FAMILY CODE

ARTICLE I: CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE

ARTICLE II: CONSENT OF PARTIES; BREACH OF PROMISE

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO

SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC

399 SCRA 10 (2003)

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness and uprightness.

Nature: Administrative Case

PARTIES:
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality. Complainant
alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the
MTCBrookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a
girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the
letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate reflecting the names of respondent
and Dedje Irader as her parents. Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by
the petitioner was just a mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred and
jealousy. By respondents own admission however, he had an illicit relationship with
the petitioners wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit relationship was
explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a kasunduan in
writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their
marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one
would go to court to institute any action against the other.

FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who
feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok,
Thailand. The procedure was successful he (she) now has a female body.
Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to
Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before
the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can
marry his American fianc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.

HELD:
SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and
effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the
family code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature and
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is
an institution of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law which
cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may
be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.

Respondent is suspended for 6 months.

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction

The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on
equity; that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing
and should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his
petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness
on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and the realization of their dreams.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support
in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name

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in petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition
of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming
that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which
it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under
the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender reassignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a
petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support
it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was
born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is
that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.
FACTS:
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on
filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Not in conformity, the OSG
filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar
to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to
enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

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HELD:
No, respondents marriage is not void.
The court said:
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The court also explained that There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it
suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs COURT OF APPEALS

103 Phil 629
Civil Law Torts and Damages
Breach of Promise to Marry Moral Damages
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an
insurance underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship
pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a regular intimate and sexual
affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to
marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month,
Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.

Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his
daughter with Soledad and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to
marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad.
He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires that
being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.
HELD:
No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of
Appeals based its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in
part that Moral damages may be recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it
must be noted that the Seduction being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision
is the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised
Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction)
Soledad given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than
Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall than Francisco
who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she
surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on
September 4 of the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the
preparations for their wedding. However, two days before their marriage, Paking left a
note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother was against it. A day before
their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking
did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit
against the former. Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary
damages to Wassmer.

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Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day
because of fortuitous events. He also insisted that he cannot be civilly liable for there
is no law that acts upon the breach of promise to marry. He also contested the award
of moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise
to marry suit.
HELD:
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, Wassmer
has already made preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear on the
wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy which is embodied
on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled to moral
damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velezs acted in wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to marry Wassmer.

ARTICLE IV: REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B.
Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server).
Respondents are: Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II.
All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married
just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato
Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya &
Gina Bismonte.
As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts

and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually
several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to
him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do
so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage
by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date
and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo &
Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated
by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite
license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests
which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:

Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license

along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola
including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon
who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by
judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their
marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife
even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge
explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real
one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The
court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the
marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed
a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6
years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only

FAMILY CODE
18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years
already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must
have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to
believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in
order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.

ARTICLE VII: WHO CAN SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE

BESO VS. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000
Complainant: Zenaida S. Beso
Respondent: Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan, Pagsanjan,
Samar
Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago
FACTS:
Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the
Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a
copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil
Registrar with the following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants fiance, Bernardito A.
Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondents
residence in Calbayog City, Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire
regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was
not registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that
all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the
complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the

complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be
not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondents failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because
Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11,
1998 found the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
ISSUES:
The issues raised in this complaint are:
(1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction;
and
(2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and
not registering the complainants marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the
Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, Any incumbent member
of the judiciary with the courts jurisdiction. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of
the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a
marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.
In this case, non of the three instances is present.
(2) Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code,
such duty to register the marriage is the respondents duty. The same article provides,
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to send the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage,
to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper
receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting
copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, and
in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8..
The recommendation of the OCA stands.

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ARTICLE 23: PROOF OF MARRIAGE; PRESUMPTION OF
MARRIAGE
PEOPLE VS. BORROMEO
133 SCRA 106
FACTS:
At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told
Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was
killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn,
told his father and together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found Susanas
lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the
weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were
legally and validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not parricide.
He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day
and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and
that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
ISSUE:
Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
HELD:
In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are
presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of
society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of
the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of
the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration
and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and
law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long
as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda
vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity
increased from 12,000 to 30,000

TRINIDAD V. CA
289 SCRA 189
FACTS:
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and
Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He
presented the following evidence.
a.
b.
c.
d.

testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got
married.

Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios
claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was
simply a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she
is shown holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are
sufficient.
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of
marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate
of the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the
birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is
admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO VS.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

PEREZ, J.:

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FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a
marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR
were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but
Eustaquio left his family in 1954.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the
birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/
records were destroyed.
Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on
30 March 1979 and showed the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of
marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and
wife and begot four children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial evidence
created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of
the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?
RULING:
TECLA

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is

not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no
other proof can be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties;
or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of
the officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and
documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law.

ARTICLE 26: FOREIGN LAWS RELATING TO MARRIAGE;

RELATIVE DIVORCE; PROOF REQUIRED
YANEZ DE BARNUEVO VS. FUSTER
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2000
FACTS:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in
aCatholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892,
Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal
property.Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her
husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of
April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a
public document, by which they resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting

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to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to
Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases.
In the same document, the husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300
pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain,from the month of June of
the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after
which time he ceased to make further payments.In the beginning of March, 1909, the
wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom in
the early days of February of the same year.
On the11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband,alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year
1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had
lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be
granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the
plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal
society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount
of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to
pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which,
reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint,
amounted to P12,959.90.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event
that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners
according to law.Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the
appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with.
These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the
partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the case and partition of property as
decided by the court should be affirmed.
HELD:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th
ofSeptember, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.The two judgments appealed
from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
RATIO:
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised
within the personal xstatus of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory
of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the

sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of
the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. The
jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of
a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . .
All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since
they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the
tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to
enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit
to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute
to secure his rights because of the courts lack of means to enforce them. (Torres
Campos, Elementos de DerechoInternational Privado, p. 108.) Justice, says the
same professor, is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be
administered without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the
litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all
civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to
those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in
some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid,p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in
suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties,
but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal
law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the
territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories
regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it
would be equivalent to recognising extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The
provisions of article 80 of the CivilLaw of Spain is only binding within the dominions of
Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go.
He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in
any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in
Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said
article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law
of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to
territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation.It is a
question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme
Court(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep.,
325).In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
subjects,they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a

FAMILY CODE
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

HELD:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian
citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign
divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court
ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the
ruling.

CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on certiorari

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.
Ponente: Sereno J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on
the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce
decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first
be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC
where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the
basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
Resolution regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.

ISSUES:
WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground
of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.

FAMILY CODE
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Meropein Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said
marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly
not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October
10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of
her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was dismissed by the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the
bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her
grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She
claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the
marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal
and immoral marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the
RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being
bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which
were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21,
1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was
indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando,
does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas. In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the

nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce

decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court
for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce
the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant case.

FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 34: MARRIAGE EXEMPT FROM LICENSE
REQUIREMENT
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife
Teodulfas death. Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because
they lived together for 5 years and thus exempt from marriage license. Some years
after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only
occurs after the death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a petition for
declaration for nullity of marriage (a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void marriages)
between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a marriage license as a
legal basis.
ISSUES:
The lower court dismissed the petition because:
(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a cause of action. Can there be
such a petition when the heirs parent is deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a proper party?
(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is
a must but is a different matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.
The lower court ruled:
(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their fathers
marriage before the latters death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were
used as a basis to dismiss petitioners case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the
Family Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in
force at the time the marriage was contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage
void ab initio. The exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one
described by the Civil Code. It is not the one described by the Civil Code because the
cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires
five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and months before
the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first
marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count
cohabitation.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken.
(4) The judges ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made
identical is erroneous. Void and voidable marriages are not identical.
A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.
A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while a void marriage can never be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.
The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes.

FAMILY CODE
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families
and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.

ISSUE:
Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5
years under Article 34 of Family Code.

(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before
determining succession rights.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.

MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four
children.
On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that
the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage
of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and

HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as
indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment
that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage.

