LAW IN THE NEW TESTAMENT:

THE PARABLE OF THE TALENTS AND TWO LOGIA

By J. Duncan M. Derrett
(School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London)

The parable of the talents (or pounds) (Mt. xxv. 14-28; Lk. xix.
12-27) is not fully intelligible without technical information. References
to the legal background have so far been slight1. A contribution from
Professor JEAN DAUViLLiER2 has however thrown welcome light. Material necessary for the elucidation of the parable will throw light
also on two wandering logia. The problem of the original form of the
talents parable requires some reference to the legal knowledge which
the hearers of Jesus and their contemporaries can easily have drawn
upon when thinking about such a story. If we had legal information
directly from the time of Jesus we should be on firm ground. In
default of this we note the Babylonian material, the Talmudic material and the (ancient customary) Islamic material: proceeding inwards from both directions we can determine with sufficient sureness
what customs will have been familiar to Jesus' contemporaries. The
difference between the laws at both ends, as it were, of this timescale must be noted, for the sake of accuracy, but the final result is
not materially affected by the doubt which remains. The institution
of law which is explained in this article is also glanced at in the difficult
parable of the Unmerciful Servant, but that topic requires separate
attention.
1
J. JEREMIAS, Die Gleichnisse Jesu, 6th edn. (Gttingen, 1962) deals with the
parable at pp. 6560. Recognition of legal points is seen at 57 n. 1 and 69 n. 1. Some
practical considerations weigh with W. FOERSTER, "Das Gleichnis von den anvertrauten Pfunden", in Verbum Dei Manet in Aeternum (Festschrift f. 0. Schmitz, Witten,
1953), 3766. A. JLICHER, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu, II (Tbingen, 1910), 472493,
and L. FONCK, Die Parabeln des Herrn im Evangelium (Innsbruck, 1902) both show
the importance of apparently trifling details. C. H. DODD'S study of the third servant's
behaviour (Parables of the Kingdom, London, 1961, 108114) shows how details may
lead to a particular application he sees an attack on the Pharisees. The nature of
the over-caution and its cause needs further exploration. JEREMIAS would see the
lesser sums (Lk.) and the fewer servants (Mt.) as correct. This writer would incline
to favour the Matthaean scheme in both regards. On BILLERBECK'S contribution see
a comment below, n. 3.
2
"La parabole des mines ou des talents et le 99 du Code de Hammurabi",
M alanges Joseph Magnol (Paris, 1948), 153166. LAGRANGB in part anticipated him.
The author was (1589) somewhat influenced by the alleged allegorical sense of the
parable.

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The parable of the talents. Introduction

This writer accepts the view that both Lk. and Mt. preserve
versions of an original parable, and that the differences reflect different understandings of the function of that original or its successors.2*
But this paper is in no way influenced by any such considerations.
The residuum obtainable from both surviving versions subserves our
discussion adequately. The questions to be asked are these: what is
the master-servant relationship alluded to; what does the servant
expect to gain; what courses of conduct are open to him and what
are their implications? The material within the parable amounts to
this: a master is about to be absent; he hands cash to servants with
instructions (Lk.), or confidence (Mt.), that they should do business
with it. The master went away and was out of touch. On his return
the two first were found to have made profits, while the third had
buried (or hid) the money. The master praises the first two, rebukes
the third, making a particular remark about a bank, a peculiarly
specific point which has puzzled many.
The servants are not slaves. But they are dependants. Psychologically inhibited from free bargaining with their master, they are
legally capable of being related to him as mifassaqin, the correct
Jewish name for people who do business with other people's money,
partners with capitalists, themselves supplying all the skill and labour.
Mifassaqin naturally have rights and liabilities, and these are complicated when the capitalist is also their master.
The servants, as usually in the East, were quasi-relatives, even quasi-sons.
Commensality and loyalty exclude a strictly commercial relationship. They cannot
have been slaves. The Israelite slave can indeed act as agent for some purposes. Islamic
evidences are in places contradictory. But it is conclusive that the wide powers needed
for commercial enterprise and to protect the capital belong to a fully competent
agent, which a slave never can be8. Economically and psychologically our servants
represent freedmen under Roman law.
2a

Against the view of P. Jo on at Rech. Sc. Rel. XXIX (1939), 489494.

