Atr 42

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105
CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under
subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to
correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in
the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes
AD/ATR 42/1
State of Design Airworthiness Directives
8/2007
DM
Applicability:
ATR 42 series aeroplanes, as identified in the individual Airworthiness Directive

(AD) listed Tables 1 and 2.
Requirement:
1.
Determine the applicability of the ADs issued by the Direction Gnrale de

lAviation Civile of France (DGAC), listed in Table 1, and the ADs issued by the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), listed in Table 2.
2.
If it is determined that an DGAC or EASA AD listed in Table 1 or 2 is applicable

and has not been previously accomplished, perform the actions required by that
AD.
Table 1
DGAC AD
Issue Date
Title
F-1986-085-002 R1
28 May 1986
Oil cooling system
F-1986-078-001 R1
23 July 1986
Ipeco pilot and copilot seats - ATR Airplanes
F-1986-130-003 R1
26 March 1997
Flaps 45 Configuration
F-1987-022-004
4 January 1987
Automatic stop of the flight and cockpit voice recorders
F-1987-046-005 R1
10 June 1987
Attitude and heading system
F-1987-155-007
10 November 1987
Elevator trims
F-1987-156-008 R1
16 November 1988
Propeller brake control system
F-1987-173-009
9 December 1987
Protection for auto pilot roll actuator
F-1988-051-010 R2
21 February 1990
Fuel quantity indicators
F-1988-070-011
11 May 1988
Rudder control channel cables
F-1988-080-012
22 June 1988
Engine and propeller flexible control shafts
F-1988-092-013
17 August 1988
Honeywell-Sperry navigation equipment
Page 1 of 5


AD/ATR 42/1 (continued)
F-1988-135-014
19 October 1988
Main gear wheel bearing
F-1988-147-015
16 November 1988
Propeller brake control pushbutton
F-1988-186-016 R1
31 May 1989
Test system of the smoke detectors in cargo

compartment areas
F-1989-033-019 R1
31 May 1989
Pitch trim
F-1989-042-018 R1
5 April 1989
Oil pressure transmitter manifold
F-1989-067-020 R2
20 March 1991
Main L/G retraction jacks fitting bolts
F-1989-077-021 R2
19 July 1989
Aileron tab inboard hingepin
F-1989-093-022
28 June 1989
Automatic cut-off of the voice recorders
F-1989-197-025 R1
4 April 1990
Fire extinguishing system
F-1990-028-026
21 February 1990
Nose landing gear retraction system
F-1990-029-027
21 February 1990
Emergency lighting
F-1990-030-028 R1
23 January 1991
Propeller brake
F-1990-109-029
13 June 1990
Main frames
F-1990-155-030 R1
27 November 1991
Emergency oxygen system for cabin attendants
F-1990-163-031
3 October 1990
Structure modification resulting from fatigue tests

landing gear bay area
F-1990-193-032 R2
8 July 1992
Hydraulic system - Low pressure warning
F-1990-201-033 R2
23 April 1997
Flight controls
F-1991-005-036
9 January 1991
Nose landing gear
F-1991-068-039
20 march 1991
Flight controls
F-1991-081-040 R1
6 June 1991
Main landing gear
F-1991-157-041
31 July 1991
Nose landing gear
F-1991-214-042
2 October 1991
Flight controls
F-1991-216-043 R1
22 January 1992
Engine and propeller flexible controls
Page 2 of 5


F-1991-237-044
30 October 1991
Auto pilot
F-1992-043-045
19 February 1992
Commercial furnishing
F-1992-122-047
27 May 1992
ECE push-button
F-1992-133-048 R1
19 August 1992
Pitch control
F-1992-197-049
30 September 1992
Autopilot
F-1993-205-052
8 December 1993
Pitch trim controls
F-1994-003-053
5 January 1994
Flight control rods
F-1994-004-054
5 January 1994
Roll trim
F-1994-005-055
5 January 1994
Nose Landing Gear Nardi hinge pins
F-1994-162-056
6 July 1994
Karman fairing attachment clips
F-1995-051-058
15 March 1995
Main landing gear side brace pin
F-1995-103-059
24 May 1995
Protection of the electrical harness in front area
F-1995-127-062
21 June 1995
Corrosion on wing rear spar (ATA 57)
F-1996-109-063
5 June 1996
Engine nacelle drain system
F-1996-131-064
3 July 1996
Main landing Gear - Pins Magnaghi
F-1996-132-065
3 July 1996
Fuselage - Stringer 6 to frame 34 junction
F-1996-208-067 R1
21 April 1999
De-icing procedures and protection improvements

(ATA 30)
F-1996-230-066
23 October 1996
Standby horizon - Power supply
F-1996-256-068
6 November 1996
Stick shaker/pusher system
F-1996-289-069 R1
18 December 1996
Forward cargo compartment nets
F-1997-115-070 R1
11 February 1998
Fuselage - Main landing gear actuator fitting
F-1997-159-071
16 July 1997
Karman fairing panel fasteners
F-1997-328-072 R1
19 November 1997
Flight controls - Rudder
Page 3 of 5


F-1998-069-073
11 February 1998
Engine mount and upper engine fairing stiffener fouling
F-1998-070-074
11 February 1998
Rotron recirculation fan
F-1999-014-076 R2
10 December 2003
Icing conditions - Revise the Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM)
F-1999-165-077 R1
12 July 2000
Severe icing conditions - Implement aircraft design

enhancements (ATA 30)
F-2000-189-078
3 May 2000
Landing Gears - Install modified uplock boxes

(ATA 32)
F-2000-281-078 R1
19 September 2001
Fire protection - Fire handles (ATA 26)
F-2000-449-082 R2
19 September 2001
Take-off after use of type II or IV fluids - Appendix to

the Flight Manual (ATA 04)
F-2000-454-081
15 November 2000
Electrical system - Engine start selector (ATA 24, 80)
F-2001-214-084
30 May 2001
Propeller feathering -ATPCS test selector switch

(ATA 24, 61)
F-2001-387-085
5 September 2001
Flight controls - Normal pitch trim switches
F-2001-554-087 R1
2 October 2002
Wing to fuselage fairing panel (ATA 53)
F-2002-071-091
23 January 2002
Engines - High pressure oil pump - Pressure Regulating

Valve (PRV) (ATA 79)
F-2002-090-092
20 February 2002
Electrical rack 90VU - Wire bundle routing on 93, 94

and 95VU carbon shelves (ATA 92)
F-2002-431
21 August 2002
Flight controls - Pitch control interface
F-2002-539
30 October 2002
Forward attendant seat (ATA 25)
F-2003-106 R1
16 April 2003
Flight controls - Stand by pitch trim switch (ATA 92)
F-2003-376
1 October 2003
Main Landing Gear - Swinging lever (ATA 32)
F-2004-191
22 December 2004
Wings - Outer wing boxes - Upper skin and ribs
F-2005-160
12 October 2005
Fuel - Fuel quantity indicators
Page 4 of 5


Table 2
EASA AD
Issue Date
Title
2006-0216-E
14 July 2006
Main Landing Gear - Shock absorber - Cross locking

bolt of the attachment pin
2006-0283
14 September 2006
Electrical Power - 120 VU Electrical Harness Inspection
Note: EASA and DGAC ADs may be accessed via the internet at the following URLs:
http://ad.easa.europa.eu/
http://www.gsac.fr/php/P_ConsignesNav.php
Compliance:
For Requirements 1 and 2 - Within 30 days after the effective date of this Directive or
prior to the issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness, whichever occurs first.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 22 June 2007.
Background:
The DGAC and EASA ADs listed in Table 1 and 2 of this Directive require one time
actions for which the compliance date and/or period has passed. CASA has
determined that these ADs may be applicable to recently registered or imported
Australian aircraft. This Directive is issued to ensure all State of Design ADs are
complied with.
CASA appreciates that, due to date of aircraft manufacture or aircraft configuration
and modification status, not all the ADs listed in Table 1 and 2 will be applicable to
all ATR 42 series aeroplanes.
David Punshon
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
8 June 2007
Page 5 of 5
(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39.001(1)

On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes
Airworthiness Directive AD/ATR 42/2 Amdt 1.
AD/ATR 42/2
Amdt 1
Requirement:
Fuel Tank Safety - Electrical Wiring
23/2009
CANCELLED.
This AD is cancelled on 24 November 2009.
Background:
A State of Design airworthiness directive issued on or after 1st October 2009 is

defined as an airworthiness directive per CASR Part 39.001A.
AD/ATR 42/2 Amdt 1 was based on European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD
2007-0226. The EASA issued AD 2007-0226R1 on 10 November 2009 revising the
original Directive by extending the compliance until 28 August 2011. Therefore, this
Directive is cancelled.
William David
11 November 2009
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/3
Propeller Pitch Change System Components
8/2007
Applicability:
ATR 42-200, -300 and -320 series aircraft.
Requirement:
Carry out ultrasonic cleaning of the Propeller Control Unit servo ball screw on
Hamilton Sundstrand 14SF5 propellers in accordance with Hamilton Sundstrand
Component Maintenance Manual 61-21-07.
Note: DGAC AD 2002-070-090(B) R1 dated 15 May 2002 refers.
Compliance:
Before reaching 10,500 flight hours since new or since last critical inspection; or
Before further flight, in the case of contamination; or
Before further flight, in the case of anomalies found during production acceptance
tests.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 2 August 2007.
Background:
Three cases of propeller pitch lock during final approach have been experienced on
ATR aircraft. During two of these events the asymmetric power resulting from the
propeller pitch lock was not recognized by the crew during landing and the aircraft
veered off the runway after selection of reverse power while the Low Pitch
condition was not effective for both engines.
On one case the investigation led on the suspected components of the propeller pitch
control system showed significant anomalies of the pitch control unit ball screw. The
hang up and the loss of efficiency noted on the test bench are due to ball screw
contamination. These anomalies could contribute to a pitch lock condition when the
combine with another propeller component failure of the pitch control system.
The actions detailed in the AD are intended to clean the ball screw and avoid the
propeller lock situation which could lead to reduced controllability of the aircraft
during landing.
David Punshon
21 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/4
Passenger/Crew Door Lifting Device
8/2007
Applicability:
ATR 42-300 and -320 aircraft that incorporate Service Bulletin (SB) ATR
42-52-0019 (mod 1236) and have not incorporated ATR SB 42-52-0043 (mod 2440).
Requirement:
1.
Inspect and if required, repair the passenger/crew door lifting device

compensation rod and its fail safe cable in accordance with paragraph A of SB
ATR 42-52-0042 or later NAA approved revision.
2.
Carry out installation of the improved passenger/crew door lifting device

compensation rod and its fail safe cable as detailed in paragraph B of SB ATR
42-52-0042 or later NAA approved revision.
Note: DGAC AD 89-138-024(B)R1 dated 21 February 1990 refers.

Compliance:
1.
Initial inspection within 30 days of the effective date of this AD, unless
previously accomplished, thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 flight hours.
2.
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously
accomplished.

Background:
The requirements of this AD are intended to prevent simultaneous rupture of the

passenger/crew door lifting device and its fails safe cable.
David Punshon
21 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/5
Main Landing Gear Side Brace Assembly
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200, -300, and -320 aircraft, all serial numbers, with main landing
gear fitted with side brace assemblies part number D22710000 not incorporating
suffix -8 (ATR modification 8346 - MESSIER DOWTY Service Bulletin
631-32-176); and equipped with upper arm part number D56778-10.
Requirement:
Action in accordance with the requirements of DGAC AD F-2005-106.

Note: MESSIER DOWTY Service Bulletin 631-32-181 Revision 2, or later EASA
approved revision, refers.
Compliance:
As specified in the Requirement document, with a revised effective date of

2 August 2007.
Background:
A report was received of a MLG unlock warning indication on an ATR aircraft during
taxi operation. Inspection found that the upper MLG side brace assembly was
cracked. Investigation revealed that crack propagation occurred at a corrosion pit on
the surface under the part identification plate. This Directive requires visual and NDT
inspections.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/6
Vertical Stabiliser Fin Tip
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-500 aircraft, with modification No. 4440 incorporated, and on which
modification No. 5426 or Service Bulletin ATR42-55-0012 has not been
incorporated; except aircraft serial numbers 618 through 623.
Requirement:
Action in accordance with the requirements of EASA AD 2006-0303.

Note: ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-55-0011 original issue, or later EASA approved
revision, refers.
Compliance:

2 August 2007.
Background:
A report was received of rudder operation difficulties on an ATR 42-500 aircraft. An

investigation determined that the upper closing rib could be subject to fatigue cracks
induced by installation stress. This Directive changes the interval of the current
repetitive inspection requirement, and requires incorporation of a modification which
terminates the repetitive inspection requirement.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/7
Aileron Tab Bellcrank Assembly
8/2007
Applicability:
All Model ATR 42 aircraft, all serial numbers, except aircraft with ATR modification
04372 incorporated in production or with ATR Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-27-0081 or SB ATR42-27-0092 incorporated in service.
Requirement:

Note: ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-27-0098 original issue, or later EASA approved
revision, refers.
Compliance:
Unless already accomplished, before 30 August 2007.

Background:
Reports were received of in-service aircraft with aileron tab bellcrank assemblies that
do not conform with design drawings. This Directive requires inspection of the
aileron tab bellcrank retainer and, if necessary, restoration of the correct installation.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/8
Time Limits
8/2007
Applicability:
All Model ATR 42-200, -300, -320, -400, and -500 aircraft, all serial numbers.
Requirement:
Action in accordance with the requirements of DGAC AD 1995-104-060(B) R1.
Compliance:
As specified in the Requirement document.

