[G.R. No. 107345. January 27, 1994.

]
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
SIY, respondents.

OF

APPEALS

and

WILSON

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 28714 dated 23
June 1992 affirming the order of the trial court dated 22 January 1986 in Civil Case No.
144269, BA Finance Corporation v. Yanky Hardware Co., Inc., for replevin with damages or, in the alternative, for
payment of P559,565.00 plus interest.
On 15 June 1976, Yanky hardware Company, Inc. (YANKY, for brevity), applied for and was granted
by BA Finance Corporation a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line under which YANKY could from
time to time discount with and assign its trade receivables to petitioner. To secure the payment of all its loans, YANKY
executed a chattel mortgage over its stock-in-trade or merchandise inventory in favor of petitioner. To guarantee
those loans, Antonio Ngui Yek Siem, President and General Manager of YANKY, executed a continuing suretyship
agreement in favor of petitioner.
On various occasions, YANKY drew on that credit accommodation and executed in favor of petitioner separate deeds
of assignment.
In time, petitioner demanded from YANKY the payment of its accumulated obligations which, as of 20 October 1981,
had allegedly reached the amount of P559,565.00, or the delivery of the mortgaged chattels for purposes of
extrajudicial foreclosure.
On 21 October 1981, petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance a complaint against YANKY and Antonio
Ngui Yek Siem for replevin with damages or, in the alternative, payment of the amount of P559,565.00 plus interest.
Petitioner contended that it had the right to take possession of the chattels described in the chattel mortgage or to be
paid the total amount of the loans plus interest since YANKY had breached the conditions of the chattel mortgage by
failing to pay the amounts secured thereby. cdll
On 26 October 1981, the trial court ordered the seizure of all the merchandise and other personal properties
described in the chattel mortgage. The sheriff accordingly seized chattels found in the premises of YANKY and later
transferred them to petitioner's warehouse. He then issued a sheriff's receipt dated 26 October 1981 containing a list
of the properties seized and a sheriff's return dated 4 November 1981. But on 5 November 1981, the sheriff filed
another report which, according to him, superseded the earlier list, stating therein that this list was arrived at after he
and some of petitioner's employees had conducted a reinventory of the replevied chattels in petitioner's warehouse.
YANKY and Antonio Ngui Yek Siem filed an answer claiming that since not all of their obligations were due, petitioner
had as yet no cause of action against them.
Meanwhile, YANKY came into deep financial difficulties. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), China
Banking Corporation (China Bank) and International Corporate Bank (Interbank) intervened in the replevin case as
creditors of YANKY. During the pre-trial conference on 27 February 1984, RCBC moved for the sale at public auction
of the replevin chattels in order to prevent further depreciation of their value. Petitioner and the rest of the intervenors
agreed with the motion. On the same day, the trial court accordingly issued an order granting the motion for the sale
of the mortgaged properties at public auction and directing that the proceeds of the sale be deposited in a
government bank.
In compliance with the aforesaid order, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated 3 April 1984 announcing the
public auction sale on 24 April 1984 of the chattels included in the list of mortgaged properties mentioned in the
notice.
In the auction sale, Lito Ramos was declared the highest bidder. Unfortunately, he failed to remit the amount of his
bid. As a consequence of his failure, another auction sale had to be conducted and rescheduled on various dates.
Eventually, a public auction sale was held on 31 May 1984 at petitioner's warehouse, as evidenced by a Notice of

Sheriff's Sale dated 21 May 1984 of "Assorted Hardware for Cash." The highest bidder was respondent Wilson Siy
with a bid price of P60,000.00. After Wilson Siy tendered the amount of his bid, a Certificate of Sale was issued.
Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Auction Sale stating that it was not given an opportunity to participate
in the sale and was deprived of its right to bid considering that the winning bid of P60,000.00 was insufficient
compared to the proposed bid of plaintiff which was willing to go up to P150,000.00; that since the other bidders
criticized the representative for not bringing cash for the public bidding, it was forced to put together P150,000.00 in
bills, and since the counting of the bills took some time, its representative arrived late for the bidding. prLL
On 1 June 1984, the sheriff submitted a Sheriff's Report which detailed the factual antecedents of the auction sale.
The trial court then cancelled the auction sale.
On 6 June 1984, private respondent Siy, as the highest bidder in the 31 May 1984 auction sale, filed his motion for
reconsideration on the following grounds : (a) Petitioner was afforded full opportunity to participate in the 31 May
1984 public auction sale; (b) The sale of the properties in the public auction was consummated, thereby vesting legal
title to the movant as highest bidder who should not be deprived of such properties of such properties without due
process of law; and (c) The bid price of movant, contrary to the allegation of petitioner, was not shockingly low and
hence was not a ground to nullify the public auction sale.
In an order dated 20 June 1984, the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and modified its 1 June 1984
order holding that respondent Siy agreed to put up a surety bond subject to approval by the court to justify the release
to him of the properties purchased at auction.
Respondent Siy submitted a surety bond of P140,000.00 after which, on 28 June 1984, the sheriff was directed to
deliver to Siy the chattels thus sold.
Conformably with the above order, the sheriff delivered assorted hardware materials to Siy and submitted a Sheriff's
Report on the properties actually delivered. However, the sheriff subsequently informed the court that what he
delivered to Siy were substantially less than those listed in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated 3 April 1984.
On 24 July 1984, private respondent filed his motion to compel delivery of certain chattels sold in the auction sale but
not delivered by petitioner to him. In an order dated 27 July 1984, the trial court directed petitioner to produce and/or
account for the undelivered properties.
On 2 August 1984, petitioner manifested that the alleged undelivered chattels were those listed in the inventory
attached to the Sheriff's Report dated 5 November 1981, which list was not furnished petitioner prior to the auction
sale.
The trial court then appointed a commissioner to look into the matter. The first commissioner rendered a report stating
the petitioner should produce or account for certain undelivered personal properties. Petitioner and the intervenor
banks opposed this report and the court disapproved it. A second commissioner designated by the trial court similarly
reported that not all of the properties mortgaged and sold at the public auction had been delivered to Siy as highest
bidder. This second report was approved by the trial court in an order dated 11 June 1985.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the foregoing order, but without success. On 24 September 1985, the trial court issued
an order requiring petitioner to deliver the alleged missing chattels or their value.
This time, Siy filed a motion for reconsideration contending that because petitioner was depository of the chattels, it
should be made liable to him for damages for having failed to deliver the chattels listed in the 27 October 1981
inventory.
On 22 January 1986, the trial court issued an order amending and/or modifying the order of 24 September 1985, and
directed petitioner to deliver to Siy the properties appearing in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5
November 1981 minus the properties already delivered on 28 June 1984, and if this be not possible, to pay the
equivalent amount thereof. To determine the monetary value of these properties, the trial court appointed a committee
chaired by Atty. Francisco Sanchez III, its Legal Researcher, and one representative each from the petitioner and the
highest bidder, as members, to canvass the current price of the subject properties and to make a report thereon.
Twenty-three days after its receipt of the aforementioned order, petitioner filed its notice of appeal and a record on
appeal which the trial court disapproved due to late filing. After denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner went
to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari. But the appellate court dismissed the petition
because the notice of appeal was filed late. Hence, petitioner filed a petitioner for review on certiorari with this
Court. LexLib
On 16 October 1989, in BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 2 we directed the trial court to approve the
notice of appeal and record on appeal filed by petitioner because the same was actually filed within the reglementary

period of thirty (30) days, the case being regarded as one falling within the term "other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed," where the period of appeal is not fifteen (15) days but thirty (30) days, in accordance with Sec.
19, B.P. 129.
On 23 June 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the appeal from the order in Civil Case No. 144269
which directed petitioner to deliver to respondent Siy certain properties appearing in the inventory attached to the
Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. The appellate court considered the first and second errors assigned by
petitioner as moot and academic. In these assigned errors, petitioner questioned the 20 June 1984 order of the trial
which, in effect, permitted the intervention of respondent Siy by entertaining his motion for reconsideration and
allowing him to put up a surety bond to justify the release of the properties to him. The Court of Appeals held that
petitioner could no longer appeal the 20 June 1984 order because it was already way beyond the reglementary
period to appeal.

In the third assigned error of petitioner, it argued that what should have been delivered to respondent Siy was the list
of merchandise inventory appearing in the Sheriff's Receipt of 26 October 1981 and not the list in the inventory report
attached to the Sheriff's report on 5 November 1981. In the order of the trial court of 22 January 1986, the Court of
Appeals found that the Sheriff's Receipt of 26 October 1981, which petitioner insists to be the correct list, had been
superseded by the reinventoried list attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. On 28 September 1992,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied.
Hence, this petition imputing error to the Court of Appeals in not allowing petitioner's appeal from the order of the trial
court of 20 June 1984 which permitted the intervention of respondent Siy and ordered the release of the properties
purchased by the latter at the auction sale, and in affirming the order of the trial court of 22 January 1986 directing
petitioner to deliver to respondent Siy as highest bidder the properties appearing in the inventory attached to the
Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. LibLex
There is no merit in the petition. In its first assigned error, petitioner submits that the order of 20 June 1984 was
merely interlocutory hence unappealable, and that in appealing the final order of 22 January 1986, it should be
allowed to question the order of 20 June 1984 because its reversal will necessarily render null and void the final order
of 22 January 1986. Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the intervention of respondent Siy as
the legal requisites for intervention were not complied with, and in not setting aside the auction sale of 31 May 1984
which involved many irregularities, to wit : (a) The price of P60,000.00 realized in the bidding was grossly inadequate;
(b) There was undue haste in the conduct of the sale; and (c) The deputy sheriff conducted the sale in the absence of
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. cdrep
In BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra, which involved the same parties, this Court noted that the
principal case filed with the trial court by petitioner against YANKY was for replevin or, in the alternative, for collection
of the amount of the loans, plus interest owed by YANKY. This Court likewise noted that the disputed order of 22
January 1986, subject of the present appeal, only directed petitioner to turn over to respondent Siy properties which
had remained undelivered to the latter as highest bidder, a matter which was merely an incident of the principal case.
However, this Court recognized therein that the order of the trial court was already final so far as it concerned the
dispute between petitioner and respondent Siy because it was to resolve the right of the latter to receive the disputed
properties to Siy. This is based on the settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the merits may be the subject
of an appeal. A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other
hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. 3
Hence, the argument of petitioner that it can still question the order of 20 June 1984 while appealing the final order of
22 January 1986 is untenable. It may be true that the 20 June 1984 order allowed the intervention of respondent Siy
and reversed the court's previous order setting aside the auction sale by allowing him to put up a surety bond to
justify the release of the properties to him. However, upon submission by Siy of a surety bond with the court, the latter
issued a final order dated 28 June 1984, which was issued earlier than the final order of 22 January 1986. The order
of 28 June 1984 directed the delivery of the auctioned properties to respondent Siy.
Although the order of 20 June 1984 may be considered interlocutory as it required something more to be done by
respondent Siy, i.e., the filing of the bond, the subsequent order of 28 June 1984 can be considered a final one which
determined and settled the issue on the validity of the auction sale and the right of respondent Siy as highest bidder
to acquire the properties he purchased. Petitioner should have appealed the 28 June 1984 order if it wanted to
question the validity of the intervention of respondent Siy as well as the auction sale. But it did not do so. Moreover,
records show that after the issuance of the order of 28 June 1984 directing the delivery of the properties to Siy, the
remaining proceedings in the trial court pertained only to the execution and implementation by the sheriff of the order

of 28 June 1984. Hence, when the deputy sheriff informed the court that what were delivered to Siy were less than
those listed in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale, respondent Siy filed on 24 July 1984 a motion to compel delivery. The trial
court even appointed a commissioner to investigate the matter and found that not all the properties sold in the auction
sale were actually delivered to the awardee. Cdpr
It may be worth to note that petitioner impliedly admitted the regularity of the auction sale of 31 May 1984 when its
manifested before the court on 2 August 1984 that the chattels allegedly undelivered to Siy were those appearing in
the list attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981, which list was allegedly not furnished petitioner, without
raising any issue as to the validity of the auction sale and the right of Siy as highest bidder.
Petitioner cannot belatedly question the validity of the auction sale, It is estopped from claiming that the bidding was
not validly and regularly conducted after it had led the court and respondent Siy, as well as the other parties to the
case, to believe that the remaining unresolved issue after 28 June 1984 was the identification of the properties to be
delivered to Siy. Estoppel arises, as in this case, when one by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 4
In its third assigned error, petitioner contends that it had no knowledge of the reinventory attached to the Sheriff's
Report of 5 November 1981 as it was not furnished copy thereof; that what was sold to Siy in the auction sale of 31
May 1984 were pieces of "assorted hardware" as indicated in the notice of sale of 21 May 1984 and which were on
display inside the warehouse of petitioner, and not those listed in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5
November 1981.
The issue raised here by petitioner involves a question of fact which is not reviewable by this Court in this petition.
The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze
or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed, unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 5
In affirming the order directing the delivery of the properties sold to respondent Siy as appearing in the new inventory
of 5 November 1981, the Court of Appeals made the following factual findings in support of its decision : (a) The
Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981 which contains the reinventory of the merchandise seized in the premises of
YANKY expressly states that the earlier list of 26 October 1981 had been superseded by this new list; (b) On 4
November 1981, the sheriff notified the petitioner of a reinventory, which was actually conducted in petitioner's own
warehouse; the petitioner's representatives were the ones who inventoried and prepared the list of items actually
taken from YANKY; and, the original copy of the inventory list duly signed and verified by petitioner's representatives
is in the possession of the latter; (c) Petitioner did not question the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981 for a period
of almost three (3) years; and (d) On 27 February 1984, the trial court ordered the sale of the properties mentioned in
the "list of properties mortgaged" appended to the chattel mortgage. llcd
These properties also appear in the inventory attached to the Sheriff's Report of 5 November 1981. In compliance
with the order of 27 February 1984, the sheriff issued a notice of sheriff's sale dated 3 April 1984 announcing the
public auction sale on 24 April 1984 of the chattels enumerated in the "list of properties mortgaged." This notice
includes an enumeration of all the merchandise seized by the sheriff as shown in the Sheriff's Report of 5 November
1981. On the basis of the foregoing, there is no doubt that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are fully supported
by the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 June 1992 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107345, January 27, 1994)
[G.R. No. 73794. September 19, 1988.]
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST SPECIAL
CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; AMENDMENTS ALLOWED BEFORE FINALITY TO MAKE JUDGMENT

CONFORMABLE TO THE LAW. There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments,
to make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have not yet attained finality
(Villanueva v. Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Pinamalayan, Branch II, 119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact,
motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts that their rulings are erroneous and improper (Siy v.
Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur (32 SCRA 317
[1970]) and in so doing, said courts are given sufficient opportunity to correct their errors.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CORRECTION OF RESOLUTION REQUIRING DEPOSIT OF THE LARGE AMOUNT IN LITIGATION,
PROPER. In the complaint for interpleader, petitioner claims that it has no interest in the amount due from it and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to the said amounts. The appellate court found that more than twenty
million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing
in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as
it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the
lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said
amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
3. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former
judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action (Arguson v. Miclat, 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; Carandang v.
Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344 [1984]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNREVERSED DECISION IS CONCLUSIVE UPON PARTIES AND THOSE IN PRIVITY WITH THEM.
There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as
it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao
v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the
grant of the motion for reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for execution, while in
the case at bar, what is assailed is the propriety of the order of respondent appellant court that
petitioner EternalGardens should deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement
with a reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact, there is a pending trial on the merits in the trial court
which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question which should first be resolved. Moreover, while there may be
identity of parties and of subject matter, the Land Development Contract, there is no identity of issues as clearly
shown by the petitions filed.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:
This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to set aside the two resolutions of public
respondent First Special Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 04869 entitled
"North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists versus Hon. Antonia Corpus-Macandog, Presiding
Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation,": (a) dated
September 5, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 21-25) reconsidering its Decision1 of February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48) and
ordering petitioner to deposit whatever amounts due from it under the Land Development Agreement, and (b) dated
February 13, 1986 (Rollo, p. 27) denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration. cdll
Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) are corporations duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
They executed a Land Development Agreement (Rollo, pp. 179-182) on October 6, 1976 whereby the former
undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property
owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated
area and price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net
gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a designated

depositary trustee bank. On the same date private respondent executed in petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale
with Mortgage (Rollo, pp. 183-186) on the lots with titles involved in the land development project. The deed was
supplemented by a Sale of Real Property with Mortgage and Special Conditions dated October 28, 1978 (Rollo, pp.
189-194). The amounts totalling about P984,110.82 paid by petitioner were to be considered as part of the 40% due
private respondent under the Land Development Agreement. All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of
ownership over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a
complaint for interpleader (Rollo, pp. 169-179) against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate, docketed as
Special Court Case No. C-9556 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan, alleging among others, that in view of
the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent and Maysilo Estate) over the
properties subject matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein petitioner) has no claim of
ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of plaintiff corporation which has no interest in
the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the owners of said
properties, the defendants should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves
(Rollo, p. 177).
An order was issued by the presiding judge 2 requiring defendants to interplead on October 22, 1981. MISSION filed
a motion to dismiss dated November 10, 1981 for lack of cause of action but also presented an answer dated
November 12, 1981. The motion to dismiss was denied in an Order dated January 12, 1982. The heirs of Maysilo
Estate filed their own answer dated November 11, 1981 and an amended answer dated October 20, 1983 thru the
estate's special receiver. The heirs of Pedro Banon filed an "Answer in Intervention with Special and Affirmative
Defenses" dated October 24, 1983, while Lilia B. Sevilla and husband Jose Seelin filed their "Answer in Cross-claim"
dated October 31, 1983 (Rollo, p. 30). The heirs of Sofia O'Farrel y Patino, et al. filed their Answer in Intervention
dated November 10, 1983.
However, earlier on November 21, 1982, private respondent presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the
amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion, the trial court 3 denied judicial deposit in its order
dated February 13, 1984, the decretal portion of which reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, all or the full amount the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks
Corporation have already paid the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh
Day Adventist is hereby ordered to deposit the same to this Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this order considering that real or true owner of the subject properties in question, due
hearing of this court has yet to be undergone in order to decide as to who is the true owner which
is a prejudicial question. Hence the motion dated November 21, 1983 of the NPUM for
the Eternal Gardens Corporation to deposit the balance due and unpaid is hereby ordered
denied and the opposition thereto dated December 19, 1983 is hereby ordered granted.
"The contract between the Eternal Gardens Corporation and the North Philippine Union Mission
dated October 1, 1976 is ordered and declared ineffective as of today, February 13, 1984
because the subject matter of the sale is not existing between the contracting parties until after
the question of ownership is resolved by this court. The court will order the revival of the contract
if the North Philippine Union Mission will win.
"If not, the declared winner among the intervenors will be the party to enter into a contract of sale
with the plaintiff as aforementioned." (Rollo, p. 66).
Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order and setting aside the order
for private respondent's deposit of the amounts it had previously received from petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS the order of February
13, 1984, is hereby ordered amended, reconsidered and modified by this same Court as follows:
"(a) The order directing the NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS to deposit the amounts it received under the implementation of
the LAND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT which is not questioned by the
plaintiff, Eternal Gardens, is hereby ordered set aside for the reason that the titles to ownership,
the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists on the lots subjectmatter of the aforesaid agreement is not established invalid, and the alleged titles of intervenors
are not proven yet by competent evidence;

"(b) The motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance under the Land Development
Agreement is likewise hereby ordered denied considering the fact the aforesaid plaintiff had not
denied its obligations under the aforesaid contract; and
"(c) The trial or hearing is hereby ordered as scheduled to proceed on November 29, 1984 and
on December 6, 1984 at 8:30 in the morning per order of this Court dated October 4, 1984 in
order to determine the alleged claims of ownership by the intervenors and all claims and
allegations of each party to the instant case will be considered and decided carefully by this court
on just and meritorious grounds." (Rollo, p. 39)
Said Orders were assailed twice in the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals) and in the Supreme Court as
follows:
In G.R. No. 73569 it appeared that on January 11, 1985, MISSION filed a motion to dismiss the Interpleader and the
claims of the Maysilo Estate and the Intervenors and to order the Eternal Gardens to comply with its Land
Management with MISSION.
On January 28, 1985, the trial court passed a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, after a lengthy, careful judicious study and
perusal of all the stand of each and everyone of all the parties participating in this case, hereby
orders the dismissal of the interpleader, and the interventions filed by the intervenors, heirs of
Pedro Banon, heirs of O'Farrel, heirs of Rivera, heirs of Maria del Concepcion Vidal, consolidated
with the Maysilo Estate as represented by receiver Arturo Salientes, the heirs of Vicente Singson
Encarnacion, and Lilia Sevilla Seeling.
"This Court likewise orders the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation to comply
with the Land Development Agreement dated October 6, 1978, it entered into with the North
Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists." (Rollo. p. 68).
The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned order of dismissal, the hearing of
which was requested to be set on February, 28, 1985. However, the trial judge, on February 14, 1985 issued the
following orders:
"Considering Motions for Reconsideration filed, the Court resolves that the same be GRANTED
and instead of a hearing of the said motions on February 20, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing on the
merits shall be held." (Rollo, p. 68)
In spite of the February 14, 1985 order, MISSION filed on March 6, 1985 a motion for Writ of Execution of the
resolution of January 28, 1985. This was denied on June 25, 1985. The said court further set the case for pre-trial
and trial on July 18, 1985.
It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals), docketed as ACG.R. Sp. No. 06696 "North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, vs. Hon. Antonia CorpusMacandog, Presiding Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks
Corporation, and Heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion." It was raffled to the Second Special Division. MISSION
assailed the February 14, 1985 and June 25, 1985 orders as violative of due process and attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The petition was however dismissed in the decision of said Appellate Court, promulgated on December 4, 1985, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, for want of merit the petition for certiorari and mandamus under consideration
cannot be given due course and is accordingly, DISMISSED, without any pronouncement, as to
costs. The restraining order embodied in Our Resolution of July 31, 1985, is hereby lifted." (Rollo,
G.R. No. 73569 p. 232)
The private respondent challenged the above decision in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569. In its resolution
dated June 11, 1986, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, as follows:
"G.R. No. 73569 (North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.) considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced
in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit."
(Ibid p. 263)

Said resolution has become final and executory on July 16, 1986. (Ibid p. 269)
Earlier in 1983, the heirs of the late spouses Vicente Singson Encarnacion and Lucila Conde filed Civil Case No. C11836 for quieting of title with Branch CXXII, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, where petitioner and private
respondent were named as defendants.
Said case is still pending in the lower Court.
In the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. No. 04869 praying that the aforementioned Orders of February
13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in
court or in a depositor/trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private respondent
MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to whomever may be found
later to be entitled thereto, with costs. (Rollo, G.R. No. 73794 p. 38)
The Intermediate Appellate Court, acting through its First Special Cases Division, 4 dismissed the petition in its
decision on February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48). In its Resolution 5promulgated on September 5, 1985, the Court
however, reversed its decision, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision of February 27, 1985, and sets aside the
questioned portions of the respondent Court's orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The
private respondent is hereby ordered to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the
Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable bank to be designated by the
respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be
found entitled thereto. No costs." (Rollo, p. 25)
Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied for lack of merit in a resolution
promulgated on February 13, 1986, which states:
"The private respondent Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's resolution promulgated September 5, 1985 requiring it 'to deposit
whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 . .
.,' which was strongly opposed by the petitioner North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh
Day Adventists, is hereby denied for lack of merit, reiterating as it does, the very same issues
and arguments that were passed upon and considered by the Court in the very same resolution
sought to be reconsidered." (Rollo, p. 27)
Hence, this petition.
On July 8, 1987, the Third Division of this Court issued the following resolution:
". . . the court RESOLVED to give due course to this petition and require the parties to file
memoranda.
"In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of funds, the Court RESOLVED to require the
private respondent 6 to DEPOSIT its accruing installments within ten (10) days from notice with a
reputable commercial bank in a savings deposit account, in the name of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, with the details to be reported or manifested to this Court within ten (10) days
from the time the deposit/deposits are made, such deposits not to be withdrawn without authority
from this Court." (Rollo, p. 162).
Petitioner's Memorandum With Prayer for the Deferment of Time to Make Deposit (Rollo, p. 218-236)
was filed on July 14, 1987. Its prayer was granted for a period of ten (10) days for the purpose, in the resolution
of July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 238). Private respondent filed its Opposition to Deferment of Time to Make Deposit
(Rollo, pp. 239-253) on July 24, 1987 to which petitioner filed its Reply to Opposition on August 4, 1987 (Rollo,
pp. 256-267). Both were noted by the Court in its resolution dated September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 270). On August
25, 1987, private respondent filed its Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply to Opposition (Rollo, pp. 271-292).
Petitioner filed its Supplemental Memorandum with Reply to Opposition (To Deferment of time to Make Deposit) on
August 31, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 294-313) and a Sur-rejoinder on September 1, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 304-315).
The main issues in this case are:
I

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the
resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are
due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by
the respondent court.
II
Whether or not the dismissal of AC-G.R. SP No. 06696 (North Philippine Union Mission of the
Seventh Day Adventists vs. Hon. Macandog, et al.) by the Second Special Cases Division of the
IAC which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569 constitutes a basis for the
dismissal of the case at bar on the ground of res adjudicata.
I
There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make them conformable to the law
applicable provided that said judgments have not yet attained finality (Villanueva v. Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro, Pinamalayan, Branch II, 119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact, motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince
the courts that their rulings are erroneous and improper (Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra
Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur, 32 SCRA 317 [1970]) and in so doing, said courts are given sufficient
opportunity to correct their errors.
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in
Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such
amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. Such admissions in the complaint
were reaffirmed in open court before the Court of Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution dated September 5,
1985 in A.C. G.R. No. 04869 which states:

"The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then reaffirms before the Court its original position that it
is a disinterested party with respect to the property now the subject of the interpleader case . . .
"In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court, affirming the complaint filed
below, that the private respondent (MEMORIAL) will pay whatever is due on the Land
Development Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there is no reason why the amount due on
subject agreement has not been placed in the custody of the Court." (Rollo, p. 227).
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections to the deposit of the
amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader
where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation
of the petitioner under the Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in
the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the
court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or
funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled
thereto." (Rollo, p. 24).
The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said
appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time
deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very
essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
(Rollo, p. 25).
Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turnabout, presently claiming in its memorandum that there
is a novation of contract so that the amounts due under the Land Development Agreement were allegedly
extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit of said amounts in a depositary bank should be held in
abeyance until after the conflicting claims of ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTC-Caloocan City, has
finally been resolved.

All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, not only in the lower courts and
in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such deposit was required in the resolution of July 8,
1987 to avoid wastage of funds.
II
The claim that this case should be barred by res judicata is even more untenable.
The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action (Arguson v. Miclat, 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344 [1984]).
There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once
and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate ( Sy Kao
v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]).
But a careful review of the records shows that there is no judgment on the merits in G.R. No. 73569 and in the case
at bar, G.R. No. 73794; both of which deal on mere incidents arising therefrom.
In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for reconsideration without a hearing
thereon and the denial of the motion for execution, while in the case at bar, what is assailed is the propriety of the
order of respondent appellant court that petitioner Eternal Gardens should deposit whatever amounts are due from it
under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact, there is a
pending trial on the merits in the trial court which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question which should first be
resolved. Moreover, while there may be identity of parties and of subject matter, the Land Development Contract,
there is no identity of issues as clearly shown by the petitions filed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) this case (together with all the claims
of the intervenors on the merits) is REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings; and (c) the resolution of
the Third Division of this Court of July 8, 1987 requiring the deposit by the petitioner (see footnote No. 6) of the
amounts contested in a depositary bank STANDS (the Motion for Reconsideration thereof being hereby DENIED for
reasons already discussed) until after the decision on the merits shall have become final and executory. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
||| (Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73794, September 19, 1988)
[G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.]
LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and ANITA NUAL
HORMIGOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her
behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY SABARRE,
EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON
ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS PEAS, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT BECOMES FINAL, MAY NO LONGER BE
MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS. In the case of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, (195
SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of
land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "(a)ny
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF AGGRIEVED PARTY. In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.

Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in
excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case
No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their
respective claims.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** dated February 22, 1990 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 14889 entitled "Emma Lyon de Leon, et al., plaintiffs-appellees versus Luisa Lyon Nual, now deceased
herein represented by Albert Nual, et al., defendants appellants," dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the
trial court's order *** dated January 9, 1987 for the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as one of the heirs who shall benefit
from the partition.
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows.
This case originated from a suit docketed as Civil Case No. 872 filed by Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as
guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre and Kenny Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman, Mercedes Lyon Taupan,
Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las Peas, (herein private respondents) against Luisa
Lyon Nual, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs, Albert Nual and Anita Nual Hormigos (herein
petitioners), for partition and accounting of a parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was
formerly owned by Frank C. Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and
William James. Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3141 in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nual since 1946 and that
she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the
partition and delivery of their shares.
On December 17, 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its
judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property but dismissing private respondents'
complaint for accounting. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows: prcd
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among the plaintiffs and defendant. The parties shall make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to the Court's
confirmation, should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the court shall appoint
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to such party in interest such
part and proportion of the property as the Court shall direct. Defendant is further ordered to pay
plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000.00." 1
On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57265-R. The
case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition. 2
On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the court a quo. 3
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her
counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not
being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be
affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right,
ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a
quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. 4
On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of the three commissioners and in lieu
thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. 5
On February 4, 1986, the said court issued an order appointing a Board of Commissioners to effect the partition of
the contested property. 6
On May 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the motion to quash order of execution with preliminary injunction filed by
Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition of the property among the original party plaintiffs and defendants. 7

On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of the fact that the name of
Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she could therefore be construed as one of the
heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then sought. 8
On September 29, 1986, the lower court issued an order directing the counsel of Emma Lyon de Leon to furnish the
court within five days from receipt thereof all the names the of heirs entitled to share in the partition of the subject
property. 9
On October 1, 1986, the petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the court issue an order directing the partition of
the property in consonance the decision dated December 17, 1974 of the trial court the order of said court dated May
28, 1986. 10
Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board of Commissioners to
immediately partition the said property. 11
On January 3, 1987, the private respondents filed motion for clarification as to whether the partition of property is to
be confined merely among the party plaintiffs and defendants, to the exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin. 12
On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as coowner with a share in the partition of the property, to wit:
"After a perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 57265-R, where this case
was appealed by the unsatisfied parties, there is a finding that Mary now Mary Lyon Martin is one
of the legitimate children of Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom. (Page 3 of the decision).
In view of this finding, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left out in the partition of this
property now undertaking (sic) by the said court appointed commissioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court appointed commissioners is hereby directed to
include Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner in the said property subject of partition with the
corresponding shares adjudicated to her. LLjur
SO ORDERED." 13
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 14 of the aforesaid order was denied by the trial court. 15
On February 22, 1990 the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing petitioners' appeal, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no legal impediment to the inclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin by the court-appointed Board of Commissioners as one of the heirs who shall benefit
from the partition, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED." 16
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on June 6, 1990. 17
Petitioners filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance contrary
to law and the applicable decisions of this Court, for the following reasons:
"1.) BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DIRECTING THE
COURT APPOINTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO INCLUDE MARY L. MARTIN TO
SHARE IN THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION DESPITE THE FACT, OVER
WHICH THERE IS NO DISPUTE, THAT SHE HAS NOT LITIGATED EITHER AS A PARTY
PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 872, IT HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO AMEND OR MODIFY THE
JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 872 AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED
28 MAY 1986 WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2.) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT MARY L.
MARTIN "NEVER LITIGATED AS ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN SAID CASE," AND HER ONLY
PARTICIPATION THEREIN WAS SIMPLY CONFINED "AS A WITNESS FOR DEFENDANTSISTER LUISA LY ON NUAL," AND TO ALLOW HER TO SHARE IN THE PARTITION THIS
LATE WITHOUT REQUIRING A PROCEEDING WHERE THE PARTIES COULD PROVE THEIR

RESPECTIVE CLAIMS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO DENYING THE NUALS OF THEIR RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS. 18

The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to
participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in
Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case
has long become final and executory.
Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872 ordering the
partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among plaintiffs and defendants has
long become final and executory. Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated
January 9, 1987 ordering the Board of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of said
property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said Order, therefore, resulted in an amendment
or modification of its decision rendered in Civil Case No. 872.
We find merit in the instant petition.
In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 We held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in the law
than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment
is void."
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose." 20
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its
finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this
case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. LLpr
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other
heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9, 1987 of the trial Court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated December 17, 1974 in Civil
Case No. 872 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, April 06, 1993)
[G.R. No. 111985. June 30, 1994.]
INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORP. and/or LORENZO TANGSOC, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CONCORDIA DOS PUEBLOS and LOLITA
SANCHEZ, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; RULE AND EXCEPTION ON THE MODIFICATION
THEREOF AFTER ITS FINALITY. It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer
be modified or otherwise disturbed. However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances
transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of
justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances (Seavan
Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice
(Pascual vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164;Central Textile Mills vs. United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA 883). In the case at
bar, the modification of the judgment, rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1993, is warranted by the fact that the
Bank had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing the possibility for the Bank to resume its

business. Reinstatement of Galindez, as Cashier, therefore was rendered inappropriate considering the Bank's
eventual closure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED TO CASE AT BAR. Applying this exception to the case at bar, we note with approval
the following observations of the Solicitor General: It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits
due to the private respondents as recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of the dispositive portion of the
decision subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that at the time the recomputation was made
in 1992, five (5) years had already elapsed from the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on February 26,
1987. Thus, a recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and proper determination of the monetary awards due
the private respondents. Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private
respondents in the amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on April 26,
1986, up to the time of the rendition of the decision on February 26, 1987. There is no dispute that from April 26,
1986, to this date, the private respondents have not been reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards
decreed by the NLRC been made them.
3. ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; RULE IF MADE BY ORDINARY MAIL OR BY PRIVATE MESSENGERIAL
SERVICE. On the issue of the timeless of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, we find that
the NLRC correctly applied the rule that where a pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service,
it is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the
messengerial service. As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, (209 SCRA 55 [1992]): The
established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered
as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of
delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
4. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; RULE IN THE FILING THEREOF IF LAST DAY FALLS ON A SATURDAY. The 10th day
for filing the motion for reconsideration was June 26, 1993, which fell on a Saturday. The last day for filing would have
been the following business day, June 28, 1993, which was a Monday. The petitioners' counsel claims he was able to
deliver the pleading to JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration reached the Commission on
June 29, 1993, or a day late.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:
In the earlier case of Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83616, 1 this Court affirmed the finding of
the NLRC that the petitioners are the employers of private respondents and remanded the case for a determination of
the validity of the quitclaim allegedly signed by the latter.
In its resolution dated February 3, 1992, 2 the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado M. Solamo
on February 26, 1987, ordering the petitioners to reinstate the private respondents (complainants therein) without loss
of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay them back wages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay, vacation and
sick leave pay in the amount of P24,300 each, moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each, and attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the total award.
In view of the lapse of time since the promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise directed the petitioners to pay
the private respondents severance benefits equivalent to one month pay for every year of service computed from the
date of their employment up to the promulgation of the resolution should reinstatement of the private respondents to
their former position be no longer possible. 3
This resolution became final and executory on March 9, 1992, and entry of judgment was made on March 25, 1992.
The private respondents meanwhile had filed on March 20, 1992, an ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of
execution with manifestation that from February 26, 1987, up to the present, they have not been reinstated and thus
were entitled to back salaries for the said period and until actual reinstatement shall have been made. cdrep
Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez thereupon directed the Fiscal Examiner of the Arbitration Branch to
compute the actual amount that the private respondents should receive. In a report dated March 22, 1992, 4 Fiscal
Examiner Renrico N. Pacamo found that each of them was entitled to P175,964.84, representing three years back
wages, ECOLA under Wage Order No. 6, 13th month pay, legal holiday pay, vacation and sick leave pay and other

privileges under the collective bargaining agreement likewise for a period of three years. In addition, the private
respondents should also be awarded moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each and attorney's fees equivalent
to 10% of the total monetary award. In sum, the petitioners were held liable to the private respondents for the total
amount of P387,122.65.
Both the petitioners and the private respondents filed their respective objections to this computation. Meanwhile, the
Executive Labor Arbiter transferred the case to Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo, who thereafter issued an order dated
November 19, 1992, 5 concurring with the computation of the Fiscal Examiner Pacamo.
The Commission, on appeal of the computation, only made a slight modification of the amount of the award and
directed the petitioners to pay the private respondents the sum of P375,795.20. 6 The motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners through JRS-Butuan, a private letter-forwarding company, reached the NLRC a day late and was
denied on August 31, 1993, mainly for tardiness. 7
In this petition now before us, the NLRC is faulted with grave abuse of discretion for merely modifying the award of
damages and denying the motion for reconsideration. LLjur
On the first issue, the petitioners submit that the NLRC decision of February 3, 1992, which affirmed in toto the order
of Arbiter Solamo and remanded the case for immediate execution need not be recomputed because the monetary
awards due the private respondents had already been determined and fixed in the said order. It is argued that to
allow the decision of Arbiter Murillo to prevail and sizably increase the monetary award to the private respondents
would in effect allow an arbiter to change a decision of the Commission that has become final and executory. Arbiter
Murillo's duty, it is stressed, is limited to the ministerial act of executing the NLRC decision.
We disagree.
It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed.
However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to
harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances." 8
The general rule is indeed, that once a judgment becomes final and executory, said judgment
can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. That principle, however, admits of exceptions as
in cases where, because of supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of
justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
circumstances (Seavan Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascualvs. Tan, 85 Phil 164; Central Textile Mills vs.
United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA 883). In the case at bar, the modification of the
judgment, rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1993, is warranted by the fact that the Bank
had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing the possibility for the Bank to
resume its business. Reinstatement of Galindez, as Cashier, therefore was rendered
inappropriate considering the Bank's eventual closure. (Emphasis supplied). 9
Applying this exception to the case at bar, we note with approval the following observations of the Solicitor
General: 10
It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits due to the private respondents
as recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal import of the dispositive portion of the decision
subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact that at the time the
recomputation was made in 1992, five (5) years had already elapsed from the time the Labor
Arbiter rendered his Decision on February 26, 1987. Thus, a recomputation was necessary to
arrive at a just and proper determination of the monetary awards due the private respondents.

Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter Solamo to each of the private respondents in the
amount of P24,300.00 correspond merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on April 26, 1986, up to the
time of the rendition of the decision on February 26, 1987. There is no dispute that from April 26, 1986, to this date,
the private respondents have not been reinstated nor has payment of the monetary awards decreed by
the NLRC been made them. cdll
A similar action was taken in the recent case of Sampaguita Garments Corporation v. NLRC, 11 where this Court
upheld the nullification of a decision of the NLRC ordering the reinstatement of an employee after her conviction of
the same offense of which she was absolved in the administrative case.

On the issue of the timeless of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, we find that the NLRC correctly applied the
rule that where a pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service, it is deemed filed on the day it
is actually received by the court, not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service.
As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency
is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of
actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date
of filing of that pleading.
The 10th day for filing the motion for reconsideration was June 26, 1993, which fell on a Saturday. The last day for
filing would have been the following business day, June 28, 1993, which was a Monday. The petitioners' counsel
claims he was able to deliver the pleading to JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration
reached the Commission on June 29, 1993, or a day late. cdll
At any rate, the respondent Commission noted that the motion contained no substantial matters to warrant the
reconsideration sought and could have been denied just the same on that ground.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions of the respondent NLRC dated May 31, 1993, and August
31, 1993, are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
||| (Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111985, June 30, 1994)
[G.R. No. 79425. April 17, 1989.]
CRESENCIANA ATUN ESQUIVEL, and LAMBERTO ESQUIVEL, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL
M. ALEGRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch II, 5th Judicial Region, Legaspi
City and TEOTIMO ALAURIN, VISITACION MAGNO & SPS. WILFREDO ENCINAS &
PATROCINA ENCINAS, respondents.

R. Aquende Raeses for petitioners.

Otilio Sy Bongon for respondents.
Florante C. Dris collaborating counsel for petitioners.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; AMENDED JUDGMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
DISTINGUISHED; CASE AT BAR. There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental
judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment
and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended
and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision (Magdalena Estate, Inc. v.
Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964]; Sta. Romana v. Lacson, 104 SCRA 93 [1981]). Following the Court's differentiation of a
supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the
place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something
to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements (Aznar III, et. al. v. Bernard, et. al., G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988). In the instant case no restudy was
made by respondent court of the original decision but only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The
supplemental decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the respective
rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental defendants as successors-in-interest of the
defendants in the original complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding
upon them . . ."
2. ID.; ID.; FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT; WRIT OF EXECUTION; SHALL ISSUE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
The original decision became final and executory on October 6, 1986. In general, the prevailing party is entitled as
a matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus

(Nuez v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 197 [1987]; Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo
Bun Tiong v. Sayo, G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988). The issuance of an order of execution is the ministerial duty of
the lower court once the judgment of a higher court is returned to it and it is without jurisdiction to interpret or reverse
the judgment of the higher court (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). The writ of execution must,
however, conform to the judgment which is to be executed (Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 [1982]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNNECESSARY WHERE PREVAILING PARTY ALREADY IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY. The restraining order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 restored the status quo between
the parties before May 23, 1987. There was no need for the issuance of a writ of execution. The respondents who
won the case were already in actual possession of the property in question (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo, p.
258) in accordance with the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 4883 and in consonance with paragraph No. 2 of the
joint manifestation of the parties embodied in the decision of the Court in G.R No. L-38826. As a consequence,
respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion
of petitioners herein to take possession of the property in question, in his order of July 21, 1987 and petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside, nullify and declare invalid the order of respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 4883, dated July 21, 1987 denying petitioners' motion dated July 3,1987 and the order of August 6, 1987
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order of July 27, 1987.
The questioned order of July 21, 1987 (Rollo, p. 10) reads, as follows:
"For utter lack of factual and legal basis, and considering further that this case was already
terminated and decided against the plaintiffs-movants by the affirming decision of the Supreme
Court, the motion of plaintiffs-movants dated July 3, 1987 is hereby DENIED."
The dispositive portion of the questioned order of August 6,1987 (Rollo, p. 11) also reads as follows:
"WHEREAS, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. This shall be a
final Order on the same incident."
The antecedents of the case are taken from G.R. No. L-38826 which was promulgated by the Court on June 27, 1975
(Rollo, p. 46) and are quoted as follows:
"It appears that in the action of ejectment (Civil Case No. 990 of the City Court of Legaspi City),
petitioners secured a judgment ordering respondents to vacate a parcel of land, with an area of
201; square meters situated in Legaspi Port, Legaspi City and known as Lot No. 57 of Plan MSIV-11535-D of the Cadastral Survey of said City. In said ejectment case, respondents claimed
prior and continued possession of the land in question, and with respect to Original Certificate of
Title No. 28 of the Register of Deeds of Legaspi City on which petitioners based their action,
respondents alleged that the same was secured through fraud. Upon this decision being
appealed to the Court of First Instance, the same was affirmed, the court holding that the
evidence of prior possession in favor of petitioners was so strong that the action for annulment of
petitioner's (Teotimo Alaurin) title (Civil Case No. 4602 filed by the Republic of the Philippines at
the instance of respondents) was only a mere weak attempt to annul an existing certificate of title
in favor of which the presumption of law is clearly on its side. Eventually, this decision of the
Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, said appellate court holding that
Civil Case No. 4602 is 'a contingency which may not be taken into consideration in deciding the
issue of who has prior possession. Respondents' attempt to have the case appealed to the
Supreme Court did not prosper, and so, the ejectment decision became final and
executory." LLjur
The judgment having become final and executory on July 25, 1973, the City Court of Legaspi ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution for the enforcement of its judgment (Rollo, p. 123) However, before the decision could be
executed, petitioners, the spouses Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel filed against respondents Teotimo

Alaurin and Visitacion Magno and the City Sheriff, Civil Case No. 4883 on August 24, 1973 for reconveyance with
nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction, injunction, before the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch
I, (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo, p. 245). The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction having been granted
by the court a quo (Rollo, p. 104), the respondent spouses and Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court to set aside the order granting the writ, docketed as G.R. No. L-38826 (Respondents
Memorandum, Rollo, p. 246). Meantime, on July 1, 1974, Civil Case No. 4602, the case filed by Republic against
private respondent Teotimo Alaurin, was dismissed (Rollo, p. 47).
During the hearing of the petition, the parties agreed to file with the Court a Joint Manifestation which when filed was
embodied in the decision of the Court promulgated on June 271 1975 (Rollo, p. 46), as follows:
"The PARTIES, assisted by their respective counsel, unto the Honorable Supreme Court
respectfully set forth:
"1. That during the hearing of the above-entitled case on November 25, 1974, the parties agreed
to the suspension of the consideration of the petition for certiorari. Instead the parties agreed to
have Civil Case No. 4883 entitled Cresenciana Atun, et al. versus Teotimo Alaurin, et. al., before
the Court of First Instance of Albay, tried on the merits.
"2. That after a decision is rendered in Civil Case No. 4883, the winning party shall possess the
land in litigation - that is, if plaintiffs win (private respondents herein) they shall be entitled to the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Albay, otherwise, plaintiffs
shall immediately vacate the premises and the defendants (petitioners herein) restored to the
possession of the land in litigation.
"3. That the parties pray that a directive be issued by the Honorable Supreme Court to Branch II,
Court of First Instance of Albay (Branch I of the same Court where Civil Case No. 488s assigned
for hearing has no presiding Judge) to expedite the trial of Civil Case No. 4883, preferably to
hear and decide the case within ninety (90) days from notice."
In view of the joint manifesto, the Court dismissed the case and ordered the trial court to expedite the trial of Civil
Case No. 4883 and to try and decide the same within ninety (90) days from notice. The Court also ordered the
transfer of the case from Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Albay which had no presiding Judge then, to
Branch II, enjoining the judge therein to comply with the decision, and the parties, to observe the agreement
embodied in the aforequoted joint manifesto (Rollo, p. 49).
On October 29, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 4883
dismissing the case and dissolving the preliminary injunction issued earlier (Rollo, p. 107), the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.
On January 19, 1976, herein petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The record of appeal was filed in due time (Rollo, p.
30). They were, however, directed to amend their record on appeal in an order dated April 14, 1978 but before they
filed their amended record on appeal, on May 10, 1978 petitioners filed a motion for permission to serve
supplemental complaint in pleading the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two other private
respondents herein (Rollo 30). The amended record on appeal was only filed on August 24, 1978 after several
extensions granted by the court a quo. On July 20, 1979, private respondents filed a notice to disapprove the record
on appeal and for execution of judgment which was denied by the court a quo, in its order of August 15, 1979 (Rollo,
p. 31). LLphil

The supplemental complaint was admitted by the court a quo in its order dated January 12, 1979 and on motion of
respondents herein in that supplemental complaint, supplemental defendants were declared in default (Rollo, p. 17).
On July 31, 1979, the court n quo rendered a decision on the supplemental complaint declaring the supplemental
defendants as successors-in-interest of herein private respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, such that
whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding them (Rollo, p. 17). This dispositive portion of the
decision reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that Wilfredo
Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and

Visitacion Magno such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding
upon them, with costs against supplemental defendants."
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision in the supplemental complaint declaring private respondents Wilfredo
Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas as successors-in-interest of private respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion
Magno, said private respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals praying that: (1) the petition be
given due course; (2) after hearing on the merits, the decision in Civil Case No. 4883 entitled Cresenciana Atun, et.
al. v. Alaurin, et, al., be declared final and executory; and (3) the decision against supplemental defendant spouses
Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas be declared null and void (Rollo, p. 29).
The appellate court dismissed the petition in a decision promulgated on November 18, 1982. The dispositive portion
of the decision (Rollo, p. 29), states:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs."
The decision became final and executory on December 20, 1982 (Rollo, p. 36).
On the other hand, the appeal of herein petitioners of the decision of the trial court promulgated on October 29, 1975
in the original complaint for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction was docketed
in the appellate court as AC-G.R. CV No. 01896. On March 10, 1986 the appellate court rendered a decision (Rollo,
G.R. 74339, p. 47) affirming the appealed decision, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against plaintiffsappellants."
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners herein was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated April
14, 1986, for lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 52). Consequently, the case was raised to the Court for the
second time in G.R. No. 74339 in a petition for certiorari, also filed by petitioners herein (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p.
11).
On July 2, 1986, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 58). The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner herein (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 63) was also denied by the Court in a
resolution dated September 17, 1986 wherein the Court resolved "to DENY the Motion for lack of merit, and this
denial is FINAL" (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 102). The decision of the Court became final and executory on October 6,
1986 (Rollo, G.R. No. 74339, p. 100).
On October 16, 1986, petitioners herein moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of respondent court's
supplemental decision as affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 09754-P (Rollo, p. 39) which was granted by
the trial court in its order of October 2, 1986 (December 2, 1986 according to petitioners, Rollo, p. 54), "it appearing
further that the decision rendered in this case has already become final and executory." It directed the Branch Clerk
of Court to issue the corresponding writ of execution upon receipt of proof of payment of the corresponding sheriffs
fee. (Rollo, p. 41). LexLib
Armed with the said order of respondent courts, on May 23, 1987 petitioner herein Cresenciana Atun, claiming to be
the prevailing party, took possession of the property in question (Rollo, pp. 15; 133).
On May 25, 1987, a motion for contempt was filed by private respondents herein, the prevailing parties in Civil Case
No. 4883, against petitioners herein, praying among others, that respondent court: (1) immediately order petitioners
herein appear in court and be, ordered to desist from doing contemptuous acts complained of in order to maintain
status quo before this contempt charge; and (2) hold petitioners herein in contempt of court (Rollo, p. 132), but it was
dismissed and denied by respondent court in an order dated June 51, 1987 (Rollo, p. 43). A restraining order was
however, issued by the Court of First Instance of Legaspi City, Branch X, on June 8, 1987 which according to the
Sheriff's return was served personally on petitioners herein who declined to vacate the premises subject of the
restraining order (Rollo, p. 62). Upon motion of the new owners of the subject premises (Rollo, p. 124), the same
branch of the court issued its order of June 10, 1987 ordering the Station Commander of the INP, Legaspi, "to assign
two (2) policemen to help the sheriff implement the restraining order of this Court dated June 8, 1987, and to use
force, if necessary, should the defendants still refuse to abide by the above-mentioned Order" (Rollo, p. 61).
On July 3, 1987, petitioners herein, filed a motion with respondent court praying among others, that an order be
issued: (1) ordering private respondents herein to reconvey to movants the property in question, and directing the
City Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 311 in the name of Encinas, for having been obtained through fraud, hence,
null and void; and (2) allowing petitioners herein to immediately take possession of the property in question, it being
in accordance with the agreement of the parties in a manifestation submitted and approved by the court (Rollo, p. 16).
Respondent court denied the motion in the question order of July 21, 1987 (Rollo, p. 10).

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners herein on August 6, 1987 (Rollo, p. 54), which motion was
likewise denied by respondent court in its equally questioned order of the same date which respondent court
denominated as final order on the same incident (Rollo, p. 221).
Hence, the instant petition filed with the Court on August 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 4).
In the resolution of March 14, 1988 the court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition; and (b) to require the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
The sole issue is whether or not the decision rendered by a trial court in supplemental complaint modified the
decision of the same branch of the court in the original complaint and amounts to a amendment of the original
decision.
The question must be answered in the negative.
The original complaint for reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 4883 decided by respondent court on October 29, 1975 arose from Civil Case No. 990 for unlawful detainer filed
by the spouses Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, private respondents herein, against the spouses Cresenciana
Atun and Lamberto Esquivel, petitioners herein, in the City Court of Legaspi which rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents herein, the spouses Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno. Said decision was affirmed by
respondent court herein, the Court of Appeals and finally by the Supreme Court. The question of prior possession of
the land in question was raised and passed upon in that case which had already become final and executory when
Civil Case No. 4883 was filed in the Court First Instance of Albay. LLphil
In Civil Case No. 4883, petitioners herein anchored their action for reconveyance on their claim of prior possession
but this matter had already been resolved in favor of private respondents herein and therefore, conclusive on
respondent court in Civil Case No. 4883 being res judicata as to the issue possession de facto (Ang Ping, et. al. v.
Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]. Trial on the merits was held on all the other aspects of the case after
which judgment was rendered by respondent court which proved to be unfavorable to petitioners herein.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners herein filed their notice of appeal but due to the
opposition of private respondents herein notice of appeal but due to the opposition of private respondents herein, to
the non-inclusion in the record on appeal of certain pleadings, order and decisions which they claimed are relevant to
the disposition of the appeal, petitioners herein were ordered by respondent court to amend their record on appeal to
satisfy the objections of the private respondents who are the original defendants in Civil Case No. 4883 (Rollo, p. 30).
In the meantime private respondents transferred the property in question to the spouses Wilfredo Encinas and
Patrocinia Dasmarinas, the two other private respondents herein, evidenced by an inscription of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 19, 1970 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 28 on November 2, 1976 (Rollo, p. 38).
Petitioners must have learned of the sale before they could file their amended record on appeal which must have
prompted them to file a motion for supplemental complaint against the vendees of the property in question, the
spouses Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas which was admitted by respondent court. As borne by the
records of the case, respondent court ruled in favor of herein petitioners in the supplemental complaint which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claim that the decision of respondent court in the supplemental complaint revised the decision in the
original complaint tantamount to an amendment or reversal of said original decision of respondent court penned by a
previous presiding judge therein (Petitioner's Memorandum, Rollo, p 181).

The claim is without merit.