ARTICLE 35: VOID MARRIAGES

ENRICO VS HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO & TRINIDAD MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614

FACTS:
It is petition assailing the RTCs reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents
father. Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married on June 14,
1962, begotten seven children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another
woman named Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed
away.
Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petition
er and the respondents late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the
requisite of marriage license, and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony due to
respondents father serious illness that made its performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her exemption
from getting marriage license. She sought then the dismissal of the respondents filed
action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par.(a) Rule of the family code.

FAMILY CODE
Pursuant to AM -02-11-10- SC embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents
filed action. Respondents filed motion for reconsideration invoking the ruling in the
case of Nial v. Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the
standing to assail a voidable marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC
granted the motion and issued an order for reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed
motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby petitioner assailed a petition directly to
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the
death of Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule AM 02-11-10-SC or Nial v. Bayadog shall govern
the instant case
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity
of the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on AM 02
-11-10-SC shall govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines.
Particularly Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of
a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.Question: Why the rule
on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held decision on Nial v. Bayadog
case whereas the two cases expressed a common cause of issue?Here the court
resolved that; in Nial v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers second marriage even after their fathers death
because the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the
Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli where same holding
cannot be applied because the marriage here was celebrated in 2004 where the
Family Code is already effective and under family code is embodied the rule on AM 02
-11-10- SC where this rule shall govern petitions for the declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.
Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have
still remedy to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

FAMILY CODE
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.

(2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married
petitioner;
(3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondent's marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and
(4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence
null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the
second marriage was contracted.

HELD:
The petition is DENIED.

ARTICLE 36: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

IWASAWA VS GANGAN
GR 204169

LEOUEL SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS

204 SCRA 20 (310 Phil. 21)

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as single and has
never married before. Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year,
petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November
28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009,
petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have
happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private
respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and
that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the
ground that their marriage is a bigamous one.
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous
HELD:
YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely
establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground
that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts:
(1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila

Note: This was the first case where the term psychological incapacity was discussed
by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In
September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia
gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent
interference of Julias parents, as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally
quarreled about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently
from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels
opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home
in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the
US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but
to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to
nullify their marriage due to Julias alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted
that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all
his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it
is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion
between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD:
No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the
term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But

FAMILY CODE
basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in
PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to
decree a nullity of marriage.

CHI MING TSOI VS. CA

since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together
in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General
Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency
status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and
want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the
other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically
capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

NAVARRO JR. VS CECILIO-NAVARRO

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their
fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to
Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.Petitioner and respondent were childhood sweethearts who eventually got
married and their marriage gave birth to four children. The first part of their marriage

G.R. No. 162049. April 13, 2007

FAMILY CODE
was lived in harmony.However, the petitioner claims that even before their marriage
respondent would complain when she didnt get what she wanted from him and she
quarreled with him a lot during their marriage for not having time for her and was
always jealous. A marriage counselor testified that when she saw petitioner he was
harassed, distraught and unhappy and that she found the marriage to be dysfunctional
and destructive. Reconciliation, she said, was impossible. Velasco, another doctor
testified that professionals per se are incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage because of their time and goals. The respondent was said to
be incapacitated because she did not support her husband and was not understanding
of his profession as a doctor. Respondent on the other hand claims that she had no
marital problems until petitioner had an affair with another doctor and she caught him
in a motel where they had an altercation.Petitioner eventually stopped coming home.
She said she only refused to have sex with his husband, as his husband claims, due to
her discovery of the affair. She also said that she did love her husband. The trial court
held that both were psychologically incapacitated and that the marriage is now null and
void. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that the marriage still subsists.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated and such should warrant
the nullification of their marriage.
HELD:
The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Psychological Incapacity must
be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability for it to nullify a
marriage. It must be a mental incapacity that truly renders a person incapable of
performing basic marital obligations such as living together, observing mutual love,
respect and fidelity as well as render mutual help and support. It must be confined to
the most serious cases that would truly remove the significance of marriage. In this
case, the quarrels and bickering as well as the constant arguments cannot be
considered as psychological incapacity. Difficulty, refusal or neglect in performing then
marital obligations is not sufficient, it must be some psychological illness. A previous
decision of the court gave guidelines for deciding similar cases. One of the guidelines
says that the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff and any doubts should be decided
in favor of the subsistence of marriage. The testimony of the marriage counselor was
based only on the claims of petitioner and has no probative value and the statement of
the other witness is highly debatable, hence there is doubt.

