoral rules that reduce the probability of becoming absolute losers. This
situation exists in plurality voting systems (parliamentary or presidential), on the winnertakes-all principle. Plurality voting involves periodic risk exclusion from the
government. Proportional systems have more than one winner (usually because such
systems rarely produce a party with over 50% of the seats), and the probability that the
current loser might accede to power even before the next election is acceptable.
The two-party system has advantages such as: the majority party will form the
government alone, giving it stability (and therefore effectiveness), but also drawbacks,
such as the lack of interest in any other political opinion, even of those who did manage
to entry the parliament. From this point of view, a proportional system provides more
fairness for all parties and a more accurate representation of all interests expressed
politically in the society.
If there are more than two parties in a system, it will be difficult for a single one of
them to secure a parliamentary majority, so the many parties in parliament will use the
solution of forming coalition, which although looks like it could cause government
instability actually produces compromises that mitigate the radicalism of the winnertakes-all position.
In a plurality system, the actors incentive to accept and participate is reduced,
because their odds of defeat are very high (50%). In a proportional system, there can be
more winners (those who will form the ruling coalition) and a larger chance of victory.
The fact that there are many actors who can form a government, regardless of the votes
obtained, reduces significantly the chances of total electoral defeat, which proportionally
increases the interest of all political actors to participate in politics and to accept the
democratic political game. Normally, each political actor wants a bigger chance to
participate, in any way, to an electoral victory, and they find such odds in the
proportional system. Political actors who champion plurality systems are interested in
benefiting alone, therefore completely, from the levers of executive power.
The winner-takes-all mentality is much less democratic, because it gives total victory
to one of the actors, despite a margin of electoral support that could very well be quite
Josep COLOMER, Its Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (Or Duvergers Laws Upside Down),
UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 812, March 2005.
2 Daniel BARBU, De la partidul unic la partitocraie in Jean Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partide politice i
democraie in Europa Centrala i de Est, Humanitas, 2003, p. 263
1
55
limited. Hence the superior democratic quality of the parliamentary democracy over the
presidential one, and of the proportional system over the plurality.
In conclusion, the plurality system in single winner districts reduces the quality of
democratic representation, and, coupled with the presidential system which favours the
concentration of power in the hands of just one person, increases the risk of failure of
democratic transition and consolidation.
56
Bibliography
BLONDEL, Jean, Types of Party System, in Peter MAIR (ed.), The West European Party
System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
CHEIBUB, Jos Antonio, Fernando LIMONGI, Democratic Institutions and Regime
Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5, 2002.
CHEIBUB, Jos Antonio, Adam PRZEWORSKI, Sebastian SAIEGH, Government
Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, British
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, 2004, pp. 565-587.
COLOMER, Josep, Its Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (Or Duvergers Laws
Upside Down), UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 812, March 2005.
DIAMOND, Larry, Marc PLATTNER, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1993.
DUVERGER, Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,
Wiley Science Ed., New York, 1963.
FISH, Steven, Matthew KROENIG, The Handbook of National Legislatures. A Global Survey,
HUNTINGTON, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,
University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991.
LINZ, Juan, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990.
LIJPHART, Arend, Modele ale democraiei. Forme de guvernare i funcionare n treizeci i ase de
ri, Polirom, Iai, 2000.
LINZ, Juan, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1996.
MAINWARING, Scott, Timothy SCULLY (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions: Party
Systems in Latin America, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000.
MAINWARING, Scott, Matthew SHUGART, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and
Democracy: A Critical Appraisal, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 1997), pp.
449-471.
NORRIS, Pippa, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems, International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.
18, No. 3, July 1997.
RIKER, William, Liberalism against Populism, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1982.
STEPAN, Alfred, Cindy SKACH, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation: Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism, World Politics, Vol. 46, 1993.
57
Perceptions on the Political System

and the Constitution Reform
Cristian ANDREI
Romanian Political Marketing Association (ARMP)
Political Rating Agency (ARP)
Abstract: Constitutional reform, issue ballots or policy making in general are the same
as and maybe more than elections the subject of interactions between providers of public
products, ideas and services, and the public which is the final consumer. The making
or the revision of the Constitution is a long process where both sides of this exchange
influence each other and to some extent they acknowledge the opinion of the other. By
studying public opinion and reactions to initiatives by politicians in Romania regarding
Constitutional change this paper explains what the output of this conversation in recent
years is. Results of surveys relative to issues and results in previous referendums are also
presented. Additionally a discussion is made about the elections results, the electoral
system and the party system perceptions. This statistical and numerical report is moreover
expected to provide from a political marketing perspective an insight on what kind of
strategic posture political parties choose in this process.
Keywords: Constitutional change, political marketing, political system, referendums,
public opinion.
1. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional reform is about social and political change. It is about what a society or
group of people envision now for the future. Its what people think now about what it
would would subsequently be good. The motivations are forged from experiences and
the general past and present contexts. Essentially it is what people perceive as correct or
productive to the present political and social system, how they evaluate the output of
general rules.
Even if a new Constitutional draft is written by a group of experts and politicians
their work is done within a framework of trust and support from the general public, an
agenda pushed by the mass-media, politicians and organised interested groups. The
Constitutional debate follows these general lines and eventually the public opinion is set
to a certain degree of interest and to some important issues.
The focus here is to underline key public opinion responses to long-lasting issues
in the Romanian public debate regarding regime change or annotations, re-evaluations of
public interest and public life, and what is sometimes called the efficiency of the
political system. The opinion-context in which the new draft is prepared plays a major
58
role in understanding what support some new features will have and what public trends
politicians will follow or try to determine.
From a political marketing perspective, influenced by marketing management
theory, there are two strategic general postures: political parties leading or following
(public opinion, consumers), and mixed postures of these two1. This is useful here also
for understanding that a Constitutional reform is an exchange process between an
audience which is also subject to debate, on the one hand, and the people who are
actually writing the text, on the other hand. They influence each other, but how strong
and productive this exchange is its probably a matter of political culture on both sides.2
It is also helpful for clarifying that during the exchange the output is volatile, even if for
example a leading strategic posture which can be identified in classic political science to a
strong ideological-doctrine party will push more on its own arguments than listen to
what the public has to say. In the end, it is the role of political parties and interest groups
to choose and come up with a filtered vision and version of the general public agenda.
Yet, such a representative bares in mind up to the end the final sanctioning vote usually
done in a Referendum, and works under this specific pressure of public support.
In addition, the Constitution is not only an isolated item living in a vacuum. Its
provisions become political issues per-se in a power-seeking game by political parties and
candidates. Public opinion follows and influences over again this power struggle.
The present paper is close to a statistical and sociological evaluation of some
important issues in the Constitutional debate and of data regarding participation and
interest in similar previous moments (1991, 2003). Moreover, it covers some findings
and facts regarding the output of the electoral system as a premise and information for
the debates related to the political system architecture.
The data is collected from national opinion polls conducted in 20133 during the very
months and days before the Parliamentary committee drafted the project, as well as from
some earlier surveys, conducted in 2011. I will also employ generic data from similar
available surveys. For participation I look at official Referendum reports of the past
(1991, 2003, 2007, 2009, and 2012) and to the specific political context. Actual elections
results will help draw a picture of how the Romanian political landscape looks like after
22 years under a democratic Constitution and how an extra element, the electoral system,
can reshape the perceptions regarding the Constitution.
2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A new Constitution was drafted and validated in Romania in 1991. In a way it was
merely a confirmation of the new political system structure which emerged from the
Stephan C. HENNEBERG, Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political Marketing

Postures, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-47.
2 Cristian ANDREI, Romanias Total War. How Political Marketing Strategies Work in a Democratisation
Process, review process for Journal of Political Marketing, 2013; presented first at the conference Political
Spaces in Eurasia: Global Contexts, Local Outcomes, Ralph and Ruth Fisher Forum at the University of Illinois in
June 2012.
3 At the Political Rating Agency (ARP or Agenia de Rating Politic).
1
59
violent and only to some point negotiated transformations of 1989 and early 1990. The
text described actually the new political reality as it was de-facto created by the new
leaders. The check and balances were a result of their day by day power game. Beside the
revolutionary legitimacy the power-holders (FSN) worked the draft under the large
majority and enthusiastic mandate received in the first free elections of May 1990. This
initial support was built in an extraordinary and special context. It had no previous
democratic and constitutional experience, possessing only the ideological and totalitarian
ritual practices before 1989. The sole benchmark was that of Western democracies,
consequently the concepts and the language were adapted to make the new Romanian
law compatible.
Since in 1990 the new text was so umbilically connected to the powerful party
FSN and its amalgamated vision on the political system all the subsequent debates
pointed to this biased construction. Even if presidents, Prime Ministers and parties in
power eventually changed during the 23 years of democracy, the issue of the primordial
flaws in the system returned over and over to the public agenda. Politicians from all sides
blamed the Constitutional provisions at some point for the shortcomings of everyday
politics and used them to engage in political accusations.
The support for the 2003 revision of the fundamental law was raised in
connection with the objective of EU accession and integration. It was again an
extraordinary motivation, namely to make an EU compatible version. Due to the
political context no essential change was made as to the structure of power or as to the
type of Republic, the only essential modifications being that the Presidents tenure was
extended from 4 to 5 years and the latters power to recall the prime-minister was
limited.
Political fights and tremendous scandals, accusations of authoritarianism against
the President and criticism for the Parliaments lack of functionality, heavy political cases
at the Constitutional Court regarding the balance of power or even concerning day-today responsibilities of democratic institutions, all have flourished in recent years. The
Constitution revision has become a very partisan electoral issue and an instrument of
attacking political opponents.
3. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE BALANCE OF
POWERS
Until 1947 and the advent of the totalitarian regime, Romania as a modern state
was a constitutional monarchy. The rapid option for a continuation of the Republic after
1989 had created a long living issue regarding the necessity and rightness of restoring the
monarchy. Later, new arguments about failed and corrupt politics have also pleaded for
this alternative. They positioned monarchy as an objective and patriotic reality, above
small and frivol party interests. The support has never been large in opinion polls;
however, a minority always kept this battle alive. At the same time the economic and
social disappointments under the new regime imbued another minority with the need to
undo democracy and return to dictatorship or to another form of (indefinite)
60
authoritarian rule. Table 1 shows the limits of these orientations and the predominant
option for the republic, registered in April 2013.
Table 1: In your opinion Romania should be:
A democratic Republic
A constitutional and democratic monarchy
A dictatorship
Dont know
64.2%
20.5%
5.9%
9.4%
Table 2 (April 2013) indicates small variations in these options when asking a
similar question but much more oriented to the resident of the power.
Table 2: Who would better lead Romania?
A President directly elected by the people
62.6%
A queen or a king who inherits the throne and acts in constitutional
boundaries
16.8%
A dictator
8%
A Prime Minister nominated by the winning party in elections
Dont know
5%
7.6%
The same rapid reconstruction of the regime after 1989 put at the head of the
state an elected President with executive powers. At that time the option was presented
as opening the possibility for all people to change the head of state by universal vote,
which was a popular idea and in opposition to the practices inherited from the
communist regime. Unclear responsibilities for this position and later large political
scandals between the President and the Prime Minister or the President and the
Parliament triggered some political parties to discuss other options such as: the President
elected by the Parliament or the Prime Minister acting as the head of state. The counter
response to this was the accusation that political parties want to block the Romanians
direct vote and to increase their power against the people. The public opinion seems
definite in this matter refusing the alternatives to the current situation (Table 3, April
2013). One can say that the legacy of the first years after the Revolution is still alive and
powerful.
Table 3: Who should elect the President?
People directly by universal
vote
88.2%
The Parliament
8.9%
Dont know
2.9%
61
For the same purpose of defining the role of the Presidency some have argued
that a President should only play a decorative part in the Republic, while others are
claiming that a better idea would be to have a full-responsible President acting as the
leader and manager of the executive branch. Firstly, Table 4 (April 2013) is pointing to
an equilibrium of opinions. No option has a majority, only the more power alternative
is in some disadvantage.
Table 4: The President of Romania, after the Constitution revision, should have:
Less power than now
The same power as now
More power than now
Dont know
33.6%
32.7%
25.0%
8.7%
Secondly, the suggestion to merge the Presidents and the Prime Ministers offices
in order to have a clear leader of the executive branch, which is the equivalent of
expanding either the Presidents role, or that of the Prime Minister, has a low backing
(Table 5, April 2013). This may seem strange for an observer of the Romanian politics,
as long as the main frictions and political fights are connected to the blurred distinctions
between the two offices. However, a powerful and in total control President is too much
to bear for a sensitive society which has both the tragic past of dictatorship and a
growing disappointment towards politicians.
Table 5: What option is preferable for Romania?
The President to represent the state, and separately the Prime
Minister to lead the Government, the same as its now
72.8%
The President to be the head of state and at the same time to lead
the Government
22.0%
Dont know
5.1%
The increasingly political strife and the difference in the tenure of the President,
on the one hand, and of the Parliament and cabinet mandate, on the other hand (5,
respectively 4 years) that led to a cohabitation stance between opposing forces since
2004 are not strong enough incentives for the people to ask for a diminishment or
annulment of the Presidents or the Prime Ministers office. On the contrary, people are
oriented towards cooperation.
In December 2012 after the Parliamentary elections and after a political crisis that had
led to suspicions expressed by the EUs and the USs officials regarding democracy in
Romania, a cohabitation and institutional cooperation agreement was signed between
62
the Prime Minister and the President1. A majority of Romanians have a positive
perception of such a mutual understanding (Table 6, April 2013). One may say that what
they ask from politicians is precisely to cooperate in the framework of the present
Constitution, and are not ready to validate a change in the structure of powers.
Table 6: Do you appreciate the cohabitation agreement
between Prime Minister Ponta and President Bsescu ?
Is good for Romania
45.8%
Is not good for Romania
32.5%
Has neither a positive nor a negative
impact
13.6%
Dont know
8.1%
4. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The electoral system is a key factor in the Constitutional arrangement, even if its
not an effective component of the fundamental act. The allocation method for number
of votes into number of seats in the Parliament substantially alters the perception on the
political system as a whole. In line with Duverger2 or Taagepera and Shugart3 one will
find that depending on the electoral algorithm the output of elections varies significantly
and there are totally different paths of democratic evolutions.
Following Duvergers classic laws, or later hypothesis, proportionality will
encourage a multi-party system and coalition governments, and a majority rule will
encourage a two or two and a half party system. The Constitution provides that a
separate law is responsible for how elections are organised. However, the mechanical
effects described by Duverger are of great importance when designing the power
structure and functions. A system oriented toward a larger political representation is
expected to choose a proportional formula and a more important role for the Parliament.
Vice versa, a system oriented toward effective Government will tend to fortify the
executive branch.
Romania picked some of both. The predominant electoral rule in local, parliamentary
and European elections is based on proportionality; even if in 2008 a new mixed formula
was put in place, the prevalent effects are proportional4. Predominantly electoral alliances
and coalition governments were formed in the central Government and in the local
councils. The number of effective parties calculated by the Taagepera and Shugart
It was more an agreement on a common interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.

Maurice DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, 2nd ed., Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.
3 Rein TAAGEPERA, Matthew SHUGART, Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.
4 Cristian ANDREI, Despre efectele sistemului electoral romnesc, cu ajutorul unei simulri electorale,
Expert electoral, No. 2, 2013.
1
2
63
formula had an average value close to 41 (Table 7) which is a clear indication of multiparty system. Political parties are aware of the consequences of the system and they are
trying periodically to grab more power by attempting to change the electoral formula to
their advantage. When they are up in the polls and leading the market they tend to favour
the majoritarian rule; and contrariwise, when they go down in the polls and have a
weaker position, they tend to prefer a proportional rule2.
Table 7: Elections, winners, coalitions, effective number of parties
1990
FSN
No.
of
Winners
Effective
Parties in
Votes %
No. of parties
Parliament
67.52
16
NA
1992
FDSN
28.29
4.5
1996
CDR
30.70
3.9
2000
PDSR
37.09
3.2
2004
PSD
37.16
4.9
2008
PDL
33.57
USL (3
parties) 60.10
3.5
3.8
Winner
2012
Government
1 party
1 party + support
from 4 parties in
Parliament
4 parties + other
civic organisations
1 party + support
from 1 party in
Parliament
4 parties and later 3
parties
2 parties and later 3
parties
3 parties
Nevertheless the executive branch has many constitutional reinforcements and a

double command: the Prime minister who depends on the vote of the Parliament, but
has the necessary instruments to lead the legislative activity; and the President who is
elected directly by the people and can be sacked only by referendum, even if he is
impeached by a majority of the MPs; the President leads mostly uncensored the foreign
policy and has important responsibilities regarding the judicial system and the secret
services. As noted above the relation between the two offices is also problematic and has
generated permanent conflicts3.
N (where p= party share of votes/seats, n=number of parties). This index shows the concentration of
power in elections or in Parliament, by trying to operationalize the concept of relevant party.
2 Cristian ANDREI, Romanias Total War cit.
3 Not necessarily during previous years when unstable coalitions ruled and in cohabitation with the
President, but also in 1990-1991 or later in 2001-2004, when FSN and its successor PDSR got strong
majorities. The 1991 conflict had even bloody consequences when mass protesters and workers rallied
against the Prime Minister and turned into violent actions.
1
64
This confusing duality of proportionality-coalitions system, on the one hand, and

semi-presidential stance of the democratic regime1, on the other hand, has not generated
a rich mutual cooperation, but the opposite. Although the power is mostly in the hands
of the executive branch, there is dissatisfaction with the Parliament which was most of
the time unable to provide a clear Government formula, causing permanent coalition
scandals, renegotiations and setbacks.
The results were clear in the case of a successful 2009 referendum organised by
the President and its loyal coalition. Even in this case it was obvious that politicians were
trying to rearrange the political system to accommodate more power to their camp in
this particular case, the President2. It was an easy choice to organise an issue ballot as
long as the Parliament and the political parties have had in all the opinion polls of the
previous years a favourability index around or below 10%. Some may call it a populist
move or a strong following strategic posture3.
Table 8 and 9 show how the Romanians responded in this constitutional reform
referendum4. The first question regarded the number of chambers in the Parliament
there are two since 19905 with similar responsibilities, and only slightly different after the
2003 revision. The second was about the maximum number of MPs usually around
470 and the general idea that MPs are useless in such a great number and they only
spend and squander money pointlessly. That is why the second question had even a
greater success.
Table 8: Referendum question No 1:
Do you agree to Romanias adoption of a unicameral Parliament?
Yes
No
Shares
77.7%
22.2%
Votes
6740213
1925209
As it is called by constitutional experts.

The referendum had a very clear electoral purpose. It overlapped with the presidential elections where the
incumbent Bsescu successful portrayed his opposition as the failed politics represented by the
Parliaments activity.
3 Stephan C. HENNEBERG, Leading or Following? cit.
4 The results are not mandatory for the Parliament, even the Constitutional Court explained in repealing a
new electoral reform in 2012 that the law does not take into account the will of the Romanians validated
in the 2009 Referendum.
5 Before the 1991 Constitution was validated, a Decree (No. 92, March 14 1990) issued by the National
Unity Provisional Council in fact a provisional revolutionary Parliament instated the separation of
powers principle, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the proportional formula and the President of
the Republic. It was the ground for organising the first elections in May 20, 1990.
1
2
65
Table 9: Referendum question No 2: Do you

agree to the reduction of the number of parliamentarians to a maximum of 300 persons?
Yes
No
Shares
88.4%
22.2%
Votes
7765573
975252
The debate around the Parliaments utility and efficiency pointed again to another
radical option supported by a minority. The economic, social and political discontent
prompted the idea that political parties are useless and they are not necessary or that one
party is enough (similar to the Communist experience). The results of a survey in 2011
(December) are showing that a multi-party system is supported only by a 30% minority,
and that a one-party system is attractive for almost 20% (Table 10), especially young
people (Table 11).
Table 10: What party system do you prefer for Romania?
No parties
Only one party
A system with two parties which alternate in power
depending on elections
A system with more than three parties which form coalitions
in government or in opposition
Dont know
1.2%
19.5%
42.6%
29.9%
8.1%
Table 11: Crosstab party system vs. age

18-29
Total years
1.3% 0%
19.5% 32.7%
No parties
Only one party
A system with two parties
which alternate in power
depending on elections
42.5% 37.%
A system with more than
three parties which form
coalitions in government or in
opposition
29.8% 23.0%
Dont know
5.7% 5.3%
66
30-44
years
2.5%
19.8%
45-59
years
1.0%
163%
Over
60
years
1.2%
17.9%
42.6%
42.4%
43.8%
27.7%
5.9%
36.5%
3.5%
28.0%
7.8%
In spite of the technical and mathematical elaboration of the electoral formula and
its effects, the Romanians have revealed a large support for the majoritarian electoral
system and the two-party system. In a broader understanding it can be seen both as an
adaptation to the constitutional framework and as a request for more electoral and
constitutional reform. This support was somewhat visible in a 2007 referendum
regarding the electoral reform1, although the turnout was low (about 26%) see Table
12.
Table 12: Referendum question: Do you agree that, beginning with the next elections
that will be held for the Romanian Parliament, all deputies and senators be elected in singlemember constituencies, based on a majority vote in two rounds?
Yes
No
Shares
16.17%
81.36%
Votes
784640
3947212
Pushing further the populist-following posture some parties suggested to the

public that too many elections are not necessary and that it would be useful to merge
the dates of some elections, local, parliamentary or presidential2. It was again an
opportunistic approach taken by some of the parties favoured by such a move in the
political context. Table 13, December 2011, shows the lack of support for this idea,
although there was a great polarisation between the parties in power (PDL) and
opposition (USL, PPDD) at that moment (Table 14, December 2011). Later on, the
Constitutional Court repealed the decision to merge local and parliamentary elections on
system predictability grounds (the elections were too close to change the dates).
Table 13: What do you prefer?
Elections should be organised on separate days, the local elections in
56.2%
June, and the parliamentary in November, as it was before?
Local and parliamentary elections should be organised the same day in
36.1%
2012, merged?
Dont know
7.8%
Table 14: Crosstab support for elections dates merger vs. political vote
This referendum was organised in the same manner as an electoral campaign issue for the party
sympathetic to the President, in the first elections for the European Parliament, and as an attack against the
party-system.
2
From 1992 to 2004 local elections were held approximately 6 months before the parliamentary and
presidential elections (the same day). Since 2008 due to the expansion of the presidential mandate to 5 years,
parliamentary and presidential elections are held separately, in an interval of 20 years when they coincide
again.
67
Total
PDL
USL
PPDD
Undecided
Elections should be organised

on separate days, the local
elections in June, and the 56.2%
parliamentary
ones
in
November, as it was before?
25.2%
71.8% 66.9%
49.0%
Local
and
parliamentary
elections should be organized 36.1%
the same day in 2012, merged?
72.9%
21.8% 27.3%
38.5%
Additionally one proposal from 2013 and adopted in the official report of the
official Constitutional committee1 is to permanently separate the parliamentary and
presidential elections, by reducing again the presidential to 4 years and by interpolating
the two types of elections. Table 15 shows the positive response to this idea in the results
of a survey conducted at the beginning of June 2013, the same time the revisions were
drafted. Likewise, Table 16 from the same survey indicates a clear support for reducing
back the Presidential mandate to 4 years.
Table 15: Presidential and parliamentary elections should be permanently separated?
I am more likely to support
I am more likely to be
against
Dont know
64.7%
27.8%
6.7%
Table 16: The presidential term should again be of 4 years, not 5 as it is now?
against
Dont know
82.3%
10.9%
7.5%
A wider range of proposals to increase the Parliament strength and role has been
put into question. This comes as a response to years of public discourse against the
institution and the manufactured idea that Romanians hate or dont want a Parliament.
All these propositions are rated positively and with high rates of approval (Tables 17, 18
and 19, in June 2013). This proves again that the extreme following or leading postures
in a constitutional democratic debate can be misleading and toxic. The question in Table
17 settles a political debate in recent years, when some accused that such an initiative
The Constitutional committee started its activity in May 2013 and continues further as this paper is being
completed.
68
would be an abuse from the Parliament against other independent branches of the
Government. The results in Table 19 bring the answer to a discussion about limiting the
Presidents intervention over the decision of the Parliament or the Prime Minister. It has
a limited but 50% majority support and its an addition to another limitation in the 2003
revision that restricted the President in revoking the Prime Minister and in extending his
powers by large re-interpretations of the Constitution.
Table 17: Any citizen, judge, minister or businessman should be bound
to present himself in front of a control Parliamentary committee?
against
Dont know
78.5%
15.1%
6.4%
Table 18: At least once in a month the Prime Minister should be compelled
to go and talk in front of the Parliament?
I am more likely to be against
Dont know
90.3%
5.5%
4.2%
Table 19: The president should not be allowed to cancel a ministers appointment?
Dont know
52.5%
37.7%
9.7%
The support for an efficient Parliament and Government and for stopping
political crisis is displayed in the results of a question presented in Table 20 (June 2013).
It is a change proposal responding to situations like the one of 2009 when a new
majority dismissed the Cabinet, indicated the new prime minister, but the President
refused to appoint him. For a three month period the former Cabinet provisionally ran
the country with limited powers and organised presidential elections and a referendum,
until the re-elected President managed to force another majority in Parliament.
69
Table 20: The opposition in the Parliament may revoke a Cabinet only if they propose at the
same time the name of the next prime minister?
Dont know
50,1%
33,4%
16,5%
A large controversy in Romanias post 1989 politics refers to the phenomenon of

elected officials changing their party membership for personal, political or other
opportunistic reasons. A law of 2004 ruled that local elected officials will lose their office
if they quit the party that supported them in elections. Many say now that a similar
stipulation should limit the MPs transfers. An interesting case happened in 2009-2012
when a group of MPs from all opposition parties created a new political group in the
Parliament and a new political party that ensured the critical 50% majority for the ruling
party (PDL). Accusations of blackmailing MPs and opportunistic behaviour were made.
A proposal was advanced in 2013 to sanction the migrating MPs from a party to
another through a local referendum. Even the constitutional committee rejected up to
this point any amendment on this matter it enjoys a strong public support (see Table 21,
June 2013).
Table 21: Can MPs changing the party that supported them in the elections
be revoked by a local referendum?
Dont know
80.6%
12.3%
7%
5. THE INTEREST FOR THE CONSTITUTION REVISION

The history of the electorates participation in elections and referendums after
1989 is one that went from enthusiasm to indifference. Referendums have followed the
general trend, the participation in both 1991 and 2003 constitutional referendums, and
even in the more political referendums of 2007 and 2009 with a constitutional agenda,
being very similar to the closest elections in time. The data and trends are shown in
Table 22. By analysing this simple data set it becomes obvious that the interest in
referendums is correlated with the overall interest in elections and politics.
Table 22: History of participation in elections and referendums
Elections
Parliamentary
Elections
70
and
Date
Participation
Share
May 1990
14826616
86.2%
Presidential
Constitution referendum
Local elections
Parliamentary and Presidential
Elections
Presidential elections, 2nd round
Local elections
Elections
Local elections
Elections
Constitution
revision
referendum
Local elections
Elections, 1st round
Impeachment referendum against
the President
European elections
Referendum for electoral
reform
Local elections
Parliamentary elections
European elections
Referendum for Parliament
reform
Presidential elections, 1st round
Local elections
Impeachment referendum against
the President
Parliamentary elections
December 1991
February 1992
10948468
10812023
67.3%
65.0%
September 1992
October 1992
June 1996
12496430
12153810
10016932
76.29%
73.23%
56.47%
November 1996
November 1996
June 2000
13088388
13078883
9295165
76.01%
75.9%
50.85
November 2000
December 2000
11559458
10184715
65.3%
57.5%
October 2003
June 2004
9938441
9911813
55.7%
54.22%
November 2004
December 2004
10794653
10112262
58.51%
55.21%
May 2007
October 2007
8135272
5370171
44.45%
29.46%
October 2007
June 2008
November 2008
June 2009
4851470
9045068
7238871
5035299
26.51%
48.81%
39.2%
27.67%
November 2009
November 2009
December 2009
June 2012
9320240
9946748
10620116
10430884
50.95%
54.4%
58.02%
56.3%
July 2012
December 2012
8459053
7666169
46.24%
41.7%
71
This seems to be the case also in 2013. The survey of April 2013 revealed a
participation interest in the Constitutional Referendum of 45.2%1 as compared to 50.3%
interest in Presidential elections (forthcoming in 2014). Withal, this number is close to
the 41.7% participation in Parliamentary elections held last December. This represents a
problem for a potential referendum for the Constitution draft if the threshold will still be
of 50%, given that a highly disputed revision of the law of referendum has recently (May
2013) lowered the threshold to 30%. It still waits for a positive sanction from the
Constitutional Court.
Previous referendums for validating or amending the Constitution in 1991 and
2003 indicated a strong support for the act (Table 23 and 24), but again it was related to
the interest in politics and context at that time2.
Table 23: The response in the Constitution referendum of 1991
Votes
8464624
2235085
Yes
No
Shares
79.1%
20.9%
Table 24: The response in the Constitution referendum of 2003
Yes
No
Votes
8915022
875172
Shares
91.06%
8.93%
6. CONCLUSIONS
The Romanians tend to support a Constitution reform which renders the political
process more effective, but are reluctant to back an unbalanced strengthening of one
specific branch of the government. They want an efficient Government, but it should
also be accountable to the Parliament. They want the President to be the leader of the
State, yet with balanced and limited tasks. The political scandals and crisis should not be
a pretext for offering someone more power or for reducing the others, but an incentive
for cooperation between power holders.
A special note about Romanian surveys is that they are conducted on the population still living on
Romanias territory and are statistically representative for this population only. Another estimated 3 million
Romanians are living abroad, and they are not accounted for in the polls, but they are accounted in the
official voters lists. Romanians living abroad register a very low rate of participation. That is why the
participation numbers in surveys must be calculated only from the total population still living within
Romanias borders, which results in a lower figure.
2 In 2003 a large mobilisation made by political parties, and a special provision that a Referendum can be
organised uninterruptedly over two days of the week (Saturday and Sunday) rendered possible such a
participation.
1
72
In recent years, the Constitution has become a political battleground. The strategic
postures of the combatants are more likely to suggest an interest in extending self-power
than a market exchange approach towards the public. In spite of heavy argumentation
a lot of the politicians suppositions about what do the Romanians really think of
their political system have proven to be false. Even when some leaders are following
the public mind on certain issues, there is always another side of the same story in the
collective opinion which tends to balance the narrow proposition made by politicians.
The excessive interpretations of what do people want are transformed into a
manufactured reality repudiated by the public.
Yet, the interest in constitutional matters has depended on the political context.
This is an indication that public opinion is reacting strongly to the political system output
and that the Constitution is a substantial part of the respective system.
The electoral system has a great impact on how the political system is evaluated by
people and on the support of the Constitutional structure of powers. For instance, a
proportional formula is likely to lead to unsatisfactory negotiated results and tensions
within coalitions which are not fully compatible with a strong definition of the executive
branch.
If it wants to generate interest and participation, the process of constitutional
making has to take into consideration both leading and following strategies in
constructing the text and to share and integrate public opinion and sentiment. The
modern political market orientation (PMO)1 may be a solution to this issue.
Appendix Technical sheet
The surveys of December 2011, April and June 2013 that were used in this study
are all statistically representative for the population living on the territory of Romania.
They were conducted by telephone interviews using CATI procedures and an
approximation of Random Digit Dialling2 technique for households telephones in
Romania. At any rate, it was a private and independent endeavour pertaining to the
Political Rating Agency, a periodical evaluation of the Romanian political arena (Piaa
politic, trans. The Political Market).
- The 2011 survey: 8-16 December 2011, 960 interviews, +/-2.65% error.
- The April 2013 survey: 12-17 April 2013, 1020 interviews +/-2.55% error.
- The June 2013 survey: May 29 June 6 2013, 1090 interviews, +/-2.5% error.
All the participation and referendum or elections results data were collected from
official sources, with the exception of 1990-1992 where access to archives was difficult
and the numbers were picked from other public sources.
Dominic WRING, Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A Secret History, European
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, 1996, pp. 92-103; Nicholas OSHAUGHNESY, Paul R. BAINES,
Aron OCASS, and Robert P. ORMROD, Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and
Criticisms, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, pp. 353-366.
2
Michael C. CUMMINGS, Radnom Digit Dialing: A Sampling Technique for Telephone Surveys, The
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1979, pp. 233-244.
73
Bibliography
ANDREI, Cristian, Despre efectele sistemului electoral romnesc, cu ajutorul unei
simulri electorale, Expert electoral, No. 2, 2013.
ANDREI, Cristian, Romanias Total War. How Political Marketing Strategies Work in a
Democratisation Process, review process for Journal of Political Marketing, 2013.
CUMMINGS, Michael C., Random Digit Dialling: A Sampling Technique for
Telephone Surveys, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1979, pp. 233-244.
DUVERGER, Maurice, Les partis politiques, 2nd ed., Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.
HENNEBERG, Stephan C., Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political
Marketing Postures, Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-47.
OSHAUGHNESY, Nicholas, Paul R. BAINES, Aron OCASS, Robert P. ORMROD,
Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and Criticisms, Journal
of Political Marketing, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, pp. 353-366S.
TAAGEPERA, Rein, Matthew SHUGART, Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of
Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989.
WRING, Dominic, Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A Secret
History, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, 1996, pp. 92-103.
74
Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A Unicameral Parliamentary Political System as a Solution for the
Implementation of the Ruling in the Case Sejdi and Finci vs.
Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Saa GAVRI
Centre for Political Studies, Sarajevo
Abstract: The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in
December 2009 in the Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) case has
set a clear task for BiH institutions and political elites: the political system of BiH
must be reorganised in such a way so that all citizens be able to run and be elected for
the BiH Presidency and House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly,
regardless of their ethnic origin. Since 2010 till today we have heard a number of
discussions on the implementation of the decision, but none of them found consensus
among BiH political elites. Based on the opinions of the Venice Commission, the Swiss
political system and the analysis of the actual BiH political structure, a proposal for the
implementation of the ruling Sejdic and Finci will be presented in this text. It foresees
the abolishment of the Presidency and House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly
by creating a unicameral parliamentary political system in BiH, with a more functional
decision making process. The executive power will not be anymore divided between the
collective head of the state (Presidency) and the state government (Council of Ministers),
but would be focused on only one body: the Council of Ministers.
Keywords: Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) case, BiH
Presidency, House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, constitutional
reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
By December 22, 2009 it became clear: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) needs a
constitutional reform. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled in
favour of the plaintiffs in the case Finci-Sejdi vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Exclusion
of minorities from active participation in the elections has no objective and logical
justification and thus stands in contradiction with the European Convention on Human
Rights, which prohibits discrimination, the Court stated, and the local media reported.
BiH had been taken to the Court of Human Rights by Jakob Finci, president of the
Jewish community of BiH and BiH diplomat, and Dervo Sejdi, president of the Roma
organization. Finci and Sejdi had pleaded that, as members of minority communities in
BiH, they were subject to discrimination. The reason is that, according to the Dayton
75
Constitution, only members of the constituent peoples Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats
may be elected to the State Presidency and the upper chamber the House of Peoples
of the BiH parliament. Minorities are unable to participate in these institutions, since
after the war BiH was built on clear ethnic and entity grounds. The rule should have
strengthened the peace between the three majority ethnic groups. There was no room
left for minorities and those who are not ethnically determined (e.g. the so-called
Bosnians). Nevertheless, these checks-and-balances actually present a barrier to the
further development of the country seeking EU membership, especially concerning the
building of a functional state.
Based on the aforementioned, it can be concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina
needs a constitutional reform for two reasons:
a. In order to harmonise the State Constitution, as well as entities and cantons
Constitutions (cantons within the Federation of BiH FBiH) with the
applicable international, but also regional documents on human and civil rights
(most importantly the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols), thus
abolishing various discriminatory elements related to the political rights of
certain groups of the population.
b. In order to build a functional state with government structures and
competencies that allow for a speeding up of the decision-making process and
its implementation, especially in terms of implementation of the EUs Acquis
communautaire in the process of European integration1.
Since 2010 till today we have heard a number of discussions on the
implementation of the ruling. Political elites have not found yet a satisfactory solution
for all the citizens. The negotiations were conducted in closed circles, away from the
official parliamentary structures. Civil society organisations have presented different
models for the implementation of the ruling.
2. DAYTON CONSTITUTION
Before we discuss the issue of the constitutional reform, we will briefly recall the
basic characteristics of the Dayton Constitution, state institutions envisaged by the
Constitution, and the amendment procedure stipulated thereby.
The main characteristic of modern constitutional development in BiH (in relation
to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and what
distinguishes it from continental and Bosnian-Herzegovinian constitutional tradition is
that the BiH Constitution was de facto adopted during peace negotiations and thus
formally represents a part of an international treaty2. The Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was agreed upon as a supplement to the international treaty: Annex 4 of the
Dayton Peace Agreement. Its constitutional character has been acknowledged by the
1 Saa GAVRI, Damir BANOVI, Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina Procedures,
Challenges, Recommendations, Sdosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol. 50, No. 05-06, 2010, pp. 60-75.
2 Edin AREVI, Dejtonski ustav: Karakteristike i karakteristini problemi, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer,
Predstavnitvo u Bosni i Hercegovini, Sarajevo, 2009.
76
authority of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian constitutional