There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended and clarified
judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified
judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new
decision which supersedes the original decision (Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964]; Sta.
Romana v. Lacson, 104 SCRA 93 [1981]). Following the Court's differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an
amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of
the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A
supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements (Aznar III, et. al. v.
Bernard, et. al., G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988). Cdpr
In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision but only on the issues raised in
the supplemental complaint. The supplemental decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was

no declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental defendants as
successors-in-interest of the defendants in the original complaint, "such that whatever is the result of the appealed
case shall be legally binding upon them . . ." (Rollo, p. 28).
The part of the supplemental decision which petitioners claim to have revised the original, is quoted as follows:
"In the light of the foregoing testimony of the witnesses presented by supplemental plaintiffs
together with the documentary exhibits supporting the allegations of the supplemental complaint,
the Court finds that the evidence presented by the supplemental plaintiffs are preponderantly
sufficient to justify and warrant a judgment in their favor." (Rollo, p. 28).
There can be no other interpretation of the above statement of respondent court than that all documentary and
testimonial evidence prescribed by supplemental plaintiffs, petitioners herein, sufficiently prove that when
supplemental defendants entered into the contract of absolute sale with the original defendants, they already had full
knowledge of the controversy between supplemental plaintiffs and the original defendants in Civil Case No. 4883
such that they must be adjudged as successors-in-interest of original defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion
Magno. This interpretation is borne by the statement of respondent court at the end of the paragraph preceding that
which petitioners herein claim to have revised the original decision, which states:
". . . One thing, however, clear is that both supplemental defendants are successors-in-interest of
Teotimo Alaurin. The prayer for reconveyance of the property in question cannot be justified in
the light of the decision of Hon. Jose C. Razo." (Rollo, p. 28)
It must be pointed out that the dispositive portion itself of the supplemental decision is clear and unambiguous. It
does not make any declaration or pronouncement that may be taken to have revised or amended the original
decision. All that it declares is that the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are
successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that whatever is the result of the
appealed case shall be legally binding upon them.
Petitioners herein pursued their appeal of the original decision with the Court of Appeals which can be interpreted to
mean that they themselves did not believe that the supplemental decision had amended the original decision of
respondent court. Unfortunately for them, the appellate court found the appeal without merit. Petitioners herein then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of the appellate court which petition
likewise did not prosper.
The original decision became final and executory on October 6, 1986. In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus (Nunez v.
Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 197 [1987]; Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo,G.R. No. 45875, June 30, 1988). The issuance of an order of execution is the ministerial duty of the lower court
once the judgment of a higher court is returned to it and it is without jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of
the higher court (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). The writ of execution must, however,
conform to the judgment which is to be executed (Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 [1982]) which is this instant
case, is the dispositive portion of the original decision in Civil Case No. 4883.
The restraining order issued by respondent court on June 8, 1987 restored the status quo between the parties before
May 23, 1987. There was no need for the issuance of a writ of execution. The respondents who won the case were
already in actual possession of the property in question (Respondents' Memorandum, Rollo, p. 258) in accordance
with the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 4883 and in consonance with paragraph No. 2 of the joint manifestation
of the parties embodied in the decision of the Court in G.R No. L-38826. As a consequence, respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion of petitioners herein to
take possession of the property in question, in his order of July 21, 1987 and petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
aforesaid order.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued by
respondent court on June 8, 1987 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Esquivel v. Alegre, G.R. No. 79425, April 17, 1989)
[G.R. No. 59284. January 12, 1990.]

JUANITO CARDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. PABLO S. SINGSON, Judge of Branch I of the Court of
First Instance of Southern Leyte, ROMULO G. MADREDIJO, Executive Sheriff of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, PONCIANO ALVAREZ and CIRILO ALVAREZ, respondents.

Jose Batiquin for petitioner.

Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 443 CHAPTER IV, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); PREVAILING PARTY
ENTITLED TO WRIT OF EXECUTION WITHIN FIVE YEARS FROM DATE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT.
Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190 of the Code of Civil Procedure the counting of the five (5) year period
to enforce the Judgment starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR RECORDS NOR PREJUDICE VESTED
RIGHTS. No presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals can apply to the instant case. There is no record whatsoever whether in the appellate court or in the court
below of any entry of judgment in Civil Case No. 1853. Presumptions cannot substitute for the records, much less
prejudice vested rights.
3. ID.; JUDGMENT; NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT AS HELD IN LICHAUCO v. TAN
PHO, (51 Phil. 862). The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho,
51 Phil. 862 where an order or judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record
as rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTRY THEREOF NOT ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS WHERE A PARTY GIVEN OPPORTUNITY
TO OPPOSE MOTION. The lower court's action decreeing the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc was not
done arbitrarily nor capriciously. The petitioner was already allowed to oppose the motions in open court and was
even required to submit a memorandum to support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to submit a
memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims over the properties in question.
5. ID.; ID.; WHEN FINAL AND EXECUTORY, SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT THERETO, NOT PROPER. Well
settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case
except to execute the final judgment, as in this case. (Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 SCRA 470).

DECISION

PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking (a) to annul and set
aside the writ of execution dated July 2, 1981 issued by respondent Judge Pablo S. Singson in Civil Case No. 1853
entitled: Juana Corollo, et al. v. Juan Cardoza et al.; (b) to restore to petitioner possession of the three parcels of land
in controversy; and (c) to nullify the proceedings leading to the issuance of the order and writ of execution.
It appears on record that in a Motion for Execution of Judgment dated August 29, 1979, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy as
counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 entitled: "Juana Corollo, Silvestre Corollo, Severino Corollo, Ponciano
Alvarez, Cirilo Alvarez, Candido Alvarez, Leon Ageroy, Bustico Agero, Demandantes Contra Juan Cardoza, Por si y
Como Administrator de los bienes de Eulalia Cardoza, Urbano Cadabos, Magdalena Ordiz y Miguel Galos,
Demandados" prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution in the aforesaid case. The motion alleged that a decision
dated February 7, 1938 of the Court of First Instance, Maasin, Leyte which was affirmed with modification in the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 3545 promulgated on December 6, 1939 had long been final and
executory. Plaintiffs allegedly acquired knowledge of the appellate court's decision only in November 11, 1974
because before the death of their original counsel in 1944 they were not informed of the said decision. Attached to the
motion is the certification dated January 9, 1979 of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte

to the effect that the record does not show that plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Francisco Zialcita and defendants' counsel
were furnished a copy of the decision. Also the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals issued a Certification dated
August 23, 1979 that the record of the case in C.A. G.R. No. 3545 was burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945
(Rollo, pp. 39-40)
In an order dated September 4, 1979, the trial court directed the plaintiffs movants to submit their memorandum
within fifteen days and for the defendants oppositors to file their opposition thereto within the same period from
receipt of the memorandum. Plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on August 18, 1980. Defendants did not submit
their memorandum nor submitted their reply to written interrogatories (Rollo, pp. 42-45). Cdpr
On May 4, 1980, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion to defer the consideration of the motion for execution on the ground
that in the April 22, 1980 hearing they allegedly discovered that no entry of judgment had been made and that nobody
could tell whether parties or their counsel received a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. (Rollo, p. 41)
Plaintiffs therefore, prayed for the recording of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
On July 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order that "a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered pursuant to the decision of
the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545". For the satisfaction of the judgment it likewise ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution (Ibid).
On July 21, 1981, the writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Southern Leyte or his deputies to
enforce and execute the decision of the trial court as modified by the appellate court.
The February 7, 1938 decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte reads as follows, viz:
"En sue virtud, se dicta sentencia declaranda a los demandantes con derecho a la mitad de la
parcelas A, B, C y D y se ordena al Albacea que haga entrega de la mitad de diches parcelas a
los demandantes, declarando al demandado Juan Cardoza dueno de las parcelas E, G y H, y
sobreseyendo la demanda con respecto a las parcelas F, I y J, sin especial pronunciamiento en
cuanto a las costas.
"ASI SE ORDENA."
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision promulgated on December 6, 1939,
provides as follows, viz:
"In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the modification that
Urbano Cadabos is ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of parcel I. There is no
pronouncements as to costs."
On July 29, 1981, Sheriff Romulo Madredizo served a copy of the writ of execution on petitioner
Juanito Cardoza through his wife and son at Sta. Cruz, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Trinidad Malbas who was in actual
possession of parcel I was also served a copy of the writ on July 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 50).
On July 31, 1981, Juanito Cordoza's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the execution
of the writ. Accordingly, the implementation of the writ was held in abeyance.
On September 14, 1981 the heirs of the original defendants filed a manifestation to the effect that they interpose no
objection to the issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment. The manifestation was filed by Rustico Cardoza, the son of the
late original defendant Juan Cardoza, who also represented the late original defendant Magdalena Ordiz and the
grandchildren of the deceased original defendant Miguel Galos. The children of the original defendant Urbano
Cadabos, namely: Honorato, Camilla and Basilio all surnamed Cadabos except Basilio whose surname is Calapre by
reason of the judicial adoption joined in the said manifestation (Rollo, pp. 78-79). LexLib
On October 14, 1981 the trial court reinstated its order dated July 6, 1981 and directed the issuance of an alias writ of
execution (Rollo, p. 49). The trial court opined that courts are given wide latitude in allowing the issuance of a nunc
pro tunc judgment.
On November 11, 1981 respondent Sheriff executed the writ and personally delivered to plaintiffs the property subject
matter in Civil Case No. 1853. Rustico Cardoza was furnished a copy of the writ on November 23, 1981. On
November 26, 1981 Juanito Cardoza was informed of the formal turn over of the property and was furnished a copy
of the writ of execution (Rollo, p. 50).
On November 26, 1981, Petitioner appeared before the trial court in compliance with the summons directing him to
appear and explain why he should not be declared in contempt of court for harvesting the coconuts in parcels A, B

and C, the land in question. In the hearing, petitioner was personally served the writ of execution and the respondent
judge directed him to desist from harvesting the coconuts and to explain in writing why he should not be declared in
contempt of court.
On January 8, 1982 herein petitioner Juanito Cardoza filed the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. In his petition he alleged inter alia that the respondent judge usurped the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when it issued the Order of July 6, 1981 directing that 'a non pro tunc judgment be
entered pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case C.A. G.R. No. 3545' because under Section 10
of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, its issuance is the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals; that the trial court erred in granting the application for issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment because
plaintiffs' inaction to move for the execution of the Judgment 40 years after its promulgation is a ground for its denial;
that private respondents have not adduced evidence to overcome the regularity in the performance of official function
so that it can be presumed that the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment; that
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he deprived petitioner of his property without due process of
law; that petitioner acquired the land from his aunt Eulalia Cardoza who executed on April 13, 1935 her last will and
testament in the Visayan dialect; that after the death of Eulalia Cardoza her last will and testament was probated on
February 25, 1936 in special proceeding No. 1781 of the then Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte and as a
legatee, petitioner received the four (4) parcels of land identified as parcels A, B, C, and D from the Court-appointed
administrator Juan Cardoza; that as owner he paid the real property tax and caused the issuance of tax declarations
in his name; that when plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 received a copy of the decision they agreed to receive parcel
D, the biggest land, instead of getting one-half of the four parcels of land; that his uncle Juan Cardozaprevailed upon
petitioner to turn over parcel D to the plaintiffs; that assuming that the respondent Judge can issue a writ of execution
40 years from the rendition of the Judgment, nonetheless, it could not deprive petitioner of the one-half portion of the
four (4) parcels of land decreed to him in the judgment sought to be implemented.

Petitioner, therefore, prayed for the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct public
respondents to restore to him the three (3) parcels of land and to recall the writ of execution.
On February 18, 1982, the First Division of this Court issued a resolution directing public respondents to restore to
petitioner possession of the three (3) parcels of land. Also, respondent Judge was enjoined from further proceeding or
enforcing the writ of execution issued by him in Civil Case No. 1853. Likewise the respondents were required to file
their comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution (Rollo, p. 52). LLphil
On the other hand, private respondents alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge did not usurp the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals when he issued the July 6, 1981 Order because the Court of Appeals, that decided
CA G.R. No. 3545 and failed to leave any record of entry of judgment was different from the present Court of Appeals
as the former which was created under Commonwealth Act No. 3 on February 1, 1936 (Amended by Commonwealth
Act Nos. 259, 425 and 639) was abolished under Executive Order No. 37 dated March 10, 1945; that in the exercise
of its function as court of law and equity and as the final repository of the decision transmitted by the defunct
appellate court, the trial court correctly made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc; that despite the lapse of about 40
years, execution is still in order because under Section 443, Chapter IX ofAct No. 190 or the Code of Civil
Procedure the counting of the five (5) year period to enforce the Judgment starts from the entry of judgment and not
from its promulgation; that except for original plaintiffs Ponciano Alvarez and Cirilo Alvarez, all the other original
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 are all dead; that it is not true that petitioner had been the owner and possessor of
the subject property for 45 years; that Tax Declaration No. 16832 covering parcel "A", Tax Declaration No. 18307
covering parcel "B" and Tax Declaration No. 18301 covering parcel "C" previously in the name of Pablo Corollo were
cancelled and transferred in the name of Juanito Cardoza only in 1964 and 1965. Private respondents therefore
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The decisive issues to be resolved in the instant case are (1) whether or not the decision of the trial court as modified
by the Court of Appeals can still be enforced and (2) whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion when it made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.
On the issue of whether or not the judgment of the trial court dated February 7, 1938 in Civil Case No. 1853 as
modified by the Court of Appeals in the decision promulgated on December 6, 1939 can still be enforced, the answer
is in the affirmative.
Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure which took effect on
September 1, 1901, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained
by him within five years from the date of its entry. The counting of the five-year period starts from the entry of
judgment and not from its promulgation.

No presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals can apply
to the instant case. There is no record whatsoever whether in the appellate court or in the court below of any entry of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1853. Presumptions cannot substitute for the records, much less prejudice vested rights.
Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the trial court correctly made the entry of a
judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In so
doing, the lower court merely ordered the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be executed.
The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 where an
order or judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. There is
no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made. LLphil
Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the lower court's action decreeing the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc
was not done arbitrarily nor capriciously. The petitioner was already allowed to oppose the motions in open court and
was even required to submit a memorandum to support his position. The petitioner, however, failed to submit a
memorandum. Neither did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims over the properties in question.
Finally, well settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or
corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over
the case except to execute the final judgment, as in this case. (Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, 165 SCRA
470).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cardoza v. Singson, G.R. No. 59284, January 12, 1990)
[G.R. No. 150134. October 31, 2007.]
ERNESTO
C. DEL ROSARIO and
DAVAO
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY 1 and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

TIMBER
PRIVATE

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch "65" (sic) 2 having, by Decision 3 of July 10, 2001, dismissed
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 00-540 on the ground ofres judicata and splitting of a cause of action, and by
Order of September 24, 2001 4 denied their motion for reconsideration thereof, petitioners filed the present petition
for review on certiorari.
From the rather lengthy history of the present controversy, a recital of the following material facts culled from the
records is in order.
On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent Private Development
Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a
foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 million or a total amount of approximately P4.4 million,
computed at the then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso.
The loan agreement provided, among other things, that DATICOR shall pay: (1) a service fee of one percent (1%) per
annum (later increased to six percent [6%] per annum) on the outstanding balance of the peso loan; (2) 12 percent
(12%) per annum interest on the peso loan; and (3) penalty charges of two percent (2%) per month in case of default.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land one situated in Manila (the Otis
property) which was registered in the name of petitioner Ernesto C.Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental
and chattel mortgages over pieces of machinery and equipment.

Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to interest, service fees and penalty charges.
This left petitioners, by PDCP's computation, with an outstanding balance on the principal of more than P10 million as
of May 15, 1983.
By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 828088, was dismissed by the CFI. HAEDCT
On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the CFI's dismissal of the complaint and declared
void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP.
PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to this Court where it was docketed as G.R. No. 73198.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from petitioners (the receivables) to its corespondent Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) under a Deed of Assignment dated April 10, 1987 5 for a
consideration of P5,435,000. The Deed of Assignment was later amended by two Supplements. 6
FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated
December 8, 1988 whereby petitioners agreed to, as they did pay FEBTC 7 the amount of P6.4 million as full
settlement of the receivables.
On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 73198 8 affirming in toto the decision of the
IAC. It determined that after deducting the P3 million earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP, their remaining balance on
the principal loan was only P1.4 million.
Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint 9 for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC of
Makati, mainly to recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 million 10 P4.335 million from
PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC. The case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a decision 11 in Civil Case No. 94-1610 ordering PDCP to
pay petitioners the sum of P4.035 million, 12 to bear interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1994 until fully paid; to
execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages on the five parcels of land in Mati, Davao Oriental and on the
pieces of machinery and equipment and to return the corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay the costs of the
suit.
As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the trial court dismissed it for lack of cause of action,
ratiocinating that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No.
73198, FEBTC not being a party thereto.
From the trial court's decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50591.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision 13 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, holding that petitioners' outstanding
obligation, which this Court had determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million, could not be increased or
decreased by any act of the creditor PDCP.
The CA held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount
payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the Deed
of Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not bound by its terms. cASEDC
Citing Articles 2154 14 and 2163 15 of the Civil Code which embody the principle of solutio indebiti, the CA held that
the party bound to refund the excess payment of P5 million 16was FEBTC as it received the overpayment; and that
FEBTC could recover from PDCP the amount of P4.035 million representing its overpayment for the assigned
receivables based on the terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general principle of equity.
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the amount of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that
it could not grant a relief different from or in excess of that prayed for.
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the payment of P1.4 million had no basis,
DATICOR's obligation having already been paid in full, overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee FEBTC the amount of
P6.4 million.
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages it was holding over the Mati
real properties and the machinery and equipment, and to return the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners.

And it ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners the amount of P965,000 with legal interest from the date of the promulgation
of its judgment.
FEBTC's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied, and so was its subsequent appeal to this Court.
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a Complaint 17 against FEBTC to recover the balance of
the excess payment of P4.335 million. 18 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540, the precursor of the
present case and raffled to Branch 143 of the RTC.
In its Answer, 19 FEBTC denied responsibility, it submitting that nowhere in the dispositive portion of the CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held liable to return the whole amount of P5.435 million representing the
consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables, and since petitioners failed to claim the said whole amount in
their original complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1610 as they were merely claiming the amount of P965,000 from it, they
were barred from claiming it.
FEBTC later filed a Third Party Complaint 20 against PDCP praying that the latter be made to pay the P965,000 and
the interests adjudged by the CA in favor of petitioners, as well as the P4.335 million and interests that petitioners
were claiming from it. It posited that PDCP should be held liable because it received a consideration of P5.435 million
when it assigned the receivables.
Answering 21 the Third Party Complaint, PDCP contended that since petitioners were not seeking the recovery of the
amount of P965,000, the same cannot be recovered via the third party complaint.
PDCP went on to contend that since the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 had held that
DATICOR has no cause of action against it for the refund of any part of the excess payment, FEBTC can no longer
re-litigate the same issue.
Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not privy to the MOA which explicitly excluded the receivables from the effect
of the Supreme Court decision, and that the amount of P6.4 million paid by petitioners to FEBTC was clearly intended
as consideration for the release and cancellation of the lien on the Otis property. cDEHIC
Replying, 22 FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot deny that it benefited from the assignment of its rights over the
receivables from petitioners. It added that the third party claim being founded on a valid and justified cause, PDCP's
counterclaims lacked factual and legal basis.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 23 to which FEBTC filed its opposition. 24
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment for lack of merit. 25
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground of res
judicata and splitting of cause of action. It recalled that petitioners had filed Civil Case No. 94-1610 to recover the
alleged overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC and to secure the cancellation and release of their mortgages on
real properties, machinery and equipment; that when said case was appealed, the CA, in its Decision, ordered PDCP
to release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest, which Decision became final and
executory on November 23, 1999; and that a Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was
in fact submitted on August 8, 2000, hence, the issue between them was finally settled under the doctrine of res
judicata.

The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC clearly stated that the "pending litigation
before the Supreme Court of the Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive of the Receivables assigned to
FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not covered by this Agreement." That statement in the MOA, the trial court ruled,
categorically made only the loan subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, hence, it was with the parties' full
knowledge and consent that petitioners agreed to pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as consideration for the settlement. The
parties cannot thus be allowed to welsh on their contractual obligations, the trial court concluded.
Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the trial court held that FEBTC's payment of the amount of P1,224,906.67
(P965,000 plus interest) to petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it could not
entertain such claim because the Complaint filed by petitioners merely sought to recover from FEBTC the alleged
overpayment of P4.335 million and attorney's fees of P200,000.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 26 of the July 10, 2001 decision of the trial court was denied by Order of
September 24, 2001.

Hence, the present petition.

In their Memorandum, 27 petitioners proffer that, aside from the issue of whether their complaint is dismissible on the
ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action, the issues of 1) whether FEBTC can be held liable for the
balance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus interest which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in Civil
Case No. 94-1610, and 2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of Assignment and the
MOA that the assignment of the receivables shall not be affected by this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be
considered.
Stripped of the verbiage, the only issue for this Court's consideration is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
00-540 upon the grounds stated by the trial court. This should be so because a Rule 45 petition, like the one at bar,
can raise only questions of law (and that justifies petitioners' elevation of the case from the trial court directly to this
Court) which must be distinctly set forth. 28 DHSCEc
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine of res judicata, reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order whichappears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49 (b) * enunciates the first rule of res judicata known
as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by judgment," which states that the judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal. 29
Stated otherwise, "bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the
subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but
also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged
therein.30 It is in this concept that the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases. 31
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47 (c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment." This rule
provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. 32 It refers to a situation where the judgment in the
prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included
therein. 33
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment," viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and cHaCAS
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action. 34

There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
50591) was a final judgment. Not only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a
consequence of the denial of FEBTC's motion for reconsideration and appeal. 35
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the merits for it determined the
rights and liabilities of the parties. 36 To recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC
was bound to refund the excess payment but because DATICOR's claim against FEBTC was only P965,000, the
court could only grant so much as the relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR because
its obligation had already been paid in full. Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based upon the same
cause of action. 37
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, it cannot be gainsaid that the first case,
Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by petitioners to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3 million P965,000
from FEBTC and P4.335 million from PDCP.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same petitioners, was for the recovery of P4.335 million which
is admittedly part of the P5.3 million earlier sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. 94-1610. This time, the action
was brought solely against FEBTC which in turn impleaded PDCP as a third party defendant.
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the application of the rule of res judicata, the test is to
ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would suffice to authorize a
recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms or nature of the two actions are different. 38 Simply stated, if the
same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment
in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
It bears remembering that a cause of action is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 39
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to
return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same facts and evidence
presented in the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, were the very same facts and evidence that petitioners presented
in Civil Case No. 00-540.
Thus, the same Deed of Assignment between PDCP and FEBTC, the first and second supplements to the Deed, the
MOA between petitioners and FEBTC, and this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198 were submitted in Civil Case No.
00-540.
Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their allegations for, and defenses against, the
recovery of the P4.335 million. Petitioners, of course, plead the CA Decision as basis for their subsequent claim for
the remainder of their overpayment. It is well established, however, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action
or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein petitioners
are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated. 40 ITScHa
In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than restrict the doctrine of res judicata on the ground that public as well as
private interest demands the ending of suits by requiring the parties to sue once and for all in the same case all the
special proceedings and remedies to which they are entitled. 41
This Court finds well-taken then the pronouncement of the court a quo that to allow the re-litigation of an issue that
was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a
ground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and
instituting two or more actions based on it. 42 Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is
mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relies;
he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or
injury. 43

Clearly then, the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 operated as a bar to Civil Case No. 00-540, following the abovequoted Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
A final word. Petitioners are sternly reminded that both the rules on res judicata and splitting of causes of action are
based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium. 44 Re-litigation of matters already settled by a court's final judgment merely burdens the courts and the
taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier
cases. 45
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the RTC, Branch 143, Makati dismissing petitioners'
complaint in Civil Case No. 00-540 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007)
[G.R. No. 161777. May 7, 2008.]
DOMINIC GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. ANGELITO ESTUR, JUAN OFALSA, and ROLANDO
EREVE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the Decision 2 dated 24 September 2003 and the Resolution dated 16 January 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73663.
The Facts
On 25 July 1997, respondents Angelito Estur, Juan Ofalsa, and Rolando Ereve (respondents) filed an amended
complaint 3 for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay
against Lincoln Gerald, Inc. (Lincoln) and petitioner Dominic Griffith (petitioner).
Lincoln, a corporation owned by the Griffith family, is engaged in the manufacture of furniture. Respondents alleged
that petitioner, the Vice President for Southeast Asia Operations, managed the corporation.
On 4 October 1999, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen (Labor Arbiter Layawen) decided the case in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered with the following rulings:
1. Dismissing the complaint of complainant Angelito Estur for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
2. Ordering respondent(s) to pay Angelito Estur his 13th month pay for the (sic) 1996 in the
amount of PHP7,930.00, but dismissing his other claims for insufficiency of evidence.
3. Declaring the dismissal of complainants Juan Ofalsa and Rolando Ereve [illegal], and ordering
respondents to pay them their backwages from the time of their dismissal up to the rendition of
this decision. Due to the apparent strained relationship between complainants and respondents,
the latter are directed to pay complainants their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent
to one month salary for every year of service.
4. Their money claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 4

Lincoln filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 1999 but failed to file the required memorandum of appeal. On 6 July
2001, the decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen became final and executory, and the first writ of execution was issued on
2 October 2001.
In February 2002, petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution dated 7 January 2002, issued by Labor
Arbiter Jaime Reyno (Labor Arbiter Reyno) directed against him and Lincoln. The first alias writ of execution orders
the sheriff:
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of respondent(s)
Lincoln Gerald, Inc. and/or Dominic G. Griffith located at #7 Sheridan corner Pioneer streets,
Mandaluyong City or anywhere respondents may be found in the Philippines and collect the total
amount of Php590,828.00 representing their backwages, separation pay and 13th month
pay plus execution fee in the amount of PhP5,408.00 and to turn over the said amount to this
Office, for further disposition to the complainants. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
On 19 February 2002, petitioner filed a motion to quash the first alias writ of execution. 6 Petitioner alleged in his
motion that he was unaware of the labor case filed against him because he was Lincoln's Vice President for
Southeast Asia Operations only until 17 September 1997. Petitioner contended that the addition of the execution fee
in the writ in effect modified Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision, and thus nullified the writ. Furthermore, petitioner
maintained that as an officer of Lincoln, he was not personally liable to pay the judgment debt because he acted in
good faith and within the bounds of his authority. Labor Arbiter Reyno denied the motion in an order dated 24 April
2002. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied on
16 July 2002.
On 11 September 2002, Labor Arbiter Reyno issued a second alias writ of execution against petitioner and Lincoln.
On 4 November 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated 24
September 2003, and subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the Labor Arbiter's order. The appellate court cited Section 19, Rule V of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC (NLRC Rules) which prohibits motions for reconsideration of any order or decision of a Labor
Arbiter. However, when a motion for reconsideration is filed, it shall be treated as an appeal provided that it complies
with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's motion to recall the first
alias writ of execution cannot be treated as an appeal.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the addition of the execution fee did not modify the decision because the
NLRC Rules and the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment (Sheriff Manual) 7 provide for the inclusion of the
execution fee which shall be collected from the losing party.
Lastly, the appellate court found no evidence which would substantiate petitioner's claim that as of 17 September
1997, he was no longer connected with Lincoln. There was no evidence that there was a change in the situation of
the parties.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the order of Labor Arbiter Reyno, denying the motion to quash the writ.
The issue revolves on the validity of the first alias writ of execution dated 7 January 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter
Reyno.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the 4 October 1999 decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen, finding Lincoln and
petitioner solidarily liable to respondents, became final and executory on 6 July 2001. Petitioner, however, persists in
challenging Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision by insisting that the judgment debt should have been the sole liability of
Lincoln. Petitioner maintains that the writ is defective because it makes him personally liable for the judgment debt
even though he was only a corporate officer acting in good faith and within the bounds of his authority. The inclusion

of petitioner in the writ as solidarily liable with Lincoln for the backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay of
respondents does not make the writ defective. On the contrary, the writ is in accord with the terms of Labor Arbiter
Layawen's decision which the writ seeks to enforce.
Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision is already final and executory and can no longer be the subject of an appeal. Thus,
petitioner is bound by the decision and can no longer impugn the same. 8 Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a
decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law. 9 The doctrine of finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo: 10
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his
case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of
courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality. 11
While petitioner can no longer challenge the decision which has become final and executory, he can question the
manner of its execution especially if it is not in accord with the tenor and terms of the judgment. 12 As held in Abbott
v. NLRC: 13
In Sawit v. Rodas and Daquis v. Bustos, we held that a judgment becomes final and executory by
operation of law, not by judicial declaration. Accordingly, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon
the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution; and issuance thereof is a
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.
In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the decision itself but the
manner of its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true that the decision itself has
become final and executory and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either that
it must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any deviation therefrom can be
the subject of a proper appeal. 14
In his motion to quash the writ, petitioner alleged that the writ was a nullity because it modified the 4 October 1999
decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen by including the amount of the execution fee in the writ.
The inclusion of the execution fee is not a modification of the Labor Arbiter's decision. Section 6, Rule IX of the Sheriff
Manual provides that the execution fee shall be charged against the losing party, thus:
SEC. 6. Sheriffs/Execution Fees. Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall be provided at the
beginning of the month with a cash advance of five hundred pesos only (P500.00) for
transportation expenses which shall be liquidated at the end of the month with a statement of
expenses and itinerary of travel duly approved by the Commission or Labor Arbiter issuing the
writ.