DAUVILLIER, 166. as an official: BAUER-ARNDT-GINGRICH 2, RENGSTORF, TWNT II, 26970. In Ptolemaic Egypt slaves could not be revenue farmers:
Rev. Laws, col. 15. C. PRiAUX, op. cit., inf., n. 32a, at p. 462. The agent is like the
principal, and partners are agents. Maliki law agrees: F. H. RUXTON, Maliki Law . . .
(London, 1916), 1937. Slaves transacting business for their masters are known in
Islam, and in pre-British India Gokha women sold at Rs. 60 each because of their
commercial ability, but there is no evidence that they engaged in litigation, granted
releases, etc., as a Jewish partner would have to do. BILLERBECK, Kommentar z. N. T.
aus Talmud und Midrasch, I (Munich, 1926/1961), 971, 6, misleads: only a free man
can represent another for purposes of litigation. A slave may well lend money as his
master's implement (as in Rome) but our men are engaged in trade ( =
3

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In the capital-services partnership, a phenomenon not limited to Asia4, one

partner (P, primus) invested capital with one or more trusted persons, each of whom
we may call S (secundus), not having capital of his own to adventure in partnership
with P. Each treated the other bona fide*. At the conclusion of the adventure or
periodically S rendered an account to P. S has ample discretion, and may choose
methods unforeseen by P6. Without a breach of faith by S a unilateral termination
of the partnership by P would not necessarily be valid7, and it might always be immoral. The proportion of profit to be taken by P and S respectively would be fixed
by agreement, or by custom. Customs would vary with the region, period, and state
and nature of the trade contemplated.
It was good to offer such a partnership to a poor man. R. Abba, in the name
of the third-century Pal. Amora R. Simeon b. Laqish, said: "He who lends is greater
than him who performs charity, and he who 'throws into a purse* is greater than all."
It was none the less righteous for its conducing to profit if S were honest and fortunate8.
: Pro. xxxi. 18). Billerbeck also thought that our earned what
they earned for their master. Upon such a view our verses (Mt. xxv. 24b, 26 b, Lk. xix.
21, 22 b) are hardly intelligible. On the meaning of eved = see also L. GULKOWITSCH, "Der kleine Talmudtraktat ber die Sklaven", , (1925), 87.
4

Exhaustive is B. BEINART (Prof. of Roman Law, Univ. of Cape Town), "Capital in partnership", Ada Juridica, 1961, 118155, essential for the understanding
of the parable. Business has features which are perennial. It was commonly assumed
that capital was more valuable than labour, thus the capital is not presumed (in the
absence of agreement) to be common property, i. e. it must be returned intact on
dissolution. The capitalist alone bears the risk of loss, and the merchant is never
debtor in respect of the capital. This corresponds to the qir d position. Services (Baldus ad Cod. IV. 37.1, num. 1315) correspond not to the capital but to its use, i. e.
interest. GROTIUS, De lur. B. et P., II, 12, 24. 1, conceives that capital may become
joint property (whereupon only a half must be returned the Jewish view), and
POTHIER, Societe, I, 4,16, favours community in capital in the absence of a contrary
intention. U. HUBER, Prael. lur. Civ., ad Inst. III. 26, num. 4 (c), says that equity
points the other way. VAN DER KEESSEL, Dictata ad Grotium, ad III. 21. 5, points out
the result but merchants did in practice insure capitalists against loss. BEIN ART
leans (140) to the presumption that the capital remains that of the capitalist, but he
recognizes the possibility of modification. If the merchant were the other's servant
(an uncontemplated modification), this would only reinforce the capitalist's right to
have his capital intact.
5
See protestations in P. Cair. Maspero 67158, 67169 (J. MASPERO, Cat., 11,1913,
113117).
6
Rabbis speak of "drinking beer", and reject it R. Tarfon and R. "Aqiba
illustrate this: Mid. R. Lev. XXXIV, 16 (trans., 444). Money intended to be invested
in a field was distributed in charity by the 'labouring' partner who, when challenged,
cited Ps. cxi/cxii. 9!
7
B. T., B. M. 69 ab = Sonc. trans., 402; 105 a = Sonc. 599.
8
B. T., Shab. 63 a = Sonc. 298. Merit increases with risk. Cf. Bets. 32 b =
Sonc. 165 (a refusal of an 'i$qa'). For "purse" meaning a deposit in business see W. F,
LEEMANS, Foreign Trade in the Babylonian Period (Leiden, 1960), 99.

