Guisan, A Political Theory of Identity PDF

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013
A Political Theory of Identity in

European Integration
This book provides a theoretical and historical examination of the speech and
deeds of the European Communities founders, and discusses the relevance of
their practices to meet current political challenges such as Turkeys EU accession
and reconciliation in the Western Balkans.
Using a fresh and innovative approach, this monograph connects political theory
with concrete political practices. It introduces the reader to major contemporary
Western political thinkers, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Jrgen Habermas, Paul
Ricoeur and Charles Taylor, who shared the concerns of European founders for
rebuilding shattered societies, and developed analytical categories helpful for the
interpretation of European integration. The books empirical evidence draws upon
over 100 interviews, memoirs, autobiographies and essays of elite and grassroots
actors across the history of the European Union, from the founding of the European
Coal and Steel Community in 195052 to the negotiations of the 2009 Lisbon
Treaty. By focusing on the philosophical interpretation of the lived experiences of
the EC/EU founders and of the treaty texts they wrote, as sources of shared identity,
this thoroughly original inquiry constitutes the first comprehensive study to connect EU memories with specific policies, and contributes to our understanding of
the political tradition born of European integration.
A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration: Memory and policies
will be of strong interest to students and scholars of EU studies, European politics
and contemporary political theory.
Catherine Guisan is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science at the University of Minnesota and the author of Un sens LEurope:
Gagner la paix (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003).
Routledge advances in European politics
1 Russian Messianism
Third Rome, revolution, Communism and after
Peter J.S. Duncan
2 European Integration and the Postmodern Condition
Governance, democracy, identity
Peter van Ham
3 Nationalism in Italian Politics
The stories of the Northern League, 19802000
Damian Tambini
4 International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995
Edited by Peter Siani-Davies
5 Widening the European Union
The politics of institutional change and reform
Edited by Bernard Steunenberg
6 Institutional Challenges in the European Union
Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrn
7 Europe Unbound
Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union
Edited by Jan Zielonka
8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans
Nationalism and the destruction of tradition
Cathie Carmichael
9 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe
The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and
Eastern European countries, 19911998
Christian W. Haerpfer
10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro

The power of ideas
Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer
11 Europe
A Nietzschean perspective
Stefan Elbe
12 European Union and E-Voting
Addressing the European Parliaments internet voting challenge
Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel and Fernando Mendez
13 European Union Council Presidencies
A comparative perspective
Edited by Ole Elgstrm
14 European Governance and Supranational Institutions
Making states comply
Jonas Tallberg
15 European Union, NATO and Russia
Martin Smith and Graham Timmins
16 Business, The State and Economic Policy
The case of Italy
G. Grant Amyot
17 Europeanization and Transnational States
Comparing Nordic central governments
Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lgreid and Ove K. Pedersen
18 European Union Enlargement
A comparative history
Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jrgen Elvert
19 Gibraltar
British or Spanish?
Peter Gold
20 Gendering Spanish Democracy
Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente
21 European Union Negotiations
Processes, networks and negotiations
Edited by Ole Elgstrm and Christer Jnsson
22 Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Stephen C. Calleya
23 The Changing Face of European Identity

A seven-nation study of (supra)national attachments
Edited by Richard Robyn
24 Governing Europe
Discourse, governmentality and European integration
William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr
25 Territory and Terror
Conflicting nationalisms in the Basque country
Jan Mansvelt Beck
26 Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe
Claus Hofhansel
27 Popular Protest in East Germany
Gareth Dale
28 Germanys Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic
Ostpolitik revisited
Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff
29 Kosovo
The politics of identity and space
Denisa Kostovicova
30 The Politics of European Union Enlargement
Theoretical approaches
Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
31 Europeanizing Social Democracy?
The rise of the party of European socialists
Simon Lightfoot
32 Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics
Johannes Lindner
33 Gibraltar, Identity and Empire
E.G. Archer
34 Governance Stories
Mark Bevir and R.A.W Rhodes
35 Britain and the Balkans

1991 until the present
Carole Hodge
36 The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

John OBrennan
37 Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy
Edited by Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners
38 European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe
Pami Aalto
39 Democracy in the European Union
Towards the emergence of a public sphere
Edited by Liana Giorgi, Ingmar Von Homeyer and Wayne Parsons
40 European Union Peacebuilding and Policing
Michael Merlingen with Rasa Ostrauskaite
41 The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945
At the heart of Europe?
N.J. Crowson
42 E-Government in Europe
Re-booting the state
Edited by Paul G. Nixon and Vassiliki N. Koutrakou
43 EU Foreign and Interior Policies
Cross-pillar politics and the social construction of sovereignty
Stephan Stetter
44 Policy Transfer in European Union Governance
Regulating the utilities
Simon Bulmer, David Dolowitz, Peter Humphreys and Stephen Padgett
45 The Europeanization of National Political Parties
Power and organizational adaptation
Edited by Thomas Poguntke, Nicholas Aylott, Elisabeth Carter,
Robert Ladrech and Kurt Richard Luther
46 Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States
Dynamics of choice, duties and participation in a changing Europe
Edited by Bjrn Hvinden and Hkan Johansson
47 National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union

From victims of integration to competitive actors?
Edited by John OBrennan and Tapio Raunio
48 Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980

The totality of relationships
Eamonn OKane
49 The EU and the European Security Strategy
Forging a global Europe
Edited by Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson
50 European Security and Defence Policy
An implementation perspective
Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskait
51 Women and British Party Politics
Descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation
Sarah Childs
52 The Selection of Ministers in Europe
Hiring and firing
Edited by Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont
53 Energy Security
Europes new foreign policy challenge
Richard Youngs
54 Institutional Challenges in Post-Constitutional Europe
Governing change
Edited by Catherine Moury and Lus de Sousa
55 The Struggle for the European Constitution
A past and future history
Michael ONeill
56 Transnational Labour Solidarity
Mechanisms of commitment to cooperation within the
European Trade Union movement
Katarzyna Gajewska
57 The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union
Edited by Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson,
and Thomas Persson
58 The European Union and Global Social Change

A critical geopolitical-economic analysis
Jzsef Brcz
59 Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe

Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski
60 EU Enlargement and Socialization
Turkey and Cyprus
Stefan Engert
61 The Politics of EU Accession
Turkish challenges and Central European experiences
Edited by Lucie Tunkrov and Pavel aradn
62 The Political History of European Integration
The hypocrisy of democracy-through-market
Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Strth
63 The Spatialities of Europeanization
Power, governance and territory in Europe
Alun Jones and Julian Clark
64 European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy
When and why do they work?
Clara Portela
65 The EUs Role in World Politics
A retreat from liberal internationalism
Richard Youngs
66 Social Democracy and European Integration
The politics of preference formation
Edited by Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos
67 The EU Presence in International Organizations
Edited by Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis
68 Sustainability in European Environmental Policy
Challenge of governance and knowledge
Edited by Rob Atkinson, Georgios Terizakis and Karsten Zimmermann
69 Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations
A Sisyphean Story
Edited by Armagan Emre akir
70 Europeanization and Foreign Policy

State diversity in Finland and Britain
Juha Jokela
71 EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts

Stealth intervention
Nicu Popescu
72 Switzerland in Europe
Continuity and change in the Swiss political economy
Edited by Christine Trampusch and Andr Mach
73 The Political Economy of Noncompliance
Adjusting to the single European market
Scott Nicholas Siegel
74 National and European Foreign Policy
Towards Europeanization
Edited by Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill
75 The European Union Diplomatic Service
Ideas, preferences and identities
Caterina Carta
76 Poland within the European Union
New awkward partner or new heart of Europe?
Aleks Szczerbiak
77 A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration
Memory and policies
Catherine Guisan
A Political Theory of
Identity in European
Integration
Memory and policies

Catherine Guisan
First published 2012

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
2012 Catherine Guisan

The right of Catherine Guisan to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Guisan, Catherine.
A political theory of identity in European integration :
memory and policies / Catherine Guisan. p. cm.
(Routledge advances in European politics ; 77)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. European federation. 2. Group identityEuropean Union countries.
3. European Union countriesEconomic integrationPolitical aspects.
I. Title. II. Series.
JN15.G844 2011
341.242'2dc22
2011017181
ISBN13: 9780415562911 (hbk)
ISBN13: 9780203357460 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon
In memory of Andrew
For Nicolas and Marijke and my students from four continents
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of abbreviations
xiv
xvii
Principles of action or clichs? Why hermeneutics matters to

European integration
After the deluge: the principle of reconciliation
21
Remembering the principle of reconciliation: applications
45
Of power and purgatory: building the European Communities
60
Enlargements and the recognition of the Other: the case of

Turkey
83
The question of the demos: truth-telling and right-speaking
106
EU borders and the enlarged mentality
127
Appendix: list of interviews and questionnaires for elite

interviews, 1999 and 2008
Notes
Bibliography
Index
149
155
201
225
Acknowledgments
I had the privilege to be taught from birth to be a European. My well-rooted

French-speaking Swiss grandparents Franois Guisan and Ccile Piguet gave me
a sense of place and of scholarship. My Greek grandparents Basil Demetriades and
Sevasti Maliara had the sadness to leave their beloved Constantinople, and never
quite adjusted to life in Switzerland. Over many cups of Turkish coffee I learned
from them and my extended diaspora family that there are at least four points
of view to any issue. My parents Louis Guisan and Hlne Demetriades were in
public causes, which familiarized me with the notion of the world so dear to
Hannah Arendt, one of the inspirations for this book. May they all be thanked for
their contributions to my education, which fostered my love of Europe, and of the
complicated theoretical arguments and sympathetic exchanges of the heart, which
were crucial in writing this book.
This project started 16 years ago with a modest pre-doctoral paper on the European Coal and Steel Community founders and the democratic deficit, which eventually turned into a dissertation at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. I am
grateful to former Commission President Jacques Delors for encouraging me to
approach the ditions Odile Jacob, which published my Un sens lEurope: Gagner la paix (19502003) in 2003. I thank my editor for her trust in this first book,
which opened many doors on the European continent.
I thank Ian Manners for strongly encouraging me to publish a study of EU
politics from the point of view of political theory in English. I needed the push,
because as late as 2003 there were few AngloAmerican political theorists venturing into the field of EU studies. This has changed fortunately. My teaching also
introduced me to new fields of scholarship in immigration studies, memory, the
politics of reconciliation, international governance and cosmopolitanism, which
served me well in conceiving this second book.
I would like to thank especially the Members of the European Parliament, the
Commission, Council and European Parliament officials, the collaborators of Jean
Monnet, and the academics who were willing to spend an hour, and often more, to
respond to my questions. Not all are cited in this book, but all made a tremendous
contribution to my education for which I am profoundly grateful. I was gratified
by their willingness to engage in perhaps unusual theoretical arguments on great
contemporary thinkers such as Arendt, Jrgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Paul
Acknowledgments xv
Ricoeur, to discuss EU politics (see list of interviewees in appendix). I would like
to give a special mention to the three close collaborators of Jean Monnet: Max
Kohnstamm, Jacques-Ren Rabier and Henri Rieben, who shared so generously
their thoughts with me, while at the same time strongly disagreeing with some of
my interpretations. Having knowledgeable critics is a gift. I thank also Franoise
Nicod, archivist at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour lEurope, Lausanne, for her
dedicated and expert support for my research, and the Fondation for generously
providing an office whenever I needed one for my work.
I thank my colleagues and friends Raymond Duvall, Ron Holzacker, Kemal
Kirici, Ian Manners, Leigh Payne, Kathryn Sikkink, Margaret Smith, Theofanis Stavrou and Antonio Vazquez-Arroyo for being willing to read and critique
chapters of this book. Their insights were invaluable. I am most appreciative of
my friend and dissertation adviser Mary Dietzs ongoing interest in my progress;
I love those animated conversations on hot button topics like truth in politics. I
thank also the anonymous reviewers of the book proposal who got me going with
much food for thought, and Michelle Pace and William Scheuerman for their judicious comments as always.
I am indebted to the Political Theory and International Relations colloquia so
ably organized by the University of Minnesota Department of Political Sciences
graduate students. They provided intellectual stimulation and welcome breaks for
the solitary writer, and gave me a chance to try out chapters on a willing and
critical audience. I would like to single out Andrew Dickinson for his insightful support and suggestions, Ross Edwards, Mark Hoffman and Garnet Kindervater who got me to read Levinas and Ricoeur, Sergio Valverde, and Esen Kirdi
for her helpful comments on Chapter 5. I thank also my undergraduate students
at the University of Minnesota and University of Utrecht, Netherlands for many
thought-provoking exchanges.
At the most practical and financial level my extended network of friends, family and former NGO colleagues provided shelter, encouragement and contacts
and made possible my ambitious attempt to combine political theory, face-toface interviews and policy studies to interpret the ethos of European integration.
I would like to recognize especially Marjolaine Chevallier, Michel and Catherine
Koechlin in Strasbourg, Charles and Juliette Danguy in Yutz, Lorraine; HlneMarie Blondel, Lette Maton, Ambroise Perrin, Lili Joubin and Alicia PerrinJoubin in Brussels, Lisbeth and Philippe Lesserre in Paris, Lis and Maarten de
Pous-Davey and Hennie and Johannes de Pous-de Jonge in The Hague, Nicolas
Dickinson and Marijke de Pous in Rotterdam, and Hlne Guisan in Lausanne. I
am indebted also to the citizens of all ages and many nationalities, whom I met in
a taxi or a train, at a coffee terrace, in homes and offices, from Britain to Greece,
and who willingly shared with me their thinking and experiences.
I thank Mitch Ogden, Assistant Director of the Writing Center at the University
of Minnesota, for his very professional rereading of the text and his enormously
helpful critical comments. Mitch knows how to encourage and prod at the same
time. I am grateful to my editor cum life partner Steve Dickinson for providing expert support when it mattered, with the assistance of my friend and former
xvi Acknowledgments
student Lucy Saliger. They got me through the finish line. Finally I thank my editor Heidi Bagtazo at Routledge and her collaborators Harriet Frammingham and
Alexander Quayle for all their hard work. Heidi and Alex graciously extended
the deadline several times, and guided me through the details of book publishing.
A special thanks goes to Clare Weaver for her diligent editing and many helpful
queries and suggestions and to Caroline Watson and Richard Willis for skillfully
overseeing the final editing and production of this monograph. Nothing is possible without action in concert, just as Arendt surmised. It remains that I am
responsible for all the interpretations offered here, and that any and all mistakes
are mine.
Abbreviations
ACP
CAP
CBM
CC
CEEC
CFSP
DG
DM
DTEU
EBRD
EC
EC-6
ECB
ECJ
ECSC
EDC
EEAS
EEC
EFSF
EIB
EMS
EMU
ENA
ENP
EP
EPC
ESDI
ESDP
EU
EU-12
EU-27
EULEX
Euratom
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

Common Agricultural Policy
Community Building Mitrovica
Candidate Country
Central and Eastern European Country
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Directorate General
Deutschmark
Draft Treaty on European Union
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
European Communities
European Communities of six Member States
European Central Bank
European Court of Justice
European Coal and Steel Community
European Defense Community
European External Action Service
European Economic Community
European Financial Stability Facility
European Investment Bank
European Monetary System
Economic and Monetary Union
cole nationale dadministration
European Neighborhood Policy
European Parliament
European Political Community
European Security and Defense Identity
European Security and Defense Policy
European Union
12 EU Member States who acceded in 2004 and 2007
European Union of 27 Member States
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
European Atomic Energy Community
xviii List of abbreviations

FJM
Fondation Jean Monnet pour lEurope
FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
FRONTEX EU Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders
GDP
Gross domestic product
GDR
German Democratic Republic
HA
High Authority of the ECSC
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICTY
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IGC
Intergovernmental Conference
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IofC
Initiatives of Change
IR
International Relations
JHA
Justice and Home Affairs
KFOR
NATO Kosovo Force
MEP
Member of the European Parliament
MGK
National Security Council (Turkey)
MP
Member of Parliament
MRA
Moral Re-Armament
NA
National Assembly (France)
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NPE
Normative Power Europe
OEEC
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RECOM
Regional Commission (for former Yugoslavia)
SI
Scholars Initiative
TEC
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
TEU
Treaty on European Union
TCN
Third-country national
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UNHCR
UN High Commission for Refugees
UNMIK
United Nations Mission in Kosovo
WEU
Western European Union
WTO
World Trade Organization
WWI
World War One (191418)
WWII
World War Two (193945)
Principles of action or clichs?
Why hermeneutics matters to

Introduction1
European integration provokes intense political strife among Europeans. This
book takes the view that on balance and so far European integrations positive
outcomes outweigh the negative ones. This should not be construed as a prediction
of similar outcomes in the future, but it heightens the relevance of an inquiry into
the putative political European identity(ies), because a political project needs the
underpinning of shared self-understandings. A new political science is needed for
a world itself quite new, Tocqueville wrote about the still young American political experience.2 Likewise the successive foundings of European integration broke
with the past, and therefore cannot appeal to a pre-established sense of identity for
legitimacy. This book retrieves elements of an EC/EU shared identity by interpreting philosophically the ethical and political practices of the founding actors. This
approach, quite common in the study of American political roots, may seem less
applicable to the technocratic projects of European integration.3 Yet repeatedly,
policies have been implemented that eschew explanation from the point of view
of economic self-interest or national power politics alone. To date, much of the
scholarship on European integration has overlooked, or misinterpreted, the selfunderstandings of political actors central to the process.4 This has made it difficult
to fill the rather blank category of European identity with meaningful content.
This book is the first to draw from the interpretation of the speech and deed of the
founders (elite and non-elite) of the EC/EU as a source of shared identity.5 Major
political theorists of a post-Holocaust political order provide the framework for
a content analysis of these texts, which transcends the national level of reference
and connects empirical evidence with philosophical reflections. This thoroughly
original attempt to connect novel political practices with innovative political theory sheds light on the relevance of hermeneutics to EU studies, and provides fresh
evidence and a new interpretation of the role of ideals and their relation to interests
in the process of EC/EU identity formation.
The fact that former enemy nations could pool the production and marketing of
coal and steel in the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), only six
years after the end of a murderous conflict, is too often taken for granted, or justified primarily by economic calculations.6 Such accounts, however, do not disclose
Why hermeneutics matters to European integration
how participants in the European founding dealt with their historical memories
of war, invasion and mutual exploitation, and how they could trust one another
enough to put their war industries under a common authority with no hegemonic
power mediating conflicts. As a result, the much-touted European reconciliation
remains a concept devoid of concreteness and with little apparent relevance to
current conflicts and the resurgence of national populism in several EU Member
States.7 Neither has there been enough attention paid to how European founders
understood community, a word laden with emotional and affective connotations,
and which they chose very deliberately to name their highly technocratic enterprise. The reexamination of the negotiations of the European Economic Community (EEC) elucidates the conceptual break with an ancient understanding of
political power that was effected rather unselfconsciously at the time: it was to be
action in concert rather than domination over the other. And to interpret the meaning of the accession to the European Union (EU) of 12 new Member States since
2004, I suggest that the Hegelian concept of recognition is a more useful lens than
the concepts of enlargement, reunification or, worst, absorption.
Exploring the ethical politics of European integration is important for scholarly
purposes, and it matters also politically. Voluntary associations such as the EU
rest on a sense of common identity formed around ideals and traditions, as well as
on material and security interests. But many EU citizens, and even some of their
leaders, express confusion as to what this common tradition might be.8 The heated
debates leading to the French, Dutch and Irish rejections of major EU treaties illustrate this lack of common understanding. Scholars and public figures engaged in
conflict-resolution efforts often cite European integration as a model to follow;9 but
what is to be emulated? Specific economic policies and legal arrangements may not
be transferable. However, issues of trust and truth-telling, of personal and collective
accountability for past deeds, of the tension between economic and political imperatives are not unique to the European context. Focusing on the self-understanding of
important actors in the process can help illuminate a more hidden yet vital factor for
the success of the enterprise. As Andrew Moravcsik writes, it is important to generalize the European experience, because By subsuming European integration
wherever possible under general theories, rather than treating it as sui generis, we
invite outsiders to treat its lessons as relevant to their own experience.10 Moravcsik
concludes that the European experience fits the liberal rather than the realist view of
International Relations because primarily the commercial interests of the nationstates involved have driven it. My conclusion is different: I interpret the European
integration experience as a political theorist, and commercial interests, seen through
this lens, are too simple an explanation for this complex phenomenon.11
This is less a work of explanation, however, than a work of memory and interpretation. As Paul Ricoeur reminds us, founding stories help ground the political
community. These narratives may consist in fictional or historical accounts, and
they remain open for rectification and retelling, as the debates on the meaning of the
French Revolution or the German Historikerstreit demonstrate. In fact, controversies help build the democratic political community. What is striking in the case of
European integration is that such narratives are almost entirely missing. Where are
Why hermeneutics matters to European integration 3

the founding stories of the ECSC or the Treaty of Maastricht or the enlargements?
There is little memory although there is history. What is the difference? For Ricoeur,
the work of memory is an ambition, an attempt to be faithful to the past, an
action-oriented responsibility of citizenship, whereas history, the task of professional
historians, aims at truth. Memory and history both matter politically, and what links
them is the testimony of those who can say, I was there! Believe me or not. And if
you do not believe me, ask someone else! Ricoeur wishes for a happy memory,
that is a memory reconciled to the tragic roots of all political foundings, which are
born out of violence. Such a memory is a hard-won gift, granted to those who have
done the work of mourning and moved beyond melancholia, a paralyzing denial
of loss, which Freud analyzed in Mourning and Melancholia. This is what makes
the capable human being.12 So we may ask: could the lack of memory in the EU
be caused partly by an all too successful exorcism of the past? I leave the question
open; the need for memory(ies), constitutive of identity, remains.13
Political theorists and the ECSC/EC/EU politics

How can we interpret (or generalize) political experiences in a manner respectful of the intents of their initiators, yet also analytical and critical? There is no
direct access to identity for any subject, singular or collective. The road from self
to self is through the other and never reaches the Hegelian promised land: To
interpret meaning is, for Ricoeur, to arrive in the middle of an exchange which
has already begun and in which we seek to orient ourselves in order to make
new sense of it. This exchange takes place in the midst of various long intersubjective relations, mediated by various social institutions, groups, nations and
cultural traditions: it leads the individual to a kind of second navet, propitious
for action, yet self-reflective.14 Twentieth-century political thinkers who took
seriously the challenge of rebuilding a world in ruins have created some of the
long intersubjective relations, in the midst of which hermeneutics can deploy
its best effects. Hannah Arendts reflections on natality, plurality, forgiveness and
promise, action and thinking, and the responses of Arendtian scholars, provide me
with my main interpretative categories.15 I also draw from Isaiah Berlins discussion of pluralism, Karl Jaspers exploration of collective responsibility, Jrgen
Habermas discourse ethics, and Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeurs concepts of
recognition. What makes this conceptual framework meaningful is that both the
actors and thinkers share one urgent concern: to invent new forms of political life
in Europe after the murderous wars of the early twentieth century. They also hold
in common several opinions: social reality does not consist merely of hard and
immutable facts, but of the self-understandings of those who act and, therefore,
it can change, and human agency matters politically; the past must be accounted
for without pre-empting the future, hence the need for civic self-reflection and
the letting go of hatred; in the nuclear age, violence is an obsolete means to solve
international disputes; politics as a discursive and ongoing process of conflict
resolution, arbitrated by the most persuasive argument, must progress beyond
national borders.
Jaspers and Arendt: actors and thinkers in dark times

There is no need for theorists to have thought positively or at length about a particular political phenomenon to develop useful concepts for its analysis. Arendt
and Jaspers endorsed the project of European integration enthusiastically in the
late 1940s. But Jaspers became more interested in world unity than European
unity, and turned away from the European Communities by 1964 for the sake of
German security, condemning Adenauers policy of rapprochement with France,
because if we play up to De Gaulle we are disloyal to America. Yet his discussion of German guilt, which illuminates both the virtues of self-incrimination, and
its political pitfalls a form of disempowerment and his insistence on the sharing of responsibility for recovery after major political breakdowns are relevant to
the early years of European integration.16
In contrast to Jaspers, Arendt was suspicious of world government. Freedom
could only exist as a living political reality if national laws hedged it in. The
1954 French National Assemblys rejection of the European Defense Community
(EDC) and Political Community with their transeuropean representative institutions disappointed her greatly. Twenty years later she had this to say in The
Origins of Totalitarianism:
The attempts to build up a European elite with a program of intra-European
understanding based on the common experience of the concentration camps
have foundered in much the same manner as the attempts following the first
World War to draw political conclusions from the international experience of
the front generations. In both cases it turned out that the experiences themselves could communicate no more than nihilistic banalities.17
Arendt indicted (among others) the bourgeois, moved by materialistic considerations, whom she contrasted with the citizen motivated by the will to principled
action. The 1957 Treaties of Rome may have struck her as one more of these
merely material pursuits, and I will draw from her controversial distinction
between economics and politics to analyze the principle of power as action in
concert, which moved to action the Treaties negotiators according to my account.
Like other victims of Nazism, Arendt continued to wrestle with her relationship
to the Germans after the war. She linked the human capacity for political initiatives (natality) with promise and forgiveness, which palliate the unpredictability
and irreversibility of human action. She was one of the first to make forgiveness
a concept relevant to politics (she does not apply the term reconciliation to peacemaking), releasing it out of the preserve of familial and communal relationships
and theological discourses.
Charles Taylor and Jrgen Habermas: contemporary theorists
Charles Taylor and Jrgen Habermas, in contrast to Arendt and Jaspers, have
witnessed more recent developments of the EC/EU. Their strongly participatory view of politics makes them well aware of the weaknesses of this process.