Background:
The DGAC requires compliance with this Directive to maintain the airworthiness of
applicable aircraft.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/9
Outer Wings
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200 and -300 aircraft, without modification 2805 or modification
8039 incorporated.
Requirement:
Action in accordance with the requirements of DGAC AD 93-190-051(B).

Note: ATR Service Bulletins ATR42-57-0038 original issue, and ATR42-57-0040
original issue, or later DGAC/EASA approved revisions, refer.
Compliance:

Background:
During aircraft wing fatigue testing, damage was detected in the outer wing area.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/10
Main Landing Gear Side Brace Lower Arm
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200 and -300 series aircraft, equipped with a main landing gear side
brace lower arm with part number GA 62045, 62045-1, or 62045-2.
Requirement:

Note: ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-32-0036 Revision 3, or later DGAC/EASA
Compliance:

Background:
The DGAC requires certain actions to prevent main landing gear collapse due to
failure of the side brace lower arm.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/11
Structural Modification
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42 aircraft, serial numbers 3 through 152.
Requirement:
Compliance:

Background:
During aircraft fatigue testing, damage was detected in certain fuselage and wing
locations. This Directive requires modification actions to affected locations.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/12
Main Landing Gear Wheels
8/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-300 and -320 aircraft, all serial numbers, without ATR Service
Bulletin ATR42-32-0017 incorporated (Modification 1536 that introduces reinforced
wheels ref. 500 6856-3).
Requirement:
Compliance:

Background:
A report was received of the failure of the internal half rim radii of a main landing
gear wheel during the acceleration stage of take-off. This Directive requires visual
and NDT inspections of the affected wheels.
David Villiers
22 June 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/13
MLG Swinging Lever Spacer
9/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200, -300, -320, -400, and -500 series aircraft, without ATR
modification 5338 (Service Bulletin ATR42-32-0094) incorporated.
Requirement:

Note: ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-32-0094 original issue, or later DGAC/EASA
Compliance:

30 August 2007.
Background:
Reports were received of fatigue cracks on the main landing gear swinging lever
spacer. Propagation of cracks could result in failure of the spacer base and potentially
affect, during some operating phases, the symmetrical functioning of the braking
system. This asymmetrical braking could result in reduced aircraft controllability, in
the case of a strong crosswind during landing.
David Villiers
10 July 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/14
Structural Fatigue Tests - Inspection

Requirements
9/2007
Applicability:
All Model ATR 42-200, -300, and -320 aircraft.
Requirement:
Compliance:

Background:
As a result of damage discovered during fatigue testing, special inspections are

required at the threshold times specified in the Requirement document.
David Villiers
10 July 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/15
Wing Inner Skin Surface at Rear Spar Junction
9/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-300 and -320 aircraft, serial numbers 3 through 59.
Requirement:
Compliance:
Before the accumulation of 33,000 flights.

Background:
This Directive requires fastener hole cold-working in order to prevent the initiation
and development of fatigue damage.
David Villiers
10 July 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/16
Windshield Frame
9/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42 -200, -300, and -320 aircraft, without modification 1392 incorporated.
Requirement:
Action in accordance with the Requirements of DGAC AD 95-126-061(B).
Compliance:
Before the accumulation of 24,000 flights.

Background:
This Directive requires inspection and modification of the windshield frame in order
to prevent the initiation and development of fatigue damage.
David Villiers
10 July 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/17
Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Blankets
9/2007
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-400 and ATR 42-500 aircraft, all serial numbers, except aircraft with
modification 5117 or 5322, or Service Bulletin ATR42-25-0134 Revision 4,
incorporated.
Requirement:
Compliance:

30 August 2007.
Background:
The flammability characteristics of thermal/acoustic insulation material made from

MPET may have been a contributing factor in certain incidents initiated by electrical
short circuit behind a fuselage compartment side wall. Although ATR aircraft were
not affected by similar incidents, DGAC France issued AD F-2005-211 to require
improvement of the fire safety standard of insulation blankets installed on ATR
aircraft. This new EASA AD retains the requirements of the DGAC AD and requires
removal of insulation blankets over frame 24.
David Villiers
10 July 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/18
Pitot Probe Current Sensors
10/2007
Applicability:
All ATR 42 series aircraft models, all serial numbers, except aircraft modified per
ATR modification 05469 (Installation of new current sensors for pitot probes) during
production (ie MSN 631 and subsequent) or per ATR Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-30-0072 at any approved revision whilst in service.
Requirement:
1.
Verify the three pitot probes heating resistance in accordance with the
instructions of SB ATR42-30-0074 dated 14 May 2007 or later revision approved
by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
2.
If, during the Requirement 1 verification, any resistance exceeding 50 Ohms is

found, replace the pitot probe in accordance with the instructions of SB
ATR42-30-0074 or later revision approved by the EASA.
3.
Replace the three pitot probe current sensors in accordance with the instructions
of SB ATR42-30-0072 Revision 1 dated 1 June 2005 or later revision approved
by the EASA.
Replacement of the pitot probe current sensors is terminating action for the
Requirement 1 repetitive verification tests.
Note: EASA AD 2007-0179 refers.
Compliance:
For Requirement 1 - Within the next 550 hours time in service (TIS) after the
effective date of this Directive and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 550 hours TIS
until the pitot probe current sensors are replaced in accordance with Requirement 3.
For Requirement 2 - Before next flight after the Requirement 1 verification test.
For Requirement 3 - Within the next 5 000 hours TIS after the effective date of this
Directive.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 September 2007.
Background:
The EASA has received a report that a recent incident indicated that some failures of
the pitot probe heating resistance may not be detected by the low current detection
system on aircraft not equipped with modification 05469 (SB ATR42-30-0072).
Page 1 of 2


This Directive requires repetitive verification of the pitot probes resistance and
replacement of any defective probes, together with ultimate replacement of the three
low current sensors for Captain, First Officer and Standby pitot probes.
Charles Lenarcic
3 August 2007
Page 2 of 2

On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes
Airworthiness Directive AD/ATR 42/19 Amdt 2.
AD/ATR 42/19
Amdt 2
Requirement:
Fuel Tank Safety Fuel

Airworthiness Limitations
1/2010
CANCELLED.
This AD is cancelled on 12 January 2010.
Background:
A State of Design airworthiness directive issued on or after 1st October 2009 is

defined as an airworthiness directive per CASR Part 39.001A. The requirements of
this airworthiness directive were referred to in EASA AD 2006-0219R2 and have
been superseded by EASA AD 2009-0242 issued on 18 December 2009.
Mike Higgins
5 January 2010
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/20
Main Landing Gear - Side Brace Assembly
12/2007
DM
Applicability:
ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320, all serial numbers, unless MLG side brace
assemblies P/N D22710000 with suffix -9 are installed on both sides, as specified
in ATR Service Bulletin (SB) ATR 42-32-0092 (ATR modification No. 8463).
Requirement:
Carry out inspections and actions as required by EASA AD 2007-0263, dated

3 October 2007.
Note: The referenced EASA AD 2007-0263 supersedes EASA AD 2007-0112, issued
27 April 2007.
Compliance:
As per requirement document (EASA AD 2007-0263), with a revised effective date

of 25 October 2007.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 25 October 2007.
Background:
An ATR 42-300 experienced a collapse of the Right (Starboard) Main Landing Gear
when taxiing. The cause of the failure was subsequently found to be a crack in the
side brace assembly originating from a corrosion pit in a very highly stressed area of
the upper arm. The dimensions of the corrosion pit were lower than the minimum
defect size that can be detected during overhaul inspections.
This AD is issued to require re-inspection of MLG side brace assemblies previously
inspected in accordance with Rev 1 of Messier Dowty SB 631-32-191 and reduces the
inspection interval initially proposed in EASA AD 2007-0112 in order to maintain the
same level of confidence.
David Villiers
5 October 2007
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/21
Thermal Acoustic Insulation Blankets

on Frame 24
12/2007
DM
Applicability:
ATR 42-400 and 42-500 models, all serial numbers, except aircraft modified with
ATR modification No. 05117 or 05322 or 05791 or Service Bulletin (SB) ATR
42-25-0134.
Requirement:
Unless previously accomplished, remove the metallised PET insulation blankets

installed on the left and the right sides of the aircraft over frame 24 between stringers
5 and 14, as detailed in the accomplishment instructions of SB ATR 42-25-0155.
Note: EASA AD 2007-0106-E, effective 20 April 2007 refers.
Compliance:
Accomplish within 25 flight hours after the effective date.

Background:
On two ATR 42-500 aircraft, some burnt spots were found on insulation blankets
installed over frame 24. Investigations concluded that due to the proximity of the hot
bleed air duct, installation of thermal-acoustical insulation blankets having a
metallised PolyEthylene Terephtalate (PET) covering (Mylar), may represent a fire
risk. This AD requires the removal of metallised PET blankets covering frame 24.
David Villiers
5 October 2007
Page 1 of 1
On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, this AD is revoked by CASA ADCX 007/11.
AD/ATR 42/22
Requirement:
Vertical Stabilizer - Fin Tip Upper

Closure Rib
7/2011
CANCELLED.
This AD is cancelled on 15 April 2011.
Background:
This Airworthiness Directive specified SB ATR 42-55-0012 Revision 1 and was

based on DGAC AD F-2005-059. This DGAC AD has been superseded by EASA
AD 2006-0303 which also specifies SB ATR 42-55-0012 Revision 1.
EASA AD 2006-0303 is mandated in Australia by AD/ATR 42/6 so this
Airworthiness Directive is no longer required.
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/23
Applicability:
Rear Pressure Bulkhead Area - Electrical

Wire Chafing
6/2008
DM
ATR 42 model aeroplanes, all serial numbers, as follows

ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320 that have embodied ATR modification (Mod)
00639, except aircraft which have received ATR Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-92-0018 whilst in service.
ATR 42-400 and 42-500, except aeroplanes that have embodied ATR Mod 05780
during production or ATR SB ATR42-92-0018 whilst in service.
Note 1: Mod 00639 has been embodied on production aircraft Manufacturer Serial
Number (MSN) 109 and MSN 113 and was factory-incorporated from MSN 116.
Note 2: Mod 05780 is now factory-incorporated on ATR 42-500 from MSN 667.
Requirement:
1.
Perform a one-time inspection of the electrical routing in the rear baggage zone
in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of SB ATR42-92-0015,
dated 11 February 2008.
2.
If ANY damage is found during the Requirement 1 inspection (chafing and/or

contact between bundles of cables and the airframe structure):
3.
a.
Contact and report the finding(s) to ATR (by means of the accomplishment
form enclosed in SB ATR42-92-0015) to obtain an approved repair solution
and perform the repair in accordance with the ATR instructions, and
b.
Modify the electrical routing and wire bundle protection in accordance with
the accomplishment instruction of SB ATR42-92-0018, dated
11 February 2008.
If damage is not found during the Requirement 1 inspection:

a.
Report to ATR the result of inspection by using the form enclosed in SB

ATR42-92-0015, and
b.
Modify the electrical routing and wire bundle protection in accordance with
the accomplishment instruction of SB ATR42-92-0018.
Page 1 of 2


The use of later revisions of SB ATR42-92-0015 and SB ATR42-92-0018 approved
by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is acceptable for compliance with
the requirements of this Directive.
Note 3: EASA AD 2008-0062 refers.
Compliance:
For Requirement 1 - Within the next 550 hours time in service (TIS) after the
effective date of this Directive.
For Requirement 2.a. - Before further flight after the Requirement 1 inspection.
For Requirement 2.b. - Before further flight after any repairs accomplished in
accordance with Requirement 2.a.
For Requirement 3.a. - Within 15 days after accomplishment of the Requirement 1
inspection.
For Requirement 3.b. - Within 5 000 hours TIS after the effective date of this
Directive.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 18 April 2008.
Background:
EASA has advised that an ATR operator reported some spurious Pitch disconnect
warning and AIL and R ELEV Anti-Ice Horn Fault caution annunciations which
precluded the use of the autopilot.
During the investigation, chafed wiring was found in the rear baggage zone, close to
the forward side of the aft pressure bulkhead, due to contact with a structural securing
screw. The concerned wiring harness includes rudder trim, pitch trim and stick
pusher control wires. Damages on those wires might lead to the loss of fail safe
criteria for those critical functions.
To address the unsafe condition, this Directive mandates a one-time inspection and a
routing modification of the electrical wires in the bulkhead area.
James Coyne
15 April 2008
Page 2 of 2

AD/ATR 42/24
Flaps - 45 Degree Configuration
9/2008
DM
Applicability:
ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320 aircraft.
Requirement:
1.
For all Aircraft - Revise the Limitations and Performance Sections of the EASAapproved ATR42-200/300/320 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) to include the ATR
42 AFM Temporary Revision (TR) No.51 and delete pages concerning Mod
01314.
By means of this TR No. 51, the 45 flaps configuration can only be used for
emergency operations by decision of the captain provided that icing conditions
have not been encountered during the flight and the aircraft is clear of ice.
Note 1: When changes introduced by TR No.51 have been incorporated into the
Normal EASA-approved revisions of the AFM, the Normal revisions may be inserted
into the AFM, provided that the information contained in the Normal revisions is
identical to that specified in TR No.51
Note 2: The new Appendix 20 Landing with Flaps 45 provided by AFM TR No.51
does NOT constitute any airworthiness approval to conduct Normal Operations with
Flaps at 45 but is only ATR guidance and recommended information to be used in
case any individual operational exemption is granted by a National Aviation
Authority (NAA) for using of the 45 Flaps setting on specific airfields where no icing
conditions may be encountered and the aircraft is clear of ice.
2.
For all ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320 aircraft Pre Mod. 01192 or which have
NOT embodied SB ATR42-27-0008 at any revision, in service - Unless
previously accomplished, restrict the maximum permissible flaps extension in
normal operations to 30 and install new speed limits placards as instructed in the
accomplishment instructions of SB ATR42-27-0008 Revision 6 or later EASA
approved revision and after embodiment, send the accomplishment report back to
ATR.
Page 1 of 3