In the National Labor Relations Commission, the sheriff or duly designated officer shall
collect the following execution fees which shall be charged against the losing party:
(1) For awards less than P5,000.00 P200.00;
(2) P5,000.00 or more but less than P20,000.00 P400.00;
(3) P20,000.00 or more but less than P50,000.00 P600.00;
(4) P50,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 P800.00;
(5) P100,000.00 or more but not exceeding P150,000.00 P1,000.00;

(6) P150,000.00 the fee is plus P10.00 for every P1,000.00 in excess of
P150,000.00.
The sheriff or duly designated officer shall be administratively liable in case of failure to
collect the execution fees without any justifiable reason. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the inclusion of the execution fee does not make the writ of execution defective.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 September 2003 and the Resolution dated
16 January 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73663.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Griffith v. Estur, G.R. No. 161777, May 07, 2008)
[G.R. No. 125447. August 14, 1998.]
MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and H.L.
CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondents.

[G.R. No. 125475. August 14, 1998.]

H.L.
CARLOS
CONSTRUCTION,
INC., petitioner, vs.
and MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondents.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

Chavez, Laureta & Associates for Marina Properties Corporation.

Camacho & Associates for H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc.

SYNOPSIS
The cases under consideration are two separate appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) of June 27,
1996 in CA-GR. SP No. 37927 which affirmed with modification the Order of the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 5462 which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in the
case filed by H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (Carlos) against MARINA Properties Corporation (Marina) for specific
performance with damages. The records of the case reveal that Carlos filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages against Marina with the HLURB, alleging, among others, that it has substantially complied with the terms
and conditions of the contract to purchase and sell, having paid more that 50% of the contract price of the
condominium unit built on a parcel of land at Asiaworld City, Coastal Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Moreover, Marina's act of canceling the contract was done with malice and bad faith. In its decision, the Court of
Appeals affirms the decision of the Office of the President but sustained Marina as regards the award of actual
damages, finding that no evidence was presented to prove the P30,000.00 award as monthly rental for the
condominium unit. Hence, this appeal. AaIDCS
The Supreme Court finds the decision of the Court of Appeals proper and correct. The Court upholds the findings of
the appellate court that Marina's cancellation of the contract to buy and to sell was illegal. It is very clear that Carlos
had already paid P1,810,330.70, or more than 50% of the contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum Carlos
had disbursed amounted to more than the total 24 installments. In addition since the cancellation was done not
through a notarial cancellation, as explicitly required by Section 24 ofPD 957, the cancellation was void. The Court
likewise agrees with the conclusion of the appellate court that the award of P30, 000.00 as actual damages for
unearned monthly rental income was arbitrary because no proof was submitted by Carlos to substantiate the
recovery. In view thereof, the Court denied the petitions in these consolidated cases and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; GROUNDS THEREFOR. Under
our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a trial court may move for reconsideration thereof
on the following grounds: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision; or (c) the decision is contrary to law. A motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to
appeal, unless the motion is pro forma. This is now expressly set forth in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRO FORMA MOTION; ALTHOUGH A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY MERELY
REITERATE ISSUES ALREADY PASSED UPON BY THE COURT, THAT BY ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE
IT PRO FORMA AND IMMATERIAL; CASE AT BAR. A motion for reconsideration based on the foregoing grounds
is deemed pro forma if the same does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported
by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. It is settled
that although a motion for reconsideration may merely reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself
does not make it pro forma and is immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules.
. . . We are thus unable to hold that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma. Our review of the
records reveals that said motion adequately pointed out the conclusions MARINA regarded as erroneous and
contrary to law and even referred to findings not supported by evidence as well as jurisprudence to sustain MARINA's
claims. As to the justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed upon the issues raised
by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above readily refute such a position. EaTCSA
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 1-91; AN AGGRIEVED PARTY IS ALLOWED ONE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION OR FINAL ORDER. It may be pointed out that under
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 dated 27 February 1991 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated 16
May 1995, which took effect on 1 June 1995, an aggrieved party is allowed one motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision or final order before he may file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. All told, MARINA's
motion for reconsideration was but proper under the adjective rules extant in this jurisdiction.
4. ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; A PARTY IS NOT GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT SIMULTANEOUSLY
FILED A CASE TO ENFORCE A CONTRACT BEFORE THE HLURB AND A SUM OF MONEY CASE BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; CASE AT BAR. The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant
consideration. H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB to enforce
their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party. Contrary
to MARINA's assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a duplication of Civil Case No. 89-5870 which was filed
to collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in
the civil case was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the HLURB. For this
reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause of action.
5. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGE; ACTUAL DAMAGES; TO BE RECOVERABLE, IT MUST NOT ONLY BE CAPABLE OF
PROOF, BUT MUST ACTUALLY BE PROVED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY; CASE AT BAR.
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the award of P30,000.00 as actual damages for unearned
monthly rental income starting from March 1990 until the delivery of the property to H.L. CARLOS was arbitrary.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as is duly proved. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. As the Court of Appeals correctly found here that no proof
was submitted by H.L. CARLOS to substantiate the recovery of actual damages in the form of monthly rentals, the
deletion of such award was but appropriate.
6. ID.; OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS; SALES; AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO BUYERS OF REAL
ESTATE ON INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS (R.A. 6552); IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE CANCELLATION OF A
CONTRACT TO BUY AND TO SELL, A NOTARIAL CANCELLATION MUST FIRST BE HAD; CASE AT BAR. The
Court likewise uphold the finding thatMARINA's cancellation of the Contract To Buy and To Sell was clearly illegal.
Prior to MARINA's unilateral act of rescission, H.L. CARLOS had already paid P1,810,330.70, or more than 50% of
the contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum H.L. CARLOS had disbursed amounted to more than the total
of 24 installments, i.e., two years' worth of installments computed at a monthly installment rate of P67,024.22,
inclusive of the downpayment. As to the governing law, Section 24 of P.D. 957 provides: SEC. 24. Failure to pay
installments. The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than
failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552. Then among the
requirements of R.A. No. 6552, in order to effect the cancellation of a contract, a notarial cancellation must first be
had. Therefore, absent this, MARINA's cancellation of its contract with H.L. CARLOS was void.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:
We resolve here two (2) separate appeals from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals of 27 June 1996 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37927, which affirmed with modification the 15 March 1995 Order 2 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case
No. 5462 which, in turn, affirmed in toto the 14 June 1993 decision 3 of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) in the case filed by H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (hereafter H.L. CARLOS)
against MARINA Properties Corporation (hereafter MARINA) for Specific Performance with Damages and docketed
as REM-A- 1179. 4
The factual antecedents, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner Marina Properties Corporation (MARINA for short) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of real estate development. Among its projects is a condominium complex
project, known as the "MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT" consisting of 10
building clusters with 31 housing units to be built on a parcel of land at Asiaworld City, Coastal
Road in Paraaque, Metro Manila. The area is covered by T.C.T. No. (121211) 42201 of the
Registry of Deeds of the same municipality.
The construction of the project commenced sometime in 1988, with respondent H.L. Carlos
Construction, Inc. (H.L. CARLOS for brevity) as the principal contractor, particularly of Phase III.

As an incentive to complete the construction of Phase III, MARINA allowed H.L. CARLOS to
purchase a condominium unit therein known as Unit B-121. Thus, on October 9, 1988, the
parties entered into a Contract to Purchase and to Sell covering Unit B-121 for P3,614,000.00.
H.L. CARLOS paid P1,034,200.00 as down payment, P50,000.00 as cash deposit and
P67,024.22 equivalent to 13 monthly amortizations.
After paying P1,810,330.70, which was more than half of the contract price, H.L. CARLOS
demanded for the delivery of the unit, but MARINA refused. This prompted H.L. CARLOS to file
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 a complaint for damages against MARINA,
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5870.
Meanwhile, on April 20, 1990, MARINA wrote H.L. CARLOS that it was exercising its option
under their Contract to Purchase and to Sell to take over the completion of the project due to its
(H.L. CARLOS') abandonment of the construction of the Phase III project.
In a letter dated March 15, 1991, H.L. CARLOS inquired from MARINA about the "turn-over
status" of the condominium unit. MARINA replied that it was cancelling the Contract to Purchase
and Sell due to H.L. CARLOS' abandonment of the construction of the Phase III Project and its
filing of baseless and harassment suits against MARINA and its officers.
Forthwith, H.L. CARLOS filed the instant complaint for specific performance with damages
against MARINA with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), alleging among
others, that it has substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the Contract to
Purchase and Sell, having paid more than 50% of the contract price of the condominium unit;
and that MARINA's act of cancelling the contract was done with malice and bad faith. H.L.
CARLOS prays that MARINA be ordered to deliver to it the subject unit, accept the monthly
amortizations on the remaining balance, execute the final deed of sale and deliver the title of the
unit upon full payment of the contract price. Also, H.L. CARLOS prays for the award of actual and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, MARINA claimed that its cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and Sell is
justified since H.L. CARLOS has failed to pay its monthly installment since October 1989 or for a
period of almost two (2) years; that H.L. CARLOS abandoned its work on the project as of
December 1989; and that the instant case should have been suspended in view of the pendency
of Civil Case No. 89-5870 for damages in the Makati RTC involving the same issues. dctai

On February 21, 1992, the HLURB, through Atty. Abraham N. Vermudez, Arbiter, rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
cancellation of the subject Contract to Sell as null and void and ordering
respondentMarina Properties Corporation as follows:
1. To turn over the subject condominium unit to herein complainant, accept monthly
amortization[s] on the remaining balance and to execute the final deed of sale
and deliver title/ownership of the subject property to the complainant upon full
payment of the contract price.
2. To pay complainant actual damages of P30,000.00 per month commencing from
March 1990 until the delivery of the subject property and the amount of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
4. To pay to this Board the amount of P5,000.00 as [an] administrative fine.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
In ruling for H.L. CARLOS, the HLURB Arbiter held:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's position that the case is a complex one is
more imaginary than real. Clearly, the cancellation of the subject
'Contract to Purchase and to Sell' was in violation of Republic Act No.
6552, otherwise known as the 'Realty Installment Buyers' Protection
Act,' which prescribes the procedure for cancellation of installment
contracts for the purchase of subdivision lots and/or condominium
units.
In the case at bar, the complainant had already paid
P1,810,330.70 or more than 50% of the contract price of
P3,614,000.00 and more than the total of two years (24 months)
installments computed at the monthly installment of P67,024.22,
inclusive of the downpayment, which is more than 24 installments.
Under R.A. 6552, notarial cancellation of the installment contract
becomes effective only upon payment of the cash surrender value to
the purchaser, which however respondent did not do.
Respondent's cancellation of the subject contract was clearly
illegal, void and cannot be sanctioned.
Neither can this Office find merit in respondent's contention
that this case should be suspended because of the pending civil case
between the parties, said pending case, Civil Case No. 89-5870 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila, was filed by
the same complainant herein against the same respondent for
collection of unpaid billings in the amount of about P10,000,000.00.
On the other hand, this Office find that respondent's act in
cancelling the subject installment sales contract without following the
provisions of R.A. 6552is an unsound real estate business practice for
which respondent is fined the sum of P5,000.00.
As to damages and attorney's fees claimed by complainant
and borne out by the records, this Office finds that respondent should
be held liable for unearned rental income of P30,000.00 per month,
commencing from March 1990 when the condominium unit should
have been delivered until actual delivery thereof, and attorney's fees
of P50,000.00, both amounts to be deducted from the unpaid balance
due on the subject condominium unit.

Likewise, for its wanton breach of the subject contract,

respondent is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 as an example for the public good, deductible from the
balance due on the subject condominium unit.
xxx xxx xxx
Whereupon, MARINA interposed an appeal to the Board of Commissioners of HLURB (First
Division) which affirmed the assailed decision.
On further appeal to the Office of the President, the decision of the Board of Commissioner (First
Division) was affirmed.
MARINA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 5
MARINA filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals ascribing the following errors to the Office of the
President:
(1) In sustaining the award of actual damages for unrealized profits in favor of private respondent
H.L. CARLOS which were unliquidated, speculative and patently unreasonable;
(2) In declaring the motion for reconsideration filed by MARINA "pro-forma" and depriving it of the
right of appeal, and
(3) In not dismissing the case on the grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping and splitting a
single cause of action. 6
The Court of Appeals sustained MARINA as regards the award of actual damages, finding that no evidence was
presented to prove the P30,000.00 award as monthly rental for the condominium unit. However, as to the
pronouncement of the Office of the President that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro-forma, the
Court of Appeals noted that MARINA did not raise any new issue in its motion for reconsideration. In the same vein,
respondent court ruled that MARINA was not deprived of its right to appeal.
The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside MARINA's assertion that the complaint should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia thus:
The requisites of lis pendens as a ground for dismissal of a complaint are: (1) identity of parties
or at least such representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted as
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity in both cases is such that
the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata to the other case.
There is no dispute that the case at bench and Civil Case No. 89-5870 for damages at the Makati
RTC involves the same parties although in the civil case, the officers of MARINAhave been
impleaded as co-defendants. While the first requisite obtains in this case, the last two are
conspicuously absent.
It will be observed that the two cases involve distinct and separate causes of action or rights
asserted. Civil Case No. 89-5870 is for the collection of sums of money corresponding to unpaid
billings and labor costs incurred by H.L. CARLOS in the construction of the project under the
Construction Contract agreed upon by the parties. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is for
specific performance (delivery of the condominium unit) and damages arising from the unilateral
cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and to Sell byMARINA.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are also different. In the civil case, H.L. CARLOS prays for the
award of P7,065,885.03 representing unpaid labor costs, change orders and price escalations
including the sum of P2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory damages. In the instant case,
H.L. CARLOS seeks not only the awa[r]d of actual and exemplary damages but also the delivery
of the condominium unit upon MARINA's acceptance of the monthly amortization on the
remaining balance, the execution of a final deed of sale and the delivery of the title to the said
private respondent. LibLex
MARINA's claim that the present complaint should be dismissed on the ground of splitting a
cause of action, deserves scant consideration. The two complaints did not arise from a single
cause of action but from two separate causes of action. It bears emphasis that H.L. CARLOS'

cause of action in the civil case stemmed from the breach by MARINA of its contractual
obligation under the Construction Contract, while in the case at bench, H.L. CARLOS' cause of
action is premised on the unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and Sell
by MARINA. 7
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the Office of the President but deleted the award of actual
damages. As such, the parties sought redress from this Court by way of separate petitions.

In G.R. No. 125447, MARINA asserts that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in finding that petitioner should turn over the
subject condominium unit to H.L. CARLOS and accept monthly amortizations on the remaining balance; and (2) in
not ordering the dismissal of the case on the grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping and splitting of a single cause
of action.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 125475, H.L. CARLOS contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in: (1) finding
that the award of actual damages equivalent to P30,000.00 in unearned monthly rentals was not sustained by
evidence; (2) in not declaring that the petition for review was filed out of time and fatally defective for lack of
verification and certification by MARINA Properties, and in not declaring the decision of the Office of the President
final and executory; and (3) in not dismissing MARINA's appeal as without merit.
MARINA's motion to consolidate both cases was granted in a resolution dated 27 January 1997. 8
We first address the lone procedural issue of the timeliness of the petition for review filed by MARINA with the Court
of Appeals and the supposed lack of verification and certification.
We find without merit the allegation that MARINA's petition for review before the Court of Appeals was filed out of
time as MARINA's motion for reconsideration (of the order of the Office of the President) was found to be pro
forma and, therefore, did not stop the running of its period to appeal.
MARINA filed its Motion for Reconsideration 9 on the last day of its . period to appeal, specifically, on 3 May 1995.
However, the motion was ; found by the Office of the President to be pro forma as "the issues of litis ; pendentia in,
forum-shopping and splitting of a cause of action as well as the issue of unliquidated, speculative and unreasonable
damages raised therein were basically the same issues raised and discussed extensively in the Appeal Memorandum
and which were already weighed, discussed and considered by this Office in its Order dated March 15, 1995." 10 As
a consequence, the Office of the President declared its decision final and executory.
Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a trial court may move for reconsideration
thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision; or (c) the decision is contrary to law. 11 A motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to
appeal, unless the motion is pro forma 12 This is now expressly set forth in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion for reconsideration based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the same does not specify the
findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, making express
reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. 13 It is settled that although a motion for reconsideration may
merely reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma and is immaterial
because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. 14 Thus, in Guerra
Enterprises, Co. Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur, 15 we ruled:
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince
the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in
doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a
motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a
decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and
new trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a ruling that would, in
effect eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule 37.
On this note, it has also been fittingly observed that:
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings,
and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light,
the courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro formamotions has a
direct bearing upon the movant's valuable right to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice to accord the appellate

court the opportunity to review the decision of the trial court on the merits than to abort the appeal by declaring the
motion pro forma, such that the period to appeal was not interrupted and had consequently lapsed. 16
We are thus unable to hold that MARINA's motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma. Our review of the
records reveals that said motion adequately pointed out the conclusions MARINA regarded as erroneous and
contrary to law, and even referred to findings not supported by evidence as well as jurisprudence to
sustain MARINA's claims. As to the justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed
upon the issues raised by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above readily refute such a position.
It may be pointed out that under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 dated 27 February 1991 and Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated 16 May 1995, which took effect on 1 June 1995, an aggrieved party is allowed
one motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or final order before he may file a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. All told, MARINA's motion for reconsideration was but proper under the adjective rules extant in this
jurisdiction.
The charge of a lack of verification or certification in MARINA's petition before the Court of Appeals is baseless. Even
the most cursory of reviews will disclose that such may be found on pages 30 and 31 of the Petition. 17
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the award of P30,000.00 as actual damages for unearned
monthly rental income starting from March 1990 until the delivery of the property to H.L. CARLOS was
arbitrary. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as is duly proved. 18 Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. 19 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 20 As the Court of Appeals correctly found
here that no proof was submitted by H.L. CARLOS to substantiate the recovery of actual damages in the form of
monthly rentals, the deletion of such award was but appropriate.
The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration. H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum
shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB to enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum
shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari,
or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one
or the other court might look with favor upon the party. 21 Contrary to MARINA's, assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint
was hardly a duplication of Civil Case. No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to
unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case was, therefore, totally distinct
from the cause of action in the complaint before the HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting
of a cause of action.
Anent the absence of litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals' meticulous analysis of this issue leaves no room for
improvement and we adopt it as our own.
We likewise uphold the finding that MARINA's cancellation of the Contract To Buy and To Sell was clearly illegal. Prior
to MARINA's unilateral act of rescission, H.L. CARLOS had already paid P1,810,330.70, or more than 50% of the
contract price of P3,614,000.00. Moreover, the sum H.L. CARLOS had disbursed amounted to more than the total of
24 installments, i.e., two years' worth of installments computed at a monthly installment rate of P67,024.22, inclusive
of the downpayment.
As to the governing law, Section 24 of P.D. 957 22 provides:
SEC. 24. Failure to pay installments. The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay
the installments due for reasons other than failure of the owner or developer to develop the
project shall be governed by Republic Act , No. 6552.
Then among the requirements of R.A. No. 6552, 23 in order to effect the cancellation of a contract, a notarial
cancellation must first be had. 24 Therefore, absent this, MARINA's cancellation of its contract with H.L. CARLOS
was void.
In conclusion, cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations, filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman fall under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB. 25 It is incumbent upon said administrative agency, in the exercise of its powers and
functions, to interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award
damages whenever appropriate. 26 LLphil

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these consolidated cases, G.R. No. 125447 and G.R. No. 125475 are DENIED and
the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 27 June 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner in each case.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Marina Properties Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447, 125475, August 14, 1998)
[G.R. No. 160406. June 26, 2006.]
SPS. DOLORES MIRANDA PROVOST and JEAN PROVOST, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. VICTOR RAMOS and FE A. RAMOS, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:
The instant petition seeks the annulment of the Decision 1 dated February 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 57008 and its Resolution 2 dated August 27, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court reversed the Decision 3 dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao,
Camiguin, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 573, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated February 19, 1999 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 212.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 12542,
Case 15, Cad. 473 situated in Putingbalas, Tupsan Grande, 5Mambajao, Camiguin. The spouses' lot was donated to
them by Nicolasa Yap Vda. de Abao on October 24, 1994. Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
12543, C-15, Cad. 473 owned by petitioner Dolores Miranda Provost. She bought it from Rosario Abanil.
Sometime in May 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two lots. In 1994, the Ramoses, believing
that the Provosts encroached on a portion of their lot, demanded the return of the encroached area but the latter
refused. The Ramoses thus had a relocation survey and the relocation survey showed that the fence was indeed on
their land.
The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used had been disapproved by the DENR
Regional Office for being defective and was replaced with a correction survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. Under
the correction survey, Lot No. 12542 with an area of 4,402 square meters was surveyed as Lot No. 13436, Cad 473,
Module 2, but with a reduced area of 3,845 square meters, and Lot No. 12543 with an area of 1,774 square meters
as Lot No. 12769, Cad 473, Module 2 with an increased area of 2,634 square meters. Upon request of petitioners
Provosts, another relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey plan. This relocation survey
showed that the fence was within petitioners' property.
On December 26, 1994, the Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages and with prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC. They alleged that the Provosts encroached on
314 square meters of their lot. The MTC dismissed the complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their
ownership and possession of the disputed area. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the
claim by the Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved survey plan. IcTCHD
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and ordered
the Provosts to vacate the area, remove the fence, and pay damages, to wit:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mambajao,
Camiguin in Civil Case No. 573 entitled, "Spouses Victor Ramos, et al. vs. Jean Provost, et al."
is reversed and set aside and in lieu thereof, another one is entered:

(a) ordering respondents to vacate and surrender the encroached area of 314 square
meters to the petitioners and to remove their fence;
(b) to pay petitioners the following amounts:
(1) the amount of P6,355.82 as actual damages;
(2) the amount of P500.00 per annum as reasonable rentals of the encroached area;
(3) the amount of P35,500.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,500.00 as traveling expenses
every hearing;
(4) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) the amount of P500.00 as litigation expenses and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioners argue:
1. That respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal
of private respondents outside of the issue raised in the decisions of both the Municipal Trial
Court and the Regional Trial Court.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in insisting on the technical description of the erroneous and disapproved survey of
private respondents' land as the basis for its findings that petitioners had encroached the land of
respondents.
3. That the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in merely denying in a cavalier manner petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration as
mere refutation of its own findings, without stating the legal basis for the denial in direct violation
of the provisions of the second paragraph, of Section 14, of the 19[8]7 Constitution of the
Philippines, that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis [therefor].
4. That there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law open to petitioners, except this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. 7
At the outset, we note that this case involves an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Thus, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not proper. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant
petition as one proper for review under Rule 45.
Simply, the main issue in this case is whether petitioners (Provosts) encroached on the property of private
respondents (Ramos spouses).
Private respondents anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan, while petitioners base theirs
on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey plan.cEAIHa
Petitioners aver that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it held that they encroached upon the
Ramoses' property since the frontage (points 7, 8 and 9) in the old survey plan of the Ramoses' property was the
same frontage in the new survey plan and the fence was constructed at point 8 of the cadastral plan. They argue that
the points of the frontage of respondents' property in the old and new survey plan are similar but with different
technical descriptions on measurements and bearings, thus the location of the frontage in the two surveys cannot be
identical. More so, under the approved survey plan, the fence was constructed at point 9, which is point 4 of their lot
and clearly within their property. They posit that the Court of Appeals did not bother to check the technical
descriptions and instead relied on the testimony of the engineer who conducted the relocation survey using the
technical description on the disapproved survey plan. They maintain that private respondents were unable to
establish the identity of their property, since they relied on a disapproved survey plan. Moreover, the contested area
was previously occupied by Asterio Aboc, a tenant of Rosario Abanil.
Private respondents, on their part, state that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous and
open possession as owners, as evidenced by the tax declarations and that petitioners did not deny points 7, 8 and 9

of respondents' property. They insist that the Provosts encroached on their land as the fence was constructed at point
8.
The Court of Appeals in reversing the RTC decision reasoned that the petitioners had no right to move the common
boundary such that the area of the adjoining lot was reduced to 3,552 square meters. It further held that they could
not validly claim ownership over the area of 2,327 square meters since they bought only 1,774 square meters, and
that the correction survey plan was under protest as it would prejudice private respondents. 8
We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion
reivindicatoria. 9 Section 8, Rule 40 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the
case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case
on the merits. In the instant case, the MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of
jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC.
Now, on the main issue, we sustain the decision of the RTC.
Significantly, the parties do not deny that a correction survey was made in Barangay Tupsan; that the survey plan
was approved on February 16, 1994; and that the area of the private respondents' property under the corrected
survey plan was reduced to 3,845 square meters, while that of petitioners' was increased to 2,634 square meters.
In an action to recover under Article 434 11 of the Civil Code, the claimant must (1) establish the identity of the
property sought to be recovered and (2) rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of defendant's claim.
It is also settled rule that what defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in the description but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 12
In this case, we find that private respondents failed to identify the property they seek to recover. They relied on the
old survey plan, the technical descriptions of which did not indicate the accurate measurements and limits of their
property. The technical descriptions under the old cadastral survey plan cannot be the basis to delineate the
boundaries of the lots or determine their respective areas for the obvious reason that it was not approved. In fact, a
relocation survey plan 13 of Lot No. 12542, attached to the complaint as Annex "B" and presented in evidence by the
petitioners as Exhibit "1", reveals that the area of the lot is still subject to verification and final computation.