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Merchants trading with the king's capital or a temple's8a were a feature of

ancient Babylonia9. Hammurabi deals with the obligations of such merchants10.
Solomon profited from his merchants11. Jews borrowed from kings. At 1 Mace. xiii. 15
there is an example. A Jewish parable depicts a king angry with a merchant at his
losses12. In a midrash a king opens his treasures to his minister to find that the latter
converts them into tainted assets13. The Jewish word 'i^q'1* (Heb. taq) retains the
idea of the relevant Akkadian root, meaning to 'cast lots', 'to divide', 'to allot property* between shares on an equitable basis15. Apparently the Heb. meaning 'business', 'affair' ('eseq) has developed from the sense of 'sharing',
8a
F. M. HEICHELHEIM, Ancient Economic History I (Leiden, 1958), 1278.
". .. foreign merchants of the ancient orient were almost completely dependent on
royal courts and estates, temples and nobles, who alone could lend them sufficient
capital..." See W. F. LEEMANS, The Old Babylonian Merchant: His Business and his
Social Position (Leiden, 1950), 122, n. 308.
9
E. SZLECHTER, tude Sociologique du Contrat de Societe en Babylonie (Paris,
1945), 97ff., 104ff.; Le Contrat de Societe en Babylonie, en Grece et a Rome (Paris, 1947),
54ff. G. R. DRIVER and Sir J. C. MILES, Babylonian Laws, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1955, 1956),
I, 186202; text and trans, of U (= 99) and 1003 are at II, 423. The
tamkrum gives ana tadmiqtim to the amallm (bagman, agent not a slave but a
paid servant Leeman, 1960, at p. 142, unaccountably calls him an apprentice or
helper, which latter he was, but much more, it would seem) and the latter trades
with it but is Liable for all capital if it is lost otherwise than in trading. The capitalist
was entitled to two-thirds of the profits: G. EISSER and J. LWY, Die altassyrischen
Rechtsurhunden vom Kltepe, Mitt. Vorder as. Ges. (Leipzig), XXXIII, 35 (3). This
partnership is distinguished from tapptim (partnership). Tamkrum could mean
merchant or moneylender. The tamkru (capitalists) were at some periods royal officials
(DRIVER and MILES, I, 120, 200, LEEMANS, 122). E. SZLECHTER inclines to the view
that Ham. 99103 referred to a *socie*te* en commandite' (i. e. an *i$q') with
modifications. An example appears at id., Tablettes Juridiques de la le Dynastie de
Babylonie (Geneve), Publ. Inst. Dr. Romain, Paris, XVI (Paris, 1958), pt. II, 1257
(the parties engage to return the capital if they lose, which conflicts with Ham.
1012). On the Babylonian soc. en comm. see id., "Revue Critique des Droits
Cun&fonnes. V", in Studia et Documenta Historiae et luris XXVIII (Rome, 1962),
470ff., at 4923 (harrnu Vertrag mit einseitiger Kapitalbeteiligung).
10
DRIVER and MILES supersede previous discussions.
11
I K. x. 28, also 15 = II Chr. ix. u (?).
12
Mid. R. Gen. VIII. 3 (I. ZIEGLER, Knigsgleichnisse des Midrasch, Breslau,
1903, 253, Anh., Ixxxviii).
18
Mid. R. Exod. XXXI, 15 (trans. S. M. LEHRMAN, 1939, 397). N. T. S. VII
(1961), 3778.
i* B. T., Bets. 32 b = Sonc. 165, B. M. 104 b105 a = Sonc. 598f. Maimonides,
Mishneh Torah, XII (Book of Acquisition), IV (Agents and Partners), vi, 1 (trans.
I. KLEIN, Yale Jud. Ser. 5, New Haven, 1955, p. 226).
15
Assyrian Dictionary (Chicago, Or. Inst.): isqu 1) lot (as a device to determine
a selection), 2) share (of income, assigned by lot), 3) fortune, 4) nature, power, esequ
2) to apportion lots or shares (see Assyrian Laws B 1). isihtu (by-form of isqu)
1) assignment, assigned working material, share (assigned to officials).