doctrine and decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH. However, it cannot be
seriously claimed that Annex 4 is the constitutional and legal text of the BiH demos
(state nation1). By analysing the evolution of the BiH socialist constitutional system to
the present Dayton Constitution, it is possible to identify the following changes: a)
Establishment of ethnicity as the holder of sovereignty and basis for the entire system to
the detriment of an abstract citizen2; b) Establishment of consensus as a decision-making
practice (firstly as a mere practice established by political parties and later on by
introducing this aspect into the constitutional text).
These changes are the result of changes on a social basis and rest primarily on the
collective and ethnic identification of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other
words, the Preamble3 of the Constitution of BiH states that constituent peoples are the
adopters of the Constitution of BiH, i.e. Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent
peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.4 The principle
of an abstract citizen is not envisaged in the Dayton constitutional provisions. The
Constitution of BiH does not address the Others, but interpretation leads to the
conclusion that these are national minorities and persons without ethnic identification.
3. BIH STATE INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING TO THE
CONSTITUTION
According to the constitution, BiH is divided into two federal units: the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). State
institutions are mostly regulated by the Constitution of BiH. State authority is divided
between executive, legislative and judicial authorities. The executive and legislative
bodies are expressly regulated by the Constitution, but judicial institutions are not.
The legislative authority at the BiH state level is exerted by the bicameral
Parliamentary Assembly, which consists of the House of Representatives (Article IV, Item 2
of the Constitution) and the House of Peoples (Article IV, Item 1 of the Constitution). The
House of Representatives has 42 members with two-thirds of the representatives elected
from the Federation of BiH, and one-third from the territory of the RS. The
representatives are elected directly from their entity in accordance with the Election Law
of BiH. The House of Peoples consists of 15 delegates out of which two-thirds are from
the FBiH (including five Bosniacs and five Croats), and one-third from the RS (five
Serbs). FBiH representatives in the House of Peoples are elected by Croat and Bosniac
delegates in the FBiH House of Peoples. Representatives from the RS are elected by the
Ibidem, p. 61.
Tarik HAVERI, Ethnos i demokracija. Rabic, Sarajevo, 2006, p. 16.
3 According to the Constituent Peoples Decision of the BiH Constitutional Court, the Preamble represents
the normative part of the BiH Constitution.
4 An interesting fact is that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been translated into the
three official languages (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) and two scripts (Latin and Cyrillic), nor was it
published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, it exists only in English and French.
1
2
77
RS National Assembly. All legislative decisions must be approved by both Houses;

where efforts will be made to include at least one third of the representatives from each
entity. Or, otherwise, in case this is not possible, the aim is not to have two thirds of the
representatives/delegates from each entity voting against the decision, only after the
commissions attempts to solve the dead-lock failed (Article IV, item 3 of the
Constitution). This practice is known in politics and legal theory as Entity Voting.1
The executive authority is divided between the BiH Presidency (Article V of the
Constitution) and the Council of Ministers (Article V, Item 4 of the Constitution). The
BiH Presidency is composed of three members, one Bosniac and one Croat who are
directly elected from the territory of the FBiH, and one Serb who is elected from the
territory of the RS. Similarly to the situation of the House of Peoples, the election of the
Presidency members exhibits clear signs of discrimination.
The Council of Ministers is insufficiently regulated by the constitutional text. BiH
Presidency appoints the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who is responsible for
appointing the other members the Ministers. Ethnic structures have to be taken into
account during the appointments. The House of Representatives passes a vote of no
confidence to the Council of Ministers, in which case the latter must resign.
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article V, Item 3 of the
Constitution) is a specific body that deals with the implementation of the principles of
constitutionality and legality, solving disputes between entities, disputes between BiH
and the entities or other BiH institutions. It can also be appealed to when constitutional
provisions become a subject of dispute before any of the BiH courts. It is interesting that
the constitutional text lacks provisions on judicial authority at a state level.
4. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RULING
IN THE CASE SEJDIC AND FINCI VS. BOSNIA
HERZEGOVINA
AND
The applicants, Dervo Sejdi and Jakob Finci, are citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. They were born in 1956 and 1943 respectively and live in Sarajevo. The
former is of Roma origin and the latter is a Jew. They are both prominent public figures.
As mentioned above, the Bosnian Constitution distinguishes between two categories of
citizens: the so-called constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) and the
Others (Jews, Roma and other national minorities together with those who do not
declare affiliation with any ethnic group). Comparing to the entity institutions after the
constitutional reform of 2001, the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly (the
second chamber) and the Presidency are composed only of persons belonging to the
three constituent peoples. Mr Jakob Finci consulted the Central Election Commission
about his intentions to stand for election to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of
1 Compare Solveig RICHTER, Saa GAVRI, Das politische System Bosnien und Hercegovinas, in
Wolfgang RICHTER (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden,
2010, p. 863 and also Kasim TRNKA (et. al.), Proces odluivanja u Parlamentarnoj skuptini Bosne i Hercegovine:
stanje, komparativna rjeenja, prijedlozi, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Sarajevo, 2009, p. 88.
78
the Parliamentary Assembly. On 3 January 2007 he received a written confirmation from

the Central Election Commission that he was ineligible to stand for such elections
because of his Jewish origin.
The applications were lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on
3 July and 18 August 2006 respectively. On 10 February 2009 the Chamber before which
the case was pending decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber
pursuant to Article 30 of the Convention.
The applicants argued at the European Human Rights Court that, despite
possessing an experience comparable to that of the highest elected officials, they were
prevented by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the corresponding
provisions of the Election Act 2001, from being candidates for the Presidency and the
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly solely on the ground of their ethnic
origins. Firstly, the Court considered that, given the applicants active participation in
public life, it was entirely coherent that they had considered running for the House of
Peoples or the Presidency. The applicants could therefore claim to be victims of the
alleged discrimination. The fact that the present case raised the question of the
compatibility of the national Constitution with the Convention was irrelevant in this
regard.
The Court also noted that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an
annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement. The power to amend it was, however, vested in
the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was clearly a domestic
body. In addition, the powers of the international administrator for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the High Representative) did not extend to the State Constitution.
Accordingly, the contested provisions came under the responsibility of the respondent
State. The Court noted that although the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary
Assembly was composed of indirectly elected members, it enjoyed very wide legislative
powers. Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was therefore
applicable.
In consequence, the Court concluded by 14 votes to 3 that the applicants
continued ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and
Herzegovina lacked an objective and reasonable justification and had therefore breached
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. With regard to the eligibility
to stand for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the applicants relied only on
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. The Court noted that whereas Article 14 of the Convention
prohibited discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in []
the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 extended the scope of protection to any
right set forth by law. It thus introduced a general prohibition of discrimination. The
applicants contested the constitutional provisions rendering them ineligible to stand for
election to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, whether or not
elections to the Presidency fell within the scope of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, their
complaint concerned a right set forth by law, which made Article 1 of Protocol No. 12
applicable. The Court reiterated that the concept of discrimination was to be interpreted
in the same manner with regard to Article 14 and in the context of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 12, although the latter provision had a different scope. It followed that, for the
79
reasons put forward with regard to the elections to the House of Peoples, the
constitutional provisions under which the applicants were ineligible for election to the
Presidency had also to be considered discriminatory. Accordingly, the Court concluded
by 16 votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. The
Court also considered, unanimously, that it was not necessary to examine the case under
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 taken independently or in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 12.
Based on the ruling BiH should adopt amendments to the Constitution and
Electoral law, eliminating all kind of discrimination based on the ethnic background
when it comes to the election of the BiH Presidency and House of Peoples of the BiH
Parliamentary Assembly.
5. PROPOSAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. PART ONE:
REFORM OF THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PARLIAMENT
When it comes to the BiH Parliament, the first think to be done is to rectify the
linguistic flaw: the pleonasm in the name of the parliament the Parliamentary
Assembly, which in essence means Parliamentary Parliament1. This is linguistically
incorrect the parliament should simply be called Parliament, Assembly (Skuptina) or
Sabor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having in mind the historical tradition of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it would be interesting to call the parliament Sabor, referring, inter alia, to
the first modern Bosnian parliament of the early 20th century. On the other hand,
considering that this term resembles excessively the legislative institution of the
neighbouring Croatia (likewise, the term Assembly resembles the National Assembly of
Serbia), perhaps it would be the most neutral to call the parliament simply the Parliament
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
And now we reach the essential question: how to eliminate the discrimination of
Others which is reflected in violation of their right to be elected and to fully participate
in the legislative procedure in the House of Peoples? In my opinion, to answer this
question we must first examine the following issue: What is the House of Peoples what
is its role in the political system, and therefore in the legislative process of BiH?
Article IV of the Constitution refers to the bicameral system, with the House of
Representatives and the House of Peoples, both with the same competences.
Bicameralism is typical for federal states2, and therefore it is not surprising that the BiH
Constitution opted for two houses. However, the common purpose of the second house
in federal states is to ensure a stronger representation of federal units. The composition
of one house is based on the number of inhabitants, whereas in the second one, all
entities, i.e. federal units, have the same number of seats (Switzerland, USA), or at least
the smaller entities enjoy higher representation (Germany) in relation to the population.
Goran MARKOVI, Bosanskohercegovaki federalizam, University Press, Sarajevo, 2012, p. 424.

Saa GAVRI, Damir BANOVI (eds.), Parlamentarizam u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevski otvoreni centar,
Fondacija Friedrich Ebert, Sarajevo, 2012.
1
2
80
In BiH, this is entirely different: in both houses, two thirds of the members come from
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the difference that the House of
Peoples represents only Bosniaks and Croats from the Federation, and only Serbs from
Republika Srpska. Accordingly, the House of Peoples is not reflecting the federal
character of the state it is an additional mechanism in favour of constituent peoples.
The basic function of the House of Peoples, according to the Constitution, is in fact to
act as the house that uses the vital national interest veto1. The shortcoming of such an
arrangement is that the House of Representatives becomes a legislative institution where
necessary compromises are made in order to achieve a majority. The role of the House
of Peoples is only negative, as a Veto House, where members perceive the protection of
the interests of their own people as their sole, exclusive task, without significant
participation in the legislative process.
With all this in mind, an analysis of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, carried out
by a group of authors and covering the research period from 1996 to 2007, revealed the
following (surprising) fact: in the observed period, the House of Peoples failed to
perform its basic function the protection of vital national interests. In 11 years, the
procedure as to the protection of these interests was initiated in only four cases. Besides,
the party structure of this house is often identical to the structure of the leading political
parties represented in the House of Peoples. Therefore the disharmony of the houses is
rather rare. Contrary to its nature, the House of Peoples has much more often used the
instrument of entity voting, thereby blocking the parliamentary decision-making2. Hence,
as suggested by the Venice Commission of 2005 as well, it seems that it would be
preferable to move the exercise of the vital national interest veto to the House of
Representatives and abolish the House of Peoples. This would harmonize the
procedures and enable the adoption of laws without impeding the legitimate interests of
any people or the Others. This would also solve the problem of discriminatory
composition of the House of Peoples.
The result of such Constitutional amendments, when it comes to the House of
Peoples, would be the following:
a. Abolish discrimination of Others, since the discriminatory house, the House
of Peoples, would no longer exist, and that election for the House of
Representatives is of a general character, and does not envisage any ethnic
parties, i.e. exclusion of citizens on any ground.
b. Abolish discrimination of Bosniaks and Croats from Republika Srpska, and
Serbs from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, together with
Others, have so far been discriminated and prevented from the election to the
House of Peoples. This re-composition of the BiH Parliament would provide a
solution for yet another problem (case Pilav vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, at
Venice Commission: Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of
the
High
Representatives,
Venice,
2005,
paragraph
36,
see
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282005%29004-e (last time visited
April 15th 2013).
2 Kasim TRNKA (et.al.), Proces odluivanja u Parlamentarnoj skuptini Bosne i Hercegovine: stanje, komparativna
rjeenja, prijedlozi, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Sarajevo, 2009, p. 142.
1
81
the European Court of Human Rights).

c. Conduct legislative procedures in one institution/body, which would enable the
legislative process to become more transparent for the public, by enhancing the
capacities of academic, advisory, expert and administrative bodies in the
Parliament. This should enable a faster, more efficient and more democratic
work of the legislative power.
d. Place the legislative process in the hands of legitimate representatives of the
citizens. Considering that the House of Representatives is elected in direct
election, while the House of Peoples has hitherto often been the house filled by
those unable to enter other directly elected bodies. There is a huge number of
examples that unsuccessful candidates as members of the BiH Presidency were
elected to the House of Peoples (e.g. Mladen Ivani of the PDP, Sulejman Tihi
of the SDA, Borjana Krito of the HDZ, etc.). Delegates in the House of
Peoples were often the representatives of political parties and their election was
a result of the interests of big political parties and not of the will of the people.
e. Bosnia and Herzegovina would lose one feature pertaining to federal systems,
considering that the bicameral parliament is most frequently the characteristic of
complex states1. However, as already said, the House of Peoples in its actual
structure does not represent a classic second house, as it is not the house of
federal units, but the house of constituent peoples. This would symbolically
contribute to the integration of the state, although Bosnia and Herzegovina
through its two entities and the Brko District is a federally organized state, the
abolishment of the House of Peoples would reduce one of the numerous
characteristics of federalism and potentially contribute to the unification of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
f. The formation of the House of Peoples depends on cantonal parliaments and
the House of Peoples of the Federation BiH, that elect the delegates to the
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly BiH. This process takes a lot
of time and can block the work of the Parliamentary Assembly. This kind of
dependency would no longer exist.
g. With the abolishment of the House of Peoples the legislature would become
more cost efficient. The budget expenditures intended for the salaries of the
delegates and administration of the House of Peoples would decrease
significantly. At this moment, BiH spends around 1.000.000 KM (500.000 EUR)
every year only for the delegates salaries. These resources could be used instead
to strengthen the unicameral parliament, especially its expert pool.
If Sejdi and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina verdict is implemented in such a
way that one question still remains open: how to satisfy interests of some national parties
which would not be willing to waive the instrument of protection of vital national
interest", bearing in mind that their votes are necessary to adopt these amendments?
One possibility would be to move the protection of vital national interest, in the
Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1999.
82
form of the collective vital interest, to the House of Representatives, in such manner
as to entitle the Constitutional-Legal Committee of the House of Representatives (i.e. the
future unicameral parliament) to decide on this issue. Moving from vital national
interests veto to collective vital interests, the veto mechanism would not be available
only to constituent peoples, but also to Others. The Constitutional-Legal Committee is
the committee through which all laws should pass anyway, as it is the one that defines
the extent to which a law is in accordance with the BiH Constitution. On the other hand,
it guarantees the representation of all constituent peoples, and the representation of
Others should also be guaranteed. In addition, the collective vital interest should in
that case be defined as a form of positive discrimination guaranteed both to the
constituent peoples and Others. The Constitutional-Legal Committee would in that
case decide whether there is a breach, and if there is, the bills would be addressed to the
BiH Constitutional Court, as the House of Peoples used to do. BiH Constitutional Court
would then render the final decision on the possible violation of the collective vital
interests.
Another solution is the formation of ad hoc Caucuses of constituent
peoples/Others within the House of Peoples (the only House). The club of one
constituent peoples and/or Others would be composed of all elected parliamentarians
of that constituent people/Others. Any parliamentarian can ask for the meeting of his
peoples club (Others would have the same right) in case he/she considers a decision
as destructive for the collective vital interest. If the Caucuses decide with a (50%+1)
majority, then the decision will go to a joint commission (4 members,
Bosniac+Serb+Croat+Other) and if they cannot agree within 10 days, the law proposal
will go to the BiH Constitutional Court for a final decision.
We can assume, based on the aforementioned study of the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation1 for the period 1996-2007, that the instrument of protection of vital national
interest would be seldom used or even not at all, since the House of Representatives (the
future unicameral House) has other mechanisms, such as the entity veto which has in
any way been the cause of the non-adoption of a large number of laws. As much as 59%
of the not adopted laws in the period 1996 to 2007 were rejected because of the absence
of the entity support2. Unfortunately, although it would be important, due to the depth
of the subject, we cannot discuss the issue of the entity veto or possible interrelation
between the entity veto and the protection of vital national interests/collective vital
interests".
As already pointed out in the opinion of the Venice Commission of 2005, it is
necessary to precisely and rigidly define the collective vital interest. The Constitutional
Court by its decision of June 25th, 20043 started to interpret this concept. It is correct
that the future jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court can offer a definition of the
collective vital interest and reduce the risk inherently existing in that mechanism.
However, this might take time, and it seems inappropriate to leave such a task, with
Kasim TRNKA (et. al.), Proces odluivanja u Parlamentarnoj skuptini Bosne i Hercegovine: stanje, komparativna
rjeenja, prijedlozi, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Sarajevo, 2009.
2 Ibidem, p. 143.
3 Decision U-8/04, on the vital interest veto against the Framework Law on Higher Education.
1
83
significant political implications, to the Court itself, without any guidelines given in the
Constitution. As envisaged by the April Package of constitutional reforms, the
collective vital interest could include the following rights: the right of all three
constituent peoples and Others to be represented in legislative, executive and judicial
bodies (maybe through minimum quotas) and to enjoy equal rights to participate in
decision-making; the rights related to: collective identity (education, use of language and
alphabet, religious and culture identity, tradition), establishment of public institutions,
public information system, and preservation of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We need to point out certain particularities related to the size, structure and the
election procedure for the future unicameral parliament. The parliament represents the
citizens. It is very important to define the constituency areas for the election of MPs. As
in many federations, the current constituencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina are formed
within federal units. The solution envisaged by the Constitution and the Election Law
does not deviate from solutions known in federal states, so it would not be a curiosity
and inappropriateness if such practice would remain. On the other hand, in case of
creation of supra-entity constituencies, that would include territory of both entities, the
elected representatives would not represent citizens of entities, but citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in a true sense of that expression. This would end the domination of ethnic
voting, since constituencies would also become multinational which in turn would
require shift in focus of the election programmes of national parties, in order to gain
votes from different ethnic groups within a specific constituency.
The equal participation of Others has to be ensured in all parliamentary
committees and other bodies, wherever quotas for constituent peoples are foreseen. If
the Collegium/collective head of parliament will foresee quotas for constituent peoples,
then the Others need to be equally represented too, by having a fourth seat in the
Collegium.
It is necessary to increase the number of MPs. With its actual 42 MPs, Bosnia and
Herzegovina can compare with the European dwarf states: Andorra, Lichtenstein or
San Marino. The state of more than three million inhabitants must have a parliament
with an at least double number of MPs, in order to establish a truly working
parliament. Only an adequate number of MPs can enable the work in parliamentary
committees, so parliament is not only a venue for execution of governments
recommendations and party deals that are currently made outside the parliament, but can
independently influence the process of political decision-making. A larger number of
MPs needs to be followed by a larger number of electoral units (decries the size of
current electoral units). In that way, the MPs will be closer to their voters (physically, but
also in terms of adequate representation of their voters). Currently a MP from Velika
Kladusa is also representing the interests of citizens of Tomislavgrad or somebody from
Trebinje is represented by a MP from Zvornik (more than 300 km distance).
Finally, in the spirit of the judgment in the case Sejdi and Finci vs. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Parliament should consider the introduction of compulsory seats for
representatives of national minorities, as it is the case in many European states. Of
course, the exact manner of implementation of such a decision should be developed
through international comparison and in consultations with international advisory
84
bodies, such as the Venice Commission and the like. The minimum number of
compulsory seats for the representatives of constituent peoples and Others should
also be taken into consideration.
6. PROPOSAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. PART TWO:
REFORM OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA
In order to answer the question how to reform the collective Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and thus remove the discriminatory elements defined by the verdict of
the Strasbourg court, it is necessary to refer to the very nature of the collective Head of
the State and its relation with the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
considering that these two institutions jointly exert the executive power at the state level.
The Venice Commission concluded in its analysis of 2005:
A collective Presidency is a highly unusual arrangement. As regards the
representational functions of Head of State, these are more easily carried out by
one person. At the top of the executive there is already one collegiate body, the
Council of Ministers, and adding a second collegiate body does not seem
conducive to effective decision-making. This creates a risk of duplication of
decision-making processes and it becomes difficult to distinguish the powers of the
Council of Ministers and of the Presidency. Moreover, the Presidency will either
not have the required technical knowledge available within ministries or need
substantial staff, creating an additional layer of bureaucracy. A collective Presidency
therefore does not appear functional or efficient. Within the context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, its existence seems again motivated by the need to ensure
participation by representatives from all constituent peoples in all important
decisions []. The best solution therefore would be to concentrate executive
power within the Council of Ministers as a collegiate body in which all constituent
peoples are represented.1
In order to honour the conclusion that the executive power should be

concentrated in the Council of Ministers, as a collegiate body representing all constituent
peoples, which nevertheless, pursuant to Article 6 of the Law on the Council of
Ministers, leaves the possibility for election of one minister from the group of Others
and thus not being discriminatory per its composition, in this paper we propose the
complete abolishment of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proposal, of
course, does not originate from pure theory, nor is it an experimental example, but is
practically founded in the Swiss political system. As already known, although the political
Venice Commission, Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers
of the High Representatives, Venice, 2005 (paragraph 38 and 39).
See http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282005%29004-e (last time visited,
April 15th 2013).
85
systems of Switzerland and Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely different, some authors
nevertheless point to notable similarities1, so that parallels can certainly be drawn.
The result of such constitutional amendments would be the following:
a. The executive power in Bosnia and Herzegovina would concentrate in a single
body, which would prevent further blockage or disputes such as those which
have already happened between the current Council of Ministers and the BiH
Presidency, e.g. when the state budget was about to be adopted. After being
professionally prepared by the ministries administration, it was proposed to the
Presidency by the Council of Ministers. Due to different political views the
proposal was amended by the Presidency resulting with the third version of the
law to be adopted in the Parliamentary Assembly. In short, the executive power
would be concentrated in one institution.
b. The existing flaws in the work of poorly organized and understaffed Presidency
would be eliminated, since all policies, which so far have been divided between
the Presidency and the Council of Ministers (e.g. foreign policy) would now fall
under the competence of the Council of Ministers, which is better staffed.
c. Political crises, which can be caused by the fact that a group of parties holds a
majority or a part of majority in the Parliament and therefore in the Council of
Ministers while another group of parties has its representatives in the
Presidency, would be avoided or eliminated.
d. By abolishing the Presidency, Bosnia and Herzegovina would in the formal sense
loose the Head of the State, the institution, which is the supreme
representative of the peoples. In BiH case this would not leave too many
negative consequences. Due to the dominant multi-ethnic character of the state
we cannot consider BiH to be a state/constitutional nation (German:
Verfassungsnation), as it is the case in the mono-ethnic countries of Europe.
e. By abolishing the BiH Presidency and vesting the executive power in the BiH
Council of Ministers, Bosnia and Herzegovina would shift from the current
semi-presidential political system to the group of states with parliamentary
political system. To conclude, after all the above-proposed reforms, the BiH
political system would become parliamentary and unicameral.
The described constitutional amendments would have large consequences on the
competences of the strengthened Council of Ministers, the manner of its election, and
representation of the Others, as well as on the work and decision-making within the
Council of Ministers itself.
The Council of Ministers would take over the competences which according to
the constitutional provisions have so far been vested in the actual Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. These provisions have been defined in Article V.3 of the Constitution,
pertaining to:
Silvano MOECKLI, Politiki sistem vajcarske: kako funkcionie, ko uestvuje, ime rezultira, University Press,
Sarajevo, 2010.
1
86
a. foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and appointing ambassadors and

other international representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
b. representing Bosnia and Herzegovina in international and European
organizations and institutions, and seeking membership in international
organizations and institutions of which Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a
member;
c. negotiating treaties, denouncing and, with the consent of the Parliamentary
Assembly, ratifying treaties;
d. executing decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly;
e. proposing annual budget to the Parliamentary Assembly, upon the
recommendation of the Council of Ministers, reporting to the Parliamentary
Assembly on expenditures of the Presidency, as requested, and at least once a
year;
f. coordinating as necessary with international and non-governmental
organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
g. performing other functions as necessary to carry out its duties, and as assigned
by the Parliamentary Assembly, or as agreed upon by the entities.
Further on, the Presidency is entitled to nominate the Chair of the Council of
Ministers (to be approved by the House of Representatives) (Article V.4 of the
Constitution), dismiss the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure), accept credentials from
diplomatic-consular representatives (Article 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the BiH
Presidency), submit petitions to the Constitutional Court (Article 10 of the Rules of
Procedure), perform civilian command of the armed forces, and symbolic competences,
such as the certification of the symbols of Bosnia and Herzegovina, upon the decision
adopted in the Parliamentary Assembly (Article 40 of the Rules of Procedure),
appointment of five members of the Committee for the Preservation of National
Monuments (Article 41 of the Rules of Procedure) and appointment of five members of
the Governing Board of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 54 of the
Rules of Procedure).
When observing these competences of the Presidency, it can simply be concluded
that in the majority of cases there are two forms of action. The first one pertains to
conduct and practical implementation of foreign policy, which the Council of Ministers
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can simply take over, respecting the existing
principles (if possible, consensual decision-making and respect of an equal representation
both of the constituent peoples and Others). The other field of work covers standard
appointments and confirmations, which can as well be carried out by the Council of
Ministers as a collective body, or by individual Ministries. The only issues that remain
open are the appointment of the Chair of the Council of Ministers, which can be done
by the Speaker of the future unicameral parliament, and the issue of civil control of
armed forces, which can be given to the parliamentary committee (with the
representation of constituent peoples and Others).
The status of the Council of Ministers is ambiguously defined in the Constitution.
The legal definition that the Council of Ministers is the executive power should be
87
confirmed in the Constitution. Thereby, as already stated, the constitutional amendments

would make the Council of Ministers the sole body of executive power, to carry out a
large part of competences which hitherto have been exerted by the BiH Presidency,
particularly referring to the budget proposal and foreign policy. At the same time, this
would require the establishment of new ministries. Particularly in the context of
European integration, it is unquestionable that the state level will have to become
competent for a set of fields. The current number of ministries does not have
management capacities. The composition of the Council of Ministers should represent
both entities, i.e. all constituent peoples and Others. Proportional representation is
possible, but it should not be the exclusive principle for the election. The example of
Switzerland is again interesting in this context. Article 175 Paragraph 4 of the
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation reads: In electing the Federal Council, it must
be ensured that the various geographical and language regions of the country are
appropriately represented. It is interesting that, although Switzerland is a state with large
language, geographic, religious, ideological and economic diversities, this is the only
written quota when it comes to the appointment of the federal government. However,
the political culture and consensual approach to democratic decision-making resulted in
the following tacit rules:
Table 1: Representation quota in the Swiss Federal Council1
Representation
criteria
Quota
Language region
At least two members must come from Latin Switzerland

(Ticino or Western Switzerland)
Geographic region
All parts of the state should be taken into consideration
Sex
Both sexes should be represented
Party affiliation
The most important parties should be represented in

accordance with their strength (the so-called magic formula)
In Swiss practice, this means that out of seven members of the state government
(Federal Council) at least 2 or 3 members are always from the francophone or Italian
language region, although they represent less than 30% of population. All regions are
geographically represented, and when it comes to gender equality, it can be noted that
currently there are four male and three female ministers. What Switzerland is worldwide
famous for and what is the basis of its consensual democracy is the party composition of
the federal government. Since 1959, four of the strongest and ideologically most
combative parties have been governing jointly, whereas since 2009 there have been as
many as five parties2. Together, they have more than a 70% majority in the Parliament.
1
2
Ibidem, p. 73.
Ibidem, p. 74.
88
BiH parties have to work on building similar principles, so that the future Council
of Ministers, which would incorporate the role of the current Presidency, would share
similar values that in our case as well should become tacit rules, which would result with
more female ministers, decentralization of ministers origin (they should not come only
from the centres of power: Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar), and the rule of inclusion
and balance between all big parties. In order for this proposal to be adopted in the
parliamentary procedure, I assume that fixed ethnic quota cannot be avoided within the
current framework. In that case, we propose minimum quotas, i.e. that each constituent
people and Others are represented by minimum 20% of ministerial seats, whereas one
fifth of the seats would be allocated according to the success of the biggest parties, with
clear compulsory representation of Others. The current Law on the Council of
Ministers envisages only a possibility and not the obligation for one ministerial seat or
the position of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers to be filled by Others
(Article 6 of the Law). Both genders should be presented by at least 40%. Nevertheless,
it would be interesting if written rules (ethnic quotas) would be transformed into
political culture of BiH parties and peoples.
In other words, in order to guarantee the ethnic balance of the new Council of
Ministers and remove the fear that a member of only one ethnic group would preside
over the four-year term of office, we propose to refer to the Swiss political system in this
respect as well. Switzerland recognizes the institution of the acting president, the socalled Federal President (President of the Confederation) who is elected for a one-year
term of office by the Federal Assembly of Switzerland (Article 176 of the Constitution of
the Swiss Confederation). The Federal President chairs the debates in the Federal
Council (government), represents the Council in relation to other institutions, and
ceremonially represents Switzerland in foreign policy (Article 184 of the Constitution of
the Swiss Confederation). If Bosnia and Herzegovina opt for such a principle, it would
increase the accountability of the Council of Ministers towards legitimate representatives
of the peoples, i.e. the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the Chair of the
Council of Ministers, who would at the same time represent Bosnia and Herzegovina,
would be the person elected for a one-year or perhaps two-year term of office. Upon the
expiry of his/her term of office, the BiH Parliament would decide on the successor of
the former Chair, respecting the principle of rotation. Thus it should be regulated that
two Chairs in a row cannot come from the same constituent people or from Others,
thus granting the possibility of equal representation of all peoples and Others, yet not
fixing rigid rotations which sometimes can be at the expense of the quality of work, i.e.
can lead to compulsory election of a member of a group although the offered candidates
are not the best choice for directing the state politics.
In the end we need to briefly discuss the decision-making within the Council of
Ministers. Critics of this proposal might say that, considering the ethnic divisions in the
state and the ideological differences of parliamentary majorities electing the Council of
Ministers, the desired consensus would not be reached in a large number of cases. This
critique is indeed justified, if we observe the work of the former Councils of Ministers;
however, we need to raise a question: do we have a consensus in the existing Presidency
of Bosnia and Herzegovina? When we examine the work of the existing Parliamentary
89
Assembly and its houses, we also notice absence of consensus, bearing in mind that a
large number of laws have never been adopted due to, for example, entity veto1.
Therefore, the lack of consensus is not a sufficient obstacle for the abolishment of the
Presidency, i.e. by merging the two weak executive institutions (the Presidency and the
Council of Ministers) into one, relatively strong executive institution, the future Council
of Ministers.
7. CONCLUSION
The proposal for the implementation of the decision in the case Sejdi and Finci
vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina of the European Court for Human Rights titled unicameral
parliamentary political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is built upon the proposals of
the Venice Commission and the Swiss political system. The proposals include:
a. Abolishment of the BiH Presidency and transferring executive powers and
competences to the BiH Council of Ministers. The BiH Council of Ministers
would be the central executive body, with the representation of constituent
peoples and Others. The executive body would become more functional and
simpler. This would prepare the ground for a more intensive engagement in the
Euro-Atlantic integration.
b. Abolishment of the BiH Parliamentary Assemblys House of peoples and
creating a unicameral parliament that would include the power of veto for the
protection of collective vital interests. This veto would be available to both
constituent peoples and Others. The parliament would be twice bigger, with
an equal representation of Others. The legislative process would become
more efficient and transparent. In return, this would create the necessary
preconditions for the parliament to become a central institution of the BiH
political system.
The proposed model might be a radical one, but it could be also a logical and
simple solution.
Kasim TRNKA (et. al.), Proces odluivanja u Parlamentarnoj skuptini Bosne i Hercegovine: stanje, komparativna
rjeenja, prijedlozi, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Sarajevo, 2009.
90
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Three Ends, Two Transitions, One Crisis:

The Quest for the Lost Transition in Balkan Normative Order
Ilia ROUBANIS
National School of Public Administration, Athens
Abstract: In the comparative politics literature, transitology is the study of a
particular kind of regime change, namely the passage from non-democracy to a liberal
regime. This article widens the scope of the investigation, addressing the question of how
grand teleological narratives of socioeconomic transformation, including but not limited to
the democratisation project, are domesticated in normative terms. It does so by retrieving
Balkan constitutional texts and analysing them as narratives of transition. The texts
selected are from characteristically revolutionary periods: 1945, the 1960s, and
1989, corresponding to major shifts in modernist socioeconomic narratives. It is argued
that in both socialist and liberal discursive traditions, transition is a fully perspective
and open-ended historical stage characterised by a series of reforms, not least
constitutional, intended to conclusively transform society. However, a comparable
transitory narrative from or to the European Social Model has never existed; yet, it is
precisely this narrative that emerges as the current economic crisis unfolds. As such, the
term of Balkans might acquire new significances, as a region of convergence of several
EU peripheries (South-Eastern Europe, the South, Western Balkans).
Keywords: Balkans, crisis, modernity, constitutions, transition.
The unfolding political and financial crisis in Europe may be perceived as a

transition with implications, paving the way from the European Social Model to a
European Libertarian Model. On the one hand, signatory states to the Fiscal Compact, in
effect since January 2013, are committed to constitutional austerity, which takes
precedence over national social rights.1 On the other hand, court rulings seem largely
circumvented and, coextensively, social rights otherwise deemed inalienable by national
constitutions are de-substantiated in Slovenia, Portugal, Greece and, once again, in
Romania, especially in crucial fronts such as social insurance and collective bargaining.2
This development may have a bearing on a broader theme, namely how grand
socioeconomic teleological narratives affect constitutional blueprints in the European
periphery and, particularly, in the Balkans. Addressing the theme of how grand
modernist socioeconomic narratives gain hold over the normative/constitutional
Matjaz NAHTIGAL, The EU Fiscal Compact: Constitutionalisation of Austerity and Preemption of