Nonetheless, they exhibit cautious optimism. In recent years Habermas has
shifted his attention from European to global governance, proposing a threetiered system of institutions of decision-making at the national, transnational
(regional) and supranational levels. But the European Union experience continues to shape his more policy-oriented proposals, while his discourse ethics
remains a reference for EU scholars studying the EU democratic deficit.18 Taylor
draws lessons from the EU experience to solve problems much closer to home.
Commenting on the status of Quebec in his native Canada, he suggests an innovative solution to overcome the Canadian impasse by distinguishing between
the nineteenth-century FrenchAmerican model of direct membership in an
exclusive polity, and a new model, the European model where citizens belong
to the larger entity via their membership in constituent societies. Citizens of the
English-speaking provinces may choose to be Canadian citizens according to
the FrenchAmerican nation-state model while the Quebecois who stress their
belonging to a distinct society could follow the EU model.19 Implicit in Taylors
argument is his acknowledgment that the EU offers a viable model for the difficult politics of recognition of his homeland. In spite of their knowledgeable
interest in European integration affairs, Habermas and Taylor do not derive their
main political categories from the study of European integration any more than
Arendt or Jaspers did.
Isaiah Berlin and Paul Ricoeur: distant observers
Isaiah Berlin displays an astonishing knowledge of European intellectual and
philosophical tradition, but scant theorizing announced the politics of European
integration, which may explain his apparent neglect of this issue. He makes no
mention of it in The Pursuit of the Ideal, a largely autobiographical essay by
his own account; nor does he comment on it in his wide-ranging conversations
with Ramin Jahanbegloo shortly before his death. However, Berlins discussion
of pluralism, that is, the conception that there are many different ends that men
may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each
other and sympathizing and deriving light from each other, and his stress on
fantasia, a type of empathy that one should develop even for the opponent, provide rich theoretical resources to reflect on the ECSC/EC/EU representations of
differences.20 Paul Ricoeur is another encyclopedic thinker who does not engage
directly with the project of Europe integration, but considers it with sympathy. He
sees the need for a market to serve as the basis of unification for Europe, and
new institutions with the rest of the world to solve the problem of the multiplicity of nation-states. The fundamental challenge underlying these economic and
political arrangements, however, is spiritual: narratives of founding are missing
to provide some basis of unity for the diversity within the culture. Ricoeurs
hermeneutics of memory and identity provides the theoretical justification and the
methodology for my interpretation of European integration.21
All memory is of the past, writes Ricoeur.22 His concern is that the hard
work of recollecting the past must be kept carefully separate from experiencing
the present or expecting the future. This is less a temporal than a psychological
distinction, an attempt to keep interpretations of the past faithful to the past as
lived experiences, as undistorted by current sensations and/or anticipations of the
future as possible. For interpretive work, which seeks to discover the meaning
of practices in specific social contexts, identity has everything to do with selfinterpretation. Taylor argues that a crucial feature of human agency is that we
cannot do without some orientation to the good, that we each are essentially (i.e.
define ourselves at least inter alia by) where we stand on this.23 In other words,
identity and visions of the good intersect with the capacity to take action. Where
might we search for EU visions of the good? My response is to study how ECSC/
EC/EU initiators (elite and non-elite) understood their work and purposes by interpreting their speech and deed as texts of political theory, an old tradition in
nation-states. Memoirs, essays and interviews abound and constitute a rich source
of information regarding the common past. Self-reflection has not been lacking either but, due to the controversial nature of integration politics, it has often
been considered a type of propaganda, which should only concern proponents of
integration politics. Yet, ever since the early constitutional debates between the
Federalists and anti-Federalists, Americans have been debating a political
tradition grounded in the texts of the Republics actors.
Ricoeurs hermeneutical treatment of memory, history and imagination traces
a middle course between the thickets of uncritical memory and the wasteland of
a hermeneutics of suspicion. Following a great personal loss, he responds with
a renewed focus on phronesis, that form of prudential judgment that make man
capable to act. As Philippe de Schoutheete notes, emphasis on common action
rather than common culture shaped the European founders first initiatives.24 Like
Arendt, Berlin, Habermas, Jaspers, Ricoeur and Taylor albeit in a very different manner they are moved by an urgency borne out of tragedy, and this may
explain some of the affinities between the thinkers and actors that will become
more apparent in the next chapters.
In the past decade, normative inquiries on EU identity formation and politics
have multiplied. Below I discuss briefly what a work of hermeneutics may add to
these studies. Then I turn to Arendt and Montesquieu to justify my own emphasis on the principles of action around which the remaining chapters of the book
are articulated. Ricoeurs discussion of testimony helps validate my recourse
to long interviews to develop a political theory of European integration. I close
with a summary of the six other chapters and a review of the clichs of European
integration to which they respond.
European visions of the good: political perplexities

and scholarly responses
Ever since the public debates on the ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty,
which created a European Union citizenship, citizens, politicians and academics
have complained about the democratic deficit in the processes of European
integration. Some of the first scholars to ponder European citizens discontent

concluded that shared values could give European citizens a sense of their
common identity.25 Political leaders agreed, although few would call for a soul
for Europe as former EU Commission presidents Jacques Delors and Romano
Prodi once did.26 One reason for the publics disaffection, according to Marc
Abls, is that politicians and civil servants of the EU Commission too often
live the communitarian identity in a futuristic mode: Everything happens as if
Europe should reinvent itself every day, assert an eternal youth . . . . Reference to
the past is limited to a brief evocation of the founding fathers; no sign indicates
the presence of a tradition.27 This inability to articulate purpose and identity
might not have surprised Arendt, who mourned the lost treasure of so many
political experiences from the French Resistance to the American Revolutionary
tradition. Arendts concern was that people lacking political concepts (or the
remembrance of their original principles of action) would tend to rely on farfetched ideas with little relation to the reality of their lives. The tragedy was that
since Socratic times, men of action and men of thought have parted company. By
talking over political experiences and crystallizing them into political concepts,
thinkers contribute to a political tradition without which the polis cannot last.
They have a special responsibility for creating certain guideposts for future
remembrance.28
In the case of the EU, democratization and its fractious referenda have had a
similar impact on political scientists as on politicians: they have made the exploration of questions of public ethics and political identity more urgent, prompting
also much self-reflection on methodological commitments.29 Craig Parsons puts
to rest the idea that the ideational argument should not figure in explanations
of European integration, by studying the French contribution to the development
of the EC/EU in A Certain Idea of Europe. Crosscutting cleavages across party
and bureaucratic lines show that commitment to three different models of Europe
pre-empted material interests and group loyalties. In the end, pro-community
leadership made the difference.30 Parsons argues against an overly narrow view
of the social sciences, which favors general theories over close attention to the
specific nature of human agency. His most original contribution may be to show
how policies satisfying material interests should not be interpreted as contradicting or separate from ideational motivations. Surprisingly, in spite of its stress on
ideas, A Certain Idea of Europe reveals little about the normative content of the
ideas of the pro-community French actors.
In Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective, Stefan Elbe provides a more philosophical study of European commitments, and critiques brilliantly the various political
attempts to articulate a new ethos for Europe, which he sees as so many straightjackets or ascetic ideals. From a Nietzschean perspective, Europeanization
would not manifest itself primarily through an institution or a political project.
Instead, we should look for Nietzsches good Europeans, autonomous human
beings who experiment with new dispositions toward existence. The stress on
action rather than rigid ideals is well taken, but there is an enigmatic character
to the good Europeans free thoughts, which disquiets.31 Personal autonomy could
give play to nationalistic impulses just as much as transcending them. There is a
kind of emptiness to freedom talk that calls for the more concrete commitments of
Parsons French politicians.
It is difficult to detect the standards of normative assessment for a project whose
leaders (the distinguished Reflection Group convened by EU Commission President Romano Prodi in 2003) affirm that, there is no fixed list of European values.
There is no finality to the process of European integration. Europe is a project of
the future.32 Paradoxically, the other dilemma of a very open-ended value talk is
that it lends itself to a moral perfectionism that may require too much from political actors instead of too little. Jacques Derridas list of the nine duties involved in
what is proper for Europe . . . . as a heading for the universal essence of humanity
and its double contradictory imperatives, (difference and universality, accepting the alterity of foreigners and integrating them) is an exhaustive and somewhat
intimidating enumeration of contradictory ideals to any person minimally aware
of human frailties.33
How then to skirt the obstacles of relativism and excessive idealism that may
paralyze action rather than prod it? One way is to study normative issues more
empirically. Ian Manners, who coined the term Normative Power Europe (NPE),
backs his argument on the EUs capacity to set international norms through nonviolent means by reviewing EU advocacy of the abolition of the death penalty
across the globe.34 The critical debate on whether the EU is a benevolent normative power or, on the contrary, an unreflective Eurocentric hegemony has not
abated since.35 But even if the EU promotes successfully democratic norms in the
international sphere, this will not necessarily generate a stronger sense of shared
identity among its citizens. It is notoriously difficult to democratize foreign
policy, and Manners acknowledges that the EU drive to abolish the death penalty
across the globe came from elite decisions with little involvement or interest on
the part of EU public opinion.36 NPE tends to bracket the source of the norms
shaping the outreach of the EU as the black box of EU studies, and the connection
between grassroots identity formation and elite initiatives remains an important
topic for research.
This is a challenge which Glyn Morgan takes on boldly in The Idea of a European Superstate by arguing that the international ramifications of the arguments
between eurosceptics, federalists and post-sovereignists are too rarely discussed:
they could help the European peoples decide whether they want to take on a common European project, and, if yes, what kind. Though the federal option may
seem a pipe dream, Morgan considers the security-based argument the most
plausible and the only one that might convince people that they need a European level of government. In a world where the United States, China and Russia
will continue to guard jealously their sovereignty, the EU alone can balance other
superpowers by becoming a superstate (in effect a federal polity), which protects
its external sovereignty by reinforcing its internal sovereignty. This pragmatic
approach leaves concerns of shared identity in the background. However, if European institutions prove their efficacy, Morgan sees no reason why peoples who
shifted the horizon of their loyalties from the local to the national, could not again
accept new and more all-encompassing forms of political membership.37 This is

all in the future, of course, and distant prospects tell us little about identity content
today.
Morgans argument has the merit of putting the citizen at the center of the
debates on EU norms and identity. Thanks to the Eurobarometers and other polls,
we have a pretty good idea of public opinion on social, economic and political
issues across Member States since 1973.38 Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse
and Marilynn B. Brewers Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the
EU and Michael David Greens The Europeans: Political identity in an Emerging Polity reach some similar conclusions: citizens are perfectly able to negotiate
multiple political identities and attachments; national and EU identities need not
conflict; progressively, the EU has come to mean Europe, although paradoxically,
attachment to Europe grew in the 1990s while support for EU policies decreased.
But polls reveal little on the depth of attachment (or what happens when the
national interest conflicts with the European interest); on what causes identity
change; and even less on the content of European ideals, which is what matters
most to our argument here.39 Even the idea of a singular content to European
identity is itself contested, Green writes, although the notion of peace is referred
to most frequently. Therefore he wonders whether the Europeans have adopted
a new, vanguard form of political identity, replacing the powerful, passionate,
nationalisms of old with something of a more diffident, considered and reciprocity-based nature. Given the evidence of European attachments Risse concludes
that there is a European demos in spite of the emptiness of Europe as a social
identity marker, a problem that he chooses to set aside.40
This is the problem this book addresses. Phenomenological interpretations provide content to fill the empty box of the EC/EU social marker by drawing from
the lived experiences and self-understandings of the actors involved in political
processes. They stress distinct practices rather than opinions, values, cultural or
philosophical concepts. Still, this argument should not be misconstrued as an
attempt to impose a singular content to the EU identity; interpretative narratives
offer resources for debates crucial to the health of democratic societies, not an end
point, with the understanding that such narratives must remain open for retelling
and rectification.
Moral theory in the Western tradition has often combined two approaches, one
modeled on law, with categorical demands at its center, and the other based on precepts for living the good life with prudence and fortitude.41 Current events suggest,
however, that abstract moral arguments, utilitarian justifications and treaty reforms
are not enough to motivate civic involvement. As Aristotle wrote long ago, citizens
need to practice the kind of virtue and rationality appropriate to the maintenance of
the particular kind of constitution under which they live.42 This form of rationality
requires an understanding of the original ethical practices underpinning a political enterprise. Arendts definition of understanding is to try to be at home in the
world. Understanding leads to meaning.43 As a political theorist, I would like
to shed some understanding on the process of European integration. Arendt shied
away from general moral principles, which would limit human natality (or creativity) and plurality (or diversity). For her there were no prepolitically formed values,
10
no ultimate truth, and no invisible hand of history. Rather than starting from general
principles, she took a historical and phenomenological approach and reflected on
the lessons to be drawn from a lived human experience: the Holocaust, Stalinism,
the French Revolution, and the American Revolution. Here men have acted; what
can we understand? What is the meaning of their action? Although Arendt had
little time for theoretical justifications of her work, she called herself a phenomenologist of sorts. Phenomenology and the broader tradition of philosophical hermeneutics probe how people experience various aspects of the human condition, and
what can be said about these experiences.44 This approach seems especially well
suited to a reflection on the European integration process. The whole process came
out of a determined commitment to create a different future for Europe. The enterprise was, and still is, an experiment.
Imagining the European Union and its principles of action

Political principles: from Montesquieu to Arendt
Since Benedict Anderson, we know that political communities of strangers are
imagined.45 There are affinities between imagination and memory because both
void absence and distance; imagination gives something to be seen, even if it
can also mislead to the fanciful or mythical.46 Arendt traces back the tradition of
the American Revolution to the principles and practices of the Founding Fathers
public freedom, public happiness, public spirit. She celebrates an ethical politics of participation and wants us to remember its heroes, as she calls those who
had the courage to insert themselves into the public world. The political theorists
imagination does play a part in the selection of facts. Arendts nostalgic story of
the American founding is controversial not so much for what it says, but for what it
does not say, about slavery and the American Indians demise especially. Elisabeth
Young-Bruehl argues that Arendt was not writing a history or distinguishing types
of revolution, rather she wanted to present an ideal for practice. On Revolution
became the handbook of American student activists in the 1960s.47 Arendt, far
from inventing the idea of a political regimes principles of action, borrows it from
Montesquieus The Spirit of the Laws, which outlined the principles inherent
in each constitutional order: love of country and equality, or virtue, in republics;
honor in monarchies; moderation in aristocracies; and fear and suspicion in tyrannies. Montesquieus political principles are what make each specific government
act, not moral virtues or Christian absolutes.48
Although Montesquieu calls his principles the human passions that make a
government act, neither he nor Arendt stresses the role of feelings or emotions in
politics. As Berlin notes, Montesquieus central notion is that individuals and
states decay when they contravene the rules of their particular inner constitution.49 Might a tyranny whose people stopped fearing not crumble? Undoubtedly
Arendt agrees as she mourns the lost treasure of important political experiences.
She writes of the European Resistance, the American and French Revolutions, and
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956:
The loss . . . was consummated by oblivion, by a failure of memory which

befell not only the heirs but, as it were, the actors, the witnesses, those who for
a fleeting moment had held the treasure in the palms of their hands, in short,
the living themselves.
The loss is not due to ill will or historical circumstances, but to the fact that there
are no stories to weave a tradition and a framework of reference for future generations.50 Arendt has an idiosyncratic way of using words. For her, principles are
not abstract but they are extremely general, inspiring actions without prescribing
them, Margaret Canovan writes. They relate to the manner in which people
act, and particularly to the way they begin to act, the principium that establishes
the principle of later action.51 Principles limit the arbitrariness and instability of
new beginnings without limiting the freedom of the beginners; they are immanent, arising solely from the constituent act, not transcendental rules, nor rational, universal precepts with a cognitive content imposed from the outside. Not
predetermined by history or culture they shape a new political tradition. They
enable, but do not set political goals or final results. According to Andreas Kalyvas,
the extraordinary act of democratic founding enacts the principles of equality,
autonomy, mutuality and solidarity, which are also the very conditions of its possibility.52 In other words, principles are not theoretical absolutes or laws demanding compliance, rather they indicate psycho-political dispositions and may inspire
new political practices.
The ECSC/EC/EU principles of action
Montesquieu and Arendts concept of a regimes political principle constitutes a
powerful act of imagination; indeed, who has ever seen or quantified such principles? Nevertheless, immanent principles can also be detected in the extraordinary act of beginning European integration although they were not intuitively
apparent to the actors.53 Like the American Revolution, the last 60 years of European integration can be thought of as a founding, although it did not occur all at
once or according to a single plan. Commentators have compared this process
to a revolution.54 This book argues that three core principles, as Montesquieu and
Arendt understood them, have motivated actors to action: reconciliation, power
as action in concert, and recognition of the other; and that two other principles:
truth-telling and right-speaking; and thinking as the enlarged mentality, have
impacted the development of the ECSC/EC/EU also. The principles of European
integration are more often implied than articulated; and when they are expressed
in preambles to the treaties and in governmental declarations, it is in a language
that does not excite the enthusiasm of citizens. One exception in this regard is
the 1950 Schuman Declaration that proposed the ECSC, and which mentions the
three founding principles: reconciliation, the age-old opposition of France and
Germany and its sanguinary divisions must be eliminated; power as action in
concert, the solidarity in production (of coal and steel), and the creation of a new
High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member
12
countries will be the key to future economic prosperity and security for Europe;
recognition of the Other, the organization is open to the participation of the
other countries of Europe without distinction.55
The next chapters will analyze each of the five principles theoretically and
empirically. What distinguishes historical representations from fiction is their
claim to truth, or adequation and correspondence with the past itself.56 This
book discusses the ECSC/EC/EU principles of action in five historical settings;
indeed people do not act unconstrained.57 In narratives, settings have a subjective quality: they are the outcome of choice by the storyteller, but they need not
be arbitrary. In European integration they must always involve the law, treaty
negotiations and decisions by the various European institutions that structure the
process and legitimize it. The question of reconciliation haunts the first juncture, the negotiations and ratification of the ECSC Treaty (19502). Power as
action in concert deploys its effects at the second juncture, the negotiations and
ratification of the Treaties of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (19557).
The third setting is framed by 21 treaties of accession with candidate countries
(19732007), which manifest a certain commitment to recognition of the Other.
The fourth setting is situated at the turn of the century when two Conventions
with a majority of elected representatives proposed the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe (2004). Diplomats and civil servants wrote the Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
after the rejection of the constitutional treaty, a step backward from earlier
attempts at truth-telling. The fifth setting is the present time, with its twin policy
challenges of immigration and enlargement, which call for the kind of thinking
Arendt and Kant called the enlarged mentality.
The common feature of the European principles of action is that they engage
the Other sometimes a rival or an enigma, never an enemy on the basis
of mutuality, with a view to long-term interests and the willingness to enter
binding commitments. Reconciliation, power as action in concert and recognition of the Other, truth-telling and thinking need not inspire every policy. They
should rather be considered as logical necessities inscribed in the psychology
of the citizens and their representatives if the community is to last. Familiar to
most people in daily life, they have relevance for public life also. Isaiah Berlin
suggests that Montesquieu conceived his principles as tentative, rather like
hypotheses.58 It is with this understanding that I discuss the ECSC/EC/EU
principles of action.
Testimonies
Documenting memory
There is no educated memory without the historians mediation, whose work
consists of three tasks, often overlapping, but nevertheless distinct: documenting, explaining/understanding, and the writing of a literary text. This list does not

indicate a strict chronological succession and the final text remains submitted to
the endless dialectics of criticism and revision. But what documents should we
trust? Ricoeur urges us to accept the good memory of the testimony with its
ambition to be faithful to the past, because we have nothing better to signify that
something has happened.59 Being less interested in memory than in action, Arendt
would rather call these testimonies heroes, whose stories, gathered together,
constitute the storybook of mankind. Storytelling is one form of thinking that
does not trump acting. But the hero cannot disclose the full significance of her
story: the work of interpretation starts only when the action itself has come to
an end and become a story susceptible to narration.60 Selection of testimonies
is the historians prerogative. What matters is that the story be probable and possible.61 If there is a certain navet in recalling stories about European integration
as their heroes tell them such narratives are always in part self-justificatory acts
the words of major political actors may provide us with some of the most politically salient contemporary political theory. This is, of course, nothing new. Men
of action, such as Machiavelli, Locke, Burke, and Tocqueville used the pen to
comment on the conduct of public affairs.
Historically, political foundings seem to result from action by small groups of
initiators. I define leadership as Arendt did: the capacity to initiate political action;
many of the political actors featured in this work are elected politicians or senior
administrators, while others are actively engaged citizens. Even if such testimonies are trustworthy, how to choose among thousands of actors? I do not argue
that I have a statistically representative sample of ECSC/EC/EU testimonies, but
rather what Joseph A. Maxwell calls a purposeful or criterion-based sample.
This is a methodological strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events
are selected deliberately in order to provide important information that cannot be
obtained as well from other choices.62 In fact, only a few dozen actors were directly
involved in the foundings of the ECSC and the EEC; and the 17 long interviews
of the main EEC negotiators, deposited in the archival fund of the Jean Monnet
Fondation pour lEurope in Lausanne and recently published, with memoirs and
autobiographies, give a fairly good picture of the original actors intents and
actions.63 Present times are more challenging. My 82 interviews/testimonies
(19952009) include 45 European members of Parliament (MEPs), who must
explain and develop the European tradition with their electors; to know their
mind on issues seemed particularly relevant. I also interviewed former EU Commission President Jacques Delors, senior civil servants at the Commission and the
Council, diplomats from countries negotiating for accession and three close associates of Jean Monnet, the senior French civil servant who crafted the Schuman
Declaration and became the first president of the ECSC High Authority: Max
Kohnstamm, Jacques-Ren Rabier and Henri Rieben. I learned from interviews
and statements available on the Internet and from quality media and the Eurobarometers. Finally, I had many informal, but highly informative conversations
with citizens in nine EU Member States from 1999 to 2010. At all times it was
important to confront discordant testimonies with scholarly work, which interprets
events differently from those interviewed (see list of interviewees in appendix).64
14
Explaining/understanding
The hermeneutical circle starts from the memories of witnesses, progresses
through history, whose critical methods challenge the veracity of these testimonies, and circles back to memory, now an educated memory illuminated by historiography. Representations of the past constitute a symbolic universe, which
contributes to the creation of social bonds that eventually become like a habitus
or sensus communis. But, beside veracity and the apt choice by the historian of
political thought, several challenges arise in the use of testimonies: the first is the
well-known problem of the proper level of analysis, which crops up in interpretative arguments. To what extent should individual memories be taken seriously in
the social sciences? What links them to collective memory and even more seriously to a credible practice of history? Arendt stayed away very deliberately from
complex methodological issues, to which Ricoeur pays more sustained attention.
He agrees with Maurice Halbwachs that if the memories of the witnesses are private, they arise in collective settings the family, the school, the village which
they impact in turn.65 Especially when traumatic events such as war occur, the
memories of thousands or even millions of individuals coalesce through ongoing
exchanges into new forms of collective identities based on shared memories. Thus
the strict delineation between individual and collective memory, or even history
and memory, is blurred.66 Some social scientists theorize elite rhetorical acts, more
empirically than Arendt ever did, as important political moments, an approach this
book shares.67 Moreover, it interprets specific instances of grassroots speech and
deed as no less constitutive of politics.68
Another challenge concerns these limit experiences, of which it is almost
impossible to testify. How to speak of Auschwitz gas chambers? Equally daunting (and not necessarily separate): what about the witnesses who never encounter
an audience capable of listening to them or hearing what they have to say?69
Limit experiences escape ordinary understanding. In the Westphalian system of
nation-states, negotiating agreements with a view to a federal Europe and to the
abolition of war was hardly a limit experience. Yet it was new, perhaps even extraordinary, but did the negotiators seek an audience beyond their peers and parliamentarian ratification? Historically, foreign policy decisions rarely depended on
popular acceptance. The growing recourse to referenda across the EU is a recent
innovation, which makes testimonies on European integration even more important since they promote civic understanding (though not necessarily agreement or
conviction).
Writing memories and application
With documenting and explaining comes the consigning of the stories of the testimonies to a literary text, once they have been critically examined. Historical narratives do not explain causally, but represent: such representations endow event(s)
with an intelligibility, which overcomes Diltheys sharp distinction between
explaining and understanding.70 But why remember? In On Revolution Arendt

makes the case that if Americans had remembered the principle of public virtue,
which founded their Republic, they would be better equipped to act in domestic
and foreign politics. She writes as a political theorist, not a policy expert, and thus
only alludes to the Cold War and the US capitalist order, which did not prevent
American student activists and Eastern European dissidents from responding to
her call for engagement.71 Likewise, the principles of action that shaped the mindsets of the many founders of the EU27 could contribute to the formation of an
EU political tradition. Not remembered faithfully, principles of action fade
from memory and stop inspiring appropriate action. Only clichs remain: trite,
stereotyped expressions that have lost their originality and impact by long overuse
(a form of abuse, which need not negate their original use), and that shield citizens
from the legacy of lived experiences. This deficit in conceptual understanding and
memory constitutes the lost treasure of European integration.
Kalyvas notes the dearth of secondary literature on Arendts principles and turns
to Habermas to understand better what a principled action means, in a move that
is only half-convincing, as principles hardly correspond to Habermas universal
norms.72 More helpful for this books argument is Habermas notion of application. Habermas, like Arendt, remains highly abstract even when he discusses
application, but it matters to him that norms be applied in the life world appropriately. This happens when all can accept the consequences and side effects of a
norms general observance for each individual in every particular situation, a tall
order as Habermas admits.73 Although principles of action are understood here
not as imperative norms, but rather as an incitement and guide to action, this book
also takes application seriously. It interprets the development of the ECSC/EC/EU
principles of action with close attention to the details of lived experiences as the
witnesses and historians document them, and probes how contemporary political
actors understand the principles, and whether they still apply to current policy
challenges. For instance, how does the principle of power as action in concert
inform EU foreign policy today? Admittedly there is a certain artificiality to this
exercise, which consists in discussing discretely the application of each principle
to one specific policy challenge. On the other hand, the analyst must distinguish
and separate in order to bring some clarity to highly complex phenomena.
This introduction concludes with an outline of each chapter. The principle of
reconciliation is the foundational principle of European integration and therefore
calls for an extended analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 draws from the theoretical resources available in comparative politics and political theory to analyze
the post-WWII experiences of reconciliation in Western Europe and the ECSC
founding, and it highlights the uncoordinated, yet converging elite and grassroots
initiatives in these processes. The briefer Chapter 3 discusses two putative cases
of application, the first in the Western Balkans between Kosovo and Serbia after
2008; the second examines the contests over EU memory(ies) among official and
civil society actors. The other four chapters are divided in three parts each. The
first parts analyze the featured principle of action philosophically; the second part
examines how the principle moved actors to action in the past; and the third part
discusses its application to a current issue.
16
Contents of the book
Chapter 2: After the deluge: the principle of reconciliation

Shocked by the ease with which good Germans had shed their Christian values
under Nazi rule, Arendt stressed action rather than reconciliation.74 Theorists of
conflict resolution claim her because, with hard-headed realism, she understood
the unpredictable and irreversible consequences of human initiative and proposed
her own remedies: forgiving and promising.75 Forgiveness, which is not a feeling, but a political capacity, restores the ability to act anew, unconditioned by the
past. With the faculty of promising, people establish laws and treaties, which are
like islands of certainty in the midst of unpredictability.76
The 1950 Schuman Declaration stated peace as the main motivation of European integration and, since the end of the Cold War, reconciliation has become
the EUs new mantra. But there is little memory about the ECSC as a project for
peace. tienne Balibar describes the European Communities as essentially the byproduct, and part of the mechanism of the Cold War. Andr Glucksmann expresses
a widely shared puzzlement regarding the ECSC founders motivations: they acted
in deafening silence, without explanation; meanwhile the reconciliation, so
often celebrated, has yet to be thought through.77 The sarcastic film of Sarajevoborn director Pjer Zalica, Fuse, makes this especially apparent. This is the story of
Tesanj, a small Bosnian town on the Serbian border with a mixed SerbMuslim
population, which decides to mimic reconciliation in a charade to lure international
capital with the approaching visit of US President Clinton. The deception seems
one project Tesanjs split communities can agree on. At one point the elegant middle-aged German fire brigade officer, representing the international community,
patronizingly pats the knee of the Bosnian town mayor and tells him, We reconciled; we have confidence in you, you can do it too, with no apparent sympathy for
the mixture of humiliation and determination in his interlocutor. This is a top-down
relationship, which only shared experiences of defeat, guilt and recovery might
help equalize. Reconciliation turns into a moneymaking enterprise, high salaries
for international bureaucrats and subsidies for the assisted, whereas its original
intent was equalizing and rooted in the divided communities.78
Perhaps the early Western European reconciliations are misunderstood because
of their complexity. They deployed their first public effects in the highly technical
Treaty of Paris on the ECSC (1952) and, in that case, the principle of reconciliation
consists of five distinct practices: accounting for the past; forgiving; promising; a
fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties; and the benevolent
involvement of an external political power. Chapter 2 draws from Jaspers and Arendt
to interpret the speech and deeds of Jean Monnet, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, and French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman, and those of close collaborators and of grassroots activists
dedicated to European reconstruction, as manifestations of accounting for the past,
forgiveness and promise. It turns to comparative politics to examine the role of the
USA as a mediating party and the political relevance of shared material interests.