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The importance of *i$qa' was that, although a profit was obtained by P, no rate
of interest on his capital could be stipulated, and therefore usury could be avoided.
The Islamic counterpart is called qir d or mutfarabah16*, very ancient customary law,
well documented.

*Isqa was well known temp. Chr. See Sirach xlii. 3

and Gospel of Thomas, log. 64/6516. The word should
be rendered back into tit'asstqu17. In our parable it is actually alluded
to twice, once in the investments with the servants and again in the
hypothetical deposit with the bank.
The investment
Our (cf. p. 186) chose his S's from amongst his servants. Talmudic
law insists that all S's must become, if only ad hoc, servants of P18. The
Pharisees' rule, scrupulously avoiding a suggestion of usury, seems to
have agreed with actual custom. For the independent businessman
would not often be as attractive as the servant over whom P had
ultimate control.
We commence our investigation of the terms of the investment
with the Talmudic law, that nearest in time and circumstances to
those supposed in the parable. Under that system, which follows the
rule of the Nehardeans19, there could be a specific agreement as to
terms, and the proportions of profit to be taken by each. Naturally
15a

BEN ALI FEKAR, La Commande en Droit Musulman (Lyon, 1910). D. SANTILLANA, Istituzioni di Divitto Musulmano Malichita con Riguardo anche al Sistema
Sciafiita II (Rome, 1938), bk. X, ch. iv, 323334. C. HAMILTON (trans.), The Hedaya
or Guide ..., 2nd edn., S. G. GRADY (London, 1870), III, bk. xxvii, 454471. FREYTAG,
Lexicon (1837), 497: qaritfa mutuo creditoque dedit, ut lucri ex mercatura redeuntis certam partem cum sorte reciperet. Shafi'ite definition: a contract sui generis,
mixed of hire and partnership, with a predominance of hire of labour. Minhaj etTalibin (II, 132): "consigning to someone of a sum of money to be employed in commerce, the profit being on the common account". In modern Arabic mugarabah means
exactly "speculation", commercially or otherwise.
16
GUILLAUMONT and others, 1959, p. 37, pi. 92.1516, M. GRANT and D. N.
FREEDMAN, Secret Sayings of Jestts (London, 1960), 15960, which has a better
translation.
17
BILLERBECK, II, 252 suggests 'a$aq biphragmaty ' for the infinitive. See
JASTROW, Diet., 10989.
18
Mishnah, B. M. V. 4 (DANBY, 356; BLACKMAN, IV. 123), B. T., B. M. 68 a
69 a = Sonc. 397401. DAUVILLIER, 164. The rule that a mifa$$eq can in any case
claim 1/Q of the profit is much later Jewish law (n. 23 below) and does not apply to
our period.
19
Nehardea, a town in Babylonia near the junction of the Euphrates and the
Nahr Malka, was the seat of the academy rendered famous by Samuel and other
great rabbis.

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189

profit would not be calculated until the capital had been repaid
this is a universal feature. But if there were no agreement (as would
be the case between master and servant) half of the capital was considered a deposit in trust (the risk lying entirely with P), while the
other half was a debt, a loan to S20. When the *isqa was dissolved,
S must restore half the capital if so much or more had been lost in
business. S's expenses could not be recovered in such a case, and he
would bear them himself.
The reasoning is convincing. Better or worse terms subsisted at other periods.
In Babylonian law the merchant must repay the entire capital in any event (saving
force majeure)21. In Islamic law none of the capital is treated as a loan to S. P could
have no recourse to S's own funds to make good any loss (not due to S's fraud) at
the dissolution of the qirad2*. In between in time the Jewish rule is curiously intermediate in nature. P would not have invested unless he wanted fruit (interest), but
without S's labour there would have been no fruit. In the absence of agreement to
the contrary the labour of S must be presumed equivalent to the use of the capital
of P, and therefore P was entitled (so the Jewish businessmen believed) to the fruit
on half, and S to that on the other half. Only half of the capital is treated as a loan,
i. e. the half on which P was entitled to the 'interest'. His oath as a bailee discharges
S from liability for the other half.