Democracy in Europe, Express, 2012, [http://works.bepress.com/matjaz_nahtigal/1].
2
See for example: Charlemagne, Austerity Plans Overturned, Economist, April 9, 2013,
[http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2013/04/portugals-bailout].
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narrative in the region, via suitable transitions, this article explores the Balkan
significance of European crises from 1945 to 2008.
In a chronological sequence, the major narratives domesticated in the Balkan
constitutional narrative have been the following: the Marxist utopia promising the end
of exploitation of man by man; the European Social Model, promising the end of
politics and the ascendance of technocracy; the End of History utopia, promising the
final and conclusive victory of liberal governance. We can observe that reform-driven or
transitional periods of normative acculturation in socialism and democracy were
articulated in comparable terms as staircases to modernity. This was evidenced in the
fully perspective drive of constitutional reforms implemented in 1945 and 1989.
However, there has never been an equivalent transitional narrative for the passage from
the European Social Model to a post-welfare or libertarian model. In the light of this
observation, this article adopts the hypothesis that the currently unfolding economic
crisis triggers the emergence of a 1989 sequel or liberalisation.2 narrative that may
affect the normative and political landscape of the Balkans in the near future.
1. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
The term of Balkans is in itself pass. The prevailing geographical term is
South-Eastern Europe, when referring to former communist EU member states, or
the Western Balkans, when referring to aspirant EU member states in the region. The
Balkans as such is the sum of these neologies plus Greece, which makes the term more
adequate if the theme under discussion is the remodelling of the region through
convergence in normative and socioeconomic terms of the European periphery.
Normative discourse is about fundamental rules; modernist discourse is about
fundamental principles for the organisation of society motivated by a single teleological
vision of seemingly natural socioeconomic evolution. The two themes are evidently
coextensive, as values and norms go hand in hand in the context of radical reformist
political projects. Nonetheless, the regional grounding of such socioeconomic and
normative transformations is a distinct theme that must be examined separately.
The recorded failures in certain regions or states to embrace a singular modernist
narrative are often perceived as symptomatic of a cultural deficiency, if one refers to
issues such as clientelism, lack of transparency, administrative neutrality, etc. Regions
exhibiting such symptoms, as the Balkan Peninsula does, are often prescribed with
reform packages meant to transform not merely their governance structures, but also
their political culture as such. In this scheme, reform-packages are in effect designed
to treat a condition of historical legacies as much as policy shortcomings.1 In sum,
through the paradigm of democratization studies but, arguably, also in the context of
comparative communisms, we have studied Balkan transitional experiences as episodes
in a greater narrative of institutional alignment, geared towards the modernisation of
societies, for the people and, frequently, despite the people.
Maria TODOROVA, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.
94
Focusing on transition it is customary for legal and political analysts to bundle

together a number of diverse phenomena. Longing for clarity, this study has been
designed with the assumption that the passage from one regime to another entails at least
two distinct sets of transitions:
a) the negotiation of a rule by law agenda, which refers to the renegotiation of the
politys ideational character from a plurinational state, such as Yugoslavia, to a
nation-state;
b) the negotiation of a rule of law agenda, which refers to the politys political
structure in terms of separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary
and the like.
The notion of rule by law describes modern governance. A fundamental
transition in this sense would entail a fundamental rupture on the very delineation
and/or identity of the polity in question. For instance, a rule by law transitional dilemma
is what happens to the property, residence, and other inalienable rights of a Yugoslav
citizen when there is no such a thing as Yugoslavia? On the other hand, a rule of law
agenda focuses more narrowly on themes of governance, such as checks and balances,
individual and social rights; a question of this sort would be the proverbial qui custodiet
ipsos custodies. This article focuses precisely on this latter rule of law agenda, abstaining
from the favourite theme of inter-ethnic relations that has dominated academic attention
in the region. The point of departure of this analysis is the post-1989 liberal narrative and
its coextensive constitutional expression; this might be called a thesis. We then take a
step back to examine the post 1945 socialist eschatological narrative and its coextensive
normative roots, comparing the socialist and liberal notions of formative transition.
Against this background, it is argued that the European Social Model was a synthetic
narrative, devoid of eschatology, drawing on both socialist and liberal discursive
traditions and, therefore, lacking a neatly defined notion of transition. In this scheme,
the lost transition is a case of revisiting the 1989 liberal narrative with a more
revolutionary thrust.
2. A THESIS: ONE END & ONE TRANSITION
IN THE POST 1989 NARRATIVE
In legal theory, transition is seen as a process that presents technical challenges,
defined as the time-bounded period in-between regimes where the polity has no evident
legal foundation.1 Seeking to conceptualise the dynamics of regime change is anything
but unprecedented as indeed some authors claim direct intellectual heritage to none
other than Machiavelli himself.2 However, post-1989 transitology referred to the passage
from dictatorship, autocracy, totalitarianism, or communism to democracy. In clustering
these transitions under a unique heading, what emerged was a retrospectively
Teitel RUTI, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 106, No. 7, 1997, pp. 2057, 2069-2070.
2 Philippe SCHMITTER, Karl TERY, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists:
How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?, Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 173-174.
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95
evolutionary narrative, pronouncing liberal democracy as the state of nature1 or, in

rather apocalyptic terms, the End of History.2 In fact, democratisation was likened to a
[third] wave, or a tsunami-like natural force, erupting in Portugal in 1974, spreading
swiftly across the shores of Southern Europe, proceeding to Latin America in the 1980s,
until its latest third thrust overrun the Berlin Wall in 1989 to wash away communism.3
When focusing on indigenous post-communist societies, reformist prescriptions
for reform were thus expressed in terms of a legalistic and scientific discourse, often
drawing on similes such as the Tayloristic production line, or a progress race, with
definite stages, inevitable laggards and frontrunners.4 In this scheme, constitutional
engineering5 kept the policy production line in check, from the raw material of
communism6/authoritarianism7, through necessary milestones (conditionality), to the
final destination of EU and NATO membership.8 Thereby, the Balkans became a space
of highly coordinated rule of law agendas where transition was not a time-bounded
period between constitutional orders, but rather a long and open ended reformative
route from the basic Copenhagen criteria (1993) to the full incorporation of EUs acquis
communautaire, that is, a body of legislation no smaller than 80.000 pages.
In terms of minimum democratic benchmarks, the domestication of this
democratisation narrative was rather swift. Without exception, the post-1989
constitutional charters of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania declared a commitment to
parliamentary democracy9, market capitalism10, and a Madison-Montesquieu blueprint of
Stephen ELKIN, Citizenship and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Regimes, Political Science and
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 1990, p. 448.
2 Francis FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York, 1992.
3 Samuel HANTINGTON, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma University
Press, Oklahoma, 1992.
4 Ji J. PIB, Temporality, Civility, and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Constitution-Making, Law and
Society Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1994, pp. 409-410; Gergana NOUTCHEVA, Dimitar BECHEV, The
Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romanias Accession to the EU, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.
22, No. 1, 2008; Doh Chull SHIN, On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of
Recent Theory and Research, World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1, October 1994, pp. 138, 143; Lucan WAY,
Stephen LEVINSKY, Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-communist Divide, East European Politics and
Societies, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2002.
5 Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul LEWIS, Developments in East and Central European Politics, Duke
University Press, Durham, 1997, pp. 190-210.
6 Levent GNENC, Prospects for Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Countries, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 2002; Wojciech SADURSKI, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of
Rights, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring 2002.
7 Jeremy ELSTER, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, The University of Chicago Law
Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 448.
8 Ilia ROUBANIS, Marilena KOPPA, Dark Knights in the Balkans: for how long will the EU remain the
only game in town?, Hellenic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 2010; Stephen FISH, Omar CHOUDHRY,
Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Post-Communist World, Comparative Political Studies,
Vol. 40, No. 3, March 2007; Grigore POP-ELECHES, Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of
Western integration: Democratic Conditionality after Communism, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.
21, No. 1, February 2007.
9 Bulgaria 1991: Preamble, Chapter 1: Art. 4; Albania 1991: Art. 2, 3, 4, 5; Romania 1991: Title I.: 1.3, 8.1.
10 Albania 1991: Chapter 1: Art. 10; Bulgaria 1991: Chapter 1: Art. 19.1; Romania 1991: 6(h), 8.
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balance of powers1. Nonetheless, the deepening of the process was directly related to the
the process of functional engagement with the EU and NATO. Of course, there have
been frictions. For example, in Bulgaria the European Commission pressed for juridical
independence vis--vis political authority and organized crime; reform prescriptions were
fiercely contested by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court which, faced with the prospect
of being singled out as responsible for Bulgarias failure to join the EU, time and again,
submitted to the Commissions demands. Similar pressure was exerted in Romania,
meeting again the trench warfare resistance of the Constitutional Court which, once
again, faced with EUs threat to delay accession, reversed course.2 In sum, the
Europeanisation project had a largely overpowering effect over national constitutional
discourse.
In this scheme, the case of Albania, which maintained an interim constitution
from 1991 to 1998, is instructive. Clearly, the country was less responsive to European
Commission demands, precisely because membership was not in sight. While article 45
of this transitional basic law did lay the ground for a pluralist democracy, formally
invalidating the constitution of 1976, it took years before the country acquired a
constitution validated directly by popular vote via a constituent assembly. During this
period, the organisational structure of the judicial system was defined by Law 7561 (April
1992) on the Organisation of the Judiciary which, while providing for a new
Constitutional Court, essentially bestowed control over the judiciary to the executive.
This normative structure predictably precluded a democratic level-playing field. For
instance, in promoting a new constitutional draft in 1994, the President at the time, Sali
Berisha, would not take no for an answer. Failing to acquire consensus in parliament,
he introduced the Law on Referendum, while the Socialist Party abstained from
Parliament and the quorum required was not achieved. Expectedly, the Constitutional
Court did not move against the President3. To this day, the impartiality of the Albanian
Constitutional Court is questioned by the EU, while membership remains an elusive
objective.
Overall, constitutional reforms in the Balkans have been largely shaped by the
Europeanisation discourse, whether we speak of candidates or full EU member states.
In this sense, it is fitting to note the paradigmatic affinities between Stalinist and liberal
transitologies. Arguably, both discursive traditions were founded on naturalist
determinism, prescribing an inevitably linear process of reform, suitably supervised by
third party stakeholders. Since 1989, the probability or improbability of joining the EU
has been an independent variable in shaping the pace of revolutionary constitutional
reforms. By the same token, between the spring 1944 and autumn 1945, the presence of
the Red Army or the lack thereof was regarded as the single independent variable for the
evolution of Balkan polities.
Albania 1991: Chapter1, Art. 3; Bulgaria 1991: Chapter 1: Art. 8, Romania, Art. 4, 6.b-c .
Georgana NOUTCHEVA, Dimitar BECHEV, The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romanias
Accession to the EU cit..
3 Fred ABRAHAMS, Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania, Human Rights Watch (U.S.A.), 1995, pp. 1516.
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3. ANTITHESIS: ANOTHER END, ANOTHER TRANSITION

AND THE POST-1945 NARRATIVE
Indeed, as the Red Army marched through Europe, four distinct regime
trajectories emerged: a) former member-states of the axis powers, where transition to
socialism took place under direct military occupation, namely Bulgaria, East Germany,
Hungary, and Romania; b) formerly occupied states, where transition was dictated by the
fait accompli of the Red Armys liberating presence, namely Poland and Czechoslovakia;
c) regimes annexed by the USSR, namely Moldavia, Polish territories and the Baltic
States; d) finally, regimes with a strong Partisan movement Albania, Yugoslavia and
Greece where Moscows influence was of ideological rather than military significance.
In this scheme, two questions remain open: a) what was the ideational structure of the
socialist telos; b) how this teleology was domesticated in the normative landscape.
In chapter three of his thought-provoking book Why Marx Was Right, Terry
Eagleton takes exception to the criticism that Marxism is a form of determinism.1
Nonetheless, while attempting to salvage the notion of agency on behalf of Marxism,
he does not dispute the notion that existing socialist regimes did embellish a linear and
teleological view of history. Indeed, the emergence of classless society was regarded as
inevitable, as much as liberal post-1989 narratives regarded liberal democracy as the
state of nature. And socialist regimes sought to harness what they conceived to be a
natural force, calling for a reform-driven shortcut to modernity, not unlike
democratisation theorists.
Gilhots more trivial observation is that the term transition-as-consolidation
employed by liberal transitologists is not only comparable to but in fact directly inherited
from Marxist tradition. He traces the current use of the term of transition in the
Stalinist discourse of the 1930s, arguing that modern advocates of liberal modernisation
consider as did Stalinist theorists that transition is not the time bounded period
between regimes, but a historical stage in its own right. Transition is then chiefly
perceived as a collective educational phase, where society is supposed to assimilate and
internalise new norms under the enlightened guidance of a scientifically informed avant
garde, or technocrats.2 In this sense, the very evocation of the term transition in the
Balkans brings an uncomfortable feeling of dj vu. Indeed, with the exception of Greece,
Balkan polities in 1945 domesticated the teleology of Socialism in their normative
discourse, although under a different context of conditionalities, that is, with or
without the presence of troops.
For example, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, all constitutional preambles in
the region or, alternatively, the first articles of each constitution revealed the
establishment of Peoples Democracies as the result of popular uprisings against
Terry EAGLETON, Why Marx Was Right, Yale University Press, New Haven, C.T., 2011, pp. 30-63.
Nicholas GILHOT, The Transition to the Human World of Democracy: notes for a history of the
concept of transition, from early Marxism to 1989, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, pp.
222, 225, 229-230.
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monarcho-fascist regimes.1 A Peoples Democracy was a term denoting in effect that

the regime was making its first step towards the establishment of a Socialist Republic.
During this transition, a popular front would be established amongst working class
parties, gradually consolidating into a single working class monopoly, pushing through
the necessary reforms for the emergence of a Socialist State. The consolidation of
this latter stage of socialist development was claimed by these regimes in the early
1960s, when Peoples Republics assumed the title of Socialist Republics. In this
teleological scheme, Communism i.e. Communist Republics was an elusive utopia
even for the USSR, since it implied nothing less than the withering away of the state,
where constitutions as such would lose their significance.
In parallel, Peoples democracies in the region underwent another form of
transition. Up until the mid-1960s Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia were
experiencing double-digit growth in both foreign exports and national income. Their
rapid industrial expansion transformed their socioeconomic outlook and an increasing
range of social services was on offer; simultaneously, an urban working class was being
created virtually ex nihilo. Citizens of Socialist regimes in the Balkans were subsequently
invested with substantial social rights, such as guaranteed employment, maternity leave,
vacations, housing entitlement, healthcare, education, and the like.2 In this sense,
Socialism was the realm of social rights, creating a normative precedent that did affect
Europe as a whole. The opportunity cost was individual rights. Indeed, the Soviet model
called for the liquidation of the private economic sphere3 by means of the so called
forced-draft model.
The Soviet precedent was initially binding for Balkan polities in this respect but,
ultimately, Yugoslavia deviated. Much like the USSR, in 1946 Yugoslavia did attempt
collectivisation, which was predictably met by passive or active resistance. However,
rather than choosing an open front battle between state, party and society, by 1952 the
Yugoslavs abandoned collectivisation and, at times, there was ever property restoration.
Instead, a model of voluntary participation in agricultural collectives was promoted,
where members could offer both labour and land inputs.4 This deviation also had an
ideational dimension. Yugoslavias expulsion from the Kominform in June 28, 1948,
revealed its defiance of Stalins hegemonic project and, coextensively, his interpretation
of the socialist doctrine. Essentially, Yugoslav communists evoked many of Troskys
arguments, being careful not to cite him directly: they accused the USSR of opportunistic
bargaining with the West, of instituting unequal economic relations with other socialist
states, of creating imperialistic spheres of influence, and of claiming nearly Papal
infallibility.
See: Jan TRISKA, Constitutions of the Communist Party-States, Hoover Institution on War, Stanford, 1968, pp.
124, 150, 152, 350, 454-456; Albania (1946, Art. II), Bulgaria (1947, Art. 1), Romania (1948, Art. I),
Yugoslavia (1946, Preamble).
2 Fatos TARIFA, The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia, Social Forces, Vol. 76, No.
2, 1997, pp. 441-442, 444, 450, 454-457.
3 Berit BACKER, Self-Reliance under Socialism the Case of Albania, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No.
4, 1982, p. 365.
4 Fred SINGLETON, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989,
pp. 216-218, 224-226.
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Many of these criticisms were later on mainstreamed in Moscow with

Khrushchevs rise to power. Khrushchev believed in the need to build a Soviet bloc with
an integrated division of labour, which is in Marxist terminology the main logic
underpinning the establishment of the European Community. In harnessing such a
Socialist Union, instead of a Marshall Plan, the USSR provided cheap primary products,
trade credits, absorbed products of doubtful quality and, in effect, subsidised public
consumption in order to legitimise weak, albeit politically loyal, communist party
monopolies. But, already in the 1960s, the economic cost of political stability in socialist
vassal states was gradually becoming dearer whilst Soviet GDP growth was declining.1
Meanwhile, a number of Balkan regimes were less than impressed by Khrushchevs
rationale of interdependence. Yugoslavia carved its own course. Albania articulated a
self-reliance position, breaking every economic tie with the USSR, holding onto the
forced-draft model, reaching out to China for structural funds.2 Gheorghiu-Dej also
resisted de-Stalinisation, insisting on the development of heavy industry rather than
pursuing complementarity within the Comecon framework.3 In sum, in the Balkans, only
Bulgaria joined the Moscow consensus. There was indeed a socialist acquis, but that
was hardly of a communautaire type.
4. A TRANSITORY END: THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL
In 1960, long before the end of history, another American author had
proclaimed the end of ideology. In his thesis The End of Ideology: On the
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties , Bell suggested that the grand narratives of
modernity were exhausted. He was implicitly claiming that political discourse would be
dominated by technocrats. Of course, much like Fukuyama, in proclaiming the end he
was defending the status quo. And as anyone describing current affairs in terms of
destiny, he did seem to have certain facts on his side.4 Since 1942 the Beveridge Report
of in Britain had identified five Giant Evils squalor ignorance, want, idleness and
disease recommending a national, compulsory, flat rate insurance scheme which would
combine health care, unemployment and retirement benefits. In 1945 the Labour Party
government pledged to eradicate these evils and committed to guaranteeing a set of
social rights from the cradle to the grave. In the US, Roosevelts New Deal in the
1930s was followed by Kennedys New Frontier commitments (1960), precisely as Bells
book was coming out. In Germany the social market economy model implemented by
Adenauer (1949-1963) was blurring the dividing lines between social democracy and
conservatism.
Valerie BUNCE, The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a
Soviet Liability, International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, Winter 1985.
2 Berit BACKER, Self-Reliance under Socialism the Case of Albaniacit..
3 John CAMPBELL, State Building and Postcommunist Budget Deficits, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.
38, No. 5, March/April 1995, p. 767.
4 Daniel BELL, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Free Press, Glencoe, 1960.
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In sum, Bell was riding a wave of intellectual conventional wisdom. Bells

thinking was in certain respects echoed in the rather techno-philosophical arguments of
Rawls Theory of Justice (1971) where he was attempting to solve the problem of
distributive justice by references to the modernist construct known as the social
contract, essentially blurring the lines between socialist and liberal arguments of
redistribution.1 And Bells thinking was surely echoed in the famous phrase attributed to
Milton Friedman in 1965, pronouncing we are all Keynsians now. In many respects,
Bell spoke for his generation, that is, Americans who lived through the Depression of
the 1930s, through US global status ascendance, committing in 1945 to address the
interwar challenge of unequal development in Europe, thus making the world safer for
democracy and capitalism.2
Not dwelling in the political and institutional dimension of this conventional
wisdom, it is worth revisiting its ideational foundations. Libertarian individualism
assumes that self-fulfilment is mainly derived from the struggle to achieve relative to
other humans (competition); Marxist individualism assumed that self-fulfilment is
directly related to the nature of relations with other humans (solidarity). In 1971, Wards
major contribution was taking note of the fact that in institutional terms the debate was
largely grounded on the conceptual arsenal of the former. Because Marxs work focused
mostly on the appraisal of the capitalist project, Ward argued, there were no institutional
blueprints upon which socialism and bourgeois democracy could ground their utopian
encounter. For this reason, most of the discussion gravitated around the liberal ideal of
equilibrium, namely the moment where those participating in an economy and
coextensively a society cannot improve their position legally or without coercion.3
In this scheme, the issue at hand is quite straightforward: to pave the path towards
this modernist nirvana libertarians evoke the notion of Paretos optimality, which is in
effect the rational account of market-magic, capturing the moment where, ceteris paribus,
demand and supply combine in the context of a competitive price mechanism to reach
the optimal allocation of resources. However, libertarians unfailingly imbue the price
mechanism with a sense of moral significance: allocative efficiency emerges as the single
most important collective value, defined as the distribution of wealth and power by
following the principle of marginal returns, that is, each should get as much as initially
invested. In this scheme, social stakeholders make individual sacrifices measured in
terms of land, labour, or capital assume risks and should be rewarded proportionally
rather than equally. If this means large scale social inequality, then so be it: money talks,
merit walks.
On the other hand, the socialist critic, who was conceptually parasitic to the liberal
corpus of economic discourse, suggested that the optimal allocation of resources in the
market does not in-itself preclude the possibility of a more egalitarian distribution.
DiQuattro notes that the socialist conceptual leap is to treat factors such as profit, rent,
Jeremy RAWLS, Theory of Justice, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971; Will KYMLICKA,
Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990.
2 Yannis VAROUFAKIS, The Global Minotaur, Zed Books, London, 2011.
3 Benjamin WARD, Comparative Economic Systems: Changing Times Changing Issues, American
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1980, pp. 395-397.
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or interest as accounting indicators of Paretos efficiency, but not to imbue them with
moral significance. Resources are logistically registered, but no single individual should
appropriate these returns. A socialist advocates the principle of, ultimately, socially
owned means of production, favouring an egalitarian principle of distribution of
logistical profits through the provision of public or free goods.1 This is not too far
away from a similar line of argumentation by Rawls, who suggested that the optimal
allocation should be based on the principle that inequality is acceptable only as far as an
optimum guarantee of equal opportunities is not called into question.
To this day, reformist proposals spring from the consensus point of Paretos
optimality, only to deviate on the ethical question of distribution.2 Therefore, revisionist
projects of one or another teleology liberal or Marxist usually begin with a
commitment to a specific utopia in liberal or socialist terms whilst making an
argument for a compromesso storico. Each polity then is subject to limitations posed by
constrains of the past upon the present, forcing indigenous actors to seek locally
functioning solutions even if they ascribe to universal projects.3 Was this a discussion
confined in the open spaces of Western academia? It is true that socialist regimes were in
fact dominated by a nomenklatura with little room for individual defiance. The
counterargument is that while not everyone was individually free, few were materially
marginalised. Hence, socialist citizens were made beneficiaries of subsidised mass
consumer goods, health care, child care, housing, subsidized vacations, and social
security entitlements by virtue of their citizenship or their status as employees. Ceteris
paribus, the provision of social rights precluded the possibility of individual
marginalization; but of course it did not.
In 1959, Djilas touched upon a socialist taboo when he pointed out that
alcoholism, crime, prostitution, drug abuse were problems kept off limits to academic
inquiry in socialist regimes, precisely because such phenomena undermined their selfperception as harmonious egalitarian utopias.4 And Djilas went further to suggest that
centrally planned economies were but a form of bureaucratic state capitalism, where
surplus value is appropriated not by private owners, but by a class of technocrats, which
had the same effect of alienation, as indeed free market capitalism.5 Incidentally, this
was also to be the mantra of Euro-communism in the years to come, who sought to
dissociate themselves from the legacy of actually existing communism. However,
Yugoslavs neither feared nor shied away from comparisons with the West. In fact, Tito
Arthur DIQUATTRO, Alienation and Justice in the Market, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 72,
No. 3, September 1978.
2 Michael GOLDSTEIN, Privatization Success and Failure: Finance Theory and Regulation in the
Transitional Economies of Albania and the Czech Republic, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 18, No.
7/8, November-December 1997, pp. 530-531.
3 Paul BLOKKER, Post-Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in Europe,
European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2005, pp. 512-513; John CAMPBELL, State Building and
Postcommunist Budget Deficits cit., pp.762-763.
4 Victor PESTOFF, Reforming Social Services in Central and Eastern Europe: Meso-Level Institutional
Change after the Fall of Communism, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 5, 1995, p. 788.
5 Fred NEAL, Yugoslav Communist Theory, American Slavic and Eastern European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1,
February 1960, p. 54.
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and Kardelj in the 1950s met European social democrats half-way by arguing that
capitalism had indeed been weakened by its inherent contradictions, but not in the
manner Marx foresaw it. Pure capitalism, they argued, was obliterated and Western
regimes exhibited not only socialist tendencies but also socialist forms.1 Selfmanagement has often been dismissed as an ineffective mode of participatory democracy
or, worse yet, a legitimacy-faade of the Yugoslav regime.
And yet the experiment itself deserves attention for, unlike forced-draft Stalinism,
the Yugoslav consociational model addressed a foundational criticism to centralplanning, namely the alienation of the individual from the decision making process.
Specifically, in 1953 a number of amendments to the Yugoslav constitution empowered
the workforce to participate in socioeconomic decision-making. The Yugoslav Federal
Assembly became bicameral, representing both nationalities and corporate-productive
classes, which bears some resemblance to the basic rationale underpinning the work of
parliamentary committees in countries such as Germany and Italy. The question is
whether this reformist discourse emerged in two parallel worlds, or whether this was
somehow a European or global discourse. There is evidence to the latter.
Socioeconomic pluralism in Europe was substantial, while Rhine and Nordic
capitalist models were as committed to full employment as any socialist regime. In
academic circles, Gross would by the 1960s delineate the economists land-in-between
polarities as a set of common questions, which led to a global interdisciplinary
conference in Syracuse University (USA), focused on central planning. Note that the
term central planning did not refer to the forced-draft model. Apparently,
conventional wisdom at the time, from east to west, held that national governments
across the world had assumed an important degree of responsibility for the guidance of
economic activity with tremendous variation in policies: Yugoslavia could not be
compared to the USSR just as much Dutch planning could not be compared to French,
or Indian to Chinese. One of the keys to variation, Gross noted, was not only the shared
burden of the less-than-developed nations to remould social structures implicitly by
emulating the developed bourgeois structure but also to navigate between social
systems that were increasingly interdependent.2 Nonetheless, this End of Ideology
discourse was rooted in experience of governance rather than ingrained in the selfperception of governments.
This was not a utopian or a teleological vision. The coexistence of socialist and
liberal narratives was discussed amongst sensible people alluded by Bell, allowing for
various synthetic possibilities rather than an end. How to avoid unequal development
and ensure political stability was the question, not the legitimation of power per se. This
thinking was perhaps theorised by Ralws and Djilas, but there were no ships, no troops,
no flags, no anthems and no martyrs in this vision. Technocrats positioned themselves in
a contextually sensitive vision of Paretos optimality to solve problems, as Christian and
Social Democrats took turns in power in a less than emotionally thrilling political
Ibidem, p. 45; Roy MACRIDIS, Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism, World Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2,
January 1952, pp. 227, 232-236.
2 Bill GROSS, National Planning: Some Fundamental Questions, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8, No. 7,
1964, p. 13.
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pendulum. Social and individual rights were seen as counterbalancing each other, finding
their way on normative landscapes, albeit with different weight in different polities.
5. CONCLUSION: IS THIS THE LOST TRANSITION?
The aforementioned three teleological discourses in the Balkans have been
accompanied by only two transitional discourses. The End of History requires
democratic transition; the end of the exploitation of man by man, required
socialization or collectivization. The process of internalising values and affecting
institutional reforms was in this sense commonly perceived as a historical period in its
own right, which we might call a transition. And if we are to take Gilhots position at
phase value, these transitory discourses were in fact closely interrelated. So, the loose end
in this scheme is the end of ideology discourse, which resisted the notion of a
transition in either ideational or normative terms.
This hybrid Social Model appeared as a teleological discourse of an evertransitory nature. Are we then in search of a lost transition? Ultimately, the significant
question at hand is whether this question has any political relevance for the
understanding of the evolution of Balkan polities today. To address this question we
must once again return to the end of history democratisation narrative and,
specifically, to the constitutional narrative in its realms. In doing so, we may observe that
in mechanistically prescribing the third wave normative package, liberal theorists of the
1990s were well aware that they were fighting a two front reformist battle against both
the largely discredited end of exploitation of man by man discourse and,
simultaneously, the end of ideology. At that particular point in time, certain battles
took precedence over others.
Libertarian constitutional orthodoxy advocated a clean break with the normative
legacy of the homo Sovieticus. This catch-phrase was employed as an argument against
social rights, linking the communist legacy of constitutionally guaranteed health,
education, pension, or housing rights to a culture of docility a Soviet breed of people
who placed their welfare in the hands of the state from cradle to grave. Of course,
because of the end of ideology legacy, those theorists were forced to recognise that
substantial rights were a distinctly European rather than merely a socialist constitutional
tradition. But, the technical argument was that as socialist states were undergoing
economic reform at times referred to as shock therapy positive rights would
amount to unfulfilled promises. Thus theorists such as Sadurski argued that the nonjusticiability of positive rights threatened to infect the moral status of constitutions as
such. Alas, Sadurski also noted that dismantling positive rights was a rational but highly
impracticable demand, not least because communist successor parties would resist it.1
Holding back the third wave thrust made liberal transition more palatable to key
stakeholders in the negotiating process. Indeed, in making the case for the defence of
Wojciech SADURSKI, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rightscit., p.
223.
104
positive rights, former communist parties did not emerge as champions of an ancien rgime
but, on the contrary, as defenders of a social-democratic and distinctly European
tradition. It is telling for the nature of political discourse at the time that most of these
parties re-named themselves social-democratic and then joined the Socialist International
and the Party of European Socialists. Subsequently, these parties reaped the electoral
benefits stemming from their self-pronouncement as defenders of a European rather
than a communist legacy. In this scheme, irrespectively of whether positive rights are
justiciable or not, it was clear they constituted a non-negotiable aspect of political culture
across Europe. In this respect, this constitutional debate was central for the reinvention
of former communists as social-democrats, allowing them to take ownership of the
Return to Europe discourse, not to mention the implementation of necessary shock
therapy programs.
There was a single and telling exception to the tribute paid to this European
substantive rights tradition. That was Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that war tormented
corner of the Balkans, what was at stake was the delineation of the polity as such and the
constitution-making process was essentially taken over completely by foreign
technocratic and End-of-Ideology inspired reformers. Specifically, the conclusion of
the Dayton-Paris Agreements (1995), provided this former Socialist Republic with an
annexed de facto constitution, whose authors were less than tactful; they introduced a
constitution with the most limited substantive rights agenda in Europe, which of course
in Sadusrkis terms makes it the most American constitution in Europe.1
The lost transition might in this sense be considered looming for over two
decades. It was all about complementing a democratic transition with a libertarian
transition. In political terms, most states in post-communist Europe had to undergo a
democratic and a libertarian transition simultaneously: the Balkans recovered from their
initial 1989 transitional slumps to regain pre-1989 GDP levels in the 2000s, with the
exception of Slovenia, which fared better (1998) and Moldavia that never recovered.
Deacon noted that by 2000 a severe depression of public expenditure on welfare had
been affected across Eastern Europe, including the complete or partial privatisation of
many social services ranging from housing to education.2 In 2008, the economic crisis
emerged as an opportunity to revisit the issue of a final break with the European
Social Model. Romania and Greece experienced a severe fiscal crisis of comparable
magnitude to those experienced by Balkans states in 1989. Slovenia is said to be on the
brink of a similar crisis. Therefore, the case for a more realistic approach to
substantive rights and their non justiciability can be made.
Greece had not been considered in transition for at least three decades, having
past most benchmarks of democratic consolidation not to mention being an emblematic
first waver. And Slovenia was arguably the most successful post-communist reformer
in the region indeed, a model being the first amongst post-communist polities to gain
simultaneous membership of the EU, NATO, as well as the EMU. Nonetheless, the
Ibidem, p. 233.
Bob DEACON, Eastern European Welfare States: the impact of the politics of globalization, Journal of
European Social Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2000.
1
2
105
unfolding crisis since 2008 has proved that transition is a phase of internalising values
and norms that can be revisited. As it happens, inadequate internalisation of norms and
values allows for a penitentiary transition project. The difference is that these new
revisionist demands are no longer grounded in a national framework.
From a constitutional perspective, it is already conventional wisdom that
especially in the realms of the EU the constitutionalists object of study is no longer
domestic in the Westphalian sense of the term.1 Member states not only renegotiate
their normative foundations on a multilateral level, but the evaluation of their normative
alignment has taken the most rigid of forms, embodied in the all-mighty Troika, that
is, representatives of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and
the European Central Bank overseeing far reaching shock therapy reforms. This Troika
has, at times, tested the limits of constitutional norms when prescribing measures to be
taken. The trend is clear: the Social Model is collapsing. Interestingly enough in
Greece, this has also signalled the end of the political pendulum between Social
Democrats and Liberals, in consonance with the end of ideology thesis. Perhaps of
equal significance is the fact that post-communist and post-dictatorship Mediterranean
peripheries have converged politically and normatively, perhaps reviving a pass term in
political geography, namely the Balkans.
Neil WALKER, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2002, p.
322.
106
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109
Terremoto con Liquefazione

e le Prospettive della Riforma Istituzionale in Italia
Fulco LANCHESTER
La Sapienza Universit
Abstract: The recent parliamentary elections have generated the third electoral
earthquake after the elections in 1975-1976 and 1994. At that time, their effect was
the dissolution of the political system built after the 70s. Considering the recent crisis
that seems aggravated by major geopolitical changes, the author analyzes the innovations
produced at the institutional level. The author demonstrates that these are closely related
to the necessity to override the hurdle that has been present in the constitutional political
system for four decades. This step is needed in order to avoid the risk of its turning into
a deeper phenomenon that will permeate society to its core, without overlooking the
investments necessary in the political, economic and social subsystems.
Keywords: elections, political system, institutional reform.
1. UN TERREMOTO CON LIQUEFAZIONE