The chapter reviews extensively the witnesses of grassroots actors of
European reconciliations because their initiatives helped provide the emotional
healing and broad-based support crucial for the acceptance of the political changes
initiated at the top.
Chapter 3: Remembering the principle of reconciliation: applications

Arendts political theory offers exceptionally rich resources to theorize the reconstruction of political societies. On one hand, the continuation of politics hinges on
political forgiveness and promise. On the other hand, Arendt understood the term
reconciliation quite differently, as a continuous and endless process of understanding, not as singular acts of forgiveness or promise.79 This kind of reconciliation corresponds to the attempt to make oneself at home in the world and
define ones political identity. Chapter 3 discusses two kinds of applications.
The first invokes Arendts concepts of natality (the capacity for new beginning),
forgiveness and promise, and probes whether the ECSC five practices analyzed in
Chapter 2 could inform state policies and grassroots initiatives between Kosovo
and Serbia today. The second case consists of a review of some of the initiatives under way in Brussels to understand the meaning of European integration
through books, museums and schools projects. These two case studies highlight
the link between reconciliation as promise and forgiveness and reconciliation as
understanding, two discrete concepts in Arendts thought, but not in the practical
politics of the EU.
Chapter 4: Of power and purgatory: building the European Communities
There is more to winning the peace than reconciliation. With the elimination of
violent conflicts comes the affirmation of a common destiny. The early European
actors launched a daring reconceptualization of power, which the treaties they
negotiated were meant to symbolize. It was to be action in concert rather than
domination over the other. But isnt this a privilege reserved to countries that have
lost the capacity to impose their will? This is Robert Kagans argument.80 Arendt
contributes to a renewed understanding of European power. She defines power as
an organized solidarity, binding partners on a basis of equality and mutuality,
not as violence or force.81 If the European paradise was established under US
military protection, the principle of power as action in concert kept it from lapsing
into a mere footnote in history books. The 19557 negotiations on the EEC constitute a case study of power as action in concert in the second part of this chapter.
Thanks to 17 long interviews of the main negotiators in 1984, and memoirs and
essays, we have the stories behind the history, which divulge what official declarations, memoranda and treaties never could reveal: how individual political actors
changed their own minds and persuaded others. It is part of the interpretative
theorists task to expose lacunae and contradictions in the actors recollections.
Other authoritative accounts confirm and complete rather than contradict the facts
(though not necessarily the interpretations) evoked by the interviewees.82
18
Agreement is much more difficult to reach when hundreds or thousands of

actors are involved in negotiating what Kalypso Nicolaidis calls a community
of projects.83 The third part of Chapter 4 probes whether the multiplication of
actors and projects over the next 50 years has made this new form of power merely
more challenging or quite unattainable, by discussing the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Witnesses and scholarly analyses highlight the attempt
to move beyond AngloAmerican categories of power, but also the temptation
to amalgamate power with inside the EU with power over outside. What traces
(Ricoeur) has the principle of action in concert left among those who care to
remember? EU Council official Robert Cooper and Polish MEP Bronislaw
Geremek make some suggestions.
Chapter 5: Enlargements and the recognition of the Other:
the case of Turkey
Because of the constraining nature of the accession process, reunification and
enlargement too easily become code words for Western dominance. Recognition of the Other, the difficult process of self-transformation through confrontation
with the Other, defines more aptly the current relationship among 27 different
nation-states than reunification with its irenic vision of consensus.84 Charles Taylor analyzes the process of recognition, which facilitates the coming together of
parties previously opposed, or merely disconnected, by drawing from Hegels
historical dialectics (while discounting Hegels metaphysical propositions on the
end of history). The new association, far from abolishing the parties, helps them
toward a higher stage of individual and collective self-realization. This is the goal,
if not the reality, of EU enlargement, a neologism for the peaceful expansion of
a union of democratic nation-states, driven primarily by the requests of outsiders
to join. Stories of enlargement represent how certain EU policies, such as the
programs of economic and social cohesion, and institutional arrangements, such
as the rotating presidency, have facilitated mutual recognition among Member
States, which is predicated on the equality of treatment and status. Chapter 4s Part
III examines the relevance of the principle of recognition (and the lack thereof) to
current negotiations for accession. It notes the new obstacles thrown in the way
of candidate countries, with a special focus on the complicated case of Turkeys
accession. Faced with 80,000 pages of acquis communautaire85 and 27 interlocutors, is there any possibility for any candidate country (actual and potential) to
experience the give and take of recognition? Are the Member States open to the
possibility that this process will transform them also? Ricoeurs theorizing of the
gift, as a temporary suspension of the agonistic process of (non-) recognition,
points to the unexpected event or initiative that might unlock the stalled process
between Turkey and the EU. Even a tragic event can act as a gift, such as the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999, which served as a pretext for reconnection,
but only if the parties can receive it.
Chapter 6: The question of the demos: truth-telling and right-speaking

Trustworthiness and legitimacy are core issues in democratic politics and concerns,
which Habermas discourse ethics address. I draw from his analyses of truthtelling and right-speaking in politics to discuss the EU democratic deficit.
Did the founding of the ECSC satisfy or, on the contrary, fail the test of Habermas
discourse ethics? Was Jean Monnet truly an autocratic civil servant immersed in
neo-functionalism? There is solid evidence that he took democracy and politics
much more seriously than has often been depicted. Other questions I examine are
to what extent the European Parliament has become a communication community and whether referendums provide EU citizens with genuine possibilities of
right-speaking. Part III of Chapter 6 offers a discussion of the writing and ratification of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. Scholarly commentaries and interviews with
MEPs provide a critical analysis of the reasons for the departure from truth-telling
and right-speaking, which the European Convention was meant to usher in by
openly debating and writing a constitutional treaty for the EU.
Chapter 7: EU borders and the enlarged mentality
The lack of persuasive speech about European integration masks another more
fundamental problem, thoughtlessness. As the EUs stability seems endangered
by the very dynamism of the processes it starts, only more deeply reflective politics will allow leaders and citizens to make themselves at home in the world.
Arendt stressed action in times of crisis, but she reemphasized the importance of
judgment, or the enlarged mentality, for politics at the end of her life. Good
Germans under Nazism had not thought through their values, and responded
to stock phrases and conventional standardized codes of expression and conduct.86 The enlarged mentality, such as Kant and Arendt theorized it, facilitates
better judgment by prompting citizen-thinkers to reflect from several standpoints,
not just their own. Although Monnet was hardly introspective, he took pains to
outline his method for thinking the new in his Memoirs; and the chapter offers
other testimonies of the principle of the enlarged mentality. Today the EU strives
to coordinate its Member States immigration policies while facing constantly
changing external borders. There are strange ramifications between the discrete
issues of immigration into the EU, legacies of colonialism, and the defining and
guarding of external borders. This chapters conclusion examines elite, scholarly
and grassroots discourses on EU borders and immigration from the standpoint of
the enlarged mentality.
Studies on memory have so far thrived on catastrophes and trauma, with
unavoidable theoretical consequences; for instance, a strong emphasis on the therapeutic aspect of recalling collective memories, and psychoanalytical methods.87
It may be time to recall critically constructive legacies for the sake of action: the
expansion of direct democracy in the EU calls for more civic involvement on a
knowledgeable basis. This constitutes a formidable pedagogical challenge, which
has yet to be met adequately by EU leaders. Yet, as the next chapters will show,
20
numerous grassroots groups moved the reconciliatory process after WWII; and
since 1989, the dialogue of recognition across borders has engaged academics,
students, workers and journalists as well as politicians and bureaucrats. Provided
with enough evidence, more EU citizens might identify with the innovative political practices of the European foundings. I am well aware that much work remains
to be done to delineate the principles of action at the heart of the European project,
and that other interpretations are quite possible. For Arendt, understanding is
unending and therefore cannot produce final results. But this did not stop her
quest, nor should it stop ours.88
After the deluge
The principle of reconciliation
Introduction
European integration is accepted today as a successful project for peace, and
respondents to the Eurobarometers put a high priority on peace as a European
value.1 But only recently has reconciliation become a rhetorical leitmotiv to legitimize this project. For almost four decades, the consensus among decision-makers
was that Europe would be built on tangible foundations such as the productivity
index, trade and investment. Brief references to peace, prosperity and democracy
in treaty preambles signaled larger ambitions, but there were few public debates.2
The 1993 Copenhagen criteria for EU accession, which clarified EU values officially, left peace and reconciliation unmentioned.3 The starting date of the reconciliatory process is not readily agreed upon, and the accession of 12 Member
States in 2004 and 2007 with different historical experiences makes the task of
definition even more challenging.4 Peace, once achieved, is quiet, which may
explain why the development of an EU peace community entailing reconciliation
between former enemies has been under-analyzed.5 But undetermined concepts
quickly morph into empty clichs that excite cynicism rather than involvement.6
To understand when, and how, the European reconciliation process started therefore matters politically.
This chapter offers an interpretative analysis of the speech and deeds of the
1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)s founders and of civil society
actors in post-WWII Western Europe. It draws its main conceptual framework
from Arendts discussions of action, forgiveness and promise, and Jaspers reflections on political accountability; but the analysis borrows also from comparative
politics and conflict resolution theory to explain the material aspect of the ECSC
reconciliatory politics and the role of the US. Indeed, the ECSCs founding and
the attendant grassroots initiatives constitute highly complex and overlapping processes that a singular theory cannot interpret adequately; interpretative analyses
that pay attention to lived experiences are rarely parsimonious. The Treaty of Paris
establishing the ECSC came out of a complex web of relationships, in which five
practices breaking with the culture of blame and accounting for the past, forgiving, promising, a fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties
and the benevolent involvement of an external political power together weaved
22
the new. Jacques Attali dubs the ECSC founding as easy.7 I argue that, on the
contrary, the start of European integration may hold useful lessons for the present
because it was fraught with difficulties and fragile. This chapters Part I examines
the theoretical understandings of peace and reconciliation developed by EU scholars, and explains what political theory can add to comparativist studies to develop
an interpretative framework of the post-WWII reconciliation processes in Western
Europe. It examines the founding of the ECSC as an example of state policymaking for reconciliation. However, if political reconciliation cannot occur without state action, it implies also psychological processes of conversion in individuals who move from enmity to partnership. Part II analyzes the processes of
self-transformation in elite and grassroots actors, drawing from their speech and
deed. Part III offers some EU leaders reflections on the political relevance of the
post-WWII reconciliatory experiences for current conflicts. Chapter 3 will discuss
two other applications: the first focuses on the search for solutions to conflicts in
the Western Balkans, and the second on the attempts to create an EU memory, a
highly diversified and agonistic exercise.
Part I Theories and state practices of peace-making

Comparative analyses of EU reconciliation
In conflict resolution literature, peace is usually defined as the elimination of
war as a means for solving international conflicts, through changes in structural/
institutional conditions and learning processes; whereas reconciliation refers to an
affective and psychological process involving the healing of emotions and the elimination of resentment.8 The brief 1950 Schuman Declaration, which made public the
French offer to Germany to create jointly with other European countries a European
Coal and Steel Community, mentions the words peace and peaceful five times, but
not reconciliation. Lily Gardner Feldman, however, like many other Europeanists,
uses the two terms almost interchangeably while establishing another useful distinction between pragmatic reconciliatory policies that serve state interests and security and the moral programs that break age-old animosities.9 If peace is an unattainable absolute,10 reconciliation need not mean the final elimination of conflicts.
Rather, conflicts are now articulated as differences that can be managed rather than
existential threats; they become productive contention in a shared and cooperative
framework.11 At the state level, the plan for a European Coal and Steel Community
proposed structural changes: de facto economic solidarity and supranational institutions rather than the healing of emotions and amity. Meanwhile, grassroots movements sought the healing of memories and promoted reconciliation, manifesting a
spontaneous reconciliatory tendency, which has been observed at other important
junctures of the European integration process.12
Theorizing 60 years of reconciliatory efforts across the European continent is an
ambitious task that few have tackled. Neo-functionalism offered an original explanation of the rapprochement among the first six Member States that combined the
pursuit of material interests with changes in mindsets,13 but perhaps because of the
The principle of reconciliation 23

eurosclerosis of the 1960s and 1970s scholars lost interest. The difficult ratification
of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty prompted new inquiries into the relationship between
political ethics and legitimacy,14 although the reconciliatory dimension of European integration continued to attract little scholarly attention, with a few exceptions.15 This need not surprise as the EC was for three decades rather conservative
about its potential role in conflict resolution, preferring to ignore disputes among
Member States. The 1999 Helsinki European Council, however, established the
peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes as a Community principle for its
current and future Member States, and today the EU identifies peace-making as a
key priority of its external action.16 Scholars have responded. Current assessments
of the outcomes of the EUs reconciliatory policies are mixed: neither in Cyprus,
nor in the IsraeliPalestine case have conflicts become de-securitized, although this
has not altered EU self-perceptions as a force for good.17 At the same time, there
is evidence that the prospect of EU membership has encouraged rapprochements
between Germany and Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic/Slovakia, Greece
and Turkey, and in the Western Balkans.18 The EU has used its contractual relationships with neighboring countries to mediate solutions to some conflicts successfully, for instance between Serbia and Montenegro. In the case of Ireland it intervened both directly in the peace process by funding cross-community projects, and
indirectly by affecting the broader political context.19 Although there is frequent
mention of the FrenchGerman reconciliation as a precedent and inspiration,20 this
is not a literature about memory or a political tradition. It exhibits little familiarity
with the lived experience of French and German actors of reconciliation, and no
indication of what past experiences might transmit beyond a sense of possibility
(admittedly important). This lack of interest in analyzing founding practices may
strike one as odd given the already long history of European integration. Could this
be one reason why EU pacifism provided scant guidance in how to deal . . . with
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the religious fanaticism of the Near East?21
Arendt might not have been surprised by such lacunae in understanding.
She took pains to distinguish the reconciliation with ones fate, which understanding permits, from the peace-making practices of forgiveness and promise.22
As a self-described phenomenologist, she adopted story-telling as the point of
departure for her concept of political thinking.23 Story-telling need not establish
causal relationships but be plausible.24 This chapter offers a political theorists
interpretation of European integration as a set of internal experiments in peacemaking through stories that make sense, therefore completing the increasingly
sophisticated comparative analyses of the EU as an external agent for peace in
conflictual situations.25 Because context matters to understanding, the next section
describes the political and socio-economic setting, in which some Western European actors started anew in 1950.26
The setting
Milward documents the speed and success of western Europes economic
recovery, beginning in 1947 even before the Marshall Plan was in place.27 At the
24
time, however, no one in Europe could anticipate these developments. The British
government for the first time had to ration bread and tea, a measure kept in place
until 1951. In France and Italy, strong communist parties challenged parliamentary systems. In West Germany entire cities had been razed, and over 12 million
displaced ethnic Germans had to be integrated into a nonfunctioning economy.28
Even if cities could be rebuilt, lost lives and loves could not be retrieved. In these
conditions, how could peoples ever trust one another enough to act in concert
again? Barrington Moore, Jr. argues that, It is just plain hate that holds people
together. More specifically, shared hatreds play a crucial role in social bonding
all the way from small groups of friends up to membership in big states and even
empires. Hate also holds international communities together: see the rapprochement between France and Britain directed against Germany in the early twentieth
century. Hostility as such does not disappear. There is merely a change of target.
There is no doubt that the Stalinist threat in the Eastern part of Europe and the
American presence in the West spurred Western Europeans to action. Moores
ways to peace, new threat, mutual exhaustion, and the competing attractions of economic growth were at work.29 However, to think that these factors
would have been enough to bring about the FrenchGerman reconciliation, on
which the whole European integration process was predicated, is to overlook the
depth of feelings separating the two countries and their neighbors after centuries
of war.30
In 1945 the Western Allies pondered what to do with Germany. They soon
abandoned the harsh Morgenthau Plan for the de-industrialization of the country
because, at the onset of the Cold War, West Germany needed to be solidly integrated into the Western alliance and to play its part in the economic redevelopment
of Europe. With the Marshall Plan the Americans hoped to foster not only European
reconstruction, but also integration. But in the late 1940s France was not ready for
this step. General De Gaulle, and after him George Bidault, imitated the policies
of 1919, by annexing the Saar economically, while granting it political autonomy,
and making sure that the Rhineland would remain a buffer zone between France
and the potential German aggressor.31 They refused to merge their occupation zone
with the AngloAmerican Bizone, although they relented a year later; and they
failed to impose on the Ruhr the strict allied control they sought. In 1949 the newly
elected government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) obtained considerable autonomy in managing the coal and steel industries, where production
had reached its prewar level.32 As the FRG sought an end to the International
Ruhr Authority imposed by the occupying forces, its industrial plants were still
being dismantled and transported to France as war reparations, and the status of
the Saar was another important point of contention. The French also opposed the
higher rate of devaluation for the mark that the Germans were seeking. In 1950
Winston Churchill and the Council of Europe recommended the creation of a
European army, which would include a German contingent. The French government, who had most of its troops stationed in Indochina, adamantly opposed this
proposal.
Despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge:

Jaspers and the question of German guilt
Arendt and Jaspers, victims and survivors of Nazism, gave much thought to the
reconstruction of the public realm despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge.33 Jaspers discussion of personal and collective guilt sheds light on one key
practice of the ECSC principle of reconciliation: accounting for the past. Historically, the rulers of a new political order have not been held accountable for the
corruption of the previous order. And, until the 1960s, there were few popular
debates about guilt and responsibility for the crimes perpetrated during WWII
in any of the countries involved. What matters here is that some chose to assume
responsibility on both the victims and perpetrators side (and in the latter case to
offer sizable compensations).
On the victims side, already in 1941, a few months after France had been
invaded, French philosopher Jacques Maritain stated boldly during a lecture tour
to the US that, no doubt the Versailles Treaty and even more the faults which
followed it have contributed to the rise of Hitler. He called for a federal Europe
in which a confederal Germany would be integrated. We are all really much too
unhappy not to convert ourselves.34 Prisoners in Nazi and fascist camps elaborated projects for the future United States of Europe. Such were Lon Blum in
Buchenwald, Simone Weil in Auschwitz and BergenBelsen, Jean Rey in several
German prisoner camps, and Altiero Spinelli on the island of Ventotene, to mention only a few of the most illustrious personalities; and eight resistance movements issued a public call in 1944 from Geneva for the reintegration of a democratic Germany in a united and pacified Europe.35 At the state level, both the
Schuman Declaration and the Preamble of the ECSC Treaty signed by France,
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries included frank admissions of Europes
age-old rivalries and sanguinary divisions, but without finger-pointing:
a united Europe was not achieved and we had war.36 French Foreign Affairs
Minister Robert Schuman did not minimize the difficulty of the relationship with
Germany after WWII, which will remain perpetually dissatisfied, history has
proved it. But he acknowledged Frances own dynastic and ideological ambitions, manifested especially in Napoleons invasions; so that both countries must
overcome painful memories to move from hate to esteem and mutual trust and
deal with each other on a basis of equality.37 When Maritain and Schuman recognized publicly the historical wounds that their country inflicted upon Germany,
few of their fellow citizens endorsed these views.38 Assuming some responsibility
for the conflict need not negate German guilt and responsibility for WWII, but it
made it psychologically and politically feasible to include the perpetrator on an
equal footing in 1950.
Recent research suggests that public memory of Nazi atrocities was inaugurated in West Germany, not in the 1960s as historians have suggested, but in the
1940s and 1950s.39 During the winter of 19456 Jaspers asked his Heidelberg
University students, many of them war veterans, to reflect on The Question of German Guilt. Jaspers addressed himself to every citizen, not just a few grievous perpetrators, and in that respect he offers a very different perspective from the current
26
scholarly debates on transitional justice.40 He associated himself with German guilt

in spite of the persecutions he and his Jewish wife had suffered under Nazi rule (and
he did not exempt the Allies either from responsibilities):41 Being thus spared,
yet, in view of our own survival, having a sense of shared guilt, we felt increasingly challenged to live right and to work to the very limits of our capacity.42 He
argued that the capacity for political freedom hinges on the willingness to assume
guilt: in that case, no one is beyond the pale of human existence.43 Jaspers fourfold typology of guilt criminal, political, moral and metaphysical develops a
sophisticated argument about the intricacies of collective and individual guilt and
reconnects with the Socratic insight that to be at home in the world is to be at home
with oneself. Criminal guilt applies to the few who have committed acts capable
of objective proof, and it concerns the individual. The Nuremberg trials, in spite
of their shortcomings, were the harbinger of a future world order to which victors
and vanquished should submit. In contrast, political guilt involves both leaders and
citizens of a state that had wronged others. Jaspers wanted the German people to
amend by paying reparations even at the cost of continuing poverty. But if Germans
were collectively liable for actions committed in their name, they were not in the
moral sense of actual and intellectual participation in the crime. Like criminal
guilt, moral and metaphysical guilt can only be acknowledged by the individual
through a work of penance and repentance.44 Jaspers was well aware that few
would undertake this task; nevertheless he encouraged Germans to engage in a
process of individual purification, thus leaving resolutely the realm of politics,
which has to do with public action not individual conversion.45 He was so adamant
about the need for purification that he counseled American officials to retain political control of Germany for 20 years until the power of reasonable men who exist
in Germany, and I believe, in good measure has matured; this practical learning
process could only start in communities, at the local level.46 Disappointed by the
Allies negative response and the lack of introspective thought among Germans,
Jaspers moved to Switzerland with his wife Gertrud in 1948, became a Swiss citizen and lectured at Basel University until his death.47
Politicians, not political theorists, implement the difficult politics of atonement.
On this score, the FRGs first Chancellors record is complicated.48 Konrad
Adenauer, who was arrested several times during the war and lost his second wife
to the sequels of internment in a Gestapo camp, supported premature amnesty
and public forgetting for those who had not been active supporters of Nazism. He
worked hard and long, however, on tangible restitution to the Holocausts victims,
and on establishing a stable democracy in the FRG.49 At considerable political
risk he started negotiations in 1951 with the state of Israel and Jewish organizations to repair for the eternal suffering the German nation had inflicted upon
the Jewish people. The FRGs economic situation was difficult, with 12 million
refugees from the East to resettle and the repayment of loans to the Allies. But,
the demands of the State of Israel and of the world Jewish associations were first
of all justified morally. They should be examined in this spirit.50
In his Memoirs Adenauer adopts a Jaspers-like self-reflective and critical tone
to prod his fellow citizens to accountability:
If we were to emerge from this misery and to find the right way forward, we
had first to understand what had brought us so low. We could find the way to a
better future only if we recognized how we had got into this most fatal period
in the history of the German people. To find our course we had to search our
consciences.51
The seminal causes reached back well before 1933, although National Socialism was the immediate cause of the catastrophe. Nazism could not have come to
power had it not found fertile soil for its poisonous seed among much of the population. For many decades the German people suffered from the wrong attitude
to the state. Not only military and business elites, but also farmers, shopkeepers,
professionals, intellectuals and workers had worshiped the state and subordinated
the individuals worth to it.52 If the criminal policies of Nazism were a national
responsibility, were Jaspers and Adenauer essentializing certain German attitudes and thus trapping their fellow citizens in a set of negative stereotypes? This
cannot be said of Jaspers: he argued that if Germans accepted the challenge of
communicating with one another they could forge a new sense of collective identity; and Adenauer pointed to the long tradition of city self-rule in Germany. Yet
both asserted daringly the responsibility of the citizens for their states policies
even under totalitarian conditions.
Beginning something new is dangerous business. The negotiations between
Israel and the FRG were so controversial in both countries that they took place
in the Netherlands, and an assassination attempt was made on Adenauer in March
1952. After the agreement was successfully concluded in September of that year
for a DM 3 billion payment, Adenauer expressed his satisfaction to have contributed however little to erase the evil committed, although the agreement was
only a symbol . . . a modest tentative to rehabilitate Germany. When he visited
Israel in 1966 as an official guest and met many German-born Israelis, he hardly
felt in them hate or enmity; they showed moving greatness in spite of the monstrosities which burden our past.53 It is estimated that between 1952 and 2000 the
FRG paid some $70 billion to the state of Israel and other war victims. Negotiations of compensations between Israel, Jewish organizations and Germany have
continued for 60 years.54
Forgiving and promising in the ECSC founding
Jaspers call for self-reflection cannot by itself help a people develop a new sense
of identity: too much introspection leads to denial, despair and despondency.55
Even thoughtful actors commit acts whose consequences are unpredictable and
irreversible; this is why Arendt makes the concepts of promise and forgiveness
central to her theory of public action.56 Forgiving palliates the irreversibility of
action; it is the only reaction, which does not merely re-act but acts anew and
unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing
from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.
As for the faculty of promising, it creates islands of certainty and remedies
28
actions unpredictability. Promises are almost always written: laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances.57 Forgiving and promising should be understood as
potentialities arising directly from the human capacity for action, not private
affects or spiritual insights. They imply a political relationship.58 Promise has long
been accepted in political theory and practice. But Arendt is well aware that she
breaks with an old tradition by politicizing forgiveness.
One reason why forgiveness is so controversial in politics is that it may contradict the requirements of justice, on which the legitimacy of democratic orders
rests. Thus Ricoeur concedes a political role to promise, but does not see how
forgiveness could be institutionalized: state amnesties granted for utilitarian and
therapeutic reasons are a poor substitute.59 Thomas Brudholm objects to processes
of forgiveness and reconciliation, which too often discount the victims voice and
feelings. And George Kateb critiques political forgiveness for its all inclusive
vagueness: no one is entitled to forgive me for the wrong I have done except the
person to whom I have done wrong.60 It is important to note, however, that Arendt
is not discussing institutions of forgiveness such as amnesty, but forgiving as the
breaking free from the vicious cycle of revenge and as a political experience.61
Forgiveness does not count as the opposite of punishment: only punishable acts
can be forgiven and the radical evil manifested in Nazism is beyond the scope
of forgiveness.62 And one may ask Kateb: what about collective harm inflicted
by one collectivity upon another? It is precisely because of the intractability of
injustice even in the best regimes that we should consider the appropriateness of
forgiving.63
Arendt deserves credit for freeing the concept of forgiveness from its Christian
ghetto, a secularizing but not anti-religious move, which Ricoeur resists by coupling forgiveness with repentance, a process of self-reflection unbinding the agent
from his act.64 Arendt is loath to enter the secret recesses of the human heart and
thus repentance does not feature in her considerations. Political forgiveness is to
act anew, unshackled by the past, but hardly forgetfully; it resists the power of the
past to determine the possibilities of the present.65 At times Arendt proves to be
a frustrating theorist in that her originality and insights are not developed in concrete examples.66 Young-Bruehl argues, however, that Arendts political theory
can be applied to many contemporary political practices including the European
Union, an astonishing demonstration of the power of promising and a miraculous transformation.67
Surprisingly there is a dearth of commentaries on the tight connection between
forgiving and promising in the vast scholarly literature on Arendt, but the story
of the ECSC founding illustrates to what extent promise and forgiveness belong
together.68 When Jean Monnet, a senior French civil servant,69 approached
the French Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman with his proposal for the
European Coal and Steel Community in April 1950, Germany had requested the
authorization to increase its steel production from 11 to 14 million metric tons
while French production was leveling off. The AngloSaxons were favorable to a
German economic renaissance but the French felt threatened. Franois Duchne,
Monnets close collaborator, explains why the Schuman Declaration on the ECSC,

which proposed to place under shared political control two industries crucial to the
war effort, came as a shock to the Western Allies: it would make war materially
impossible. It was the willingness of the French to submit to a common authority with the Germans within an egalitarian organization open to the participation
of all the other European nations that convinced the Dutch to sign the treaty.70
US ambassador to France David Bruce described the Schuman Plan in a cable
to US State Secretary Dean Acheson as the most imaginative and far-reaching
approach that has been made for generations to the settlement of fundamental
differences between France and Germany.71
Ideally political theorists should let political reality challenge, and if necessary,
change their ideas. This is a difficult act, and Arendt did not see that the capacity to
act together of formerly bitter enemies France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux
countries could illustrate her theorizing of political forgiveness as the human
capacity for new beginnings. Her view of politics literally hinges on natality, and
she writes of this life-changing ability with awe: the new therefore always appears
in the guise of a miracle. Even The Origins of Totalitarianism does not conclude
on a despondent note: But there remains also the truth that every end in history
necessarily contains a new beginning. . . . This beginning is guaranteed by each
new birth; it is indeed every man.72 In the case of European integration Schuman
was every man. He assumed the political risks of the initiative for the ECSC
and on 9 May 1950 chose to announce the plan directly to the public because it
was essential to act quickly and to impact public opinion before any diplomatic
negotiation, thus pushing the governments toward an agreement.73 According to
Schuman, the surprise was general. Nobody expected an initiative of this kind.74
If political forgiveness is about giving up revenge and daring to propose an action
in concert with former enemies, as Arendt and Digeser both argue, then the French
proposal for the ECSC can be interpreted as emblematic of this human capacity.
The Schuman Declaration also offered a promise, which the Treaty of Paris
institutionalized.75 Scholars and actors have compared the American and the
European founding experiences.76 Like their American predecessors, the Europeans trusted constitutional arrangements more than individual good will.77 When
Jean Monnet left the presidency of the ECSC High Authority, his collaborators
gave him a bound volume of his speeches, Les Etats-Unis dEurope ont commenc, whose title reflects well the spirit of the time.78 The Schuman Declaration can be compared to the American Declaration of Independence in so far as
it set forth basic goals and principles. The Treaty of Paris Preamble retained its
lofty language.79 But the 180 pages of this European promise, with its 100 articles
divided into ten chapters, three annexes, two protocols, and one exchange of letters between the governments of France and Germany regarding the status of the
Saar, and a Convention on the transitional provisions, does not make for politically inspiring reading in spite of Monnets assertion that it was beautifully written, in a strict and limpid style.80 Article 2 defines the tasks of the community:
to contribute . . . to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising
standard of living of the Member States. The other articles deal with the implementation of free competition, the establishment of a common market for coal and
30
steel, fair prices, and the modernization of production. The Community executive,
or High Authority (HA), carries technocratic and economic responsibilities: to
grant loans to encourage investment programs, promote technical and economic
research related to production, assist redundant workers, and authorize industrial
agreements and concentration.81
The goal of the ECSC was a partial fusion of sovereignty to eliminate domination by the strongest, and its alternative, lawlessness.82 The HA, in making
executive decisions on matters pertaining to coal and steel, would act by majority,
which meant that individual Member States wishes could be ignored in the name
of the common European interest. The Benelux countries, which worried about
FrancoGerman domination, insisted on a coordinating Council of Ministers in
addition to the supranational HA.83 The Member States would refer disputes to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), which had general competence to interpret the
treaty.84 There was no treaty provision establishing that Community law overrode
national law, but the ECJ established this principle in spite of the resistance of
several Member States, and the Court became central to the integration process by
insuring that the law was applied uniformly throughout the Community.85
Consistent with her critical stand on the post-WWII order in Europe, Arendt
noted the extraordinary instability and lack of authority of most European governments restored after the downfall of Hitlers Europe.86 Yet governments proved
determined enough to found a new covenant and to lay down rules to allow future
integration in their national constitutions. The 1949 German Basic Law and the
French, Dutch, Luxembourg, Italian and Danish constitutions all made provision
for the partial transfer of sovereignty to international institutions for the sake of
peace.87 In political practice new beginnings do not mix easily with stability.88
The idea of process was so important to Monnet that he refused Luxembourgs
offer to construct permanent office buildings for the ECSC, only to regret it later.89
Schuman ended Pour LEurope with a question: Will Europe ever be completed?
No one can say. It was a partial success . . . the starting point for more ambitious
realizations.90 But enough promises were made and kept to mitigate the paralyzing impact of actions unpredictable consequences.
In spite of her mistrust of the role of goodness in politics, Arendt, like Jaspers,
theorized poignantly the ethical stands that guarantee the rebirth and continuation of politics. But neither paid much attention to the material conditions that
guarantee the very survival of the actors and constitute the core of state policies.91
Comparativists have more to say on the role of economic interests in reconciliatory politics, which the next section discusses.
Reorganizing material relations towards fairness
Lily Gardner Feldman stresses the pragmatic aspect of successful reconciliatory
politics, programs of economic cooperation, which serve state interests and constitute a proven source of security and prosperity.92 In contrast with Jaspers and
Arendt, the European founders did not establish a strong distinction between economics and politics: economic interactions would create the public space where
former enemies could learn to trust and begin to act together again.93 Max Kohnstamm, who became a close collaborator of Monnet in 1950, was held captive by
the Germans for two years. He explains the rational aspect of reconciliation:
At first, there was a very strong feeling of hate among the prisoners. But it did
not last very long. No genius was required to understand that we could not
rebuild Europe without the Germans. The Netherlands, a de facto economic
province of Germany, needed German industry. But what was the meaning of
German renaissance if bombs were again fabricated in the Ruhr and dropped
on Rotterdam? How to break out of this vicious circle?94
Kohnstamms first trip to Germany was an eye-opener. Rotterdam had always
been the port of the Ruhr. But in their eagerness to get the German economy
going again the AngloAmerican occupiers had all exports from the Ruhr go
through the port of Hamburg, thus recreating Hitlers autarchic system. When
Kohnstamm complained, the Allies agreed with him, but responded that they
were responsible for Germany only. This is why when he read in the London
Times the Schuman Declaration, Kohnstamm felt struck as if by thunder . . .
This was the answer to the vicious circle which was not only economic, but also
moral and ethical.95
Assessments of the economic benefits of the ECSC vary greatly.96 Some call it
a success because production and trade in coal and steel increased considerably
among the six partners, by 21 per cent in coal, by over 25 per cent in iron ore and
by 157 per cent in steel;97 others a failure, in spite of the elimination of tariffs
and quotas.98 The German steel cartels were never successfully dismantled, partly
because Monnet did not want to antagonize the FRG government during the difficult negotiations over the European Defense Community. As a result, by 1957
eight firms controlled the entire German steel production.99 Moreover, the HA also
had occasional difficulties with the other ECSC institutions and national governments who had no intention of giving it carte blanche; therefore it failed to acquire
the political status which Monnet had hoped for. In 1959 the ECSC was unable to
solve a serious coal crisis, and it became apparent that partial integration, which
did not cover competing energy sources such as oil and nuclear power, could not
guarantee European prosperity.100 After the launching of the EEC and Euratom in
1958, competition developed between the different Communities and, in 1967, the
ECSC High Authority merged with the EEC Commission.
From the start, however, the ECSC was able to develop generous programs of
subsidized housing for miners and retraining for unemployed workers, thanks to
its levies on production and to US and Swiss loans; it gathered crucial information
about the European energy markets which had not been available in a structured
form before and developed a rich experience in the areas of investment, competition and economic forecasting and planning; and it developed community-wide
tax policies. It also fostered unprecedented relationships of collegiality among
representatives of six nation-states that would carry over in the establishment of
the EEC a few years later.101
32
The US: benevolent hegemon, mediator or actor in concert?

