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30 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of Employers Under

Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract


On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an
employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When
he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train
was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly
moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to
the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his
arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few
meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed
to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and
a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article
2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

Marikina Auto Line transport Corp. vs. People


MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owneroperator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned
as the regular driver of the bus.
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus
along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of

P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto
offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus
company for damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law,
negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.
xxx
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an
emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep
coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus.
The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the
right side of the road or highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different course of action is required in the
interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable
difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an
animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles
coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same
direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall
be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall
drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and
proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition
then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a
speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will
permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time
of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto

violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the
right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos defense, in light of his contradictory
testimony vis--vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the
commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven
by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong
impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was
traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion
finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the
Court stated that "physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the
incident. The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the
accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop
when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident
or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his
testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was
because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop.
But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from
EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material
points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the
variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such
inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his
prudence and diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted
had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent
as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit
the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was
driving too fast in a usually crowded street.
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint
against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime
charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.

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