In occasione delle recenti elezioni parlamentari del 2013, a me sembra che
lordinamento politico-costituzionale italiano sia stato investito da un vero e proprio
terremoto con liquefazione e che, come accade dopo ogni sisma, ci sia da affrontare
lemergenza, con la previsione di eventuali nuove scosse, e la necessaria ricostruzione.
Com noto, i terremoti hanno di solito una origine tettonica, ovvero sono
originati dallo spostamento di placche delle crosta terreste e dal conseguente rilascio di
energia che si riflette in superficie attraverso onde meccaniche, che sfruttano la
propriet elastiche del mezzo materiale per la loro propagazione, e con conseguenze che
possono essere pi o meno devastanti a seconda della composizione del suolo e del tipo
di strutture investite. E stato, infatti, verificato dalla ricerca sismologica che terreni
prodotti, ad esempio, da esondazioni fluviali o trasgressioni marine su aree costiere
esaltano le oscillazioni sismiche, aggravando i possibili danni. Casi simili si sono verificati
proprio in Italia con i terremoti avvenuti in Umbria e Marche nel 1997-1998 e con quello
emiliano del 2012.
Se si esamina dunque attraverso la metafora tellurica la vicenda degli ultimi
quaranta anni di storia costituzionale italiana (considerando il sistema partitico come il
terreno su cui si fonda lintero impianto costituzionale), si pu affermare che siamo di
fronte al terzo sisma elettorale della storia repubblicana dopo quelli del 1975/76 e del
1994. Nel 1975/76 il terreno dellordinamento politico-costituzionale, nonostante le
peculiarit della situazione italiana era ancora sufficientemente compatto e le conseguenze
della scossa tellurica, derivante dagli avvenimenti interni ed internazionali della fine anni
110
Sessanta, furono limitate allinterno della faticosa dinamica della prima fase della storia
costituzionale repubblicana1.
Nel 1994 la scossa invest un terreno oramai sempre meno coerente in
conseguenza del contesto internazionale ed interno profondamente mutato. Le
conseguenze furono un intenso mutamento dei soggetti politicamente rilevanti nella
vischiosa continuit con il passato di un ordinamento sregolato con la novit della
partitocrazia senza partiti e di istituzioni non coerenti con la nuova situazione2.
Oggi non soltanto pare essersi liquefatta la base oramai sabbiosa ed incoerente del
sistema politico partitico della seconda fase della storia repubblicana, ma dalle difficolt
sono investiti anche i sottosistemi sociale ed economico3. Si profila una vera e propria
crisi societaria, che richiama altri esempi che a livello comparato hanno portato al
crollo dellordinamento democratico.4
La conferma di Giorgio Napolitano alla Presidenza della Repubblica, dopo un
travagliato anche se breve procedimento che ha visto la sostanziale implosione del PD e il
fallimento del suo gruppo dirigente (che ha bruciato due dei suoi fondatori: Marini e
Prodi), evidenzia come si sia andati avanti nel processo di fusione dellassetto tradizionale
e come siano presenti contraddittori sintomi di una sua ibernazione o rottura.
Tenendo conto del suddetto sfondo e dei fallimenti di lungo periodo del dibattito
riformatore, in queste note accenner in maniera sintetica alle necessit del momento
istituzionale sotto il profilo istituzionale (votazioni di tipo pubblicistico, forma di governo
e tipo di Stato)5 e ai connessi temi concreti che dovrebbero essere affrontati al fine di
ristrutturare un edificio terremotato come quello politico-costituzionale italiano.
2. LO SFONDO GENERALE
Siamo alla fine di un ciclo ed necessario situarci per comprenderne le ragioni e
gli effetti. Dal punto di vista macro si sta, a mio avviso, concludendo, nellambito della
crisi della finanza capitalistica che venuta conclamandosi nel 2008, un ciclo di circa di
mezzo millennio in cui si sono spostati gli assi geopolitici. Il mio riferimento
ovviamente alle riflessioni ed ai dati forniti nellultimo ventennio dal Maddison,
Pomeranz e Arrighi6 che descrivono in maniera sintetica spostamenti epocali degli assi
Celso GHINI, Il terremoto del 15 giugno, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976 e Idem, L'Italia che cambia: il voto degli italiani:
1946-1976, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1976.
2 Ornello VITALI, Il terremoto del 1994: dal Governo Berlusconi alla dissociazione di Bossi, Viani, Roma, 1995.
3 Per una prima analisi, v. Enrico GALLI, Gianluca PASSARELLI, Elezioni politiche e regionali del 2013. I flussi
elettorali, Istituto Cattaneo, Bologna, 2013; sulla dinamica della forma partito e del sistema dei partiti, v. da
ultimo Piero IGNAZI, Forza senza legittimit. Il vicolo cieco dei partiti, Laterza, Roma, 2012 e Marco REVELLI,
Finaledi partito, Einaudi, Torino, 2013.
4 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration.
An Introduction, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1978.
1
Per lo schema concettuale, v. Fulco LANCHESTER, Gli strumenti della democrazia, Giuffr, Milano, 2004.
V. Kenneth POMERANZ, The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000; Angus MADDISON, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy.
5
6
111
geopolitici di lungo periodo (dal Mediterraneo allAtlantico; dallAtlantico al Pacifico) con

la riqualificazione dei rapporti geopolitici di breve periodo nellultimo sessantennio.1
Questultima fase, cui faccio solo un accenno, iniziata negli anni Settanta; divenuta
conclamata alla fine degli anni Ottanta inizi anni Novanta con il crollo del socialismo
reale; ed stata certificata agli inizi degli anni 2000.
La crisi italiana dei tre terremoti segue, senza dubbio, le fasi di breve periodo
descritte in precedenza e si inserisce nella realt di un ordinamento frammentato e
caratterizzato da un pluralismo estremo polarizzato. Se esaminiamo il sessantennio
repubblicano sotto il profilo della storia costituzionale e della Costituzione, possibile
individuare tre periodi significativi, dopo entrata in vigore della Costituzione
repubblicana:
a) 1948-1968, articolato in tre fasi (1948-1953: o del centrismo stabile a
Costituzione ibernata; 1954-1960: o della crisi del centrismo e della prima applicazione
della Costituzione; 1961-1968: o della scommessa di centro-sinistra).
b) 1969-1993, articolato in quattro sottofasi (1969-1975: o della crisi del
centrosinistra fino al primo terremoto; 1976-1978: o della collaborazione bipartitica
incompiuta; 1979-1988: o della rinnovata coalizione di centro-sinistra allargata con inizio
della discussione riformatrice; 1989-1993: o della crisi di Tangentopoli sino al secondo
terremoto).
c) 1994-2013, suddiviso in tre fasi: due politiche ed una sotto tutela presidenziale
(1994-2005: linstabilit sotto le nuove leggi elettorali 276-277 del 1993 (il cosiddetto
Mattarellum); 2006-2010: linstabilit sotto la legge elettorale 270 del 2005( il cosiddetto
Porcellum); 2011-2013: o del Governo tecnico-presidenziale.
In estrema sintesi si pu affermare che alla fine degli anni Sessanta il fallimento
della scommessa riformista di centro-sinistra port allavvitamento progressivo di una
democrazia parlamentare gi a basso rendimento, senza che classe dirigente e ceto
politico fossero capaci di invertire la tendenza. A differenza di ci che capit in Francia
ed in Germania, dove le scelte integrative vennero opportunamente operate, in Italia
questo obbiettivo risultato problematico ed alla fine impossibile. La metafora geologica
precedentemente suggerita pu essere, dunque, considerata azzeccata per la situazione
italiana, se si tiene conto che la scossa che ha investito il mondo industriale avanzato ha
trovato un terreno sociale e politico oramai disfatto dalla mancanza di riallineamento e di
solidificazione del sistema partitico scaturito dalla seconda fase della storia costituzionale
repubblicana, successiva alla cesura del 1992-1993 (Tangentopoli). Il terremoto del 1993
costitu una vera e propria crisi di regime che sembra oggi ripresentarsi in maniera pi
grave. Tuttavia, nelle elezioni politiche del 1994 la novit fu rappresentata da Forza
Italia che riusc a strutturare il polo moderato attraverso la connessione della Lega a
nord e di Alleanza nazionale al Sud attraverso i mezzi di comunicazione di massa di
Mediaset. Quella novit doveva preludere alla formazione di uno stabile partito moderato
di massa, capace di strutturarsi nel Paese e di contrapporsi ad una coalizione di centro
The Roots of Modernity, Aei, Washington, 2004; Giovanni ARRIGHI, Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the
Twenty-First Century, Verso, London, 2007.
1 V. per una valutazione complessiva, Rudyard GRIFFITHS, Patrick LUCIANI (eds.), Does the 21st Century
Belong to China? Kissinger and Zakaria vs. Ferguson and Li, The Munk Debate On China, Anansi, Toronto, 2011.
112
sinistra, che non aveva ancora superato tutte le contraddizioni della trasformazione della
ragione sociale del PCI.
3. IL RIALLINEAMENTO MANCATO
Lauspicato riallineamento e la stabilizzazione non sono, invece, avvenuti per i
difetti del processo di transizione ed in particolare per la permanenza di un bicameralismo
perfetto frutto della persistente sfiducia reciproca dei contendenti. I circa venti anni
successivi al 1993 sono stati la certificazione dellincapacit del ceto politico e della classe
dirigente di innovare razionalmente lordinamento. Lo stato di crisi , daltro canto,
confermato dal fatto che nel ventennio citato, di fronte ad una diminuzione media del
7/8% del PIL pro capite nei paesi industriali avanzati, il sistema Italia ha visto un
decremento dello stesso del 19%.
La gravit della situazione che si presenta come preludio di una ulteriore crisi di
regime che potrebbe divenire anche una crisi del complessivo sistema politico (la
cosiddetta crisi societaria) stata attestata, alle spalle del sostanziale commissariamento
dellordinamento con le dimissioni del governo Berlusconi e lavvento del governo
tecnico di Monti nel novembre 2011, dallo smembramento delle formazioni di
maggioranza, dalle difficolt dello stesso Pd, dalla salita in campo di Mario Monti, ma
soprattutto dallingrossarsi dellonda di piena del Movimento 5 stelle.
Lelettorato italiano si sfarinato. E crollato il voto di appartenenza, aumentato
quello di opinione, si mantenuto quello di scambio a livello locale e regionale, mentre
aumentato a dismisura il voto di protesta in un terreno sempre pi sabbioso. In una
simile situazione il bipolarismo coalizionale polarizzato che ha caratterizzato le elezioni
dal 1994 al 2008 (con lutilizzazione di regole elettorali pi vicine a quelle delle nuove
democrazie dellEuropa centro-orientale ed orientale che a quelle degli ordinamenti di
democrazia stabilizzata) ha prodotto una ondata di protesta che favorisce la
centrifugazione sistemica.
4. LE ELEZIONI DEL 2013: NESSUN VINCITORE, MA DI SICURO
UN PERDENTE
Dopo lo scioglimento anticipato (invero di poco) delle Camere la sensazione del
terremoto si rafforzata. In primo luogo perch lofferta partitica si frammentata,
mentre il personale parlamentare ricandidato sceso ai minimi termini sulla base di scelte
divergenti. Nel 2008 circa l80% dei parlamentari eletti nel 2006 vennero ricandidati.
Nella tornata del 2013 il PD ha ripresentato solo il 19% dei suoi parlamentari, mentre il
PDL circa il 16%. Le altre formazioni presenti in Parlamento sono state ancora pi
selettive, ma per tutti stata sostanziale la cooptazione dallalto. Ci vuol dire che le
nuove Camere, sono piene di volti nuovi, mentre il previsto successo del movimento di
Grillo costituisce la vera preoccupante novit.
113
La scelta stata ancora una volta viziata da un sistema elettorale che impedisce una
scelta trasparente e stabile in tutta la filiera, dalla scelta infrapartitica a quella interpartitica.
Lincertezza sui risultati del Senato ha coperto la tendenza del ceto politico a schiacciarsi
sui programmi europei, nella consapevolezza della debolezza italiana e della gravit della
situazione. Ci ha rafforzato la distorcente sensazione dellinutilit della scelta e la sua
imposizione dallesterno, con effetti delegittimanti per lordinamento democratico.
In una simile situazione la scadenza della elezione del Capo dello Stato ha
rafforzato il clima di incertezza di un sistema che ha vissuto negli ultimi anni sulla tenuta
del pilastro Quirinale, che ha incrementato a fisarmonica la sua capacit di influenza,
fino a rasentare leccezione1.
Le elezioni del 2013 hanno visto una diminuzione della partecipazione elettorale, la
perdita incisiva di consenso di tutti ipartiti tradizionali, laffermazione di un Movimento
antisistema e di protesta (M5S), con linesistenza di una maggioranza al Senato della
Repubblica e lapparente impossibilit di dialogo tra le forze tradizionali.
Al di l dellanalisi dei flussi elettorali e della composizione del voto(su cui si v. il
rapporto di Gianluca Passarelli nellambito delle ricerche dellIstituto Cattaneo di
Bologna), lofferta politica di candidature ha visto un incisivo rinnovamento anche da
parte dei due maggiori competitors (PD e PDL), con alcune differenze che si sono riversate
sui risultati degli eletti (per questo si v. la ricerca, Ragno, Bernardini, Ferraro Rosero).
Il PD ha selezionato i suoi candidati per il 90% per mezzo di votazioni interne di
partito( le cosiddette primarie) e per il 10% sulla base di una scelta operata del Segretario
nazionale del partito, con la presenza di ricandidature per solo il 19%. Il PDL,
apparentemente ha presentato una continuit ancora minore (il 16% di ricandidature
eccellenti), ma le ha strategicamente inserite nelle liste bloccate ai posti alti. Mentre tutte
le altre formazioni sono state caratterizzate da un rinnovamento quasi totale (ad es. la
Lega Nord ha presentato nelle sue liste appena il 7% scarso di ricandidature rispetto alla
legislatura uscente, cos come lUDC), dalla tabella 1 possibile verificare il tasso di
rinnovamento effettivo dei membri delle due Camere:
Tabella 1: Composizione gruppi parlamentari, rieletti e volti nuovi
Camera XVII
Fratelli DItalia
Il Popolo della Libert -Berlusconi
Presidente
Lega Nord e Autonomie
Movimento 5 Stelle
Partito Democratico
Scelta Civica per lItalia
Sinistra Ecologica Liberta
Num.
Membri
9
97
Rieletti da
XVI
8
70
Volti
nuovi
1
27
%
Rinnovo
11
28
19
109
293
46
37
11
0
109
1
0
8
109
184
45
37
42
100
63
98
100
Sul ruolo del Capo dello Stato, v. ora Vincenzo LIPPOLIS, Giulio SALERNO, La Repubblica del Presidente.Il
settennato di Napolitano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2013.
114
Misto
Totale
Senato XVII
Grandi Autonomie e Libert
Il Popola della Libert
Lega Nord e Autonomie
Movimento 5 Stelle
Partito Democratico
Per le Autonomie -PSI
Misto
Totale
19
629
6
205
13
424
68
67
Num.
Membri
10
91
16
53
107
21
10
21
11
319
Rieletti da
XVI
5
32
11
0
36
8
3
8
1
96
Volti
nuovi
5
59
5
53
71
13
7
13
10
223
%
Rinnovo
50
65
31
100
66
62
70
62
91
70
In sostanza il rinnovamento stato estremamente incisivo, ma il partito che ha

saputo condurre il rinnovo pi equilibrato tra i due maggiori stato sicuramente il PDL,
che, seppur sconfitto alla Camera dei deputati per poche decine di migliaia di voti,
risultato compattato dal suo leader carismatico. Il PD, invece, stato centrifugato dalle
contraddizioni posizionali interne e dallo shock di una vittoria mancata, che hanno pesato
sulla stessa vicenda peculiare del pre-incarico del segretario Pierluigi Bersani da parte del
Capo dello Stato.
5. LE NECESSIT DEL MOMENTO E LIMPASSE SISTEMICA
Mentre sto scrivendo queste nota il Presidente della Repubblica Giorgio
Napolitano (88 anni a giugno), rieletto per la prima volta nella storia costituzionale
repubblicana, ha attribuito lincarico di formare il nuovo Governo al vice-segretario del
PD Enrico Letta, schiudendo le porte ad una formazione politica volta allinnovazione e
allemergenza. Una simile proposta corrisponde allesigenza che in situazioni come quelle
descritte necessario rispondere al pericolo, prospettando allopinione pubblica e,
soprattutto, a tutte le forze politico-parlamentari, che sembrano ancora divise sui punti
essenziali, la necessit di un concreto superamento dello stallo attraverso un opera di
convergenza fattiva1. I due corni del problema attuale si situano infatti nel
superamento del rapporto di sostanziale incomunicabilit tra le forze oggi presenti in
Parlamento ed in un programma di interventi da operare nel corso di una legislatura dalla
durata incerta al fine di potersi presentare di nuovo ed in modo meno arrischiato davanti
agli elettori. Il primo dei temi si configura come quello di recuperare una maggioranza
capace di sostenere un Governo sulla base di quanto previsto dallart. 94 della Cost. e di
Arend LIJPHART, Thinking about Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice, Routledge,
New York, 2008.
115
uno specifico indirizzo politico in campo economico e sociale; il secondo si concentra nel
complesso delle innovazioni attinenti alle regole istituzionali per rendere governabile il
sistema.
La maggioranza alla base del Governo dovrebbe sostenere uno specifico e
controverso programma economico-sociale, mentre il parco di riforme politicocostituzionali potrebbe utilizzare di una maggioranza diversificata. In questa forcella si
inserisce il tema delle riforme istituzionali(costituzionali e/o ordinarie) e la difficolt del
momento. Per stabilizzare lordinamento ci sarebbe bisogno di una trasformazione
radicale delle forme e dei meccanismi della rappresentanza, che partano dallambito
infrapartitico, investendo il settore della legislazione elettorale (sistema elettorale e
legislazione di contorno) e suggerendo la riforma radicale della forma di governo e del
tipo di Stato.
Diritti degli iscritti nelle formazioni politiche e selezione dei candidati, trasparenza
e riduzione drastica delle spese nelle votazioni elettive e deliberative, introduzione di un
sistema elettorale che unisca rappresentativit e selettivit, riduzione del numero dei
parlamentari, riforma del bicameralismo e dei regolamenti parlamentari, elezione diretta
del Capo dello Stato dovrebbero costituire le proposte cardine di un programma che
vuole rilanciare il piano istituzionale nazionale nellambito di una ristrutturazione di
quello europeo.
6. LIPERCINETISMO ISTITUZIONALE INCONCLUDENTE
Di fronte a queste richieste, che fanno parte oramai storica della discussione
sullinnovazione istituzionale in Italia da circa quaranta anni, lordinamento fin qui
apparso sostanzialmente bloccato. In realt, come conferma anche lanalisi di Alan
Renwick1, in materia di votazioni elettive in Italia non vi stata immobilit, ma piuttosto
un ipercinetismo inconcludente (ed ipocrita) derivante dal mancato superamento di una crisi
pi che trentennale, che impedisce linnovazione razionale. Tra il 1993 ed il 2012
lordinamento politico costituzionale italiano, unico tra quelli a democrazia stabilizzata, ha
infatti subito per due volte la modifica del sistema elettorale in senso stretto per le
Camere (senza considerare la innovazione dei livelli subnazionali ed europeo). A questo si
aggiunga che nel 2001 sono state introdotte ampie, anchese confuse modifiche al titolo V
della Costituzione, mentre nel 2006 una ben pi incisiva riforma della seconda parte della
Costituzione, approvata dal centro-destra, stata respinta dal Corpo elettorale nel
referendum confermativo. Un simile dato fornisce gi i primi sommari elementi del
quadro clinico, che sempre pi comparabile a ci che avvenuto in alcuni ordinamenti
dellEuropa centro-orientale ed orientale.
Per quanto riguarda il tema del sistema elettorale in senso stretto, che costituisce
uno strumento tecnico ad alta valenza politica che si connette con lo stesso regime, tre
logiche differenti si sono, dunque, susseguite nellultimo ventennio per la costruzione del
V. Alan RENWINCK, The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 111 ss.
116
circuito democratico nazionale individuato dal Costituente, mentre costante stata

linsoddisfazione per le scelte ed i risultati operati non soltanto nellambito del sistema
elettorale in senso stretto, ma anche per quanto riguarda la legislazione elettole di
contorno. Lo stato dei rapporti di forza e la sostanziale sfiducia reciproca ha contribuito
solo a formali tentativi di mutare razionalmente lo strumento elettorale in vigore sulla
base di un sostanziale immobilismo derivante dagli interessi posizionali interpartitici e
intrapartitici. Il panorama che si andato consolidando quello di un ordinamento
partitocratico sregolato senza pi formazioni di partito coerenti e sostanzialmente
delegittimato.
Tutto il 2012 stato caratterizzato da un simile persistente atteggiamento. La road
map per la riforma, che i partiti commissariati dal Governo tecnico politico di Monti
avrebbero dovuto portare avanti per preparare degnamente le elezioni del 2013,
ipotizzava una serie di interventi sui rimborsi elettorali (alias finanziamento pubblico),
lapplicazione dellart.49 Cost. relativo al partito politico, una riforma costituzionale
concentrata in particolare sul bicameralismo e infine la riforma del sistema elettorale,
di cui alla L.270/2005.
Come prevedibile, il punto fondamentale della riforma elettorale venne posto alla
fine del percorso, nel tentativo di osservare come si sarebbe evoluta la contemporanea
liquefazione del sistema partitico.
Le cronache del 2012 sono state piene di lavori e di annunzi, ma lunico frutto a
livello costituzionale stata la legge per lintroduzione dellequilibrio di bilancio (art.81
Cost.).Tutti gli altri interventi sono falliti e per approfondirli invito alla lettura del dossier
preparato dal servizio studi della Camera dei deputati per approfondire largomento.1
Nel gennaio 2012 si ipotizz, in particolare, di un accordo basato su una doppia
rinunzia: il PD avrebbe messo da parte la sua formale propensione per il doppio turno
maggioritario in collegio uninominale; il PDL avrebbe dovuto concedere il premio di
coalizione. Si sarebbe ritornati ad un sistema proiettivo con clausole di esclusione a vario
livello, soluzione che naturalmente avrebbe posto il problema della scelta tra i candidati e
quindi quello della reintroduzione delle preferenze, richiesto dallUdc e da settori del PDL
(gli ex-AN) e del PD (alcuni ex-Margherita). La conseguenza di una simile opzione
sarebbe stata labbandono della scelta del partito o della coalizione di governo,
caratteristica fondamentale della seconda fase della Costituzione repubblicana. La logica
sistemica di un simile meccanismo proiettivo, di fronte allemergenza economica e
politica, sembrava ormai quella di favorire la decisione sulle alleanza di governo dopo le
elezioni: si trattava di un ritorno allarcheoparlamentarismo descritto da Maurice Duverger
negli anni Settanta2. Una simile ipotesi assomigliava troppo alla proposta Passigli di
ritorno ad un meccanismo sostanzialmente speculare, per cui trov subito avversari. I
giovani leoni del PD avanzarono lidea del sistema ispano tedesco (pi spagnolo che
tedesco), discutendo anche sulla paternit del progetto stesso (Vassallo o Ceccanti), ma
CD, XVII legislatura, Documentazione e ricerche, I temi dell'attivit della XVI legislatura: Affari costituzionali e
ordinamento della Repubblica, No. 1/1, Marzo 2013.
2 V. Maurice DUVERGER, La monarchie rpublicaine, Laffont, Paris, 1974 e Idem, Echec au roi, Albin Michel,
Paris, 1978.
1
117
come ovvio la questione non stava e non sta nelle technicalities, ma nelle logiche
sistemiche e nelle conseguenze coalizionali.
7. LE PROPOSTE E GLI INTERESSI DIVERGENTI DEI PARTNER
Di fronte allimmobilismo sostanziale in materia e alla sfiducia che i partner hanno
evidenziato reciprocamente nel passato, scarse parrebbero le prospettive di successo delle
proposte attualmente in discussione.
A scanso di equivoci bene ribadire che il problema non tecnico, ma
squisitamente politico e che investe in maniera diretta la responsabilit dei soggetti
implicati, giustificando la assoluta cautela dei commentatori in argomento1. I meccanismi
istituzionali (ed in particolare quelli elettorali) sono, infatti, strumenti tecnici ad altissima
valenza politica. Senza tema di smentite si pu affermare, in particolare, che, per la
concezione sostanzialista, il sistema elettorale in senso stretto per lelezione delle Camere
rappresentative nazionali si connetta con la stessa costituzione in senso materiale, mentre per
quella formalista assurgono a questo ruolo i regolamenti parlamentari. In entrambi i casi
sono i soggetti presenti nel Paese e nelle Assemblee elettive che li determinano, per cui
indispensabile guardare con gli occhi asciutti non soltanto alle loro trasformazioni, ma
anche alla loro natura, capacit di azione e di dialogo.
Partiamo dalle alternative presenti nellarena, rappresentate dai tre protagonisti
delle elezioni di febbraio. Gli 8 punti prospettati dal PD nel recente periodo postelettorale e i 20 del programma del M5S sembrano evidenziare, nonostante i tentativi PD
ed il comune riferimento alla procedura di votazione, una contrapposizione esemplare tra
democrazia rappresentativa e democrazia diretta, senza espliciti riferimenti alla forma di
governo. Il progetto PDL , invece, identificabile negli atti approvati dal Senato della
Repubblica nel corso dellestate 2012 e richiama i contrasti che si sono avuti sul tema
della forma di governo ed in particolare sul ruolo del Capo dello Stato, che dovrebbe
essere eletto direttamente dal Corpo elettorale .
I tre programmi si posizionano su punti differenti del piano istituzionale o,
addirittura, su livelli differenti. Lelemento carismatico-plebiscitario prevalente nello
schema del PDL, quello democratico rappresentativo nel PD, mentre spiccano elementi
tipici della democrazia diretta intrisi da elementi populisti in quello del M5S, la cui
ispirazione si sovrappone parzialmente agli indirizzi della Piratenpartei tedesca2.
Durante le consultazioni tra il presidente pre-incaricato Bersani e i capogruppo
del M5S(trasmesse con uno streaming da processo romeno) la cittadina Lombardi ha
estrinsecato la mancanza di fiducia in promesse riformatrici dopo venti anni di
1 V. significativamente per questo la parte elettorale delle Proposte per un programma di Governo (ASTRID 2013)
a cura di O. Massari e S. Passigli.
2 Invito a confrontare Beppe GRILLO, Gianroberto CASALEGGIO Siamo in guerra. Per una nuova politica, Chiare
Lettere, Milano, 2011 con lanalisi di Stefan APPELIUS, Armin FUHRER, Das Betriebssystem erneuern: Alles ber die
Piratenpartei, Story Verlag, Berlin, 2012.
118
disillusioni. Bench in Italia il dibattito improduttivo sia durato per un periodo ben
superiore, opportuno sottolineare la fondatezza di una simile critica.
La Commissione di facilitatori individuata dal Capo dello Stato (dal punto di vista
giuridico un gruppo di amici, vista linesistenza di un decreto di nomina)evidenzia come
anche i saggi abbiano problemi quando sono investiti dal tema elettorale, per cui hanno
dovuto mettere lo stesso allultimo posto per non far saltare il tavolo. Tuttavia il rapporto
ha messo opportunamente incollegamento il tema della legge elettorale con quello della
forma di governo, sottolineando con forza la necessit di riformare il bicameralismo
perfetto. A questo fine uno dei componenti della Commissione ha successivamente
ipotizzato anche un intervento di urgenza sul premio di maggioranza del vigente sistema
elettorale al fine di calcolare lo stesso sulla somma dei voti ottenuti dalle formazioni nelle
consultazioni per la Camera dei deputatie per il Senato della Repubblica.
Per quanto riguarda il meccanismo di trasformazione dei voti in seggi le opzioni
sono, daltro canto, le pi varie. Elenco quelle pi rilevanti qui di seguito: a. modifiche al
Porcellum (preferenza; soglia per il premio); b. ritorno al Mattarellum; c. ritorno al sistema
pre-1993; d. sistema spagnolo; e. sistema tedesco; f.sistema ispano-tedesco (VassalloCeccanti); g. doppio turno in collegio uninominale; h. collegio uninominale ad un turno
solo.
Tutti questi meccanismi non risolverebbero, per, in alcun modo le possibilit di
blocco derivante dal bicameralismo perfetto oggi esistente (che necessita di un intervento
di revisione costituzionale), ma impongono che si analizzino perlomeno i maggiori
interessi partigiani coinvolti.
Il M5S ha dichiarato, prima, di desiderare il ritorno al sistema pre-1993 con la
preferenza unica (punto 11 del programma), poi al Mattarellum. Ci spiegabile perch
nel 2007 quando venne presentata la proposta di iniziativa popolare (Senato-XV
leg.d.d.l.1936) e nello stesso periodo pre-elettorale il Movimento in questione non
soltanto era tarato sullantipartitocrazia (la preferenza viene oggi vista sotto questa
specifica prospettiva), ma era anche una formazione di minoranza. Il mutamento sul
Mattarellum definisce (forse) un cambiamento di prospettiva, derivante dai risultati
elettorali, sulla possibilit di guadagno partigiano con lutilizzazione del collegio
uninominale nelle aree di prevalenza e con il recupero proporzionale in quelle minoritarie.
Il PD viaggia sulle alternative diversificate di un sistema speculare con soglia, del
Mattarellum e del doppio turno in collegio uninominale. Proposta questultima che non
pu essere accettata dal M5S, perch punitiva per una forza sostanzialmente antisistema
con scarse (o nulle) possibilit coalizionali.
Il PDL ha creato il Porcellum in prospettiva difensiva (e per questo gli va bene) e
non ama il doppio turno, soprattutto se isolato. In materia rilancia implicitamente
laccoppiata di questultimo con la riforma della forma di governo ed in particolare con
lelezione diretta del Capo dello Stato, che dovrebbe precedere come in Francia le
elezione delle Assemblee.
Il sistema tedesco quello che piaceva ai centristi e anche ad altri settori
preoccupati dal fallimento del bipolarismo centrifugo, ma in questo momento non appare
essere proposta di successo, cos come il meccanismo spagnolo. E, tuttavia, bene
mettere in evidenza che, in materia, non si pu mai dire mai.
119
Di qui scaturisce uno stallo sostanziale, che viene affiancato da un giudizio

sullinconsistenza della riforma senza la modifica del bicameralismo, che abbisogna
ovviamente dei tempi lunghi della riforma costituzionale.
Come si vede tutto sembra in questa prospettiva ancora bloccato. Si pu, invece,
incidere di pi sul settore della legislazione elettorale di contorno al fine di rilegittimare le
istituzioni politiche in gravissima crisi. Lelenco noto e parte dai temi delleleggibilit,
ineleggibilit, incandidabilit, per investire larea intrapartitica (statuto minimo, diritti degli
iscritti, selezione dei candidati a cariche pubbliche), quella interpartitica (finanziamento,
costi, rimborsi, controlli) e la comunicazione politica (radio, televisione, internet). Sono
questi argomenti che in una democrazia a basso rendimento come quella italiana
assumono un valore polemico rilevante e rischiano (nonostante lequilibrio del recente
contributo di Giuliano Amato1) di finire nel tritacarne dei veti incrociati per la loro
altissima valenza polemica e per il differente impatto sulle strutture organizzative delle
formazioni coinvolte.
8. CONCLUSIONI:
LE PROSPETTIVE E I PERICOLI DELLA CRISI SOCIETARIA
Concludo. Le prospettive dellinnovazione istituzionale in Italia non sono mai
state favorevoli, ma in questa legislatura paiono ancor pi limitate di quando esisteva la
via duscita rozza del referendum abrogativo. Il circolo vizioso in materia richiama la
riflessione di Kirchheimer sulle riforme weimariane, ricordata da Zagrebelsky2 alla met
degli anni Ottanta: quando tutto va bene linnovazione inutile, quando tutto va male
impossibile. In simili casi, ma soprattutto davanti al burrone, ci si raccomanda alla
resipiscenza dei protagonisti fino ad arrivare alla richiesta di un suicidio autoconservativo, in
cui i soggetti politicamente rilevanti per salvare lordinamento rinunziano a privilegi
posizionali ed interessi consolidati. Una simile istanza non ha grandi possibilit di
attuazione, anzi pu essere considerata inattuabile. I pericoli che la crisi societaria potrebbe
comportare per lordinamento democratico, ingigantendo il ricorrente incubo di Weimar,
devono per stimolare la tendenza alla fantasia ed al compromesso salvifico3.
V. Giuliano AMATO, Analisi e orientamenti , Rassegna parlamentare, No. 4, 2012, pp.751 ss. frutto della
consulenza che il Presidente del Consiglio gli aveva affidato e che si sostanziata in tre note predisposte tra il
maggio ed il luglio del 2012.
2 V. Gustavo ZAGREBELSKY, Adeguamenti e cambiamenti della Costituzione, Studi in onore di Vezio
Crisafulli, Cedam, Padova, 1985, pp. 915 ss.
3 V. su questo Fulco LANCHESTER, Francesco BRANCACCIO (a cura di), Weimar e il problema politicocostituzionale italiano, Giuffr, Milano, 2012.
1
120
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IGNAZI, Piero, Forza senza legittimit. Il vicolo cieco dei partiti, Laterza, Roma, 2012.
LIJPHART, Arend, Thinking about Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and
Practice, Routledge, New York, 2008.
LINZ, Juan, Alfred STEPAN (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown
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Napolitano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2013.
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REVELLI, Marco, Finaledi partito, Einaudi, Torino, 2013.
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121
Constitutional Reform and Political Regime

in Interwar Portugal. A Challenge for Political Theory1
University of South-East Europe Lumina
Abstract: Salazars authoritarian regime (1932-1968) represents unquestionably a
controversial moment in Europes political history. Antonio Salazar is considered either
a saviour of interwar Portugal and an exponent of Christian philosophy in politics, or,
on the contrary, a dictator of fascist filiation who obstructed his countrys democratic
evolution. All disputes aside, it can be stated with certainty that the Portuguese politician
was the longest-serving state leader of twentieth century Europe and that his
constitutional philosophy is still a challenge for political theory. Was Salazars an
authoritarian, dictatorial, totalitarian regime or, conversely, can it be considered a sui
generis aspect of the Mediterranean political model? Starting from this question, the aim
of this article is to analyse the substance of Salazars political thought, as well as its
reception phenomenon from the viewpoint of Arendtian critique of totalitarianism, and of
the model of conceptual history, as theorised by Reinhart Kosellek.
Keywords: Portugal, interwar period, constitutional reform, authoritarianism,
dictatorship, totalitarianism, Mediterranean model, conceptual history.
1. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND CORPORATISM
The political regime established by Antonio Oliveira de Salazar in Portugal,
between 1932 and 1968, was received in various ways. Thus, Salazars regime was
depicted as either a form of successful corporatism which put an end to anarchy in
interwar Portugal, or as a dictatorship which, chiefly after 1945, abused the states
coercive means against political opposition. Notwithstanding these controversies, Salazar
is the main author of the 1933 Portuguese Constitution, which echoes a corporatist
political philosophy wherein the concepts of family, profession and nation occupy
a central position. On the basis of the new fundamental Law, interwar Portugal
witnessed an impressive economic revival, due to which it was possible to speak at that
time and even long afterwards about a Lusitanian model of restoration of the nations
stability and welfare.
Acknowledgment: This paper was financed by POSDRU/89/1.5/S / 62259 contract, strategic project
Socio-human and political applied sciences. Postdoctoral training programme and postdoctoral research
fellowships in socio-human and political sciences, co-financed by the European Social Fund through the
Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.
122
Starting from these contextual premises, we can say that the constitutional
philosophy formulated and encouraged by Salazar represents a relevant case study for
the history of the concept of corporatism. Hence, from the perspective of conceptual
history as theorised by Reinhart Koselleck the concepts which structure social and
political life do not have monolithic semantic contents, but are rather composed of
superposed and fragmented meanings according to the contexts in which they were
forged. Unlike the Cambridge School of historiography (represented mainly by Quentin
Skinner) which is interested in language as source of social changes, Kosellecks
historiographical method considers that discourse and concepts mirror social and
political realities of an era, constituting its main category of documents.1 Consequently,
by applying the method of conceptual history, corporatism can be described as a
polysemantic concept used both in antidemocratic oratorical contexts (specific to the
interwar period) and in the theories formulated in the second half of the 20th century
touching the evaluation and strengthening of democracy. The relationship between
corporatism and democracy was eloquently analysed by Arend Lijphart in his theory of
consociational democracy, as well as by Philippe Schmitter by means of the concept of
social and political concurrence. Lijphart and Schmitter equate democratic corporatism
with the functional inclusion of interest groups in the political process.2
In the interwar period, the corporatist doctrine was a dominant current, and rather
an antidemocratic one, yet important differences can be observed between its manifold
hypostases. Italian fascism promoted a form of economic corporatism completely
subordinated to Mussolinis revolutionary political movement. The transformation of the
corporation-based system in a revolutionary tool for seizing political power was
considered at that time by other representatives of corporatism as a distortion of this
theoretical current. In this respect, the Romanian economist Mihail Manoilescu
published in 1934, in Paris, his work Theory of pure and integral corporatism in which
he defined the corporate state by delimiting it from both communism and Italian
fascism. According to Manoilescu, corporatism integrates individual energies in a
functional, oriented to community system. Unlike communist collectivism which relies
on coercion, corporatism turns to good account individual energies only and only if the
corporate state is an ideal accepted by all citizens. Likewise, Manoilescu denounces the
claim of universality of Italian corporatism and its dependence on the existence of a
revolutionary party. In this respect, Manoilescu states that corporate institutions cannot
be imposed by a revolutionary party, but ought to be the expression of a natural
historical development of each and every society.3
As far as Salazars corporatism is concerned, its most distinctive element is the
identification of family as foundation of the nation. As such, Salazar did not regard the
Armin HEINEN, Elaborarea istoriei Romniei: dezbateri metodologice, in Victor NEUMANN, Armin
HEINEN (eds.), Istoria Romniei prin concepte. Perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice, Polirom, Iai,
2010, pp. 38-39.
2 Arend LIJPHART, Modele ale democraiei. Forme de guvernare i funcionare n treizeci i ase de ri, trans. Ctlin
Constantinescu, Polirom, Iai, 2000, p. 165.
3 Armin HEINEN, Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail. Micare social i organizaie politic. O contribuie la problema
fascismului internaional, 2nd ed., trans. Cornelia and Delia Eianu, Humanitas, Bucureti, pp. 163-165.
1
123
Portuguese nation as a construct, as an imagined community, as Benedict Anderson1