How to interpret the role that the US played in the ECSC founding? Conflict
resolution literature has paid much attention to mediation and the role of the
international community in peace-making since 1989.102 Lily Gardner Feldmans
comparative study of the Federal Republic of Germanys relationships with
France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic after WWII, lists the intervention
of third parties as one of the four variables affecting reconciliatory processes in
the international context.103 It is difficult to theorize the US presence in Western
Europe in the late 1940s according to the usual IR norms of realism, liberalism
or constructivism. It could be said that the US was a kind of mediator. Or another
way to interpret its role is that the US used its hegemonic position (or dominance)
benevolently to help open and protect public spaces in Western Europe for the four
reconciliatory practices detected so far: accounting for the past, forgiving, promising, and a fair rearrangement of economic relations between former enemies.104
The US called the worst breaker of peace to account by organizing the Nuremberg trials, which left the Allies off the hook in terms of their own crimes or questionable acts during the war. But victors justice was better than no justice. The
US also encouraged the democratization of the West German occupied zones and
provided legal assistance to the drafters of the 1949 Basic Law; it made sure that
the Marshall Plan funds would encourage European cooperation by requiring that
the 16 state beneficiaries draft the plan for distribution of the funds together in the
newly created Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).105 Most
importantly perhaps, the US decided to defer to the French instead of pushing
for the immediate re-armament of the FRG. Shortly after the election of the first
German government in 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked his French
colleague Schuman to define the main lines of the common policies which we
should adopt toward Germany. Bernard Clappier, Schumans directeur de cabinet, remembers that Schuman would ask him every week afterward: And Germany? What should I do to fulfill the mandate which has been entrusted to me?
It had become for him an obsession.106 The US government waited eight months
without any guarantee of the outcome, and subsequently it supported the Schuman
proposal for the ECSC, which it had no part in developing, against British opposition. A young Harvard professor, Robert Bowie, drafted the two most controversial articles on anti-trust legislation in the Treaty at Monnets request;107 and as
soon as the ECSC started its operation in Luxembourg, the US appointed a Special
Representative.
Gratitude toward the United States was sincere, but hardly naive. Monnet
wrote, I feel easier in my mind when Europeans take the necessary steps to
establish equality between themselves and the United States. Yet he remarked
in a 1953 speech to the ECSC Assembly that for the first time in history . . . a
great power, instead of founding its policies on maintaining divisions, grants its
resolute and continuous support to the creation of a large Community founded
on the union of previously separated people. He was referring to the continuous US moral and political support to the ECSC and a recent US loan to the
Community of $100 million at the advantageous rate of 3.7 per cent.108 Rather

than as a hegemon, or mediator, more often than not the US acted in concert with
its Western European allies.
The ECSCs manifold political impact qualifies it as the first major European
state-led initiative for reconciliation after WWII, although it has faded from memory today. It delivered on its most important promise, the European integration
process and substituted for a peace treaty with Germany.109 Moreover, the High
Authority, in which Member States had equal status, replaced the International
Ruhr Authority under which the Germans had chafed. The French annexation of
the Saar territory ended peacefully with a 1955 referendum when the Saar population chose to join the FRG. Finally, the US request for German re-armament was
satisfied through German accession to NATO in 1955, which had become acceptable to France in the new climate of trust.
Part II Self-transformation
Elite testimonies
Grassroots movements rather than elite leadership provided the necessary
emotional underpinning to the European reconciliation. But too sharply
drawn distinctions between elite and popular behavior distort the facts.110 Prointegration leaders were well aware of the political importance of emotions
although they conceived the new transeuropean institutions as an instrument
of behavioral transformation rather than healing of emotions. They stressed
the psychological barriers between the nations of Europe: Mens attitudes
must be changed: the French had to be delivered of their fears of the Germans,
the Germans of the humiliation of occupation, according to Monnet.111 For
Adenauer, the ECSC would change the thinking and political feeling of
European man.112
Openly facing and overcoming a legacy of abuse can induce feelings of shame,
which explains perhaps also why there are relatively few elite testimonies on such
transformative processes. Jacques-Ren Rabier and Max Kohnstamm, who started
working with Jean Monnet early in their careers, warn against an excessive idealization of European integration.113 But Kohnstamm still recalls with emotion
meeting the author of the Schuman Declaration in 1950:
It was love at first sight. I was struck by Monnets worldwide vision, which
was political, not economic. He was proposing a deep change in the relationships between nations with a very soft voice; it was about introducing a new
element in these relationships besides national sovereignty. Monnet did not
write on his philosophy, but all his actions were guided by a philosophical
conception: what matters is man as a person, not abstractions. He is abstract,
thus cruel, wrote Dostoevsky. De Gaulle talked about French greatness as an
abstraction. Monnet was a personalist even if he did not pronounce this word.
He detested domination and relationships of inequality; the rule of law was
essential, because men stand equal under it.114
34
Both Kohnstamm and Rabier reject the idea that the ECSC should be understood
as a symbol of forgiveness and stress promise instead, i.e. the bedrock of institutionalized and mutual commitments. Working with the Germans was not a problem. What mattered above all was the future. We were called to the same task,
and quickly a climate of trust developed among us.115 Kohnstamm, who was held
in a German concentration camp because of his student resistance activities during
WWII, prefers to speak of European reconciliation rather than forgiveness. Like
Kateb, he thinks:
Forgiveness is a personal act. To speak of forgiving the Germans in general is
already the beginning of the Holocaust, a dangerous abstraction. Moreover, to
find the guilty ones is a complex task. It is absurd to speak only of the German
sin; Europe was guilty. Few countries can be entirely proud of their attitude
during that period. Keynes had warned us that the Treaty of Versailles might
provoke another war.116
Kohnstamm insists that assigning blame fairly is a quasi-impossible task. A
German soldier saved the life of his father, a Dutch Jew of German origin
who wore the yellow star, by warning him of imminent arrest. After the war
as a young Dutch diplomat, he traveled through razed German cities and saw
little children emerging from the ruins: To speak of forgiving these innocent
young people would have been ridiculous. In 1947 Gustav Heinemann, a future
FRG President, and the theologian Martin Niemoeller welcomed Kohnstamm
to Germany as a delegate of the Dutch Reformed Church, people who did not
have any blood on their hands. The Nuremberg trials, the denazification programs imposed by the occupiers and the sizable reparations Germany paid to
war victims met the requirements of justice. The Germans atoned for their past
also by renouncing dictatorship, adopting a democratic constitution, and electing men like Adenauer who had not been compromised with the Nazi regime.
We trusted Adenauer and if a few of his collaborators were former Nazis, we
accepted it. All this would have been unthinkable if we had not been entirely
turned toward the future. We had much to accomplish together.117 But every so
often the desire for revenge lurked, even in the mind of someone as discerning
as Kohnstamm. Negotiating the ECSC Treaty in Paris as a member of the Dutch
delegation, and having dinner with Walter Hallstein, the head of the German
delegation, was not easy. Two of Kohnstamms aunts had died in Auschwitz and
so had the parents of Etienne Hirsch, Monnets closest collaborator. Kohnstamm
recalls vividly an incident in Luxembourg after he became secretary-general of
the ECSC:
The window of my office opened right above a bridge crossing a very deep
ditch in the middle of the city. One day I was eating my sandwich when I saw
a young man who was walking alone, in a raincoat, which resembled a Nazi
uniform. The thought flashed through my mind: Why not push him in the
ditch! I was shocked by my reaction.118

Some of the senior initiators of the European integration process were less wary
than Rabier and Kohnstamm to acknowledge the forgiving element of the process. Schuman, born a German citizen in Lorraine and trained, like Adenauer, as
a lawyer in German universities, sat in the French National Assembly from 1919
to 1940. With a large majority of his colleagues, he voted full powers to Marchal
Ptain in July 1940, but he refused to participate in the Vichy government and
was arrested. After escaping from Germany in 1942 he lived clandestinely until
1944. It was in his capacity as foreign affairs minister (194852) that he promoted
the Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community. What was needed between
France and Germany was a detoxification from history books. This is why
Schuman proposed to extend our hand to our enemies not simply to forgive, but
to build together the Europe of tomorrow, which was an undertaking of peace
beyond antagonism and resentments. At last, both countries had made mutual
sacrifices to amicably and entirely eliminate their differences.119
Alcide De Gasperi is the least well-known hero of the European integrations
founding, partly because his extensive writings are only being made available
now (in Italian), and the English-speaking world has paid superficial attention
to him.120 Like Schuman he was a man of the frontiers, having started his career as
a member of the Habsburg Diet in Vienna. The Trentino region of Austria became
Italian after WWI, and De Gasperi lived for almost 20 years in internal exile under
fascism. He re-emerged in 1943 to found the ChristianDemocratic Party, and
became prime minister in 1945. He was known, in spite of a rather abrupt personality, as a mediator in Italian politics where he opposed the outlawing of the
powerful Communist Party, supported an amnesty for ex-fascists and negotiated
an agreement with the German-speaking Alto Adige. In European politics his most
original initiative was his proposal for a European Political Community, in the
name of peace, which the French National Assembly rejected with the European
Defense Community (EDC) in 1954. Maritain and Emmanuel Mouniers personalist theories influenced him and, as a staunch Catholic believer who supported
a secular state in the same way as Adenauer and Schuman, there is no reason to
doubt that he shared also their convictions on personal accountability and forgiveness of enemies.121
Monnet, whose massive pre-war archives were burned by the Germans during
the occupation, had not received the formal education of an Adenauer, De Gasperi
or Schuman; neither did he share their fervent Christian convictions. He was more
reticent to expose his inner motivations, and simply wrote of his passion to unite
people. His 500-page Memoirs has no comments on virtue although it mentions
the daily solitary walks, which helped him think.122 Rabier remembers him as a
man of action who adopted a lifestyle favoring reflection:
Religion deals with the transformation of behaviors. Regarding faith Monnet stood as if he was facing a mountain or a cliff; he was interested, but not
involved. But, consciously or unconsciously he was doing spiritual work.
To reconcile people implies necessarily a spiritual connotation. This transforming vision was more conscious in Adenauer and Schuman. What I find
36

interesting is that Monnet thought that human behaviors could change. It
is not self-evident that institutions contribute to change in behaviors and
reciprocally. Some of Monnets collaborators were personalists, others were
moved by the economic realities of the time, but all were convinced that
we could not make progress on a purely political path. It worked thanks
to the pressure of material necessity, which was not the essential concern
for Monnet. As for me I had the feeling to act as a citizen and a father, my
Catholic faith was not a primary motivation. In any case, Christians have no
privileges, only supplementary duties. Agnostic humanists had other motivations: to avoid war.123
There were never any philosophical conversations in Monnets entourage according to French economist Jean Fourasti; he was a man focused on action with no
time to waste on abstract debates: I have the impression that he wanted to limit
himself, at least with us, to political, administrative and economic problems, which
was already a considerable undertaking. The point was to try, starting from the
tensions between men, to limit the dramatic and disorderly character of life.124
Once only in his Memoirs Monnet mentions the harm lack of forgiveness may
cause in international affairs. He condemns the negative attitude of the French
Minister of Defense Jules Moch who like some others, had never forgiven Germany for the crimes committed by the Nazis. This attitude was proving untenable, so that France had to take a new, bold initiative in transforming the situation as a whole . . . and remove the controls and restraints on Germany faster than
we had planned.125 The bold initiative, another brainchild of Monnet, became the
Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community.
Was Monnets reticence a way to deflect painful memories, with the unforeseen
result that it would also deflect the mourning that Ricoeur associates with faithfulness to the past? Arendt would not have faulted Monnet, nor Kohnstamm and
Rabier, for not revealing or analyzing publicly their innermost motivations. The
human heart should be protected from public scrutiny lest it becomes an object
of suspicion rather than insight; indeed, we can never be sure even of our own
motives. Arendt cited the example of Robespierre, whose insane mistrust of others
sprang ultimately from his not so insane, but quite normal suspicion of himself
and led to the excesses of the Terror.126 Action manifests its goal and principle, but
not the innermost motivation of the agent. Arendt, according to Margaret Canovan, drew from her encounters with totalitarianism the lesson that goodness was
politically irrelevant: Conventional morality had been no impediment to political
evil . . . The only adequate answer was, she [Arendt] concluded, a political one:
the agreement of citizens to establish and to maintain a republic based on equal
rights for all.127
Oases in the desert: grassroots initiatives for European reconciliation
Scholarly literature on conflict resolution tends to view top-down reconciliatory
processes (truth commissions, trials, reparations, public apology) as antagonistic

or at least detached from bottom-up processes (community initiatives and individual healing), according to David Bloomfield. But a strong argument can be made
to see them [reconciliatory processes] as complementary, mutually related and
mutually supporting.128 Although European integration is most often discussed
as an elite process,129 a surge of grassroots movements provided the necessary
affective underpinning to reconciliatory processes in Western Europe after WWII.
Indeed, the principle of reconciliation could not have shaped a new kind of European politics without popular roots. Because Arendt was intensely critical of representative democracy, the process of negotiation and parliamentarian ratification,
which gave the ECSC its legitimacy, may have struck her as falling short of her
exacting standard of participatory politics.130 Arendt herself recognized that her
concept of public engagement might work best in a small society, and some commentators discount her contribution to modern democratic theory altogether.131
Jeffrey C. Isaacs offers a more sympathetic interpretation: Arendt took for granted
that representative democracy was here to stay and merely advocated for a complement to this political form. Her elementary republics, be they the councils of
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the student and the civil rights movements of the
1960s, or the labor movement, are meant to invigorate democracy, not replace
the institutions of representative democracy. They are like oases in the desert
and members of the participatory elite select themselves:132
[They] are counterposed to the masses. But the counterposition is not between
a privileged few and an incapable many. It is not between two classes or types
of people as much as between two competing attitudes. . . . But this is not a
derogation of average people. It is an invitation, perhaps even an incitement,
for them to surpass their ordinariness simply through their voluntary association and concerted action.133
After WWII, grassroots initiatives established public spaces of interaction where
citizens could account, forgive, promise and mediate. They did not represent
majoritarian opinion, but another kind of elite, perhaps more genuinely political than elected politicians; the spaces they inhabited were like Arendts oases in
the desert. Grassroots activism sometimes overlapped with official action, but in
the more intimate settings offered by trade unions meeting halls, churches and
non-profit associations, small and large shifts in attitude could occur away from
the glare of publicity. Like the state-led initiatives, these grassroots networks were
transeuropean, not exclusively French and German. All kinds of religious, cultural and political associations started to speak with each other after the war,
says Jacques-Ren Rabier.134 The World Council of Churches, the International
Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax Christi brought former enemies together.
Joseph Rovan, a former prisoner of Dachau, founded in 1945 the International
Bureau of Liaison and Documentation, an organization dedicated to Franco
German reconciliation. In 1949 the FrenchGerman Institute of Ludwigsburg was
created to serve a real political and cultural interpenetration between the two
countries.135 And there were also many youth meetings. French Member of the
38
European Parliament (MEP) Michel Rocard traces back his interest in European
integration to a European Boy Scout camp, which he attended at the age of 16 in
1946. Belgian MEP Fernand Herman helped organize a meeting of 9,000 European students in 1958, who dismantled the wooden gates at the FrancoGerman
border near Strasbourg, a symbolic and fantastic event.136
Edward Luttwak documents the role of one NGO, the Moral Re-Armament
movement (MRA, today renamed Initiatives of Change, IofC), which relied on the
work of hundreds of volunteers from all walks of life. One hundred Swiss families
pooled their savings to buy a dilapidated hotel in the village of Caux, Switzerland,
and rehabilitate it with the express purpose to serve European reconstruction. In
the years immediately following the war between 1946 and 1950 MRA brought
together in Caux 1,983 French citizens and 3,113 Germans. Among the French
visitors were three cabinet ministers (Franois Mitterrand was one of them) and
other government officials, 200 trade unionists, 207 industrialists, 35 clergy, 30
media representatives and 100 from education including two university rectors.
From the FRG, 82 came from government circles, including Konrad Adenauer,
400 were trade unionists, 210 industrialists, 14 clergy and 160 media representatives. The participation of French and German coal industry representatives from
labor and management was strong.137 According to Luttwak, these encounters
dovetailed with the launching of the ECSC in a classical case of serendipity.
Jean Monnet, the initiator of the ECSC, did not have contact with MRA (although
Schuman and Adenauer both did). However, it was certainly a crucial advantage
for the politicians and bureaucrats on both sides that many leading French and
German coal and steel industrialists and trade union leaders had already developed warm personal relationships at Caux. Luttwak concludes that MRA did not
invent the Schuman Plan but it facilitated its realization from the start.138
The work of self-transformation could be excruciatingly painful. French journalist Franoise Giroud, whose sister had spent years at the Ravensbruck concentration camp, traveled as a young peace activist to a conference in Germany.
But when she heard German spoken at the station she could hardly get out of the
train.139 One of the organizers of the Caux Conferences, Leif Hovelsen, a former
student member of the Norwegian resistance who had been incarcerated and brutalized by the Gestapo for several years, later worked for reconciliation between
Germany and Norway and spent some years in Germany. His autobiography Out
of the Evil Night describes the encounter between a former French resistance
fighter, Irne Laure, who had become a socialist member of the French Constituent Assembly, and a group of young Germans in Caux in 1947. Laure had come
to Caux suspecting a capitalist trap, and her suspicion turned to revulsion when
she saw Germans there. She had seen the bodies of her friends in mass graves, and
her youngest children almost starved to death. But the question of Frank Buchman, MRAs American leader, stopped her from leaving Caux immediately: As
a socialist what kind of unity do you want for Europe? With her bags already
packed, she struggled through three sleepless nights between holding on to her
hate or giving it up.140 Meanwhile, the German youths had made up their mind
that if Laure expressed her justified hate for Germany publicly they would remind
her of the exactions committed by the French occupying forces in the Black
Forest. But Laure surprised them. She asked to speak at a meeting and said only
three sentences: that she had so much hated Germany that she had wished it erased
from the map of Europe; but that she had understood that her hate was not justified; and that she would like to ask all Germans present to forgive her for it. One
of the Germans, Peter Petersen, who had served in the Nazi Youth Movement,
describes the emotional turmoil this simple declaration provoked in him:
For several nights I could not sleep. My whole past was in revolt against the
courage of this woman. I suddenly realized that there were things for which
we, as individuals and as nations, could never make restitution. Yet we knew,
my friends and I, that she had shown us the only way open if Germany was
to play a part in the reconstruction of Europe. The basis of a new Europe
would have to be forgiveness, as Madame Laure had shown us. One day we
told her how sorry we were and how ashamed we were for all the things she
and her people had had to suffer through our fault, and we promised her that
we would now devote our lives to work that such things would never happen
again anywhere.141
Petersen would eventually become an influential member of the German Bundestag. For Irne Laure the Caux speech was only a beginning. From January to
March 1949 she crisscrossed West Germany, speaking 200 times in public, and in
11 of the 12 state parliaments. Every time she asked for forgiveness for her hatred
in order to restore Germany to a place in the family of nations, and to inspire the
youth with a vision of a future to be built, rather than with dreams of revenge.
Her son Louis, a former resistance member, rebelled like others among her fellow resistance fighters; and she chose to explain herself publicly at a meeting of
5,000 persons arranged by a Socialist trade union friend in Lille, France: I know I
may offend many of you. For weeks my heart ached, when I spoke in Germany.
But I made penance. Our task is to take the first step towards the Germans so that
what happened before can never happen again.142 Existential philosopher Gabriel
Marcel writes of Laures experience as an event-principle or event-source,
which impacts others like radioactivity. At a time when experts are unable
. . . to solve the basic problem, that is to establish a peace worthy of its name,
Caux provided emergency help and healers.143 For Joseph Montville, Laure
made a noteworthy contribution to a public environment, which facilitated
FrancoGerman reconciliation and eventually led to the creation of the European
Community.144
Therefore two kinds of initiatives, mostly uncoordinated, yet compatible, drove
the first post-WWII European reconciliation, those of the state and those of civil
society. The first addressed primarily material interests and state security, the second affective issues and self-transformation. The grassroots practices, like the
elite initiatives, included: accounting for the past; unexpected acts of forgiveness,
for instance the Laure speech in Caux and her subsequent visits to the FRGs
state parliaments; promises such as the young Petersens response to Laure; and
40
external mediation from Swiss, Americans, Canadians, Swedes, and others. They
relied on volunteer work and financial donations to support programs and may
have inspired efforts toward the fair rearrangement of economic relations, which
only state-led initiatives could implement. From the start the European reconciliation process was multilateral. France and Germany, in spite of their central role
in launching the European integration process, have no monopoly on it; nor does
the EU today. Like the Indian experiment in non-violent liberation politics and the
South African exercise in transitional justice, European reconciliation(s) represent
a set of experiences and memories whose inheritors need not be defined by nationality, ethnicity, or geography.
Part III A contested legacy

The two logics of European integration: turning memory on its head
I asked some EU decision-makers, on the eve of the 1999 NATO intervention in
Serbia and Kosovo, whether Arendts reflections on forgiveness and promise were
still relevant in politics. Spanish MEP Enrique Barn Crespo lived through the
transition to democracy in Spain which was founded on forgiveness and promise; and he experienced the most moving moment of his political career when
he voted for the laws of amnesty in the Cortes (Spanish legislature) in 1977. He
added, Arendt is still relevant today. I share the frustrations of most of my colleagues regarding the situation in the Balkans. The method that we followed in
the EU is the only solution there too.145 For German MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit,
whose parents were close friends of Arendt, the experience of forgiveness between
France and Germany, which made European reconciliation possible, is still necessary in Northern Ireland, in the Basque country, in Bosnia. I often talk about it.
Moreover political forgiveness is the basic justification for amnesty laws. Arendt
inspires his political thinking: Our big challenge is to overcome the reduction of
politics to the economic. The primary mission of Europe is political, cultural and
social.146 The issue of reconciliation was pressing for Austrian MEP Reinhard
Rack. Being the only representative for Styria in the EP, he got letters and petitions from constituents asking for restitution now that Slovenia (until 1918 Southern Styria) was acceding to the EU. After WWI, borders were drawn arbitrarily
and German-speaking citizens suffered discrimination and loss of property there.
Rack agreed that grievances must be dealt with if we want to live together in a
community, but he also told his constituents that they must be satisfied even with
partial compensation. At some point you have to draw the line and put an end to
past history. Forgiveness is part of the game.147
Swedish MEP Ivar Virgin took a prosaic view: Forgiveness is an experience
necessary in daily life, so it is also naturally part of the international process.
In the short run countries have to accept unfavorable deals for themselves and
must try to get over it. But such instances should be minimized.148 And others
described the impulse behind the European integration process primarily in instrumental terms. Austrian MEP and lawyer Maria Berger, who helped negotiate her

countrys accession to the EU, stated: In everyday politics principles as such do
not count very much. A peace agreement is about the right balance of interests.
Even the integration of the coal and steel industries was a very pragmatic way to
prevent war. Belgian MEP Fernand Herman, an economist by training, agreed
that peace was part of the EUs charisma, but it was a rational process: We
obtain from European integration the benefits we hoped to gain in earlier days
though war. . . . The causes of resentment are so old that political and economic
rather than spiritual considerations are the motor of the process.149
French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges summed up best the complexity of the
debate on the respective weight of ideals and interests in European reconciliations
by detecting two logics in the project, one rationalist, utilitarian, Benthamian,
the other affective, based on memory and forgiveness. He admitted to an almost
Freudian concept of Europe:
The EU is the superego of the nation-states, imposing on them the mastery
of their nationalisms, of their ethnic urges. The EU represents the victory
of reason over folly, of law over force. The European ethic resides in the
realization that we defend our interests only by taking into account the others
interests. This is the Benthamian logic, which is the opposite of the logic of
forgiving and promising which is essentially affective.
Bourlanges recalled that Simone Weil drew her European faith from her experience in Auschwitz; she saw only two solutions, kill all Germans or create a united
Europe. So Arendt had an important point to make. There is also in the EU the idea
that union is born out of the remembrances of sufferings imposed and received.
Forgetfulness is the beginning of disunion. In effect, because I remember I forgive.150 Arendt does not link memory with forgiveness, nor does she conceive the
logic of forgiveness and promise as affective. Promise and forgiveness manifest
themselves as political initiatives in the public sphere. But in the past Europeans
went to war in the name of memory. Bourlanges assertion that to remember is to
forgive shows to what extent the substantive content of European memory has
been turned on its head, at least for some European actors.
A lasting chain reaction of reconciliations?
In The Rebirth of Europe, Pond describes the miracle of the present chain reaction of reconciliation in Europe.151 In order to qualify for membership in the EU,
Hungary and Romania signed a peace treaty dealing with the tricky issue of the
Hungarian minority living in Romania; there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany and Poland (recognizing as permanent the post-WWII
borders between the two countries) and Germany and the Czech Republic (putting
to rest the claims of the Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after
WWII). In this context, Pond argues that the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia constitute
a tragic exception, and that four decades of teamwork between Western European nation-states have been habit-forming.152
42
Long-standing enmities, however, do not die a quick death. Czech Prime