What share of the net profit might our S's have expected if they
had not been servants ? Perhaps one-third23. But our S's were servants,
that is to say their maintenance would be the first charge on the
capital or its profits, if any. Their skill was already supposed to be
paid for. The proportion would be much less, and it would not be
bargained for in advance. A P who in fact profited much from his
*isqa would reward the honest S well24, who would obtain absolutely,
20
B. T., B. M. 104 b = Sonc. 598. plpD KJ^BI mV KpO*S7 ^. The
rule is connected with the ratio of Mishnah, B. M. V. 4.
21
SZLECHTER, Contrat, 68, relying on Ham, 102.
22
SANTILLANA, 330. HAMILTON, 454, 464.
23
So apparently in Babylonia. In the mud rabah (HAMILTON, 462), as in Roman
Law, half-and-half would be the rule, but variations are contemplated. In the qirdd
the texts (SANTILLANA, 326) suggest /3 or */4 (at 332, the usual proportion seems to
have been 1/3). Circumstances might at any time justify a partner's agreeing to accept
V8: P. Lond. V. 1705 (p. 110) (6th cent.), though half-and-half is almost universal
(e, g. P. Flor. Ill, 370, p. 91, A. D. 132). In late talmudic law the unpaid mifasseq
is entitled to x/6 of the profit as remuneration for handling the trust half of the capital,
giving him a total of 2/3 of the profit; and he bears only x/3 of the loss. This was not
generally accepted, but illustrates concern for the unpaid working partner. Maimonides, XII, IV, vi, 34 (trans., 2278).
24
Under the qira4 the proportion could be altered when the enterprise was over
(Santillana, 326). In Old Babylonia the tamk rum carrying on trade on behalf of the
palace would receive an ilkum (land or money in lieu thereof) as his reward (LEEMANS,
Old Bab. Merch., 125).

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J. Duncan M. Derrett, The parable of the talents and two logia

and relatively a larger share than would less successful, or suspect

servants.
The greater the risk the larger the percentage of profit is offered by the merchant.
Where risks are widely spread demand for capital falls as offers of capital increase,
and interest-rates fall. Hopes of participation in profit fluctuate with the anticipated
success; with the likelihood that success would encourage further investment and
better terms; and the recognition of the investor's actual risk. When many servants
were S's the competitive and comparative aspects were unavoidable.

The commencement of the relationship occurred when the cash

was committed to them. If we follow the qirad the partnership would
be perfected only by the actual commencement of trading25. According to Mt. the master committed amounts varying with the servants'
abilities, an entirely plausible scheme. No actual P would do otherwise, for no group of servants will lack differences in skill. Did the
third S originally have the smallest amount ? Possibly. But it is sufficient if he thought the amount too small for him.
The outcome and the third servant's behaviour
According to Mt. the first two servants multiplied the capital by
100 per cent, which is the minimum profit accepted under the laws
of Hammurabi26. They did what was expected of them. Both versions have two plausible features: the amount received as capital is
stated first there might have been a dispute at that point had it
been a real event27, and they speak as if their labour had no part
in the multiplication a piece of etiquette as prudent as it must
have been usual. Lk. shows the first servant reporting 1000 per cent,
a possible and most satisfactory result. The next's 500 per cent was
creditable. It is harder to double a small sum than to treble a large
one. The original parable might have had a mere skeleton: but the
lively force of the details cannot be denied.
Though Lk. may have embellished, the features of the third servant's behaviour seem original. The man buried the money and his
e
isqa3 never became alive. Lk., saying that he kept the money tied
up28 in a sudarium, accuses him of failing to keep the capital itself
safe, in itself a breach of the faithfulness required of a servant (who
25

SANTILLANA, 327, 333. Consent alone does not perfect a qirad.

DAUVILLIER emphasises this at 157, 161. Under 101 the capitalist is guaranteed a profit of 100%. The merchant is a defaulter if he reports less. For Indian
law to a similar effect see KAUTILYA, Arthasstra III. 11, 59 (trans. KANGLE, 1963,
112113).
27
Hanafi law dilates on who must be believed in a dispute as to the terms:
HAMILTON, 471.
28
Mishnaic language. For the sudarium see Mid. R. Levit. VI. 3 (trans. J.
ISRAELSTAM and J. J. SLOTKI, London, 1939, 80).
26