3.
For ATR 42 with manufacturing serial numbers (MSN) 027,102, 106 and 214,
and modified per SB ATR42-27-0080 - Unless accomplished previously, undo
changes introduced by SB ATR42-27-0080 and restrict the maximum permissible
flaps extension in normal operations to 30 and install new speed limits placards
as instructed in the accomplishment instructions of SB ATR42-27-0099 original
issue or later EASA approved revision and after embodiment, send the
accomplishment report back to ATR.
4.
For ATR 42 MSN 097, if not previously modified per SB ATR42-27-0008 at any
revision - Modify the aircraft per the instructions of SB ATR42-27-0099 original
issue or later EASA approved revision.
5.
For ATR 42 MSN 403 - Modify the aircraft per the instructions of SB ATR4227-0099 original issue or later EASA approved revision.
6.
For all other ATR 42 not addressed by Requirements 2, 3, 4 & 5 of this AD Check that the red colour mechanical stop is installed on flaps control and that
the following statement is written on the speed limits placard concerning the VFE
limitations:
EMER: (45). 130 kt.
If any discrepancy is found, contact ATR to obtain the procedure in order to
restore the aircraft to the approved configuration and implement the procedure
accordingly.
7.
Do not install ATR Mod. 01314 or implement SB ATR42-27-0080 on any

aeroplane.
Note 3: EASA AD 2008-0124 dated 4 July 2008 refers. The EASA AD supersedes
Direction Gnrale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) France AD F-1986-130-003.
Note 4: DGAC AD F-1986-130-003 is listed in Table 1 of AD/ATR 42/1, State of
Design Airworthiness Directives. AD/ATR 42/1 requires the operator to determine
the applicability of each of the ADs listed in Table 1. As AD F-1986-130-003 has
been superseded by EASA AD 2008-0124, F-1986-130-003 should be considered as
no longer being applicable.
Compliance:
For Requirement 1 - Within 7 days after the effective date of this AD.
For Requirements 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 - Within 6 months after the effective date of this
AD.
For Requirement 7 - After the effective date of this AD.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 16 July 2008.
Page 2 of 3


Background:
DGAC AD F-1986-130-003 was issued following an incident during a training flight

when a temporary loss of the aircraft pitch control occurred due to a suspected
tailplane stall that would have been caused by the conjunction of ice accretion on tail
surface, flaps extension at 45 and airplane by the approach speed.
Revision 1 of AD F-1986-130-003, in April 1997, prohibited the use of flaps at the
45 configuration, except for emergency situations, and mandated the installation of a
mechanical stop along with new markings through ATR modification (Mod) 01192
(ATR Service Bulletin (SB) ATR 42-27-0008). However the DGAC AD let the
possibility for some operators to request an operational exemption, based on the
aircraft operating network, granted by their National Aviation Authority. For these
specific cases, the mechanical stop could be removed and the markings modified, in
accordance with Mod 01314 (SB ATR42-27-0080).
These days, with second-hand aircraft movements worldwide, it is likely that some
aircraft which were previously granted with an operational exemption can be
currently operated without the flaps 45 limitation in geographic locations where the
use of the 45 configuration may represent an unsafe condition.
This AD mandates AFM TR No.51 of the AFM with modification of the aircraft so as
to restrict the maximum flaps extension to 30. These actions are intended to prevent
an uncontrollable nose pitch-down at low altitude resulting from a tail plane stall
caused by ice accretions on tail surfaces in conjunction with full flaps down at 45
and the aircraft at approach speeds.
James Coyne
10 July 2008
Page 3 of 3

AD/ATR 42/25
Wire Bundles in the Rear Baggage Zone
3/2009
Applicability:
ATR 42-500 aircraft, with Manufacturer Serial Numbers (MSN) 667, 669 and 671.
Requirement:
1.
Verify the installation of the appropriate protection sleeves and the correct
routing and clamping of the wire bundles in accordance with the accomplishment
instructions of ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-92-0020 dated 17 October 2008 or
later revision approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
2.
If any discrepancy is found during the Requirement verification, accomplish all

corrective actions as instructed in the ATR Service Bulletin ATR42-92-0020 or
later revision approved by the EASA.
Note: EASA AD 2008-0218 refers.

Compliance:
For Requirement 1 - Within 550 hours time in service after the effective date of this
Directive.
For Requirement 2 - Before further flight after the Requirement 1 verification.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 12 March 2009.
Background:
Identification of an unsafe condition related to the loss of the fail-safe design criteria
for the rudder trim, pitch trim and stick pusher control functions after a reported event
led in April 2008 to the release of AD/ATR 42/23 (EASA AD 2008-0062) to mandate
ATR modification 05780.
It has appeared that some aircraft manufactured and delivered before the 1 April 2008
may have received on the production-line a partial or incorrect implementation of the
required ATR modification 05780. This Directive requires an inspection of the
identified aircraft to verify and, finalize when necessary, the complete and correct
implementation of the ATR modification 05780.
James Coyne
27 January 2009
Page 1 of 1
On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, this AD is revoked by CASA ADCX 006/13.
AD/ATR 42/26
Amdt 1
Requirement:
Windows - Cockpit Forward Side Windows
9/2013
CANCELLED.
This AD is cancelled on 26 April 2013.
Background:
A State of Design airworthiness directive issued on or after 1 October 2009 is defined

as an airworthiness directive per CASR Part 39.001A. The requirements of this
airworthiness directive have been superseded by EASA AD 2013-0087 issued on
9 April 2013.
Page 1 of 1

AD/ATR 42/27
Multi Purpose Computer with Aircraft

Performance Monitoring Function
11/2009
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320 aeroplanes that are not already equipped with
Multi Purpose Computer / Aircraft Performance Monitoring (MPC/APM) per ATR
Mod 08420 (Service Bulletin (SB) ATR42-31-0071), and Model ATR42-400 and
42-500 aeroplanes that are not already equipped with MPC/APM per ATR Mod
05567 or by retrofit through SB ATR42-31-0068.
Requirement:
Unless previously accomplished, install a Multi Purpose Computer (MPC) with

Aircraft Performance Monitoring (APM) in accordance with the accomplishment
instructions of:
SB ATR42-31-0071 Revision 07 dated 7 February 2008 (Mod 008420) for

ATR42-200/300/320 aeroplanes.
SB ATR42-31-0068 Revision 07 dated 15 January 2009 (Mod 05567) for

ATR42-400/500 aeroplanes.
Installation of a MPC/APM accomplished before the effective date of this Directive in

accordance with earlier revisions of the aforementioned SBs, satisfy the requirements
of this Directive.
Later revisions of the aforementioned SBs approved by the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) are acceptable for compliance with this Directive.
Note 1: Mod 05567 was factory-incorporated onto ATR 42-500 aeroplanes from
Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 641.
Note 2: At the effective date of this Directive, Appendix 15 to the Aircraft Flight
Manual (AFM) which describes the specific procedures associated with the APM is
included in the following Normal Revision of the applicable AFM:
-
AFM 42-200/300/320 Normal Revision 27 dated April 2008.
AFM 42-400/500 Normal Revision 13 dated October 2008.
Note 3: EASA AD 2009-0170 refers.
Page 1 of 3


Compliance:
Not later than the second C check or within 72 months, whichever occurs first after
the effective date of this Directive.
Background:
This Directive is intended to minimize hazards on ATR42 aeroplanes associated with

the inadvertent encounter of severe icing conditions (which are beyond current
certification envelope requisites for Part 25 aeroplanes) by providing the flight crew
with measurable and objective evidence and timely alert when such severe ice
conditions are encountered.
The accumulated experience on the worldwide fleet of commuter aeroplanes together
with recently reported ATR42/72 in-flight incidents, show that a long exposure to
severe icing conditions, outside the certification envelope, can result in unsafe
conditions. This could lead to rapid performance degradation resulting in sudden
stall of the lifting/controlling aerodynamic surfaces and subsequent loss of control of
the aeroplane.
Prolonged exposures to these severe icing conditions are due to the lack of crew
awareness of these extreme environmental conditions leading to their late detection
and/or untimely or incorrect application of the existing AFM procedures, which
require the flight crew to actively monitor the encountered icing conditions and to
leave them as soon as they are recognised as severe.
Current ATR42 AFM emergency procedures for the encounter of severe icing
conditions remain valid and must be applied by the flight crew. However, their
application is based on the detection of such severe icing conditions by means of
flight crew subjective interpretation of:
an unexpected decrease of the aeroplane speed and/or rate of climb and/or;
a set of very different visual cues like ice covering unheated portion of either
forward side windows, possibly associated with water splashing and streaming
on the windshield and/or;
several secondary indications based on visual observation of ice accretion on

different parts of the airframe.
All these together require the flight crew to perform a final qualitative judgement
based upon its experience to fly icing conditions, and which could be different
depending on the specific circumstances of each case where other concurrent
environmental factors like poor light conditions, night operations, etc., can impair the
decision-making process.
Page 2 of 3


In addition, even if the severe icing conditions are quickly identified by the crew and
the escape manoeuvre promptly initiated, it may still take a few minutes for the
aircraft to exit these conditions.
In order to improve flight crew situation awareness in icing conditions, ATR
developed a new function called Aircraft Performance Monitoring (APM) that is
available on ATR aeroplanes with Multi Purpose Computer (MPC) installed.
The APM processes a collection of different parameters (among them the aeroplane
take-off weight as selected by the crew on a specific rotary selector), and in particular
computes and compares the actual drag on the current flying path with the
theoretical/expected value. From the comparison, a measurable and objective
determination of the performance degradation possibly due to abnormal ice accretion
can be calculated. When the performance degradation passes given thresholds, the
APM annunciates warning signals by triggering up to two different levels of alerts
while on climb/descent and three levels of alerts on cruise to the flight crew to make
them aware of potential severe icing conditions degrading the aircraft performance.
It is recognised that, although the ice protection system of the aeroplane is compliant
with the current certification envelope for flight into known-icing conditions, the
possible unsafe condition originating from a prolonged exposure to severe icing
environment will be annunciated by the alert(s) provided by the APM, which has
proved to be reliable during its in-service experience.
Because the APM warning will only indicate the significant aerodynamic penalties,
the current AFM Emergency Procedures for severe icing remain totally valid and
applicable. No relief to the pilot procedures concerning the current visual cues to
detect severe icing conditions can result from this Directive because APM function
provides flight crews with objective indications which complement and enhance the
situation awareness.
James Coyne
2 September 2009
Page 3 of 3
EASA AD No : 2007-0226R1
EASA
AD No.: 2007- 0226R1
Date: 10 November 2009

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation
(EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of the
European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that
Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may
operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that Airworthiness
Directive unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the
State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holders Name :

ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional
Type/Model designation(s) :
ATR 42 series and ATR 72 series
aeroplanes
TCDS Number :
EASA A.084
Foreign AD :
Not applicable
Revision:
This directive revises AD 2007-0226 dated 24 August 2007.
ATA 28
Fuel - Fuel Tank System Wiring & Sensors Modification/Replacement - Fuel Tank Safety
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly AEROSPATIALEAERITALIA, AEROSPATIALE-ALENIA, AEROSPATIALE ATR-ALENIA,

EADS ATR-ALENIA)
Applicability:
All ATR 42 series aircraft models, all serial numbers, except aircraft that
have received ATR modification 05355 in production or ATR Service Bulletin
(SB) ATR42-28-0039 Revision 3 or any later approved revision in service
and
All ATR 72 series aircraft models, all serial numbers, except aircraft that
have received ATR modification 05356 in production or ATR SB ATR72-281019 Revision 5 or any later approved revision in service.
Reason:
Further to the accident of Boeing 747-131 (flight TWA 800), the FAA has
published a set of new rules related to the fuel tank safety, including the
Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88).
The JAA has issued an Interim Policy JAA INT/POL 25/12, to recommend
the application of a similar requirement to the National Aviation Authorities
(NAA).
This recommendation was followed by French DGAC, which rendered the
compliance to JAA INT/POL 25/12 mandatory for all ATR Aircraft.
Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates are required to conduct a
design review of their fuel tank systems against explosion risk. It also
requires the development and implementation of maintenance and
EASA Form 110
Page 1/3
EASA AD No : 2007-0226R1
inspection instructions to maintain the safety of the fuel tank system.