Minister Milos Zeman revived painful controversies in January 2002 when he
called the Sudeten Germans Hitlers fifth column. Reacting immediately,
right-wing politicians in Germany and Austria asked for the abolition of the 1945
Bene decrees that legitimized the expulsion, as a condition for Czech accession
to the EU. The uproar was such that German Chancellor Gerhard Schrder had to
cancel a state visit to the Czech Republic in March 2002.153 French vice-president
of the European Parliament Catherine Lalumire warned that to reopen this dispute could lock in Czechs, Slovaks, Germans and Austrians. Why not reopen also
the territorial disputes between Germany and Poland over Silesia (today Polish
territory), or between Italy and Slovenia? This would mean putting the finger in a
suicidal chain of events for Europe. The founders made of reconciliation a priority
. . . we will not erase what happened, but we will turn the page.154
Austrian MEP Maria Berger, whose constituency in Upper Austria included
a large number of descendents of the Sudeten Germans, also spoke of turning
the page. Three years earlier she had described the integration process as primarily interest-driven; in 2002 she stressed the importance of reconciliation for
the current enlargement. Understandably many of her constituents would have
liked to see their sufferings acknowledged by the Czech government, but they
did not expect monetary compensation, well aware that they have prospered in
Austria much more than would have been possible in Czechoslovakia. Berger,
thus, did not make of the cancellation of the Bene decrees a condition for Czech
accession. It takes a long time for a country to confront its past. We know something about this in Austria. . . . The EU is the solution to historical conflicts . . .
cooperation instead of blame.155 The legal experts consulted by the EP agreed
that, the confiscation on the basis of the Bene decrees did not raise an issue
under EU law, which has no retroactive effect, and a repeal of the decrees
did not seem mandatory in the context of accession. However, they found
this law repugnant to Human Rights and all fundamental principles and were
of the opinion that the Czech Republic should formally recognize this.156
The Czech Republic did not heed this recommendation, and the Parliament
accepted the experts report supporting Czech accession, in effect ending this
controversy.
Some worry about the loss of the ECSC legacy. German MEP and president
of the EP Delegation for Relations with Southeast Europe Doris Pack regretted
that in Western Europe European peace politics have unfortunately become
normalized, and taken for granted. She told the story of the seven-year-old son
of a German constituent who came home one day saying that his teacher had gone
crazy because during the class she mentioned wars between France and Germany.
Even the 35-year-old father had trouble remembering. Yet when she went to Bosnia, Pack felt she had the authority to speak of the forgiveness that took place
among WWII former belligerents. In Bosnia people have not forgiven for 600
years. Forgiveness is a Christian word which is not the property of Christians, and
goes way beyond religion.157
Skeptics
The idea of drawing ideas from the ECSCs experience to solve current conflicts
is not new. The 1993 proposals of the Delors Commission for regional cooperation in the Middle East reflected strikingly the spirit of Monnet and Schuman
and of Europes own experience after World War II. In the wake of the Oslo
Agreement the Commission suggested that regional cooperation between Israel,
the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt should focus on
pooling common capacities to tackle common problems, particularly water,
energy and transportation. It proposed establishing the basis of a Middle East
economic area with free movements of goods, services, labor and capital.158 The
1995 EuroMediterranean partnership provided a broader scheme for interregional cooperation. But the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin and the resumption of violence on both sides in 1996 brought the negotiations for interregional cooperation to an end before they had even started.159
So, the idea that the ECSC experience may suggest initiatives to solve current conflicts can meet skepticism among some of the most experienced founders of European integration. This was the reaction of Rabier when he was asked
about the long-standing conflicts between Greece and Turkey in spring 1999. He
noted the long maturation of the reconciliatory process, which began to involve
French and German political actors of the left and the right and Catholic and Protestant religious personalities in the 1920s already. I am not sure such a process
has taken place between Greece and Turkey. Monnet is no longer here. It would
take EU representatives to go on the spot and tell the decision-makers: We love
you, but, please, love each other a bit better.160
Former EU Commission president Jacques Delors also denied the relevance
of an Arendtian interpretation of the ECSC founding for contemporary conflicts,
especially in the Western Balkans: he recalled accompanying the EC president
Jacques Poos to Belgrade in 1991. The two EC representatives encouraged the
six Yugoslav republics presidents to form a loose confederation, even if they
wanted separation. We offered them a treaty of association with the European
Community if they did so. But we could not convince them. The logic of hate
and rejection of the other took over. It was no longer the Arendtian logic.161 Still,
Delors response was not a dismissal of Arendtian thought:
Even perhaps without having read Arendt, the European Founding Fathers
implicitly applied her maxims. As recently as 1995, when speaking about
Europe to the giants of history who were finishing their careers, [German]
Chancellor Kohl and [French] President Mitterrand and many others who had
known the awakening of Europe in 1948, one heard them respond never
again war between us, which implies a promise and forgiveness. That French
and Dutch people, freed from concentration camps, could create links with
Germans right after the war, this is true greatness.162
In politics opinions change as Arendt stresses. Delors revisited his interviewers
questions less than a year later in two major speeches, the second celebrating
44
in Luxembourg the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1950 Schuman Declaration. He

stated that if Europe had remembered its treasure, the virtues of promise and
forgiveness borrowed from Hannah Arendt, it would have dealt with the Balkans issue quite differently. Arendt illustrated the thought and action of French
Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman even though she wrote eight years after
he acted:
Forgiveness without forgetfulness, promise to allow the other not to sink into
despair or revenge. Let us think of what strength these maxims might carry if
they were applied in Bosnia and Kosovo. . . .
We must therefore find in the Balkans, on both sides, men and women
whom we could trust to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together
a promise, of course, with the support of nearby countries, among others
Bulgaria and Romania. But this was not done because the little light the
treasure I spoke about is no longer shining.163
More prosaically Delors asked why one of the recipes of the ECSC, the pooling of economic resources, was not applied to Kosovo and its neighbors, which
would compel them to develop common institutions to administer their material
exchanges. He concluded that forgiveness and promise together form a project,
which is part of the legacy left to the European people.164 Delors has not developed these ideas in more detail since, although he has mentioned them again and
refers to Arendt.165
For his part, Polish MEP Bronislaw Geremek regretted that during the EUs
Fiftieth Anniversary celebrations of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, the very origin
of European integration was left in the shadow:
After all, 1950 preceded 1957. In the GermanFrench rapprochement, the most
important work, which matters historically, was not the will to build around
coal and steel, but the transcending (dpassement) of recent memories. . . .
The EU has paid little attention to issues of reconciliation in Kosovo, which
has been handled as a political issue and a question of international law. Reconciliation cannot be imposed by decree. But the EUs offer of accession to
both Serbia and Kosovo implies a future made possible by reconciliation.166
Whether there is an ECSC treasure of reconciliatory practices, and how it should
be put to good use, will remain two highly contested questions as the statements of
witnesses demonstrate. It is a matter of opinion, just as it should be in politics
and political theory.167 Chapter 3 offers a way to think through the evocative, but
indefinite statements of Delors and Geremek on the relevance of the ECSC example to the conflicts in the Western Balkans. It retraces also another lively debate
of opinion within the EU over the constitution of a common memory, which EU
citizens could share, in order to identify with each other politically.
Remembering the principle of

reconciliation
Applications
Introduction
The principle of reconciliation is fragile in that its effectiveness depends entirely
on the actors willingness to implement it. There is no easily accessible blueprint of
what the post-WWII reconciliatory practices may offer for the solution of current
conflicts. At the time of writing Spain and the UK are still arguing over Gibraltar;
the parties in Northern Ireland are sorting out many issues related to their conflict;
there are tensions between Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, Italy and Romania,
and this list is not exhaustive. Moreover, in 2004, in a major breach of its reconciliatory tradition and policies, the EU accepted the accession of the still divided
Republic of Cyprus.
Florence Hartmann claims that the EU success story required a strong belief
that Europe could only be united if it learns about and from the crimes and horrors of the past.1 This assertion sounds credible in hindsight, and supports Hartmanns belief in the importance of transitional justice, but it has little to do with
the facts as they stood in 1950. The practical politicians who founded the ECSC
reconciled around a practical project that served material and political interests,
not around memory. Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran Dzihi acknowledge the danger of depolitisation of the memory process. Reconciliation must address the
structures of political power, social inequality and exclusion that constituted the
framework within which the violence of the old order was both perpetrated and
endured.2 Part I of Chapter 3 expands on Delors and Geremeks reflections on the
Western Balkans. It consists of a hermeneutical exercise in pondering the application of the EU foundings reconciliatory practices accounting for the past,
forgiving, promising, structural transformation and the mediation of a third party
to the unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. What might this mean
in terms of state-led policies and grassroots initiatives? This story is meant to
highlight the way collaborative projects around concrete objectives can promote
peace, even if not all the policy suggestions offered below convince.3
There is something right about Hartmanns argument, however. Reclaiming
memory is a form of reconciliation, and this is the way Arendt theorized it. The
work of memory is not a singular political act like promising and forgiving, but
rather a mental and civic activity undertaken for the sake of the world, where
46
Reconciliation: applications
human beings engage with one another about shared purposes and commitments.
It corresponds to the attempt to make oneself at home in the world.4 Arendt does
not encourage the work of memory because of its immediate political consequences; political action is more effective to fight totalitarianism than remembering. Yet understanding the past, a continuous and unending exercise, is essential
to the formation of political identity and empowers the actor.5 Part II of Chapter 3
offers several stories of action that illustrate Arendts concept of reconciliation as
a form of remembrance: collaborations between MEPs and academics; initiatives
of EP staff members; the attempts to create museums of EU history; and classroom
scenes in one of the four Brussels European Schools.
Part I Remembering the ECSC to consider the relationship

between Kosovo and Serbia
Comparing histories
A major concern of the ECSC partners was to chart an original course that would
limit the excessive dependence on the two superpowers vying for hegemony, and
yet contribute to the security of all.6 They had no model to follow for reconciliation: the ECSC was their brainchild. Could there be a successful pax balkanica,
once again initiated by those primarily involved?7 There seems to be little similarity between France and the FRG in 1950, and Kosovo and Serbia in 2010. Yet,
in 1950, the sovereignty of the FRG was still contested by some governments,
as Serbia and Kosovos sovereignties are currently. When the ECSC treaty was
negotiated, there was no peace treaty between the former European belligerents;
East Germany was under Soviet occupation and the Saar had become an economic
province of France. An international administration supervised the Ruhr Gebiet,
and all European countries were struggling to recover economically from wars
depredation. The occupying powers were deeply divided on the future of Germany, and the Western Allies could not agree on the partial rearmament of West
Germany, which the US and UK supported and the French opposed, just as today
there is not full international consensus on the future of Kosovo.
The emotional wounds were very deep also. Arendt stressed in 1947 that a
way out of fanatical hatred had to be found, with some model of how human
beings can speak with each other despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge.8
During a 2005 seminar for Serb and Albanian Kosovars organized in Strasbourg
around the post-WWII Franco-German reconciliation, one participant remarked
how the fact that reconciliation is possible even after much suffering and hate
gives hope. Another noted the similarities between AlsaceLorraine and Kosovos histories, two regions torn apart by major powers rivalries across several
centuries: This contextualizes our own problems because we see that we are not
the only ones left in the world with such a history. Nicolas Moll, one of the organizers, describes the FrenchGerman experience as a motivator, not a model
to emulate, whose remembrance impacts French and German as well as Western
Balkans actors when they dialogue about it.9
Reconciliation: applications 47
There can be no thinking through a historical legacy without some understanding
of its inheritors circumstances. A historical reminder of recent events in the Western Balkans is in order,10 although no such account can avoid controversies,11 the
first regarding when to start. A major turning point was 1989 when Serb leader Slobodan Miloevi forcibly incorporated the autonomous province of Kosovo into the
federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After resisting non-violently, Albanian Kosovars
set up an armed resistance movement (KLA) in the late 1990s, which provoked
increased repression from Serbia. Confronting the expulsion of the entire Albanian
population from Kosovo, NATO started a controversial bombing campaign against
Serb troops in March 1999 without UN authorization.12 After Miloevi withdrew
his troops, Albanian Kosovars returned to their devastated homes and, in June, UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 set up a civil administration, the UN Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK), supported by a NATO-led military force (KFOR) to facilitate the transition of Kosovo to a final status that might satisfy both its Serb and
Albanian populations. Several elections have taken place in Kosovo since, largely
boycotted by the Serb minority. Violent demonstrations in March 2004 involving
50,000 anti-Serb demonstrators increased the Serb exodus from Kosovo.13
Internationally sponsored talks between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars met
with little success, and in March 2007 UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari recommended independence for Kosovo, supervised for an initial period . . . by
international civilian and military presences.14 In February 2008 Kosovo declared
its independence, which the US and 22 EU Member States have since recognized
Kosovos independence, but Russia, and EU Member States Cyprus, Greece,
Romania, Slovakia and Spain have not. In spite of its divisions, the EU Council
under Slovenian presidency acknowledged the independence of Kosovo in February 2008 and agreed to send EULEX, a force of 2,000 police officers, prosecutors
and judges to help train local police and organize customs and the courts. But the
EU mission, which started on 9 December 2008, declared itself status-neutral
regarding Kosovo, to the dismay of Albanian Kosovars and, because of Russian
opposition on the Security Council, UNMIK cannot cede its international mandate
to EULEX.15 On 22 July 2010 the UN International Court of Justice ruled that
Kosovos declaration of independence violated no international law or UN resolution. Meanwhile, the remaining Serbs in northern Kosovo (120,000 Serbs live in
UN-protected enclaves in Kosovo) have developed parallel political institutions.16
Commentators (see authors cited above on Kosovo history) agree that the prospect
of EU accession may be the only way out of intractable differences.
Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe with a per capita income of 250 euros a
month. Half of its 1.9 million population is under 25. It has a weak administrative
capacity and there are few industrial resources except for the vast but dilapidated
Trepa/Trepa Mining Complex. Serbia, with a 10.8 million population, is struggling to recover from the destruction of infrastructure by NATO bombing and to
integrate over 200,000 Serb refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo left from
the half million who came in the 1990s. And in Kosovo it was estimated that
there were still 19,000 internally displaced persons in 2010.17 Both countries suffer from organized crime and a high level of unemployment.18
48
Pax balkanica: accounting for the past
Transitional justice
The next three sections discuss the prospects of pax balkanica by using the postWWII reconciliatory practices (see Chapter 2) as an analytical framework. This
should be understood as a heuristic rather than a prescriptive exercise. Arendt
and the ECSC founders stressed action in concert and promise rather than justice,
whereas Jaspers emphasized the personal aspect of accountability, and supported
international trials against war criminals. Arendt did so somewhat less enthusiastically as she noted the double standard of victors justice.19 Since the 1950s, and
especially after the 1995 South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
there has been an international learning process in transitional justice. In a process
reminiscent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, justice is being delivered in fits
and starts in the Western Balkans through trials. Radovan Karadi, the infamous
Bosnian Serb leader, is in the hands of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), following Slobodan Miloevi and other Serbs. At
the time of writing the last major Serb perpetrator, Goran Hadi, was sent to The
Hague. In 2005 former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj surrendered
himself voluntarily to the ICTY and was exonerated from charges of human rights
violations and released, to be rearrested later. The Croatians delivered General
Ante Gotovina to the ICTY. According to Pond, it is significant that local judges
in all Western Balkan countries are trying and convicting defendants of their own
ethnicities.20 Jelena Suboti argues, however, that Serbia has subverted the international norms of transitional justice for instrumental purposes, such as securing
candidate status for accession to the EU, and is in fact rejecting the profound
social transformations these norms require. She calls for more international
involvement in socializing and rewarding domestic elites to open the black box
of the past in a responsible manner.21
Scholars initiatives
It took sixty years for the Germans and French to adopt a common textbook to teach
their high school students.22 But in the Western Balkans historians and teachers
are already hard at work to confront clashing memories: the Southeast European
Joint History Project has published four workbooks for university and secondary
school use, translated into seven languages. The Thessaloniki-based Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe supported the Project with
the collaboration of four dozen Balkan historians. For the Albanian language edition, 53 teachers attended two training workshops in Pristina and Prizren in February 2009.23 Although no exact causal relationship can be established between
the teaching of history and the reduction of conflict, school history teaching and
the contentions over curriculum disturb rigid mindsets and encourage interactive
pluralism that is, a willingness to regard the political environment as a shared
space. As Margaret E. Smith writes, perhaps the best that can be expected from
school history teaching is a refusal to propagate lies. And a society has to find
other ways to digest its past before it can be adequately expressed didactically.24
Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars Initiative, published in
2009 by Purdue University Press and the US Institute of Peace, is another bid to
assist the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to stand back and take as objective as
possible a look at the events in their region in the period 198595. By mobilizing over 300 scholars (75 of them of ethnic Serbian origin) to research, write and
critique accounts of significant episodes, the Scholars Initiative (SI) steps back
from promoting nationalist agendas and thus questions or debunks narratives and
mythologies.25 It maintains that none of the players can overcome the culture of
victimization so long as their democratically elected politicians remain bound to
the mutually exclusive wartime narratives that unite their countries electorates.
No national constituency will be more uncomfortable than the people of Serbia
(and their cohorts in Bosnias Republika Srpska) as they confront the findings of
this research, according to editors Charles Ingrao and Thomas E. Emmert, which
lay responsibility for Yugoslavias dissolution with the destruction of the constitution by Slobodan Miloevi. In autumn 2010 the Bosnian translation of the book
was launched in Sarajevo and sold at the Belgrade Book Fair.26
Pax balkanica: forgiving, promising and the fair
reorganization of economic relations
If forgiveness is understood with Arendt as a novel action (rather than a feeling),
breaking with the past, and paving the way for political (re)connection, what might
correspond for Kosovo and Serbia today to the post-WWII joint administration by
six countries of coal and steel, key resources for re-armament? Only Kosovars and
Serbs can answer these questions. Journalist Dan Bilefsky has suggested that the
Trepa/Trepa Mining Complex could offer a ground for action in concert instead
of remaining an apple of discord.27 In the 1980s this complex included 40 mines,
foundries and subsidiary plants, with vast mineral resources of coal, nickel, lead,
zinc, cadmium and bauxite, spread between Northern and Southern Kosovo; it
employed a mixed Albanian and Serb workforce of 20,000 workers and generated
25 per cent of the entire regional industrial production. Miloevi fired thousands
of Albanian Kosovars, and the mines fell into disrepair after the NATO campaign; the complex resumed partial operations to cover maintenance costs only in
2005 under UNMIK.28 As of 2010 there were two authorities directly involved in
deciding its future: Kosovos Albanian authorities and the UN-run Kosovo Trust
Agency, which oversees privatization. There is still disagreement over the sell-off
of the mine and how much of it should remain in state hands. Moreover, agreement with Serbia is needed, and the leadership of the two countries have little
contact with each other.29
Both Serbs and Albanian Kosovars consider themselves to be victims, according to Moll, and either could initiate Arendtian forgiveness and promise by proposing an entirely new way.30 Of course, symmetry in responsibilities should
not be confused with symmetry in culpabilities.31 But could the Trepa/Trepa
50
Mining Complex be jointly administered by independent and respected personalities from Serbia and Kosovo? Could there be a High Authority accountable to
the parliaments of both countries, to supervise the fair management of the mines?
Its budget could invest in the retraining and housing for workers, and be made
up of a small tax paid by the complex. Decisions of the Trepa/Trepa Mines
High Authority would carry weight in Kosovo and Serbia, with a Court of Justice
adjudicating disagreements between institutions and the two governments. The
promise could consist of a Treaty on the Trepa/Trepa Mines, ratified by the
parliaments. Just as the French and German governments decided to bracket the
issue of the Saar temporarily, in a letter attached to the ECSC Treaty, a similar
device could be used to bracket the issue of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or
of Kosovo over Serbian-majority parts of its territory. This issue could be decided
in a few years through new referenda supervised by international authorities, once
habits of cooperation and trust have been established and economic interests are
clearly seen as being served by the Trepa/Trepa Mines Treaty. Even if, as Bashkim Iseni argues, Kosovo would never accept to run the mines with the Belgrade
government as an equal stakeholder, he acknowledges that this might be done
with representatives of the Serb community in Northern Kosovo.32 In any case,
political forgiveness, understood as Arendt did re-engaging with the enemy in
path-breaking actions in concert for the sake of the shared political future does
not require feelings of amity, and certainly not forgetfulness, which would make
any deeper understanding impossible as well.
Pax balkanica: the EU mediator or actor in concert?
One way to interpret the US role in the late 1940s is that it used its hegemonic
position benevolently to help open a space for forgiveness and promise between
Germany and France by supporting the Schuman Plan and providing the first large
loan to the ECSC.33 What might the EU do to protect such spaces in the Western Balkans today? The Brussels-based Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe,
which steered over 25 billion euros toward the Western Balkans, stimulating a
modest increase in intraregional trade, is a partial answer to this question.34 The
Pact was transferred from Brussels to Sarajevo in February 2008 through the
creation of the Regional Cooperation Council with increased regional leadership
and financing.35 Moreover, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro are official candidates to the EU, and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia have all signed
pre-EU accession agreements. The first state-sponsored reconciliation between
France and Germany was not merely a bilateral process, as it included Italy and
the Benelux countries; EU accession prospects guarantee that Serbia and Kosovo
also will not be left alone facing each other.
The presence of observers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro and Serbia in all EU institutions constitutes an important socializing
process. The EP, especially, offers a space for non-violent confrontation: some
of its members sat down in May 2008 with Kosovo Parliament President Jakup
Krasniqi, and Serbian Parliament Speaker Oliver Duli, to speak of the shared
future, immigration and visas, and the role of parliaments in European integration.
Thirty-two-year-old Duli stated: For my generation and me, as for the majority
in my country, the crucial regional stake is the process of historical reconciliation
between Albanians and Serbs. Krasniqi responded that the prospect of EU accession was the common future.36 According to Doris Pack the EP is seeking training
and education programs initiated from the Western Balkans that it can support.37
Self-transformations: oases in the desert

It is too early to assess fairly the extent and impact of reconciliatory initiatives
at the elite level in the Western Balkans. In what is seen as a significant gesture,
Serbian president Boris Tadi went to both Srebrenica in Bosnia and Vukovar in
Croatia in 2010 to offer apologies to the victims of massacres by Serbs. In March
of the same year, Serbias parliament passed a landmark resolution apologizing for
the Srebrenica massacre, saying Belgrade should have done more to prevent the
tragedy. Meanwhile, some Serbs protest that their own losses are not sufficiently
acknowledged.38 Marek Antoni Nowicki, the international ombudsman who held
UNMIK and local authorities accountable for human rights abuses from 2000 to
2005, notes that local populations in Serbia and Kosovo are not ready to forgive
and be forgiven today because civil society . . . has not had the strength to face
the darkest parts of the past.39 This should come as no surprise. Among the citizens of the ECSC/EC/EU, facing up to the past and the healing of emotions has
unfolded over several decades, even if stable peace was established much faster
at the political level.40 Retrospectively it is tempting to make light of the emotional and political pressures they confronted. Laure, the socialist member of the
1946 French Constituent Assembly, spoke for many when she admitted, I never
forgot the sight of the atrociously mutilated bodies of my fellow resistance fighters exhumed from a common grave. The Norwegian Leif Hovelsen, who spent
four years in a Nazi concentration camp, took revenge by mistreating the German
prisoners of war entrusted to his care after the liberation. Through much soulsearching, Laure and Hovelsen became involved in reconciliatory programs toward
Germany, braving the ire of some of their friends who could not understand.41
At the grassroots level, Arendts elementary republics, whose principled
involvement supports democracy and reconciliation like oases in the desert, are
present in Serbia and Kosovo.42 A very small Western-oriented elite in Belgrade
now argues explicitly that Serbs must first of all transform their mind-sets and confront their past. Young activists work with the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law
Center and Helsinki Committee.43 The Center helped found in 2008 the Regional
Commission for Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and Other Serious
Human Rights Violations in the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM). The aim is to create
an official and objective account of war crimes, covering the period 19912001.
After Kosovos declaration of independence, some victims associations refused
to attend RECOMs Fourth Regional Forum in Pristina, Kosovo. But the Serbian
Association of the Families of the Kidnapped and Killed in Kosovo and Metohija
and its leader, Sima Spasi, defied official pressures. In Pristina, Spasi condemned
52
the Serbian governments attempt to abuse our tragedy and acknowledged

Albanian victims, while asking for acknowledgment of Serbian victims.44 From
Mitrovica, the ethnically divided city of Northern Kosovo, Community Building Mitrovica (CBM) has sponsored more than 200 multi-ethnic, grassroots-level
reconciliation projects in the region. Ali Ahmeti, an Albanian Kosovar, runs the
NGO Peace Doves in Southern Mitrovica with a partner organization in the North.
They sponsor inter-ethnic dialogues, programs of economic integration, and services for women and children. The community-policing force funded by UNMIK
trains volunteers of different ethnic background to solve community problems in
20 districts across Kosovo.45 Since 2000 the bilateral FrancoGerman Office for
Youth has supported over 200 training programs, which discuss critically French
German reconciliation processes with thousands of students, teachers and NGO
activists throughout the Western Balkans.46 The work of memory often highlights
tragedies and trauma.47 But it can serve many other purposes: revenge, atonement,
finger-pointing, celebration. Here it waxes pedagogical to incite to action.48 This
is remarkable so few years after deadly conflicts.
Part II EU clashes of understanding

The work of memory and the capable citizen
The work of memory matters to the formation of individual and political identity.
On this Arendt and Ricoeur agree. But Ricoeur offers a more detailed and systematic analysis of the work of memory than Arendt. At best, to remember, singly or
collectively, is to enter the hermeneutical circle, to follow a trajectory that leads
from personal memory to the professional work of historiography, and eventually
back to the happy memory of the capable citizen.49 Although Ricoeur does not
offer a detailed definition of the term capable in Memory, History, Forgetting,
we can infer from the texts that this is a citizen able to think and take political
responsibility with integrity, someone with an identity who can act in the world
with and for others.50 The adjective happy does not mean giddy with joy, but
reconciled with self, at peace.
Only the work of mourning heals repressed memory, and Ricoeur wishes for
the labors of mourning and memory to be placed under the sign of justice, because
justice is by definition other-oriented. Everyone owes a debt (inseparable from the
notion of legacy or tradition) to those who came before them. Pay the debt, I shall
say, but also inventory the heritage.51 But is Freuds work of mourning only
required of individuals or does it also matter to collective memory? Some think
that collective memories should not be psychoanalyzed, nations can repress with
psychological impunity.52 Ricoeur is more nuanced: no therapist is available for
interhuman relations, but the public space of discussion constitutes the equivalent of . . . the play ground as the intermediary region between the therapist and
the analysand. Ricoeur is critical of the current obsession with commemoration that too easily displaces history in favor of the particular, the fragmented,
the local.53 Yet commemorations have their positive side: they can act like
Freudian talking cures, which eventually substitute for compulsive repetitions of

past events, allowing for healthy memory; this process requires much patience.54
The last part of this chapter discusses a few initiatives for remembrance (or Arendts
reconciliation) on the basis of field research in Brussels in 2008. Scholars warn
against the danger of a homogenized Brussels-manufactured memory.55 The evidence discussed here should put any fear of uniformity to rest, at least for now.
Even if actors could agree that sharing some common memories is a good thing,
the debates over the content of these memories will not be settled soon.
The use and abuse of history
In the EP living memories confront each other, especially since the 2004 and 2007
accessions of 12 new Member States. We saw that it is easier to unite economies
than to unite memories, says Polish historian and MEP Geremek.56 Creating a
European narrative is an urgent task because common memory is the basis for
a sense of shared identity.57 MEPs are just beginning to grapple with the diverging mindsets that shape everyday action, and they sponsor an increasing number
of projects on memory and history: books, exhibits and even the creation of a large
museum by 2014. Financed by political groups, think tanks and the EP, these projects offer a fragmented view of the past rather than unitary mindsets.
Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda and Dutch MEP Jan Marinus Wiersma joined
forces to edit Politics of the Past: The Use and Abuse of History, a thoughtprovoking and too little-known attempt by scholars and a few politicians from
20 EU Member States and Russia to dialogue and disagree about memory and
history.58 Although the EP Socialist Group and the Austrian Renner Institut supported the seminars and the book that followed, the volume does not represent the
Socialist Groups official position. Its purpose is to seek in depth understanding,
to learn from the past, and find meaning, and it includes the contributions of
well-known scholars such as Norman Davies, Bronislaw Geremek, Pierre Hassner, Gyrgy Konrd and Martin Sabrow.59 Wiersma, a historian by training, insists
that politicians and historians have fundamentally different responsibilities. Mixed
committees of historians are best equipped for debates on the past and can assist
politicians in evaluating the requirements of post-conflict justice.60 Members and
colleagues of the courageous Mixed Committee of Hungarian-Slovak Historians
have contributed several chapters.61 Language remains a topic of strife between
Hungary and Slovakia, which in 2009 forbade the use of Hungarian in public in
districts with less than 20 per cent ethnic Hungarians.62 Which language to use in
schools is also highly controversial. The editors claim some credit for the fact that
in February 2009 the Slovak Parliament voted an amendment to the School Act,
which puts geographical names in minority languages in front of Slovak names in
minority school textbooks.63
Another hot button issue is how to assess fairly whether Western European
Socialists were too soft on the Eastern European Communist regimes during the
Cold War.64 Wiersma admits the illusion existed among Western social democrats like himself, who for a while hoped to build bridges between Communist
54
parties and dissidents. Therefore, Polish MEP Jzef Piniors invitation to the EP
Socialist Group to visit Gdansk in 2008 was politically significant: it brought
together representatives of working-class movements who held profoundly different views on Communism but fought for freedom.65 This act of recognition was
especially important to Spanish MEP Miguel Angel Martnez Martnez who, as a
Spanish socialist, felt betrayed by the passivity of Western democracies toward the
Franco regime. He joined the opposition young in the late 1950s, and had to live
in exile. He spent nine years in Vienna where he treasured the friendship of Central and Eastern European dissidents in a similar situation.66 The book airs other
conflicts in a similarly balanced vein, warning against the use of national identity as a means of destruction. Thus Lithuanian historian C eslovas Laurinaviius
critiques both the Lithuanian practice of calling Russia the evil empire and the
Russian strategy of economic and energy strangulation put in place against Lithuania. The key threats resulting from this escalating confrontation, that I want to
stress here, are not so much economic or even military but rather psychological.67
The book, a work of memory and history that addresses current issues and suggests pathways for the future, departs from more strictly backward-looking acts
of remembrance.
EPs memorialists of the Group of the European Peoples Party
and the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
Memory can be self-congratulatory. When the the Group of the European Peoples
Party hired its long-time advisor Pascal Fontaine, and several graduate student assistants, to write its history, it did expect a celebratory chronicle. Fontaine strived
not to lapse into the hagiographical mode. He wished for his Voyage to the Heart of
Europe 19532009 to help open a critical debate on the Groups activities and, at the
same time, saw his role in keeping with a family tradition: his father Franois Fontaine assisted Monnet in writing his Memoirs. Daunted by the number of potential
interviewees 1,080 former MEPs and civil servants since 1952, and another 500
current MEPs and civil servants and the impossibility of assessing which memories might be the most reliable, Fontaine organized his book around three chronological periods: the pioneers (195279); the builders (197994); and the reformers
(19942009). His approach is anthropological like Marc Abls (1992), but from
the point of view of an insider who started working at the EP in 1980: People
have trouble grasping how the EP functions. To explain the rules, the customs, the
culture, even taking into account conversations in the elevators, is a contribution to
the democratization of this institution.68 While Fontaine offers tantalizing insights
on many controversies, such as the difficult negotiations which forced the federalist Christian-Democratic Group to morph into the Group of the European Peoples
Party that includes Euro-skeptics,69 his duty of loyalty prevented him from doing
more than to indicate questions worthy of further inquiry. There is little of the selfquestioning tone of Swoboda and Wiersmas volume.
Ambroise Perrin, an advisor on the European Neighborhood Policy to the
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (formerly the
Socialist Group) in the Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Delegation for
Central Asia, offered to memorialize the Groups activities in a very different
way. With roots in both France and Germany, he has long been interested in
questions of memory.
At the most practical level memories go missing in the European Parliament.
. . . Few even remember what happened during the previous legislature. This
may be a sheer problem of organization. But I wondered whether the whole
European enterprise, by abandoning the idea of vengeance, had become
grounded in forgetfulness.70
Perrin proposed the creation of a museum featuring the Socialist Groups activities since 1979. Because of the Groups future-oriented identity he encountered
resistance and eventually got a modified proposal funded: a playful mobile
exhibit made up of lightweight panels on wheels, which will be put at the disposal
of the 27 Member States socialist parties (with one permanent exhibit in one of
the Groups rooms at the Brussels EP building). Each panel consists of a pictorial
montage featuring a photograph of a Socialist MEP with a picture of the object that
represents his/her most satisfying political initiative. Thus Danish MEP Richard
Baffe chose a car key and is shown at the wheel of a Volkswagen minibus sporting
the slogan Yes to Maastricht. This is the same vehicle that the Socialist Group
bought in 1989 to support the campaign of East German comrades in favor of
the reunification of Germany.71
Museums of European history
In spite of their interest in memory, Arendt and Ricoeur have little to say about
museums, which could be considered as traces of the past.72 Arendt denotes
a certain commonality between the statesman and the artists activities. Both
political and artistic products require the light of publicity to be validated in
a world that is common to all; art museums, like churches, other holy places
and monuments, provide a protective public space for art objects against the
possessiveness of individuals.73 What about historical museums? Their actionoriented conception of memory and history may have prevented Arendt and
Ricoeur from showing interest in such institutions. In Brussels much more ambitious museum projects than Perrins mobile exhibit were under way in 2008.
They were expected to fulfill a dual role: besides being repositories of the past,
they would act as prompters of debates on the present and the future involving the youth.74 EP Vice-president Martnez Martnez represented the EP with
a more radical and secular view on the committee of nine experts (directors
of museums and historians) commissioned by the EP to lay down the conceptual basis for a House of European History. The museum is expected to open
in 2014 with its main exhibit on the post-1945 period and two shorter sections
on Europe before 1914 and the interwar periods. Martnez Martnez feared that
time might be too short:75
56
The museum should not be a juxtaposition of memories, like a book with 27