Moreover, private respondents failed to prove open, continuous and adverse possession of the disputed area. That
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of owners since World War II based on the early tax
declarations, is insufficient to delineate boundaries. 14 Also, they admitted that Asterio Aboc is the tenant of Rosario
Abanil. 15 They merely claimed that a portion of the land where Aboc's house was once built, is part of their property.
Such claim without further proof of title does not suffice to define the boundaries of the adjoining lots. It thus appears
clearly that the contested area was part of Abanil's lot sold to petitioner Dolores Provost. aSTECA
As held in Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 16 when the records do not show that the land subject of
the action for recovery has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, inasmuch as respondents'
ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
Considering that there is already an existing correct and approved cadastral survey plan of Barangay Tupsan, and
absent any showing that the same is erroneous, that plan should be the basis to delineate the boundaries.
Additionally, however we find the RTC's award of actual damages for P10,000; attorney's fees for P10,000; and
litigation expenses for P5,000, without legal and factual basis; hence, the awards must be deleted.
An award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is proper when the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be recovered, and when the civil action or proceeding is clearly
unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith. The award of attorney's fees as damages is
the exception rather than the rule. It is not to be given to the defendant every time the latter prevails. The right to
litigate is of great consequence that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it mistakenly unless,
of course such party acted in bad faith. In this case, we could not award attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in
the absence of showing of gross and evident bad faith in filing the action. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated August 27, 2003 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
actual damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees are deleted.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Provost v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160406, June 26, 2006)
[G.R. No. 169793. September 15, 2006.]
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857,
ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for
further proceedings.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting of 100 square meters
and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651,
located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single
707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18,
1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his
widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver 2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in
favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the
land into two lots 3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996. 4
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property sometime
in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued
even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 were issue to petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter 5 dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent
vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered
mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to
vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint 6 for ejectment, damages with
injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as
CV-01-030. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of
the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with
irregularities. 7
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads:
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES
AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land described in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and surrender it to the
plaintiff; DETACa
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000)
as attorney's fees, and
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per month from February,
2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff.
COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED. 8

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the ground that as the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction
thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED. 9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review 10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals
which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:
[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN
THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY
THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER. 12
The petition lacks merit.
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should
be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which
should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more
than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of
ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court. 13
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery
of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the
remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. 14 Thus, if the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be
filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court. AEDCHc
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case isaccion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 15 On its face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to
assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 16

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11,
1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2,
2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained
unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby
making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for
unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been
since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to
his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner
was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively
made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional
Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty. 17
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was occupying his property way back
in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion
publiciana and not one under the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject lot
and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim before
the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even
if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who
had been in physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment. 18

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only on March
2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should
have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If
an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on
the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case
of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits
as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded
for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section,
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by
the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may
no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall
no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. 19
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,
for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED. ATcaID

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006)
[G.R. No. 137122. November 15, 2000.]
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
BERNARDO, DOMINADOR, HERMOGENA LUCIA, and MARIA GATCHALIAN, and the
HEIRS OF GREGORIO GATCHALIAN: ROLANDO, CONRADO and ARTURO, all surnamed
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

Arturo S. Santos for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner herein and
other co-defendants. After a protracted litigation, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the
claims had been barred by the statute of limitations and laches. Private respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court. The respondents filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court gave
due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. However, the
records were not transmitted to the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes. Thereafter, the
respondents instead filed a motion for new trial since reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer
possible. Petitioner opposed the motion. However, the trial court granted the motion for new trial. Petitioner elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioner was barred from
assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting the motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on the ground that petitioner was stopped by laches in assailing the notice of appeal which had been given
due course by the trial court. Hence this petition.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and granted this petition. Petitioner could not be
faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an earlier time acting upon the assumption that the
appeal was filed on time relying on the order of the trial court that the notice of appeal had been filed within the
reglementary period. The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court
and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its having been filed out of time. The
respondents did not attempt to explain the reason for the delay and instead blamed the petitioner for its failure to
assail the timeliness of the appeal.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; EFFECT OF FILING A
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION AND THE DENIAL THEREOF. In Lacsamana
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court has ruled that in an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order of a
metropolitan or municipal trial court to the regional trial court, and from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals
in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court, the fifteen-day period for appeal prescribed by
Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed. If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the
remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of time to file
such a notice of appeal is neither required not allowed. This rule has been substantially reproduced in Section 3, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the
last day of the fifteen day prescribed period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they only
had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect
their appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt and including the next day. Since respondents had received a copy of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of notice of appeal on 07
December 1989 came much too late for by then the judgment has already become final and executory.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE PERFECTED IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW
AND FAILURE TO DO SO RENDERS JUDGMENT FINAL AND EXECUTORY; RATIONALE. The perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a
quo, and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory. A fundamental precept is that the
reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has
more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals.
The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court concerned
to order execution of the judgment. After the judgment has become final and executory, vested rights are acquired by
the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. Not being a natural right or a
part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with rules provided therefore. A failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed periods has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of a court, and an appellee's failure to file a motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of
origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose
such objection.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL; INTENDED TO AVOID A CLEAR CASE OF INJUSTICE; CAN BE
INVOKED ONLY IN HIGHLY EXCEPTIONAL AND JUSTIFIABLE CASES. The doctrine of estoppel is predicated
on, and has its origin in equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle
intended to avoid a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its
counterpart, must be inequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become a convenient and
effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principle that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but,
as it concededly is, a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in
highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION ON LEGALITY THEREOF MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. A motion contesting a late appeal may be filed before the appellate court even
after the transmittal of the records therein. The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in
the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its being out of time.
A recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with any assumption or conclusion that it has been
filed. Strangely, respondents did not contempt to explain the reason for the delay and would, instead, lay the blame
on petitioner for its failure to assail the timeliness of the appeal. It may here be worthwhile to reiterate the
pronouncement in Galima vs. Court of Appeals than an error by counsel in ascertaining the appeal period will not
arrest the finality of the judgment.

DECISION

VITUG, J p:
In a decision, dated 18 May 1998, the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 46385, entitled " Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., vs. the Honorable Luis R. Tongco, et. al.," dismissed a petition for certiorari and mandamus brought
by petitioner against the Honorable Luis Tongco in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 155, of Pasig City.
The factual and case antecedents were synthesized by the appellate court in its assailed decision. cDSAEI
On 04 June 1975, respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., and its co-defendants United Housing Corporation, Victorino Hernandez, heirs
of Aurelio de Leon, and heirs of Nicolas Gatchalian.
After a protracted litigation, the trial court, through then Presiding Judge Efricio B. Acosta, dismissed the complaint in
a decision, dated 17 June 1983, thusly:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby dismisses the complaint of the plaintiff
for lack of merit and having been barred by the statute of limitations and by laches. The
counterclaim of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of evidence." 1

Respondents received a copy of the decision on 04 July 1983. On 19 July 1983, the last day of the prescribed
fifteen-day period for appeal, private respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. The motion
was denied by the trial court in its order of 03 October 1989. A copy of the order was received by respondents on
28 November 1989.
On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a notice of appeal and, on 11 December 1989, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The records of
the case, however, were not transmitted to the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes. On 23
April 1996, the trial court required the parties to appear in conference. Almost a year had lapsed but the missing
stenographic notes were still not submitted to the trial court.
On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a motion for new trial for the retaking and presentation of testimonial and
documentary evidence on the ground that the reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible
considering that the court stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of witnesses by then since retired from
the service, their whereabouts unknown.

On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new trial filed by
respondents contending that the appeal was filed out of time and that the remedy for new trial could not be availed of
since it was filed long after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed.
The trial court, in its order of 16 July 1997 resolved the incidents in this wise; thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for New Trial prayed for by the plaintiffs being
based on meritorious grounds is hereby GRANTED.
"Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by defendant Manila Memorial Park is hereby
DENIED for being moot and academic and barred by laches.
"Further, considering that the Motion For New Trial filed by plaintiff has been favorably acted
upon for the above reasons, the Notice of Appeal interposed by plaintiff on December 7, 1989 is
hereby declared MOOTED." 2
The trial court ratiocinated that the final resolution of the case could not be held in abeyance indefinitely nor
could petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal still be entertained after their having waited for eight years before
raising the issue.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but to no avail, the trial court's order of 16 July 1997. Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated
the matter via a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals insisting that the trial court had acted capriciously and
whimsically, as well as with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in holding that it was
barred from assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting respondent's motion for new trial long after the
decision of the trial court had already become final and executory.
The Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision, dated 18 May 1998, dismissing the petition on the ground
that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the notice of appeal which had meanwhile been given due
course by the trial court. The appellate court explained:
"It is undisputed that petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after almost eight years the
respondent court gave due course to respondent's notice of appeal. Petitioner did not raise the
issue of the timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of appeal was filed by respondents on
December 7, 1989. During the conference on April 23, 1996 for the completion of the record,
petitioner remained silent on the issue. Instead, it voluntarily asked for time to locate the missing
transcript of records to be submitted to respondent court, which petitioner never accomplished
without explanation. It was only after respondents filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new
trial for the retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence that petitioner started questioning the
appeal essayed by respondents.
"Obviously, petitioner is estopped by laches from assailing the notice of appeal which has long
been given due course by respondent court. The motion to dismiss appeal was filed too late." 3
In its instant petition, petitioner argues that
"I.

"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE WELL-ENTRENCHED

RULE IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL WITHIN THE TIME
PRESCRIBED BY LAW IS JURISDICTIONAL AND AS SUCH IT CAN BE ASSAILED AT
ANYTIME. TSCIEa
"II.
"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS ALREADY
ESTOPPED BY LACHES FROM ASSAILING THE TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
"III.
"THE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT ALLOWING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO HAVE THE CASE TRIED ANEW ON
THE MERITS CONSIDERING." 4
Anent the first assigned error, petitioner maintains that compliance with the reglementary period for perfecting an
appeal is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional, and it is thus never too late to assail the timeliness of an appeal.
Respondents, upon the other hand, urges the Court to sustain the assailed decision asseverating that in view of the
meritorious character of their appeal, a stringent application of the rules would defeat substantial justice.
The petitioner has it.
Concededly, respondents received on 04 July 1983 a copy of the decision of the trial court, dated 17 June 1983,
dismissing its complaint. Conformably with Section 39 of B.P. 129, like Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, respondents had up to 19 July 1983 within which to file an appeal. On said date, respondents, instead of
filing their notice of appeal, moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court in its order of 03 October 1989, and a copy of the order was received by respondents on 28
November 1989. Respondents failed to file a notice of appeal until 07 December 1989.
In Lacsamana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 the Court has ruled that in an ordinary appeal from the final
judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to the regional trial court, and from the regional trial court
to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court, the fifteen-day period for
appeal prescribed by Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted or suspended by a
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed. 6 If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving
party has only the remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for
extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed. 7 This rule has been substantially
reproduced in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus:
"Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment or final order.
"The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."
Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the last day of the fifteen day prescribed
period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they only had one (1) day from receipt of a copy
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect their appeal, i.e., excluding the day of
receipt and including the next day. 8 Since respondents had received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of the notice of appeal on 07 December 1989 came much too late
for by then the judgment had already become final and executory.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional upon the court a quo, and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory. 9 A
fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The strict
compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in
respect to the perfection of appeals. 10 The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, 11 and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, 12 and it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the judgment. 13 After the judgment has become final
and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal

within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
the case. 14
The Court is not unmindful of highly exceptional cases where it has allowed a relaxation of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of appeal.
In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 15 the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the
questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record
was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period was
over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the
delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of
land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 17 a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore
been judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the
appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. 18 These instances indeed constituted
exceptional circumstances that would hardly find parallel elsewise.
Not being a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege, the right to appeal may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with rules provided therefor. 19 A failure to perfect an appeal within
the prescribed period has the effect of rendering final the judgment of a court, and an appellee's failure to file a
motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court does not
constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection. 20
Should petitioner be now held estopped from assailing the timeliness of the appeal after the lapse of almost eight
years from the time the notice of appeal was approved by the trial court on 11 December 1989? Citing Dequito vs.
Lopez 21 and Carillo vs. Allied Workers' Association of the Philippines, 22 respondents would contend in the
affirmative.

The cases invoked are not squarely applicable.

In Dequito, defendant-appellees moved to dismiss the appeal after plaintiff-appellant Dequito had filed his appeal
brief with the appellate court and solely on the ground that the record on appeal did not disclose on its face that the
appeal was timely perfected. Similarly, in Carillo, petitioners had already submitted their brief when the respondents
tried to question the timeliness of the appeal, and there was no showing that the appeal was interposed beyond the
reglementary period for its filing. In the instant case, respondents had not once denied that their appeal was, in fact,
interposed beyond the prescribed period.
The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to
natural law and right. It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable
from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can
easily become a convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principle that, as a
rule, should prevalently apply but, as it concededly is, a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general
application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases. 23
Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an earlier time acting upon the
assumption, albeit erroneously, that the appeal was filed on time relying on the order, dated 11 December 1989, of
the trial court declaring that the notice of appeal had been filed within the reglementary period. Neither can the
conduct of petitioner's counsel during the conference called by and held before the trial court be regarded as a waiver
of its right to contest the seasonableness of the appeal. A motion contesting a late appeal may be filed before the
appellate court even after the transmittal of the records therein. 24 The legality of the appeal may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the
ground of its being out of time. A recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with it any
assumption or conclusion that it has been timely filed. 25 Strangely, respondents did not attempt to explain the
reason for the delay and would, instead, lay the blame on petitioner for its failure to assail the timeliness of the
appeal. cDTHIE
It may here be worthwhile to reiterate the pronouncement in Galima vs. Court of Appeals 26 that an error by counsel
in ascertaining the appeal period will not arrest the finality of the judgment.
Given the foregoing, the Court sees no further need to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. ISAcHD
||| (Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000)
[G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005.]
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and
CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, respondents.

Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioners.

Miguel M. Gonzales Rosemarie M. Osoteo and Antonio M. Chua for Land Bank of the Phils.
Jose Rico P. Domingo for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; RIGHT TO APPEAL; A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE AND MAY BE
EXERCISED ONLY IN THE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW. First and
foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of
the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right
to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD TO APPEAL; ORDER OR JUDGMENT WHEN DEEMED FINAL. An appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES THE
FINAL ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CASE; CASE AT BAR. In the
recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on
received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules.
We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where we again considered the
order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED. In National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is
an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every
party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants
to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to
strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to
tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application

of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and
proper disposition of his cause.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FRESH PERIOD RULE. The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It
has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process,
and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly
Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; 15-DAY APPEAL PERIOD COUNTED FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF JUDGMENT OR
FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The
use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the
"final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the
new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from
receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW 15-DAY PERIOD MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY WHEN EITHER A MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED; CASE AT BAR. To recapitulate, a party litigant
may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration
on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

DECISION

CORONA, J p:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of

Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely,
Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial
court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and
the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the
foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of
Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent
heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion
to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could
be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground
that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself
without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order 2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration 3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal 4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. CTEaDc
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. 5 This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an
order dated September 3, 1998. 6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. 7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held
further:
Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory. 8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals
on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly
committed by the appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN
CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING

THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE
LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS
"FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL
REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1,
1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY
22, 1998.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION
IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of
appeal. HESAIT
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to
the loss of the right to appeal. 10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, 11 as
amended, provides:
Sec. 39.Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. . . .
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3.Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action. 12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should
be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they
received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the
MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., 13 the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on
received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since
this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as
it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. 14 where we again
considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed
of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did
petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time? aHCSTD
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the
trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal
but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running
of the 15-day appeal period. 15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial
of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled
there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently
applied this rule in similar cases, 16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. 17 The rule is also
founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. 18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3.How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice
of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such
motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein
provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing
received notice of the denial of said motion. 19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced
this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization 20 that drafted BP
129, the raison d' etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal 21 and enhance the efficiency and
dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have
we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, 22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of
justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 23 however, we declared
that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This
Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and
that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must
be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of

substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of
fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods
set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that
every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. 25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or
even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 27 43 28 and 45, 29 the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions
may consist of 15 days or more. HcTIDC
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies 31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. 32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from
July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. 33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from
30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998)
remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only
when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from
(July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion
for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days,
as already discussed. 34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC 35 since the Court of Appeals
never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. THcEaS
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005)
[G.R. No. 128421. October 12, 1998.]
TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO A. PASTORAL,respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE TIMELY
PERFECTION THEREOF; EXCEPTION; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. Forgetfulness is neither
accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would warrant justification for the one (1) day delay in filing the
notice of appeal. We quote with approval the citation made by movant in the case of Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs.
Arca, 19 SCRA 300, 302-303, viz.: ". . . The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect
in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court
notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural
requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common-place excuses, in
the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable
negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December
1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as is a grave abuse of discretion." Consequently, the liberality
extended to respondent National Power Corporation in considering the tardiness of filing notice of an appeal as an
exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional rule on the requirement for the timely perfection of an appeal cannot be
given consideration. And, as petitioner again correctly contends, falling foursquare to the situation presented is our
ruling in Velasco vs. Ortiz, et al., 184 SCRA 303, 310: "Fourth. Neither a mistake of law . . . nor the fact that the delay
in the filing of the appeal bond was only one day, nor both of these circumstances together, are legal justifications for
non-compliance with the rule. If mistake of law were excusable, the law would be unenforceable. That is why it is
expressly provided that 'ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith (Art. 2, Civil Code).
If, without justification, transgression of the deadline fixed by the rule for perfecting an appeal may be sanctioned, the
public policy behind the rule would necessarily have to be abandoned, and the litigants would be at a loss to know
exactly when they may obtain execution of judgments or consider the case terminated. On the other hand, when the
law fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one
days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by
step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is
intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on
reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application. We do not agree that 'the ends of justice would be
better subserved' by allowing an appeal presented 'only one day late.' On the contrary, these considerations militate
against it: (1) The orderly administration of justice would suffer a drawback if the period for perfecting appeals be
rendered uncertain, as it would be, by sanctioning such transgression of the deadline. (2) The appealed decision is
presumed by law to be just and correct, and therefore the denial of the appeal does not necessarily imply an injustice
to the appellant. (3) The right to appeal is a purely statutory right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with
the statute." With the foregoing jurisprudence as bench mark, the Court is compelled to conclude the same, as
in Bank of America, NT and SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., et al., 230 SCRA 9, 15-16, to wit: "The case at bench, given its own
settings, cannot come close to those extraordinary circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from an
otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not
even this Court cannot(sic) trifle with." cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. It is not enough that the delay be excusable, one added requisite is that the
intended appeal be "impressed with merit." The Court perused the record and find confirmation in the fact that
respondent NAPOCOR never, at any time in the trial court or in the respondent court, alleged, much less
demonstrate; that the intended appeal is meritorious. It was the respondent court which unilaterally considered that
the supposedly anomalous amount awarded in the decision of the trial court as a factor that warranted such
relaxation. On second look, obviously given the presumption of validity and correctness of the decision of the trial

court, this would be indulging in speculation that should not be allowed. The Court notes that in the decision of the
trial court, it said: "On plaintiff's claim for damages, while the Court is hesitant in granting the same because
defendant Napocor is a government agency, however, it acts by and thru its defendants officer and is consequently
bound by their acts. And unfortunately, the plaintiff's claim for damages are all substantiated by the testimonies as
well as documentary evidence presented and identified by plaintiff's witness, namely: Mr. Syed Hasim Zaide, Miss
Erlinda Cross and Myrna Magdaluyo in the hearing of this case." Apparently, there was basis for the award of
damages. Hence, it is premature to speculate on the merits of the aborted appeal, since such a speculation would be
wanting in factual basis. TAECSD

RESOLUTION

MARTINEZ, J p:
Petitioner has filed this motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 26, 1998, denying the petition, on the
ground that:
"SAID DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ON RECORD
AND/OR IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE TO THE MATTER
IN CONTROVERSY "
In essence, movant posits the view that while the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the timely perfection of an
appeal is subject to well-recognized exceptions, the circumstances reflected in this case do not come close to the
exceptional circumstances that could justify a turn about from the otherwise strictly followed general rule.
Upon perusal of the motion for reconsideration and the comment thereto filed by the public respondent, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, we have been persuaded to take a second look at the facts and circumstances
obtaining herein.
For a better perspective of the case at bar, we go back to the petition for certiorari filed before the respondent court,
which, as in petitions of this nature, the focus of the inquiry invariably is whether or not the trial court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to
respondent National Power Corporation's appeal. The threshold issue posed for resolution, therefore, is whether or
not, in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining as spread out on the record, private respondent's tardiness in
the filing of the notice of appeal from the trial court's decision may be considered as an exception to the general rule
that failure to appeal on time is fatal.
We upheld the respondent court when it ruled that the failure of the National Power Corporation to file the appeal on
time falls under the exception to the general rule despite the fact that the perfection of an appeal within the period
fixed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Resultantly, the respondent court opined that, in denying
due course to respondent's appeal and directing the issuance of a writ of execution, the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, respondent court said:
"The Supreme Court has pointed out that a lower court should not be cited as having acted with
grave abuse of discretion simply because it has correctly but strictly applied the rules
(Castro vs. CA, supra). However, in this case, We hold that the denial of the notice of appeal,
filed one day late despite the valid excuse presented before it, which excuse was not found to be
incredible or concocted, was arbitrary and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge, being in clear disregard of established precedents enunciating a liberal policy
towards invocation of the right to appeal as an essential part of our judicial system." 1
Now, petitioner prays that we again review the facts and circumstances on record to determine whether the
respondent court's application of the exception instead of the general rule measures up to the extraordinary
circumstances held sufficient in the decisions of the Court.
After a meticulous re-examination of the background facts, We find that the respondent court was in error, thus, we
reconsider our earlier decision and grant the motion for reconsideration.

We are constrained to agree with petitioner that the reasons relied upon by the respondent court for the relaxation of
the rule of the timeliness in the perfection of an appeal in this case are not as compelling as was our previous
assessment. The stringent rule can be relaxed only when the demands of substantial justice so warrant. As correctly
argued by petitioner, thus:
". . . that may be done only when, in the varying but consistent language of jurisprudence, 'to do
so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of (our) equity jurisdiction'
(Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., 161 SCRA 122, 130), or, when
there are 'strong considerations of substantial justice' (Vda. de Crisologo, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 158 SCRA 236); or, 'on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave injustice' (Paramount Vinyl Products
Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., 190 SCRA 525, 534); or, 'on grounds of substantial justice and
equity, the delay must, however, be excusable and the appeal must be impressed with merit'
(Acena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 623, 630). Some such strong and compelling
reasons are exemplified in Republic vs. CA, 83 SCRA 453, where the six-day delay in the filing of
a record on appeal was excused because, among others, there were involved serious issues of
jurisdiction and the application of defenses like prescription, statute of limitations and laches
against the Republic which would place technicality over substance if the dismissal of the appeal
is upheld; in Ramosvs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, where the four-day delay was justified because
the plaintiff's lawyer died and the decision was served directly upon plaintiff who still had to
engage the services of a new counsel to take the appeal on her behalf; in Siguenza vs. Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 570, where the delay in the filing of the record on appeal was overlooked
and this Honorable Court opted to already decide the case on the merits inasmuch as, on its
face, the appeal appeared to be impressed with merit; in Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA
444, where the seven-day delay in the filing of the notice of appeal was excused because the
party's counsel, who was appointed RTC Judge, failed to file a withdrawal of appearance such
that notice of the decision was still served upon him and it was only after he returned to his
former law office from his station that he learned of said decision and also only after a new
counsel was engaged that the notice of appeal was filed; and, in Orata vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 148,
where the delay was likewise overlooked and this Honorable Court resolved the case on its
merits because, in addition to the basic merits of the main case, the petition embodied
circumstances that warranted heeding the petitioner's plea for justice." 2

However, a re-examination of the reasons advanced by private respondent National Power Corporation to justify the
tardiness of their filing the notice of appeal before the trial court, cannot be catalogued under the aforecited
exceptions to the general rule.
The respondent court said that "the notice of appeal was admittedly filed one (1) day late." However, it was convinced
"that under the circumstances of the case, the delay of one (1) day in filing the appeal is justified and should be
excused by the court a quo . . ." The reasons for this, the respondent court so holds, was due to the big amount
involved in the case; and, that "the one (1) day delay arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident. . . ." 3
In justifying the one (1) day delay, the respondent court took into account the affidavit of Ronald Lapuz, the receiving
clerk, pertinent portions of which is quoted as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
2. On August 23, 1996 at 4:54 p.m. Friday, I received a copy of the Order dated August 2, 1996
issued by the RTC-Branch 101, Quezon City, entitled Trans International vs. NPC, et al;
3. Since it was already almost 5:00 p.m., I placed the said order inside the drawer of my table
together with some other documents;
4. On August 26, 1996, that was Monday I was unable to report to the office because of severe
pain in my front jaw as a result of the extraction of my three front teeth, causing severe pain in
my body;
5. I forgot to deliver immediately the copy of the Order to Atty. Collado nor to his secretary on
August 23, 1996, despite his instruction to me to immediately deliver to his secretary any order in
this case, Trans International vs. NKPC, et al, RTC-Quezon City and Sps. Lim vs. NPC, et al
RTC-Lingayen as it was already almost 5:00 p.m. and believing that on the next succeeding

working day, I could report to work, but incidentally, I got sick and was able only to report on
August 28, 1996 as per hereto attached copy of my approved sick leave;
xxx xxx xxx
7. My failure to deliver the said order to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo Collado on the next
working day, August 26, 1996 was due to my aforesaid illness which incapacitated me from
reporting to work on August 26 & 27, 1996." 4
Petitioner makes a rather strong case that the respondent court (and we add, this Court) erred in concluding that the
one-day delay in the filing of the notice of appeal was sufficiently explained.
Upon perusal of the aforequoted affidavit, we overlooked or otherwise failed to consider the failure of Ronald Lapuz to
comply with the strict instruction of Atty. Collado, respondent Napocor's counsel, for the immediate delivery to his
secretary of any order in the case. It might be true that when he received the copy of the order, it was already 4:54
p.m., Friday. Yet, there is nothing on record or in the affidavit that Atty. Collado or the latter's secretary was no longer
in the office. Lapuz states that he placed the order inside the drawer of his table believing that he could give the order
the next succeeding working day (Monday). But then, Ronald Lapuz could have at least given the order to the
secretary of Atty. Collado the following day, Saturday, since there is no showing that Saturday was a non-working day,
and consequently said denial order could have been transmitted on said day to Atty. Collado or his secretary.
Furthermore, absent in the record is any independent proof of the alleged indisposition of Ronald Lapuz. To his
affidavit, he attached an approved leave of absence form for two (2) days (Monday and Tuesday) to prove that he
was absent on those days due to illness. However, there is no medical certificate to attest to the fact of illness, thus,
there is no competent supporting proof of the alleged extraction of three front teeth.
Another capital sin of Ronald Lapuz is his admission that he "forgot to deliver immediately the copy of the order . . .,"
despite the instruction of Atty. Collado for him to "immediately deliver to his secretary any order" in this case.
Forgetfulness is neither accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would warrant justification for the one (1)
day delay in filing the notice of appeal. We quote with approval the citation made by movant in the case of Philippine
Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300, 302-303, viz.:
". . . The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time his
appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court
notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe
the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this
kind of common-place excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are
neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January
1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L- 19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment as is a grave abuse of discretion." 5
Consequently, the liberality extended to respondent National Power Corporation in considering the tardiness of filing
notice of an appeal as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional rule on the requirement for the timely
perfection of an appeal cannot be given consideration. And, as petitioner again correctly contends, falling foursquare
to the situation presented is our ruling in Velasco vs. Ortiz, et al. 184 SCRA 303, 310:
"Fourth. Neither a mistake of law . . . nor the fact that the delay in the filing of the appeal bond
was only one day, nor both of these circumstances together, are legal justifications for noncompliance with the rule. If mistake of law were excusable, the law would be unenforceable. That
is why it is expressly provided that 'ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from
compliance therewith (Art. 2, Civil Code). If, without justification, transgression of the deadline
fixed by the rule for perfecting an appeal may be sanctioned, the public policy behind the rule
would necessarily have to be abandoned, and the litigants would be at a loss to know exactly
when they may obtain execution of judgments or consider the case terminated. On the other
hand, when the law fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that
deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further
stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is
forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable. We
cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on
reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application.
We do not agree that 'the ends of justice would be better subserved' by allowing an appeal
presented 'only one day late.' On the contrary, these considerations militate against it: (1) The
orderly administration of justice would suffer a drawback if the period for perfecting appeals be

rendered uncertain, as it would be, by sanctioning such transgression of the deadline. (2) The
appealed decision is presumed by law to be just and correct, and therefore the denial of the
appeal does not necessarily imply an injustice to the appellant. (3) The right to appeal is a purely
statutory right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with the statute." 6
With the foregoing jurisprudence as our bench mark, we are compelled to conclude, as we did in Bank of America,
NT and SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., et al., 230 SCRA 9, 15-16, to wit:
"The case at bench, given its own settings, cannot come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be
overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court
cannot(sic) trifle with." 7
To hold otherwise, as we did, after a conscientious review of the factual milieu of this case, would disturb a wellentrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains finality, leaving the same to depend upon the
resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses to justify unwarranted departure from the time-honored
policy of the law that the period for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
One other thing. It is not enough that the delay be excusable, one added requisite is that the intended appeal be
"impressed with merit." 8 We perused the record and find confirmation in the fact that respondent NAPOCOR never,
at any time in the trial court or in the respondent court, alleged, much less demonstrate, that the intended appeal is
meritorious. It was the respondent court which unilaterally considered that the supposedly anomalous amount
awarded in the decision of the trial court as a factor that warranted such relaxation. On second look, obviously given
the presumption of validity and correctness of the decision of the trial court, this would be indulging in speculation that
should not be allowed. We note that in the decision of the trial court, it said:
"On plaintiffs claim for damages, while the Court is hesitant in granting the same because
defendant Napocor is a government agency, however, it acts by and thru its defendants officer
and is consequently bound by their acts.
And unfortunately, the plaintiff's claim for damages are all substantiated by the testimonies as
well as documentary evidence presented and identified by plaintiffs witness, namely: Mr. Syed
Hasim Zaide, Miss Erlinda Cross and Myrna Magdaluyo in the hearing of this case." 9
Apparently, there was basis for the award of damages. Hence, it is premature to speculate on the merits of the
aborted appeal, since such a speculation would be wanting in factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 26, 1998, is GRANTED, and
the Court hereby SET ASIDE the decision dated October 21, 1996 and the resolution dated January 31, 1997 of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No. 41977. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q- 94-20960 is hereby declared as having attained finality in due course, in consequence of which the said court may
issue such orders as it may deem proper and appropriate in the premises.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421 (Resolution), October 12, 1998)
[G.R. No. 82789. November 21, 1991.]
NARCISO KHO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CAMACHO, SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and
HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
97, respondents.