To answer JAA INT/POL 25/12, and in accordance with SFAR 88
requirements and guideline, ATR carried out a safety review on the fuel tank
systems and zones adjacent to the fuel tanks on all ATR models using
relevant safety assessment methods of JAR 25.1309.
As a result of this safety review, ATR developed for ATR 42 the modification
05355 (SB ATR42-28-0039), and for ATR 72 the modification 05356 (SB
ATR72-28-1019). Those modifications consist in the installation of fuses
adapters on wiring entering the fuel tanks and current limitation devices. For
ATR 72 aircraft, the modification also requires replacement of the high level
sensors with new sensors having shorter harness.
Embodiment of these modifications or Service bulletins provides full
compliance with JAR 25.1309 and eliminates the unsafe conditions in
accordance with SFAR 88 and AC 25-981-1B guidelines.
EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2006-0186 was issued to mandate
compliance with SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 1 and SB ATR72-28-1019
Revision 1. Missing components or discrepancies depending on aircraft
variants were evidenced during its application. Consequently, both SBs were
revised to correct these situations.
The initial issue of the present AD superseded AD 2006-0186, and required
application of SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 3 and ATR72-28-1019 Revision
5 as well as some additional works for aircraft to which a previous revision of
those SBs has been applied.
For logistical considerations and after evaluation of fleet exposure, the
revision 1 of this AD is published to extend the compliance date from 31
December 2009 to 28 August 2011.
Effective Date:
AD 2007- 0226 Revision 1: 24 November 2009

AD 2007- 0226 Initial issue: 07 September 2007
Required
Action(s) and
Compliance
Time(s):
Required before 28 August 2011, unless accomplished previously.

1. For all ATR aircraft NOT ALREADY MODIFIED per any previous
revisions of SB ATR42-28-0039 or ATR72-28-1019. Modify the fuel
system, in accordance with instructions of SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 3
for ATR 42 series aircraft or SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 5 for ATR 72
series aircraft.
2. For ATR 42 aircraft ALREADY MODIFIED per a previous revision of
SB ATR42-28-0039.
(a) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 1.
- Install all of the components delivered in the kit S280039A04.
- Perform additional works as detailed in the Transmittal Sheet of
SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 3.
(b) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR42-28-0039 Revision 2.
3. For ATR 72 aircraft ALREADY MODIFIED per a previous revision of
SB ATR72-28-1019.
(a) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 1:
- Install all of the components delivered in the kit S281019A03
and in the kit S281019A04.
-
EASA Form 110
Verify the backshell for correct installation as detailed in the

Page 2/3
EASA AD No : 2007-0226R1
Transmittal Sheet of SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 5
(b) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 2:

- Install all of the components delivered in the kit S281019A04.
-

Transmittal Sheet of SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 5.
(c) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR72-28-1019 Revision 3:

-

(d) On aircraft in compliance with SB ATR72-28-1019 at Revision 4:

- Verify the backshell for correct installation as detailed in the
Ref. Publications:
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional Service Bulletins ATR42-28-0039

Revision 3 and ATR72-28-1019 Revision 5.
The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for
compliance with the requirements of this AD.
Remarks :
1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve

Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. This initial issue of this AD was posted on 21 June 2007 as PAD 07-102 for
consultation until 19 July 2007. No comments were received during the
consultation period.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness
Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification
Directorate, EASA. E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in
this AD, please contact:
Continued Airworthiness Service
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18
E-mail: continued.airworthiness@atr.fr
EASA Form 110
Page 3/3
EASA AD No : 2009-0242
EASA
AD No.: 2009-0242
Date: 18 December 2009

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of
the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that
Regulation.
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate
an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency
[EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].
ATR 42 and ATR72 series aeroplanes
TCDS Number :
EASA A.084
Foreign AD :
Not applicable
Supersedure:
This AD supersedes EASA AD 2006-0219R2 dated 05 August 2008.
ATA 05
Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Certification Maintenance

Requirements and Critical Design Configuration Control
Limitations [Fuel Tank Safety]
Manufacturer(s):
ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly AEROSPATIALE

AERITALIA, AEROSPATIALE ALENIA, AEROSPATIALE ATR ALENIA,
EADS ATR ALENIA)
Applicability:
ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101,

ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
Reason:
Following a policy statement about demonstration of compliance with the

certification requirements for prevention of ignition sources inside the fuel
tanks of transport category airplanes ATR conducted a safety review of the
aircraft fuel tank system against safety requirements of CS 25.901(c) and
25.1309.The assessment showed that it was necessary to introduce specific
fuel system related Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) and Critical Design
Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL) items in order to preserve the fuel
tank system ignition source prevention features from any configuration
alterations that could occur during maintenance actions, repairs or
modifications. Failure to preserve those critical ignition source prevention
features could result in a fuel tank explosion.
The Time-Limits Document - that is appended to the ATR Maintenance
Review Board Report (MRBR) - is an EASA-approved document that
synthesizes all MSIs, as are the systems Certification Maintenance
Requirements (CMRs) and Structural Significant Items (SSIs).
CMRs and SSIs are requisites of the design approval. Failure to comply with
the CMRs and SSIs requirements nullifies the design approval because any
EASA Form 110
Page 1/3
EASA AD No : 2009-0242
non-compliance could result in a catastrophic failure.

Time-Limits documents at Revision 7 for ATR42-200/-300/-320, Revision 6 for
ATR42-400/-500 and Revision 8 for ATR72 were issued to introduce the
Functional test of fuse adapters (Task 28.10.00-2) - whose installation has
been mandated by AD 2007-0226 - to extend to 12.5 years (150 Months) the
interval for the detailed visual inspection of the fuel tanks and associated parts
and components thereof (Task 28.10.00-1) and to add the CDCCL section
related to the fuel tank safety.
Consequently, to ensure the management and control of the Airworthiness
Limitations, this AD retains the requirements of AD 2006-0219R2, which is
superseded, and clarifies the required compliance schedules, without
introducing additional technical requirements.
Effective Date:
01 January 2010
Required as indicated, unless already accomplished:
Fuel CMRs and Detailed Visual Inspections (DVIs) of the Fuel Tanks
(1) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, amend the operator's
approved aircraft maintenance programme to incorporate the tasks as
introduced per the current revision of the applicable ATR 42 and ATR 72
series Time-Limits document identified in the section Ref. Publications of
this AD.
(2) Accomplish the CMR Task reference 28.10.00-1 (fuel tanks DVI) at the
time indicated in Table 1 of this AD, as applicable.
Table 1
Aeroplane Accumulated Time*
on 27 July 2006 (the effective
date of EASA AD 2006-0219)
Compliance Time
144 months or more
within 20 000 flight hours or 72

months, whichever occurs first
after 27 July 2006
Less than 144 months
Prior to accumulating 150

months since initial C-of-A
issuance.
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
* Calculated from the issue date of the initial standard or export Certificate of
Airworthiness (initial C-of-A)].
(3) When any discrepancies are detected during the inspection as required
by paragraph (2) of this AD, before further flight, contact ATR-GIE to
obtain the necessary approved instructions for corrective action and
accomplish those instructions accordingly.
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)
(4) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, amend any of the
ATR42 and ATR72 series aeroplanes related procedures or
documentations to highlight the existence of CDCCL items as introduced
per section 4 of the applicable revision of the Time-Limits document
identified in the section Ref. Publications of this AD to emphasize the
requirement to maintain the design features of those CDCCL items.
Ref. Publications:
EASA Form 110
Time-Limits document dated 16 August 2007, Revision 7 for ATR42-200/300/-320, Revision 6 for ATR42-400/-500 and Revision 8 for ATR72.
These documents are part of the appendix A of the Maintenance Review
Board Report.
Page 2/3
EASA AD No : 2009-0242

1.
If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve

2.
The required actions and the risk allowance have granted the issuance of
a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public
consultation process after publication.
3.
Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness

Directorate, EASA. E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu
4.
For any questions concerning the technical content of the requirements in

Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18
Remarks :
EASA Form 110
Page 3/3
EASA AD No.: 2010-0061
EASA
AD No.: 2010-0061
Date: 31 March 2010

(EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of the European
third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an
aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC
2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holders Name:
Type/Model designation(s):
ATR 42 and ATR72 aeroplanes
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure :
This AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0276R1 dated 05 February 2010.
ATA 26
Fire Protection Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification /

Replacement
Manufacturer(s):
ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly AEROSPATIALE

AERITALIA, AEROSPATIALE ALENIA, AEROSPATIALE ATR ALENIA,
EADS ATR ALENIA)
Applicability:
ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101,

ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72-212A
aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with LHotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire
extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in
LHotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26-001 Revision 2 dated 04 February
2010.
The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA that
significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be outside the required
specification, have been supplied to the aviation industry for use in fire
extinguishing equipment. Halon 1211 (BCF) is used in lavatory waste bin fire
extinguishers and portable fire extinguishers, usually fitted or stowed in aircraft
passenger cabins and flight decks.
Reason:
EASA published Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2009-39 on 23 October 2009

to make the aviation community aware of this safety concern.
The results of the ongoing investigation have now established that LyonTech
Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied further consignments of
Halon 1211 (BCF) to LHotellier that do not meet the required specification. This
Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863521-01 portable
fire extinguishers that are now likely to be installed in or carried on board ATR
aeroplanes.
EASA Form 110
Page 1/3
EASA AD No.: 2010-0061
The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide
reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aeroplane and its
occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to the release of toxic
fumes, possibly causing injury to aeroplane occupants.
For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD 2009-0276 to require the
identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguishers
and replacement with serviceable units.
Since that AD was issued, LHotellier discovered that when revising the SB to
revision 1, a group of serial numbers was inadvertently deleted.
For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD
2009-0276R1, which is superseded, and expands the Applicability by
referencing the corrected LHotellier SB 863521-26-001 Revision 2.
Effective Date:
14 April 2010
Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:
Re-statement of AD 2009-0276R1 requirements, applicable to aeroplanes with
LHotellier fire extinguishers installed, listed by s/n in LHotellier SB 863521-26001 Revision 1 dated 28 January 2010:
(1) Within 4 months after 06 January 2010 [the effective date of EASA AD
2009-0276], accomplish the following:
(1.1) Identify the s/n of the P/N 863521-01 fire extinguisher(s) installed or
carried on board the aeroplane, and
(1.2) If any P/N 863521-01 fire extinguisher identified by s/n as required by
paragraph (1.1) of this AD is listed in LHotellier SB 863521-26-001,
remove it from the aeroplane and replace it with a serviceable unit.
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
New requirement of this AD, applicable to aeroplanes with LHotellier fire

extinguishers installed, s/n QL 71732 through QL 71770 inclusive:
(2) Within 4 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following:
(2.1) Identify the s/n of the P/N 863521-01 fire extinguisher(s) installed or
carried on board the aeroplane, and
(2.2) If any P/N 863521-01 fire extinguisher identified by a s/n between
QL 71732 and QL 71770 inclusive, as required by paragraph (2.1) of
this AD, remove it from the aeroplane and replace it with a
serviceable unit.
Applicable to all aeroplanes:
(3) From the effective date of this AD, do not install any fire extinguisher as
identified in LHotellier SB 863521-26-001 Revision 2 on any aeroplane,
unless it has been overhauled with compliant Halon 1211 (BCF) and reidentified, in accordance with the instructions of LHotellier SB 863521-26001.
LHotellier SB 863521-26-001 revision 2 dated 04 February 2010.
Ref. Publications:
Remarks:
EASA Form 110
The use of later approved revisions of this document is acceptable for

1.
If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative

Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2.
The required actions and the risk allowance have granted the issuance of a
Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation
process after publication.
3.
Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness

Page 2/3
EASA AD No.: 2010-0061
Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.

4.
For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in

Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18
E-mail: continued.airworthiness@atr.fr.
For information on the fire extinguishers, contact:
LHOTELLIER, 4 rue Henri Poincar, 92167 ANTONY Cedex, France
Telephone +33(0) 1 46 66 08 08, Fax +33(0) 1 46 66 23 24
E-mail alain.dorneau@hs.utc.com.
To obtain a copy of the referenced SB 863521-26-001, please contact
LHotellier at Sylvie.laruffa@hs.utc.com.
EASA Form 110
Page 3/3
EASA AD No : 2010-0138
EASA
AD No.: 2010-0138
Date: 01 July 2010

Regulation.
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional
ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes
TCDS Number :
EASA.A.084
Foreign AD :
Not applicable
Supersedure :
None
ATA 55
Stabilizers Elevator Inboard Hinge Fitting Lower Stop Angles

Inspection / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly AEROSPATIALE

AERITALIA, AEROSPATIALE ALENIA, AEROSPATIALE ATR- ALENIA,
EADS ATR ALENIA)
Applicability:
Models ATR 42-200, 42-300, 42-320, 42-400 and 42-500 aeroplanes, all
Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) up to MSN 643 inclusive, and
Models ATR 72-101, 72-102, 72-201, 72-202, 72-211, 72-212 and 72-212A
aeroplanes, all MSN up to MSN 728 inclusive.
One ATR operator has experienced in-flight elevator travel limitations with
unusual effort being necessary on pitch axis to control the aeroplane, while
the pitch mistrim message appeared on the ADU display. The elevators
seemed to be jammed.
Reason:
During the post-flight Inspection, it was discovered that the LH elevator lower
stop assembly was broken at the level of the angles, which may have
prevented the elevator to respond normally to the flight control input.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced control of
the aeroplane.
For the reasons described above, and as a precautionary measure, this AD
requires a one-time inspection of the elevator hinge fittings and the reporting
of all findings. Depending on the results, further action may be considered.
Effective Date:
EASA Form 110
15 July 2010
Page 1/2
EASA AD No : 2010-0138

(1) Within the next 6 months after the effective date of this AD, perform a
general visual inspection of the inboard hinge fitting area and a detailed
visual inspection (DVI) of lower stop angles of the inboard hinge fittings on
both LH and RH elevators in accordance with the instructions of ATR
Service Bulletin (SB) ATR42-55-0014 or ATR72-55-1006, as applicable to
aeroplane model.
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
(2) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any
damaged angles are found, before next flight, replace the damaged angles
with serviceable parts and accomplish a DVI of adjacent areas to detect
any damage, in accordance with the instructions of SB ATR42-55-0014 or
ATR72-55-1006, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(3) If, during the DVI as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, any damage is
detected in adjacent areas, before next flight, contact ATR to obtain
approved repair instructions and accomplish those instructions
accordingly.
(4) Within 20 days after accomplishment of the inspections as required by
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this AD, fill the accomplishment report on the SB
ATR42-55-0014 or ATR72-55-1006, as applicable to aeroplane model, and
submit it to ATR. In addition, return any damaged lower stop angles to
ATR.
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-55-0014, and

ATR SB ATR72-55-1006, both at original issue, dated 11 May 2010.
2. This AD was posted on 28 May 2010 as PAD 10-053 for consultation until
25 June 2010. The Comment Response Document can be found at
http://ad.easa.europa.eu/.
Remarks :
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness

Directorate, EASA; E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu
ATR GIE Avions de Transport rgional
Tel.: + 33 (0) 5 62 21 62 21 - Fax:+ 33 (0) 5 62 21 67 8
EASA Form 110
Page 2/2

AD/ATR 42/28
Barrel - Swinging Lever Hinge
10/2011
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-200, 42-300 and 42-320 aeroplanes on which Service Bulletin
MESSIER-DOWTY 631-32-145 has not been incorporated.
Requirement:
Incorporate Service Bulletin MESSIER-DOWTY 631-32-145.