chapters, each devoted to a different country. . . . But in none of our countries, especially those with a dramatic history, have we succeeded in writing a
national history, not even in quiet and peaceful Belgium.
How then to agree to a common conception among so many divergent memories?76
Martnez Martnez found especially disappointing the efforts by some Eastern and
Central Europeans to dramatically simplify the Cold War by depicting it as a
fight between gangsters and policemen. They find it impossible to understand
and accept that the Cold War justified the Western support of fascist dictatorships
in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Francos police arrested Martnez Martnez when
he was 19 and he was condemned to 20 years in prison. He waves his hand where
some fingernails are missing as a result of torture and asks for the sufferings of
fascisms victims to be equally recognized. But such facts cannot even be mentioned. Fair enough, communism was unacceptable elsewhere. Yet the attempt to
establish a House of European History has been worth the trouble:
The European construction is an ocean and we are talking about a small river.
We are perhaps no more than 20 people talking about this here. This is a
modest education project, with a modest budget. But the process has its own
dynamic and it is one of the many initiatives started to educate the young.
Memory is about the future. The European construction started as an antidote
to war, but the process has been so successful that the younger generation has
no idea that war is possible. Only if we build a union, which acts as an influential and consistent global actor, will we be able to defend both our welfare
and world peace.77
Martnez Martnez experience during the Spanish transition to democracy, when
his generation had the privilege of accomplishing in twenty years what took hundreds in other countries, may be what encourages him to persevere. Paraphrasing
Ricoeur (without citing him) he adds, I want to bring testimony, to be a witness.
To say, yes it was like that, no it was not like that, to prevent the falsification of
history.78
The Committee lists the main topics that the permanent exhibition should cover
and makes no mystery of the political nature of its mission in its report to the
EP.79 Surprisingly the report lists Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, two well-known
secular public figures and in the case of Spaak, a Socialist, among the ChristianDemocrat politicians. The FrancoGerman reconciliation is traced back primarily to the actions of Adenauer and De Gaulle in 1963; and the 1989 revolutions
are described as leading to the Eastern and Central European countries return in
terms of their national history . . . to the mainstream.80 The meaning of the term
mainstream is left unspecified, which should provoke healthy controversies.
Moreover, the timeline of European history does not mention the eight centuries
of Arabic presence on the Iberian peninsula and its role in reconnecting Europeans to their Greek roots; neither is there mention of the Ottoman Empire except
for one reference to the long period of Turkish domination, which exerted a
major influence on European history through the great European powers, first of
all Austria and Russia and then also France and Great Britain. What about Greek,
Romanian and Bulgarian histories?81 The last room in the museum will encourage visitors to think of the future, with questions that might change over time
so as to make clear to visitors how open the situation is and at the same time
allow them to react in the short term to new developments.82 A new Academic
Committee appointed by the EP in December 2008 was to develop the conceptual
basis further. It is to be hoped that it will work on the historical misinterpretations
mentioned above.
Antoinette Spaak, a former Belgian cabinet minister and member of the Belgian and European Parliaments, shares Martnez Martnez passion for educating
the young. She chaired the board of another museum project, the Association pour
le Muse de lEurope, which Israeli historian Elie Barnavi and Belgian businessman Benot Remiche founded in 1996. It ran a large exhibit on European integration between January and March 2007 in Brussels: Cest notre Europe attracted
150,000 visitors. The central idea was that not only elites but also citizens with
fascinating stories to tell make modern Europe.83 Starting in 1945 the exhibit confronted frankly the bellicose past of Europe, and called the unification of Europe
(194851) a revolution, which broke with the age-old formula woe to the vanquished. It also covered the years 19452007 from a sociological point of view
with rooms depicting the way people lived in Eastern and Western Europe in the
1950s and 1980s, and portraits of the major figures of European history, including
Stalin. When a Belgian historian critiqued the newly opened exhibit for being too
Christian, this triggered a passionate debate with Barnavi. The discussion did not
change the exhibit; Barnavi stuck to his concept of the Christian origins of European integration. But Spaak, the daughter of the staunchly secular Belgian Foreign Affairs minister Paul-Henri Spaak who chaired the negotiations on the Treaties
of Rome, thinks, This is a fundamental discussion that must be pursued.84 Some
efforts were made to establish a dialogue between the expert committee for a House
for European History and the academic committee advising the Association for a
Museum of Europe, with little success, and the goal of the Association is to open
another permanent museum. So far, securing a site has not been possible in spite of
long negotiations with the Brussels regional government and the EP.85
Preparing to celebrate the 90th Anniversary of the 1918 Armistice
at the European School II
The cacophony of memories and ways to remember, which confronts the academic interviewing in Brussels EU institutions, demonstrates the liveliness of
debates on memory and identity among Europeans. Ricoeur celebrates the constant debates that surround important historical events:
By acknowledging that the history of an event involves a conflict of
interpretations and memories, we in turn open up the future. And this
58
retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications. Different political projects concerning the future invariably presuppose different
interpretations of the past.86
Debates on the meaning of the past must start in the classroom, as Smith points
out. The lectures of two French teachers at the Brussels European School II offered
a study in contrasts on the eve of the 90th Anniversary celebration of the 1918
armistice. The school, like eight other similar establishments (four just in Brussels), educates the children of EU civil servants; it provides its 2,893 students with
elementary and secondary education in nine languages. Jeanne S. is a historian
specialized in the medieval history of the French South, who teaches social studies to high school seniors. The days topic was the geography of European cities.
There was no mention at all of the celebration of the armistice, when the school
would be closed. Jeanne S. knew little about European integration until she asked
to be detached to Brussels by the French Ministry of National Education. The
first time she had to vote for the EP election, the experience totally surprised her.
Teaching in Brussels had been transformative. She would miss the international
milieu when her seven-year contract ended; on the other hand she was constantly
challenged, which she has experienced as destabilizing and exhausting. What
seems evident to me is not at all evident for those facing me.87 Far from overlooking the next days celebration, Bertrand I., who hailed from Alsace like Ambroise
Perrin, spent almost an hour in preparing his 26 six-year-old students from Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, the USA, Britain and Spain to
commemorate the 1918 Armistice. He shared memories of his grandfather who
died young during the war among the six million dead. During those wars Europe
lost, Bertrand I. told his pupils. He assigned as homework, to find documents on
the armistice and to visit a monument to the dead, and added, To avoid war, the
Germans and the French decided to make peace. This included many every day
gestures. The class did not learn more about these gestures except for the fact
that the EU flags 12 stars stand for cooperation and equality and that French and
Germans celebrate with Swiss neighbors the armistice in Alsace. Some children
volunteered enthusiastically that they had great-grandparents in their nineties who
had survived all the European wars.
Conclusion: Soft messianism vs. humility
Remembering concrete political achievements is fraught with one major danger,
to encourage hubris in those who claim the legacy exclusively. Moll and Lvy
stress the humbling role of memory in the EU: the actor who remembers manifests
compassion, the capacity to suffer with. The post-WWII state-led and grassroots initiatives in Europe serve as flawed exemplars whose witnesses share
remembrance of the especially demanding and painful character of managing
suffering and contentious pasts.88 But Arendt warned against an excess of compassion; she trusted only solidarity, an egalitarian mindset that establishes a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited.89 Undoubtedly references to
reconciliation and peace can legitimize a kind of soft messianism. When he was
EU president in 2001, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt contrasted the
softer power of the EU with the United States unilateral and arrogant power,
evidence that the EU had learned lessons of humility from its dramatic past.
Valrie Rosoux worried that this show of humility could turn into new forms of
paternalism.90 Jacques Dewittes Lexception europenne discusses ces mrites
qui nous distinguent (these meritorious features that make us distinctive) and
singles out the capacity to admit the wrongs European civilization has committed,
whereas other peoples and cultures do not manifest this aptitude.91 The notion of
European exceptionalism implies a hierarchical distinction between more or less
virtuous actors, which is inimical to the egalitarian and rule-based order that the
EU purports to support within and without. Mills concept of originality, the
courage of non-conformism and acting in ways never or rarely done before (like
Arendts natality) would seem more appropriate.92
External observers are often the best positioned to assess the value of a political experiment.93 R. Pavanthi Vembulu is prompt to denounce European integrations cultural imperialism, and he critiques also the Indian academics uncritical
importation of Western theories of integration, which re-circulate old colonial
discourses on the universality and uniqueness of the European model.94 Yet every
so often the ECSC is remembered as a signpost of hope in the most unexpected
quarters. Pakistans ambassador to the Netherlands, Mustafa Kemal Kazi, spoke
as a sharp critic of the EU immigration policies and the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), which are turning the EU into a fortress state. However, when
asked how he would explain to an illiterate but intelligent Pakistani farmer the
meaning of European integration, he surprised the interviewer:
I would adopt a historical perspective to explain how European countries
after two great wars decided to confront their differences and solve them.
There is here a lesson in regional cooperation, which we could learn from.
An important ingredient of this reconciliation was the sharing of material
resources, coal and steel. The European experience transmits to us a vision
of optimism.
Kazi added that oil could be used in South Asia the way coal and steel was in 1950s
Europe.95 Contradictory debates on the political relevance of European integration
for other parts of the world keep the experiment alive for its direct inheritors also.
This chapter has offered a discussion of the relevance of the ECSC legacy for the
Western Balkans today, and stories of reconciliation as remembrance. European
and non-European actors are tapping into memory and history for various purposes: to overcome current conflicts; to celebrate; to define new political traditions; and to break from a warring or colonial past. These constant exercises in
understanding challenge old identities and test the patience of all involved. Under
such conditions, how can action in concert continue to develop within the EU and
beyond? The next chapter seeks to answer this question.
Of power and purgatory
Building the European Communities
Introduction
The alleged European paradise rests on power, but of unusual kind that deserves
much closer scrutiny; and Hannah Arendt rather than Hobbes contributes to its
understanding contra Robert Kagan.1 Indeed, Arendts concept of power as an
organized solidarity provides a useful analytical category to probe the intents
and actions of the first European Communities founders. They sought to challenge an ancient political tradition of intra-European relations as a hierarchical
and war-prone system; at the theoretical level Arendt was doing similar work,
recasting political power as action in concert rather than domination. Comparing
these practical and theoretical innovations reinforces the meaning of the negotiations of the 1957 Rome Treaties on the EEC and Euratom as an important moment
in the identity formation of the European Union. If Community constituted the
end goal for the European actors, the principle of power as action in concert was
its enabling condition.2 But there were ambiguities in the nascent Community tradition: on one hand, institutionalizing political cooperation among former
enemies was the most cherished aim of the founders; on the other, there has been
a strand of ambition for power from the very beginning in the European ideal.3
Power is one of the essentially contested concepts that make the stuff of politics,
as Steven Lukes argues. Different definitions serve different value systems that
are not always openly specified. Thus Arendts interestingly idiosyncratic concept of power supports her conception of engaged citizenship in the res publica.
Lukes dismisses it for being out of line with the central meanings of power
as hierarchical, constraining and conflict-laden.4 Another objection to Arendts
theory of power is that it applies primarily to domestic politics. Except on the
question of international human rights law, she is the great absentee from the
lively debates between political theory and international relations theory.5 Michael
Barnett and Raymond Duvalls sophisticated typology of the four manifestations
of power compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power bridges, to
some extent, the analytical gap between power defined as domination and power
as action in concert in global governance. Whereas compulsory, institutional and
structural forms of power deploy effects of domination, the productive power
of ideas may upset this order and summon other forms of political association;
Building the European Communities 61

yet Barnett and Duvalls argument that resistance, a multifaceted conceptual
field, ranging from direct response to altering predominant discourses, is the
main response to power by subjects seeking sovereignty, demonstrates the difficulty to conceptualize power as something other than the imposition of a will over
another(s).6 Arendts concept of power as power with explains best the intents and
some of the actions of European actors in the 1950s. Barnett and Duvalls argument provides useful heuristic concepts however, to discuss power in European
integration, especially since the end of the Cold War. Today, pace Kagan, the EU
and its Member States are torn by a double standard of their own, and experience
their so-called paradise as a purgatory. They call Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, Serbs
and Croats to practice power as Arendt would have it, while finding it impossible
to agree on a fiscal policy for the eurozone and the next budgetary period. Their
monetary, neighborhood and development policies elicit accusations of authoritarianism.
Chapter 4 sets out to explore these tensions within the theory and practices of
transeuropean power. Part I lays down the theoretical foundation for a discussion
of community and power as action in concert. Part II offers a hermeneutical
reading of the narratives of the 19557 negotiations of the Rome Treaties, based
on 17 in-depth interviews of the main negotiators, to illustrate the theoretical argument more empirically. It concludes with a few comments on the understanding of
EU power in the current financial crisis. Part III discusses the application of the
EU norms of power to international affairs. How does the notion of power feature
in current academic and policy debates on the EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP)? How do political actors navigate the shifting tides between EU
power as action in concert, and the EU as a hegemon in the international trade
system? What kind of power will guarantee security? The chapter concludes that
while it is impossible to make sense of the EU current foreign policies without
recourse to Lukes notion of power as domination, power as action in concert
remains an aspiration and occasional practice.
Part I Reinventing political power

Arendts power as action in concert vs. the politics of the ordinary life
Like Heidegger, Arendt transforms the world by assigning new meanings to
ancient terms; and she refuses to conflate power with domination, whose most
flagrant manifestations are violent. In the plural world of new beginners, power
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert,7 and
it manifests itself most clearly in the founding of new political bodies. Those
willing to take political responsibility join in spontaneously and disinterestedly,
moved by their commitment to the common good. The power they generate is
not dependent on wealth, but on cooperation and numbers; and it offers astonishing resilience in the face of brute force, as the US civil rights and student
movements demonstrate; yet it is also fragile and vanishes the moment they
[men] disperse.8 Arendt contrasts power with violence. Violence indicates a
62
command-obedience relationship and is instrumental whereas power is an end

in itself and the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act.
There are only two justifiable uses for violence, self-defense and the dramatization of particular grievances.9 In international affairs war is still the final arbiter,
and a substitute is unlikely to appear so long as national independence, namely
freedom from foreign rule, and the sovereignty of the state, that is the claim to
unchecked and unlimited power in foreign affairs, are identified. What Arendt
means is that power, as she defines it, has too little sway in international relations although, according to the US constitution, foreign treaties and promises
are part and parcel of the law of the land. To the Constitution of the United
States, the term sovereignty is totally unknown.10 The notion of sovereignty,
both at the individual and collective level is isolating, thus profoundly antipolitical. The alternative is the federalist principle, according to which constituted
political bodies can enter into lasting alliances without losing their identities.
But this heritage of the American Revolution has been forgotten also.11
Monnet had no such heritage to draw upon when he challenged the defense of
narrowly conceived sovereign interests; he set about to transform the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris into the undertaking of a common task, tirelessly
repeating the lesson, irrespective of how impatient my audience became.12 Kohnstamm remembers the beginning of the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris in July
1950:
The first thing which happened as soon as our meetings opened at the Quai
dOrsay was that Monnet, Etienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri [the French delegation] who were sitting next to each other started arguing among themselves
. . . This went on for several days. I remember Spierenburg [the head of the
Dutch delegation] telling me one day: I am going crazy. How can I defend a
Dutch interest here if these idiots do not even know what the French interest
is? Mr. Monnet broke habits and there something started which was not a
negotiation, but truly a common search for solutions. It was totally different
from the negotiations we were used to.13
For Arendt, the council system is the most exemplary manifestation of power
as action in concert: councils spring up spontaneously whenever the people are
allowed to act together in the new space opened up by revolutionary change, and
are best suited to exceptional times of upheaval, such as the 1918 German worker
councils and the 1956 Hungarian Revolutions councils. She mentions also the
civil rights and the student movements in the USA, and the European resistance
movements during WWII.14 The councils common object is the foundation of
a new body politic. Sadly, no intellectual tradition has formed around this new
form of government, which has always been considered temporary and ill-suited
to the conditions of modern life.15 Arendts audacious reconceptualization of
power makes Paul Ricoeur wonder whether her definition is merely inscribed in
some Platonic sky of idea. Yet he salutes her appeal to another tradition made
of discontinuous eruptions and aborted attempts, which seeks to replace the
domination of man by man with the exercise of the popular will.16 The Arendtian
discussion of the council system has enriched the interpretation of numerous nonviolent revolutions of the last 55 years,17 but Eric Gorham may be the only one
to compare the circles of European activists with Arendts council system. He
describes Jean Monnets Action Committee for the United States of Europe as:
The best example of an elite public space engaged in political struggle (with
domestic governments) and one carved out of a larger political elite. Despite
its restricted membership, it functioned as a site of dissent and change within
the larger theater of elite European politics.18
Yet, after the 1954 rejection of the European Defense Community, Arendt dismissed the politics of European integrations nihilistic banalities (see Chapter 1). Her encounter with Nazism had convinced her that the greatest threat to
politics was the emergence of a new sphere of activity at the onset of the modern
age: the curiously hybrid realm of the social, where private interests assume
public significance.19 Totalitarianism had found a ripe ground in Europe in part
because economic self-interest trumped civic concerns, and Arendt thought that
under the current conditions of prosperity, administration and management could
be safely entrusted to experts, because their business is dictated by necessities
that are not only non-political, but even non-partisan. Power could reveal unjust
socio-economic conditions, but failed to transform them.20 Hanna F. Pitkin and
John F. Sitton critique the emptiness of Arendts discourse for it excludes from
politics the concerns for justice that invariably involve economic issues and are
transformative.21 Arendtian scholars concede, however, that a theorist of Arendts
stature is not fundamentally hostile to material concerns, rather she guards against
a particular kind of attitude, the failure to transform the social question into political activity.22 The technical nature of the EC policies may have condemned them
to political irrelevance.
Like Pitkin and Sitton, Charles Taylor rejects the distinction between material
concerns and disinterested political ideals, but he theorizes it differently by detecting one of the main strands of modern identity in the affirmation of ordinary life,
a term which designates the life of production and the family.23 The gradual shift
from the ethics of honor (or heroism) to the ethics of the ordinary life was a major
departure from Aristotle (Arendts frequent reference) who placed the good life of
contemplation and participation in the polis well above mere life as a necessary
support to these activities.24 According to Taylor, the ethic of honor reappeared in
a different form with the rising ideal of citizenship in the late eighteenth century.
And in one sense, the task of doing justice to both of these notions of the good
becomes a major problem for those reflecting on politics and the development of
society.25
Gilles Andrani detects a similar shift in the mindset moving European founders to action. If the initial principle of action was reconciliation, its continuation
in a mode which has ceased to be heroic is compromise, the capacity to understand and accommodate diverse points of view and interests that inhibits attitudes
64
of isolationism, of blockading and of domination by force.26 In many respects the

ECSC/EEC initiators were attempting rather unselfconsciously to meet both the
requirement of heroic politics and the politics of ordinary life. They rejected
the artificial distinction between economics and politics, for the organization of
economic resources would create a public space where former enemies could act
together and be transformed.27 The Benelux leaders who proposed the creation
of a common market in 1955 were concerned that their 20 million fellow citizens
made up a market much too small to be economically viable. But they stressed
political and strategic considerations first: We were completely fed up being
the battleground between France and Germany, suffering terrifying destruction
because of fights over interests which were none of ours, says Jean-Charles Snoy
et dOppuers, a senior Belgian representative at the ECSC/EEC negotiations.28
The traditions of social democracy and Catholic social thought converged after
WWII to articulate a political and democratic order that would meet the socio-economic needs of citizens. This was not a tradition Arendt was familiar with or ever
wrote about. She knew much more about Bismarcks state that provided social
goods bereft of political liberties.29
The purgatory of methodical politics
Undeniably there is a sharp contrast between the honor and joy of the extraordinary
politics of founding and the ordinary politics of juridification, with its retreat
from the public realm.30 Polish MEP Jzef Pinior, a self-described existentialist resistant who did prison time for his opposition to Communism and read a
banned copy of On Revolution in the 1980s, says, Arendt was the starting point
for us . . . The Solidarity movement represented plurality, a kind of exemplar of
her council system, especially at the beginning when it was a movement of workers councils; later it changed. He remembers with some melancholy the victory of Solidarity in 1989, as the great victory of the Western liberal democratic
system. But we lost something, the potential for the creation of new institutions.
People returned to their private lives.31 Paradoxically, a similar danger threatens
European integration politics and Arendts theory of public action: the temptation
to cede the most important aspects of political activity as everyday life to charismatic founders on the one hand and administrative teams on the other.32 Thus
Mary G. Dietz recasts Arendts theory of action into a liberatory form of instrumentality thanks to Simone Weils concept of methodical thinking. In Weils
theory of freedom, work specifies problems and finds solutions rather than makes
things; its emancipatory quality does not depend on efficacy, but on the sheer
engagement of the worker in the task. Dietzs methodical politics constitutes
a mode of action oriented toward problems and solutions in a context of adventure and unfamiliarity,33 which preserves Arendts stress on agency, natality and
unpredictability. Even glorious moments of heroic politics involve and require
attention to means and the purposeful recognition of ends: so the distinction is
not simply one of the ordinary versus the extraordinary, but about realizing the
extent to which the former is always already in the latter.34

Arendts categories seduce by their very clarity. Monnet also liked simplicity:
the responsibility of the Treaties negotiators was to negotiate not for their own
national advantage, but to seek it in the advantage of all.35 The actors narratives
of the negotiations of the 1957 Rome Treaties on the EEC and Euratom, in which
Monnet did not take part, suggests a more complex picture. Although the term
community remained in use, defining the national interest proved arduous even
among representatives of the same country and a divisive task for national bureaucracies. And how to figure out the advantage of all was even more challenging.
The thick narrative of the negotiations that follows shows that far from being a
spontaneous exercise in consensual decision making, power as action in concert
was a matter of methodical politics, compromising on contradictory interests,
thinking through solutions and taking advantage of moments of crisis (or structural events such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the failed Franco-British
Suez expedition). As Arendt would have wished for, political leadership trumped
technical expertise; small countries, regardless of the size of their GDP or population, initiated the relaunch of action in concert after a major political crisis; and
council-like groups acted on their strong commitment to institutionalizing agreements and to the rule of law for conflict resolution. This was purgatory rather
than paradise, yet a marked improvement over the anarchic and violent Hobbesian
universe of earlier years.
Inventing community
Being men of action, not philosophers, the ECSC founders did not leave a theoretical justification of their choice of the term community to name the new
European institutions, although Monnet required from his collaborators numerous drafts before settling on a proposal.36 So it would be unwise to gloss over
this unusual terminology. According to Anthony Cohen, community came to
Monnet through Paul Reuter, a young law professor who helped draft the ECSC
proposals.37 To understand Reuters views on community is to go back to the prewar years and the strong reactions of both the left and the right of the French
elite against the ineffectiveness of parliamentarian democracy in dealing with
social injustices and national decline.38 In his 1941 lectures to the cole des Cadres dUriage, an organization established in non-occupied France to train new
elites, Reuter promoted a communitarian humanism to overcome the individualism that pitted not only class against class and nation against nation, but also
man against man. The national French community could no longer deal with the
excesses of both capitalism and collectivism without a European community organized politically on the federal model.39 The ideological reconversion
of the most notorious prewar themes of federalism and community occurred
after 1945 with the promotion of an economic philosophy that was neither socialism nor liberalism or capitalism, but something new and utterly impossible in
a national framework. In order to resist the reign of money and capitalism and
create federation, strong states were needed, which an elite body of civil servants
would serve by coordinating and regulating the economic life of the nation.40
66
It is best not to exaggerate Reuters influence on Monnet. The collaboration

was short-lived and the two men shared neither life experience nor intellectual
roots. But they concurred that the great evil was the recurrence of wars, and
what caused them, the instinct for power of nation states (italics by the author).41
Only an organized Europe could rein in such impulses.42 Contra Michael Sandel, Arendts credentials as a communitarian are tenuous. Her German experience
taught her that individual citizens, in times of crisis, must act unencumbered by
affective ties to family, community or nation.43 Likewise the European Communities initiators were not promoting some European identity based on shared creed
or culture; they established community in order to keep politics (or integration) going, even if the opportunities for action in concert were too limited and
technical to elicit Arendts interest. Ian Manners sums up the ideological narrative of global Europa as the attempts to come to terms with an age of extreme
ideological differences, and to avoid the extremes of capitalism and communism, while at the same time shunning populist nationalist temptations and the
traditional failings of power politics.44
Part II Community, Power and the EEC