would say, but as a reality made up of a sum of realities. These principles became
the conceptual core of the 1933-35 Portuguese Constitution, according to which the
New Portuguese State is characterised by an eminently social thought, since it has not
its basis in the individual as source of law, but directly in the Nation. Parting with the
ideas of the liberal revolution, this Constitution sees the State not as an arbitrary creation
of reason, but as the legal essence of the national community. Denouncing the
exclusively political character of 19th century demo-liberal constitutions, Salazars
Constitution builds the State on collective realities, opting for an overall vision on
family, economic, and social manifestations, in their entire huge complexity.2
Consequently, in Salazars political philosophy national politics is a key-concept resting
on the definition of the Nation as living and immortal reality, as an organic whole
made up of individuals differentiated by their aptitudes and activities. Therefore, the
premise of serving the national interest lies in the recognition of natural and social
groups (such as: family, society, professional unions, associations for ideal goals, local
autarchies) and not of political groups, organised to conquer the power and seize the
state.3 Accordingly, Salazar introduces a distinction between the natural forms of
associativity (following the family pattern) and the artificial ones (represented by
political groups).
To a large extent, the substance of Salazars corporatism was determined by the
severe economic crisis Portugal had to confront with in the first decades of the 20th
century. Between 1927 and 1928, Portugal was in full financial meltdown, with a huge
foreign debt and galloping inflation, so that the public debate in Lusitania was gravitating
around the hope that the politicians in power had placed in the idea of resorting to a
foreign loan. In this context, Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, as university professor
specialised in law and economy, launches a press campaign in the Novidades gazette,
meant to demonstrate to the Portuguese people that the solution able to avoid the
catastrophe did not reside in a foreign loan, but in each persons effort to revitalise
national economy. Salazar advocates in particular the need for all Portuguese people to
change their view on wealth and labour, emphasising the national value of small
savings for the families budgets. This being so, the professor of Coimbra does not
hesitate to criticise the rhetorical tradition of Lusitania prone rather to great deeds of
ardent patriotism, and excessive tittle-tattle than to small constant efforts to learn the
practice of saving and spending properly.4
In the debate primordialists vs. constructivists, regarding the concept of nation, Benedict Anderson
launched in 1991 the formula Imagined Communities that defined the nation as an imaginary political
community and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign. Cf. Benedict ANDERSON, Comuniti
imaginate. Reflecii asupra originii i rspndirii naionalismului, trans. Roxana Oltean and Ioana Potrache, Integral,
Bucureti, 2000, pp. 7-8.
2 Oliveira SALAZAR, Doctrina i organizarea revoluiei portugheze, Editura Ziarului Universul, Bucureti, 1939, pp.
37-38.
3 Antonio FERRO, Salazar. Le Portugal et son chef, trans. Fernando de Castro, Editions Bernard Grasset 61,
Paris, 1934, pp. 39-40.
4 Mircea ELIADE, Salazar i revoluia n Portugalia, Scara, Bucureti, 2002, pp. 143-145.
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Salazar pinpoints the cause of his countrys catastrophic budget deficits which,
says he, resides not in her being poorly administered, but in a false conception on life
and the world. Once the diagnosis found, the therapy has to start from a number of
principles such as: common sense, simplicity, saving as fundamental values of
economy which should be reintegrated in an organic system of spiritual values. These
ideas will be the pivotal elements of the political programme assumed by Salazar, this
time as prime minister, in a speech delivered on March 16, 1933, in which he proposes to
the Portuguese to redefine the concepts of wealth and labour. In Salazars opinion,
these two notions have been corrupted by the modern revolutionary spirit which has
turned upside down the meaning and raison dtre of wealth and labour as support of
human dignity. By regarding the individual as an autonomous value, the unlimited
accumulation of goods without any social utility was sanctioned and legitimised and the
human being was climbed down from the step as organic element of a community to the
status of mere producing machine. The first reality attacked by this tainting of the
notions of labour and individual worker was the family itself. The unwavering
completeness represented by the husband, wife and children, endowed with its own
dynamics and the right to dignity, was no longer considered as such, but was dissolved in
individual labour forces, ignoring the organic interdependence between them. That is
why to Salazars mind the financial rebalancing of his country and getting budget
surpluses should commence with the overall reorganisation of Portuguese economic life,
the restoration of the authentic spiritual significance of work and production and with
the viewing of the family as the foundation of national life.1
Therefore, the meaning given by Salazar, ever since 1930, to the concept of
national revolution rests in the first place on the restoration of the notion of family, in
direct opposition to 19th century political liberalism which privileged the citizen,
understood as an individual detached from his family, class, profession, cultural
background and invested with the right to intervene in the governance of the State.
However, the liberal citizen, argues Salazar, is but an abstraction, while the true reality is
the family, irreducible social cell, the original nucleus of the hamlet, of the municipality
and therefore of the nation. This being so, it is clear that the individual can be creative
but in the family and professional associations. Thus, the assertion of the dichotomy
individualist fiction vs. reality of the family is the philosophical premise of Salazars
corporatism as foundation of the New State, built on the substitution of the partisan
fiction with the reality of associativity. Virulent critic of parliamentarism (on the
ground of its catastrophic effects on Portuguese political life), Salazar seeks to safeguard
the legitimacy of the representative system centring it on the coordinates of associativity
on family and professional criteria, instead of partisan criteria. In Salazars political
philosophy, materialised in the 1933 Constitution, the social and corporate state should
reflect the natural constitution of society. Thus, the supreme bodies of the state (as an
expression of an authentic representative system) should be the emanation of the true
constituting organisms of the nation: families, hamlets, municipalities, corporations as
Idem, pp. 152-153.
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concrete expressions of associativity, wherein all the citizens are comprised with all their
fundamental legal liberties.1
Proponent of the idea of the primacy of the spiritual, Salazar believes that
social life has a sacred dimension that should be carried into effect. Hence, according to
Salazars viewpoint, in order to be efficient and useful to his nation, a politician should
first and foremost be aware of his pedagogic and spiritual mission which should be
in tune with his various other competencies. In this respect, the revolutionary dimension
of Salazars Constitution consists in his struggle to restore a tradition which had been
replaced by the 19th century Portuguese liberal elite with a modern and antichristian
perspective. Speaking with the authority of an economist who had succeeded, after only
one year tenure as minister of the Finances, to balance the state budget, Salazar explains
to all his compatriots that the inefficiency of liberal and socialist ideologies is caused
by the fact that they are grounded on the concept of individual, i.e. an abstraction,
neglecting natural bonds in society2. In contraposition to these inefficient ideologies,
Salazar places the fruitfulness of a policy based on the concept of family as an
indissoluble element of society3, as elementary cell of collective life4. Understanding
the state as thought in action and as a participant in the absolute, Salazars political
philosophy posits a return to the organic units of national life, namely the family and
the guilds, and their integration into a comprehensive Christian vision.5 By assuming the
notion of family as Archimedean point of his political philosophy, Salazar succeeds to
overcome one of the main causes of modern Portugals scission, that is to say the
conflict between monarchists and republicans. Although his Christian and
traditionalist sensibility made him take a liking to the idea of monarchy, however, Salazar
avoided any political regime fetishism. Envisaging the nation as a large family, what really
mattered to him was the union of the Portuguese family. As such, if this union had
had been injured or jeopardised by the attempt of restoring the monarchy, then Salazar
would have adopted a rather antimonarchist position.6
Considering that the real revolution and reform of his country cannot be confined
only to the institutions, Salazar highlighted even before going into actual politics that
man ought to be reformed in the first instance. Thus, at a conference held on
December 1, 1909, in the Via Sacra College, the young university teacher speaks about
the primacy of moral education, making the distinction between the development of
intelligence and the acquisition of knowledge, on the one hand, and the education of
will in love of God and thy neighbour, on the other hand. The main resorts to achieve
this pedagogical work are in Salazars thought the family and the school. By pointing
out that the parents superiority as educators resides in the love they feel for their
children, which helps them know their offspring best, Salazar emphasises that education
must start in the parental home and be completed at school, in accordance with the
Idem, p. 160.
Oliveira SALAZAR, Doctrina i organizarea revoluiei portugheze, ed. Ziarului Universul, Bucureti, 1939, p. 45.
3 Mircea ELIADE, Salazar i revoluiacit., pp. 166-167.
4 Oliveira SALAZAR, Doctrinacit., p. 45.
5 Idem, p. 164.
6 Idem, p. 181.
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foundation already laid. For this good reason, Portugals future lies firstly in the hands of
the parents and is above all their work and that of the teachers, who, by virtue of this
responsibility, should work together.1 In its turn, according to Salazars Constitution, the
State has the obligation to support and guide families through welfare services and
institutions (such as economic homes affordable to workers families), programmes (e.g.
Mothers Work, an institutional interface by which Portuguese mothers are invited to
collaborate with public authorities to defend childhood and to train physically and
morally the new generations), as well as through a protective legislation (reflected in the
adequacy of taxes in accordance with the legitimate needs of the family or by fixing a
family wage). At the same time, however, the intervention of the State is clearly
stipulated and limited, which means that the state cannot substitute itself to the
initiative of families, who must protect themselves, defending their cohesion and moral
health.2 Therefore in Salazars political philosophy the family plays the role of a key
concept, full of substance, a real pivot around which the whole social and political
system of the nation is structured. When he refers to the family, Salazar has in mind in
the first instance the nuclear family, this fundamental element of society, defined by
marriage and legitimate filiation providing equal rights and liabilities to both spouses as
to the feeding, maintenance and education of their children.3 As entity sanctioned also
by civil law, the family has the right and power to dialogue with the State and local
autarchies, its voice having the effects of a real power in the state without thereby losing
any of its sovereignty of autonomous entity integrated in the nations big organism.
2. SALAZARS CRITIQUE OF TOTALITARIANISM
The anti-political (actually a critique of distorted politics that manifested as a
source of anarchy in the Lusitanian space) and anti-individualistic character of the
Constitution of Portugal during Salazars governance is perhaps likely to shock the
political sensitivities specific to the 21st century. That is why, in order to understand it,
we should take into account all the nuances of Salazars political discourse. A good and
useful exercise in this regard would be to remember the great post-war philosophical
debate between John Rawls and Michael Sandel. The former, reckoned as one of the
greatest political philosophers of the 20th century, proposed in 1971 a theory of social
equity based on the so called concepts of original position and veil of ignorance.
Essentially, Rawls believes that to build a fair society we should imagine that when
establishing the rules of the social contract we must consider the individuals as detached
from their characteristics and purposes. In response, the philosopher Michael Sandel
formulated a critique of the disembodied self, taken as a landmark by Rawlsian
deontological liberalism. For Sandel, as for other liberal communitarian philosophers
(Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor), an equitable social contract cannot be drawn unless
Idem, pp. 97-100.

Oliveira SALAZAR, Doctrinacit., p. 46.
3 Idem, pp. 45-46.
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we think of the individuals as actually rooted in their own communities. Consequently,

the private or public identity of the individual cannot be the expression of a desocialised autonomy or merely of a rational choice, but it is, in the first place, the result
of an affiliation to a historical and cultural tradition, as source of significance and value.1
Somewhat in the terms of this kind of debate, but long before it took place,
Salazar makes a critique of the fictional individual promoted by 19th century liberalism
which regarded individuals as being abstract, geometrically equal to each other and
detached from all their preexisting interests.2 In fact, argues the Portuguese philosopher
and politician, a political ideology based on fiction can offer no protection whatsoever to
the human being. That is why, in his opinion, a Constitution which recognises that the
individuals communitarian dimension is a constitutive and inalienable value of the
person is much more adequate to mans needs. Therefore, the true advocacy of the
human person can be achieved by turning to good account its associative and
communitarian dimension. From this perspective, we might consider Salazar, the
political philosopher, much closer to postwar communitarian liberalism than to interwar
fascism. Moreover, it is precisely the way Salazars political philosophy solves the
classical problem of the relationship between individual and society that is the
stumbling block for its reception phenomenon, many historians hurrying to include
Salazars period in the interwar European fascisms category.
Standing out in the middle of the fourth decade of the twentieth century, the
Salazar political momentum is obviously deeply imbued by the interwar revolutionary
ethos. Nonetheless, its originality stems precisely from its Christian and conservative
dimension which places him in a relation of dichotomy against Bolshevism and a clear
delineation relation as to fascist movements. Yet which are the resemblances and
differences between the Portuguese Estado Novo and the other right-wing political
movements of interwar Europe?
Relevant are here Salazars own comments on the quite widespread even at that
time opinion according to which the regime resulted from of the Portuguese national
revolution of May 1926 was an exact copy of Mussolinis fascism. Admitting that his
dictatorship resembles the Dukes dictatorship in some points (strengthening of the
authority, critique of certain principles of democracy, nationalist character, concern for
social order), Salazar underlines that there are other issues, at least as consistent, related
especially to the renewal processes applied which differentiate him from Mussolini.
Beyond their different ways of acting, Salazar also identifies a fundamental element
pertaining to the very nature of the political regime, which creates a gap between the two
movements of national renewal. Whilst fascist dictatorship tends toward a pagan
Caesarism, toward a new state that knows no legal or moral limits, which pursues its
goals irrespective of any obstacles, contrariwise, the new Portuguese state founds its
reforming action on certain moral limits it deems indispensable.3 It is remarkable in this
context the radiography Salazar makes to Mussolini, the politician, in an era when few
1 Ovidiu CARAIANI (coord.), Dreptate sau moralitate? O introducere n filozofia politic a lui John Rawls,
Comunicare.ro, Bucureti, 2008, pp. 204-205.
2 Antonio FERRO, Salazar. Le Portugalcit., p. 38.
3 Idem, pp. 147-148.
128
right-wing people across Europe proved capable of critically delimitate from Italian
fascism. In interwar Romania too, in right-wing cultural and political milieus, the notion
of totalitarianism was used either in a neutral manner (to describe certain contemporary
tendencies), or in a normative manner, as a reference to a desirable political reality
(which was however intended to ensure the harmony and collaboration of the creative
forces of the nation and was not deemed to be a new radical political regime based on
the usurpation of individual and collective liberties). A notable exception is the 1940
conference of Mircea Vulcanescu at the Dalles Hall, in which the negative connotations
of totalitarianism are most explicitly stated.1
In this context, in Portugal, Mussolini is labeled by Salazar as an opportunist of
the action who vacillates between the left and right depending on the context, and who
stands out against the Church and then signs the Lateran Treaty2, and shortly afterwards
bans catholic associations. Additionally, the university politician of Lisbon finds
Mussolinis political behaviour rather wavering between his relationship with the elite
whose support he cleverly gained and the street whom, from time to time, he was
compelled to befriend. And above all, warns us Salazar, let us not forget the Dukes
socialist, almost communist origins and training.3
What he stated in 1934, in the dialogue with Antonio Ferro, Salazar was to
formulate systematically in 1939, when he expounded the doctrine of the Portuguese
revolution and the contents of the Constitution derived thereof. Although clearly
stipulating the legitimate subordination of private interests to the general interest,
Salazars Constitution sketches the State not as the recipient of a monopoly power, but
as main responsible for the creation of national unity, the establishing of the Nations
legal order, and the respect of the rights and guarantees arising from morals, justice
and law to the good of individuals, families and local autarchies.4 Hence, this definition
of the concept of State corresponds to none of the forms of Caesarism, adopted more
or less overtly by other regimes erected on the ruins of liberalism. In other words,
Salazars vision on the state rests on the idea of authority and not of totalitarianism,
that totalitarianism of pagan descent, which subordinates everything, people and things,
to a national or racial particularism, considering itself an omnipotent system which
possesses in itself the beginning and the end and which monopolises all individual and
collective manifestations.5 The hints to totalitarian political pathologies such as
Bolshevism, fascism and the emerging Nazism are only too obvious. Thus, Salazars
authoritarian regime comes in opposition not only to the anticlerical revolutionary spirit
Mircea VULCNESCU, Cretinul n lumea modern (conference held at the Dalles Hall, April 7, 1940).
The Lateran Treaty was signed on February 11, 1929 by the cardinal Pietro Gaspari (on Pope Pius XIs
behalf) and the prime minister Benito Mussolini (on the behalf of the king of Italy, Victor Emanuel III).
This treaty granted the sovereignty of the Vatican as an independent and autonomous state. In 1922,
Mussolini has also concluded an alliance between the fascist movement and the catholic party Partito
Popolare Italiano.
3 Cf. idem.
4 Oliveira Salazar, Doctrina i organizarea revoluiei portugheze, Editura Ziarului Universul, Bucureti, 1939, pp. 3940.
5 Idem, p. 40.
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that had devastated Portugal in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, but
also to interwar political extremisms (both left and right-wing).
Salazars statism, placing itself at the edge of totalitarian orientations, assumes as
limit and censor the superior order of morality. That is why the States reason is not
more legitimate once he enters into conflict with the rules of morality. The
Mediterranean dimension of this type of authoritarian regime (based on a national and
Christian concept) and having at the level of morality the principle of limiting its power
lies in the opening toward the effective participation of all the organic elements of the
nation in the establishment of the States structure, respecting, at the same time, the
autonomy of each and every entity.1 Noteworthy in Salazars case is the fact that the antitotalitarian dimension of his politics resides in its very statism, based on a fair
equilibrium between authority and liberty. Perceiving this specificity, Hannah Arendt
included Salazars regime in the category of un-totalitarian dictatorships.2 According to
Arendts explanation (expounded in 1951), dictatorships are a logical development of
continental Europes multiparty system (different from the two party Anglo-Saxon
system), because it favours the emergence of a dominant party whose aim will be to seize
the state apparatus. As far as totalitarian movements are concerned (embodied by
Bolshevism and Nazism), they seek the destruction of the state and certainly not its
conquest. Confining himself to a systemic explanation, Arendt correctly distinguishes
between Salazars New State and totalitarianisms (be they left or right-wing politically
oriented), but makes no distinction between interwar Portugal and interwar Italy
(although Mussolini spoke in 1923 about stato totalitario as aim) in terms of political
regime. Or we have seen that due to its Christian and moral grounding Salazars politics
places itself from the very beginning in contradiction with Mussolinis pagan
Caesarism.
Yet the special value of Arendts intuition consists in the emphasis he lays on the
fact that totalitarian power is installed not by an exacerbation of classical political
authority, but rather by its erosion and destruction. Being the political expression of
nihilism, totalitarian power is based, in fact, on a vacuum of authority. Leonard Schapiro,
a historian of the twentieth century, underlined, and with good reason, that the term of
totalitarian state is a nonsense, since totalitarian politics, as radical anti-institutionalist
politics, is actually a regime established on the ruins of the state. That is why, the
tendency of the totalitarian leader is to substitute himself to the pillars of society, i.e. the
State and the Church, for he himself is neither State, nor Church.3 Therefore
totalitarianism proceeds to unify society, yet not by bringing together its creative entities,
but by deleting identities and by destroying institutions, through a confusion of political,
economic and hierocratic spheres, under a Caesarian-papist-Mammonist regime.4
Hence, the destructive force of totalitarianism is a consequence of its utopian attempt to
1 Idem,
p. 40.
Hannah ARENDT, Originile totalitarismului, trans Ion Dur and Mircea Ivnescu, Humanitas, Bucureti,
1994, pp. 407-408.
3 Cf. Leonard SCHAPIRO, Totalitarianism, The Pall Mall Press. London, 1972, pp. 63-71.
4 Cf. Ernest GELLNER, apud Dominique COLAS, Dicionar de gndire politic, trans. Dumitru Purnichescu,
Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2003, p. 344.
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embody a perfectly unified society wherein all conflicts will be abolished and human
aspirations fulfilled. The idea of flawless social unity and inner reunification of man
being an eschatological concept, the attempt of its implementation at the immanence
level leads unavoidably to a call for violence.1 It is precisely in this regard that Mircea
Vulcnescu also warned since 1940, more specifically on the paradoxical character of
human striving towards unity, undoubtedly legitimate in terms of aspiration, still
tending to borrow the forms of forced external authority when unity claims to be
accomplished here on earth, in which case spirituality splits from the effort toward
unity and becomes protest.2
Seen in this conceptual context, Salazars philosophy and political work, along
with their results and fundamentals (Christian perspective on society, strong yet limited
by morals State, critical demarcation from contemporary totalitarian movements, savings
as a source of economic stability and growth, preservation of the autonomy of the
traditional collective institutions of the Portuguese nation and guarantee of individual
freedoms) can hardly be labeled as expressions of right-wing extremism. It seems more
appropriate to place Salazars political philosophy (built around the constitutional reform
of 1933) in the context of the traditional philosophical debate on the relationship
between individual and community. The 1933 Portuguese Constitution suggests
corporatism as the best way to solve this relationship. It ensues thereby a pre-eminence
of the communitys rights as compared to the rights of the individual. It is, however, a
moderate collectivism which includes explicitly, as a constitutional principle, a selflimitation by assuming civil liberty and Christian morality as its supreme values. Given
these specific elements, Salazars political philosophy can be listed as criticism of the
totalitarianism that is based on the critique of democratic individualism stemming from
the Enlightenment. Besides Hannah Arendt (with her critique of modernity), another
well-known theoretic landmark in this sense is Claude Lefort who demonstrates that
totalitarianism is the result of the revolutionary intellectuals fantasies, in their attempt
to continue the Jacobins exploits of 1793. According to Lefort, during the ancien rgime,
the body politic had a real consistency, since it was made up of an infinite number of
small bodies () fitted together within a great imaginary body for which the body of the
king provided the model and the guarantee of its integrity.3 After the French Revolution
which led to the fall of the ancien rgime, the unity of the political body was replaced by
social division, meaning that there is no representation of a centre and of the contours
of society. Consequently, argues Lefort, democracy inaugurates the experience of an
ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of
course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain
latent.4 The replacement of the former organic structure of society with a fictional unity
Cf. Leszek KOLAKOWSKI, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1978, p. 523.
2 Mircea VULCNESCU, Cretinul n lumea modern (conference held at the Dalles Hall, April 7, 1940),
apud Mircea VULCNESCU, Logos i eros, Paideia, Bucureti, 1991, pp. 75-76.
3 Claude LEFORT, The Political Forms of Modern Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, edited and
introduced by John B. Thompson, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, pp. 301-303.
4 Idem, pp. 303-304.
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prepared, according to Lefort, the conditions for the imaginary space of totalitarianism.1
This type of reasoning can be also easily found in Salazars constitutional philosophy,
which is an additional argument in favour of a systematic approach of his philosophy
from the perspective of political theory.
3. RECEPTION OF SALAZARS POLITICAL MODEL
The phenomenon of the reception of Salazars political model is one of the most
complex one can imagine. Thus, the balanced descriptions (outlining the context and the
significant nuances) coexist with interpretative abuses present both among his apologists
(who believe that Salazar succeeded what Plato had failed at Syracuse) and among his
detractors (who believe that the professor at the University of Coimbra betrayed
philosophy and politics likewise). Therefore, by comparing several representative
viewpoints from both interwar and postwar periods, we can arrive at a result apt to
indicate, even if only approximately, the middle path.
Mircea Eliade portrays Salazar, after having met him in 1942, as a man with a
profound spiritual life and at the same time simple and modest, whose whole philosophy
was reduced to being a Christian and a common sense Latin, a realist in the best
Catholic tradition and with a great love of people and things.2 When reading this
description, we can agree with Florin urcanu who considers that Eliade saw in Salazar a
sort of Catholic Nae Ionescu, with a touch of sobriety who, just like the Professor of
Bucharest, addressed state affairs from the perspective of organic, natural, family,
corporate and Christian love realities.3 Furthermore, we can add that Eliade saw in
Salazar a man with an academic and ecclesiastical calling who sacrificed his peace by
dedicating himself to a national pedagogical work.4 Worthy of notice in this respect is the
way Eliade presents Salazar as overcoming his disgust for politics which he had acquired
after the first sitting in the Parliament, and accepting to respond positively to the
proposals of becoming the minister of Finances in order to save Portugals economy, but
only after having received his mothers blessing to leave for this purpose for Lisbon.5
The gesture described by Eliade is significant for Salazars view on how politics ought to
be practiced, identifying it with an almost sacramental ministration.
Whilst Eliades perspective is by and large objective and still resists as trustworthy
evidence, although clearly marked by obvious admiration and by his intention (avowed
also in his memoirs and correspondence)6 to give the Romanians a fruitful model to face
Cf. Idem, p. 306.

Mircea ELIADE, Jurnalul portughez i alte scrieri (ediie ngrijit de Sorin Alexandrescu), trans. Mihai Zamfir,
Humanitas, Bucureti, 2006, Vol. 2, p. 323.
3 Florin URCANU, Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de lhistoire, La Dcouverte, Paris, 2003, p. 323.
4 Mircea ELIADE, Salazar i revoluia n Portugaliacit., p. 147.
5 See Ibidem, pp. 113 and 134.
6 In a letter of April 26, 1942, to Constantin Noica, Eliade confesses that he wrote the book which in
manuscript form was entitled Salazar i contrarevoluia din Portugalia (Salazar and Counterrevolution in Portugal)
to come to the aid of our so tested generation, by showing that not even after the most tragic attempts a
nation has no right to despair, no matter how irreparable losses are, no matter how vast chaos is, rescue can
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face the terrors of history, in those days more questionable opinions were also
formulated. Thus, Alexandru Gregorian, for instance, who prefaced the 1939 Romanian
edition of some of Salazars writings (The Doctrine and Organisation of the Portuguese
Revolution), does not hesitate that, after having praised the Portuguese leaders
personality and corporate system implemented by him, to find similitudes between the
Lusitanian political model and the Romanian regime under Carol II, whose claimed
corporatism were based on the 1938 Constitution.1 The differences in terms of content
and consequences between the two political realities, and especially between the two
figures, appear to us now so huge and indisputable that they almost require no additional
argument. Also in the Romanian interwar period, but at a quite different level
(untouched by ideological reading), we find in the historian Gheorghe Brtianu a very
interesting perspective on Salazars model. What fascinates this liberal historian is the
great similarity between Salazars economic recovery policy and the one applied by the
Emperor of Byzantium, Nikephoros I (802-811). What likens the two men would be the
skill, courage, efficiency and the lack of compromise in administering the finances of
their respective countries. Confronted with serious financial crises, neither Nikephoros
nor Salazar, relates the chronicler, resorted to the easy solution of the inflationary
devaluation of the national currency, but resorted to a classical policy: they laid
emphasis on savings, a new distribution of taxes, an improved tax collection and a severe
punishment of tax frauds. Therefore, concludes Brtianu, we are compelled to make a
comparison between the balancing of the Byzantine Empires budget achieved by
Nikephoros through totally transparent means and the financial recovery effected in
Portugal by Mr. Antnio de Oliveira Salazar. Great admirer of the Byzantine emperors
realism, contrariwise to the dominant historiographical current, Brtianu regretfully notes
that maybe Nikephoros would have left a reputation equal to that of the wise
Portuguese dictator, had he had the opportunity to pursue his work in peace and not
with so many wars on all frontiers, which forced him to take much tougher measures and
therefore be much more unpopular.2
One of the most interesting and notorious debates about Salazars pattern
occurred in the postwar period, in the writings and correspondence of Kojeve and Leo
Strauss, two political philosophers who have left a strong imprint on this subject. In a
comment to Xenophons dialogue Hieron, entitled Tyranny and Wisdom (1950), the
Hegelian Kojeve tries to prove, following the ancient author, that a good tyranny is
possible when certain social and economic conditions are met. To support his theory,
Kojeve gives an example of good tyranny, namely Salazars political experiment. Leaving
aside the fact that it is hard to prove Salazars tyrannical dimension (even in the
Xenophonian sense), we can say that this apology does not do a great service to the
occur unexpectedly as things happened in Portugal. Cf. Mircea ELIADE, Jurnalul portughez i alte
scriericit.
1 Alexandru GREGORIAN, Portugalia salazarian, foreword at Oliveira SALAZAR, Doctrina i organizarea
revoluiei portugheze, Editura Ziarului Universul, Bucureti, 1939, pp. 7-21.
2 Cf. Gheorghe I. BRTIANU, Politica fiscal a lui Nikephoros I (802-811) sau Ubu Rege n Bizan, Studii
bizantine de istorie economic i social, trans. and foreword by Alexandru-Florian Platon, Polirom, Iai, 2003, p.
187.
133
Portuguese politician, if we think that the project in which Kojeve, the Hegelian atheist
philosopher, strongly believed, was the work of a Universal Homogenous State, as an
embodiment of good tyranny. As a matter of fact, the retort was quick to appear. Thus,
in 1959, Leo Strauss denounces the utopian dimension of Kojeves political thought. In
this respect, Strauss agrees with the positive description of the outcomes of Salazars
policy, but believes, contrarily to Kojeve, that Salazar is rather an exception than the
illustration of a rule. At the same time, Strauss states that Salazars regime should be
defined rather as post-constitutional than as a tyrannical one.1 Relevantly, other
theorists have pointed out that the phenomenon that urged many European monarchies
and republics to adopt authoritarian regimes after 1918, leaving the impression of a
Europe of dictators, should not be dealt with by hastily sticking a general label on it. It
would be much more appropriate to establish certain criteria when it comes to
comparing dictatorships, in other words to see which of them preserve the features of
the ancient concept, and which of them correspond to a different reality, a radically
different one, implying therefore a definition with other concepts.2
However, in what could be called the main stream political science, Salazars
regime is described as being, through its authoritarianism, opposed to the so-called
Mediterranean model, based on democracy and economic liberalism.3 By fathoming
the way in which, in fact, the regime of the Portuguese New State preserved and
cultivated civil liberties and revitalised national economy through the latters own resorts
(including by encouraging private initiative), we might be led to reconsider the not
sufficiently proven antagonism between Salazars political model and the Mediterranean
one.
Leo STRAUSS, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp.
107-118.
2 Cf. Hans MAIER (ed.), Totalitarianism and Political Religions, Vol. I (Concepts for the comparison of dictatorships),
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2004, pp. 200- 201.
3 An interesting yet disputed theory on this matter can be found in Vesna PUSIC, Modelul mediteranean i
sfritul regimurilor autoritare, Polis. Revist de tiine politice, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000, pp. 21-22.
1
134
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STRAUSS, Leo, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, The University of Chicago
Press, 1988.
URCANU, Florin, Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de lhistoire, La Dcouverte, Paris, 2003.
VULCNESCU, Mircea, Cretinul n lumea modern, Logos i eros, Paideia, Bucureti,
1991.
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ESSAY
Notes and Proposals Regarding the Changes and Amendments to
the Romanian Constitution 2013
Silviu Gabriel BARBU
University of Transilvania, Braov
Nasty Marian VLDOIU
Marian DRILEA-MARGA
Oana ARAMET
Gabriela Nicoleta CHIHAIA

First Instance Court, Galai
Lorena EPURE
Ramona COZMA
Association of Lawyers from Braov
Alexandra ARZOIU
Legal Counsel
Legal adviser
Alexandru Silviu GOGA
Legal Counsel, The Order of Legal

Counselors from Romania, Braov Branch
Abstract: The following proposals are but a small part of those that were made in several
stages during the year 2013, first in the Forum1 coordinated by the Association
ProDemocraia (NGO) then on the text proposed/ adopted as amendments by the
parliamentary committee established to review Romanias Constitution in the spring of
2013, including the proposals and comments made by the Romanian Ministry of Justice.
The texts capitalize largely on the case law of the Constitutional Court, the European
Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and legal doctrine, especially the
recent constitutional doctrine of Romania and other European countries. Also, we the
authors have used the relevant jurisprudence of the courts in Romania, proving also their
personal toll by professional experience in the legal field and by academic experience. The
team of authors consists of a larger group based at the Faculty of Law, part of the
University of Transylvania from Braov.
Keywords: Constitution, constitutional reform, legal doctrine.
More information about the forum and all the texts and proposals presented in a report can be found at the
following address: [http://forumconstitutional2013.ro/].
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1. A SHORT HISTORY OF OUR PRESENT CONSTITUTION