Emilio P. Ramos for petitioner.

Camacho and Associates for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; TRIAL COURT; NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISALLOW AN APPEAL ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT INVOLVED; PROPER FORUM. The Court was no less
explicit and emphatic when it declared in the case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. 70681, October 16, 1985, 139
SCRA 320, 325-326, that: "We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law or both question of
fact and law, this question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the court which
rendered the subject decision appealed from . . . Respondent Judge erred in dismissing said appeal on his
misconception that the same involves only a question of law and based on this reasoning, disallowed petitioner's
appeal because it was not made to the Supreme Court. . . . "By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was
misdirected because the case was resolved by it on a pure question of law, the trial court committed a grave error.
Respondent Judge should have allowed the Intermediate Appellate Court to decide whether or not the petitioner's
appeal involves only a question of law and not arrogate unto himself the determination of this question. His error in
dismissing petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court, wherein it is specifically provided that 'where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to
the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and
clear statement of the grounds therefor.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT REQUIRED TO APPROVE A NOTICE OF APPEAL. Respondent Judge should have
sustained his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper
tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the
present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not
a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. The obligation to pay P57,349.00 in
attorney's fee is admitted. The appropriate checks in payment therefor have been issued. However, one check was
misplaced through the creditor's fault while the other five were dishonored because the drawee bank has ceased to
operate. A perusal of petitioner's answer convinces us that the judgment on the pleadings was proper. In that
pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks and gratuitously advanced the reason
that the bank where he had deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what
petitioner was saying was that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a
sufficient controversion of the material allegations in the complaint.

DECISION

FERNAN, C .J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether respondent Judge Oscar L. Leviste of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 97, grossly abused his discretion when he issued the questioned order of March 29, 1988 which
cancelled his previous order approving a notice of appeal.
The facts are as follows:.
In payment of attorney's fees resolved against him, petitioner Narciso Kho, a businessman, issued in favor of private
respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho six (6) postdated Manila Bank checks in the total sum of P57,349.00. One of the
checks, in the amount of P10,000.00, was lost by Atty. Camacho who promptly notified petitioner. When the other five
(5) checks were negotiated by Camacho with the Philippine Amanah Bank, the same were returned uncleared
because Manila Bank had been ordered closed by the Central Bank.
Because of petitioner's refusal to replace the Manila Bank checks or pay his obligation, Camacho instituted an action
for a sum of money against petitioner before respondent trial court. 1
In his answer, petitioner alleged that he was under no obligation to replace the lost check for P10,000.00, arguing
that Camacho should have executed a sworn statement that he lost the check issued to him and furnished both the
drawer and the bank with said statement so that the bank could place on the check "under alarmed," instead of
merely informing petitioner.
Petitioner also refused to issue new checks maintaining that the closure of Manila Bank (in which he had an
outstanding deposit of P581,571.84 which was more than enough to cover the cost of the five checks) was beyond
his control and therefore he was in no financial position to pay Camacho unless and until his money in that
beleaguered bank was released. Cdpr

Contending that petitioner's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a judgment on the
pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste granted in his order of February 12, 1988. In said order, respondent Judge
directed petitioner to pay Camacho P57,349.00 "minus the P10,000.00 pertaining to the lost check, or a total of
P47,349.00 with interest at the legal rate of 6% from June 2, 1987, until fully paid, with costs or attorney's fees." 2
On February 25, 1988, petitioner seasonably filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the February 12,
1988 order to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Judge duly approved said notice in his order of February 29, 1988.
On the other hand, despite the reduced money judgment, Camacho made no move to contest the award. Instead, he
filed a motion/manifestation praying that petitioner's notice of appeal be stricken off the record as a mere scrap of
paper.
Acting on the aforesaid motion, respondent Judge issued the assailed order of March 29, 1988 setting aside the
previously approved notice of appeal and adopting Camacho's view that the proper remedy from a judgment on the
pleadings was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Said order reads:
"In view of the Motion/Manifestation dated March 1, 1988, which this Court finds with
merit, . . ., this Court believing that only questions of law are involved, hence the proper remedy
should be a petition for certiorari, there being no question of fact presented by the pleadings and
the order in Summary Judgment, the order of this Court approving the notice of appeal is hereby
cancelled and a new order is hereby made that said notice of appeal is disapproved." 3
Hence this petition for certiorari.
The Court has readily observed two very glaring errors committed by respondent Judge Leviste. First, he listened
to Camacho who could not even distinguish between a petition for certiorari and a petition for review on certiorari.
Secondly, he pre-empted a prerogative that legally pertains to the Court of Appeals when he disapproved petitioner's
notice of appeal "believing that only questions of law are involved."
In E. Razon, Inc. vs. Judge Moya, No. L-31693, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 41, the Court, through Justice
Melencio-Herrera, held: LexLib
"Concededly, issues that involve pure questions of law are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court. However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the Trial Court to disallow an
appeal on the ground that there is no question of fact, but only a question of law, involved." 4
The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it declared in the subsequent case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr., G.R.
No. 70681, October 16, 1985, 139 SCRA 320, 325-326, that:
"We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law or both questions of fact
and law, this question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the
court which rendered the subject decision appealed from . . . Respondent Judge erred in
dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same involves only a question of law and
based on this reasoning, disallowed petitioner's appeal because it was not made to the Supreme
Court . . .
"By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was misdirected because the case was resolved
by it on a pure question of law, the trial court committed a grave error. Respondent Judge should
have allowed the Intermediate Appellate Court to decide whether or not the petitioner's appeal
involves only a question of law and not arrogate unto himself the determination of this question.
His error in dismissing petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the
provisions of Section 3 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is specifically provided that
'where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not
dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear
statement of the grounds therefor.'"
Thus, following the above pronouncements, what respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was
to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper
tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the
present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not
a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court. 5
Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed by respondent Judge in disapproving petitioner's notice of
appeal, to require him to give due course to the appeal and then elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-52014 to the
Appellate Court will serve no useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of an otherwise open-and-shut case.

The records before us are sufficient to enable us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings and to
terminate this case once and for all.

The obligation to pay P57,349.00 in attorney's fees is admitted. The appropriate checks in payment therefor have
been issued. However, one check was misplaced through the creditor's fault while the other five were dishonored
because the drawee bank has ceased to operate. llcd
A perusal of petitioner's answer convinces us that the judgment on the pleadings was proper. In that pleading,
petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank
where he had deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what petitioner was
saying was that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a sufficient
controversion of the material allegations in the complaint.
Finding no reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings rendered by respondent Judge Leviste, the Court
considers the same as the final adjudication on the respective rights of the parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, certiorari is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
||| (Kho v. Camacho, G.R. No. 82789, November 21, 1991)
[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.]
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

Maria T . M. Leviste for petitioners.

Roberto B. Arca for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; PARTY WHO DID NOT APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE RIGHT OF WAY, BARRED FROM RAISING THE SAME.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to
be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court
to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much
less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what
was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance an argument that he may deem
necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in
his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may
be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the
purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
2. CIVIL LAW DAMAGES; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES; REQUISITES. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of
the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing
it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of

law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded, it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person
sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an
act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
3. ID.; ID.; DAMAGES DISTINGUISHED FROM INJURY. There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
4. ID.; ID.; DAMAGE OR LOSS WHICH VIOLATE NO LEGAL DUTY TO OTHER PERSON, BORNE BY THE
INJURED PERSON. Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of
action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. cdll
5. ID.; PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS; REQUISITES. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right
provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
6. ID.; ID.; RIGHT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OWNERS ENCLOSE AND FENCE THEIR PROPERTY. The act of
petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon."cdll
7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LAWFUL ACTS DONE BY PERSON ON HIS
PROPERTY. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. It was only that
decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation
and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. Hence, prior to said
decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an
act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or
damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners
is damnum absque injuria. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause
of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss isdamnum absque injuria.
When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used,
such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the
inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. The proper
exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in
damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful
purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor.
Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to
an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by
Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria
Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof. 2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior
P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said
property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as
vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference,
on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigida Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then
that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic
Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20
meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between
the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru
said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and
who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982,
one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which
is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even
extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit "I-Santoses
and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified
that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged
by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her
house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and
windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. . . . 3 (Italics in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress
and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. 4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of
Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On
November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court
hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand
(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages,
and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision
is affirmed to all respects. 5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 6 Petitioners then took the
present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order. prLL
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal
from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be
satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can
only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision
that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the
appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the
decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. 8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. 10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should
be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering. 11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but
which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. 12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. 13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage,
that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the
law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. 14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites

concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. 15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing
right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way
in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to
use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right. LLcd
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of
the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. 17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts
done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20 although the act
may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latter's favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give
no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful
means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, February 09, 1996)
[G.R. No. 92591. April 30, 1991.]
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
WILLIAM SAMARA, respondents.

Romeo G. Carlos for private respondent.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

The Court is beset with the issue involving two defendants in a case for recovery of a sum of money where the trial
court adjudged them to be jointly and severally liable as judgment debtors to pay the plaintiff but who are now
required, as a result of a modification on appeal by only one of them, to pay substantially different amounts while
being solidarily liable.
As a prefatory note, this is the second time the petitioner has gone to this Court but the issues raised at the first
instance are distinct from the one at bar.
The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent William Samara, an American who does business in the
Philippines, against petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Citytrust) and a foreign bank,
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as Marine Midland).
The facts as established by the trial court show that plaintiff-private respondent Samara purchased on December 10,
1980 from defendant petitioner Citytrust Bank Draft Number 23681 for US $40,000.00, the payee being Thai
International Airways and the corresponding bank in the United States or the drawee, defendant Marine Midland. On
December 23, 1980, Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform Marine
Midland about the order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the message to Marine Midland the next day and followed
it up with a cable, which the latter bank acknowledged to have received on January 14, 1981 stating in its receipt that
it has noted the stop-payment order and has not paid the bank draft. Citytrust credited back Samara's account for
U.S. $40,000.00 due to the non-payment. After seven months or on July 3, 1981, Citytrust re-debited Samara's
account for U.S. $40,000.00 upon discovering that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust's own account for
the same amount allegedly on December 22, 1980. Despite the alleged discovery, however, there is evidence to
show that Marine Midland informed Citytrust through a letter of the non-payment or non-encashment of the bank draft
as of August 4, 1981. It is also shown that Marine Midland even confirmed in a telex letter dated August 31, 1981 that
the bank draft had not been paid as of that date.
Based on the above findings, the trial court brushed aside Marine Midland's contention that it had already paid the
bank draft of Samara on December 22, 1980 or before it received the stop payment order. The trial court was not
convinced regarding the denial of the confirmation made as to the non-payment of the bank draft since the time it
received the stop payment order. Marine Midland was held bound by its letters admitting knowledge of the stop
payment order and compliance with it. The trial court also overruled the ground relied on by Citytrust in re-debiting
Samara's dollar account, i.e., the discovery that Marine Midland debited Citytrust's account before the stop payment
order was given by Samara, this being unjustifiable.
Hence, a decision was rendered on March 4, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads: prcd
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of US $40,000.00,
plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from July 3, 1981, until full payment is made, and
the further interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the accrued interest from December
23, 1980 up to the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1983, inclusive; Exemplary damages in
the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and costs;
2. Dismissing the defendant's counter-claims for lack of merit;
3. Ordering defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever amount the
latter will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs." (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
Only Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied. The petitioner did not do
anything except to move for a reconsideration of an order of execution of the judgment against it which was granted.
The petitioner and Marine Midland filed separate appeals. The petitioner's appeal was, however, dismissed on
December 15, 1987 for having been filed out of time or fifty-one (51) days after (i.e., May 7, 1986) it received a copy
of the trial court decision on March 17, 1986. A motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On February 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned before the Supreme Court the dismissal of its appeal. That case was
docketed as G.R. No. 82009 where the petitioner raised the following issues: (1) whether or not the timely appeal of
Marine Midland inured to petitioner's benefit; and (2) whether or not plaintiff-private respondent Samara was entitled
to immediate execution even assuming the petitioner's appeal was indeed filed out of time.
While the petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of the appeal was still pending before this Court, the Court of
Appeals on February 23, 1989 affirmed the trial court decision with modification consisting of a reduction of the rate of

interest and attorney's fees, as well as the exclusion of exemplary damages. Thus, the dispositive portion of the
decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14128 reads: cdrep
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision appealed from except
paragraph 1 thereof which is hereby modified to read as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of US $40,000.00,
plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from July 3, 1981 until full payment is made, and the
sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees." (Rollo, pp 45-46)
About a month and a half later or on April 10, 1989, this Court, through its First Division, denied the petition in G.R.
No. 82009 for lack of merit. In response to the allegation that the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was also
suspended as to the petitioner when co-defendant Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled
that the rights and liabilities of the two defendants are not so interwoven as to show similarity in defenses and warrant
reversal of the judgment as to both. This Court stressed specifically the finding of the appellate court that although the
petitioner and Marine Midland were solidarily liable, only the latter was ultimately held responsible for damages
because it was the one ordered to reimburse the petitioner for "whatever amount" the petitioner will be made to pay
the plaintiff by reason of the judgment. (See Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 758 [1989].
Moreover, in filing a motion for reconsideration, Marine Midland was in fact acting only for itself. Regarding the
second issue, we held that respondent Samara is entitled to immediate execution when the trial court decision
became final and executory as to the petitioner. In overcoming the petitioner's argument that execution pending
appeal of its co-defendant should not be allowed to prevent an absurd result in case of possible reversal, we held that
the law is clear that a final judgment must be executed against a defeated party. Since both defendants are jointly
and severally liable, it is irrelevant whether or not the co-defendant would be absolved.
Some four months later or on August 7, 1989, the Supreme Court declared the decision in G.R. No. 82009 to be final
and executory. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
On September 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted on October 23, 1989. The
petitioner assailed the Order of Execution before the Court of Appeals on November 6, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No.
19176. The trial court was upheld and subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the instant petition was filed on March 29, 1990 which raises the main issue of whether or not the respondent
appellate court committed reversible error in ruling that the liability of the petitioner should be based on the original
decision of the trial court and not the modified one. cdphil
The private respondent contends that the petition is barred by res judicata alleging that the issue in the case at bar
had already been raised, passed upon, and judicially determined by this Court in G.R. No. 82009.
It is our considered opinion that the issue here is distinct from the ones raised earlier. In the present petition, the
Court is faced with the issue of the propriety of the execution of judgments in favor of private respondent Samara who
is entitled to recover on execution: against the petitioner, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 12% compounded
interest per annum, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 attorney's fees of P50,000.00 and costs; and as against
Marine Midland, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 6% simple interest per annum, and attorney's fees of only
P10,000.00.
We are less concerned now with the issues of whether or not a co-defendant's appeal inures to the benefit of another
who failed to appeal on time and on the right of a judgment creditor to immediate execution of a final and executory
judgment since such issues have become moot and academic.
It is worthy to note that the Court was not apprised of the February 23, 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals until
after we had promulgated a decision denying Citytrust's petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of its own
appeal. We were so notified through Citytrust's motion for reconsideration of our decision in G.R. No. 82009. It is a
sad fact, however, that the motion did not present sufficiently compelling grounds to convince the Court to rule
otherwise on the issues presented in G.R. No. 82009 which pertain to the validity of the dismissal of the petitioner's
appeal.

The present petition was given due course in line with our settled rule that while a decision has already become final
and executory and can no longer be challenged, the manner of its execution can be reviewed by proper appeal
(Abbot v. National Labor Relations Commission, 145 SCRA 206 [1986]). It is not only the difference in the issue
raised that makes us allow this petition. It is also because of a different Court of Appeals decision (this time in CAG.R. SP No. 19176) that is the subject of our review. The petitioner now assails the affirmation of the order of

execution based on the trial court judgment in spite of the modified judgment which reduced the liability of codefendants to pay private respondent. What bothers the private respondent is the similarity of the arguments used by
the petitioner in all the pleadings filed with this Court in G.R. No. 82009 and in the present petition.
The Court reiterates what it has held in the Abbot case:
xxx xxx xxx
"In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the decision itself but the
manner of its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true that the decision itself has
become final and executory and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either that
it must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any deviation therefrom can be
the subject of a proper appeal." (pp. 209-210)
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court decision dated February 23, 1989 has superseded and
rendered functus oficio the March 4, 1986 decision of the trial court invoked by the private respondent and is
applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to the petitioner. LibLex
The Court does not agree with this allegation which hinges on the petitioner's insistence that it can benefit from a
reversal or modification of a judgment even if it has lost its own appeal. We do not depart from our earlier analysis in
G.R. No. 82009 that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner and Marine Midland are not so interwoven in such a
manner that their defenses are similar as to readily warrant an operative effect upon a party who failed to appeal.
As found by this Court in G.R. No. 82009:
"It must be noted that two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust, filed cross claims against
each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged that the proximate cause of the injury should be
attributed to co-defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly inform Citytrust that
the demand draft Citytrust issued was really paid by Marine Midland on December 22, 1980. For
its part, Marine Midland alleged that Citytrust did not properly advise it of the actual
circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft and of the receipt by the latter of the
stop-payment instructions. The rights and liabilities of both parties concerned are not so
interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar and that a reversal of the judgment
as to one should operate as a reversal to the other. Furthermore, a perusal of the decision
appealed from shows that Marine Midland, though jointly and severally liable with petitioner, is
the one ultimately held responsible for the damages incurred by the private respondent inasmuch
as the trial court ordered 'defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever
amount the latter will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs.'"
(Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra at page 765)
The Court is of the considered view that it was the trial court judgment that created a joint and several obligation to
pay the private respondent certain sums. No solidary liability as between them existed from the drawer-drawee
relationship in the draft transaction.
The joint and several obligation imposed by the lower court had a three-fold purpose: (1) to declare the prevailing
party to be entitled to recover damages on account of the prejudice which resulted from the acts of the codefendants; (2) to give the prevailing party the right to proceed against either one of them to recover the amounts
awarded to him; and (3) to impress upon Marine Midland its ultimate liability to fully reimburse the petitioner Citytrust
consistent with the finding that the proximate cause of the injury to the private respondent was the wrongful deed of
Marine Midland. Cdpr
The trial court judgment, however, does not alter the fact that the respective defenses of the co-defendants are
distinct on trial and even on appeal. Citytrust and Marine Midland were not in privity with each other in a transaction
involving payment through a bank draft. A bank draft is a "bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon its correspondent
bank, . . . issued at the solicitation of a stranger who purchases and pays therefor" (Kohler v. First National Bank, 289
P 47, 49, 157 Wash. 417 [1930]). It is also defined as an "order for payment of money." (Polotsky v. Artisans Savings
Bank, Del. 180 A. 791, 792, 7 WW. Harr 142 [1935]). In the case at bar, Citytrust from which the private respondent
purchased the bank draft, was the drawer of the draft through which it ordered Marine Midland, the drawee bank, to
pay the amount of US $40,000.00 in favor of Thai International Airways, the payee. The drawee bank acting as a
"payor" bank is solely liable for acts not done in accordance with the instructions of the drawer bank or of the
purchaser of the draft. The drawee bank has the burden of proving that it did not violate. Meanwhile, the drawer, if
sued by the purchaser of the draft is liable for the act of debiting the customer's account despite an instruction to stop
payment. The drawer has the duty to prove that he complied with the order to inform the drawee.

The fact that the petitioner previously filed a cross-claim against Marine Midland does not make the former a party in
the latter's appeal where all reliefs granted to the plaintiff and or to the petitioner who was a co-defendant are up for
review. The rights and liabilities of Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged that the proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff was the wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already been litigated before the trial court
which ordered full reimbursement in favor of Citytrust. Until petitioner Citytrust appeals for the review of the trial court
decision either in part or in toto, its rights and obligations as pre-determined cannot generally be affected by an
appeal of a co-defendant. The respondent appellate court made this clear in its decision dated February 23, 1989,
when it stated that even assuming that the petitioner may be considered an appellee, "such a standing was only with
respect to the cross-claim against (appellant Marine Midland) and not with respect to its (petitioner's) liability in favor
or private respondent Samara", the judgment on which had already become final and executory as to the petitioner.
The petitioner cannot now present a subverted interpretation of what the appellate court meant.
The Court examines the execution of judgment rendered in favor of private respondent Samara from a perspective
which shows a glaring disparity between the amounts which each of the two judgment debtors are bound to pay
despite: (1) their being held jointly and severally liable, and (2) the right of one of them to be reimbursed for the whole
amount of whatever it is obliged to pay.
A judgment may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on the same side as between themselves such that
questions of primary and secondary liability between joint tort-feasors may be determined. (Montgomery v. Blades, 9
SE 2d 397, 217 NC 654 [1940]). This rule reaffirms that principles of joint and several liability have survived so that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire judgment from a single defendant even though the responsibility of that
defendant for personal injury is of a lesser extent. (Gorelick v. Department of State Highways, 339 NW 2d. 635, 127
Mich. App. 324 [1983]). LexLib
A review of the trial court judgment and the appellate court judgment here shows that the only difference is the
amount of damages in paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the March 4, 1986 decision as restated and reduced
in the February 23, 1989 decision. All other orders of the trial court were affirmed by the respondent appellate court.
The joint and several obligation to pay the private respondent and the right of the petitioner to be reimbursed are
retained. The problem now lies in interpreting the said modification as likewise reducing the total amount which can
be executed against the petitioner.
If we go by a literal procedure, execution against petitioner Citytrust would be based on the March 4, 1986 decision.
However, the Court can not close its eyes to the inexplicable situation where private respondent Samara would be
given a choice of executing his claim for US $40,000.00 plus bigger interest (compounded), exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees from petitioner Citytrust, or US $40,000.00 plus a smaller sum inclusive of simple interest and reduced
attorney's fees from Marine Midland. Even if it is admitted that Citytrust would anyway be reimbursed for the whole
amount which Citytrust may be ordered to pay, such reimbursement would be a circumvention of the appellate court's
judgment that Marine Midland is liable only for the modified sum.
There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic claim of Mr. Samara. The obligations arising from
the same stop payment order on the same U.S. $40,000.00 bank draft are sought to be enforced by the two
conflicting final and executory judgments. We cannot enforce one judgment while allowing a violation of the other. We
apply basic principles of justice and equity.
It is clear from the records that "the draft was not paid or cashed before the receipt of the stop payment order by the
appellant (Marine Midland)" but was certainly paid at some other date as evidenced by a reconciliation entry showing
a debit of the corresponding amount in the books of Marine Midland. (See Rollo, pp. 40 and 42). Furthermore, there
was substantial evidence to show that Marine Midland is the one actually responsible for the personal injury to the
private respondent. The respondent court made the following findings, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

"It must be noted that it was the appellant's certifications and repeated reaffirmation of nonpayment of the bank draft that led defendant Citytrust to re-credit appellee's account. Also, the
appellant negligently failed to implement the stop payment order upon receipt. It tarried in
actually executing it until January 13, 1981. Furthermore, it was the appellant's debiting of the
account of the defendant-Citytrust which also led the defendant Citytrust to again debit the
appellee's dollar account despite prior acknowledgment of the nonpayment of the draft. No
doubt, it was the appellant's actuations that triggered the whole mess. Therefore, the lower court
correctly ordered the appellant to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever amount the latter
may pay the appellee by virtue of its judgment." (Rollo, p. 44)

Considering the above circumstances, the Court will not allow the absurd situation where a co-defendant who is
adjudged to be primarily liable for sums of money and for tort would be charged for an amount lesser than what its
co-defendant is bound to pay to the common creditor and allowed to collect from the first co-defendant. Such a
situation runs counter to the principle of solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants established by a judgment
for recovery of sum of money and damages. Substantial justice shall not allow Marine Midland, which is the source of
the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct execution against him of the judgment for the reduced
amount or by the indirect execution by way of reimbursement at a later time. cdphil
Additionally, the Court notes the modification made by the respondent court which ordered not only Marine Midland
(the appellant therein) but both "defendants jointly and severally" to pay the new amount. Though, as a matter of
procedure, the modification shall be applied only to the appellant, substantial justice and equity also demand that we
re-interpret the decision to refer to petitioner Citytrust as well. There exists a strong and compelling reason to warrant
an exception to the rule that a judgment creditor is entitled to execution of a final and executory judgment against a
party especially if that party failed to appeal. (Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38
[1989]; Quigui v. Boncaros, 151 SCRA 416 [1987]; Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 148 [1990])
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 19176 dated January 18, 1990 as well as the
resolution denying reconsideration are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered to effect
execution of its judgment subject to the modifications supplied by the Court of Appeals in its judgment on February
23, 1989.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92591, April 30, 1991)
[G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005.]
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, respondents.

Ernesto L. Abijay and Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioners.
Edgar F. Gica for respondents.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; FILING OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DEEMED
AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF APPEAL. Since the unlawful detainer case
was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective
Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again
from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition
was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for
Review on time.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS; PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM
A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz that once
a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual
circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section
3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of
appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of
appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
3.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; AN ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS
UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING POSSESSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF IS DEEMED SUFFICIENT WITHOUT

NECESSARILY EMPLOYING THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE LAW. Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was
originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or
implied contract. The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court
of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is
sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an
allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply
possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba v.
Court of Appeals, we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the
defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from
plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY IN NATURE; TECHNICALITIES OR DETAILS OF PROCEDURE SHOULD BE
CAREFULLY AVOIDED. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the
former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking
that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots.
Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose
of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of
Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The case
does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz justifies
a more liberal approach, thus: . . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary
in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and,
accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF POSSESSION IS PRIMORDIAL WHILE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IS
GENERALLY UNESSENTIAL. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real
property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure,
and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful
detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY ONLY SEEKS TO RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY; CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WILL NOT DEPRIVE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
JURISDICTION. Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by
respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to
decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the
properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a
recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a
case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only
sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the
parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENDING ACTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DEED OF SALE AND
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND QUIETING OF TITLE ON THE SAME PROPERTY WILL NOT ABATE
THE EJECTMENT CASE; RATIONALE. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for
ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case
will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos stated that if
what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party.
Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting
of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the
filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land
does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale
being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for
annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LOWER COURT'S ADJUDICATION OF OWNERSHIP IS MERELY PROVISIONAL. In
Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action for

the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of
First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v.
Gutierrez when it ruled: We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the
lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and
our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. The long settled
rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court
had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose
in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the
property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:
In a Decision 1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the
aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership
of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners
likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995,
Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to
use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to
vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue
Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this
latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by
respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty. 2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering respondents to vacate
the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC's decision in its entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a motion for
reconsideration.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents' notice of appeal
filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997, 3 and granted petitioners' motion for
immediate execution pending appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for Review, the
appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties,
express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and
RTC were set aside.

Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issues
raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the
petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer
properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of
the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1)On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the
MTC.
(2)On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.
(3)On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. SAcaDE
(4)On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5)On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.
(6)On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.
(7)On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional
period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.
(8)On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal. They theorize
that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997.
According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of
the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of
Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for
review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the
RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing aMotion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll
the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and
ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment, 5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and
as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the
following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents' position. It justified the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order
dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution
GRANTED. 6 (Emphasis in the original.)

Pending

Appeal

being

meritorious,

is

Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of respondents'
position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that
the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter
mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1.How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the
denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant
an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed
a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to
have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's
brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective
withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt
of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. AMotion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed
with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsiderationand
the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly
withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that
the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon
filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of
the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the same in favor of
petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the
complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that
petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract,
express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
xxx xxx xxx
3.That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register
of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of
Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part
hereof;
4.That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5.That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband
and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;

6.That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30
days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an
integral part thereof;
7.That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said
lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of
the use of their lots;
8.That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have
suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month
xxx xxx xxx 8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was originally lawful but had
ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. IASEca
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one
of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, 10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful
withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action
for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was
legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right
and is being withheld by defendant. 12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots,
thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the
use of their lots; 14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the
properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate
the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint
establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction
over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. 15 But the
citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 16 of the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards
in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz 17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer
are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as
promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully
avoided. 18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment of deed of sale
and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us
to the nature of the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion
reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in
the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment, 19 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject
lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of

ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within
the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion
publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the
issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is
primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. 20
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents
sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide.
Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the
properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a
recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a
case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only
sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the
parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same
for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of
its summary jurisdiction. 21 This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos 22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or
recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for
declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356
will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana, 23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or
for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or
unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in
the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief
prayed for are not the same. 24
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action
for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one ofpacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court
of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez 26 when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot
in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment
case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such
action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. IECcaA
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only
be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have
the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
determine in an action for unlawful detainer. 28
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third assignment of
error which is related to the second issue.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. v. Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005)
[G.R. No. 115104. October 12, 1998.]
MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and OMICO MINING AND
INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, REQUIRED;
EXCEPTIONS. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed
before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. This rule, however, is not without
exceptions when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in
and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be
instituted in this Court, is no longer prerequisite. This rule is subject however, to exceptions among which are the
following, namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; 3) in case of
urgency; and (4) when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised
in and passed upon by, the court below. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are
substantially the same as those asserted by them in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14, 1994, before
the Court of Appeals. The argument that respondent has no right to expropriate petitioners' mineral areas
under Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and submitted by petitioners for resolution by
the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments. For this reason, we hold that petitioners' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration is not fatal to the allowance of their action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DOES IT LIE. The writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW RAISED IN CASE AT BAR. The first four arguments advanced by respondent
Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has, underPresidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the
2l.9 hectare mining areas where petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises
the issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the
Rules of Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an
examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on
the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling
otherwise. cDTHIE

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated April 12, 1994, of the Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42120, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal of private respondent from a
ruling of the trial court. 1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against
petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and OmicoMining & Industrial Corporation. The
complaint, entitled "Philex Mining Corporation v. Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc., et al.," was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-CV-0727. prLL
Based on 53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners' mining areas where
the latter's "Macawiwili claims" are located. Philex Mininglikewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas sought to be expropriated.
Although a temporary restraining order was initially issued by the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Branch X, on
November 11, 1992, it denied respondent's application for a preliminary injunction.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court, acting on the motion of petitioners, dismissed the complaint of Philex Mining. In
its resolution, the trial court stated: 2
To better appreciate the incident submitted for resolution, a review of the antecedent facts which
gave rise to this case is in order.
The decision of the Supreme Court dated October 2, 1991 in Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia,
202 SCRA 222 upheld the decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources which was affirmed
by the Office of the President. This decision recognized the possessory rights of
defendants Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims located at Tuba and Itogon, Benguet
as against Poe Mining Association and plaintiff herein Philex Mining Corporation as operator.
However, on the surface of 21.9 hectares of these mining claims awarded to
defendants Macawiwili and Omico, we find improvements of the plaintiff consisting of a network
of roads, a motorpool facility, a tailings dam and three bunkhouses. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Cordillera Administrative Region (DENR-CAR), in
pursuance of the Supreme Court decision is poised to order the removal or demolition of
plaintiff's improvements and to hand possession of the area to defendants Macawiwili and
Omico. Plaintiff, while admitting the possessory rights of defendant mining companies, stresses
that the improvements already existing thereon are vital to the conduct of its mining operations
particularly, its Nevada claims. Thus, it came to court seeking the expropriation of this area
pursuant to Section 59 of Presidential Decree No 463. prcd
The conflict between the plaintiff and defendant mining companies spans a period of almost 23
years until finally, it reached the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all disputes. The Supreme
Court has spoken and it has awarded to defendants Macawiwili and Omico the portion sought to
be expropriated by the plaintiff.
Can this Court now grant to plaintiff the right to expropriate the very land which has been denied
it by the decision of the highest court of the land?
This Court believes not. To do so would not only be presumptuous of this Court but a patent
defiance of the decision of the highest tribunal.
The plaintiff states that the expropriation is necessary in order for it to continue with the operation
of its Nevada claims. The improvements now existing on the land sought to be expropriated
consists of a network of roads constructed sometime in 1958, a motorpool facility built in 1963, a
tailings dam and three (3) two-storey concrete bunkhouses. It is thus clear that these
improvements have been existing for quite sometime now. Aware that these improvements are
essential to their mining operations, plaintiff should have initiated expropriation proceedings long
before it even started putting up said improvements. Why exercise the right of eminent domain
only now that the land has been adjudged in favor of defendant mining companies by no less
than the Supreme Court? It seems the plaintiff, mindful of the Supreme Court decision, would
now look for avenues of escape to evade the repercussions of such a decision. What it has not
achieved through the decision, it tries to gain through the power of eminent domain. Clearly, this
is forum-shopping, plain and simple. Stripped of all its legal niceties, this expropriation

proceeding is patently a last ditch effort on the part of the plaintiff to overcome the adverse
effects of the Supreme Court decision.
Can this Court countenance such a procedure under the guise of the legal process of
expropriation?
No. To agree to it would be to encourage forum-shopping which is abhorred as mere will no
longer be any end to any litigation. LLjur
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and separate from the rights
of Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme Court decision, anchoring said right on Section 59
of Presidential Decree No. 463 which states:
SEC 59. Eminent Domain. When the claim owner or an occupant or owner of private
lands refuses to grant to another claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or
install any of the facilities mentioned in the next preceding section, the claim owner or
lessee may prosecute an action for eminent domain under the Rules of Court in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the mining claims involved are situated. In
the determination of the just compensation due the claim owner or owner or occupant of
the land, the court shall appoint at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist
to be recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners.
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends either with an order
of dismissal or an order of condemnation. The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of the "just compensation for the property sought
to be taken" (Municipality of Bian vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., 180 SCRA 576 as quoted in
National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA
520).

Going to the first stage of the expropriation proceeding in the case at bar, the question is: Is the
right to expropriate granted to mining companies under Section 59 of P.D. No. 463 an absolute
right?
An examination of Presidential Decree No. 463 would readily show that Section 59 upon which
plaintiff asserts its right to expropriate is found under Chapter XI with the heading
"Auxiliary Mining Rights". From the title alone, it would seem that the right to expropriate is not an
absolute one but a mere auxiliary right. The right of eminent domain granted
to mining companies is given in aid of its mining operations and not as a matter of right. Thus, it
should be construed strictly against the mining company seeking the right. Thus, taking into
context the antecedent facts arising from this case, is it proper for plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain?
Absolutely not. But, granting arguendo that the right of expropriation can be awarded to plaintiff,
a bigger question arises on whether a mining company can expropriate land belonging to
another mining company. It would be absurd if not ridiculous. In the first place, the land would no
longer be subject to expropriation. Expropriation demands that the land be private land. When
the Supreme Court awarded the possessory rights over the land subject of this case to
defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped said land of its private character and gave it its
public character, that is, to be utilized for mining operations. Although property already devoted to
public use is still subject to expropriation, this must be done directly by the national legislature or
under a specific grant of authority to the delegate (Constitutional Law by Isagani Cruz, 1989
edition, page 64). Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is not a specific grant of authority
given to plaintiff but a mere general authority which will not suffice to allow plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain. llcd
The plaintiff also states that it does not question the mining rights of defendant mining companies
over the area as it is only interested in the surface rights as this is where its improvements are
located. But this is an illusory dream which cannot be given reality by this Court. It is a wellknown principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it to a reasonable height (Art. 437, Civil Code of

the Philippines). The surface area cannot be segregated from the subjacent minerals. There is
no dividing line between the surface and what is underneath that one can categorically state that
one belongs to the plaintiff while the other forms part of the property of the
defendant mining companies. For that is in effect what the plaintiff wants, just the surface area
where its improvements are. It would be like dismembering a human body of a lady and awarding
the upper part including her bosom to someone while giving the lower part to another, making it a
useless proposition to either one. For how can defendant mining companies operate
their mining claims when the surface belongs to somebody else and for that matter, how will the
plaintiff improve the surface area without affecting what is underneath?
As the Supreme Court stated in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-43938, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 228: "Under the (no conflict) theory of the respondent court, the surface owner
will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the miningoperations below and the miner
cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroys the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high
can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's right? Where is the dividing line between
the surface and sub-surface rights? The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible
and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural."
All told, it is clear that plaintiff has not shown that it has the right to expropriate the land subject of
this case. Moreover, that land has been placed out of its reach by the Supreme Court decision
when it awarded it to defendants Macawiwili and Omico. Both plaintiff and defendants are
engaged in mining, and the Supreme Court has adjudged defendant mining companies to be the
owner of the land. This Court now, on the ground of the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
cannot and will not overwhelm said decision by awarding it to plaintiff.
As the other motions have become moot and academic, this Court will no longer delve into them.
However, as to the motion for reduction of deposit, the Court will make its last point. In the case
of National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, supra, the Supreme Court made this pronouncement:
"Presidential Decree No. 42 requires the petitioner, to deposit with the Philippine National Bank
in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, 'an amount equivalent to the assessed
valued of the property for purposes of taxation'. This assessed value is that indicated in the tax
declaration. P.D. No. 42 repealed the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and any other
existing law contrary to or inconsistent with it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67
insofar as the determination of the provisional value, the form of payment and the agency with
which the deposit shall be made, are concerned. P.D. No. 42, however effectively removes the
discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount
equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that purpose.
All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned".
Thus, the plaintiff is right in depositing the assessed value of the property as appearing on the
tax declaration of defendant Macawiwili as the provisional value of the land sought to be
expropriated While this case remains pending, the plaintiff may then withdraw the balance of the
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) from the Philippine National Bank after deducting the
provisional value of the land amounting to Forty Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P48,600.00).
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
filed
by
defendants Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Mining Co., Inc. and Omico Mining and
Industrial Corporation is granted. This case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
costs. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only questions of law were
involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court denied petitioners'
motion in a resolution, dated April 12, 1994. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari.
Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner should have filed a motion
for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to correct itself.

Rule 65, 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court in part provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as
the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.
With some modifications, Rule 65, 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provides:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 3
It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board,
or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. llcd
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first
filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors. 4
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v. Ago and Ortiz 5 we held:
Respondent contends that petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
in question, or asked for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court,
before coming to us.
This is not always so. It is only when the questions are raised for the first time before this Court in
a certiorari proceeding that the writ shall not issue unless the lower court had first been given the
opportunity to pass upon the same. In fine, when the questions raised before this Court are the
same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by, the court below, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court,
is no longer prerequisite.

In Locsin v. Climaco 6 it was stated:

When a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to a lower court, and
the latter has decided the question, a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary as a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this Court.
And in Central Bank v. Cloribel, 7 it was explained:
It is true that Petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the order complained of, and
that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the respondent has
had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him. This rule
is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following, namely: 1) where the issue
raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency. These
circumstances are present in the case at bar. Moreover, Petitioner herein had raised in its
answer in the main case and in the rejoinder to the memorandum of the Banco Filipino in support
of the latter's application for a writ of preliminary injunction the very same questions raised in
the Petition herein. In other words, Judge Cloribel has already had an opportunity to consider
and pass upon those questions, so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order would
have served no practical purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an
exercise in futility. prLL
The issues raised by petitioners in this petition are substantially the same as those asserted by them in their Motion
to Dismiss Appeal, dated February 14, 1994, before the Court of Appeals. The argument that respondent has no right
to expropriate petitioners' mineral areas under Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been raised, argued, and

submitted by petitioners for resolution by the appellate court in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal. To further file a motion
for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals would simply be to repeat their arguments. For this reason, we hold
that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal to the allowance of their action.
We therefore come to the main question: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Appeal? We find that it did.
To begin with, the writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 8 By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act all in contemplation of law. 9
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused it discretion in denying their motion to dismiss the
appeal. According to petitioners, respondent's appeal raises only questions of law and, therefore, it should be brought
to the Supreme Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari and not, as Philex Mining did, by bringing an
ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that the question whether respondent has a right to
expropriate petitioners' mining areas under 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question of law.
On the other hand, Philex Mining maintains that the issues raised in its appeal are factual and, therefore, the
appellate court is the proper forum for the ventilation of such issues.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which is based on the Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 (Anacleto
Murillo v. Rodolfo Consul), March 1, 1990, provides in 4(c) thereof: prLL
c) Raising issues purely of law in the Court of Appeals. or appeal by wrong mode. If an appeal
under Rule 41 is taken from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals and therein the
appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not
being reviewable by said Court. So, too, if an appeal is attempted from the judgment rendered by
a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of
by petition for review, the appeal is inefficacious and should be dismissed.
Thus, judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court
of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. On the other
hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought
directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law.
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which distinguishes the different
modes of appeal from Judgments of regional trial courts as follows:
Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court to Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases,
the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance
with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law.
The rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be summarized as follows:

(1) Original Jurisdiction In all cases decided by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:
(a) Court of Appeals where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law, by filing a mere notice of appeal. LLphil
(b) Supreme Court where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction
All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, whether
the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review
under Rule 42.
The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of law or of fact.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known:
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 10
Respondent's assignment of errors 11 before the appellate court should therefore be considered in order to
determine the nature of the questions therein raised. Respondent Philex Mining argued before the Court of Appeals:
A. The trial court erred in finding that Philex has no right to expropriate; P.D. 463 expressly grants
to Philex, as operator of the Nevada claims, the right of eminent domain.
B The trial court erred in finding that Philex cannot expropriate land belonging to
a mining company; Section 59 in relation to Section 58 of P.D. 463 allows an operator of
amining claim to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by
other persons or claim owners.
C The trial court erred in finding that Philex is attempting to subvert the Supreme Court decision
and is engaged in forum-shopping. Philex is merely exercising its rights under the law.
D The trial court erred in finding that the expropriation of the land will divide the surface from the
subsurface. prcd
E The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Philex's alternative cause of action was
disregarded.
The respondent's arguments may thus be summarized as follows:
(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463. expressly grants respondent the right to
expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons once the conditions justifying
expropriation are present. The power of eminent domain expressly granted under Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No.
463 is not inferior to the possessory right of other claimowners. 12
(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to another mining company.
Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic, 13 land covered by mining claims may be
the subject of expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the power of eminent domain only means that the court may
inquire into the necessity of the expropriation. 14
(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme Court's decision
in Poe Mining v. Garcia. 15
Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious suits, is not resorted to in the present case since
respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners' mining areas, not as operator of the Poe mining claims, but as operator
of the Nevada mining claims. 16

(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for the reason that
respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have over the 21.9 hectare
area. 17
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondent's alternative cause of action, even on the assumption that
respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an alternative statement in a pleading, if
sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the other alternative statements. 18
The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where
petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether the rules on
the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to
special civil actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state of facts.
These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in ruling otherwise. prLL
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the challenged resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the
appeal of respondent Philex Mining is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998)
[G.R. No. 109834. October 18, 1996.]
CECILE SAN JUAN DITCHING and MA. CORAZON I. SAN JUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ADRIANO MOTAS, respondents.

Manalo, Puno, Gozos, Jocson & Placido for petitioners.

Ernesto M. Maiquez for private respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW
MUST BE FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. In Lacsamana vs.
Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had set the allowable extension to file
petition for review with the Court of Appeals at fifteen (15) days. . . . And in the same case, the Court explicitly ruled
that a motion for extension must be filed within the reglementary period of appeal. . . . It should be observed that in
this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion for extension of time. This distinguishes
the instant case from those cited by petitioners. It is obvious and unarguable (and it was not only in Lacsamana that
this Court held) that a motion for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the expiration or lapse of
the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the period sought
to be extended (i.e., the reglementary period to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and the
judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory. The error of herein petitioners and their
counsel goes into the very validity of the appeal, and cannot simply be brushed off as an honest mistake in computing
the period to appeal.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TIMELY PERFECTION OF APPEAL IS A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT; REASONS. It
should be stressed that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file
an appeal. He cannot escape from the rigid observance of this rule which is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with as
"mere technicality" to suit the interest of a party. The rules as to periods for filing appeal are to be observed
religiously, for it is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to
avail of the right must comply with the rules. "These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business." Perfection of an
appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement. If an appeal be not taken within the reglementary
period, the judgment becomes final and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no alternative but to
order the execution of the final judgment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISCOMPUTATION OF APPEAL PERIOD BY COUNSEL IS NOT AN EXCUSABLE ERROR;
CASE AT BAR. Although this Court had in a number of instances relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice, there is no reason to do so in this case. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by petitioner's counsel was
simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by private respondent, this Court has already held that "(a)n erroneous
application of the law or rules is not an excusable error." At this juncture, we deem it useful to reiterate this Court's
ruling in Galima, for the guidance of members of the bar and bench alike, that "the miscomputation by counsel of the
appeal period will not arrest the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive
and executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is to the interest of
everyone that the date when judgments become final should remain fixed and ascertainable."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF LATE APPEAL PROPER ALTHOUGH PRIMA FACIE MERITORIOUS; CASE
AT BAR. The respondent Court cannot also be faulted for stating in its resolution dated June 23, 1992 that the
petition filed with it was prima facie meritorious, only to dismiss it thereafter for being filed out of time. Where no
timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court. Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing
the petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry
with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed. Under Section 1(a) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the appellee may dismiss the appeal for, inter alia: "(a)
Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these
rules." ESHAcI
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT ON APPEAL;
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. We shall not pass upon and consider the other issue raised by petitioners,
challenging the factual findings of the trial court as to the existence of the tenancy relationship. Otherwise, we would
be violating that time-honored and oft-reiterated rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by
evidence . . . Petitioners have utterly failed to show any such compelling reason. And equally as significant, they are
asking us to review a judgment which had long since become final and executory something we cannot and ought
not do.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:
If a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals was filed more
than fifteen days from receipt of the order assailed, should the petition itself, when subsequently filed, be rejected
outright for being filed late? On the other hand, should the merits of the case be looked into first to ascertain whether
to allow relaxation of the strict application of the rules?
Assailed in this petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision 2 of respondent
Court of Appeals 3 promulgated August 25, 1992, and its Resolution 4 of April 16, 1993, denying the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners. In the assailed Decision, respondent Court dismissed their petition for review for being
filed late, considering that their motion for extension was filed twenty (20) days from their receipt of the order of the
trial court.
The Antecedent Facts
The antecedent of the present petition was an ejectment case 5 filed in July 1989 with the Municipal Trial Court in
Calamba, Laguna by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani, seeking to eject herein private
respondent Motas and another occupant named Vidal Batalla from the lot owned by the petitioner and her co-owners.
Said case was tried under the old Rules on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court found that the plaintiffs in said ejectment case were co-owners of parcels of land situated at
Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna covered by various transfer certificates of title. However, in 1975, a contract of
tenancy entitled "Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan" was entered into by private respondent Motas and Dr. Eduardo
San Juan, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. Then, in 1978, respondent Motas constructed his house on the
lot covered by TCT No. 57823 without the consent of petitioners, who, upon learning of such fact, demanded that he
vacate the property. The last demand to vacate having been made in September 1988, and respondent Motas having

refused to vacate, petitioners lodged a complaint at the barangay level, but no amicable settlement was arrived at,
hence the suit for ejectment.
For his part, respondent Motas alleged that he could not be ejected from his tenanted landholdings (including the lot
where his house was located) because of the existing tenancy agreement, and that he had been giving rentals/shares
to petitioners' overseer who without justifiable reason stopped receiving said rentals or share of the harvests, forcing
respondent Motas to deposit the same with a bank. 6
After due consideration of the pleadings and evidence presented, the Municipal Trial Court found that there existed a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent Motas. Then, based on Section 24 of Republic Act No.
3844, the Agricultural Reform Code, as amended, which provides that "(t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to
continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity of
(RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold," the MTC held 7 that the portion of the land where
respondent Motas' house was erected was considered included on the leasehold, hence the "ejectment" case was
actually a tenancy case over which it had no jurisdiction. The court thus dismissed the case.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, 8 which rendered a decision 9 dated June 28,
1991, in Civil Case No. 1607-90-C affirming in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court
made the following findings supporting the existence of a tenancy relationship: 10
"In the case at bar, the fact appears to be uncontroverted that plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
became the registered owners of the property mentioned in the complaint only on May 8, 1978.
This is quite evident from a reading of a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57823 (Annex 'D'
of complaint). Moreover, the land sought to be recovered by them clearly appears to be a part of
a larger tract of land identified as Lot 1416 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-266142, the latter
being also a portion of Lot 1416-X-2, Psd 58615, LRC Rec. No. 8418. Furthermore, this Court's
analysis of the other Transfer Certificates of Title attached to the complaint as Annexes 'A' to 'C',
and 'E' to 'I', inclusive, will clearly show that the parcels of land mentioned and described in the
same certificates of title issued in the names of plaintiffs and their co-owners are the results of a
previous subdivision of Lot 1416-X. Since Annexes 'A' to 'C' and 'E' to 'I' appear to have been
issued to the plaintiffs and their co-owners also on May 8, 1978, there is no doubt at all that the
parcels of land covered by such titles, including the land in question, came from one (1) tract of
land.

The foregoing circumstances appear to be very significant because plaintiffs never denied, much
less controverted the fact that defendants, more particularly Adriano Motas (private respondent
herein), have occupied a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo San Juan as
tenants of the latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the defendants' claim that the land in question
was a part and parcel of Dr. Eduardo San Juan's land being tenanted by defendants.
On the other hand, there is sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered by defendants that they
have been tenants of Dr. San Juan's land since 1972; and that on October 7, 1975, defendant
Motas even executed Annex '1' with Dr. San Juan, plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest.
Plaintiffs' contention that defendants are not tenants of the property in question has no leg to
stand on. Having succeeded Dr. Eduardo San Juan on the same property, they are bound to
observe and respect the rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they never intended
defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit."
As expected, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. In order to resolve the same,
Judge Eleuterio Guerrero set the case for clarificatory hearing on August 30, 1991, on which date a representative
from the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on the records and/or other papers
and documents relative to the ownership and/or disposition of the land subject of the controversy. 11
Afterwards, Judge Eleuterio Guerrero issued an order dated January 8, 1992 granting reconsideration and setting
aside his earlier order, thus: 12
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds merit to plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration and
accordingly the decision of this Court dated June 28, 1991, is hereby reversed and set aside and
another judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendants-appellees and/or any persons claiming rights under them to vacate
immediately the premises of the land owned by plaintiffs-appellants located at Barangay Pansol,
Calamba, Laguna, and to surrender possession thereof to the latter; and
2. Defendants-appellees are further ordered to pay the costs."
On March 5, 1992, Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero who took over as presiding judge of Branch 34 issued another
order (this time upon motion for reconsideration of respondent Motas) reversing the earlier order of Judge Eleuterio
Guerrero, as follows: 13
"The rule on the exercise of the Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial Courts mandates that
cases appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court 'be decided on the basis of theentire record of
the proceeding had in the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court' (vide. Sec. 22, Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129). The fact that the Court then presided by the Hon. Eleuterio Guerrero conducted
hearings and admitted testimonial evidence to clarify points on the decision of the Court a quo, is
beyond the purview of the rule. This being the case, the motion for reconsideration must perforce
to be GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated January 8, 1992 is hereby ordered
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the Order of the Municipal Trial court dated June 14,
1990 is AFFIRMED en toto."
On April 13, 1992, petitioners filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days
from April 18, 1992, or up to May 3, 1992, within which to file a petition for review, alleging the following material
dates: 14
"2. On March 5, 1992, the said court issued an Order adverse to herein petitioners, a copy of
which was received by petitioners thru counsel on March 17, 1992, please see Annex 'A'.
3. From the adverse order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 27, 1992
which was denied by the court per Order of even date.
4. The Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was received by petitioners thru
counsel on April 3, 1992, please see Annex 'B', thus, petitioners have until April 18, 1992 within
which to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
5. That petitioners will file a petition for review on certiorari of the said adverse order.
6. Due however, to volume and pressure of work from equally important cases, undersigned
cannot file the petition within the time allowed by law, thus, needs a period of fifteen (15) days
from April 18, 1992 within which to file said petition."
In response thereto, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting extension and stating: 15
"Petitioners' motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days from April 18, 1992 up to May 3, 1992
within which to file a petition for review is GRANTED, conditioned upon the timeliness of said
motion." (Emphasis ours)
The petition was filed on April 29, 1992.
Finding the petition to have been filed late as can be readily ascertained from the recitation of material dates, the
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with the following discussion:
"It is crystal clear from the foregoing undisputed facts that from March 17, 1992 the date
petitioners received the order of March 22 (should be '05'), 1992 (Annex A, petition), to March 27,
1992 when they filed their motion for reconsideration of said order, ten (10) days were
consumed. From April 3, 1992 the date petitioners received the order denying their motion for
reconsideration up to April 13, 1992 when they filed their motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review, another ten (10) days had elapsed. A total of twenty (20) days had already run
from the time petitioners received a copy of the questioned order up to the time they actually filed
on April 13, 1982 their motion for extension of time to file the petition. Clearly, the order of March
22 (should be '05'), 1992 had already become final and executory when petitioners filed on April

13, 1992 their motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. For this reason, this Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review except to dismiss it. (Sumbilo vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 232)."
Their motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners
hastened to this Court.
The Issues
The issues initially presented by petitioners in the petition before us were subsequently simplified and re-stated in
their memorandum thus: 16
". . . (1) whether or not respondent Adriano Motas is a tenant of that parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 57923 (and) (2) whether or not the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the
Court of Appeals notwithstanding its merit, is valid."
Disregarding for the nonce the factual nature of the first issue raised, and the rule of long standing that only questions
of law may properly be raised in petitions for review oncertiorari such as this, we shall first determine whether the
respondent Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition before it, seemingly on "sheer technicality." If the answer
is in the affirmative, then regardless of the merits of the petitioners' cause, assuming it to be meritorious, the
judgment of the RTC having become final and executory, then this appeal may no longer be entertained.
Petitioners allege that the late filing of the motion for extension and the petition was due to their counsel's "honest
mistake in computing the period appeal." Citing cases 17decided by this Court, petitioners allege that respondent
Court committed serious error and "grave abuse of discretion" in dismissing the petition on a mere technical
ground. 18
On the other hand, private respondent alleges that petitioner's failure to file their petition on time due to mistake of
counsel was "not excusable." Likewise citing numerous cases, 19 private respondent alleges that this Court has
consistently held that "perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement and failure to
do so renders the questioned decision or decree final executory and no longer subject to review." 20
The Court's Ruling
The petition before us is plainly without merit
In Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 this Court had set the
allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court of Appeals at fifteen (15) days, to wit:
"3. APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order
of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129
and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim
Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable
to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for
review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial
court, the movant has only (the) remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence,
it may be necessaryto file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such
petition for review. (Emphasis supplied)
And in the same case, the Court explicitly ruled that a motion for extension must be filed within the reglementary
period of appeal:
"6) PERIOD OF EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision (August 26, 1986), an extension
of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.