Note: DGAC AD 1996-294(B) R4 refers.
Compliance:
If a certificate of airworthiness has not been issued - prior to issue of a certificate of

airworthiness.
If a certificate of airworthiness has been issued - prior to first flight after
20 June 2011.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 20 May 2011.
Background:
DGAC AD 1996-294(B) R4 specifies periodic inspections until Service Bulletin

MESSIER-DOWTY 631-32-145 is incorporated.
Charles Lenarcic
9 May 2011
Page 1 of 1
EASA AD No :2012-0064
EASA
AD No.: 2012-0064
Date: 20 April 2012

aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC
ATR 42-500 and ATR 72-212A aeroplanes
TCDS Number:
EASA.A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
This AD supersedes EASA Emergency AD 2010-0063-E dated 01 April 2010.
ATA 27
Flight Controls Rudder Tab, Rudder Pedal and Elevator Control

Rods Inspection / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly AEROSPATIALE

AERITALIA, AEROSPATIALE ALENIA, AEROSPATIALE ATR- ALENIA,
EADS ATR ALENIA)
Applicability:
ATR 42-500 aeroplanes, from Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 671 to 815
inclusive, except MSN 811.
ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, from MSN 769 to MSN 914 inclusive, except MSN
826, 905, 908 and 911.
Note: Not all aeroplanes to which this AD applies are affected by all the required
actions; see paragraph (1) of the Required Actions section of this AD which
refers to ATR Service Bulletins for detailed applicability and exceptions.
Reason:
Prompted by the findings that led to publication of EASA AD 2010-0063-E,

additional quality investigation showed that the non-conformity of certain
control rods, which was due to incorrect polishing during the rod manufacturing
process, could also affect other flight control rods.
These other potentially non-conforming control rods are installed on elevator
controls, rudder pedal assemblies and rudder tab controls of certain ATR
aeroplanes.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of an
affected control rod which, under certain circumstances, could result in
reduced control of the aeroplane.
As a result of further investigations, other batches have been incriminated, in
addition to the ones identified by EASA AD 2010-0063-E, and new safety
EASA Form 110
Page 1/6
EASA AD No :2012-0064
analyses also indicate the need for replacement of the rods (within an adapted
compliance time), which had passed the check required by EASA AD 20100063-E. Consequently, EASA AD 2010-0063-E is superseded by this new AD.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of the
affected control systems rods and, depending on findings, replacement of the
affected rods.
Effective Date:
04 May 2012
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated, unless already accomplished

(1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following
actions concurrently:
(1.1) Only for aeroplanes (MSN) listed in ATR Service Bulletin (SB) ATR4227-0105 or ATR72-27-1066, as applicable to aeroplane model, inspect
all four elevator control rods Part Number (P/N) S27381930-004 and
P/N S27381831-006 for batch number identification in accordance
with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-27-0105 or ATR72-27-1066,
as applicable to aeroplane model.
(1.2) Only for aeroplanes (MSN) listed in ATR SB ATR42-27-0104 or
ATR72-27-1065, as applicable to aeroplane model, inspect all four
rudder pedal rods P/N S2728116400000 for batch number
identification in accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR4227-0104 or SB ATR72-27-1065, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1.1) of this AD, any
elevator control rod is found belonging to a batch number identified in SB
ATR42-27-0105 or SB ATR72-27-1066, or if the batch number is
unreadable, within the compliance time as specified in Table 1 of this AD, as
applicable, replace the affected rod in accordance with the instructions of
SB ATR42-27-0105 or ATR72-27-1066, as applicable to aeroplane model,
and identify each removed rod as unserviceable component.
Table 1 Elevator Control Rod Replacement
Number of
affected rod(s)
Compliance Time for rod

replacement
One
Within 10 days after the inspection as

required by paragraph (1.1) of this AD
Two or more
Before next flight after the inspection

as required by paragraph (1.1) of this
AD, replace all affected rods, except
one rod, the replacement of which can
be deferred for 10 days.
(3) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1.2) of this AD, a rudder
pedal rod is found belonging to a batch number identified in SB ATR42-270104 or SB ATR72-27-1065, as applicable, or if the batch number is
unreadable, before next flight, check the rod diameter by using a special
tool, in accordance with the instructions of SB ATR42-27-0104 or SB
ATR72-27-1065, and depending on the result, within the compliance time
specified in Table 2 of this AD, replace the affected rod in accordance with
the instructions of SB ATR42-27-0104 or SB ATR72-27-1065, as applicable
to aeroplane model, and identify each removed rod as unserviceable
component.
EASA Form 110
Page 2/6
EASA AD No :2012-0064
Table 2 Rudder Pedal Rod Replacement

Result of the check
Compliance time for rod replacement
Rod passes through the

tool
Before next flight after the check as

required by paragraph (3) of this AD
Rod does not pass

through the tool
Within 5 000 FH after the check as

(4) For rudder pedal rods that have been inspected as required by EASA AD
2010-0063-E, having been identified belonging to the batch 2109699 or
2118930, or for which the batch number could not be identified, and having
passed the check criteria (rod does not pass through the tool), the
inspection by paragraph (1.2) of this AD is not required and these identified
rudder pedal rods must be removed from the aeroplane within 5 000 FH
after the effective date of this AD.
(5) In addition to the actions required by paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and/or (4) of
this AD, as applicable, for aeroplanes (MSN) listed in the applicability
paragraph of this AD, except MSN 671, 673 and 769 to 784 inclusive, within
24 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the rudder tab control
rod P/N S27281929-002 for batch number identification, in accordance with
the instructions of the applicable ATR Aircraft Maintenance Manual / Job
Instruction Card (AMM/JIC) 27-20-00 DVI 10000. Refer to Appendix 1 of this
AD for rod location.
(6) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (5) of this AD, the rudder
tab control rod is found belonging to batch number 2107267 or 2120855, or
if the batch number is unreadable, before next flight, replace the rod with a
serviceable one in accordance with the instructions provided in AMM/JIC
27-21-42 RAI 10000, and identify the removed rod as unserviceable
component.
(7) Within 20 days after the rod inspection and check as required by paragraph
(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this AD, as applicable, send the relevant SB
accomplishment report or the reporting form provided in Appendix 2 of this
AD (including no-findings) to ATR.
(8) Within 30 days after the removal of an unserviceable rod, as required by
paragraph (2) (3), (4) or (6) of this AD, as applicable, or within 30 days after
the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, send a declaration that
the unserviceable rod has been quarantined or scrapped, to ATR.
Ref. Publications:
ATR Service Bulletins:

ATR42-27-0104 original issue or revision 1
ATR72-27-1065 original issue, revision 1 or revision 2
ATR 42/72 AMM/JIC 27-20-00 DVI 10000 and AMM/JIC 27-21-42 RAI 10000.
Remarks :
1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative

2. The required actions and the risk allowance have granted the issuance of a
Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation
EASA Form 110
Page 3/6
EASA AD No :2012-0064
process after publication.

3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Safety Information
Section, Executive Directorate, EASA. E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this
AD, please contact:
ATR GIE Avions de Transport rgional
Tel.: + 33 (0) 5 62 21 62 21 - Fax:+ 33 (0) 5 62 21 67 8
EASA Form 110
Page 4/6
EASA AD No :2012-0064
Appendix 1 - Rudder tab control rod location
P/N S27281929-002
EASA Form 110
Page 5/6
EASA AD No :2012-0064
Appendix 2 - Inspection Reporting Form
Send this report to: techdesk@atr.fr and continued.airworthiness@atr.fr
Aeroplane Identification
Aeroplane MSN :
Aeroplane Registration:
Inspection date:
Inspection results of rudder tab control rod P/N S27281929-002

Batch Number :
Serial Number :
Performed action :
Reminder: if batch number is 2107267 or 2120855 or if batch number is unreadable, the rod
must be replaced before next flight.
Maintenance organization identification

Maintenance organization name :
Date :
Name & Signature :
EASA Form 110
Page 6/6
EASA AD No.: 2012-0160
EASA
AD No.: 2012-0160
Date: 24 August 2012

Regulation.
Design Approval Holders Name:
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA 54
Nacelles / Pylons Engine Nacelle Lower Fairing Junction with

Underwing Box Inspection
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly Aerospatiale Aeritalia,

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR Alenia, EADS ATR Alenia).
Applicability:
Models ATR 42-200, 42-300, 42-320, 42-400 and 42-500 aeroplanes, from
Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 003 up to MSN 623 inclusive, and
Models ATR 72-101, 72-102, 72-201, 72-202, 72-211, 72-212 and 72-212A
aeroplanes, from MSN 108 up to MSN 710 inclusive.
Reason:
Some cases of defective sealing have been reported on in-service aeroplanes

on Left-Hand (LH) and Right-Hand (RH), between the nacelle lower fairing and
the underwing box.
Investigation results have shown that this issue was due to either damaged or
missing seal and/or incorrect adjustment of the nacelle lower fairing.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, may decrease the extinguishing
agent efficiency, delay the fire extinction and allow fire propagation out of the
nacelle fire protected area, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane.
affected area and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable
corrective actions to restore the area integrity.
Effective Date:
07 September 2012
CAP.00110-001 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved.

Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
1/2
EASA AD No.: 2012-0160
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

(1) Within 5 000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a
one-time inspection of the gaps and seal conditions between the nacelle
lower fairing and the underwing box and, in case discrepancies are found,
before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective actions, in
accordance with the instructions of ATR Service Bulletin (SB) ATR72-541023 or SB ATR42-54-0029, as applicable to aeroplane models.
(2) Within 30 days after accomplishment of the inspection as required by
paragraph (1) of this AD, send the relevant SB accomplishment report to
ATR.
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-54-0029 original issue 18 July 2012.

ATR SB ATR72-54-1023 original issue 18 July 2012.
Remarks:
1.
If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve

2.
This AD was posted on 31 July 2012 as PAD 12-100 for consultation until
21 August 2012. No comments were received during the consultation
period.
3.
Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Safety Information

Section, Executive Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4.
For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in

ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional,
Continued Airworthiness Service,
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;
CAP.00110-001 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved.

2/2
EASA AD No.: 2012-0193
EASA
AD No.: 2012-0193
Date: 25 September 2012

This AD is issued in accordance with EC 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
ATR 42 aeroplanes
TCDS Number:
EASA.A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA
Airworthiness Limitation Items Structural Significant Item Tasks

Amendments
Manufacturer(s):

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR- Alenia, EADS ATR Alenia).
Applicability:
ATR 42-200, ATR 42-300, ATR 42-320, ATR 42-400 and ATR 42-500 models, all
manufacturer serial numbers.
Reason:
Floor beam at Frame 26: During maintenance checks, the floor beam at frame
(FR) 26 was found cracked on several ATR 42 aeroplanes.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduce the structural
integrity of the aeroplane. A new Structural Significant Items (SSI) task will be
introduced in the next revision of the ATR42 Time Limits document in order to
address this issue.
MRBR / MPD discrepancy on Wings item: A discrepancy has been noticed
between the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) / Maintenance Planning
Document (MPD) and the Time Limits document. ATR modifications 02805 and
08039 were erroneously stated similar in the MRBR/MPD, inducing misleading
applicability of the SSI tasks depending upon the document used and leading
operators to miss several inspections, as evidenced during a recent review.
Following the structural investigation, new inspection thresholds have been
calculated and will be introduced in the next revisions of the ATR Time Limits
documents (Revision 8 and Revision 9, as applicable to the aeroplane models)
and MRBR/MPD documents.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the
FR26 floor beam, and of several areas of the wings, as defined in the ATR42
Time Limits document and, depending on findings, the accomplishment of
TE.CAP.00110-003 European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved.

1/3
EASA AD No.: 2012-0193
applicable corrective action(s).