First of all, we believe it is important to give a clear definition of a Constitution. A
Constitution is a set of fundamental principles or established precedents according to
which a state or other organization is governed.
We can concur that these rules together make up, i.e. constitute, what the entity is.
When these principles are written down into a single document or set of legal
documents, those documents may be said to embody a written Constitution; if they are
written down in a single comprehensive document, it is said to embody a codified
Constitution.
It is a known fact that within states, whether sovereign or federated, a
Constitution defines the principles upon which the state is based, the procedure in which
laws are made and by whom. Some Constitutions, especially codified Constitutions, also
act as limiters of state power, by establishing lines which a states rulers cannot cross,
such as fundamental rights.
Constitutions usually explicitly divide power between various branches of
government. The standard model, described by the Baron de Montesquieu1, involves
three branches of government: executive, legislative and judicial.
Most commonly, the term Constitution refers to a set of rules and principles that
define the nature and extent of government. During our research we have noticed that
most Constitutions seek to regulate the relationship between institutions of the state, in a
basic sense the relationship between the executive, legislature and the judiciary, but also
the relationship of institutions within those branches. For example, executive branches
can be divided into a head of government, government departments/ministries,
executive agencies and a civil service/administration. Also we have noted that most
Constitutions attempt to define the relationship between individuals and the state, and to
establish the broad rights of individual citizens. It is thus the most basic law of a territory
from which all the other laws and rules are hierarchically derived; in some territories it is
in fact called Basic Law.
The 1991 Constitution of Romania was adopted on 21 November 1991. It was
approved in a referendum on 8 December and introduced on the same day. It remains
the current fundamental law that establishes the structure of the government of
Romania, the rights and obligations of the countrys citizens, and its mode of passing
laws. It stands as the basis of the legitimacy of the Romanian government.
The Constitution was most recently revised by a referendum on 18 October 2003.
The revised text took effect on 29 October 2003.
The 1991 Constitution enshrined the return to democracy after the fall of the
Communist regime. The draft was composed by a committee of parliamentarians and
constitutional law specialists; was approved by Parliament, meeting as a Constituent
Assembly, by a vote of 414 to 95 on 21 November 1991, being published in Monitorul
We recommend further reading on the Spirit of Laws, the first work to mention the separation of powers.
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Oficial1 the same day; and was approved by referendum on 8 December 1991, with 77.3%
voting in favour. The 1991 Constitution contained 7 titles and 152 articles. Romania is
defined as a national, sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state. The form
of government is the republic, the president having up to two four-year terms. He
represents the Romanian state in domestic and foreign relations, ensures obedience to
the Constitution and the proper functioning of state institutions, and is the guarantor of
the states independence, unity and integrity.
The Parliament is the supreme representative organ of the Romanian people and
the sole lawmaking authority; it is bicameral (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) and
elected for four years. After the prime minister is named by the president, Parliament
validates the composition and programme of the Government and can dismiss it
following a motion of censure. The constitution provides for fundamental civic rights
and freedoms, and creates the office of Romanian Ombudsman2 to ensure these are
respected.
The 1991 Constitution has been amended one time, in 2003.3 Articles were
introduced on Integration into the European Union and NATO Accession, bringing
the total to 156 in 8 titles. These specified that both could take place by parliamentary
vote alone, and that EU citizens living in Romania can vote and run in local elections.
The Constitution after the revision in 2003 grants minorities the right to use their
native language when dealing with local administration and the courts, improves the
functioning of the legislative chambers (better specifying their attributes) and restricts the
privilege of parliamentary immunity to political declarations, extends the presidents term
to five years, explicitly guarantees rather than protects the right to private property
and removes the constitutional obligation for conscription (which ended in 2006).
The revised document was adopted by referendum on 1819 October 2003;
turnout was slightly above the 50%+1 threshold needed for it to be valid, with 55.7% of
The equivalent of the Official Journal of the UE is the national publication in which all laws, regulations and
other important documents are printed to be made known and put into effect by the general population.
2 An ombudsman usually appointed by the government or by parliament but with a significant degree of
independence, who is charged with representing the interests of the public by investigating and addressing
complaints of maladministration or violation of rights. The Romanian Ombudsman (Avocatul Poporului in
Romanian, literally meaning Peoples Advocate) is an independent institution of the Government of
Romania, responsible for investigating and addressing complaints made by citizens against other government
institutions. The Romanian Ombudsman was established in 1991 after the ratification of the countrys first
post-communist Constitution. Initially, the ombudsman was appointed by the Senate for a four-year term.
After the Constitutional Amendment of 2003, the ombudsman is appointed for a term of five years, by both
chambers of parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and Senate), to which it reports every year or at their
request. The ombudsman is not allowed to hold any other public or private function, aside from teaching in
a tertiary education institution. The ombudsman is aided by a number of assistants (adjunci) specialised in
legal domains such as womens rights, minority rights, childrens rights, police issues, property, industrial
relations and taxation.
3 The Constitution of Romania of 1991 was amended and completed by the Law No. 429/2003 on the
revision of the Constitution of Romania, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No. 758 of 29
October 2003, republished by the Legislative Council on the grounds of article 152 of the Constitution, with
the updated denominations and the renumbered texts (Article 152 became, in the republished form, Article
156).
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17,842,103 eligible voters showing up. The opposition and NGOs alleged serious
irregularities. 89.70% voted yes and 8.81%, no. It came into force ten days later.
2. SOME DESIRED NEW AMENDMENTS
The main amendments to the Constitution as presented by the Parliamentary
committee in the spring of 2013 are as follows:
1. Romania acknowledges the historic role in the establishment of the Romanian
state of the Royal Family, the Orthodox Church and of the other religious cults.
2. The mandate of a Deputy or Senator shall cease on the date of his/her
resignation from the political party or political entity that got him elected or upon joining
another party.
3. The Constitutional Court judges will be entitled to rule on the parliaments
decisions or on matters concerning our position within the European Union.
4. The legal representatives of national minorities may set up their own decision
making and executive bodies with competencies regarding the right to preserve, develop
and express their identity. National minorities can freely use in their public or private
spaces national symbols representing their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious
identity.
5. The Government appoints in the territorial administrative units prefects1 and
sub-prefects, under the law.
6. Romanias flag is the tricolor flag with the coat of arms on the yellow
background, the colors are arranged vertically in the following order from the flagpole:
blue, yellow, red.2
7. No means of mass communication can be suspended or suppressed.
8. Mass media communications have an obligation to publicly declare their
sources of funding and their ownership structure. The declaration procedure shall be
provided by the law.
9. The family is based on the freely consented marriage between a man and a
woman, on their equality and the right and duty of parents to ensure the upbringing,
education and training of children.
Following the Romanian Revolution of 1989, a 1990 law brought back the prefecture as an organ of state
administration with general competences, composed of one prefect, two deputy prefects, one secretary and
seven members. The law specified how the institution should be organised as well as its attributes. The office
one that represented the Government locally and headed devolved public services of ministries and other
agencies was enshrined in the Constitution passed by referendum in December 1991, as well as by a law
that year and in 2001. Further legislative reform began with the 2004 Law on the Prefect.
2 The national flag of Romania (Romanian: Drapelul Romniei) is a tricolour with vertical stripes: beginning
from the flagpole, blue, yellow and red. It has a width-length ratio of 2:3. The Constitution of Romania
currently provides that The flag of Romania is tricolour; the colors are arranged vertically in the following
order from the flagpole: blue, yellow, red. The proportions, shades of color as well as the flag protocol were
established by law in 1994 and extended in 2001.
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3. OUR PROPOSALS
Firstly we consider it necessary to introduce human dignity as one of the
provisions of the Constitution (this is one of the amendments proposed in the
parliamentary group). In art. 1 paragraph. 1, the following text should be introduced:
the source of all human dignity and fundamental rights is inviolable. All forms of
public authority must respect and protect human dignity.1
Human dignity is expressly mentioned in several fundamental laws established
democracies such as Spain (article 10, paragraph 1), Germany (article 1, paragraph 1),
Japan (article 13), Italy (art. 3). The use of this term is very useful; it is not superfluous
and will add more content Constitution, meaning the explicit protection of fundamental
values inherent to human beings.
We also proposes to amend paragraph 4 of article 21, such as: special
administrative jurisdictions are free. Under the current text special administrative
jurisdictions are optional and free of charge. According to the Decision no. 148/2003
on the constitutionality of the legislative proposal to revise the Constitution stipulates
that access to justice, according to art. 21 can not be subject to a voluntary or
compulsory administrative jurisdiction, meaning on which the Constitutional Court ruled
in several decisions.2
We believe, however, that giving up the term voluntary leads, in fact, to major
obstacles to access to justice, blocking/ stopping the settlement of disputes, as a rule, to
the administrative jurisdiction in situations (many, thinking through the text proposed by
the committee) in which the legislator will opt for arbitration rule. In all international
regulations and in the overwhelming majority of Constitutions, it talks about the
entitlement to judge or right of access to justice as the essence of the essence of
constitutional democracy and separation of powers. The current text of the Constitution
is superior and provides many more guarantees for citizens.
We appreciate to have to drop the amendment, with obvious negative
consequences for the right to access to justice.
Regarding Article 23 on individual freedom, we propose the existence of a third
paragraph: Detention may not exceed 24 hours.3
The proposed wording: Detention ordered by a judicial body with powers of
criminal investigation may not exceed 24 hours.
Prosecutors may order provisional deprivation of liberty of a person suspected or
accused for a period not exceeding 72 hours, for good reasons, and only in cases
specifically provided by law. Against this measure taken by the prosecutor, the defendant
We recommend further reading on this matter new to our Constitution in the paper The Concept of
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse published by David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein, at Kluwer
Law International, The Hague.
2 For further information on this matter, we believe one should addres the work of Marian NSTASE
GEORGESCU, Simona Theodora Livia MIHILESCU, Drept Constituional i instituii politice. Curs Universitar,
Universul Juridic, Bucureti, 2011.
3 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituional i instutuii politice (Ediia 13, Vol. I),
Editura C.H. Beck, Bucureti 2008, pp. 158, 165.
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may file a complaint with the court. Emergency complaints will be judged by the court
judge empowered to hear the case in the first instance.
Arguments. Maintaining the maximum duration of detention to 24 hours is a
normal recognition of the historical efforts to conquer strong safeguards to protect
individual liberty against the abuses of executive power. The criminal investigation,
police first, is the armed force of the Executive, and can be assimilated in critical
situations, with an effective and brutal repression. For practical reasons, for a period of
24 hours of detention we give the power of criminal investigation without the
supervision of the prosecutor, that can ensure the guarantees necessary for the legality of
the measure. But a greater deprivation of liberty during prosecution can be accepted only
if it is placed directly under the responsibility of the prosecutor, for whose independence
there are several constitutional guarantees. To meet the requirements of Article 5 of the
ECHR and the case law of the European Court, it is necessary to establish a mechanism
of judicial control, that must operate and be controlled, in fact, to be able to censure an
arrest made in the case ordered by the police but not approved by a prosecutor.
Objectives. Dynamics during criminal proceedings, adapting to the realities of
contemporary criminological theories, should provide stronger state reactions to crime
that is more organized terrorism, but should be balanced due to the respect to individual
freedom as a fundamental right. The prosecution and the court in a criminal trial, are
required to ensure that the suspected or accused person receives effective defense, and
he is appointed a lawyer to provide legal assistance. Thru such a Constitutional warranty
beyond the formal character of the right to defense in criminal cases, switching to a
pragmatic approach we ensure the active involvement of the competent judicial authority
in the protection of the right of defense of the accused. This is in full compliance with
the ECHR jurisprudence in this matter. Often in practice the judiciary process is
exercised or formally devoid of content, so defending suspected or accused persons
might seem an illusory activity, only formal. An explicit constitutional guarantee will
compel the judiciary to be more careful, more cautious regarding the management of
criminal cases.
In Article 251, we propose a new third paragraph:
In urgent cases, the prosecutor may limit the free movement of people on its own
motion or at the request of an interested party, by resolution with a reason. Through
such a constitutional guarantee we go beyond the formal character of protecting the right
to free movement, ensuring judicial review of measures that restrict this right (freedom)
fundamental. Ensuring effective protection of the right to freedom of movement, and
judicial review of any interference and its limitations imposed by the representatives of
the executive authorities of the state. Another solution for improved drafting of Article
25 on freedom of movement would be to adapt the provisions contained in Article 27.2
(1) The right of free movement within the national territory and abroad is guaranteed. The law shall lay
down the conditions for the exercise of this right.
(2) Every citizen is guaranteed the right to establish his domicile or residence anywhere in the country, to
emigrate, and to return to his country.
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the specific exceptions to inviolability of the home, noting, however, that only a judge
may limit the free movement through reasoned decision, as provided by law.
For article 261, we propose the introduction of new paragraphs with
effective protection safeguards against inviolability.
Paragraph 3) Measures to limit the interference with intimate, family and private
dealings of individuals by public authorities will be subject to the court within three days
from the date they were taken.
Paragraph 4) Any interference with private life, family and private dealings
which are used in a criminal trial can be made by judge and ordered by a motivated
decision and as exceptional emergency measure it may be ordered by a prosecutor thru a
reasoned resolution.
Paragraph 5) The State shall take measures to protect the privacy, family and
private dealing of a person against arbitrary and unlawful action of any other natural or
legal persons.
Through such a constitutional guarantee we ensure greater protection than the formal
character of the right to privacy, family and private dealings, ensuring judicial review of
measures taken by public authorities, both in criminal cases and beyond. Such
constitutional guarantee is likely to drastically reduce arbitrariness in the taking of any
measures of interfere in privacy, family and private life of the person.2 The state must
ensure appropriate conditions for the normal development of relations within the family,
the community, to protect people against all forms of abuse and interference exerted by
third parties, to provide necessary and effective guardianship whenever the security, or
the life is in danger or the health of a person, including the factors of aggression are
performed by other natural or legal entities. We want to create better constitutional
mechanisms to protect persons, intimate and private life, including family life, protection
of vulnerable persons from other individuals. Constitutional guarantees are very diffuse,
unclear in the current regulation in force.
For Article 283, we envision the introduction of new paragraphs with effective
protection safeguards for inviolability of correspondence.
Paragraph 3) Measures to limit or interfere with the secrecy of correspondence
of people must have a court reasoned ruling.
Paragraph 4) In urgent cases, the secrecy of correspondence can be taken by a
resolution issued by the prosecutor reasoned, for a period longer than 3 days.
Paragraph 5) The interception, letters, telegrams and other postal transmissions
and by any other means of communication may be imposed for a maximum period of 30
days and be extended for good reasons, the closing date of the court, without total
extensions exceeding 180 days.
(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life.
(2) Any natural person has the right to freely dispose of himself unless by this he infringes on the rights and
freedoms of others, on public order or morals.
2 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituional...cit., p. 168
3 Secrecy of the letters, telegrams and other postal communications, of telephone conversations, and of any
other legal means of communication is inviolable.
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Paragraph 6) The maximum violation of judicial measures the correspondence

can be more than 12 months in the case of prosecution for offenses relating to national
security and international terrorism.
Paragraph 7) The violation made by judicial bodies that requested the
correspondence must, be given a solution to proceed to judgment, to notify the person
whose correspondence was intercepted on the extent to which the correlation between
the order and the result to return all correspondence withheld.
Paragraph 8) All public employment agencies, the prosecutors and judges who
become aware of the content of the intercepted correspondence have an obligation of
professional secrecy.
Through such a constitutional guarantee of protection we go beyond the
perfunctory secrecy of correspondence, ensuring judicial control over the interference
measures ordered by the court, both in criminal cases and beyond, even in the
preliminary stages. Such constitutional guarantee is likely to require the legislature to
adopt procedural rules that are very precise and rigorous in this area, thus ending some
possible abuses of public labor agencies.1 The creation of an effective constitutional
mechanism to protect the secrecy of correspondence persons, will practically have now a
clear constitutional guarantee different than the regulation in force.
On Chapter VI. Judicial Authority we have made many proposals but some
of more importance are as follows:
The proposed wording
Section 1 - The judiciary
Paradoxically, in Title III, Chapter VI, Section 1, although it is obviously
dedicated to the Judiciary, this expression is not found. However, in article 1 the
constituent used explicitly in paragraph 4, the name of the judiciary. For symmetry, we
want to use these expressions in the title of Section 1, as long as this section contains the
constitutional rules governing the organization and functioning of the judiciary. Also, the
planning reasons for a correct and appropriate use of constitutional legal language, seeing
that we have a similar marginal title in Courts of law, article 126, Section 1 this last
section would be useful to bear another name, a generic name for the material they
cover, namely the judiciary.
Providing an explicit constitutional language and illuminating, clearly defining
the judicial power to the judiciary and to other public authorities.2
Article 130 Judicial police/Police in the courts3
We believe we should insert a new paragraph:
Paragraph 2) The Minister of Justice organizes the judicial police.
Constitutional rule of article 130 has not been, in fact, put in practice, in order to ensure
specialized police authorities for court activity with specificity to the proceedings in
court. Clear constitutional mechanisms have to be enacted for administrative and police
Marian Nstase GEORGESCU, Simona Theodora Livia MIHILESCU, Drept Constituional...cit., p. 163.
Ibidem, p. 304.
3 The current wording of the article is: Courts of law shall have police forces at their disposal.
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component of hearings necessary to ensure peace and order in the administration of

justice, crime, administer fines to the audience and measures to restore public order
operatively and effectively. Finally, the current form of organization, security forces
courts is provided by gendarmes, whose functional subordination is outside the judiciary,
so that the heads of courts are unable or do not have legal means to implement concrete
measures to improve the flow and rules of security and public order in the court
premises as the concrete situation of the court that everyone leads, but implementing
standardized plans imposed by the National Gendarmerie, often are inarticulated as
ground realities.1
Article 131 Introduction of a new paragraph2:
Paragraph 4) The Minister of Justice, with the Minister of Internal Affairs, after
consultation with the General Prosecutors Office attached to the High Court of
Cassation and Justice, organises Marshals. This organization will have directly
subordinated a judicial police and prosecutors will be cleared with the concernes on the
agenda of many public debates on the proper functioning of judicial activities. As long as
the Minister of Justice is the highest public office under the authority which operates
with prosecutors, according to Article 132 paragraph 1 of the Constitution (the text
should remain unchanged, as prosecutors can not be irremovable, and their
independence stops hierarchical control is evident that all the Minister of Justice is the
one who must ensure the organization of the judicial police, at least the necessary judicial
police to carry out the criminal prosecutors orders, or for cases of great difficulty, like
organized crime, complex cases corruption, other complex cases where the prosecutors
role in coordinating the work of criminal investigation, prosecution direct management is
more pronounced.
The Minister of Justice shall, through tutelage overview of the aforementioned
Police of the Courts, should provide equidistant treatment to the professional status of
these categories of officers, so their progress is assessed objectively, free from all forms
of interpersonal or group baffling arising from the interaction direct daily between
prosecutors and police. On the other hand, the anchoring duties of the Minister of
Justice in the management of this organization and its functioning judicial police, ensure
a better interconnection of the two categories of professional bodies - police,
prosecutors, without any of them to be led with partisanship as its representative at the
highest peak, the justice minister will be neither a policeman active, nor the prosecutor in
the activity. Unlike the profile of the Interior minister, as history has shown in recent
years in Romanian politics is usually predominantly political rather than technical, the
The special law is Decision no. 593 of 2 November 1993 of the Romanian Government on measures to
ensure police courts and prosecutors offices, the security of their premises, and the protection of
magistrates.
2 The present article consists of only the following 3 paragraphs: (1) Within the judicial activity, the Public
Ministry shall represent the general interests of the society, and defend legal order, as well as the citizens
rights and freedoms. (2) The Public Ministry shall discharge its powers through public prosecutors,
constituted into public prosecutors offices, in accordance with the law. (3) The public prosecutors offices
attached to courts of law shall direct and supervise the criminal investigation activity of the police, according
to the law.
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profile of the persons appointed Minister of Justice was every on technical legal terms,
the selection being made out of former judges, lawyers, professors of legal education,
lawyers with extensive professional experience in the judiciary and connected with it. As
such, these best practices, a shift of the center of gravity of Criminal Police organization
subordinated to the Minister of Justice would ensure more professionalism in the
management of macro ministerial organization and functioning of the judicial structures.
Organization of the Police of the Courts serving only the prosecutor, the entire
apparatus for carrying out activities related to judicial (forensic investigation, criminal
investigation itself, its own system of witness protection, protection of other parties in
criminal proceedings, with specializations in the key areas of crime within the jurisdiction
of the prosecutors own criminal - offenses against life, corruption crimes, organized
crime, the vast economic and financial crime, forensic department and special operations
typical for these types of investigations. Existence of the police for organized crime in
the Romanian Police is not excluded, on the contrary it would be the best organization
to cover all levels and areas of Romanian society, from everyday crime, lower gravity in
principle, up to crime in its most complex form, more serious. Police of the Courts in
the Interior Ministry still finds important role especially since the majority of offenses
under the Penal Code and special penal laws, respectively before other legislation (like
Forest Code, road, customs code, tax code, tax procedure code, etc.) is not the direct
responsibility of the prosecutor for prosecution.
It should be noted that, in terms of the theory of constitutional law, the Public
Ministry can not be raised to the fourth power in the state, because this model is typical
of the communist system and the repressive state apparatus, which provides, in essence,
conducting investigations and prosecution in criminal proceedings, shall be under the
authority of one of the three traditional powers executive, legislative or judicial, and
Romanian Constituent chosen operation in 1991, mixed legal executive and judiciary
is the best solution that responds the more demanding theoretical / doctrinal and
practical, and requirements arising from the ECHR.
The Council of Magistrates
Section Title 3 The Council of Magistrates must be changed in the event there will be
the option for separate supreme judicial council for judges and prosecutors, similar to
the French model.1
The new name of Section 3:
High Judicial Council.
Section title for the High Council of Judges shall be consistent with the new
normative content of this section.
Ensuring a fair constitutional language, adapted to the legal rules are presented
in section concerned.
For more information on Judicial Councils, please consult the following work: Consiliile judiciare n
Europa, coauthored with Alexandru Goga, published in the scientific volum Justiie, stat de drept i cultur
juridic (from the 13th of May 2011, presented at the Institute of Juridical Research Acad. Andrei Rdulescu
of the Romanian Academy) , ISBN 978-973-127-618-2.
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Article 133 Role and structure of the current formulation of the Supreme
Council of Judges.
Reformulating the entire article with the new name, the Superior Council of
Judges, Changing the composition of the High Council of Judges and term of office of
its members.
Paragraph 1) High Judicial council shall guarantee the independence of the
judiciary.
Paragraph 2) High Judicial Council consists of 17 members, of which:
a) nine judges elected by the general meeting of the court, the degrees of
jurisdiction of the courts, as follows:
2 judges from High Court of Cassation and Justice, the judges should have at
least 2 years experience in this instance;
3 judges representing the courts of appeal, with at least 3 years old to those
courts;
3 judges from the lower courts and specialized courts with experience of at least
3 years in these courts;
One judge of the judges with at least 8 years of age in the magistracy;
b) 1 prosecutor of at least 15 years of experience in magistracy elected by the
general meeting of prosecutors from the Prosecutor of the High Court of
Cassation and Justice and prosecutors offices attached to courts of appeal
c) 1 senior lawyer of at least 15 years of experience in the legal field and
minimum 5 years in the profession, elected by the Senate from among the
candidates proposed by United Associated of Lawyers Bars;
d) 1 notary of at least 15 years of experience in the legal field and minimum 5
years in the profession of notary, elected by the Senate from among the
candidates proposed by National Union of Public Notaries;
e) one legal counsel selected by the Order of the Legal Counsel with at least 15
years of experience in the legal field and at least 5 years as a Legal Council;
f) 2 legal science teachers legal of at least 15 years of experience of legal and
academic rank of associate (confereniar) get elected and another one nominated
by the Minister of education from the candidates proposed by the Councils of
Law faculties accredited by law.
g) The Minister of Justice and President of HCCJ are members by right of the
Council.
2) The members of the High Judicial Council have a 4 years mandate except as
members of the Council, other members can not perform two consecutive
elected terms.
3) The President of the High Judicial Council is elected for a term of one year
which may be renewed by the general meetings of elected judges of the courts.
4) The Superior Council of Judges vote shall be taken, usually by secret ballot.
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5) The President of Romania and the Prime Minister can participate in the High
Judicial Council, in order to address messages without the right to vote in its
proceedings.
6) The Superior Council of Judges decisions are final, except in disciplinary
matters.
7) The provisions of Article 126 paragraph 6) of the Constitution shall apply
accordingly to acts of the Council, regarding the relations with Parliament.
Justification
We are rethinking the structure of the SCM1 transformation in two separate
judicial councils, one for judges and one for prosecutors, with central roles in the proper
functioning of the judiciary and career of judges - Supreme Council of Judges, and the
proper functioning of the Public Ministry and prosecutors career with the Council
Superior Prosecutors. The term of office of a member of the CSM to date of 6 years is
too long and at some point de-motivating, bringing numerous accumulations of
prejudices and perceptions, which can hijack the original intentions of the candidates
which is less beneficial for judiciary. On the other hand, by symmetry with legislative
power2, where mandates are elected for 4 years, it would be necessary that the
representatives of the judiciary in the administrative supreme forums have warrants with
the same duration. The establishment of a judicial council exclusively for the Judiciary,
which is concerned only with proper organization and functioning of the judiciary,
judges career with a rational component and judiciously balanced in line with the
decisions of the Constitutional Court, with a majority of that body Judges represented in
this forum, to ensure effectively the Superior Council of Judges of the independence of
the judiciary. On the other hand, in a large and active presence of other legal
professionals and civil society representatives recruited from among the most valuable
professionals and theorists of law, ensure the presence of credible and professional
voices in the Council which will generate the necessary pressure on the justice system so
that it is properly connected to the socio-historical and legal realities of Romania, in the
context of supranational justice operated in Romania.
Article 134 The wording of the current constitutional text
It is necessary to replace the old name proposed SCM with the Superior Council
of Judges.
Paragraph 1 par. 1) High Judicial Council holds records for career judges,
validates exams, the senior appointment of judges, takes action, together with the
Ministry of Justice to ensure, if necessary, the protection of judges, makes requests to the
authorities competent to provide the resources necessary for the proper functioning of
On more information about the current state of affairs at SCM one can consult its website
[http://www.csm1909.ro/csm/index.php?lb=en].
2 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituional...cit., Vol. 2, p. 274
1
147
the courts and the public service of justice, ensures respect for the independence and
security of judges.
Paragraph 1 par. 2) The Superior Council of Judges handles the transfer requests
of prosecutors and judges and approves such requests of prosecutors to be promoted in
the office of judge.
Paragraph 1 par. 3) The Supreme Council of Judges supervises the promotion of
judges from other courts, approves request for judges to aid other public authorities,
including public offices, under the law, approves requests for suspension of office. In the
second Paragraph , the last sentence should be deleted, the text that prevents vote as
members of the Superior Council of Judges.
Paragraph 3 reads: The Superior Council of Judges in disciplinary matters and all
decisions relating directly or indirectly career of judges may be appealed to the High
Court of Cassation and Justice. The other Board decisions are subject to administrative
law laid down by special law. Paragraph 6 of Article 126 of the Constitution shall apply
accordingly.
Justification
We should consider the suggestions we recently received from the members of
the Venice Commission, which stressed that a worsening of magistrates liability for
anything other than serious forms of error and bad faith would lead to legal norms
(constitutional) leaving of the rules, the regulations governing the performance of judges
and prosecutors, that would lead to exaggerated shyness of the exercise of functions
by judges and prosecutors. Moreover, a more aggressive approach on magistrate liability,
as noted in some of the proposals would mean that for any judgment that would be
changed in remedies, the judge or judges of the lower courts should be punished both
disciplinary and asked to answer with material means, which is absurd! Nowhere in any
civilized democratic state that happens! Similarly, if prosecutors would mean that for an
acquittal, it is presumed that the prosecutor is guilty and on a disciplinary point of view
he or she should answer also materially. It is also absurd. A judge is usually very careful
on a case. Now we have a very functional Judicial Inspection that has a comprehensive
mechanism that has all the legal and operational instruments to professionally solve such
questions, and we can use the current constitutional safeguards without worsening the
liability magistrates to an absurd level.
Judges, prosecutors, courts and prosecutors offices do not want any other
authority, institution or individual, to have at hand a means to direct public perception
and influence reactions to the solutions given by the judicial bodies. Institutional
discretion is one of the rules of justice throughout the democratic world.
Therefore, the existence of serious constitutional guarantees for the protection
of the judicial authority is required in order to promote genuine democracy, not a force
of chaos and arbitrariness. Justice television is an example of pressure on magistrates
called to cases involving large impact on media or public persons with power over media.
148
Objectives
Outlining accurate representation of a system exclusively designed for the
judiciary to perfect its growth and the constitutional guarantees for the independence of
judges and the judiciary.
Assuming the solution with two councils with the election of prosecutors and
judges separately, ie prosecutors, it is necessary to separate the regulation of the Superior
Council of Prosecutors, while the High Council of Judges would function independently.
Therefore, by symmetry, the regulations of the Superior Council of Prosecutors
is governed essentially like the Superior Council of Judges.
Article 134, par. 2 - Powers of the Superior Council of Prosecutors.
Paragraph 1) The Superior Council of Prosecutors proposes to the President of
Romania the appointment of prosecutors, except for the trainees, under the law.
Paragraph 2) The Superior Council of Prosecutors holds records for career
prosecutors validates exam appointments of senior prosecutors, takes action, together
with the Ministry of Justice, to ensure and meet the need to protect prosecutors made
steps to the competent authorities provide the resources necessary for proper
functioning of the Public Ministry and prosecutors, ensure that the independence of
prosecutors and the correct application of the principle of hierarchical subordination.
Paragraph 3) The Superior Council of Prosecutors decide on applications for
transfer of functions of judge and prosecutors to approve requests for transfer of judges
to prosecutors.
Paragraph 4) The Superior Council of Prosecutors has prosecutors posting to
other prosecutors, the approved applications for deployment to other public
prosecutors, including public offices, according to the law approved requests from
prosecutors for personal suspension from the applicant.
Paragraph 5) The Superior Council of Prosecutors court acts as the disciplinary
liability of prosecutors, according to the procedure established by the organic law.
Paragraph 6) The Superior Council of disciplinary matters and all decisions
relating directly or indirectly career prosecutors may be appealed to the High Court of
Cassation and Justice.
The other Board decisions are subject to administrative law1 laid down by law. Paragraph
6 of Article 126 of the Constitution shall apply accordingly.
Justification
We propose the introduction of new regulations on the Superior Council of
Prosecutors to accentuate already established and generally accepted principles of
organization and functioning of the prosecution, namely independence, impartiality and
hierarchical control without building a fourth estate. Constitutional democracy works in
the system of separation of the three powers in balance: legislative, executive and
judiciary. Our system is mixed according to the constitutional tradition that is enshrined
Law no. 303/2004 regarding judges and prosecutors, republished is currently the administrative law that
governates the activity of this offices.
149
in Romania and other states with genuine democracy models, the largely Frenchinspired, where both judges and prosecutors have the magistrate quality, quality that is
required to be kept for both professions and new regulations resulting from the current
revision of the Constitution by initiative.
Objectives
Improving the functioning of the Superior Council of Magistracy, sharing its
two judicial councils for each of the two professions of judge, eliminate failures caused
by prejudice and other such causes.
The French model is the best known on the operation of two judicial councils,
one for prosecutors and other judges.
Article 134 par. 1 Role and structure
Paragraph 1) Superior council of Prosecutors shall guarantee the independence,
impartiality and hierarchical control of legality in the work of prosecutors.
Paragraph 2) The Superior Council of Prosecutors consists of 13 members, of
which:
a) 7 prosecutors elected by the prosecutor general, from all the levels of
jurisdiction, as follows:
Two prosecutors from the Prosecutors Office of the HCCJ among prosecutors
with at least 2 years experience;
2 prosecutors offices attached to courts of appeal, with at least 3 years
experience in these courts;
2 prosecutors offices attached to courts and specialized courts with at least 3
years experience at this;
1 prosecutor to prosecutors offices attached to courts with at least 8 years of
age in the magistracy;
b) one judge with at least 15 years of experience in the judiciary, judges elected
by the general meeting of the HCCJ and courts of appeal;
c) 1 senior lawyer with at least 15 years of legal experience and minimum 5 years
in the profession, elected by the Senate from among the candidates proposed by
UNBR;
d) 2 legal science teachers with at least 15 years of legal experience and academic
rank of associate(confereniar).
e) the Minister of Justice and Attorney Generals Office of the HCCJ are
members of the Council.
Paragraph 2) The members of the High Judicial Council is 4 years except as
members of the Council, other members can not perform two consecutive elected terms.
Paragraph 3) The President of the Superior Council of Prosecutors shall be
elected for a term of one year which may be renewed, the prosecutors are elected by the
general meeting of prosecutors.
Paragraph 4) The votes for the Superior Council of Prosecutors are taken
usually by secret ballot.
150
Paragraph 5) The President of Romania and the Prime Minister can participate
in the Superior Council of Prosecutors Council to address messages without the right to
vote in its proceedings.
Paragraph 6) The decisions of the Superior Council of Prosecutors are final,
except in disciplinary and professional career fields.
Paragraph 7) The provisions of Article 126 paragraph 6) of the Constitution
shall apply accordingly acts of the Council, regarding the relations with Parliament.
See the arguments and considerations mentioned above.
Article 146 e) and i)
We propose to remove the text that provides Constitutional Courts jurisdiction
to resolve disputes between government and Parliament, as experience from 2003 to the
present shows that the conflicting authorities have abused this power of the Court
beyond the original reason this new text with rules the competence of the Constitutional
Court giving a strong political role, nonspecific constitutional democracy. On the other
hand, the Court itself has abused this power, arrogating additional skills that they have
provided in the Constitution, although its powers are listed exhaustively in 146 letter k).1
Conflicts should be settled through dialogue between institutional authority and
which is set in justice, be brought before the ordinary courts, the contentious issues that
need to adjust judiciary. Eventually, the Constitutional Court could retain jurisdiction to
decide only constitutional legal conflict between the judiciary and the other traditional
powers - the executive and legislative-based on the premise that the Judiciary has no
legitimacy to resolve disputes with the other two branches itself is a party.
Letter i) of Article 146, on the other powers of the Court under its organic law
must be eliminated also because the contrary, in the absence of express limitations, the
legislature or the Court itself can give the Court jurisdiction other than the powerspowers to be considered in drafting constiutional, arbitrarily extending the jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Court. It is clear that the text of Article 146 letter l) refers to nonjudicial functions of the Court, such as internal administrative, management institution
on the Court itself. However, through an extensive interpretation, validated, political
pressure, to accept that the constitutional court might have and other judicial powers in
violation obviously, the game rules, the rule of law, and decisions giving too much
jurisdiction Parliaments political, not subject to any censorship genuine parliamentary
democracies.
We believe that Article 30 par. (4) No means of mass communication can not
be suspended or withdrawn as proposed by the parliamentary committee should not be
included in the Constitution. This amendment is excessive and unsynchronized with
other constitutional texts, including other paragraphs of Article 30.2 Also, this
amendment puts beyond the law the means of the press allowing them to be
unsanctioned making them when they perform activities prohibited by law (race hatred,
Ioan MURARU, Nasty Marian VLDOIU, Andrei MURARU, Silviu Gabriel BARBU, Contencios
Constituional, Hamangiu, Bucureti, 2009.
2 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituional...cit., Vol. I, p. 181.
1
151
anti-Semitism, discrimination, sustaining current ideological and political democracy

explicitly admitted etc)1. Art.16 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of equality
before the law, while this amendment empties of content the principles set out in Article
16, setting up the press above all forms of legal liability.2
We consider Article 36 par. (1) Citizens have the right and duty to vote at 18
years of age by election day can not be an instrument for fostering citizen participation
in voting. Although abstention from voting is increasingly a problem in Romania,
however such norm too forceful, compelling citizens to vote, is excessive and rare in
other democratic constitutional system.3
4. CONCLUSIONS
Within the current public endeavor for reviewing the Romanian Constitution
and considering the initiatives undertaken in this direction by the policymakers, we
humbly tried to give our honest and experienced word in order to present these
proposals.
All the notes and proposals are part of a bigger study we have made, following
not only the principal lines of the amendments desired by the political parties, but also all
the amendments we felt were necessary to review our Constitution and in essence make
it modern, contemporary, and useful in everyday social interactions.
Summarising on our proposals we can see a simple line following upon them,
that of ECHR and CCR precedents and case law that have made us aware of some need
to change in certaing areas. We were especially preoccupied with the judiciary, because
most of the authors have a strong relation to this field, and have simply felt the
inadequacy of certain regulations now in force, and the absurdity of certain provision
desired by certain parties that probably desire chaos to be installed in the system.
In conclusion, all of our observations, accompanied by all our comments,
justifications and argumentations must withstand not only the test of time, but the test of
the population, should it come that some of them be included in the final draft proposed
via referendum to the people to ratify this year or the next.
Marian NSTASE GEORGESCU, Simona Theodora Livia MIHILESCU, Drept constituional...cit, p. 164.
The right to private life Case law study on Law no.298/2008, Alexandru Goga, Universitatea Romno
American, 12 noiembrie 2010.
3 Ioan MURARU, Nasty Marian VLDOIU, Andrei MURARU, Silviu Gabriel BARBU, Contencios
Constituionalcit.
1
2
152
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Bucureti, 2011.
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CONSTANTINESCU, Mihai, Ioan MURARU, I. DELEANU, F. VASILESCU, A.
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CONSTANTINESCU, Mihai, Antonie IORGOVAN, Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina
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CORLEAN, Titus, Protecia european i internaional a Drepturilor Omului, Universul
Juridic, Bucureti, 2012.
DEACONU, tefan, Drept Constituional, C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2011 & 2012.
DELEANU, Ion, Instituii i proceduri constituionale n dreptul comparat i n dreptul romn
tratat , Editura Servo-Sat, Arad, 2003.
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Edit.Servo-Sat, Arad, 2003.
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Societate anonim, Bucureti, 1915.
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Bucureti, 1997.
DUCULESCU, Victor (et al.), Drept constituional comparat. Tratat (Vol. I), Lumina Lex,
Bucureti, 2002.
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IONESCU, Cristian, Drept constituional comparat, C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2008.
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a13-a, Vol. I), C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2008.
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comparativ, Actami, Bucureti, 1999.
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Gheorghe IANCU, Interpretarea Constituiei. Doctrina i Practic, Lumina Lex, Bucureti,
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154
BOOK REVIEWS
Ion IANOI,
Internaionala mea. Cronica unei viei

[My Internationale. The Chronicle of a Life],
Polirom, Iai, 2012, 856 pp.
Ion Ianoi, the most important
Marxist aesthetician alive and also one of
the most profound and subtle Romanian
intellectuals relapses, in his own words,
as a memoirist, for the last time (p. 5).
Covering most of the 20th century, his life
witnessed dramatic unfolding of events
such as World War II, the persecution of
Jews and other ethnic minorities and, last
but not least, the establishment of Moscowled communist regimes.
Born in a carefree and cosmopolite
environment, Ianoi developed progressive
convictions as a teenager. Later, as a
student, he welcomed the new regime,
believing to a certain point in its
internationalist and emancipatory appeals,
at least as a guarantee against a probable (in
the epoch) resurgence of fascism although
he expressed certain doubts about it. These
doubts will be amplified in the years to
come. Due to his intellectual abilities, he
was chosen by the party to study abroad, in
the Soviet Union, namely in Leningrad (the
Soviet denomination of Sankt Petersburg).
He encountered here, besides a susceptible
environment and a highly ideologised
curricula, competent teachers, cheerful
colleagues and an abundance of cheap food.
Back in Romania, Ianoi started to
teach aesthetics courses and write about
topics like literature or philosophy. As a
member of the Writers Union, he
witnessed and sometimes contributed to the
marginalization of certain colleagues who
became undesirable for the regime. Far
from trying to mask this not so honourable
chapter of his public life, Ianoi recognizes

it and he regrets the absence of a firmer
position. Afraid for his personal and
professional life consisting in many travels
abroad the author preferred resorting to
sometimes
shameful
compromises.
Moreover, many of the articles he wrote
between 1956 and 1989 are, the author
affirms, the ones I wish I would have not
published. And he continues: You have
the right not to take into account the past,
living, as much as you live, exclusively in the
present. But if you decide for
remembrances, it is embarrassing to select
only what is in your advantage, ignoring the
uncomfortable episodes (p. 361).
On the other hand, Ianoi was not a
fierce literary censor. Cultured and capable
of intellectual subtleties many of his
colleagues lacked, he helped writers and
philosophers like Nicolae Breban, Eugen
Negrici or Gabriel Liiceanu to publish their
books. The latter did not hesitate to
condemn him after 1989 for maintaining his
ideological
convictions.
But
more
interesting is the fact that Ianoi, a declared
Marxist, encountered hostile attitudes
regarding his orientation before 1989. He
recalls working on some chrestomathies
consisting in texts written by Marx, Engels
and, of course, Lenin with topics like
literature, art humanism or dialectics in
which the authentic Marx could be
interpreted without stressing the necessary
Stalinist dogma that encircled and
interpenetrated with his works. In this way,
the enounces could escape the
155
manipulations of the official dogmas,

regaining their genuine sense. Only from
here on the real hermeneutics of Marxism,
as plural as it is and can be, could start.
Therefore, Ianoi argues, the collections
were opposing the Marxist-Leninist, in fact
Stalinist expropriations. They sounded this
way for those who had ears to hear; and, in
the epoch, many heard them that way (p.
563). Moreover, in the late 1980s, a Marxist
position, like, among others, the literary
critic Zigu Ornea expressed, was flagrantly
contradicting the ethnicist nationalism
professed by Ceauescuist officialities.
Marx was repudiated in his substance by the
regime, which used him mainly to
manipulate his idiosyncrasy regarding
Tsarist expansionism as an anti-Russian
attitude, Ianoi concludes (pp. 669-670).
The Romanian cultural world was
generally divided, during the 1970s and
1980s, between the supporters of the
Western,
Enlightenment,
Rationalist,
Marxist tradition, on one hand, and the
supporters of cultural nationalism, on the
other hand, grotesque amplified by official
propaganda. The well-known poet Nichita
Stnescu, due to his adversity towards
Voltaire and even Caragiale, is characterized
by Ianoi as a sympathizer of the nationalcommunist group (p. 584).
Although separated by ideological
preferences, Ianoi shared ideas with
Constantin Noica or Nicolae Steinhardt.
Both appreciated his works on Dostoevsky,
Tolstoy or Thomas Mann, along with his
philosophical articles; however, both
reproached him, in milder or stronger
terms, his Marxist convictions. But finally,

the correspondence, especially with Noica,
was a pleasant and fruitful one, Ianoi being
truly interested by his ontological system.
Unfortunately, the contemporary polemics
among Romanian intellectuals are less and
less open, sincere and prone to dialogue.
After the fall of Ceauescus
dictatorship in 1989, Ianoi continued his
pedagogical and cultural activities. He wrote
new books or re-published older ones,
travelled in different countries for
conferences, seminaries or for research.
His 2004 selection of quotes extracted from
Marxs opera represents, in a country where
Marx is still understood through ideological
Leninist lens, and therefore automatically
rejected in the absence of a critical and
fairer view a brave and salutary cultural
gesture. From a tempered, non-passional
position, he continued his intellectual
polemics, although he had to face, more
than once, sarcastic attitudes, acid
commentaries and even poorly camouflaged
personal attacks. Therefore, we could ask
ourselves, was Ianoi an intellectual who
lived below or above his formative times,
1948-1989? No reader can provide a
definitive answer. The best we can do is to
read the book with openness and
impartiality; and by doing so, we will
discover one of the most profound
Romanian scholars, a man who managed to
retain his moral probity and intellectual
authenticity during an epoch where
compromising
compromises,
not
uncompromising ones, like Ianoi did,
represented a social standard.
Emanuel COPILA
West University of Timioara
156
Joerg FORBRIG, Pavol DEME (eds.)
Reclaiming Democracy. Civil Society and Electoral Change in