The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the
reglementary period of appeal.

Copies of the motion for extension of time and of the subsequent petition for review must be
served on the regional trial court on the adverse party." (Emphasis supplied).
It should be observed that in this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion for
extension of time. This distinguishes the instant case from those cited by petitioners. It is obvious and unarguable
(and it was not only in Lacsamana that this Court held) that a motion for extension of time to file a petition should be
filed prior to the expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the motion for extension is
filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e, the reglementary period to appeal), then there is no
longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.
The error of herein petitioners and their counsel goes into the very validity of the appeal, and cannot simply be
brushed off as an honest mistake in computing the period to appeal. It should be stressed that a lawyer has the
responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot escape from the
rigid observance of this rule which is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with as "mere technicality" to suit the interest
of a party. The rules as to periods for filing appeal are to be observed religiously, for it is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules.
"These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down
by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business." 22 Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is
a jurisdictional requirement. 23 If an appeal be not taken within the reglementary period, the judgment becomes final
and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no alternative but to order the execution of the final
judgment. 24
Although this Court had in a number of instances relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice, there is no
reason to do so in this case. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by petitioner's counsel was simply inexcusable.
As correctly cited by private respondent, this Court has already held that "(a)n erroneous application of the law or
rules is not an excusable error." 25
At this juncture, we deem it useful to reiterate this Court's ruling in Galima, for the guidance of members of the bar
and bench alike, that "the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the same nor
prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and executory character of the judgment would be left to
the whim of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone that the date when judgments become final should
remain fixed and ascertainable." 26
The respondent Court cannot also be faulted for stating in its resolution 27 dated June 23, 1992 that the petition filed
with it was prima facie meritorious, only to dismiss it thereafter for being filed out of time. 28 Where no timely appeal
was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings in the appellate court. 29 Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the
petition on the ground that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not carry with it
any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed.
Under Section 1 (a) of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the
appellee may dismiss the appeal for, inter alia:
"(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the
period fixed by these rules."
Having disposed of the foregoing issue, we shall not pass upon and consider the other issue raised by petitioners,
challenging the factual findings of the trial court as to the existence of the tenancy relationship. Otherwise, we would
be violating that time-honored and oft-reiterated rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by
evidence. 30 Indeed, we recently held in Sintos vs. Court of Appeals 31 that:
"The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on the
basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal except
for the most compelling reasons (Macaraeg v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 259 [1989])."
Petitioners have utterly failed to show any such compelling reason. And equally as significant, they are
asking us to review a judgment which had long since become final and executory something we cannot and
ought not do.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioners having failed to show that
respondent Court committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Ditching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109834, October 18, 1996)
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.]
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza and Virgilio C. Manguera for petitioner.

Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices for private respondent.
Amador C. Casino, Collaborating counsel for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as
then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator found him guilty of the charge and henceforth issued a resolution ordering his
dismissal from the service. The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman, but on motion for reconsideration,
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the resolution and exonerated private respondent. cdasia
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which vests
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman as it infringes the
constitutional proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advise
and consent.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SECTION 27 OF R.A. 6770; OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989. We will merely observe
and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action. EScHDA
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL FALLS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF BOTH THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; CASE AT BAR. After respondents'
separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been seriously
considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent
were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet,
pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by
the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals
effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. It could thus be
possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman
from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the
consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; RULE THAT A CHALLENGE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

GROUNDS MUST BE RAISED BY A PARTY TO THE CASE; NOT AN INFLEXIBLE RULE. Then there is the
consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent," and
that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of
that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be
raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and
the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it
is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT EX MERO MOTU MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AT ANY
POINT IN THE CASE WHERE THE FACT IS DEVELOPED. While courts will not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it
lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular
and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex
mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court
has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. HCEcaT
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 27 OF R.A. No. 6770 SPECIFIES THAT APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IS TO BE EXERCISED OVER "FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF LOWER COURTS," COMPOSING
THE INTEGRATED JUDICIAL SYSTEM. The very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts,"
that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies,
hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, as specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate
procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to
and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PRECLUDE APPEALS FROM QUASIJUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE SUPREME COURT VIA RULE 45. Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly
observed by private respondent, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This differs from the former Rule 45 of the
1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating
and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict
the scope of the appeal to questions of law. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courtsenumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals
from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on
a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. EDATSI
7. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUIESCENCE BUT AN
ISSUE OF CONFERMENT. The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the
appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already
discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the
instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion,
and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT CAN RULE ON MATTER SUA SPONTE WHEN ITS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION IS INVOLVED. Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question,
at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the
Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was

timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the
Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case.

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS; SECTION 27 OF R.A. 6770 VIOLATES THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST LAWS INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment
of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. IDScTE
10. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; RULES PRESCRIBED FOR THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
LOWER COURTS; TEST WHETHER PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE. It will be noted that no definitive line
can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rulemaking power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the
context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.
11. ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover,
relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the
law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by
substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a
vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. Thus, it
has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural
and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect
or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex
hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained. EaHIDC

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public
respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of
and absolved private respondent from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as
then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). cda
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the
major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged

in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and
private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing
acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him
in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an
ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed
under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His
resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their
office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without
pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the
former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18,
1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) 1 pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the
decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed
by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those
Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules
of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. .
.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot
assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of
proceedings before it, including those rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal in
administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition
by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the
aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her
petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in
a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public
respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al. 3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 4 were original
actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., 6 Olivas vs.Office of the Ombudsman, et
al., 7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, 9 which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs.Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an
"Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed
by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly
be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and
propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original
action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto
appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and
clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to
as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to
have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the
jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to
herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential
Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9,Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902,
all adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the
Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one
could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the
Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would
dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting
decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989,
obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on
constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an
inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and
the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it
is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, 13 the
rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction
in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the
statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court's own motion. 15 The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the
case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this
constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts
stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs.
Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which
absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of
the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into
account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the
provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the
provisions of its former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now
substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved in this case,
and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the
grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard
thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate
review. cdasia

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their position and
arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court
dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the
provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the
mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of
law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this
Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if
questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited
by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include
the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that
effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No
such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they
are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure 19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:
SEC. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and
had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation
on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then,
at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not
to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if
hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals
would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual
controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service
Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the
other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular
courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in
said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter
of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to,
including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is
involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision
would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially
when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an
actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even
be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the
constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon the
constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same.
That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and
unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the
issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two
decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely
under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this
Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 23 was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under
its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some
statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those
isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By
way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the
legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B.
No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was
approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of the
final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on
November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for
appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the
Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543
admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query
whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate
jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme
Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals
on certiorari. 27
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its
advice and consent. 28
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being
substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a
diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence
and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making
power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or
procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within
the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be
procedural in one context and substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive
is frequently a question of great difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of
pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to
the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure
only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.
The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by
substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the
remedy. 34
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a
vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy . 35
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went

into effect 36 or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law
or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force
and effect. llcd
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to
be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its
requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it
may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
[G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997.]
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU,
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., Honorable CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the Office of
the Ombudsman; JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A.
ARIZALA, all of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila,respondents.

Acosta, Rueda-Acosta & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS
This is a special civil action case under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leonila Rueda against public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman for its failure to uphold the existence of probable cause to hold public
respondents City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The records reveal that Florencio V.
Rueda, husband of herein petitioner, underwent surgical operation at the UST Hospital for the removal of a stone
blocking his ureter. He was attended by a surgeon, Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. and an anaesthesiologist, Dr. Erlinda
Balatbat-Reyes. However, six hours after the surgery, Florencio died of complications of unknown cause. Petitioner
sought the help of the NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body and its finding was that Florencio's death
was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. A formal complaint for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was then filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. In said office, petitioner's
case was transferred from one prosecutor to another who came out with contradictory recommendations. When the
case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Arizala, the latter resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any
wrongdoing. Aggrieved petitioner filed graft charges against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg and Arizala for manifest
partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes in the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the complaint
for lack of evidence. cda
The Supreme Court ruled that in exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his
power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the prosecutors, and the Court will not interfere with the
same. Being the proper investigating authority, the Ombudsman should have inquired into the successive transfer of
the case from one prosecutor to another which could hardly qualify as "standard operating procedure." The instant
petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 Constitution; OMBUDSMAN; POWERS AND FUNCTIONS THEREOF.
Preliminarily, the powers and functions of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following:
investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain information, and

function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. As protector of the people, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials" and "to investigate any act or omission of any public official when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." dctai
2. ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; CONSTRUED. In this regard, "grave abuse of discretion" has been
defined as "where a power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINED AND EXPLAINED IN THE CASE AT
BAR. Probable cause has been defined as "the existence of such fact and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecution, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." "Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a
matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so." The term
does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge. SEcAIC
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; FOUR ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES.
"In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must
prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not
have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient." Hence, there are four elements involved in
medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
5. ID.; SECTION 3(E) OF THE Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; FACTS REQUIRED. The City Prosecutors
were charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 which requires the following facts: "1. The accused is a
public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2.
The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public
position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and 4.
His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties." dctai

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:
May this Court review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman? The general rule has been enunciated
in Ocampo v. Ombudsman 1 which states: LLjur
"In the exercise of its investigative power, this Court has consistently held that courts will not
interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and
adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he
finds it to be insufficient in form and substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with
the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in due
and proper form."
Does the instant case warrant a departure from the foregoing general rule? When a patient dies soon after surgery
under circumstances which indicate that the attending surgeon and anaesthesiologist may have been guilty of
negligence but upon their being charged, a series of nine prosecutors toss the responsibility of conducting a
preliminary investigation to each other with contradictory recommendations, "ping-pong" style, perhaps the distraught
widow is not to be blamed if she finally decides to accuse the City Prosecutors at the end of the line for partiality
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Nor may she be entirely faulted for finally filing a petition before this

Court against the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint against said City
Prosecutors on the ground of lack of evidence. Much as we sympathize with the bereaved widow, however, this Court
is of the opinion that the general rule still finds application in instant case. In other words, the respondent
Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding against filing the necessary information against
public respondents of the Office of the City Prosecutor.
The following facts are borne out by the records.
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST Hospital
for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon,
while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of
complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital. 2
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of
care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr.
Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the
Office of the City Prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events which we shall try to
disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he
was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono
who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence
regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a
resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be
dismissed.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in the "interest of
justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor
Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where
a volte faceoccurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a
corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the
findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.

Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the
investigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto,
who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State
Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was
approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 3 against
Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for
lack of evidence.
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations
of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for,
allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City
Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Preliminarily, the powers and functions of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following:
investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain information, and
function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. 4
As protector of the people, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" and "to investigate any act or omission of any public
official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 5
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is
not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. 6

In this regard, "grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "where a power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. 7
From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why the successive transfers from one prosecutor to another were
not sufficiently explained in the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Being the proper investigating authority with respect
to misfeasance, non-feasance and malfeasance of public officials, the Ombudsman should have been more vigilant
and assiduous in determining the reasons behind the "buck passing" to ensure that no irregularity took place.
Whether such transfers were due to any outside pressure or ulterior motive is a matter of evidence. One would have
expected the Ombudsman, however, to inquire into what could hardly qualify as "standard operating procedure,"
given the surrounding circumstances of the case.
While it is true that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and is often the only means to discover who
may be charged with a crime, its function is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. 8 Probable cause
has been defined as "the existence of such fact and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecution, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted." 9
"Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so." The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 10
In the instant case, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence
on the part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. 11 The fact of want of competence or
diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually
impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation, research, evaluation
and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass
judgment on such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a
party's accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
A word on medical malpractice or negligence cases.
"In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her
to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in
most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider
would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient." 12
Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was
created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that, having the needed training and
skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill
in the treatment of their patients. 13 They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional
duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body
or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. 14 Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient
from want of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for
negligence. 15
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert
testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquiturto the plaintiff, have been applied in actions against
anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper
anaesthesia.16 Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical
community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this
standard in his treatment. 17

Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether the doctor's
actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause of the patient's
injury. 18 Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim's death after the negligent
act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the
appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI
deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It
appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope
with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available
to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. 19 Why these precautionary measures
were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
The City Prosecutors were charged with violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which
requires the following facts:
"1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties." 20
Why did the complainant, petitioner in instant case, elect to charge respondents under the above law?
While a party who feels himself aggrieved is at liberty to choose the appropriate "weapon from the armory," it is with
no little surprise that this Court views the choice made by the complainant widow.

To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution
of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department of
Justice's Order No. 223, 21 otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions in
Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides:
"Section 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional
State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the
subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4
hereof."
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223 states: "The Secretary of
Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution." On the other hand, "He may motu propio or on motion
of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds." 22
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in
dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the same. cdlex
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of an appeal
by the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice assailing the dismissal of her criminal complaint by the respondent City
Prosecutors. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, September 05, 1997)
[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.]
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

Isagani M. Jungco for petitioner.

Sebastinian Office of Legal Aid for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS
This is a case of an illegal dismissal filed by private respondent Bienvenido Aricayos against St. Martin Funeral
Home. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home declaring that there was no employer-employee
relationship that existed between the parties, and therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding
the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. After the motion for reconsideration of the herein
petitioner was denied, it filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari. cdasia
The Court, instead of going to the merits of the case, discussed the mode of judicial review with respect to decisions
of the National Labor Relations Commission pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code
of the Philippines) and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
In remanding this case to the Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that while it does not wish to intrude into the
congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, it further observed that there is a growing number of labor
cases being elevated to the court which, not being a trier of facts, has at times been constrained to remand the case
to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably
an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of the constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. aECTcA

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; SIXTY DAYS DESPITE
LAPSE OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR FINALITY OF THE DECISION OF THENLRC. . . . the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if
filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER DECISIONS OF THE NLRC. Therefore, all references in the
amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from theNLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired. SAEHaC

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private
respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner St. MartinFuneral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22,

1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for
payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who
was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of
the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees,
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in
the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment. 2 Cdpr
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor
arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a
"volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a
period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and
petitioner. 4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of
merit, 6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and
opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has
long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes
that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129
(The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural
aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of
Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No
appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of
the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely
provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the
appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate
review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts
to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said
Rule has now fixed the reglementary .period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-

day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as
follows:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March
18, 1995, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice."
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the
following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.
7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of
Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the
section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which
the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As
earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been
understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special
original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost
all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and
the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and
said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary
implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of B. P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded
are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This
is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no
cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. LibLex
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may
have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology
used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor
cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in
the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S.
No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech 19 from
which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the
Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its
appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but
also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the
transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals .However,
whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals."
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases.
Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s)

of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the
Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme
Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal
situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants
of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the
Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the
burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the
particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its
time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of
the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task
expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to
300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of
cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our
Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by
the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution," add the phrase " THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS
AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will
still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also
discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as
approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second
reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the
House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive of
the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and
still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation
thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and
the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The
important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the
special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed
would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on
Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse
from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and
would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that
procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals
would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and
reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A
perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on
this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this
Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for
resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative
need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their
hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this
Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED,
and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
||| (St. Martin Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998)
[G.R. No. 156081. October 19, 2005.]

FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE,

JR., petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:
For our review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated September 2, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67388, as well as its Resolution 2 dated November 12, 2002, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court dismissed the petition for review under Rule 43 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an
erroneous mode of appeal from the Resolution 4 of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary had modified the
Resolution 5 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in I.S. No. PSG 00-04-10205 and directed the latter to
file an information for estafa against petitioners.
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into
a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement clothed
FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square
meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the
standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a
downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI
would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. Neither did it release
the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked. In
several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to
some claimants who opposed FEPI's application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPI's hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this
Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the
properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.
Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI's statements and he made several demands upon FEPI to return his
payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles
316 6and 318 7 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners
as officers of FEPI. The complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to Sell categorically stated that FEPI was the
owner of the property. However, before the HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the
petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the
development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership
and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had
grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from
him the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner. IDTcHa
Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary investigation on
the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor were the payments made
in Pasig City. Besides, countered petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were
present. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint
venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. They further denied that FEPI ever made any written nor oral
representation to Go that it is the owner, pointing out that Go failed to positively identify who made such
misrepresentation to him nor did Go say where the misrepresentation was made. According to petitioner, there being
neither deceit nor misrepresentation, there could be no damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no probable cause

exists to indict the petitioners. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held criminally liable for abiding with
a cease-and-desist order of the DAR.
In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the
Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI's office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore
the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described
FEPI as owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the contract were the
acts of an owner and not a mere developer.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa, thus:
Wherefore, the case for estafa, under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, filed
against the respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepea, Federico Campos, Polo
Pantaleon and Rafael Perez de Tagle, Jr. is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 8
The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation stating that, (1) the Contract to Sell did not mention FEPI as the
owner of the property; (2) since no Deed of Sale had been executed by the parties, then petitioners are not yet bound
to deliver the certificate of title since under both the Contract to Sell and Section 25 9 of Presidential Decree No.
957,10 FEPI was bound to deliver the certificate of title only upon the execution of a contract of sale; and (3) the City
Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the HLURB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and
controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No.
1344. 11
Go appealed the City Prosecutor's Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City
Prosecutor's findings, and held, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Pasig
City is directed to file an information for estafa defined and penalized under Art. 316, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code against respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepea, Federico
Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. and report the action taken within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof. EASIHa
SO ORDERED. 12
The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under Article 316 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, pointing out that the elements of the offense were present as evidenced by the terms of the
Contract to Sell. It ruled that under the Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that
FEPI was not its owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and had
accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts. Thus, FEPI was exercising acts of ownership
when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts to convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of
strict ownership. Furthermore, nowhere did FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true
owner of the property. Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied ownership after the
perfection of the contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since a corporation can only act through its agents
or officers, then all the participants in a fraudulent transaction are deemed liable.
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before
the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed
with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial court
deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was resolved. HATEDC
On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition, HAVING NO MERIT, is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE AND ORDERED DISMISSED, with cost to Petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 13
The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal
from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasijudicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.
Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. 14

(2) THE DOJ SECRETARY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE AND RESOLVED
TO FILE AN INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA UNDER ART. 316, SEC. 1 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS, CONSIDERING THAT: (A)
Petitioners did not pretend that they, or FEPI, were the owners of the subject property;
(B) FEPI need not have been the owner at the time the Contract to Sell was furnished to
respondent Go; (C) There was no prejudice caused to respondent Go; (D) There is no
personal act or omission constituting a crime ascribed to any of the Petitioners,
therefore, there can be no probable cause against them; and (E) There was no deceit or
even intent to deceive. 15
To our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal
from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case. In the
course of this determination, we must also consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the
prosecutor is a quasi-judicial function.
Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the Secretary of Justice since
during preliminary investigations, the DOJ's decisions are deemed as "awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions", and its prosecutorial
offices are considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions.
Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and emphasizes that "injunction will not lie to restrain
criminal prosecution."
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from
decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies 16 enumerated in Section 1 of Rule
43.Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
We cannot agree with petitioners' submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that
the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 18
Though some cases 19 describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial
in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. 20 A quasi-judicial body is
as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making. 21 A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its
awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not
the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the
former's order or resolutions.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions
are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable
cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' petition for review.

Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the findings
of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much we
are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the DOJ's factual findings and its determination of probable
cause.
First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments, orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any authorized court and should raise only pure
question of law. The Department of Justice is not a court.
Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g. the ownership of the subject property, the
existence of deceit committed by petitioners on respondent, and petitioners' knowledge or direct participation in the
Contract to Sell. These are factual issues and are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The cited
questions require evaluation and examination of evidence, which is the province of a full-blown trial on the merits.
Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he
may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. 22 The decision
whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless
made with grave abuse of discretion. 24 In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for
us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence. DACaTI
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002 and November 12, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005)
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998.]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B.
BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel for intervenors.

SYNOPSIS
The alleged farmer-beneficiaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President (OP),
which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial institutional area. This led the
OP, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier decision after it had already become final and executory. The
said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the
remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Garilao
of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
The crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win" Resolution issued by the OP
on its earlier decision involving the same subject matter, which had already become final and executory? TASCDI

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the OP are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18, which provides
in Section 7, that: "Decisions . . . become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties,
unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period: . . .
When the OP declared the decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as the first motion for reconsideration was
not seasonably filed, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case or modify the decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the OP has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Section 7 of AO No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court mandate that only one motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the decision of March 29, 1996.
Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; ERROR OF JUDGMENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ERROR OF JURISDICTION. An error
of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by
an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. aHcACT
2.ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING IS
VIOLATED. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.
3.ID.; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; DEFINED; MOVANTS IN CASE AT BAR ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly,
movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest. ADSIaT
4.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; APPEALS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RULE GOVERNING THEM. The
rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereof provides: "SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases." It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable."
5.ID.; THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT MODIFIED A DECISION WHICH HAD
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23
1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win"
Resolution. Section 7 ofAdministrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse
into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. cDAEIH

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J p:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that
even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause." LLjur
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred
forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President,
through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution 2 on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The
said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four
(44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the "Win-Win"
Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win" Resolution issued by
the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already become final
and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1.This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2.In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and
Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3.In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire
144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. 4
4.NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of
the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any activity or activities"
concerning the subject land "until further orders." 5
5.Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21,
1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct
summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify
the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject
property.

6.The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional
Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b) nullifying the DAR
Regional Director's memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto;
and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject property to the DAR until
further orders." 6

7.The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner
NQSRMDC. 7
8.In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich,
passed Resolution No. 6, 8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part
of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
9.What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of
which we quote:
"Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors
who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
"Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the
classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of
their utilization or disposition.
"On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by
Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).
"Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a
Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform
and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now
docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project
proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
"1.The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for
Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
"2.Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn
starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable
rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants,
fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and
prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores;
public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
"3.Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horseback riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
"4.Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants,
dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon;
the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' Office of the President Mindanao;
the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
"In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO
OBJECTION to the proposed conversion 'as long as the development cost of the irrigation
systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer . . .' Also, the
Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question 'as it will provide more

economic benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and
employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . .'
"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.
"Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the
DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section
65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the
subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries
on the following grounds:
"1.The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
"2.The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
"3.The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
"4.There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the
beneficiaries;
"5.The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial
project has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series
of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993. LLjur
"A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant
but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995)." 9
10.Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the property." 10
11.Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed 11 the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed
for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of
Bukidnon.
12.To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13.Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after
conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum 13 to the President favorably endorsing the
project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the
province for the conversion of the land.
14.Also, in a memorandum 14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the
subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the President "hold the implementation of the DAR order
to distribute the land in question."
15.On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution 15 ordering the parties
to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the
DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the processing
stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the
petition. 16
16.In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a
Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision, the pertinent
portions of which read:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and

bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even
tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is,
indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of
way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself,
subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with
pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA)
and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property
could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease
contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered
the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to 'desist
from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.

"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares
of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of
Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received 'just compensation'
up to this time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to
speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for
agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to
local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language
of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation.
By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs
including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
"WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is
hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED." 17
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18.On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four
(4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School. 18
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over
the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of
NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance
of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmerbeneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19.Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint 21 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and

injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30,
1997 22 and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering,
occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20.Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order 24 was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying
DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said
order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
21.The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
22.On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged
farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC
case.
23.On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in
Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be
farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In
Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144hectare property be set aside. 25
24.President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the
framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary
Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. 26
25.On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win"
Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
"1.NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the
highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
"2.The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation
canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway
provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and
other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the
segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of
titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
"3.The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously
determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
"4.The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of
just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by
the CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for
CARP coverage.
"5.The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the
Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997
without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this
time.
"SO ORDERED." 27
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 28and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through
counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently
opposed 30 by the petitioners. LLjur
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was
prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda
Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely
political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been
declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997 . . ." 31 Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. . ." 32 They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." 33 They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or
contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration . . ." 34
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the
following grounds:
(1)The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the
Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2)The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution
before filing the present petition; and
(3)Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for intervention
filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw
a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 35 On the other hand,
anerror of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. 36 This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions, 38 including the Office of the President, 39 may be taken to the Court of Appeals
by filing a verified petition for review 40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution,41 whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 42
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 43 and was issued with
"grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 44 when said
resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and
executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done.
The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
"SEC. 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx."

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 45
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act "may file a
verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated
in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
"SEC. 4.Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)"
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 46 prohibition 47and mandamus. 48 But the jurisdiction of these
three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasijudicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the
Rules
of
Court.
We
have
clearly
discussed
this
matter
of
concurrence
of
jurisdiction
in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 49 through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
". . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence
to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.' This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals." (Citations
omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed
and
which
has
been
reiterated
in
subsequent
cases,
namely: 50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 51 Torres vs. Arranz, 52Bercero vs. De
Guzman, 53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
". . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket."
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice 55 and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by
the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly
void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time
and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 56

"Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of
the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is
not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97)
with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
"There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not
only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
"The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid
down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), . . . and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
'There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563
identity of parties, or at least such parties represent the same interests in both actions,
as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites,
in fine, ofauter action pendant.'" 58

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not
show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the
nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject
property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the
DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were earlier declared null
and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just compensation;
and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said
two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmerbeneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmerbeneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I" in
their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR "to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said

document reveals that movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other
words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment
or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interestmeans a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants'
interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void.
Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially
modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied
in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7.Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases." (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable."
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996
final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is
allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of
the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60 we held:
"Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is wellestablished in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasijudicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.
Castro, supra at 503]."
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and
for all. 61 This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has
attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a 1918

case, 63 is "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever
it exhibits its head." 64
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997,
issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion
For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs. LLjur
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998)
[G.R. No. 142261. April 5, 2000.]
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.

SYLLABUS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EXISTENCE OF A LAW MANDATING THE IMMEDIATE
EXECUTION OF A DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. After due deliberation, the
Court finds that the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of a
decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The
immediate implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus premature. WHEREFORE,
the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the petitioner to the position of Governor of the
Province of Pampanga. This case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal in CA-GR.
SP No. 56744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost deliberate
dispatch. AIDTSE

RESOLUTION

From the pleadings filed by the parties and after oral argument held on April 5, 2000, the petitioner represented by
Atty. Augusto G. Panlilio, the respondent Ombudsman represented by its Chief Legal Counsel, and the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Interior and Local Government represented by the Solicitor-General,
and after due deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents failed to establish the existence of a law mandating
the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is
suspension for one year. The immediate implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is thus
premature. cdll
WHEREFORE, the respondents are ordered to reinstate effective immediately the petitioner to the position of
Governor of the Province of Pampanga. This case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the
appeal in CA-GR. SP No. 56744 on the merits. Said court is hereby directed to resolve the same with utmost
deliberate dispatch.
This is without prejudice to the promulgation of an extended decision. llcd
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261 (Resolution), April 05, 2000)