ASPILLAGA V. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The fact that certain psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their
marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological disorders do not
manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital
covenants. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Psychological incapacity is
reserved to the most serious cases of personality disorder.
FACTS:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her
return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into
their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora
alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their
marriage and their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated
to enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora
Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological
incapacity
HELD:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995), it has been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

FAMILY CODE
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were
grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties
personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties psychological disorders to
his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations
as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their
performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere
difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA).
The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage (Tongol v.
Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to
perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability
of these disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to
convince. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other
aspects of ones marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground
to declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and even normal,
occurrence between husbands and wives.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and confliction personalities.
It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due
to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not
manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological
incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set
forth in this case:
1. burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
2. root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
3. such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
4. such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
5. such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code
6. decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must
be respected
7. court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on
behalf of the state.

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA V. EDWARD RUMBAUA

G.R No. 166738 August 14, 2009

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The
couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends
whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

FACTS:
On February 23, 1993, Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married in City of
Manila. However, they never lived together in one habitat because their marriage was
a secret to Edward's family. In 1995, Edward's mother died and he blamed Rowena
being responsible for her death associating it to the discovering of their "secret
marriage."Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Court nullified the marriage in its decision on
April 19, 2002.The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rend despite the absence of required

FAMILY CODE
certifications from the Solicitor General. On June 25, 2004, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of theRegional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the
nullification of the parties' marriage.Rowena, not happy with the decision of the Court
of Appeals, filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's
decision be set aside and regional Trials Court's decision be reinstated. The Supreme
Court on August 14, 2009, deny the petition for lack of merit, thus affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004.

HELD:
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be
sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage."

ISSUES:
Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed
psychologically incapacitated according toArticle 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,
coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo,
without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

HELD:
No, the psychologist did not have enough proof because in her psychiatric report, she
did not mention the cause of the respondent's so-called "narcissistic personality
disorder", she failed to explain to the court an insight into the respondents
development years. Furthermore, she did not explain why she came to the conclusion
that the respondent's incapacity is deep seated and incurable", when Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines states that evidence presented must show that the
incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have
known the marital obligations assumed in marriage

SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS RAMON REYES

RICARDO P. TORING V.
TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 185286, AUGUST 18, 2010

FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondents actions, caused the
petitioner to file a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent
alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in
performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to
their children.

G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010

FACTS:
Ricardo and Teresita were married and had 3 children. Ricardo then filed a petition for
annulment based on Teresita psychological incapacity. He alleged that Teresita was an
adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who performed the psychological evaluation
conducted on Ricardo and their son, Richardson, testified that the major factor that
contributed to the demise of the marriage is Teresita Narcissistic Personality Disorder
that rendered her incapable to fulfill her essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void
due to psychological incapacity.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is

psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as
purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and AntiSocial Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent]
to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and
void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
RTC decision and declared the parties marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the
petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, as well as of herself. It held:

FAMILY CODE

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents]
alleged mixed personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed business
ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity,
insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his
business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents]
defects were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In
fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably
and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino
households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the familyowned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business
ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the
[petitioner].
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas.
RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court held:
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never
personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in
their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception
of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had

occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she
could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based
solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner),
testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with
them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis
of the doctors assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal
knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested
in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare
denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and
cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent
does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to
recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business
attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration
of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a
personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting,
and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected
with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.

FAMILY CODE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CESAR ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned
that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then,
Cesar and Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial
support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the
RTCs decision. The Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW:
Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely
the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the
time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged
psychological incapacity.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true,
do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that

completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is set aside.

REPUBLIC V. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga
Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that
he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship in light of her
accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their conjugal abode and
sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer
Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another
man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from utter emotional immaturity.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological
incapacity?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can
be equated with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos
testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could
be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore, granted and the
decision of CA reversed and set aside.