Central and Eastern Europe (3rd ed.),
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C.,
2008, 256 pp.
The present volume, Reclaiming
Democracy. Civil Society and Electoral Change
in Central and Eastern Europe, deals with
what at a first glance seemed to be an
isolated phenomenon. Later on, the
involvement of civil society in the
attempt to prevent obvious derailments
of young democratic regimes from the
former Soviet Block proved to be a
model worthy of being followed.
The editors, Joerg Forbrig and
Pavol Deme, members of The German
Marshall Fund, possess a good knowledge
of Central and South-East European
realities. They have published numerous
articles on sensitive and present-day
issues for this region and/or are actively
involved, which gives this volume not
only a steak of professionalism, but also
one of authenticity. Joerg Forbrigs fields
of interest are the civil society and
political, social and economic transition
processes. From his latest publications
worth mentioning are Reclaiming Democracy
(2007), Prospects for Democracy in Belarus
(2006) and Revisiting Youth Political
Participation (2005).
Pavol Deme, on the other hand,
was
actively
involved
in
a
nongovernmental organization which
crucially rendered the civil and political
reform in Slovakia. Among his fields of
expertise, one can find European Union
enlargement and integration, Central and
Eastern Europe, Balkans, governance,
civil society, democratization and NGO
development. His most recent published
articles include Focus on Ukraine

Democracy in Progress (2010) and To
Engage or Not to Engage: the Policy
Dilemma of Dealing with Belarus
(2010).
The volume is structured in two
parts. The first one contains five case
studies which bring forward the efforts
made towards the mobilization of
citizens, particularly the young ones who
now had the legal age to cast a vote in
national elections. The tactics and means
used to turn the people out are hereby
presented along with the efforts made by
nongovernmental organizations to limit
the dictatorial tendencies of the
democratically elected leaders or, if the
case, to reason away these leaders, to
increase the level of citizens implication
in the act of governance and to put these
states closer to the European Union.
These five case studies are pent by
activist involved in campaigns that took
place in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia
and Ukraine, this enabling them to report
not necessarily from an academic
perspective, but certainly a relevant one,
in a manner that brings novelty and
genuineness to these papers.
Although one can talk about a
common ground, and all these countries
were facing the same sort of problems,
the fact that there cannot be an allencompassing solution to their problems
is highlighted. Hence, according to the
particularities of each state, the campaigns
followed different strategies, although
157
they were aiming at the same outcome,

which
was
reinitiating
the
democratization process. This is how one
can tell today that the actions coordinated
by the nongovernmental organizations
were more than mere islands of positive
deviance (p. 26), as Slovak sociologists
used to call them before the Fall of
Communism.
All
five
countries
had
democratically elected presidents and all
of them had dictatorial tendencies, but
different approaches were used in each
case. Despite the similarities all
presidents were trying to control the
mass-media, trying to eliminate or silence
the opposition, to sanction all those who
were trying to bring about chances (or, if
the case, all those who were opposing the
transition back to dictatorship) by raising
accusations of being antinationalists or
representing the interests of a third party
state, to polarize the population knowing
that this will make the citizens unable to
revolt or oppose any abusive decision
taken by these leaders the approaches
were adjusted point wisely.
Taking into consideration issues
that are specific to each state, awareness
campaigns were carried out aiming at
informing people about their political
rights, especially the right to actively
participate in the political decision
making mechanisms and mobilizations
campaign aimed at those citizens who
had the legal right to vote, but were
apathetic, uninvolved, mistrustful and
alienated. There were made efforts
towards the mobilization of the
opposition under the umbrella of a
common goal able to transcend
ideologies the removal of an already
well-consolidated leader and the re-railing
of the states on a democratic track.
158
Another important aspect was the

attempt to deter the leaders from
outlawing the nongovernmental forms of
organization that were the only entities
capable and willing to restrain the
authoritarian tendencies of the leaders.
Nonetheless, there were attempts to
monitor the elections so that these cannot
be manipulated or in case the elections
were after all manipulated, they could be
contested.
With the prime purpose of
marking out the specific characteristics of
each state, the second part of this volume
accommodates a series of comparative
perspectives
which
present
the
similarities,
but
moreover
the
dissimilarities between the states. Based
on these features, phenomena and
reactions are illustrated and explained.
The importance of nuances is hereby
argued. Taking or not taking these into
account might prove to be crucial in the
attempt to change mentalities, behaviors
or regimes. Thus, the extent to which the
media is controlled, the need to legitimate
the political decisions in citizens eyes, the
degree of implication in the political life,
the type of approach used by the civil
society while trying to mobilize and
inform the masses, the way the citizen
apprehend certain deficiencies, all these
can lead to a great variety of possible
scenarios. By means of analyzing the
specific circumstances for each of the five
states discussed in this volume, the
authors determine only one constant
the active and decisive involvement of
youth, this being regarded as a change
booster. The involvement of young
people is inconsistent though, fact that is
sanctioned by the authors which also note
a tendency for the youth to rapidly lose
its interest in political life and return to

political abstinence.
Beyond all these arguments, the
plurality of combinations of variables
which give specificity to each state, in the
aftermath of these nonpartisan and
nonviolent campaigns is no time for rest.
These campaigns are inherent democratic
practices
which
should
become
automatisms. These are no singular cases
and there are no final all-encompassing
answers. The authors emphasize the fact
that democratization is a self-regulatory
process and that such a campaign is never
the last one, it only precedes the next one.
Alexandra PANAIT
159
Paul MAGNETTE,
Europa, statul i democraia. Suveranul mblnzit

[Europe, the State and Democracy. The Tamed Sovereign],
trans. Eliza Ivan, Institutul European, Iai, 2005, 248 pp.
Paul Magnette has a Ph.D. in
Political Sciences, is former professor of
Political Sciences at the Universit Libre
de Bruxelles and currently he is the
Chairman of the PS (Parti Socialiste) and
the mayor of Charleroi. His main research
interest focuses on institutional policies
of EU and on democratic theories.
Magnettes work includes: La citoyennet
europenne. Droits, politiques, institutions
(1999), La citoyennet. Une histoire de l'ide de
participation civique (2001), Contrler
l'Europe. Pouvoirs et responsabilit dans l'Union
europenne (2003), What is the European
Union? (2005) and Au nom des peuples, le
malentendu constitutionnel europen (2006).
The book which is being reviewed,
Europe, the state and democracy the tamed
Sovereign, retrospectively relates the
process of European construction, aiming
at straightening out the sovereignty in the
context of the new construction which
seems to be reducing it, but which brings
advantages that would have been difficult
to achieve independently. This immanent
issue of European construction emerged
from the beginning and continues to be a
current topic as states come closer to a
political Union. Paul Magnette brings into
discussion the paradox of states giving up
a part of their sovereignty with the aim of
becoming stronger.
Structured into three main parts,
each one being split into other three, the
book represents a good start for a better
understanding of European construction,
each one of them being a step towards
the consolidation of the European
160
structure. The first part delivers a

historical insight into the evolution of
EU, from a concept to reality. What the
author calls Europe in the states era
constitutes a paradox of the period when
European Communities were being
founded simultaneously with the
reconstruction of national states. Hence,
the era of the state is the reaffirmation
of states sovereignty on one hand and
the remains of WWII, that state is a
dangerous form of organization that
should be transformed, on the other
hand. Therefore, the author starts from a
dichotomy: states either survive in their
historical form in a helpless Europe or
they assume the risk of losing the
democratic system perceived until then
only within the state. As a consequence,
small elitist groups proposed the idea of a
federation in which each state gives up a
part of their sovereignty for the common
wellbeing; idea which was rejected in the
beginning, but which afterwards was
accepted as a compromise. The
federation is about cooperation and not
about states ceding sovereignty to a
supranational organization. States are
encouraged to exercise their sovereignty
through this common organization.
The second part seeks equilibrium
between the new European institutions
and the politicians loyal to national
sovereignty. Magnette explains the
founding of the European Court as
member states will to cooperate by giving
this task to an international jurisdiction.
Moreover, he considers that courts of law
are essential for the European

construction by bringing major changes
in the political culture as judges role is to
create equilibrium between the will of the
legislative and the will of the people,
whenever they are in conflict. Besides
this, the author highlights the difficulty of
classifying the government type of the
Union and discuses succinctly, in relation
with the concept of sovereignty, about:
intergovernmental federalism, civil
federalism, state federation and
federal
contract.
The
reached
conclusion is that the Union is too
complex to be classified, but a common
element to all forms is the cooperative
spirit.
The last part has a different focus
than the others by means of discussing
the discrepancy level of Europeanization
between states, social classes and among
citizens which continue to reason into
nationalistic terms. In other words, it is
questioned if citizens have succeeded to
integrate to the same extent as the states
that they belong to. With a socio-political
approach, the author describes a
European political system in which the
outputs are made through a relation
between national governments and their
citizens and not by a direct contract with
the Community. Citizens of member
states are skeptical towards the operating
mechanism of the Union because of a
deficit which differs from one country to
another and which consists in the political
culture differences incompatible with the
Unions model. States that are open to
liberalization, modernization or which
know a form of federalization have a
greater chance to easily integrate. After
presenting the legitimation of states
regarding European institutions, this
chapter draws attention to the
legitimation of the entire system

regarding citizens control. In this
national, European, international space,
the citizen elects and becomes politically
responsible.
In the first two parts Paul
Magnette makes a literature review or
makes direct references to historical
sources like treaties. By using these
means, the book is perceived as a
historical analysis which begins at the end
of WWII and continues up until the 90s.
In the third part, the author makes
references to statistics and social surveys
in order to point out the differences that
occur during the process of European
construction.
The novelty of the book consists
in the observation of sovereignty from
incipient state of European Community
to present by making use of concepts
such as institutions, actors and
European policies. Magnette sees the
taming of the sovereign as a natural
process that comes along with the basis
of the Union. First, this taming was
noticed by the political elites and now it is
offered to citizens to be understood. The
European Union brings innovations to
political culture mainly through its
structure that is intrinsic and institutional
interdependent at the same time.
Europe, the state and democracy the
tamed Sovereign describes the recent
political evolution characterized by the
idea of Europe. The difficulties that the
West European states had faced are not
negligible and come to sustain a posteriori
the main reason why they have
surrendered a part of their autonomy: the
assertion of any kind of power on
international scene. Paul Magnette had
stressed many times the paradox of
sovereignty: as states want a stronger
161
autonomy, the autonomy of European

Community gets stronger. Maybe this
paradox could constitute a new research
lead aiming at finding the cause of it and

at a better understanding of Europe.
tefania NEAGOE
162
Bichara KHADER (dir.),
Le printemps arabe: un premier bilan

[Arab Spring: a Preliminary Assessment],
Centre Tricontinental, Syllepse, Paris, 2012, 209 pp.
Le printemps arabe: un premier bilan
[Arab Spring: a Preliminary Assessment] was
published in 2012 in the collection
Alternatives Sud of the Tricontinental
Centre
(CENTRI).
The
book
coordinated by Bichara Khader gathers
points of view of the South on the
uprisings in the Arab countries, with the
epicentre in Tunis. The scholars stated
aim is to examine the Arab spring,
after the 2011 mass events.
The volume brings into question
the social mobilizations of people from
Arab countries, such as Tunis, Libya,
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria,
Morocco and Jordan. They are presented
in a descriptive manner: genesis and
forms of organization, who the actors
behind the collective action are, what
their objectives are, what is the strategy
they used in order to reach the
authorities attention, and what kind of
resources helped them to achieve their
goals. In addition, the analytic approach
completes the scholars descriptions: the
causes of the uprisings, the main results
of social mobilizations, as well as their
economic, social and political impact.
Overall, the authors do not use a
particular type of analysis. They rather
combine sociological analysis (in relation
to the establishment of civil society and,
especially to the mobilization of the
connected young people), economic
analysis (references to the Arab states
granting annuity to their people) and
ideological analysis (related to the crisis
of the political regimes of different Arab
countries). Most mobilizations are

explained as local cleavages and less by
geopolitical
elements.
Therefore,
moments of rupture that affected the
Arab countries in the early 2011 do not
find explanations in conspiracy theories
(from the outside). As noted by
researchers, they are rather commanded
from inside, home-grown (p. 9). In
relation to the scale of collective action,
the scholars argue that generally, specific
characteristics
of
each
country
(geographical, economic, social, and
political), and in some cases, geopolitical
dimensions, determined the manner in
which social protests were deployed. The
common denominator of the social
mobilizations analyzed in this book is
related to socio-economic grievances1.
The uprisings are caused by the political
violence2 exerted by the various regimes
Grievances can be defined as a sense of

indignation about the way authorities are treating
a social or political problem (Bert
KLANDERMANS, Jojanneke van der TOORN
et al., Embeddedness and Identity: How
Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, 2008, pp. 9921012/ p. 993).
2 In trying to define the concept of violence and
conflict, Caroline MOSER and Fiona CLARK
(2001) consider that violence by definition
involves the use of force [against an individual or
a group], be it physical or psychological (Caroline
MOSER, Fiona CLARK (eds.), Victims,
perpetrators, or actors? Gendered armed conflict and
political violence, St Martin Press, New York, 2001,
p. 6). In opposition to this concept, conflict does
not necessarily inflict physical or mental harm on
others (p. 6). Moreover, conflict is broadly
understood as the pursuit of incompatible goals
1
163
of the Arab countries. The theory of

relative deprivation1 could explain the
collective action for each particular
situation studied, although this is not
explicitly used by the authors.
The two first chapters analyze two
contradictory examples of uprisings in
the Arab countries, in terms of how
various factors and actors have banded
together and led to change. Tunis is the
case of a happy revolution2 (p. 43).
According to Bichara Khader, the
by different people or groups (p. 6). Political

violence could be integrated within the broad
spectrum of violence. This concept refers to the
commission of violent acts motivated by a desire,
conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain
political power (p. 36). Therefore, political
violence includes in its meaning the acquisition
of power through violent acts. By considering
political violence linked to social injustice, we
take into account the structural violence (the
term was forged by Johan GALTUNG,
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191/ p.
171). This involves the repression through a
variety of infringements of human rights, such as
deprivation, inequities, unequal distribution of
assets (of wealth) or of resources within the
society, unequal access to political power, and
oppression of a political regime aiming to
maintain hegemony over a people.
1 Ted Gurr applies frustration-aggression theory
to the collective political violence. He finds the
cause of social mobilization in a discrepancy
between what people expect of life (their
aspirations) and what they get from it (the real
level of their satisfaction). Relying on such
comparison, deprivation is considered as
relative. The intensity of frustration leads to
collective action (Ted Robert GURR, Why men
rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970).
2 Shimon Stein talks about the Jasmine
Revolution in Tunisia and the Lotus
Revolution in Egypt (Shimon STEIN, The
European Union and the Arab Spring, in Yoel
GUZANSKY, Mark A. HELLER (eds.), One Year
of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications,
Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv,
2012, pp. 25-28/ p. 25).
164
catalyst of this spontaneous revolt that

broke out in January 2011 was the result
of convergence of several favourable
factors, such as the monopolizing of the
political scene by Ben Ali and the
increasingly ostentatious corruption
organized around him, the role of
educated young people frustrated by the
difficulties in finding jobs, the lack of
freedom, the fear of control, repression,
torture, exile, the role of new
information technologies (television,
mobile phones, internet, social networks)
that have escaped the control of political
power, turning into effective means for
mobilization able to organize mass
demonstrations (pp. 44-45). According
to this author, the originality of the
Tunisian Revolution lies in the junction
between the young generation and the
army which was in the service of the
country, which was not subject to the
political regime. In contrast, Libya is the
counter-paradigm
of
a
happy
revolution (p. 61). The lack of social
and regional homogeneity, a turbulent
history, Kadhafis clan system that
turned the country into a private
enterprise, into a family heritage (p.
71), converged towards revolt and
turned it into a civil war. Opinions about
the
Egyptian
revolution
are
contradictory.
Several
explanations
regarding the overthrow of Hosni
Mubaraks regime are simultaneously
possible. Mohammad Selim and Gamal
M. Selim (p. 77) build their arguments in
relation to three dimensions of the
revolution: permanent, betrayed,
kidnapped. The authors conclusion
about this endogenous revolution (p.
79) is that liberalization is not possible
outside of democratic reform. Compared
to other Arab countries, the process of
liberalization and democracy was delayed

in Egypt (p. 90). The achievement of
political change depends on the
accommodation of different forces
inside Egypt. The control of the political
regime by its tactics of oppression was
one of the factors of dissatisfaction of
Syrian people. Taking the other Arab
revolutions as an example, in Syria, the
challengers have built their own
repertoire of action1 (a set of
tactics). The organization of the sits-in
was accompanied by the establishment
of an organizational infrastructure2, by
the association of the activists under the
Local Coordination Committee (LCC),
the recourse to the tanseeqiat (p. 95)
as a manner of transmitting information,
the setting of an agenda and the contact
with personalities of the regime. If the
uprisings in the Arab countries are often
poorly structured, lack leaders and a clear
manner3 of deployment, Syria is one of
the few cases in which the movement
has steadily grown and accumulated
resources, building a local leadership and
the strategy of going public4. The
Charles TILLY, From Mobilization to Revolution,

Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1978.
2 Hanspeter KRIESI, Les mouvements sociaux
et le systme politique: quelques remarques sur les
limites de lapproche du processus politique,
Sociologie et socits, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2009, pp. 21-38/
p. 29.
3 Another main characteristic of the uprisings is
the absence of ideologies that accompany the new
regimes replacing radical political Islam.
4 The term was introduced by Samuel Kernell.
This approach into vogue at the White House
reflects a strategy whereby a president promotes
himself and his policies in Washington by
appealing to the American public support
(Samuel KERNELL, Going public: New Strategies of
Presidential Leadership, Congressional Quarterly
Press, Washington, 1986, p. 2). The use of this
concept forged by Kernell helps Hansper Kriesi
(Les mouvements sociaux cit., p. 31) to
1
press releases5 of the CCL aimed at

triggering a debate in the public sphere,
facilitating the access to the authorities6
and, at the same time, gathering the
opposition under the same roof (p. 97).
According to Wael Sawah, the main
characteristic of the Syrian uprising was
the increased brutality of the regime
(p. 104). In the next chapter, Marine
Poirier explains the claims that
transcended Yemen (pp. 109-119). The
revolutionary movement in Yemen,
initially labelled as a peaceful
mobilization (p. 112), knew after the
attempt on President Saleh and the
humanitarian crisis that followed to it,
a multiplication of violence (p. 115),
from strikes to local and corporate
protests. These were ways to exert
pressure by the outsiders7 upon the
government, as recipients of the claims.
explain the extension of conflict in a mobilizing

campaign by appealing to the public as preferred
strategy of challengers. In his view, media play
an important role in drawing public attention.
5 According to Gamson and Meyer, the massmedia play a crucial role in defining for
movement actors whether they are taken seriously
as agents of possible change. () The opening
and closing of media access and attention is a
crucial element in defining political opportunity
(William A. GAMSON, David S. MEYER,
Framing political opportunity, in Doug
McADAM, J. D. McCARTHY, M. N. ZALD
(eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and
Cultural Framings, Cambridge University Press,
1996, pp. 275-290/ p. 285).
6 The mass-media contribute to triggering a public
debate and strengthening the position of the
movement actors. In addition, such means of
communication facilitate the access to the
authorities on which the challengers exert
pressure (Hansper KRIESI, Les mouvements
sociaux cit., p. 32).
7 The term outsiders refers to the challengers.
Following Charles TILLY, From Mobilizationcit.,
p. 132, they are persons outside of the polity.
165
The uprisings from Bahrain are analyzed

by Claire Beaugrand (pp. 121-136). In
this case, the protests against the
Khalifas regime were initiated on
Facebook. The reference to resource
mobilization theory1 allows us to assert
that the social network formed in this
way had a role in mobilizing
structures2. The response of the regime
to mobilization was threefold: to
preserve its security, to maintain the
economic and ideological status of the
country (p. 127), while the reform was
imposed by geopolitics. Despite
corruption, nepotism, economic and
social inequalities, restricted freedoms,
the lack of housing and the poor
governance (p. 137), Algeria is
characterized by a weak democratic
mobilization. According to Ahmed
Aghrout and Yahia Zoubir, this
exception is only an illusion, as the
cosmetic reforms (p. 151) of the
regime cannot stop the change. In
Morocco, the disapproval of the
makhzen system, especially by the
Islamist party, does not result in the
Resource-mobilization theorists argue that

participants in social movement act as rationally in
the pursuit of their goals (John D. McCARTHY,
Mayer N. ZALD, Resource Mobilization and
Social Movements, American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 82, 1977, pp. 1212-1241; William A.
GAMSON The Strategy of Social Protest, Dorsey
Press, Georgetown, Ontario, 1975).
2 These are ways of engaging in collective action
which include particular tactical repertoires,
particular social movements organizational
forms, and modular social movements
repertoires
(John
D.
Mc
CARTHY,
Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting,
Adapting, and Inventing, in D. McADAM and
M. N. ZALD (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing
Structures, and Cultural Framing, Cambridge
University Press, 1996, pp. 141-51/ p.141).
1
166
installation of a democratic regime. In

Chawqui Lotfis view, the stake is to reerect a popular and democratic
movement holding democratic and social
demands. The case of Jordan is
comparable to that of other Arab
countries where mobilization is triggered
by the socio-economic and political
grievances. Once again, the theory of
relative deprivation explains collective
action, although the social mobilization
did not peak, as was the case of other
Arab countries. Due to the resources
mobilized in order to obtain political
liberalization, the social protests from
Jordan could be included in the new
social movements, as assumed by Jamal
Al Shalabi et al. Unlike Tunisia and
Egypt, which were committed to
democratization, the cyber-revolutionary
participants in the uprisings had an
important role in mobilizing people into
collective
action.
The
political
liberalization in Jordan does not seem to
have reached the same extent of
deployment. In the last chapter of this
book, Amine Ait-chaal examines the
orientation of Obamas politics towards
the Arab world. This chapter addresses
the importance of this geopolitical
territory
for
the
United-States.
According to the author, the interests of
the United States for the Middle East are
built gradually and cumulatively (p. 191),
being a constant factor of American
strategy. This chapter invites to a
broader reflection on the global
dimension of the challenges of the
Middle East.
In conclusion, one could assert
that the studies gathered in this
collection under the cover of Arab
Spring draw attention to several
common elements that seem to
characterize the social movements for

democracy and economic prosperity in
this world. The first issue relates to the
role of social networks in empowering
and bridging mass publics. Indeed, social
media networks played an important role
in the disintegration of the authoritarian
regimes from Tunis and Egypt. They
also contribute to socio-political
mobilization in Bahrain and Syria. Yet,
the studies do not exclude the possibility
that other elements had an impact on
Arab Spring social protests. The
revolutions were in some cases facilitated
by social media networks, but regional
characteristics also had an impact on

socio-political protests. This suggests
another issue: why transition and
transformation have crossed some Arab
countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunis,
while other Arab states have not joined
the wave of change and revolution?
Therefore, the views of the South
invite to reflections related not only to
the extent to which liberal ideals have
triumphed in the Arab countries, but,
more generally, on the winds of change
that are blowing over these countries.
Sonia CATRINA
Faculty of Political Science,
University of Bucharest
167
Lutgard LAMS, Xavier L.W. LIAO (eds.),
The Role of Discourse as the Interface

between Various Disciplines Studying Chinese Society,
Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie, Voor Wetenschappen en
Kunsten,Universa Press, Wetteren, 2012, 132 pp.
To a first lecture, the publication
The Role of Discourse as the Interface between
Various Disciplines studying Chinese Society
as a direct product/result of the selected
scholarly contributions from the first
explanatory Contact Forum organized by
the Brussels Centre for Chinese
Discourse Studies Working Group,
from November 5th 2010 (Royal
Academies for Sciences and the Arts of
Belgium), leaves the impression of an
intriguing architecture through the
adaptation of its discursive background
to a generous analytical perimeter (in the
sense of emplacement and of sources of
analysis the Asia-Pacific region, in
particular China). The soldering effect of
the research studies is countered just by
the two interventions which seem to
detach as the analysis shows from
the ample scientific dynamics, and which
confirm to a second lecture that they are
inserted as centres of gravity for the
theoretical background (Martine Van
Goubergen, Ambivalence in Western
Thinking, an echo to the Eastern Way of
Thinking?, pp. 117-123) or as recessive
evaluations (Henrieta Anioara erban,
Hegemony and Discourse in political
Systems with Single Party Rule One
Party, One Discourse, pp. 93-105).
Nevertheless, these contributions are
important for a better contextualization
of the studies included in the volume.
Moreover, the theme can easily be
viewed as pertaining to the classical
debate between the universalist and the
168
relativist
approaches
of
reality,
describing the conflicts emerging from
the versus rule rationalism vs. religion,
being vs. moving, literature vs. philosophy,
East vs. West, just the interpretation of
the ambivalence against bivalence prevailing.
Martine Van Goubergen notes the
perspectives of the two European
sinologists, Ulrich Libbrecht and
Franois Jullien, with effects in the
comparative
philosophy
(beyond
cultures or aside thinking polarities, as
other possibilities of entering different
patterns of thoughts p. 121).
Analysing the discourse, the
analytic
formula
confirms
what
handled
through
his
Jakobson1
synchronic model, in the sense of
reception, both of the temporal
discursive dynamics and of its
annotation with static factors gathered
from the historical, cultural, and political
or economics perspectives. Jakobsons
warning as programmatic intention
triggers precisely an imperative of
language investigation in all its various
functions, with explicit reference to the
triad context code contact.
This theory is well known to the
present publication, which organizes
itself on the subtle construction
combining, first, the dimension of context
(investigated in the recurrent practices, in
official Chinese discourses disseminated
Roman JAKOBSON, Language in Literature, MA,

Harvard University Press, 1960.
in the public media over the last decade

in the study signed by Lutgard Lams;
or, in the right for voice and the
discursive power inside the resecuritization discourse along the
institutionalization of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization at Liao, and
in the nexus of culture and economy in
Chinese discourse of modernity at
Chang Pi-chun), with the dimension of
code (as in the assessment of the hybrid
origin of Chinas Copyright Law, with
the long withstanding policies in terms
of moral rights and remuneration rights,
privileging the authors rather than the
owners right at Dietz, or in the
evaluation of the intrinsic conflicts/
incompatible elements,
which exist
between Western values embodied in
copyright Chinese discourses and values
at Kexiang). Finally, the volume
gathers studies investigating the
discursive dimension of contact (in the
analysis of the internal and the external
public spheres of Chinas discourse and
policy with regard to the political and
linguistic management of domestic
ethnic minority issues at Mumin, or the
questioning of Chinas changing human
rights discourse in the global setting at
Chou).
In the introductive chapter,
Lutgard Lams and Xavier L.W. Liao
highlight the fact that keeping the
ambivalence in balance as a familiar
brand of Eastern thinking (an idea far
from unknown in the Western
philosophical tradition p. 17)
denounces this very evidence according
to which systematic comparison may
become a dangerous enterprise, because
one can either subordinate its own
framework to the other, or, on the
contrary, turn the other into the absolute

otherness (p. 17).
This may be considered a possible
all encompassing access key to the
publications structure, careful to take an
analytic distance from the alternatives
undertaken by traditional Sinology or
geo-political Chinese Studies, and reanchored in a process of revaluation,
discursively, but also including the
societal aspect of China; in fact,
preoccupied with breaking archaic
barriers of dualist viewpoints, referring
to the general functions of language and
discourse and with the fact that Chinese
society seems increasingly eager to
articulate its existence and identity as an
important player in the global arena. All
these aspects are subsumed to the
methodological frameworks and to the
working strategies with effect in
streamlining
the
communicative
dynamics within interactions between
China and its interlocutors (p. 14).
The
publication
comprises
analyses of the use and the implications
of Chinese official discourse, including
state-owned media narratives, political
doctrines, guidelines and policies, in the
public sphere of Chinas foreign relations
and domestic inter-ethnic relations,
proving studies regarding the Intellectual
Property Right, avoiding the temptation
of justify or disqualify Chinese cultural
identity, but increasing emphasis on the
economic objectives in Chinas discourse
of cultural modernity in the era of
modernization (p. 18-19).
Aiming these declarative goals, the
merit of the present publication consists
mainly of resisting the Huntingtonian
attractions, reporting the collision or the
connection to Sinic civilization, but of
approaching,
as
unintended
169
consequence, what Martin Jacques

noticed as a less Westerner China and a
more Chinese West, or, the evidence
according to which, China will not
become a nation accustomed to the
Westernized style, because of the use of
economics by the emerging powers for
broader political, cultural and military
aims.
According to Martin Jacques1
there isnt only one kind of
modernization and modernity, but
multiple
and
competing
modernization, a point that highlights
the fact that China is a civilization-state
(Chinese
identity
derives
from
civilization elements such as language,
norms of family life, the structure of
social relations; the unity of Chinese
civilization is the priority policy,
designed as duty and responsibility of the
state; Chinese ethnicity derives from
civilization elements, China supporting
the one country, two systems
principle;
Chinese intimacy with
millennial history of the country is
preserved, the feeling
of Chinese
greatness remaining alive and important
among
Chinese
citizens).
The
perspective cannot elude the fact that
China had its difficult moments in the
relation to European and American
modernization, and especially after 1978,
it definitively engaged on a path of rapid
modernization (remarks and different
levels of analyze, anticipated by the The
Role of Discourse as the Interface between
Various Disciplines studying Chinese Society).
Although it concentrates on the
interactions of researchers from the
disciplines of political and intercultural
communication
or
law
studies,
circumscribing the extent to which
discourse could be the interface between
regional studies and theoretical insights
(p. 5), refusing the scientifically
comparative trap, the foreword note
cannot avoid the links drawn between
political discourse in China and other
regions with comparable political
histories (such as Romania p. 5). The
affirmation cannot detach itself from
some coincidences, ideological or
cultural imports, and the study
Hegemony and Discourse in political
Systems with Single Party Rule is in this
respect consolidating its quasi-theoretical
status of discursive investigation within
the publications general economy, not
through a comparative approach, but
just appealing to the communicational
instrument of lateral effects2, as intriguing
stimulation of the main topic through
wider openings and the identification of
the theoretical points of intersection.
Unrestricted to a historicalpolitical
formula
of
discourse
coagulation, Li Changchuns speech in
the Romanian Parliament (2011)
reconfigured the old traditions and
broad prospects between these two
countries, with everything that reclaims
the relocation of China-Romania
relations inside the present day
perspectives. Also, at Bucharest, George
Friedman proposed a state - analysis of
transforming China into a global power,
with all its anchoring inside a strategic
comfort zone. The scenario was also
approached by Xavier L.W. Liao (in The
Role of Discourse as the Interface between
See, in this sense, Edward DE BONO, Lateral

Thinking. A Textbook of Creativity, Penguin Books,
London, 1970.
1 Martin JACQUES, When China rules the World,

Penguin Books, London, 2012.
170
Various Disciplines studying Chinese Society,

pp. 31-49) through the issue of
projecting Chinas soft power in the
context of realpolitik of Central Asia
regional affairs, looking especially at the
discursive practices by which China desecuritizes the region while it resecuritizes and unites its Central Asia
neighbouring states, in order to
legitimize a new security community.
The corroboration of these up-todate and relevant studies reconfirms the
flexibility of the discursive approach,
reaffirming discourses traditional role in
shaping reality, creating patterns of
understanding significantly applied in
social practices (p. 43). Clearly, this
volume is an interface well structured
and beneficial for further applications, as
the The Role of Discourse as the Interface
between Various Disciplines studying Chinese
Society is a publication which delivers
implicitly the discursive matrix as
Bahtinian inter-action a re-socialization
method which puts in the act a generous

but sensible framework with various
implications relevant for the study of the
Chinese official discourse, or media
studies, foreign policy, international
relations, comparative studies in legal
theory & IPR, human rights and intercultural studies, in general.
The Role of Discourse as the Interface
between Various Disciplines studying Chinese
Society represents a landmark, provided
its serious scientific position in
interdisciplinary
discourse
analysis,
through the re-affirmation of the
discursive patterns in a context that
tends
to
dilute
the
strong
propagandistic constructions (see, the
recent caricaturized discursive clich,
summarized by the official press of the
Communist Chinese Party), reconfirming
the need for a stable analytic ground
which possesses the necessary decoding
instruments.
Viorella MANOLACHE
Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Bucharest
171
Philip J. ELDRIDGE,
The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia,