Effective Date:
09 October 2012
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

For all ATR42 aeroplanes: Repetitive inspection of FR26 floor beam:
(1) Within the compliance time defined in Table 1 of this AD, and thereafter at
intervals not exceeding 12 000 flight cycles (FC), accomplish a detailed
visual inspection of the floor beam at Frame 26, on both Left Hand (LH)
and Right Hand (RH) sides, in accordance with the instructions of the
applicable ATR42 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Job Instruction
Card 535100 DVI 10097.
Table 1 Initial inspection
Compliance time
(whichever occurs later, A or B)
A
Before the accumulation of 24 000 FC since the

aeroplane first flight
within 5 000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever

occurs first after the effective date of this AD
(2) If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any crack is
found, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective actions in
accordance with approved ATR instructions.
For ATR 42 aeroplanes on which ATR modification 02805 has not been
embodied in production:
(3) Before exceeding each threshold as defined in Table 2 of this AD, or within
6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and
thereafter at intervals not exceeding the value defined in Table 2 of this
AD, accomplish each SSI Task as listed in Table 2 and, if any crack is
found, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective actions in
accordance with approved ATR instructions.
Table 2 Initial and repetitive SSI tasks
SSI Task Nr.
Threshold (FC accumulated

since the aeroplane first flight)
Interval
(not to exceed)
572301
45 000 FC
7 300 FC
572305
46 000 FC
3 900 FC
572409
42 000 FC
9 000 FC
572410
572411
572412
572413
572414
572415
43 000 FC
10 000 FC
572416
572417
44 000 FC
7 300 FC

2/3
EASA AD No.: 2012-0193
Ref. Publications:
MRBR ATR 42-200/-300/-320 Revision 13 dated November 2011,

MRBR ATR 42-400/-500 Revision 13 dated November 2011,
MRBR ATR 42-200/-300/-320, Appendix A, Time Limits document Revision 7
dated March 2006,
MRBR ATR 42-400/-500, Appendix A, Time Limits document Revision 8 dated
April 2012,
The use of later approved revisions of the above-listed documents is acceptable
for compliance with the requirements of this AD.
ATR 42 AMM Job Instruction Card 535100 DVI 10097.
MPD ATR 42-200/-300/-320 Revision 26 dated March 2012.
MPD ATR 42-400/-500 Revision 12 dated March 2012.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 31 July 2012 as PAD 12-099 and republished as PAD
12-099R1 on 03 August 2012 for consultation until 21 August 2012. The
Comment Response Document can be found at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/.
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this
AD, please contact:
ATR GIE Avions de Transport Rgional
Tel.: + 33 (0) 5 62 21 62 21 - Fax:+ 33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2013-0032
EASA
AD No.: 2013-0032
Date: 18 February 2013

Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EU 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
ATR-GIE AVIONS DE TRANSPORT RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA 30
Ice and Rain Protection Pneumatic Ice Protection Dual Distributor

Valves Inspection / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (formerly Aerospatiale-Aeritalia,

Aerospatiale-Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR-Alenia, EADS ATR-Alenia)
Applicability:
This AD applies to the following aeroplanes, identified by Group, Model and

manufacturer serial number (MSN):
Group 1:
Model ATR 42-500: MSN 645, 653, 657, 659, 661, 663 and 665.
Model ATR 72-212A: MSN 778, 994, 995, 996, 998, 999, 1000 and 1020.
Group 2:
Model ATR 42-300: MSN 348 and 415.
Model ATR 42-500: MSN 497, 501 and 514.
Model ATR 72-202: MSN 192, 411, 496, 508 and 509.
Model ATR 72-212A: MSN 468, 568, 595, 662, 796, 920, 926, 950, 1024, 1025,
1028, 1029, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039 and 1040.
Reason:
During the investigation performed on a failed dual distributor valve (DDV)

shipped to the DDV manufacturer, a non-conformity of crimping on an internal
valve has been detected by the DDV manufacturer. This defective crimping
creates a lack of tightness that prevents the complete deflation of the related
de-icing boot chamber during de-icing cycles.
A batch of serialized DDV, potentially affected with the same manufacturing

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EASA AD No.: 2013-0032
discrepancy, has been identified by the DDV manufacturer.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, may affect the efficiency of the
pneumatic de-icing system, which could reduce flight safety in icing conditions.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of
each DDV to identify the serial number (s/n) and replacement of the nonconforming DDV units.
The affected DDV units installed on aeroplanes and those delivered as spares
have been retraced by ATR and all non-installed spare units have been
quarantined, which is why this AD only applies to specific MSN aeroplanes.
Effective Date:
04 March 2013
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

(1) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the
following actions:
(1.1) For aeroplanes identified as Group 1 in the Applicability section of
this AD, identify the s/n of the engine DDV Part Number (P/N)
B03AA1060 in accordance with the instructions of ATR Service
Bulletin (SB) ATR42-30-0081 or SB ATR72-30-1050, as applicable
to aeroplane model.
(1.2) For aeroplanes identified as Group 2 in the Applicability section of
this AD, identify the s/n of the Wing DDV and/or Stabilizer DDV, P/N
B03AA1031 or P/N B03AA1040, in accordance with the instructions
of ATR SB ATR42-30-0080 or SB ATR72-30-1049, as applicable to
aeroplane model.
A review of aeroplane delivery- or maintenance records is acceptable to
make the identification as required by this paragraph, provided those
records can be relied upon for that purpose, and the s/n of the DDV can be
conclusively identified from that review.
(2) If, during the identification as required by paragraph 1 of this AD, a DDV is
found to be installed with a s/n as listed in Table 1 of this AD, as applicable
to P/N, within the compliance time as specified in Table 2 of this AD,
depending on the location and the number of DDV affected, and on
whether the aeroplane is operated in icing conditions or under Extendedrange Twin-engine Operational Performance Standards (ETOPS) rules,
replace the affected DDV with a serviceable DDV in accordance with the
instructions of SB ATR42-30-0080, or ATR42-30-0081, or SB ATR72-301049, or SB ATR72-30-1050, as applicable to aeroplane model.
Table 1 Affected DDV units
P/N
B03AA1031
s/n
116, T1228, T1583, T2132, T2160, T2321 and
T2537
B03AA1040
318, 369, 377, 402, 560, 591, 637, 1082, 1215,

1303, 1331, 1662, 1672, 1676, 2175, 2748 to 2796
inclusive, and T1531
B03AA1060
693, and 1332 to 1351 inclusive
Note: Any DDV s/n listed in Table 1 of this AD with a suffix "R" added to the s/n
has been repaired and is considered to be a serviceable part.

2/3
EASA AD No.: 2013-0032
Table 2 DDV replacement

Compliance time after the inspection as
Location and number of
affected DDV
not operated in icing

condition or under
ETOPS rules.
operated in icing
condition or under
ETOPS rules
Wing or Engine area,

more than 1 DDV
Within 3 days
Horizontal Stabilizer
area, 1 DDV
Before next flight
Engine area, 1 of 2 DDV

Within 10 days
Wing area, 1 of 4 DDV
Ref. Publications:
ATR Service Bulletins:

ATR42-30-0080 original issue dated 18 October 2012.
ATR72-30-1049 original issue dated 04 October 2012, or Revision 01 dated
10 October 2012.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 16 January 2013 as PAD 13-010 for consultation
until 13 February 2013. The Comment Response Document can be found
at http://ad.easa.europa.eu.
this AD, please contact: ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional,
Telephone: + 33 (0) 5 62 21 62 21, Fax: + 33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2013-0087
EASA
AD No.: 2013-0087
Date: 09 April 2013

Regulation.
ATR-GIE AVIONS de TRANSPORT RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
This AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0159-E dated 20 July 2009.
ATA 56
Windows Cockpit Forward Side Windows Inspection /

Replacement
Manufacturer(s):

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR Alenia, EADS ATR Alenia).
Applicability:
ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial
numbers.
Reason:
In 2009, a Left-Hand (LH) forward side glass window of an ATR 72-212

aeroplane blew out while performing a ground pressure test. The investigation
results revealed some anomalies on the forward side window at the level of the
z-bar on the windows external side and at the level of the inner retainer on the
windows internal side. Such anomalies are considered as precursors of this
kind of failure. Air or water leakages between the z-bar and the outer glass ply,
or between the inner retainer and inner glass ply indicate the presence of
deteriorating structural components in the window.
Neither ATR nor PPG Aerospace have authorized repairs on the window z-bar
or z-bar sealant. Any attempted repairs on these forward side window z-bars
and/or z-bar sealants could lead to a similar event as described above.
In-flight loss of a forward side window would cause rapid cabin decompression,
possibly resulting in flight crew incapacitation and consequent reduced control,
or loss of control of the aeroplane, and cause the risk of injury to persons on
the ground. The loss of a forward side window while the aeroplane is on the
ground, due to differential cabin pressure, could result in injury to aeroplane
occupants or to persons outside the aeroplane.
To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD 2009-0159-E to

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EASA AD No.: 2013-0087
require repetitive inspections of the affected LH and right-hand (RH) cockpit

forward side glass windows and, in case discrepancies are found as defined in
PPG Aerospace Service Bulletin (SB) NP-158862-001, the replacement of the
window(s).
Since that AD was issued, a cockpit forward RH-side window blew out during
flight on an ATR72-212 aeroplane. Degradation of the window is considered to
have been the cause for this failure.
For the reasons described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD
2009-0159-E, which is superseded, adds another inspection interval of 750
flight cycles (FC) and requires to accomplish the inspections in accordance with
the instructions of Revision 1 of PPG Aerospace SB NP-158862-001, which
provides more information on examples of discrepant conditions.
This AD also requires the removal from service of the affected Part Number
(P/N) NP158862-1 and P/N NP158862-2 cockpit forward side windows, which
constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD.
Effective Date:
23 April 2013
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated, unless already accomplished:

(1) For all ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes that are equipped with PPG
Aerospace cockpit forward side glass windows P/N NP158862-1 and/or
P/N NP158862-2: Within 2 000 FC since first installation of the cockpit
forward side window on an aeroplane, or within 10 days after the effective
date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and, thereafter, at intervals not
exceeding 550 flight hours (FH) or 750 FC, whichever occurs first, inspect
the cockpit forward side window to detect any damage or discrepancies in
accordance with the instructions of PPG Aerospace SB NP-158862-001
Revision 1.
Note1: If, for a given cockpit forward side window, the FC accumulated since its
first installation on an aeroplane cannot be established, the total FC
accumulated by the aeroplane must be used to determine the compliance time
for the initial inspection of the affected cockpit forward side window.
(2) If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, one of the
conditions, as specified in Table 1 of this AD, is found, reduce the interval
of the inspection as required by paragraph (1) to 50 FC or 7 days,
whichever occurs later.
Table 1 Detected Conditions
a.
sealant separation between the Z-bar and the outer glass ply,
with depth less than 4 mm (0.160 in)
b.
sealant separation between inboard retainer and inner glass

ply, with depth less than 7,5 mm (0.300 in) and cumulative
length less than 300 mm (12.000 in)
c.
window showing both sealant separation between the Z-bar

and the outer ply, and separation between inboard retainer and
inner glass ply, common to the same holes location with a
length less than 225 mm (8.860 in), and not covering the entire
arc of a window corner
(3) If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (1) or (2) of this AD, any
discrepant condition, as defined in PPG SB NP-158862-001 Revision 1, is
found, before the next pressurized flight, or within 10 days after the
inspection, whichever occurs first, replace the affected window(s) in
accordance with the instructions of ATR42/72 Job Instruction Card AMM
2/3
EASA AD No.: 2013-0087
JIC 56-12-00 RAI 10000.

Note 2: For unpressurized flight conditions and limitations, refer to ATR Master
Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) item 21-30-1 and Dispatch Deviation Guide
(DDG) item 21-30-1.(4)
(4) Within 30 days after each inspection where damage or discrepancies are
found, submit a detailed report of the findings to ATR.
(5) Replacement of a cockpit forward side window as required by paragraph
(3) of this AD with a cockpit forward side window P/N NP158862-1 (LH) or
P/N NP158862-2 (RH), as applicable, does not constitute terminating
action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD.
(6) Before 01 January 2020, replace each PPG Aerospace P/N NP-158862-1
(LH) and P/N NP-158862-2 (RH) cockpit forward side window with another
approved cockpit forward side window. For alternative window installations,
consult ATR documentation, or contact ATR. Modification of an aeroplane
by replacing both PPG Aerospace P/N NP158862-1 (LH) and P/N
NP158862-2 (RH) cockpit forward side windows with other approved
windows constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections
required by this AD for that aeroplane.
(7) From 01 January 2020, do not install on any aeroplane PPG Aerospace
P/N NP158862-1 (LH) or P/N NP158862-2 (RH) cockpit forward side
windows.
Ref. Publications:
PPG Aerospace SB NP-158862-001 Revision 1 dated 10 January 2013.

ATR42/72 Job Instruction Card AMM JIC 56-12-00 RAI 10000.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 12 March 2013 as PAD 13-046 for consultation until
26 March 2013. No comments were received during the consultation
period.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2014-0056
EASA
AD No.: 2014-0056
Date: 07 March 2014

Regulation.
ATR-GIE AVIONS DE TRANSPORT

RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA.A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA 92
Electrical Routing Electronic Rack 120VU Shelf / Electrical

Harness Inspection / Modification
Manufacturer(s):

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR ALENIA, EADS ATR Alenia).
Applicability:
ATR 42-500 aeroplane model, from Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 669 to
1005 inclusive, and
ATR 72-212A aeroplane model, MSN 773, MSN 774, from MSN 776 to 1094
inclusive, from MSN 1096 to 1099 inclusive and MSN 1101.
Reason:
During inspection of an aeroplane on the production line, interference was

detected between electrical harnesses (2M-2S-6M) and a bonding lead, located
in zone 214, positioned above and forward of the 120VU shelf. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the interference was a result of an incorrect
installation of the affected bonding lead.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to arcing and chafing,
possibly resulting in an uncontrolled fire.
To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-92-0025 and SB ATR72-92-1034, as applicable to aeroplane model, to
provide inspection instructions.
electrical harness 2M-2S-6M in zone 214 and, depending on findings,
accomplishment of corrective action(s).