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is not a gratuitous bailee)29, but this prejudicial element is not essential to the parable. But why did he hide the money and not trade
with it ?
He claims fear. Was it over-caution and cowardice? Rather he
suspected he would be left with little of the profit, if any. He believed his master conformed to the (entirely appropriate) saying
which pillories a capitalist, or another, who derives (by intimidation
or otherwise) an inequitably high proportion from his investments30,
exploiting the relationship in question. Some capitalists used in the
ancient world to try to be leonine partners', and there is an inevitable
tendency to make the weaker party insure the other against all risks
without a premium.
We note in passing the discrepancy between
in Mt. and in Lk. The former, typical of wry Jewish
humour, is the equivalent of the Mishnaic herey shelch leph neych .
With this expression one disclaims responsibility and defies complaint31. The overtones are lost in Lk.
The sauciness of the speech is fascinating32. It both upbraids and
defies. The writer does not, as some, believe that he expected com29

A point observed by JEREMIAS. Safe keeping is thoroughly investigated at

Mishnah, B. M. III. 10,11 ( ANBY, 352, BLACKMAN, IV, 110111), B. T., B. M.,
42 a43 a = Sonc. 24956. Samuel said: Money can only be guarded in the earth.
BILLERBECK, I, 9712. A. W NSCHE, Neue Beitr ge (G ttingen, 1878), 317.
80
In Lk. there is a coincidence with a Greek and a Jewish maxim. Solon (Diog.
Laert. I, 57) , , quoted by Plato, De Leg. XI. 913 C as 6, . Josephus, Con. Ap. II, 27/28: , .
and again (30/31) ,
6 , , ' (the Greeks,
e. g.) ' . The Maxim refers to any unlawful gain including
theft. Job. xxxi. 8 recalls the maxim (Jo. iv. 36-8 is a paradox). Philo, Hypo. VII, 6
(COLSON, IX, 427) , * , ' '
' comes near to us. The supplementary brings in the peculiar
Jewish law that it is forbidden to reap self-sown crops in seventh and jubilee years
(the first observed temp. Chr.): Lev. xxv.5,11 (implication: "you will go to any length").
Mt. adjusts, loses the maxim, keeps the point, and adds the double entendre
of . This means (i) 'winnowed', (ii) 'scattered', (sown) in charity. Scattering (wasting) leads to wealth (sowing and winnowing): 2 Cor. ix. 6-13 (cf. Gal.
vi. 9-10), with citation of Ps. cxi/cxii. 9 (n. 6 above). Mt. indicates, the master acts
uncharitably towards dependants, why should he be served gratis (oriental dependants are always 'poor') ?
31
Mishnah, B.Q. IX, 2, X, 5. B. T., B.Q. 97 a = Sonc. 566; 98 a = Sonc. 568;
116 b = Sonc. 694; 117 b = Sonc. 703; Shev. 37 b = Sonc. 223. Illustrations: a stolen
coin is dropped in deep but clear water; or usurped land is inundated or occupied by
bandits or officials, who have extruded the owner. Also . . 79a.
82
Philo, Quis H eres, 622 (Colson, IV, 28695). Note ...
- v ...

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J. Duncan M. Derrett, The parable of the talents and two logia

mendation on the contrary this is what he seems to say: 'You

gave me too little. Have you so little confidence in me ? If there had
been any profit, I would have seen little of it. It was within my
discretion whether, as well as when, to commence trading. I decided
not to start, in the hopes of teaching you a lesson/ The oriental met
his dilemma with inaction. If he gained he would obtain a mere trifle
out of the profit; if he lost he would be without his expenses or would
have to pay (according to the Nehardean rule) half the capital out
of his own meagre funds.
Why did the servant omit to deposit the money with the bank32a ?
Because, out of the very small rate of interest which banks, engaged
in moneychanging and highly secure, petty investment, would be able
to pay32b, he, having made no contribution of labour, could expect
practically no share. Since the smallest and most secure business
would offer him nothing, he declined to do business at all.
The Gospel of the Hebrews version of this parable33, the translation of which gives trouble, seems to be a conflation with another,
possibly unknown, parable about unsatisfactory servants. This sort
of parable attracted, for a late Jewish text is vaguely parallel34.
The parable and the concept of trust
The Jews thought of God as doing business with men35. Commercial metaphors are commonplaces. In the famous multiple allegory
of R. cAqiba (Mishnah, ' vot III. 16) God's 'debtors' are candidates
for admission to a feast, another point of juncture with our parable
82a