Routledge, London, 2002, 240 pp.
How many occupants needs a
lifeboat to have in order not to sink
under the pressure and under the weight
of the cargo and how much ductile
needs the helm of the lifeboat to be, in
order not to experience a sudden
breaking, if fortuity may bring
unpleasant events?
In our opinion, Phillipe Eldridge,
in the book The Politics of Human Rights in
Southeast Asia, tries to answer this
question, not in an undecided manner,
but rather in an open-answer kind of
manner, which invites plenty of versions
of rendering.
First of all, the book has to be
read without the conspicuous ideas that
human rights are parts glued within an
ensemble of interpretations of what
democracy really stands for. This
conception points to a dreaminterpretation
of
cultures,
that
experienced the reception of these ideas
throughout centuries of identitysearching. The longstanding search for
cultural identity1 does not ensure a full
participation from the countries
belonging to the Southeast Asian region.
Just as Phillip Eldridge calls attention on,
the Southeast Asian states have only
recently entered more than figuratively in
such a journey of exploration and: The
politics of human rights in Southeast
1 We understand identity as any phase-boundary

perceptual appearance of alike elements,
manifested in different domains and fields of
composition and representation, until they are
perceived as a stated and distinctive entity.
Identity can find placement only if uniqueness
is revisited.
172
Asia entail a complex balance between

diffuse domestic and external pressures.
Post-colonial ASEAN governments,
though
historically
resistant
to
universalist
discourse
based
on
international human rights law, have
been increasingly obliged since the end
of the Cold War to incorporate human
rights into their objectives, policy
frameworks and conceptions of national
interest.2
The coverage of such ideas is not
a special field of proficiency for the
national governments of the region, nor
is it one that they particularly wished to
have, as Eldridge noted in the paragraph
quoted below. The free, uncompelled
design of human rights in Southeast Asia
was not an act of regional choice. Inside
pressures were far outweighed by
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

represents the regional facility for decisionmaking. It has been formed by the governments
of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines and
Thailand in 1967. It aimed to become a regional
assembly, empowered to impose causes of
decisions for all the countries in Southeast Asia.
In 1984, it welcomed Brunei within its structural
and organizational quarters. In 1995, Vietnam
became an ASEAN member, joined in 1997, by
Laos and Myanmar. Due to the domestic repugn
and contesting, Cambodia was not able to become
a member of ASEAN in 1997. Limitedly,
Cambodia managed to give quick and
unstructured solutions to its domestic problems.
In 1999, Cambodia was accepted as a member.
The only regional state by-standing ASEANs
entrance gates is, for the time being, East Timor.
The governing elites of Southeast Asia wanted to
establish a regional organization, for whose
membership no regional state could be undecided.
ASEAN was mandated to have a full view
capacity of regional adherence.
external ones. The latter proved out to

be much stronger and propelling in
voluntary motion.
The universalist discourse on
human rights made the regional
governments feel very apprehensive
about procuring such values and proving
their regional and national worth, as they
were seen by them as submitting
outward control and verifying. The
universalist discourse on human rights
represents a body of barristers for the
global protection of certain rights, that
cannot be overlooked by any state or
government in the world. Their scope
cannot be narrowed by national or
regional policies. Such rights include,
amongst others: the right for private
initiative, the equality of treatment for all
races and sexes, the right to be protected
against torture and discrimination, the
right to express ones views and
preferences in public surroundings, the
right of a citizen to express public
criticism against the form and methods
of government utilized by the state to
whom he/she has a relationship of
citizenship with, but also against the
form of government and methods of
government, utilized by other states.
As Eldridge argues, these muddles
have suffered some disarrangement from
the actions of national governments in
the region despite the once-over of
UNHCR1: The idea of a short list of
rights which should be regarded as
paramount and universal has received
support from both Western and Nonwestern sources, with even dedicated
anti-universalists such as former
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan
United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees.
Yew, supporting outlawing of genocide,

torture and racial discrimination.2.
For the governments of Southeast
Asia, democracy and the respect for
human rights involve a usefulness of
culture that it does not have the same
feedback in other cultural media. The
confusion resides even from the fact that
even in other cultural media, the
homogeneity could not have been that
strong, so as to breed universalism. The
universalism for Southeast Asia, as far as
the human rights discourse is concerned,
is not at all embraceable. Nor do the
Southeast Asian leaders claim such an
improved performance of regional
bargaining. What is universal as far as the
general concord of judgment, beholding
the regional discourse on human rights,
is the fact that each regional country can
work out national measures and
suggestion of proposals regarding human
rights, without its initiatives being
troubled by concepts farther in source
and quality. The final path followed by
the regional states would be a path of
loyalty to the regional discourse on
human rights. As Eldridge observes, the
regional discourse on human rights in
Southeast Asia is devoid of humane
The points made Lee Kuan Yew were that if

there is a list of principles that occupies much
more importance that national-hosted and
inspired ones, then what is the point of national
approaches and specificities for state-building and
state-management? What is the asset of specificity
that the national governments can retain if an
extra-national body has the power of overview
and of drawing attention on areas that require
amelioration? These questions show a very
persuasive point of view against the avail of such
principles into a background that is not at all
welcoming to them.
173
governance1. In this approach, the

position of the individual cannot be
treated with imprudence. The individual
has to be ensured with proper means of
existence. Certainly, it is not the job of
the state to produce the outcome.
However, it is the job of the state not to
delay it, nor to make it quite ineffective
by the counterbalancing effect of states
measures.
In comparison, the states of
Southeast Asia have been set, in what the
author of this review calls it a
collectors dilemma. It is exactly the
undo of humane governance. The
paradigm is state-centered. The postcolonial states of Southeast Asia have
accumulated plenty of power and
influence that had to be unavoidably
determined by the acquiring of
independence: The role of the state in
development and the appropriateness of
democratic relative to authoritarian
systems of government in its
achievement are closely inter-linked
issues. Unfortunately they have been
conflated to produce a falsely polarized
choice between a democratic state
progressively withdrawing itself from
economic
involvement
and
an
interventionist
state
based
on
authoritarian rule. In our opinion, at
one point, the procedure of collection
would have to be interrupted and would
have to start to broadcast more
conciseness to the human rights agenda.
Perhaps, in Southeast Asia, the
connection with the universalist
discourse on human rights can be
restarted, after state-building is finally
An acceding touch down on the individual as the

center and the most important indicator of all the
decisions taken by the national governments.
174
over. Up to now, state-building in

Southeast Asia has been only in its
intermediate phases. Very important
specifications are given in the book,
regarding Singapore and Thailand. While
Singapore has given a special mention by
its national leaders to the communitarian
character of the national image and to
the preponderance of community over
the needs, rights and obligations of the
Self, Thailand has tried to introduce in
its constitution a check and balance
mechanism regarding the actions of the
government. The legislative branch of
public decision has still a wee of powers,
despite this endeavor.
Another
very
important
acknowledgement is given by Phillip
Eldridge in connection to foreign policy.
Peculiarly, Singapore and Malaysia are
strong
advocators
for
the
reconsideration of UN structures, by the
admission of new members. The
publishing of such intentions comes with
the harbor of equal responsibility and the
human rights issue will not leave much
room for voluntary turn out. Eldridge
urges, also, some reasons regarding the
actor that has the most skipper-effect on
the reformation of the human rights
issue in Southeast Asia: Australia.
Australia is the actor that engages a
program-oriented approach, in addition
to the annotations of censure that it
shares with other actors2.
Overall, Phillip Eldridge offers aneasy reading into the human rights
policies in Southeast Asia. Easy must not
be misperceived as scientifically skimpy.
The book is one of the few that actually
The invective comments of the Western actors

have been a source of rejection of the universalist
discourse on human rights, from the part of the
regional governments.
offers a lenient and easy-going

understanding of the human rights
discourse in Southeast Asia and of its
contrarieties
with
the
universal
incisiveness. The lifeboat of democracy
in Southeast Asia avoids to greet and hail
many on-boarders.
Ioana-Bianca BERNA
National School of Political and
Administrative Sciences, Bucharest
175
EVENT
A Comparison between the Mediterranean Model
and the Extended Black Sea Region
A comparison between the Mediterranean Model and the Extended Black Sea
Region rises, from the very beginning, a few questions regarding certain aspects
pertaining to both method and content. To what extent can we identify equivalent
criteria that might sustain such an undertaking? What is the nature of the relationship
between these two spaces: is it a hegemonic-like acculturation (a substantial and univocal
influence spreading from the Mediterranean area towards the Black Sea), is it a lack of
connecting elements (each zone having its own historical evolutions, cultural and
political coagulations impervious to one another), is it a clash of civilisations (marked by
irreconcilable tensions and antagonisms) or is it rather a dialogue of cultures and an
exchange of material, cultural and spiritual goods, with a formative effect on both
geographical matrices? It is around these key-questions that the second edition of the
International Symposium The Mediterranean Model and the Extended Region of the
Black Sea was riveted, a conference conjointly hosted by the University of South East
Europe Lumina and the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, together with the Italian
Institute for Philosophical Studies of Naples.
Starting from the premise that only an interdisciplinary approach is able to answer
these questions, the first edition of the Symposium (Bucharest, 2012) succeeded, through
the attendees contributions, to theoretically and methodologically circumscribe the
tackled issue and to offer an overall perspective (highlighting the complexity of the
topic), due to the variety of the subjects dealt with and to the approaches assumed by the
contributors.
The 2013 edition of the Symposium continued the analytical approach by focusing
the contributions and dilations on new and complementary aspects to those treated in
the previous edition, as well as by a thoroughgoing analysis of merely sketched
perspectives during the first edition regarding the relation between the Mediterranean
Model and the Extended Region of the Black Sea. In this connection, the three thematic
panels represented the starting point for discussions, as well as a challenge for the
participants to identify the nature of the relationship between the Mediterranean Model
and the Extended Region of the Black Sea, from an as actual as possible perspective,
considering withal both the elements of particularity and the dynamics of the inherent
transfers of cultural goods specific to these confluence zones, namely the Mediterranean
and Pontic spaces.
Thus, the first panel, Democracy and political Representation in the
Mediterranean Space and the Extended Region of the Black Sea, concentrated on the
analysis of topics such as: civic culture and constitutionalism, political representation and
quality of democracy, national educational policies and the European model in the two
studied zones. The second workshop, International Relations at the Confluence of the
176
Mediterranean Space and the Extended Region of the Black Sea, put forward for
discussion the concept of Mediterranean-Pontic space in the field of international
relations, as well as a review of the more or less successful regional cooperation projects
of recent history, but also of the actuality of the Mediterranean space and the region of
the Black Sea. Finally, the section entitled Neo-liberalism and the Welfare State, a
Current Challenge for the Countries of the Mediterranean Space and the Extended
Region of the Black Sea invited the contributors to focus on theoretic disputes from the
economic sphere, and especially on social and economic consequences, and the political
legacy of Keynesianism, bringing likewise into question the actual relevance of the
European Social Model.
The second edition of the international Symposium The Mediterranean Model
and the Extended Region of the Black Sea was attended by representatives of the
academic environment of Romania, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Turkey and
Italy. The closing session turned into a vivid genuine debate with projections to the
medium term future.
Professor Vittore Collina of the University of Florence highlighted the complexity
of todays social and political reality at the global level, the difficulties democratic regimes
are confronted with in adapting to real world situations, as well as the importance of
mass media and the way they change individuals social life, especially due to the internet.
In the end, professor Collina underlined the fascination the Mediterranean space and the
region of the Black Sea arouse even nowadays, and he stressed the idea that the
interconnectivity between the two zones ought to be thoroughly analysed as a major
issue in the European Unions line of thought, at the level of policy-making.
Professor Luigi Di Comite of the University of Bari Aldo Moro of Italy presented
the conclusions of the panel he chaired regarding international relations in the
Mediterranean Basin laying emphasis on a pivotal topic, i.e. demography: migration,
decline in fertility rates and aging of populations. If in the 1950s only a small percentage
of the population reached 80 years, today this threshold is constantly overcome in many
European countries. Also in the 1950s, the average age did not exceed 35 years in
developing countries, whereas today it is of about 60 years. This phenomenon is
accompanied by a progressive decline in birth rates. Peoples territorial mobility and
chiefly migration from rural zones to urban environments, which has become a global
phenomenon (Tokyo exceeds 20 million of souls and Istanbul has more than 10 million
of inhabitants), raises concerns as regards cities capacity to expand and the future
management of food these growing populations need. Yet there is a benefit in these
migrations, videlicet they eliminate the risk of self-referentiality, and bring about a
change in the qualitative self-evaluation, marking the passage from the concept of
assimilation to that of coexistence.
Associate professor Drago Vasile of the University of South-East Europe
Lumina gave a summary of the discussions of the panel whose moderator he was, and
whose main concern was the economic situation and in particular the disparities between
different regions, including those recoded in the Mediterranean Basin (for instance
North versus South), as well as those existing in the wider Black Sea region. The legacy
of the socialist era in these young democracies led to different strategies in order to
177
achieve market economy status, spanning from gradualism (Romanias case) to policies
of shock therapy. Which is the economic model to be followed is still an open question.
Additionally, the participants also discussed the effects of globalisation on business and
the possibility of more thoroughly harmonising national legislations.
The conclusions of the debates around the regional security complex, the model
of Western Balkans and Southern Caucasus, the influence of external factors on these
spaces, along with the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region not only for the
European Union, but also for the Unites States and the Russian Federation, enhanced
the special attention paid to the South-Eastern zone of the Mediterranean as regards
energy security. During the same panel discussions, the most proper approach and the
strategic changes in relation to the Arab zone in the context of the global economic crisis
and the Arab Spring were also largely commented upon by the attendees.
The participants in the symposium made interesting proposals as to the topics of
the following edition and decided that Heterogeneity versus Homogeneity in
Mediterranean and Pontic Societies be the main subject of the 2014 edition of the
international Symposium the Mediterranean Model and the Extended Region of the
Black Sea.
Filip STANCIU
178
SIGNALS
I. RECENTLY PUBLISHED
Sharyl CROSS, Savo KENTERA, R. Craig NATION,
Radovan VUKADINOVIC,
Shaping South East Europes Security Community for the TwentyFirst Century. Trust, Partnership, Integration,
Palgrave Macmillan, May 2013.
This book brings together leading academic specialists and policy
practitioners to explore and develop cooperative approaches for
managing critical contemporary and emerging security challenges
for South-East Europe and the wider international community.
Including a range of contributors from South-East European
countries, the United States, and other interested regional parties,
this book focuses upon trust, partnership, and a striving for
more effective regional integration. In antithesis to traditional
approaches to national security driven by the illusions of power
and national egotism, this collection adopts what has become the
dominant approach to security management in South-East
Europe today an attempt to conceptualize and realize security
in all of its aspects as a cooperative endeavour for the collective good. This book
explores transnational challenges that will dominate the international security agenda in
the years to come, in South-East Europe and beyond. Issues considered include
management of weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, transnational organized
crime and corruption, violent extremism and terrorism, energy security, maritime
security, economic development, and demographic change.
179
Ben SHEPHERD,
Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare,

With this book, Ben Shepherd, an important scholar in the field
of military history, offers us insight into the complex and
harrowing history of the German Armys occupation of the
former Yugoslavia from 1941-1943. By analyzing the command
structures at the divisional and regimental level, Shepherd helps
to explain how and why the violence ebbed and flowed in the
various occupied regions. But he also looks further down, to see
how the behavior of specific units was shaped by the vagaries of
terrain, supply, the character of the opposition, and even certain
commanders backgrounds and experiences. Always cautious not
to make claims beyond the limits of his evidence, Shepherd
nevertheless draws important conclusions about how history, personality, and National
Socialist ideology shaped the behavior of the German Army in the Second World War.
By his scientific approach, Sheperd manages to throw a clear light on the foggy and
chaotic political and military environment in the Balkans during those years.
Eric LOHR,
Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union,

This is the first book to trace the Russian states citizenship
policy throughout its history. Focusing on the period from the
mid-nineteenth century to the consolidation of Stalins power in
the 1930s, Eric Lohr considers whom the state counted among
its citizens and whom it took pains to exclude. His research
reveals that the Russian attitude toward citizenship was less
xenophobic and isolationist and more similar to European
attitudes than has been previously thought until the drive
toward autarky after 1914. Drawing on untapped sources in the
Russian police and foreign affairs archives, Lohrs research is
grounded in case studies of immigration, emigration,
naturalization, and loss of citizenship among individuals and groups, including Jews,
Muslims, Germans, and other minority populations. Lohr explores how reform of
citizenship laws in the 1860s encouraged foreigners to immigrate and conduct business
in Russia. For the next half century, citizenship policy was driven by attempts to
modernize Russia through intensifying its interaction with the outside world. But, states
the author of the book, a growing suspicion toward non-Russian minorities, particularly
Jews, led to a reversal of this openness during the First World War and to a Soviet
regime that deprived whole categories of inhabitants of their citizenship rights. Lohr sees
180
these Soviet policies as dramatically divergent from longstanding Russian traditions and
suggests that in order to understand the citizenship dilemmas Russia faces today
including how to manage an influx of Chinese laborers in Siberia we must return to
pre-Stalin history.
Florin GRECU,
Construcia unui partid unic: Frontul Renaterii Naionale,

Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2012.
Florin Grecus book represents a scientific approach, built from
an interdisciplinary point of view (at the border of political
science domain, of history and of the constitutional law), that
highlights the way in which the single party system was built in
Romania, during the period 1938 1940, and is trying to offer a
new vision on this subject. The research is based on the study of
documents from the Central Historical National Archives and on
many central and local government reports, regarding The
National Renaissance Front, entitled afterwards the Nation Party.
Florin Grecu reveals the relationship between the party founded
by the authoritarian regime of King Charles the Second and the
state institutions, through which the members of this political party had acquired also the
status of public servants. The main conclusion of the book is that The National
Renaissance Front, as a unique party, the cult of personality imposed by the King
Charles the Second and the misuse of the corporatism theory, represented a political
laboratory for the communist totalitarian regime which was established in Romania after
1945.
*** The University of South-East Europe Lumina in Bucharest;
Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies in Naples,
Mediterranean Pattern and the Extended Region of the Black Sea.

Political, Economical and Cultural Confluences,
Ars Docendi, Bucureti, 2013.
This collective volume contains papers presented at the first
edition of the International Symposium Mediterranean Model
and the Extended Region of the Black Sea (Bucharest, June
2012), organized by The University of South - East Europe
Lumina in Bucharest and The Italian Institute for Philosophical
Studies in Naples. The book is based on an interdisciplinary
approach and is structured in three sections as follows: Institutions
and politics, Cultural interferences, Economy and society. Within these
thematic categories, the articles are highlighting on the one hand,
181
a well-structured, functional and paradigmatic Mediterranean Model and, on the other

hand, evinced a series of possible arguments conducive to the validation of a model for
the Extended Region of the Black Sea, with values cemented in specific conditions, still,
at the same time, in the context of an uninterrupted communication (which included
dialogue, openness, as well as competition) with the representative model of Western
Europe.
Polis. Revist de tiine Politice

Polis is a Review of Political Science founded in 1994 by IMAS
which was published until 1999 when its appearance was
interrupted. In a very short time, Polis has become a prestigious
publication in political science with contributors including
personalities such as Alexandru Duu, Dan Pavel, Adrian - Paul
Iliescu. Since 2011, Polis has been taken by the Faculty of Political
Science of the "Petre Andrei" University of Iai, and this year (2013)
was relaunched in a new series, whose first issue includes opinions
and analysis on topics such as: tradition of Polis journal; the
relationship between civil society, ethnicity and state; the ratio
between conservatism, modernization and tradition; Tocquevilles
perspective about democracy; political elites in the history of modern and contemporary
Romania.
Eugen LUNGU,
Zece ani de turbulene n securitatea lumii 2001 - 2011,

Editura Institutului de tiine Politice i Relaii Internaionale, Bucureti, 2013.
Eugen Lungus book is a comprehensive analysis of the decade
2001-2011 in terms of international relations. The author passes
in the review a wide range of challenges to the stability of certain
sensitive regions such as Russia or the Middle East. In this
context, a special attention is given also to the impact that U.S.
foreign policy has had on global security in the analyzed period.
In this regard, it is emphasized the Bush administrations failure
to respond adequately to the global threat of terrorism. In fact,
one of the more important contributions of this academic
research consists in putting into discussion the issue of U.S. abuse
of power in world politics. In this respect, Lungu highlights the
elements of continuity between the neoconservative doctrine of preemptive strike
assumed by the Republicans and the Obama administrations perspective on the current
U.S. foreign policy.
182
II. TO BE PUBLISHED THIS YEAR

Andrew CHADWICK ,
The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power,

Oxford University Press, 2013.
In his book, Andrew Chadwick emphasizes the way in which the
diffusion and fast evolution of new communication technologies
has reshaped media and politics. Proposing a new theory of how
political communication currently works, Chadwick examines
news making in all of its contemporary professional" and
amateur" forms, parties and election campaigns, activist
movements, and government communication. He presents
compelling illustrations of the hybrid media system in flow, from
American presidential campaigns to WikiLeaks, from live prime
ministerial debates to hotly-contested political scandals, from the
daily practices of journalists, campaign workers, and bloggers to
the struggles of new activist organizations. This wide-ranging book maps the emerging
balance of power between older and newer media technologies, genres, norms,
behaviors, and organizational forms. This book reveals how the clash of older and
newer media logics causes chaos and disintegration but also surprising new patterns of
order and integration.
183
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Cristian ANDREI
M.A. and B.A. in Political Science at the University of Bucharest. He is a
political consultant, founder of the Political Rating Agency (ARP) and
researcher in political science and political marketing. His professional
practice covers a wide range of political marketing applications, from polling
and strategy to media services and campaign management. His research
interests are political marketing development, electoral systems, electoral
behaviour and the impact of media messages. He is member in the editorial
board of the Journal of Political Marketing. Some of his publications: Despre
efectele sistemului electoral romnesc, cu ajutorul unei simulri electorale,
Expert electoral, No. 2, 2013; Romanias Total War. How Political Marketing
Strategies Work in a Democratisation Process (that is to be published in the
Journal of Political Marketing, 2013).
Silviu-Gabriel BARBU
Ph.D. in juridical sciences, postgraduate course in criminal sciences and B.A.
at the Law Faculty, University of Bucharest. He is Associate Professor at the
Faculty of Law University of Transilvania, Braov, Deputy General
Secretary at the Ministery of Justice, Judge at the Braov Court of Appeal.
Among the positions he held in the past: Associated professor at the Law
Faculty within the University of Bucharest (2006-2007), State Counselor at
the Legislative Constitutional Department within the Presidential
Administration (2006-2007), Judge at the Criminal section within the Braov
Tribunal (2006), Military prosecutor inspector within the Military
Prosecutors Office attached to the Bucharest Military Court of Appeal
(2004-2005), Consultant expert JHA (2004), National expert Council of
Europe, Strasbourg (2002-2004). Published scientific works: Dimensiunea
constituional a libertii individuale, Hamangiu, Bucureti, 2012; Drept execuional
penal, Sitech, Craiova, 2010; Curs de drept execuional penal, All Beck, Bucureti,
2005 (co-author); Curs de drept penal, Omnia Uni SAST, Braov, 2005 (coauthor).
Ioana-Bianca BERNA
Ph.D. in Political Science, in the field of International Relations, at the
National School of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest. She has
collaborated as a seminar attendant (Romanian Foreign Policy Courses) within the
Foreign Relations and European Integration Department, National School
184
of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest. Recent publication: The

South China Sea: From the Haze of History to the Disengaged Carbon of
Todays Skirmishes, Journal of East European and Asian Studies, 2013. Her
research interests are: East Asia area studies and theories of identity-building
in IR.
Sonia CATRINA
Ph.D. in Social and Cultural Anthropology at Victor Segalen University of
Bordeaux and Ph.D. in Sociology at University of Bucharest. She is
associated teacher at the University of Bucharest (Faculty of Political
Sciences). She is interested in the construction of identity and ethnicity:
interactions, contact situations, social mobilizations and empowerment.
Her current research project analyses the multivocality of cultural heritage
through the lens of its perception both of different Romanian actors in
charge with making heritage and individual actors who undertake an
indigenous heritage preservation typical of private family museums as an
identity construction tool connected with time and space. An important
chapter in the sphere of identity is: Lhritage communiste des
communauts villageoises de Maramure et son usage dans la pratique
touristique (in Alain Berger, Pascal Chevalier, Genevive Corts, Marc
Dedeire (eds.), Patrimoines, Hritages et dveloppement rural en Europe,
LHarmattan, Paris, pp. 91-106, 2010). In addition, she is author of several
articles and chapters on ethnicity, such as: Roma Children in CommunityBased Europe. Exploring the Shape of Cultural Boundaries (European
Journal of Science and Theology, June 2013, Vol. 9, pp. 85-94) and Identity
Perceptions and Buildings of the Hungarian Minority in Relationship to the
Romanian Majority Identifications (in Mircea Brie, Sorin Sipos and Ioan
Horga (eds.), Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union
Eastern Border, Cambridge Scholars Publishing House, Cambridge, 2013,
pp.65-85).
Emanuel COPILA
Ph.D. Assistant Professor at the Political Science Department, West
University of Timioara. He is the author of the book Geneza leninismului
romantic. O perspectiv teoretic asupra orientrii internaionale a comunismului
romnesc, 1948-1989, (Genesis of Romantic Leninism. A Theoretical Perspective over
the International Orientation of Romanian Communism, 1948-1989), Institutul
European, Iai, 2012. He has published scientific articles in journals such as:
East European Politics and Societies, Sfera Politicii, Studia Europaea, Revista de Stiine
Politice, Revista Romn de Geografie Politic, Impact Strategic, Geopolitica, Annales
185
Universitatis Apulensis Series Historica, Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George

Bariiu Series Historica, Valahian Journal of Historical Studies, Romanian Review of
International Studies, Political Studies Forum, Geographica Timisensis, Colloquium
Politicum, Colocviu Strategic. Major interest fields: the theory of International
Relations, the political ideologies, the political history, theories of
totalitarianism.
Drago COSMESCU
He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences, from the University of Bucharest,
after a Master in Political Sciences at the Faculty of Political Sciences,
following majors in political sciences, as well as International Economic
Relations (at the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest). The Ph.D.
thesis, coordinated by Professor Teodor Melecanu, is entitled Endogenous
and exogenous factors in the political transition. Towards a new theory of
regime change. Previously, he has taught classes on comparative politics, at
the Faculty of Political Sciences, namely Comparative Democratisation
and Typology of non-democratic regimes. Recent publication:
Democracy and the Authoritarian Tendencies: the influence of the political
regime on the societies in transition, ISPAIM - Monitor Strategic, No. 1-2,
2012, pp. 91-101.
Sabin Daniel DRGULIN
He is Associate Professor at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University,
Bucharest (Faculty of Political Sciences) and partner researcher at the Faculty
of Political Science, Petre Andrei University, Iai. He holds a B.A. from
the Faculty of History (1997) and a B.A. from the Faculty of Political Science
(2009), University of Bucharest. He obtained the Ph.D. title in history (2007)
at the Faculty of History, tefan cel Mare University of Suceava. Since
2009, he has been secretary general in the editorial office of the political
science journal Sfera Politicii. Since 2013 he has been executive editor at the
international journal South-East European Journal of Political Science. In the
academic year 2000-2001, he attended the courses and seminars of Facolta
degli Studi di Perugia. In 2013, he graduated from the postdoctoral school at
the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. A part of the
postdoctoral program unfolded at Universita degli Studi di Bari Aldo
Moro and La Sapienza Universita di Roma. He has written two books:
one book as a unique author (The History of the Romanian Political Thinking, Pro
Universitaria, Bucureti, 2010) and a book as a first author (The Modern
Political and Contemporary Universal History, Editura Universitar, Bucureti,
2010). He and Florin Mitrea have supervised the volume entitled The
186
Mediterranean Model and the Extended Black Sea Region. Political, Economic and
Cultural Confluences (Ars Docendi, Bucureti, 2013).
Saa GAVRI
He graduated in 2007 Political and Administrative Sciences (B.A.) at the
University of Konstanz (Germany) and holds a M.A. in International
Relations (Sarajevo). Currently he is working as executive director of the
Sarajevo Open Centre, leading projects related to human rights and political
participation. Research areas: constitutional reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, federalism, human rights. Most important publications: Das
Politische System Bosnien-Herzegovinas (co-author: Solveig Richter),
published in the collection of papers Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (editor:
Wolfgang Ismayr), VS Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2010;
the collection of papers Drava, drutvo i politika u Bosni i Hercegovini analiza
postdejtonskog politickog sistema (editor together with Damir Banovi),
University Press/Magistrat, Sarajevo, 2011.
Florin GRECU
Ph.D., M.A. and B.A. in Political Sciences at the University of Bucharest. He
is Ph.D. Lecturer of Political Sciences at Hyperion University, Bucharest.
Recent publications: Construcia unui partid unic. Frontul Renaterii Naionale,
Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2012; Campania electoral din mai 1939:
mecanisme, proceduri i comportament electoral, Sfera Politicii, No. 169,
2012, pp. 134-144; Regimul i principiile Constituiei de la 1938, Sfera
Politicii, No. 172, 2012, pp. 70-82.
Fulco LANCHESTER
He is professor of Italian and Comparative Constitutional Law, director of
the Political Science Departement at the University La Sapienza (Rome)
and of the Centro di Ricerca in Teoria dello Stato e trasformazioni della
politica tra lOttocento ed il Novecento. He is also member of the scientific
committees of Quaderni costituzionali, Rassegna parlamentare, Revista de derecho
constitucional europeo. Major recent publications: La legislazione elettorale degli Stati
dell'Europa centro-orientale (Giornate Amedeo Giannini), Giuffr, Milano, 1995; I
successori dell'impero. Le costituzioni degli ordinamenti ex URSS (in collaborazione
con M.P. Ragionieri), Giuffr, Milano, 1998; Finanziamento della politica e
corruzione, Giuffr, Milano, 2000; La Costituzione degli altri. Cronache costituzionali
di sette ordinamenti stranieri tra il 2000 e il 2004, Giuffr, Milano, 2005; Codice
delle votazioni nell'ordinamento costituzionale italiano (in collaborazione con A.
Gigliotti, P. Mezzanotte), Istituto poligrafico dello Stato, Roma, 2007. Major
187
interest fields: the political representation, the electoral systems, State and
government, constitutional history, Italian and German legal thought.
Viorella MANOLACHE is a scientific researcher III, Ph.D., at the Romanian
Academy, Institute of the Political Sciences and International Relations. She
has graduated Political Science Faculty (2006), Law Faculty (2007), Master in
Journalism and Public Relations (2007) at Lucian Blaga University, Sibiu.
She owns a Ph.D. in history (2009) Faculty of History, University of
Bucharest. She has accomplished her postdoctoral studies in 2010 at the
University
of
Bucharest
and
the
University
Roma
Tre
(POSDRU/89/1.5/S/64162 EUROPAEUS). She is the author of 10 books,
the latest one: Homo Posthistoricus Profil filosofico-politic, Astra Museum
Publishing House (edited by Techno Media, Sibiu, 2012). She has published
one co-authored book Cartografierea marginalitii (with Henrieta Anioara
erban), ISPRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 and coordinated two
international collective volumes Centru i margine la Marea Mediteran. Filosofie
Politic i Realitate Internaional, ISPRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009 and
Dincolo de propagand: un instrumentar istorico-politic al filmului romnesc,
TechnoMedia Publishing House, Sibiu, 2011.
Ph.D. in Political Sciences at the University of Bucharest, with the doctoral
thesis entitled Intellectuals in totalitarianism. Cultural Foundations of the
Polish Critique of Communism (1945 1989); B.A. (2000) and M.A. (2002)
at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest; studies and
academic research at the Jagiellonian University of Cracow and at the
University La Sapienza of Rome. Presently, he is Lecturer at the University
of South-East Europe Lumina (Department of International Relations and
European Studies), Bucharest. He published several scientific articles in
journals such as: Sfera Politicii, Revista de tiine Politice i Relaii Internaionale a
Academiei Romne, Romanoslavica. He and Sabin Drgulin have supervised the
volume entitled The Mediterranean Model and the Extended Black Sea Region.
Political, Economic and Cultural Confluences (Ars Docendi, Bucureti, 2013).
tefania NEAGOE
She is undergraduate student at the University of South-East Europe Lumina
from Bucharest (Department of International Relations and European
Studies). She is a former intern at Europe Direct Bucharest (European
Institute of Romania) and International Student Identity Card (ISIC)
Association. She volunteered for European Federation of UNESCO Clubs,
188
Centres and Associations (EFUCA). She represented Suomen

Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue in the European Parliament at NAPOMUN,
Cluj-Napoca Model United Nations 2012, and participated in the project
Construction of Youthworker institution, organized by the EU (European
Social Fund) and National Agency for Sports and Youth, in Predeal, 2012.
She is the co-author (with Alexandra Panait) of Inclusive Democracy in the
Middle East, a paper which was presented at the International Conference
of International Relations and Security Studies (7th Edition), at Lucian
Blaga University of Sibiu, in May 2013. Major fields of interest: Human
Rights, feminism, ethics and multiculturalism.
Alexandra PANAIT
She is undergraduate student at the University of South-East Europe Lumina
from Bucharest (Department of International Relations and European
Studies) and volunteer in the CRIM (Creativity and Imagination) Project
undertaken by the Civic Organization Miliia Spiritual. She is a former
intern at the European Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and
Associations (EFUCA), Bucharest. She is the co-author (with tefania
Neagoe) of Inclusive Democracy in the Middle East, a paper which was
presented at the International Conference of International Relations and
Security Studies (7th Edition), at Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, in May
2013. Her main interests are: social movements and civil society, democracy
and citizenship, multiculturalism.
Cristian-Ion POPA
Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Bucharest (2006); graduate of the
Postdoctoral School of Political Science at the University of Bucharest
(2013); senior researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International
Relations of Romanian Academy (since 1991). Books by author: Puterea
politic i bunurile publice. O perspectiv economic asupra politicii, Academia
Romn, Editura ISPRI, Bucureti, 2009; Teorii ale societii moderne. Evaluri i
reconstrucii actuale, Academia Romn, Editura ISPRI, Bucureti, 2005.
Research interests: modern and contemporary political philosophy, public
choice, constitutional economy.
Ilia ROUBANIS
He holds a Ph.D. in Social and Political Sciences from the European
University Institute in Florence. He is a Scientific Associate at the Hellenic
Parliament and Lecturer at the National School of Public Administration in
Athens. Since 2005 he has been working for numerous think-tanks, as a
189
political consultant, as well as teaching in the Democritus University of

Thrace and the National School of Public Administration in Athens. Recent
publications: The Challenge of Keeping the Negotiation Process on Tracess
on track, in Mensur Akgun (ed.), Managing Intractable Conflicts: Lessons from
Moldova and Cyprus, GPOT, Istanbul Kultur University, 2013; Independence,
Democracy and the Russian Taboo, Caucasus International, Vol. 2, No. 2,
Baku & Ankara, 2012; Folk Culture & Nation-Building in the Less than
Developed World: A study on the visual culture of citizenship, in Timothy
Baycroft and David Hopkin (eds.), Folklore and Nationalism in the long
nineteenth-century, Koniklijke Brill Publications, 2012; Food Security, Human
Security and the Black Sea: the Instructive Case Study of 2010-2011 Events,
ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 23, 2011. His research interests gravitate towards
European Area Studies (European Neighbourhood), with a methodological
preference for comparative approaches and several publications on themes
such as foreign policy, human security, institutional development, the oil and
gas sector, protracted conflicts and identity politics.
Filip STANCIU
Ph.D. in Sciences of Education, Al. I. Cuza University of Iai (2000);
graduated from the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (1981);
certified in The management of educational systems, International Institute
for Educational Planning, UNESCO, Paris, 1996; Associate Professor and
Rector of the University of South-East Europe Lumina, Bucharest.
Publications: The Romanian school at the beginning of the 3rd millennium, Paideia
Publishing House, Bucureti, 1997 (co-author); The anthology of laws in
Romanian Education, The Institute of Education Sciences, Bucureti, 2004 (coauthor); University in a new light... The University of South-East Europe Lumina, Pro
Universitaria, Bucureti, 2010 (co-author); The fundamentals of education, Vol.
I, Pro Universitaria, Bucureti, 2010 (coord.).
190
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191
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Press, Michigan, 1995, p. 70.
Giulia SANDRI, Carlo PALA, Limpact du processus de rgionalisation sur le systme politique
et de partis italien, in Jean-Benoit PILET, Jean-Michel DE WAELE, Serge JAUMAIN (eds.),
Labsence des partis nationaux: menace ou opportunit, ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles,
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2 Ibidem, pp. 9-24.
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4 Idem, Ce que parler veut dire. Lconomie des changes linguistiques, Fayard, Paris, 1982.
5 Antoine ROGER, Economic Development and Positioning of Ethnic Political Parties:
Comparing Post-Communist Bulgaria and Romania, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1,
2002, pp. 20-42.
6 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communitiescit., p. 145.
7 Antoine ROGER, Economic Development and Positioning...cit..
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192
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See http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/const_1948.php (accessed 22.06.2013).

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became a camouflage, an umbrella for the illegality of democratic political parties,

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Defining the provisions of the act adopted on 27 February 1938, which

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Armand CLINESCU, Noul Regim, Imprimeria Central, Bucureti, 1939, p. 105.

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The separation of powers principle became the concrete concept of concentration

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Universul, No. 153 of 7 June 1939.

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Elements for a Theory of Decentralized Governance

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