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0056
Effective Date:
21 March 2014
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

(1) Within 1 000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a
one-time inspection of the bonding lead routing above the 120VU shelf in
accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-92-0025 or SB
(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any
damage or incorrect routing is detected, before next flight, accomplish the
corrective action(s) in accordance with ATR SB ATR42-92-0025 or SB
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-92-0025 original issue dated 07 November 2013.

ATR SB ATR72-92-1034 original issue dated 07 November 2013.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 27 January 2014 as PAD 14-022 for consultation
until 24 February 2014. No comments were received during the
consultation period.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

2/2
EASA AD No.: 2014-0074
EASA
AD No.: 2014-0074
Date: 21 March 2014

Regulation.
ATR-GIE AVIONS de TRANSPORT

RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA 32
Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Hinge Pin Inspection /

Replacement
Manufacturer(s):

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR ALENIA, EADS ATR Alenia)
Applicability:
ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes, all certified models, all manufacturer serial
numbers.
Reason:
Prompted by cases of rupture of Main Landing Gear (MLG) rear hinge pin part
number (P/N) D61000 encountered in service in 1994 and 1996, DGAC France
issued AD 96-131-064 (B) for ATR 42 aeroplanes and AD 96-096-029 (B) for
ATR 72 aeroplanes to require inspection and, depending on findings, corrective
action.
Since those ADs were issued, new occurrences of cracked rear hinge pin P/N
D61000 were reported on ATR72 MLG.
The result of subsequent investigation revealed that the affected pins were
subjected to a non-detected thermal abuse done in production during grinding
process. Analysis also showed that other MLG pin P/Ns could be affected by
the same nonconformity.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to MLG structural
failure, possibly resulting in collapse of the MLG and consequently injury to the
occupants of the aeroplane.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires inspection and, depending
on findings, replacement of affected pins.

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0074
Effective Date:
04 April 2014
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

For ATR 72 aeroplanes:
(1) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, identify the serial
number (S/N) of the left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) MLG rear hinge pin
P/N D61000.
(2) If, during the identification as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, a MLG
rear hinge pin P/N D61000 having a S/N listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty
Service Bulletin (SB) 631-32-213 or SB 631-32-216 Revision 1, as
applicable, is found to be installed, within 12 months after the effective date
of this AD, replace the MLG rear hinge pin P/N D61000 with a serviceable
part in accordance with of Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-213 or SB
631-32-216, as applicable.
Note 1: For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this AD, a serviceable MLG rear
hinge pin is a part that:
- is outside of the identified batch as listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty SB
631-32-213 or SB 631-32-216 Revision 1, as applicable, or
- has been inspected and reconditioned in accordance with the
instructions of Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-213 or
SB 631-32-216, as applicable.
(3) Within the compliance time, as defined in Table 1 of this AD, identify all LH
and RH MLG pins having a P/N and S/N listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty
SB 631-32-214 or SB 631-32-219, as applicable.
pin having a P/N and S/N listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-214
or SB 631-32-219, as applicable, is found to be installed, within the
compliance time defined in Table 1 of this AD, replace the affected MLG
with a serviceable MLG, in accordance with ATR approved maintenance
instructions.
Note 2: For the purpose of paragraph (4) of this AD, a serviceable MLG is a
part incorporating pins that are:
- outside of the identified batch as listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty SB
631-32-214 or SB 631-32-219, as applicable, or
- inspected and reconditioned in accordance with the instructions of
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-214 or SB 631-32-219, as
applicable.
Table 1 Compliance time
A or B, whichever occurs first
A
Not later than the next MLG overhaul scheduled after the
effective date of this AD
Within 20 000 flight cycles or 9 years, whichever occurs first,

accumulated since installation of MLG on an aeroplane since
new or since last overhaul, as applicable
For ATR 42 aeroplanes

(5) Within the compliance time, as defined in Table 1 of this AD, identify all LH
and RH MLG pins having a P/N and S/N listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty
SB 631-32-215 or SB 631-32-220, as applicable.
pin having a P/N and S/N listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-215
or SB 631-32-220, as applicable, is found to be installed, within the
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EASA AD No.: 2014-0074
compliance time defined in Table 1 of this AD, replace the affected MLG,
with a serviceable MLG in accordance with ATR approved maintenance
instructions.
Note 3: For the purpose of paragraph (6) of this AD, a serviceable MLG is a
part incorporating pins that are:
- outside of the identified batch as listed in Messier Bugatti Dowty SB
631-32-215 or SB 631-32-220, as applicable, or
- inspected and reconditioned in accordance with the instructions of
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-215 or SB 631-32-220, as
applicable.
(7) A review of MLG maintenance records is acceptable to make the
identification as required by paragraphs (1), (3) and (5) of this AD,
provided those records can be relied upon for that purpose, and the P/N
and S/N of LH and RH MLG pins can be conclusively identified from that
review.
Ref. Publications:
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-213, dated 16 December 2013,

Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-214, dated 13 January 2014,
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-215, dated 13 January 2014,
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-216 original issue dated 30 October 2013
and Revision 1, dated 17 December 2013,
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-219, dated 03 March 2014,
Messier Bugatti Dowty SB 631-32-220, dated 03 March 2014.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 06 February 2014 as PAD 14-034 for consultation
until 06 March 2014. The Comment Response Document can be found at
http://ad.easa.europa.eu.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2014-0052R1
EASA
AD No.: 2014-0052R1
Date: 07 April 2014

Regulation.

RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Revision:
This AD revises EASA AD 2014-0052 dated 06 March 2014.
ATA 92
Electrical routing Electronic Rack 90VU Shelf / Electrical

Harness Inspection
Manufacturer(s):

Applicability:
ATR 42-400 and ATR 42-500 aeroplanes models, from Manufacturer Serial
Number (MSN) 443 up to 1006 inclusive, except MSN 811, 1002 and 1005.
ATR 72-102, ATR 72-202, ATR 72-212 and ATR 72-212A aeroplanes models,
MSN as listed below, except MSN 956 and 1042:
- from MSN 475 up to 969 inclusive,
- from MSN 971 up to 988 inclusive,
- MSN 1025,
- from MSN 1028 to 1069 inclusive and MSN 1072.
Reason:
An erroneous cockpit indication has been reported on an in-service aircraft.

Subsequent investigation identified chafed wiring between harnesses
(2M-2S-6M) and the metallic structure of the cargo lining panel above the
electronic rack 90VU shelf. The chafing was most likely the result of incorrect
harness installation. In some cases, the bracket, which supports the
harnesses, could be incorrectly positioned. Consequently, the wiring
harnesses, and in certain configurations, the adjacent air duct, could be
incorrectly routed.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to wiring harness
chafing and arcing, possibly resulting in an on-board fire.

1/3
EASA AD No.: 2014-0052R1
To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-92-0024 and SB ATR72-92-1032, as applicable to aeroplane model, to
provide inspection instructions.
For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD 2014-0052 to require a
one-time visual inspection of the affected area including a systematic bracket
position check and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable
corrective actions.
This AD is revised to make the bracket position check dependent on findings,
determined during the inspection of the electrical bundle and air duct routing.
Effective Date:
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Revision 1: 07 April 2014

Original issue: 20 March 2014
(1) Within 500 flight hours (FH) after 20 March 2014 [the effective date of
original issue of this AD], accomplish concurrently the actions of the
paragraphs (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), in the area above the electronic rack
90VU shelf, in accordance with the instructions of ATR SB
ATR42-92-0024 Revision 1, or ATR SB ATR72-92-1032
Revision 1, as applicable to aeroplane model:
(1.1) Visually inspect the condition of the electrical wires of harnesses
2M-2S-6M,
(1.2) [deleted]
(1.3) Visually inspect the routing of electrical bundle 2M-2S-6M and the
routing of the air duct.
(2) If, during the visual inspection, as required by paragraph (1.1) of this AD,
any damage is found on the electrical wire, before next flight, repair the
wires in accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-92-0024
Revision 1 or ATR SB ATR72-92-1032 Revision 1, as applicable to
aeroplane model.
(3) [deleted]
(4) If, during the visual inspection, as required by paragraph (1.3) of this AD,
electrical bundle 2M-2S-6M and/or the air duct is found to be incorrectly
routed, as defined in ATR SB ATR42-92-0024 at Revision 1 or ATR SB
ATR72-92-1032 at Revision 1, as applicable to aeroplane model, within
the compliance time as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, visually
inspect, the bracket position in accordance with the instructions of ATR
SB ATR42-92-0024 Revision 1, or ATR SB ATR72-92-1032 Revision 1,
as applicable to aeroplane model.
(5) Inspections and corrective actions, accomplished before 20 March 2014
[the effective date of original issue of this AD] in accordance with the
instructions of ATR SB ATR42-92-0024 original issue or ATR SB ATR7292-1032 original issue, as applicable to aeroplane model, are acceptable
to comply with the requirements of this AD.
(6) Depending on findings detected during visual inspections as required by
paragraphs (1.3) and (4) of this AD:
(6.1) In case the bracket is found correctly positioned, within the
compliance time as required in paragraph (1) of this AD,
accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with
the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-92-0024 at Revision 1 or ATR
SB ATR72-92-1032 at Revision 1, as applicable to aeroplane
model.
(6.2) In case the bracket is found missing or not correctly positioned,
within 500 FH after the inspection as required by paragraph (4) of

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0052R1
this AD, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in

accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-92-0024 at
Revision 1 or ATR SB ATR72-92-1032 at Revision 1, as applicable
to aeroplane model.
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-92-0024 original issue, dated 06 June 2013 or Revision 1

dated 16 January 2014.
ATR SB ATR72-92-1032 original issue, dated 06 June 2013 or Revision 1
dated 16 January 2014.
Remarks:

2. The original issue of this AD was posted on 15 January 2014 as PAD
14-009 for consultation until 12 February 2014. No comments were
received during the consultation period.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2014-0075R1
EASA
AD No.: 2014-0075R1
Date: 24 April 2014

Regulation.

RGIONAL
TCDS Number:
EASA.A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Revision:
This AD revises EASA AD 2014-0075 dated 25 March 2014.
ATA 28
Fuel Fuel Probes Inspection / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):

Applicability:
a)
ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes, all certified models, all Manufacturer

Serial Numbers (MSN) qualified for Extended range Twin OPerationS
(ETOPS) in accordance with ATR Mod. 04711, or
b)
ATR 42 aeroplanes, all certified models, all MSN, except aeroplanes which
are:
- modified in accordance with ATR Mod 04650, or
- retrofitted in accordance with ATR Service Bulletin (SB)
ATR42-28-0033 or SB ATR42-28-0034, as applicable to the aeroplane
model, or
c)
ATR 72 aeroplanes, all certified models, all MSN, except aeroplanes which
are:
- modified in accordance with ATR Mod 04686, or
- retrofitted in accordance with ATR SB ATR72-28-1013, SB
ATR72-28-1022 or SB ATR72-28-1023, as applicable to the aeroplane
model.
Reason:
A significant number of fuel probes installed on ATR aeroplanes failed during

production tests and several occurrences of fuel quantity indication
malfunctions were recently reported on in-service aeroplanes.
The subsequent investigation, conducted on the failed parts, confirmed a loss

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0075R1
of ground connection on the terminal block of the fuel probe, due to an incorrect
application of wiring instructions in production during fuel probe manufacturing
between June 2011 and August 2013. The investigation identified a batch of
parts, suspected to be affected by this manufacturing defect. Some of these
probes were delivered as spares, and operators may have installed these
probes on their in-service aeroplanes.
In case an affected fuel probe is installed on each wing of an aeroplane, being
not equipped with an independent fuel low level measurement system or an
aeroplane operated in accordance with ETOPS rules, the defected fuel probes
could indicate a higher fuel quantity value than the real quantity of the on-board
fuel.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to an undetected fuel
starvation and consequent dual engine in-flight flame out.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires the identification and
replacement of the affected fuel probes.
This AD is revised to correct typographical errors.
Effective Date:
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Revision 1: 24 April 2014

Original issue: 08 April 2014
(1) Within 5 000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever occurs first after 08 April
2014 [the effective date of this AD at original issue], accomplish the
following actions:
(1.1) Identify the Part Number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) of the fuel
probes installed on the aeroplane in accordance with the instructions
of ATR Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Job Instruction Card
(JIC) 28-42-72 RAI 10000.
A review of aeroplane maintenance records is acceptable to make
the identification as required by paragraph (1.1) of this AD, provided
those maintenance records can be relied upon for that purpose, and
the P/N and S/N of the fuel probes can be conclusively identified
from that review.
(1.2) Following the identification required by paragraph (1.1) of this AD,
replace any fuel probe, having a P/N and S/N as listed in Table 1 of
this AD, with a serviceable part in accordance with the instructions of
ATR AMM JIC 28-42-72 RAI 10000.
Note: For the purpose of this AD, a serviceable fuel probe is a part which is
either:
- not listed in Table 1 of this AD, or
- listed in Table 1 of this AD, but having control tag C marked on the part
identification plate, as specified in Zodiac Aerospace Services Europe Service
Bulletin (SB) 766983-28-002.
(2) From 08 April 2014 [the effective date of this AD at original issue],
installation of fuel probe with a P/N and S/N listed in Table 1 of this AD on
an aeroplane is allowed, only provided that the control tag C is marked on
the fuel probe identification plate, as specified in Zodiac Aerospace
Services Europe SB 766983-28-002.