Such deposits with a shulckaniy are dealt with at Mishnah, B. M. Ill, 11

(cited above). TOKOS (correct) does not mean usury, but increase (out of partnership
capital), is correct because the capital would remain his. In practice he would,
as we have seen, take all the increase for himself, or nearly all of it. A merchant partner had full authority to deposit with a bank: HAMILTON, 456. Bankers might handle
royal revenues, cf. in Galilee: Jos., Vita, ix, 38. C. PREAUX,
L' conomie Royale des Lagides (Bruxelles, 1939) 280, 291.
sab PRAUX, 282, mentions 24% as high. That was very low for international
trade.
38
Eusebius, Theoph., Migne, P. G. XXIV, 6856, reprinted HUCK-LIETZMANN,
Synapse, 180n. DODD, 113, n. 42. JEREMIAS deals with the Nazaraerevangelium at
op. cit., 55. An Indian parable is very similar. S 1 gaimed much, S 2 made no profit,
S 3 lost the capital = human life; profit = heaven. The parable is apparently
borrowed from a gospel. Full references apud R. GARBE, Indien und das Christentum
(T bingen, 1914), 423.
84
Zohar Hadash 47 b quoted by C. SCHOETTGENIUS, Horae Hebraicae (Dresden/
Leipzig, 1733), 217.
85
Mishnah, 'Avot I, 3, II, 14,15,16, II, l, 15, IV, 22, VI, 5. Mid. PS.. PS. 79
5 (trans. BRAUDE II, 46). Mid. R. Exod. XXXI. l = Sonc. 378.

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as given by Mt. God's 'business' with men is expressed in three contexts as a trust, or deposit for both safe and profitable keeping. These
are commonplaces. The soul is a deposit36. The Torah is likewise a
deposit to be worked with. Lastly the riches of the world are a trust
to be employed according to the Master's instructions, with cheerful
obedience, if we are to follow Deut. xxviii, cf. Lev. xxvi37. If men
are faithful they will prosper. They will lend to others38, and this
may be construed otherwise than historically. If they disobey they
will fail and have no credit39. A parable could bring the point home
to hearers who knew the scripture and might have assumed that it
was to be taken only symbolically. That the treasures of the world
are for man to exploit, and do not, in Jewish eyes, begin and end at
the rains to which the text is thought to refer39a, is shown by a
midrash already alluded to. Moses was God's partner () in
the world's riches39b. To illustrate the faithfulness with which these
treasures should be administered one need only point to the specific
obligation to lend (Lev. xxv. 35, Deut. xv. 7-8, Lk. vi. 35), which has,
however, no direct relation to our parable. It is conceivable that our
parable was intended to recall to its hearers the famous chapters
dealing with blessings and curses, and to reinforce the Deuteronomic
recommendation of service with joyfulness of heart40.
Lk. or his source seems to have rewritten the parable believing
that the money was entrusted as a test41. A test in loyalty led to the
notion of reward, reward in turn to the range of retribution with the
addition of u and 27. The test theme requires I7c and I9b, and
therefore the implausible equality of investment at 13 and the equally
implausible, trifling sums. But the money was not given as a test
the men were already his servants. Yet investment can detect unfaithfulness, and it is not impossible to imagine that detection was
suspected to have been behind the scheme from the first.
As a reward for faithfulness the first servant receives the money
taken from the third. The point is emphasised in Lk. Why? P not
88

Mid. R. Levit. XVIII, 1 (trans. 227), Tanhuma, Midrash Shofetim, 12 (264b).

Deut. xxviii is part of the sombre section known as at .
88
Deut. xv. , xxviii. 12.
89
Deut. xxviii. 44.
89a
Philo, Proem., 142 (Colson, VIII, 401), Leg, Alleg. Ill, 1046 (COLSON, I,
3713). Faithful depend on rain: Quod Deus, 156 (COLSON, III, 89), Quis Heres, 76
{COLSON, IV, 321). God's treasure is only of good: De Fug. xv. 79 (COLSON, V, 53).
Rain and Israel's merit: Mid. R. Deut. VII, 6, 7 (trans., 137-8, 139).
seb phiio, Vita Mos. I, 28 ( 1558: COLSON, VI, 357).
40
Deut. xxviii. 47. Sirach XI. 223. Bounties: 2 Cor. ix. 8. Whole-hearted:
Deut. xviii. is. Lack of faith in a worker: Mid. R. Levit. XIX, 2 (trans., 237).
41
W NSCHE, 317, refers to Mid. R. Exod. II (see Sonc. trans., 4851).
87

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194

J Duncan M. Derrett, The parable of the talents and two logia

only resumes the money, but terminates the *isqa in Mt. he terminates the master-servant relationship also. The partnerships of the
others naturally continued. Lk. shows administrative and fiscal responsibilities distributed41*, for which the servants were well fitted,
for tax-collectors and dealers in revenue monies were often the same
people and operated in partnership. The most successful servant was
naturally the one whose partnership capital was increased. The others
might object, and the master's ultimate share might be reduced. But
the apt logion follows. It is the way of the world. Capital chases the
lowest risk, even at the cost of interest!
In keeping with the concept of trust, one may suggest an application for the parable. A general application strikes this writer as
having a good claim. Moral generalities are worthy of pointed lessons.
Those who complain that God has dealt hardly with them, that they
are poor, stupid, oppressed, etc., may abandon piety as impractical.
They may chide God for expecting of them more than is equitable.
But this is not the spirit to adopt, says the parable. You may fail
in the search for perfection42, but persist, for if success is not met in
this world (which need not be excluded), there is the Messianic banquet hereafter. That is what Deut. xxviii, for example, promises to
those that serve in cheerfulness of heart. To those who survived the
destruction of Jerusalem that chapter may have seemed distinctly to
anticipate the penalty for failure to serve in the right spirit.
To him that hath . . /
This is obviously a saying, appearing appropriately as the culmination of the talents parable. Mt. xxv. 29 agrees with the version at
xiii. 12 in the explanatory (but perhaps genuine ?) ,
which tells us that giving increases the capital which the recipient
then has. Mk. iv. 25 agrees with Lk. viii. is, xix. 26, equally intelligible
with the Matthaean text. It seems paradoxical, its virtue as a saying.
How can anything be taken from him who has nothing ? It is not a
question of the rich and powerful receiving presents, nor of lending
to the solvent. If a merchant possessing capital shows a profit, people
eagerly offer him further capital, the trader who reports no profit
loses the capital entrusted to him. From him that has not (profit to
show) is taken (withdrawn) even that (capital) which he still has. This
remains true.
41a
See SHERWIN-WHITE, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament
(Oxford, 1963), 133.
42
Note that mi?a$eq means (i) a businessman (as we have seen), and also
(ii) a genuine student of the Torah (JASTROW, ubicit.,n. 17 sup.).

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, * ...
Lk. xii. 48 b was understood by the evangelist to throw light on
the different treatment awaiting individuals with different degrees of
knowledge of God's will, but the saying is cryptic and perhaps always
had a double entendre, and are in antithesis. The
first means 'paid' (wages) and the second 'deposited' in the unexpected sense43 of entrusted for trade. A movement from to
(note in the next verse) by way of is
possible. The contrast is, apparently, between those who receive something to be returned in equal measure (as a friendly donation or deposit for safe keeping) and those who receive many and valuable
pledges and as a result are constantly applied to for loans. The more
and more valuable the pledges they accept, the more readily people
beg large sums from them. Further (and here the application to servants is valid) money is entrusted to a man, in keeping with his
success. The more entrusted to him the larger the profits expected
from him. It is easier to multiply a large sum than a small one. The
parable showed that proportionately most could be expected of the
servant who received the largest investment.
No equal exchange is desired, or is possible, for the soul, the
Torah, or the treasures of the world. But the demands made on the
depositary are substantial*.
(Finished 15 Sept. 1964)
43

BAUER-ARNDT-GINGRICH 2bcc. C. SPICQ, "Saint Paul et laLoi des Depots",

Rev. Bibl., XL (1931), 481602, A. EHRHARDT, "Parakatatheke", Z. Sav. St., R. A.,
LXXV (1968), 3290; LXXVI (1969), 4809.
* The writer acknowledges with gratitude the assistance, by way of references
and otherwise, of M. E. SZLECHTER, of Dr. H. W. F. SAGGS, of Professor ROBERT
BRUNSCHVIG and of FR. H. JAEGER, und bedankt sich an dieser Stelle recht herzlich
f r die Anregungen, die ihm von Herrn Dr. P. STUHLMACHER (T bingen) zuteil geworden sind.

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