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0075R1
Table 1 Affected Fuel Probes

Affected aeroplanes
ATR 42
ATR 72
Ref. Publications:
P/N
S/N
766-046-2
1046 to 1083
766-047-2
1154 to 1214
766-048-2
1150 to 1197
768-055
1156 to 1227
798-038
1150 to 1238
766-793-1
1469 to 1826
766-795-2
1661 to 2093
766-796-2
1722 to 2152
766-797-2
1663 to 2051
766-983-1
2200 to 2652
768-100
1511 to 1876
Zodiac Aerospace Services Europe SB 766983-28-002, dated 15 October

2013.
ATR42/72 AMM JIC 28-42-72 RAI 10000.
Remarks:

2. The original issue of this AD was posted on 19 February 2014 as PAD 14041 for consultation until 19 March 2014. The Comment Response
Document can be found at http://ad.easa.europa.eu.
ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Rgional, Continued Airworthiness Service,
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2014-0144R1
EASA
AD No.: 2014-0144R1
Date: 10 June 2014

Regulation.
ATR-GIE AVIONS DE TRANSPORT RGIONAL
ATR 72 and 42 aeroplanes
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
None
ATA 26
Fire protection Engine Fire Extinguishing Pipe Inspection
Manufacturer(s):

Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR Alenia, EADS ATR Alenia)
Applicability:
Model ATR 42-500 aeroplanes, Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 859, and
MSN 1001 through 1010 inclusive.
Model ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, MSN 988 and 989; MSN 993 through 1000
inclusive, except MSN 996; and MSN 1020 through 1142 inclusive, except MSN
1071,1135, 1139, 1140 and 1141.
Reason:
Damage of an engine fire extinguishing pipe was reported on an in-service ATR

72-212A aeroplane. The damage was induced by chafing between the engine
fire extinguishing pipe and a fastener assembly installed between flap arm and
hinge flap at rib 4 during flaps extension to the 30 degrees position. The
subsequent investigation also determined that the chafing occurred as a result
of an incorrect (back to front) installation of the pipe.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to damage of the fire
extinguishing pipe, possibly generating a leak, leading to loss of available
extinguishing agent and resulting in reduced capability to extinguish an engine
fire.
To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued Service Bulletins (SB)
ATR42-26-0031 and ATR72-26-1027 to provide inspection instructions, as
applicable to aeroplane model.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time visual inspection
of the affected area and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0144R1
corrective actions.
This AD is revised to correct ATR SB references.
Effective Date:
13 June 2014 [same as original issue]
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

(1) Within 150 flight hours or 30 days, whichever occurs first after the effective
date of this AD, accomplish a one-time inspection of the Left Hand (LH)
and Right Hand (RH) engine fire extinguishing pipe in accordance with the
instructions of ATR SB ATR42-26-0031 or ATR72-26-1027, as applicable
to aeroplane model.
(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any
damage is detected on an engine fire extinguishing pipe, before next flight,
remove the damaged pipe, measure the maximum wear depth in
accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-26-0031 or
(3) If, during a measurement as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, a depth
of wear greater than 0.5 mm (0,0197 inch) is detected, before next flight,
accomplish concurrently the actions as required by paragraphs (3.1), (3.2)
and (3.3) of this AD, in accordance with the instructions of ATR SB
ATR42-26-0031 or ATR72-26-1027, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(3.1) Replace the damaged pipe with a new engine fire extinguishing
pipe,
(3.2) Inspect LH and RH flap parts (flap fasteners, flap arms, hinge flaps)
at rib 4, and, depending on findings, accomplish the applicable
corrective action(s), and
(3.3) Accomplish a Functional Test of the engine fire extinguishing
system.
(4) If, during a measurement as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, a depth
of wear less than, or equal to, 0.5 mm (0,0197 inch) is detected, before
next flight, accomplish concurrently the actions as required by paragraphs
(4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) of this AD in accordance with the instructions of ATR
SB ATR42-26-0031 or ATR72-26-1027, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(4.1) Replace the damaged pipe with a new engine fire extinguishing
pipe, or for a period not exceeding 30 days after the inspection as
required by paragraph (1) of this AD, re-install correctly the
damaged engine fire extinguishing pipe.
Note: Unlike the instructions of SB ATR42-26-0031 and ATR72-26-1027,
paragraph (4.1) of this AD allows re-installation of a damaged extinguishing
pipe for a maximum of 30 days.
(4.2) Inspect LH and RH flap parts (flap fasteners, flap arms, hinge flaps)
at rib 4 and, depending on findings, accomplish the applicable
corrective action(s), and
(4.3) Accomplish a Functional Test of the engine fire extinguishing
system.
(5) Within 30 days after the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD,
unless already accomplished as required by paragraph (3.1) or (4.1) of this
AD, as applicable, replace the damaged fire extinguisher pipe in
accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-26-0031 or
ATR72-26-1027, as applicable to aeroplane model, and, concurrently,
accomplish the actions as required by paragraphs (4.2) and (4.3) of this
AD.
(6) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, no
damage is detected but the engine fire extinguishing pipe is found

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EASA AD No.: 2014-0144R1
incorrectly installed, before next flight, re-install correctly the fire

extinguishing pipe and accomplish a Functional Test of the engine fire
extinguishing system in accordance with the instructions of ATR SB
ATR42-26-0031 or ATR72-26-1027, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(7) If, during an inspection as required by paragraph (3.2) or (4.2) of this AD,
as applicable, any damage is detected on flap arms or hinge flaps which is
determined to be beyond the defined limits, as indicated in ATR SRM
51-10-10, before next flight, contact ATR to obtain approved repair
instructions and accomplish those instructions accordingly.
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-26-0031 original issue dated 30 April 2014.

ATR SB ATR72-26-1027 original issue dated 30 April 2014.
ATR SRM task 51-10-10.
Remarks:

2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, EASA have
decided to issue a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the
public consultation process until after publication.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

3/3
EASA AD No.: 2015-0018
EASA
AD No.: 2015-0018
Date: 05 February 2015

Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EU 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with EU 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EU

RGIONAL
ATR 72 and 42 aeroplanes
TCDS Number:
EASA A.084
Foreign AD:
Not applicable
Supersedure:
This AD supersedes EASA AD 2013-0280 dated 26 November 2013.
ATA 25
Equipment / Furnishing Type III Emergency Exit Door

Modification
Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Rgional (ATR), formerly Aerospatiale

Aeritalia, Aerospatiale Alenia, Aerospatiale ATR ALENIA, EADS
ATR - Alenia.
Applicability:
ATR 42-500 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), on which ATR
Modification (mod) 6518 has been embodied in production, except those
aeroplanes on which ATR mod 7294 has been embodied in production.
ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, all MSN, on which ATR mod 6517 has been
embodied in production, except those aeroplanes on which ATR mod 7294 has
been embodied in production.
Note: ATR mod 6517 and mod 6518 install the Armonia Cabin respectively on
ATR 72-212A and ATR 42-500 aeroplane.
Reason:
Interference between a Type III Emergency Exit door opening and surrounding
passenger cabin furnishing was detected during a production check.
Subsequent investigation identified an insufficient gap between the emergency
exit door internal skin structure and the overhead stowage compartment fitting,
installed on the rail, as a cause of the interference.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could prevent an unobstructed
opening of both Type III Emergency Exit doors in case of emergency
evacuation.
Prompted by this finding, EASA issued AD 2013-0280 to require a one-time
check of the gap between the Type III Emergency Exit door internal skin and a

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EASA AD No.: 2015-0018
relevant fitting and, depending on findings, the accomplishment of applicable

corrective action(s). That AD was considered to be a temporary measure.
Since that AD was issued, ATR developed a design solution to ensure that no
interference with surrounding structure occurs during opening of an emergency
exit. ATR Service Bulletins (SB) ATR42-25-0185, SB ATR42-25-0186, SB
ATR72-25-1148 and SB ATR72-25-1149 were issued to provide the necessary
modification instructions for in-service aeroplanes.
For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD
2013-0280, which is superseded, and requires modification of the overhead bin
attachment adjacent to the Type III emergency exit doors.
Effective Date:
19 February 2015
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):

Restatement of the requirements of EASA AD 2013-0280
For all aeroplanes affected by this AD, except those aeroplanes on which ATR
mod 7152 has been embodied in production and except MSN 1002, 1005,
1089, 1094, 1095, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101 and 1102:
(1) Within 2 months after 10 December 2013 [the effective date of EASA AD
2013-0280], measure the gap between each Type III Emergency Exit door,
left hand (LH) and right hand (RH), and the overhead stowage
compartment fitting installed on the rail, by unlocking and slightly rotating
the LH and RH Type III Emergency Exit door, remaining on their lower
fittings.
Use a shim gauge 6 mm (0.236 in) thick, to measure the gap between the
doors internal skin and the relevant fittings, P/N S2522924620000 (LH)
and P/N S2522924620100 (RH).
Note 1: For illustrations refer to the applicable ATR Illustrated Parts Catalogue
(IPC) 25-23-02 fig 87 item 90/100 and to Appendix 1 of this AD.
Note 2: It might be necessary to locally pull on the door blanket to correctly see
the door internal skin.
(2) If, during the measurement as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, a gap
equal to or more than 6 mm (0.236 in) is detected, before next flight, reinstall the LH and RH Type III Emergency Exit door, in accordance with the
instructions of the applicable ATR Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) /
Job Instruction Card (JIC) 52-21-00 RAI 10000.
(3) If, during the measurement as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, a gap
less than 6 mm (0.236 in) is detected, before next flight, remove the fitting,
P/N S2522924620000 LH or P/N S2522924620100 RH, as applicable, and
measure the gap between the Type III Emergency Exit door internal skin,
LH and RH, and the overhead stowage compartment hooks in accordance
with the accomplishment instructions of ATR SB ATR42-25-0180 or
ATR72-25-1141, as applicable to aeroplane model, and, depending on
findings, accomplish the follow-on actions as specified in paragraph (3.1)
or (3.2) of this AD, as applicable.
(3.1) If, during the measurement as required by paragraph (3) of this AD,
a gap equal to or more than 6 mm (0.236 in) is detected, before next
flight, re-install the LH and RH Type III Emergency Exit door in
accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-25-0180 or ATR
SB ATR72-25-1141, as applicable to aeroplane model.
(3.2) If, during the measurement as required by paragraph (3) of this AD,
a gap less than 6 mm (0.236 in) is detected, before next flight,
contact ATR to obtain approved repair instructions and accomplish
the repair accordingly.

2/3
EASA AD No.: 2015-0018
New requirements of this AD

For all aeroplanes affected by this AD :
(4) Within 4 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the aeroplane in
accordance with the instructions of ATR SB ATR42-25-0185, or SB
ATR42-25-0186, or SB ATR72-25-1148, or SB ATR72-25-1149, as
applicable to aeroplane model and configuration.
Ref. Publications:
ATR SB ATR42-25-0180 original issue, dated 19 August 2013,

ATR SB ATR72-25-1141 original issue, dated 19 August 2013,
ATR SB ATR42-25-0185 original issue, dated 21 November 2014,
ATR SB ATR72-25-1149 original issue, dated 21 November 2014.
Remarks:

2. This AD was posted on 12 December 2014 as PAD 14-172 for consultation
until 09 January 2015. The Comment Response Document can be found at
http://ad.easa.europa.eu.
Section, Certification Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
Tel.: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21 - Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;

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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes

State of Design Airworthiness Directives

ATR 42 series aeroplanes, as identified in the individual Airworthiness Directive

Determine the applicability of the ADs issued by the Direction Gnrale de

If it is determined that an DGAC or EASA AD listed in Table 1 or 2 is applicable

Oil cooling system

Ipeco pilot and copilot seats - ATR Airplanes

Automatic stop of the flight and cockpit voice recorders

Attitude and heading system

Propeller brake control system

Protection for auto pilot roll actuator

Fuel quantity indicators

Rudder control channel cables

Engine and propeller flexible control shafts

Honeywell-Sperry navigation equipment

(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes

Main gear wheel bearing

Propeller brake control pushbutton

Test system of the smoke detectors in cargo

Oil pressure transmitter manifold

Main L/G retraction jacks fitting bolts

Aileron tab inboard hingepin

Automatic cut-off of the voice recorders

Fire extinguishing system

Nose landing gear retraction system

Emergency oxygen system for cabin attendants

Structure modification resulting from fatigue tests

Hydraulic system - Low pressure warning

Nose landing gear

Main landing gear

Nose landing gear

Engine and propeller flexible controls

(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes

Pitch trim controls

Flight control rods

Nose Landing Gear Nardi hinge pins

Karman fairing attachment clips

Main landing gear side brace pin

Protection of the electrical harness in front area

Corrosion on wing rear spar (ATA 57)

Engine nacelle drain system

Main landing Gear - Pins Magnaghi

Fuselage - Stringer 6 to frame 34 junction

De-icing procedures and protection improvements

Standby horizon - Power supply

Stick shaker/pusher system

Forward cargo compartment nets

Fuselage - Main landing gear actuator fitting

Karman fairing panel fasteners

Flight controls - Rudder

(Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes

Engine mount and upper engine fairing stiffener fouling

Rotron recirculation fan

Icing conditions - Revise the Airplane Flight Manual