Founding the EEC: political initiative vs. expertise
The Rome Treaties on the EEC and Euratom marked a retreat from the dream
of political European unification after the 1954 rejection by the French National
Assembly of the treaty on the European Defense Community (EDC) and its federal Political Community. The EEC was designed to strengthen the safeguards
of peace and liberty by creating a common market and eliminating barriers to a
steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition. Euratom would ensure
the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries through the creation
of a common market in the field of nuclear energy, the promotion of research and
facilitation of investment.45 The decision to conclude a treaty on Euratom was
politically important; France would not have agreed to the EECs common market
otherwise. But Euratom soon became obsolete, partly because it dealt with peaceful uses of atomic energy and the French were developing their nuclear force de
frappe and did not want to share resources, but also because of the development
of other forms of energy. Therefore this narrative of the negotiations focuses primarily on the EEC.46
Memoirs, essays and interviews divulge the story behind the story, how individual political actors changed their own minds, how they persuaded others to change
their minds in order to pursue their worldly objectives. Interpretations of the negotiations may differ, but the different sources do not reveal any major disagreement
over the basic facts.47 The Benelux politicians and diplomats who proposed the
1955 Messina meeting to restart the process of European integration after the EDC
failure made an Arendt-like decision at the outset that put politics before economics. They would be flexible on all points except for one: a political personality
rather than a technical expert should preside over the international negotiations if

they were to continue.48 But German representative Walter Hallsteins suggestion,
to appoint Belgium Foreign Affairs Minister Paul-Henri Spaak as chair of the
Committee that would draft the post-Messina report, took the Benelux representatives by surprise. In hindsight Spaak, a stranger to the mysteries of the tariff system, counted his ignorance as a blessing in disguise: it allowed him to approach
every problem without preconceived ideas, with the sole aim of securing a common sense agreement among the parties involved.49 The Spaak Committee set up
four committees of experts to solve the technical problems arising from the creation of a common market, and the pooling of atomic energy. A few months later
the experts were back with an enormous report close to 600 pages, filled with
endless technical details, but no clear line of action.50 Perplexed, but encouraged
by his colleagues, Spaak decided on a drastic change of method by disbanding the committees of experts, and dealing henceforth only with the six heads of
national delegations and their deputies.51 Once the delegations were reduced to
two men each, there was much more of a spirit of compromise, although the
exchanges on fundamental political options remained arduous.52
In spring 1956 the Spaak Committee sent a Report as its unanimous recommendation to the six governments.53 The report did not reflect the individual preferences
of each head of delegation, but puts forward the common response, which came out
of the debate: a common market would be established by stages through a customs
union and appropriate institutions, the coordination of national monetary policies,
the free circulation of workers and a European investment fund to help less developed regions.54 According to Italian diplomat Roberto Ducci, one secret behind this
achievement was that the delegations heads represented but did not commit their
governments, and thus could take more risks. French representative Flix Gaillard
experienced the transition from the I to the we, which keeps community going.
He was careful not to ask authorization from the Quai dOrsay on detailed matters
and told his Belgian counterpart: It is only with a global presentation that I have a
chance to make our views acceptable. Moreover, success moved people forward:
Once they find agreement on one or two difficult issues, everything else becomes
easy as nobody wants to jeopardize the agreement on questions of details.55
In Venice on 30 May 1956, in less than two hours, the Spaak Report was discussed and approved as a basis for negotiating the treaties on the common market and atomic energy, with an ease that surprised its authors.56 Spaaks mandate
had been to provide the six governments with ideas, not a plan for a treaty. But
with his authority and personality he went ahead without consulting the governments.57 Spaak was asked to chair the negotiations that would transform the
Spaak Report into two treaties, one on the Common Market and one on Euratom.
One of the rare journalists to follow the negotiations, Emanuele Gazzo wrote that,
Spaak was right, public opinion did follow.58
Alan Milward, the noted EEC historian, asserts that the successful negotiations of
the Treaties of Rome had little to do with political ideals, but were driven by domestic policies aimed at securing material benefits for national electorates, which could
only be provided by an increase in foreign trade. He pokes fun at the Messina Conference, a much hallowed event, which hardly differed from the long continuity
68
of commercial negotiations inside and outside the OEEC.59 But there is a great deal
of difference between a good idea and the political decision to implement it. The
Messina and Venice conferences were significant because at both economics met
with politics. At the OEEC it had proved impossible to initiate a European customs
union, and the 1952 Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministers Beyen Plan for a common
market had received no political support even in the Netherlands. Milward acknowledges, against his main thesis, that the political objectives of peace and a greater
European voice in world affairs are not truly separable from the economic ones.60
National interests: French sacred cows
Far from inspiring ready-made solutions (proposed by experts, as Arendt would
have it) the commitment to European integration forced its proponents to strike
a politically acceptable balance between European and national interests. In
France, Italy and Germany public opinion and bureaucracies were deeply divided
on what the national interest meant.61 Opposition to trade liberalization, as envisaged in the customs union project, was deepest in France because of a centuryold tradition of protectionism, the legacy of the bitter EDC fight and feelings of
reserve toward Germany after the bloody confrontations of WWII.62
The negotiations on the treaties started in July 1956. The French comit Verret,
which had been set up to coordinate the French administrations response to the Brussels negotiation, sent an endless list of French demands and reservations to the
other governments,63 which included the harmonization of social policies, an agricultural common market, special arrangements for overseas territories; and moving
from stage one to stage two only with unanimity (the treaty foresaw a dismantling of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to free trade in 12 years, divided in three stages).64 These
demands, relayed by French Secretary of State Maurice Faure, stunned Frances
five partners although Faures frankness and reputation as a good European
softened the blow. Spaak adjourned the session so that no one would be forced into
a rushed statement: The miracle happened the following day. Fortunately the heads
of delegation did not regard themselves as adversaries, but as colleagues working
for the same cause. The troubles of one were the troubles of all. The representatives compromised by distinguishing between issues that were of small importance
while others could be dealt with by means of provisional solutions and measures of
control.65 Social harmonization was negotiated without too much difficulty;66 the
Germans could concede on the idea of a common agricultural policy in exchange
for Euratom and free trade. This left the questions of the transition between stage
one and two, and the status of overseas territories. France wanted to keep its options
open with the possibility to withdraw from the common market at the end of an
experimental period of four years if it was not satisfied with the results, which went
against international rules on the irreversibility of customs unions and was unacceptable. Spaak spoke up for promise, We are gathering our economies together, thus
large elements of our sovereignties, and this can only happen in a Community for
ever.67 Eventually Faure and Marjolin convinced their government to give up this
last request, which made France look like an unreliable partner.68

The most difficult issue raised by France was the association with overseas territories.69 Like the Belgians, the French wanted their links with Africa to become
community links and advocated for trade liberalization, non-discrimination and
aid for their soon-to-be former colonies, a position that was subsequently implemented by the EEC Lom Accords.70 Although financial implications were important, the real obstacles were psychological and political. A bloody insurgency had
just ended Dutch rule over Indonesia, and the Germans and Italians, who had lost
their colonies after WWI, were not keen to contribute financially to development
schemes that favored France and Belgium.71 Moreover, Germany maintained
strong trade relations with Latin American and Asian trading partners. The French
government eventually managed to convince its partners that France was following a policy of political emancipation: locally elected autonomous authorities were
governing the colonies, an intermediary stage before total independence. Prime
Minister Guy Mollet was convinced that new links of trust with the countries
gaining independence could be established better through a Community rather
than a purely French framework of the past.72 Konrad Adenauer, who gave priority to the new relation of friendship and equality between Germany and France,
agreed that the FRG would contribute in aid as much as France.73
The EEC foundings methodical politics
For Arendt, the most hallowed outcome of action in concert is the founding and
renewing of the republics institutions. But there is little hint of the sheer hard
slog and persistence required for this exercise: her discussion of the American
Revolution makes founding sound almost easy, at least under the right conditions
of prosperity. As Dietz writes, the Arendtian dichotomy between work and public interaction seems to foreclose what Max Weber had in mind when he called
politics the strong and slow boring of hard boards a sustained, purposeful
activity that meets obstacles and undertakes acts of transformation in the world.74
The Institutional Committee, which rewrote the future Rome Treaties no less than
five times in the final two months, in constant consultation with the committees
on the EEC and Euratom, operated under a Spartan regime of seven-day workweeks. As a result its members came close to exasperation and its chair Roberto
Ducci to a nervous breakdown (Duccis italics).75 The challenge was to create
institutions to implement community policies within an egalitarian association of
nation-states. Spaaks French collaborator Pierre Uris constructive imagination
found simple solutions to complex problems.76 The High Authority was renamed
Commission, a less supranational term, but retained its power of legislative initiative as the representative of the common European interest. The European Parliament would represent the Member States peoples, although its attributions were
limited like those of its predecessor, the ECSC Assembly. The intergovernmental
Council of Ministers became the main legislator with the political weight of each
Member State based on its population size, not its GDP or contribution to the
community budget. There, decisions would be taken by unanimity for issues that
could wait and by qualified majority for more pressing problems. The European
70
Court of Justice interpreted Community law and adjudicated disputes among the
institutions and between the institutions and the Member States. This was the
community method chosen to institutionalize a new kind of extra-national
power.77 Because the advent of nuclear weapons had created a new imperative for
some sort of cosmopolitan ideal, Arendt envisaged a kind of decentralized and
global system of federations linking member units of diverse size, according to
Douglas Klusmeyer. But she hoped for this international rather than supranational model to be built from the bottom up rather than the top down, with power
constituted horizontally, not vertically.78 Equality for the Member States
and their representatives was the guiding practice for the EEC founders: in that
respect they constituted power and broke in the new. But the EEC made little
space for popular participation, just as had always been the case in international
affairs.79
At one of the last meetings of the Institutional Committee the head of the German delegation, Carl-Friedrich Ophls, required that the official treaty be written
in German as well as French. The Italian and Dutch did likewise, which plunged
the committee into the deepest despair, as the French text had to be translated into
three other official versions by translators who were also legal scholars so that all
versions suggest the same interpretation.80 As a result, in Rome the plenipotentiaries signed three blank documents except for the cover pages, in addition to
the French version.81 Power as action in concert abolishes traditional hierarchies:
switching to multilingualism broke a long-standing linguistic tradition of French
dominance in European diplomacy. According to tienne Balibar, the only genuine idiom of Europe may be the practice of translation.82 From the start the EEC
was an exercise in translation among its Member States.
Trading off sovereigntys spoils
Action in concert does not seek the unambiguous victory of one side over the other.
Like Gilles Andrani, French MEP Michel Rocard sees in compromise, which
he defines as the pursuit of an equilibrium that corresponds to a relationship of
force tempered by law and ethics, a foundational principle of European integration politics; whereas compromission (shady deal) is a solution that consists in
accepting the unacceptable in the name of interests, which are not shared by all.83
The EEC Treatys four annexes, twelve protocols, one convention and nine declarations are the legal expression of compromise. The German Federal Republic got
a Protocol on trade with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as the GDR
could not be considered a foreign country; the Italians got a Protocol on aid for
the Mezzogiorno, and the European Investment Bank.84 National interests reasserted themselves also in the choice of sites for the EEC/Euratom institutions as
the six could not agree on a single place; and the negotiations to decide who would
occupy key posts lasted 30 hours.85 The French proposed the German Hallstein
as Commission President and obtained that Strasbourg would be the seat of the
European Parliament. The Commission moved to Brussels, the European Investment Bank to Rome and the Office of Publications and the Court of Justice to
Luxembourg. For Faure such complicated and costly solutions were irrational,
but to a certain extent reflected the European common past and Europe as it still
is.86 Thus, action in concert did not lead to the renunciation of national interests,
rather to their very imperfect recasting in a larger context. National representatives
could cast a critical look at their countries, Faure and Marjolin readily admitting
that, France had to give up the ghosts of her past, Ducci the fixed ideas of
Italy, and Spaak excessive Belgian sensitivity.87
Weaving the web of relationships
There is little room for feelings in Arendtian thought, although those who participate in the councils choose their leaders on the basis of respect, the one concession Arendt makes to friendship in politics.88 Likewise, the theorizing of identity
formation in European integration highlights the rational aspect of this complex
process.89 The narratives of the ECSC/EC founding reveal, however, a complex
interplay between rational considerations and affective commitments. Marjolin
valued the realities of friendship, born of everyones devotion to the common
cause.90 Monnet recommended to international visitors eager to develop their
own plans: Above all, have a dining-room. He praised the advantages of the
tiny dining-room, reached by an awkward flight of stairs at No. 18 rue de Martignac where the ECSC negotiations took place. There, friendships grew among
the heads of delegations, who soon formed a united group, resolved to interpret
their national instructions in ways that would assist the common effort.91 The
bon vivant Spaak put meals to good purpose in Brussels and in Paris.92 For the
intergovernmental negotiations that followed the Venice conference he insisted
on a quiet place away from the city traffic noise and got Chteau Val-Duchess, an
unused state property in the Brussels periphery, which stood close to the ruins of
an old abbey in a lovely park.93 French Foreign Affairs minister Christian Pineau
thought the change of venue from the busy rue Belliard not as futile as it might
seem, because it is so true that the setting in which negotiations take place can
affect the state of mind of the protagonists.94
It is tempting to scorn such remarks as sentimental musings of retired statesmen.95 But in the web of relationships where political action weaves its countless
stories, the table plays an essential role. In La Lgende des Repas, a meditation
on the role of meals in the human condition, Georges Haldas celebrates the code
of good manners imposed on him in his childhood by the double authority of
his Greek father and Swiss mother. Far from being oppressed by this apparently absurd code, Haldas thinks that it ingrained in him an irrepressible taste
for freedom, with respect for the other, which is the opposite of individualism,
to do whatever crosses our mind.96 The distinguished guests at the European
tables had been schooled in the same apparently absurd code. Shared meals
and beautiful surroundings energized them as they tried to practice in the
public place a civility instilled in the private sphere. For Arendt, also, the distance is bridged by the table, around which the actors sit to interact in speech
and deed:
72
To live together in the world means eventually that a world of things is

between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those
who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men
at the same time.97
The table divides and connects at the same time. There was an interminable
wrangle on how to distinguish industrial from agricultural products, as the
latter would enjoy the special protection of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). The French wanted an inclusive list including cans of peas, beer and
sardines, whereas the Dutch, Germans and Italians preferred a restrictive
approach. One morning the Italian Minister Gaetano Martino angrily asked
Maurice Faure whether the table at which they were seated was a manufactured
product or an agricultural product, given that it was made of wood. The two men
were so upset with each other that others feared they would come to blows.98
This was a case of ordinary concerns treated, quite inappropriately, in a heroic
mode, which Spaak whisked away from the space of appearance, the kind of
service an honest layman can offer. He proposed to make up overnight a list
with a few aides, which was accepted the next morning without any demur in
a few minutes.99
Heroic aspirations did not lose their hold. Staging the official signing ceremony
in Rome was another idea of Spaak. As Romes church bells rang he made an
Arendt-like speech:
This time Western men have not lacked in audacity, nor did they act too late.
The memory of their misfortunes, and perhaps also of their faults, seems to
have given them the courage to forget all quarrels, to upturn obsolete traditions, to think and act in a truly new way and to realize the greatest voluntary
transformation of Europe. They have done a great thing, and remarkably and
perhaps uniquely, they have done it by renouncing the use of force, threat or
constraint.100
The EEC experienced its heyday between 1958 and 1965. By 1961 all quantitative
restrictions on imports among the six had been lifted, and by 1962 the customs
duties within the EEC had shrunk by 50 per cent. In 1968, the customs union and
the agricultural common market were in place, 18 months before the deadline
fixed by the treaty. Productivity and internal and external trade increased rapidly, by 50 per cent among the six Member States between 1958 and 1962.101 De
Gaulle returned to power in May 1958, ending the war in Algeria, implementing
politically risky monetary and financial reforms (devaluing the franc against the
dollar by almost 20 per cent, and cutting expenses and hiking taxes) in order to
modernize the French economy. This made it possible for France to proceed with
the EEC customs union. But De Gaulles policy of the empty chair in the mid1960s against Commission President Hallsteins attempts to increase the EECs
financial independence and the EPs influence stalled the EEC politics of action in
concert for over a decade.
Assessment: what kind of power?

The ECSC/EEC founders meant to break away from the ancient tradition of power
as domination on the European continent. Like Arendt they refused to conflate
sovereignty with freedom, and transcended the well-worn framework of international law by questioning the fundamental concept of state sovereignty.102 Community decisions would result from an interaction of autonomous powers, not
from a struggle between concurrent powers (italics by the author).103 The negotiators of the Rome Treaties recognized one another as members of a council-like
community, albeit an exclusive one. Imagination, respect, devotion to the common
interest, the capacity to rethink positions and compromise but also to engage in
agonistic displays of conviction were hallmarks of their action; they invented new
political institutions and policies. Contrary to Arendt they rejected the dichotomy
between politics and economics, but with the deep-seated conviction that they
were doing political work under the guidance of a politically accountable leader.
Equality of positions among the Member States was a chief concern; and when
necessary they created compensating mechanisms to level the economic and political playing field. Firmly rooted in representative democracy, it did not cross their
minds to consult the citizenry at large although the French, German and Italian
delegations kept in close touch with the ministries concerned and interest groups
(farmers, unions, business associations) during the negotiations. The French and
German governments prepared the parliamentary debates on the treaties with
utmost care (this cannot be said of Italy, nor of the Benelux countries).104
Their success in founding the EEC amazed the European negotiators.105 But
amazement soon wore off. Coming to terms with the process character of action
and its open-ended outcomes wears out the most stalwart of actors. (The shortlived Arendtian councils did not face this self-destructive aspect of action.) The
noble work of compromise106 was hidden from view, and the new Community
soon taken for granted. Eventually it appeared as the natural outcome of exclusively self-interested national policies.107 Looking back in 1984, some of the negotiators of the Treaties of Rome were disappointed by the lack of political progress.
Ducci felt deeply the failure to replace national states with a federal state . . . It
was a mistake to believe that political union would come automatically out of
economic union.108
What might Lukes three dimensional view of power and Barnett and Duvalls
typology of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power contribute
to our understanding of the founding of the EEC?109 Lukes would ask: Was there
open domination of one partner over the others? Were some topics whisked off
from the debate? And were mindsets changed through coercion rather than the
political methods of persuasion and negotiation, which Arendt favors? Action in
concert was a messy process involving over 30 diplomats, hundreds of national
bureaucrats, six parliaments and many interest groups; exchanges could be harsh
and frank; lack of interest, apathy and ignorance, rather than power over, isolated
some parliaments and senior cabinet ministers from the negotiations. Undoubtedly those who opposed further measures of European integration, and there were
opponents in all six countries, lost, but not without many debates. Democratic
74
politics makes winners and losers. Support in the highest ranks of the government (Guy Mollet in France, Adenauer in the FRG, Spaak in Belgium), and expert
knowledge (such as in Italy where diplomats convinced an absent-minded cabinet)
carried the argument in the executives; the six parliaments ratified the treaties.110
Lukes and Barnett and Duvalls notion of compulsory power does not carry much
explanatory purchase at the transregional level in the EEC founding years.
What about institutional power? The EEC negotiators resisted successfully the
power of domestic institutions such as the high-powered French Verret Committee of bureaucrats, by providing imaginative alternatives and through the backing
of other domestic institutions (this is Parsons argument regarding France). As for
the EEC institutions, they were set apart from the ECSC institutions and could
hardly constrain at the planning stage although this would eventually change.111
Structural power, which the agents differing positions in the capitalist system
generate with their unequal social privileges and biased self-understandings,112
was uppermost on the minds of the founders. Their way to resist was to set up
policies in favor of poorer regions across the EEC, which were expanded and
renamed structural policies in the 1986 Single European Act.113 Aid policies
had the same purpose. Productive power concerns discourses as systems of signification through which meaning is produced, fixed and transformed, not the
Habermasian notion of communicative action.114 In empirical reality such a sharp
contrast cannot be drawn: the founders innovated (or resisted according to Barnett
and Duvalls vocabulary) by rejecting an outworn nation-centered episteme;
they justified their action with new ideological categories combining national,
European and cosmopolitan commitments. They negotiated hard on behalf of their
countries, but they did not lose sight of the Arendt-like ethos of power in concert,
its speech and deed, to shape the new policies.115 Finally, unexpected events on
which the actors had little control opened up a policy window;116 the failed
Franco-German-Israeli Suez expedition and the repression of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956 brought home to the negotiators the reality of the insignificance of European power faced with the Soviet Union and the United States.
Uri describes the synchronicity between the two events as an extraordinary piece
of luck for the negotiators, although Parsons argues that by then the French and
German governments had made up their minds to move forward with their plans
for a Common Market.117
EU power(s) and the 2010 financial crisis
As several political actors noted, many ambiguities were left unsolved during
the EEC/Euratom founding. There was a dualism in the notion of power as
it was understood by the supporters of European integration: it was to be action
in concert among European Community members, but beyond the Communitys
borders Europeans needed to recover the mastery of their own fate politically,
economically and even militarily to be in harmony with themselves and the
world, after they had destroyed each other through the pursuit of national sovereignty and prestige.118 Fifty years later, in the midst of an unprecedented economic

crisis, the EU-27 must confront anew what kind of power it wants to be within
as well as without.119 The second part of this chapter examines what understandings of power shape the EU external policies today. But debates over the fiscal
and economic policies of the Member States illustrate also the tension between
practices of power as action in concert and power as domination within the EU. In
November 2010, the threat of a return to some sort of quasi-colonial status was
exercising the Irish as they contemplate the bail-out that is thrust upon them, to
resue the Republics debt-ridden banks, and fund government operations. They
worried about the strings attached, the demand by France, Germany and other EU
partners that the Irish corporate tax rate of 12.5 per cent be raised.120 The imperative to adopt political decisions on economic issues, such as whether to save the
euro or not, is nothing new, but the actual steps taken seemed too often inspired
by a counting-house mentality.121 There was little sense of friendship and solidarity in the EU Councils intervention, more of a grim determination not to let
contagion spread.122 The method remained intergovernmental to the dismay of
Luxembourg, Belgium and other small countries; and Greece and Ireland had to
conclude bilateral agreements with the other members of the eurozone instead
of being backed by a European monetary fund created through an act of collective solidarity and administered by the Union.123 Moreover, the term bailout
is a misnomer. These are loans at hefty interest rates, on which the lenders are
making money and that borrowers will have a hard time repaying.124 When the
new center right Slovakian government convinced its parliament to vote against
the Slovakian contribution (800 million euros) to the Greek loan, and other members of the eurozone had to make up the difference, Slovak MP Anton Marcincin
disagreed:
We have heard voices in the parliament that it is a failure of the Greeks that
they could blame only themselves, and nobody should pay them anything.
But according to this logic Brussels should not send us any money anymore
for catching up on living standards. I mean, we had communism here which
decreased our living standards, and that is also our fault.125
Consciously or not, Marcincin was recalling the mindset of solidarity, a hallmark of power according to Arendt, that shaped earlier policies.126 And when
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Sarkozy announced,
without previous wider consultation, that they would seek a treaty revision to
introduce a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, this was not appreciated by
other EU capitals at a time of crisis when joint action mattered most.127 At the
time of writing, a secret committee of technocrats and lawyers who originate
from national finance ministries was meeting to thrash out the rules that will
govern the new European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) beyond 2013.128
Institutional power (the troika from the IMF, the European Commission and
the European Central Bank), structural and productive power are shaping the
fiscal and budgetary policies of Member States in crisis with little public attempt
to explain how EU intervention could be a proactive move inspired by EU solidarity rather than panic.
76
Part III Action in concert and EU external and foreign policies
Theorizing EU power anew

The EU-27 finds it difficult to practice power as action in concert within; but the
fact that discussing European foreign and security policies has become a cottage
industry in academia underscores the point that the EU is increasingly perceived
as an important presence or power on the world scene.129 Only since the end
of the Cold War has the EU consistently strived to develop the institutions and
policies of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Foreign policy has long been
considered the realm of heroic politics and power over. According to Franois
Duchne, the great achievement of European integration has been the revolutionary shift from the traditional system of balance of power towards a civilian system of working out collectively solutions across borders over an enormous range
of topics.130 Arendt condemned with passion the European system of balance of
power, as one of the strategies in the reemployment of nineteenth-century political instruments whose ineffectiveness was discovered and denounced after the
last war.131 And Kohnstamm found the idea of a principle of compromise moving
Europeans to action during the negotiations over the Treaties of Rome horrible,
precisely because this term evoked for him the unsuccessful European attempts at
balancing power, which too many wars interrupted. The compromises struck at the
1955 Messina Conference reintroduced the preeminence of national sovereignty
in Community affairs. He granted that there may be good compromises, but only
if they are subsequently institutionalized . . . . Otherwise moods are so changeable,
concessions could disappear.132
There is a circular relationship between values and policies in the formation
of EU identity.133 Discussions of foreign policy are passionate because they pose
the primal question of collective identity: who are we as a society?134 Debates on
European power already have a long history, which the Eurosclerosis of the late
1970s80s muted. They confronted Duchnes notion of the EEC civilian power
domesticating the relations between states, with John Galtungs idea of Pax
Bruxellana, a Eurocentric world organized around the putative superpower.135
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq deeply divided the EU Member States; and Kagans
critique of the EU strategic culture of powerlessness that emphasizes negotiations, diplomacy, commercial ties, and international law over the use of force,
seduction over coercion, multilateralism over unilateralism hit a raw nerve.136
Kagan described quite accurately the temper of the Rome Treaties negotiators
except for one essential element: the willingness to pool sovereignties in limited
but meaningful policy areas.137 Some scholars use the US as the standard for international power to define EU power, to very different effects from Kagan. Ulrich
Beck contrasts the cosmopolitan empire of Europe . . . notable for its open and
cooperative character at home and abroad . . . with the imperial predominance of
the US. Thanks to the miracle of enemies becoming neighbours, the EU has
developed an attractive model of soft world power.138 Becks attempt to reconceptualize sovereignty away from state sovereignty by resorting to the concept

of European empire fails to convince given the legacy of European colonialism.139 John McCormicks term superpower does not seem appropriate, either, in
normative analyses of the EUs power in the world, although it may be useful as a
descriptive term for specific practices. It implies too radical a separation between
internal politics and external environment, instead of the commitment to equality
and mutuality, which the EU allegedly espouses in both internal and external policies.140 In the end, using American categories to discuss EU power has not proved
very fruitful.141 Therefore, Kalypso Nicolaidis proposes that Europe define (or
redefine) power as the capacity to empower others. She asks, What if not to
be the superpower or even a superpower was itself the key to Europes international influence?142 Of course, empowerment can easily morph into another
hierarchical exercise (who empowers whom)?
Ian Manners concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) constitutes one of
the most influential attempts to think through EU power by updating Duchnes
notion of civilian power. On the basis of empirical evidence (such as the EUs push
for the abolition of the death penalty across the world) Manners emphasizes the
virtuous impact of NPE.143 Whether the EUs presence in the world is conceptualized as normative power, empowerment, superpower or imperial cosmopolitanism, it has become a very different kind of association from the EEC/Euratom.
As Barnett and Duvall argue, discussion of power in global governance should
break away from realisms simplistic binary of power vs. powerlessness. There is
an esthetic of European power that aspires to move beyond this duality without
full confidence to want to, nor always with the knowledge of how to act it out.144
Ultimately, only empirical studies can assess to what extent the EU acts according
to its proclaimed values.145 Exploring the contemporary EU practices of power as
action in concert should be understood as a heuristic strategy, not an argument to
support Kagans sarcastic view of the EU as a paradise. There is a strong affinity
between Arendts notion of power and the aspirations of the ECSC/EC/EU actors
to initiate and institutionalize actions in concert across national borders, which
neither scholars of EU foreign policy nor political theorists interested in cosmopolitanism have discussed so far.
EU power: civilian and military practices
John McCormick sums up the EU current presence in the world as a complex network of multilateral and bilateral trading networks and agreements, some based
on proximity such as the new European Neighborhood Policies (ENP) toward
Eastern European and the Mediterranean states, others on former colonial ties
such as the Cotonou Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
(ACP), and others on expediency with the United States and Japan.146 With 7
per cent of the worlds population (470 million) and a GDP larger than that of
the US, by 2005 the EU had become the largest world exporter of goods. True
to form, the EECs first external policy was the common commercial policy, a
matter of the ordinary life, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is still the
only international organization where the Commission is the EU Member States
78
sole representative. The EU, together with its Member States, has also become
the worlds largest provider of development and humanitarian aid. There are 134
EU delegations (embassies) in non-Member States, but so far the representatives
of EU Member States have been prone to spend more time reconciling their own
positions than promoting a common line in international negotiations. Yet there
has been a growing convergence of positions on key issues such as climate change,
the International Criminal Court, intervention in the Western Balkans and sanctions on Iran. Public opinion polls have consistently indicated that a large majority
of EU citizens support a common defense and security policy.147
Since 1992 the EU Member States have steadily expanded their cooperation in
foreign and security policies or high politics, the traditional domain of the heroics of military victory or defeat. Partly as a response to the divisive war in Iraq
they adopted the first EU Security Strategy in 2003; and they launched 18 peacekeeping military and civilian programs between 2003 and 2007, from Macedonia
to the Democratic Republic of Congo, all run on an intergovernmental basis from
the Council of Ministers, but with support of the Commission.148 Although the
Pentagon budget still dwarfs the EU combined military budget, the EU Member
States have increased their manufacturing and exporting of weapons and crossnational collaborations.149 But civilian power should not be confused with civilizing power. According to Manners, a new danger threatens NPE: the drive
towards martial potency and the growth of a Brussels-based military-industrial simplex since 2003. Although the majority of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) missions have been non-military so far, the EU agenda has
moved from prioritizing sustainable peace and local capacity-building to military
security with the appropriate use of force.150 Per Norheim-Martinsen describes
how the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier
Solana, and his growing team of advisors and special representatives succeeded
in changing practices away from traditional intergovernmental procedures in spite
of the rule of unanimity on foreign and security policies. Crisis and military crisis
management operations are developing increasingly without US support and have
built EU self-confidence, which seems to have become an objective in its own
right. But there is little information on whether the EU operations achieved their
stated objectives.151
Power over or power with?
Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan denounce the public declarations
of noble goals that serve to mask disagreements among Member States on their
foreign policy goals implementation, and underscore the EUs self-comfortingly
superior moral identity.152 There is, for instance, a constant tension between the
internally liberalizing EU policies and the EU trade policies, which have not been
liberal in the agricultural and textile sectors, at the expense of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and other trading partners in the global South. However,
the EU has been more willing to accept WTO rulings than the US; and it opposed
its own pharmaceutical industry on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights

to lower the price of drugs in cases of health emergencies in poor countries.153
Former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy attributes this success to action in
concert and describes the global approach followed by the EU Commission,
the Council and NGOs to encourage the local production of patented and generic
anti-epidemic drugs.154
Michelle Pace offers, however, a sharp critique of the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), which started in 2004 as a series of bilateral agreements between the
EU and the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries not likely to become
Member States. The ENP Action Plan signed with Egypt seeks to establish close
cooperation on democratic reform, economic modernization, migration issues and
social reform. But,
[It] lacks any clear targets or realistic timetables in its dealings with the
Egyptian government, it also misses the crucial problem in Egyptian society
today: people have no basic rights and no trust in the political elite. In terms of
how the EU is perceived amongst the average Egyptians, analysts emphasize
the perception of the EU as a hesitant actor, a hypocritical actor and a money
machine for the Mubarak regime.155
The model of liberal democracy pushed by the EU on Mediterranean countries
masks the EUs true concerns: security and stability.156 Conditionality (that conditions the granting of aid on the implementation of democratic and human rights)
is not acceptable to many third states, which view it as a form of coercion.157
EU actors on power as action in concert
Robert Cooper, who is Counselor to the new EU High Representative Catherine
Ashton, was one of Solanas closest advisors. A self-described theorist, he has
little illusion that the EU can spread peace and prosperity across the world. Development is largely self-initiated as the example of Japan demonstrates.158 Cooper
published a noted analysis of the post-1989 international system, The Breaking
Of Nations (2003), in which he described a world of pre-modern states (in chaos),
modern states (attached to a traditional notion of sovereignty defended by force)
and postmodern states that favor the rule of law and non-violent conflict resolution. Coopers notion of postmodernity has affinities with the understanding of
power as action in concert, and he describes his colleagues at the Council in almost
Arendt-like terms, as like-minded peers pursuing the common good. He worked
in the British foreign office for a long time; but strangely, he found that his colleagues at the EU Council of Ministers Secretariat are in a sense more patriotic.
You feel a certain commitment to Europe, they know why theyre here. People
in Brussels are working for something, which has brought peace and prosperity,
not just to Western Europe but also to Central Europe. I am proud of that.159
Cooper compares the Council to an ideal type, of course. But the fact that people
listen to each other, and change their mind is an ingrained way of doing things
now.160 Sovereignty means a seat at the table. The EU policy processes provoke
80
thousands of meetings of ministers and national and EU civil servants so that all
those concerned with decisions over peace and war know each other well.
They may or may not agree; they may or may not like each other, but they do
belong to the same organization and work together and make deals together
over a wide and wonderful range of subjects . . . . To create an international
society, international socialization is required and one of the important functions of the Brussels institutions is to provide this.161
A notable achievement of the Council in 2008 was the Kosovo story. We did
not let our disagreements paralyze us and did something practical to stabilize the
situation. The only thing Belgrade and Pristina can agree on is working with the
EU.162 Arendts councils are self-appointed, encourage direct participation, and
in the best of cases, federate themselves as they multiply. This is hardly the case
in the EU. But Cooper, like Gorham, describes a council-like mindset in certain
influential EC/EU groups/committees, founded on respect and trust among
those who care rather than on partisan affiliations. Their role is to express political opinions rather than represent those of others.163 Although most scholars do not
consider the EU system of committees (comitology) as an example of democratic
participation, Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson argue that it represents an
institutional innovation that has contributed to the transformation of the economic
community into a European polity and promoted deliberative supranationalism.
Some groups are self-appointed. Belgian legal expert Jean-Victor Louis chaired a
committee of eight colleagues who acted on their personal initiative to propose a
set of statutes for the future European Bank. This brought me great personal satisfaction . . . and shows that at critical moments a few individuals without mandate
can take useful initiatives.164
But isnt the Commission, which advocates for the shared European interest
and oversees the implementations of decisions across the EU, the primary driver
of postmodernity and action in concert in the EU rather than the intergovernmental
Council of Ministers where Cooper worked until December 2010? Cooper disagreed. Having never worked for the Commission, he would not characterize it
except as a gigantic aid organization, which has managed some programs very
well, such as the 2004 and 2007 enlargement processes, and others not so well,
such as the ENPs. He counted on the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to strengthen action in
concert between the Council and the Commission thanks to the new permanent
presidency for the European Council, and the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy who combines the vice-presidency of the Commission
with the chairmanship of the General Affairs Council.165 Some fear the confusion
of roles and the multiplication of presidencies.166 Cooper argues to the contrary
that the EU will finally be able to develop a coherent foreign policy even if the
full effect takes 2030 years. He helped organize the new 3,000-strong European
External Action Service that will work for Ashton.167 The EU solution consists
in transforming political problems into technical issues and, if they cannot be
solved at that level, into procedural issues. The Commission at its best is very

good at this.168 Like Marjolin 50 years earlier, Cooper credits linkage for action
in concert: there are so many interests in the EU that it makes trade-off easier. It
is only at the summit level that one can bring together the location of the Pharmaceutical Testing Office, the nationality of the President of the European Central
Bank, the allocation of regional aid . . . and a hundred other things.169 The concerns of the ordinary life crop up again, and there is a dearth of good thinking on
how to connect the heroic politics of peace and reconciliation with the low politics
of material concerns.170 This is not a topic Arendt discusses, nor has it inspired
much secondary literature.
Negation brings change according to Barnett and Duvalls typology of power
because it highlights effects of domination calling for resistance. In Arendts concept of power there is an affirmative thrust that does justice more effectively to
the human condition of natality, the capacity to start anew.171 Shortly before his
premature death, Polish MEP Geremek articulated the main dilemma, as he saw it,
facing the EU-27 in foreign affairs:
Do we try to attract citizens attention by creating situations of danger or
hope? . . . Is it necessary to introduce the element of fear [in order to build
the future Europe], for instance by saying that an individual state is powerless to combat the global threats of terrorism and climate change? . . . My
initial response is that we should perhaps think of both fear and hope. But my
experience and my conviction tell me that we must emphasize an action that
generates public hope.172
There is a kind of politics of solidarity whose common interest gets defined by
fears, Geremek said, recalling the impact of the 1956 Hungarian Revolutions
failure on the Rome Treaties negotiations. But in Poland during the bad years
before the fall of Communism, the Solidarity movement succeeded in mobilizing citizens around hope.173 Therefore he proposed three initiatives for action in
concert based on hope rather than fear: first, a European defense based on the total
renunciation of nuclear weapons with the two nuclear Member States, France and
the UK, entrusting their arsenals to an EU command for the sake of the Community; second, that the EU should maintain a force of 70,000100,000 soldiers for
defensive purposes only and for peace-keeping operations; and finally, the EU
should strengthen its aid policies and give up thinking of international policy in
terms of national interests, with the former colonial powers dominating the EU
policies toward Africa or China.174
It will not be easy to reconcile the visions of Geremek and Cooper into coherent programs of action, and the methodical politics of the EU-27 are much
more demanding than those of the EC-6. Empirical evidence shows that in the
ECSC/EC, power as action in concert, far from being a spontaneous exercise in
consensual decision making, called for methodical thinking, compromising on
contradictory interests, and using moments of crisis as opportunities on the part
of the heroes. Political leadership could trump technical expertise, and councillike groups acted on their strong commitment to the rule of law and non-violent
82
conflict resolution. Ricoeur confers the status of the forgotten, but without any
nostalgia, to the Arendtian concept of power because the forgotten is of what
constitutes the present of our living-together.175 The post-WWI German Rte of
soldiers and citizens, the 1960s student movement and the 1956 Budapest insurrection leave traces of the interruption of domination, even if the revolutionaries
do not understand that their true strength resides in trying out the new livingtogether which holds them together, in trying out the inter-esse, rather than the
instrumentality of the all too visible and emotionally exalting violence.176 In
a political association as complex as the EU, several forms of power circulate
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive that bind people together.
The principle of action in concert leaves its traces also among those who care to
remember.
Enlargements and the

recognition of the Other
The case of Turkey
Introduction
The 1950 Schuman Declaration stated unambiguously that the proposed European
Community between Germany and France would be open to the participation of
the other European countries.1 In spite of its apparent generosity the gesture did
not commit to much in a divided continent, and the French government avoided a
solitary tte--tte with the FRG thanks to the participation of the Benelux countries and Italy. The Preamble of the 1957 EEC Treaty reiterated the commitment
to inclusiveness without spelling out the Communitys geographical or political
limits: Denmark, Ireland and the UK acceded in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal
and Spain in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995; the former GDR became
part of the EU as a result of German reunification in 1990; the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. At the time of writing,
Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey have been recognized as
official candidates for accession while Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and
Serbia have applied for this status.
A third principle of action, recognition of the Other, can be detected in the
enlargements of the EC of 6 to the EU of 27. Let us remember at the outset that a
principle of action does not indicate the purpose of a political project it remains
democracy, prosperity and peace in this case nor that it should inspire every
political initiative. Rather it should be considered like a logical necessity, a mindset
of citizens and representatives if the enlarged Union is to continue. According
to Charles Taylor, who is indebted to Hegels dialectical interpretation of history,
recognition facilitates the rapprochement of parties previously opposed (or merely
disconnected); but the new association, far from abolishing the parties, helps them
toward a higher stage of individual and collective self-realization. This is the goal
if not the reality of EU enlargement, a neologism for the peaceful expansion of a
union of nation-states, driven not by a pre-established plan but the request of
outsiders to join in.
Scholarly research on the EC/EU enlargement processes has evolved over time
from an initial focus on democratization processes in Greece, Portugal and Spain
to the critical analysis of EU-shaped accession requirements and the responses
84
Turkey: enlargements and recognition of the Other
of candidate States. More recently, enlargement has been theorized as the EUs
greatest foreign policy success.2 Comparativists focus on Europeanization, or
the impact of EU policies and institutions on the new Member States, and stress
the reciprocity of such processes.3 Some senior EU leaders have even interpreted
the accession negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries in
quasi-Hegelian terms as a process of reunification of Europe.4 A political theory of recognition, grounded in Taylor and Ricoeurs reflections, adds to these
approaches by probing the subjectivities of the actors involved, and the relationship between technocratic adjustments and the transformation of self-understandings.5 This interpretative reading is compatible with constructivist and comparative
studies of enlargement, and offers an original way to think through the interaction
of rational interests and idealistic claims.
Quebecois philosopher Charles Taylor is one of the most eloquent thinkers of
the politics of recognition. This chapters Part I discusses elements of his theorizing that are most relevant to an interpretation of the EU politics of enlargement.6
Part II interprets certain EU institutions and policies as embodiments of the principle of recognition in the six waves of EU enlargements (19732007), drawing
also from self-reflective comments by political actors. The initial invitation for all
European countries to participate in European integration was unconditional and
formulated on egalitarian terms.7 However, the process of accession has become
progressively more authoritarian (on the part of the EU and its Member States)
over the last four decades. This chapter will focus on this issue primarily in Part
III, which deals with Turkey and the EU negotiations over accession and the post2007 period.8 Taylor and Ricoeur downplay the question of power over, and Hegel
will prove more helpful on this. But is recognition an endless process? Ricoeur
worries that the claim for affective, juridical and social recognition may turn into an
indefinite demand, a kind of bad infinity that produces the unhappy consciousness. Therefore he suggests another exceptional figure of mutual recognition
through gift exchange that results in states of peace.9 Ricoeurs interpretation
of recognition as a gift is pertinent to the discussion of the Turkish EU accession
process; it accounts better than Taylors for the sense of battle fatigue pervading
the accession process after the latest enlargements, and it suggests a way out of the
stalemate of self-perpetuating antagonistic positions.
Part 1 Theorizing the politics of recognition

From Hegel to Quebec
Moved by his reading of Hegel and his direct involvement in divisive Canadian and
Quebecois politics, Taylor searches for a theory of overcoming (Aufhebung) the
two contradictory aspirations that tear apart modern individuals and their political
communities, rational instrumentality and expressive aspirations.10 Some, such
as Nancy Fraser, critique Taylors theory of recognition for its identity-based focus
that ignores the socio-economic dysfunctions of the market, and her work adds
a significant critical dimension to theories of recognition as Christopher F. Zurn
Turkey: enlargements and recognition of the Other 85
notes.11 But to assess Taylors theory of recognition it is important not to overfocus on his famous essay, The Politics of Recognition at the expense of examining his two books on Hegel, and his discussion of the role of recognition in contemporary politics in The Ethics of Authenticity and Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays
on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism. Like Hegel, and also because of his
Quebecois experience, Taylor is well aware of the role of material interests in processes of recognition. Three core arguments are especially relevant to a discussion
of the EU:
First, like the German Romantics of the nineteenth century, the contemporary
individual subject pursues the ideal of expressive unity, and the search for
self-realization through a specific calling, which Taylor calls authenticity
or the ideal of being true to oneself.12 On the other hand, this subject seeks
also rational autonomy and responds to the requirements of instrumental
rationality to reach most efficiently a given goal even at the price of emptiness. Indeed, this kind of rationality is disembodied, cut off from the body,
emotions and communal ties.13
Second, engaging in the dialogue of recognition may help or hamper the
search for authenticity, depending on whether recognition is granted or withdrawn.14 Modernity, by erasing traditional social hierarchies, has made the
search for authenticity more urgent. Previously ones birth status assigned a
social identity, which rarely changed over a lifetime. One was born a peasant
or an aristocrat. This is no longer the case; an egalitarian society grounded on
equal dignity has replaced hierarchical orders. In an increasingly ethnically
and culturally diverse world, one constructs ones identity through personal
effort and in dialogues of recognition that may fail at the expense of the unrecognized. The initial process involves two unequal parties who engage in a
struggle over recognition of their respective identities and material interests.
A successful process would presumably level the playing field although
this is not what Taylor observed in the Canadian politics of the 1990s.
Third, not only individuals but also nation-states and political communities
experience the tension between expressive aspirations that may manifest
themselves through nationalist policies and instrumental rationality. Taylor,
like Hegel, cannot conceive of an individual disconnected from social structures. The higher form of unity brought about by recognition is not merely
psychological or conceptual; it must take material forms.15
Taylor does not offer a detailed theoretical analysis of the connection between
individual and collective aspirations, but his essays on Canada read like a case
study of the politics of recognition (or rather of non-recognition). Whereas Hegel
theorizes the emergence of recognition in history, Taylor delves on its absence, but
he refuses to accept this as a fait accompli. The problem of the two Solitudes
(Quebec and the Anglophone provinces) is that they hold different views of federalism and unity: the Anglophone provinces are founded on a strong commitment
to the defense of individual rights, and Quebec on linguistic and cultural identity
86
and the defense of collective rights. These two opposed Canadian ideals may yet
be reconciled in a higher variant of unity which Taylor calls asymmetrical federalism.16 But Canada may equally break up, in large part, because of a lack of
(perceived) recognition of equal worth of one group by another, and this could happen to other large multinational societies.17 Taylor says little on the reasons why
individuals and communities refuse to grant each other recognition, except that
they manifest a narrowness of spirit and a tunnel vision which prompt them to
cast the other in the mould defined by ones major concern, no matter how well or
ill it fits others.18 Writing about multiculturalism, he couches the granting of presumption of equal worth to all cultures in terms of a moral issue, the willingness
to accept a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story. To check on
this presumption requires intensive study, and possibly a transformation of our
own standards of judgment because for a sufficiently different culture, the very
understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us.19
In this case Taylor is commenting on the politics of multiculturalism in institutions
of higher learning. However, his words may apply also to the assessment of different political and legal cultures. If checking on presumptions requires a considerable intellectual effort, would mental laziness and resistance to change be another
part of the problem, or pride and arrogance? Taylor does not answer, except that
engaging the heart, respecting dignity and the willingness to innovate seem
cardinal points for a successful politics of recognition.20
Founding practices of recognition in European integration
One incident among many illustrates the role of recognition of the Other in founding moments of European integration, and the complex interplay of rational
instrumentality with expressive aspirations. A deadlock between French and German farmers threatened to bring the EEC negotiations to an abrupt stop in the fall
of 1956. The Germans could accept the Common Agricultural Policy for political
reasons, but not by jettisoning free trade. Meanwhile, French farmers insisted on a
preference for French agricultural products over products from Canada or the US
in the future Common Market. The word preference was anathema to the Germans and the Benelux countries. French chief negotiator Robert Marjolin recalls
the inspiration that transcended the conflict:
The breakthrough occurred one day when I suggested that instead of talking
preference we talk non-discrimination. I was no longer asking for preferential treatments for French products. But I thought it was in the logic of
the Common Market that French products be treated in Germany (or in any
other country of the Community) on a non-discriminatory basis, on the same
basis as German products; and that there should be only one set of prices
applying to German products and to products imported from the other Community countries. I still remember the sensation this proposal created. It was
easy to reject the idea of a preference, practically impossible to object to
non-discrimination.21

This was an exercise in recognition of two very different mental maps that weighed
mightily on the definition of material interests and institutional arrangements.
Reading Hegel is illuminating because he theorized a dilemma that has yet to
be solved: as men shake loose from their traditional communities, what should be
the new focus of identity? We cannot afford any longer to suppress the question
of Sittlichkeit altogether, Taylor writes. (Sittlichkeit is Hegels term for the mix of
institutions, traditions, arts and religion that make up a nations identity.) Political
institutions and practices have an expressive dimension: they embody a certain
view of ourselves both as individuals and social beings. The problem today is that
institutions have ceased to express this sense we hold of our identity, hence for
instance the student revolt of the 1960s. The contemporary crisis of Sittlichkeit
may be partly brought on by our increasing awareness of the cost of growth in pollution, overcrowding, social dislocation and the impending threat of severe limits
to growth.22 But is Taylor essentializing group identities? His explicit espousal
of a hermeneutic model of the fusion of horizons through cross-cultural comparison, by which a cultures own standards of evaluation are inevitably transformed,
certainly vitiates such charges.23
Like the search for authenticity whose success it conditions, the dialogue of
recognition requires a common horizon of shared significance, or background
of intelligibility against which each participant defines his originality.24 At the
1993 Copenhagen summit the European Council defined the criteria against which
a countrys candidacy to EU membership would be assessed. The Copenhagen criteria can be interpreted as providing a common horizon of significance for the
countries involved in enlargement processes, in this case liberal democracy, market economy and the integration of the acquis communautaire.25 The fourth criterion laid out in Agenda 2000 was reforms by the EU of its own institutions and
policies to ready them for 12 new Member States.26 Initially, the Council accepted
only six countries as official candidates: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The decision to create two groups of applicants
was controversial. Dutch MEP Arie Oostlander, who co-authored the EP Report
on enlargement, felt strongly that the constitutional criterion, rather than economic or administrative criteria, should prevail: on that ground only Slovakia and
Turkey did not qualify.27 In October 1999, the Commission recommended that
the seven other countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia,
and Turkey, be accepted as official candidates for accession, as long as they satisfied the political criteria of democratic accountability, respect for human rights,
minorities rights and the rule of law. Oostlander and the EPs position had become
EU policy.28
The common feature of the European principles of action is that they engage
the Other sometimes a rival or an enigma, never an enemy on the basis of
mutuality, with a view to common long-term interests and the willingness to
enter binding commitments. But recognition is about identity formation and dignity, not war and peace. Michael O. Hardimon translates the Hegelian term of
Vershnung (reconciliation) as the reconciling of men with their social world, a
kind of place in which its members could genuinely be at home.29 This is a
88
project much closer to the Arendtian concept of understanding than to forgiveness. For his part Taylor does not emphasize forgiveness or reconciliation in his
discussion of recognition and contemporary politics, although he briefly states
that Canadians need to be free of the rhetoric of resentment. His focus is on
the search for authenticity in a community of peers, on the willingness to accept
self-transformation, and on innovative forms of institutionalism. Recognition is
the demand that people be acknowledged and valued for what they are.30 The fifth
enlargement wave (2004 and 2007) was not so much about overcoming irreparable wrongs as about uniting parties alienated by their foreignness.31 Oostlander could not see the relevance of forgiveness to this process. He asked: Who
should forgive whom? But promise is still a very valid concept: the new unity
must be institutionalized in a political community.32
Part II Policies and institutions of recognition in the EU

Post-industrial Sittlichkeit is about founding institutions and economic arrangements that correspond to collective self-definition, and doing this as rationally as
possible.33 Certain EU institutional arrangements and policies can be interpreted
as manifestations of the principle of recognition of the Other: among the first, the
representation of all Member States on the Commission, the careful weighing of
votes in the Council of Ministers, and the rotation of the European Presidency;
among the second, the granting of equal status to all the languages spoken in the
Member States, and the cohesion policies, that is the (modest) redistribution of
economic resources from richer to poorer regions. This list is not exhaustive and
this is not to say that the purpose of each of these policies and institutions was
expressly meant for recognition of the Other or formulated in such terms. But
the harsh reactions provoked by suggestions for changes during the constitutional
negotiations of the last decade demonstrate the expressive and instrumental
weights of these arrangements.
Institutions of recognition
The Council of Ministers, the EP and the Commission
Negotiating the votes attributed to each of the 27 current and future Member
States on the Council of Ministers in the 2000 Nice Treaty was so fractious that it
ended on a Monday morning at 4.20 a.m. after the longest summit in EU history.34
Agreeing to the number of representatives in the European Parliament and in the
Commission was no easier. The French presidency proposed a Commission where
only two-thirds of the Member States (15 in the EU-27) could vote by rotation,
given that the members of the Commission are charged with defining the common
European interest rather than representing their country of origin. Not having a
vote on the Commission for a few years would respect the spirit and ethos of the
treaties and enhance the effectiveness of the Commission, which otherwise might
resemble a debating chamber rather than an executive body in a future Union
of 30 members or more.35 But this French proposal excited the fury of the small
Member States in 2000 that took it as a frontal attack,36 and the subsequent
rejection by the Irish people of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 provoked a return to the
formula of one Commissioner per Member State, which another Irish referendum
approved in 2009. National representation on the Commission matters symbolically.37 Recognition was wrestled from the other rather than graciously granted,
which is just as Hegel lets us surmise it.38
The European Councils rotating presidency
Monnet pushed for the creation of the European Council, a regular gathering of the
EC/EU heads of states and governments, for reasons of efficacy and to legitimize
major political decisions (such as the election of the European parliament by universal suffrage), not to promote mutual recognition.39 Nevertheless, over the years
the European Councils rotating presidency has morphed into a very public and
symbolic moment, which generates both self-esteem in the Member State assuming this responsibility and public visibility. This institution has been criticized
for its cumbersomeness, alleged lack of follow through, and for taking up too
many secondary issues.40 The system of the troika whereby the the three Member
States holding the presidency (each for six months) cooperate closely with each
other over an 18-month period, has mitigated these effects somewhat, although
the system is heavily dependent on the quality of national administrations. Each
presidency must engage in a contradictory exercise: in principle make its theses prevail, but in fact facilitate the making of compromises.41 Most appreciated
are the presidencies that succeed in leading hundreds of ministerial and working group sessions firmly but fairly. Some small States presidencies have been
praised because, with fewer interests to defend and in spite of less manpower, they
were more effective in facilitating mutual recognition and syntheses. The presidency of Slovenia illustrates this point.42
Slovenia, whose sovereignty was only recognized in 1991, was the first Central
European Member State to hold the EU rotating presidency. Its priorities were
the implementation of the Lisbon strategy, climate change, energy policies, the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the integration of the Western Balkans, but
it wanted foremost to run the EU policy-making processes as an honest broker to
enhance Slovenias good reputation.43 According to Andrej Rahten who advised
Prime Minister Janez Jana:
The rotating presidency is an important source of identity. For us it was very
important to show that we belong to the European family. The Slovenian presidency was not a one party endeavor, but a national enterprise. We called on
everybody: officials of all ministries, diplomats and intellectuals.
Luxembourg was Slovenias role model, although Slovenia consulted most
intensively with its two troika partners, Germany and Portugal, as well as
with Austria and Finland. Thanks to these contacts the Slovenian government
90
developed a large list of the most helpful EU bureaucrats to be called in times of

need. By mere coincidence Kosovo declared its independence at the beginning
of Slovenias presidency: This advantaged us and we could be proactive because
of our experience in that part of the world, says Rahten.44
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty replaced the European Councils rotating presidency
with a two-and-a-half-year presidency, attributed to a personality rather than a
Member State, and renewable once in order to coincide with the EP legislature.
The rotating presidency for the Council of Ministers various formations remains
in place, except for the Council of General Affairs chaired by the new foreign and
security policy High Representative Catherine Ashton. Indeed, national governments were unwilling to renounce the opportunity to demonstrate to their own
public and to the outside world that they are (co)-leading the EU, even if this
opportunity only arises once every 14 or more years in an EU of 27plus members.45 In 2008 Hungarian MEP Gyrgy Schpflin was already looking forward
to the 2011 Hungarian EU presidency as an opportunity for Hungary to lead.46
Policies of recognition
EU multilingualism
Languages are vehicles of self-consciousness: each expresses a vision peculiar
to the community which speaks it.47 The German request to have the Treaties of
Rome translated in all five EEC languages in 1957 was the starting point of the
current EU-27 official policy of multilingualism. This constitutes a highly sensitive political question, rather than an unjustifiable indulgence towards small
languages, given languages dual functions: the first communicative and practical, impacting democratic participation and transparency; and the second symbolic.48 At the Commission and European Council, the working languages are
English, French and German.49 When the Finnish presidency offered interpretation for informal meetings of the Council of Ministers only in Finnish, French and
English, arguing both precedent and practicality, Germany and Austria boycotted two meetings protesting that the Luxembourg presidency had offered German
interpretation. Eventually the Finnish presidency gave up in spite of its concern
that Spain and Italy might make similar demands.50 At the EP the 23 EU official
languages are in daily use, with a third of the EPs budget spent on translation
and interpretation and a staff of 1,500 interpreters and translators.51 Costs did not
increase much after the 2004 enlargement nor were they expected to do so in
2007. Multilingualism is expensive, but it matters to us, says MEP Catherine
Lalumire.52
Corrective programs: the cohesion policies
The politics of recognition can lead to diametrically opposed policies: on one
hand they call for universalism, the recognition of equal rights; on the other
hand the recognition of the unique identity of a specific group or individual may

require programs of reverse discrimination that level the playing field, especially
if identity is defined in socio-economic terms as a second-class status.53 The
European construction planned by the Rome Treaty implied that each country,
regardless of its demographic, economic, or political importance, was treated
by the other countries with much attention, according to Jacques Delors.54
The Rome Treaties structural policies constituted from the start an important expression of European solidarity through the principle of transferring
resources from stronger to weaker regions. But they were implemented rather
haphazardly until the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal doubled the size
of the population of the least favored regions, those with per capita GDP of less
than 50 percent of the Community average.55 The Delors Commission designed
a whole new range of policies that doubled the size of the EC cohesion funds
(to 24 per cent of the budget) to mitigate the effects of market liberalization.
Of course, it was not about sending checks to the poor regions. They submitted to the Commission development programs that indicated which objectives
needed financial and technical help . . . . Some Member States receive 35 per
cent of their GDP . . . Solidarity is really strong.56 At the urging of Spain, a
new Cohesion Fund was created exclusively to aid Ireland, Greece, Portugal
and Spain, to meet the convergence criteria for the EMU. Between 1983 and
1995 the four poorest Member States received 53.27 per cent of the total EU aid
package and experienced a rise of their average per capita income from 66 per
cent to 74 per cent of the Community average, although the causal relationship
between cohesion funds and development is hard to establish.57 The 2004 and
2007 enlargements brought into the EU 12 new Member States with much lower
GDPs (except for Cyprus), and the European Council rejected the Commissions
proposal to increase the cohesion funds substantially. This meant that many previous beneficiaries would lose their eligibility. The whole prospect seemed so
unappealing from a point of view of economic self-interest that John Newhouse
wrote off enlargement all together.58 Some political scientists describe the fifth
enlargement as a puzzle, because constructivist theory helps explain the EU
stand, which is based on ideals and values, but not the bickering of the Member
States during the actual negotiations with eastern European countries. . . . In
sum, the EUs identity appears decoupled from the EUs behaviour.59 Taylors
dialectical analysis of modern political mindsets, torn between expressive aspirations and rational calculations, accounts for this apparent contradiction, which
is nothing very new in politics.
Ricoeurs capable human being and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
The EU cohesion policies aim at development, but often, political actors cast them
in terms of a demand for recognition. In order to explore recognition as a nonagonistic process, Ricoeur approaches the question of identity formation differently from Taylor: it has little to do with cultural or linguistic features; rather it
depends on self-recognition, an exercise closely tied to our capacity to impute
responsibility to ourselves and others.60 Like Taylor, Ricoeur spends little time
92
discussing the distinction between individual and collective capacities that stem
from a common anthropological base, and his commentaries on self-recognition
can be understood as applying to both individuals and the political community.61
His discussion enriches Taylors analysis by dissecting agency much more closely
and linking processes of self-recognition with recognition of the Other, and it provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the personal comments of MEPs
and civil society actors facing enlargement. Memory and promise are inscribed
within the cycle of capacities of the capable human being: the first turned toward
the past; the second prospective. These complementary capacities give temporal breadth to self-recognition, founded on both a life history and a commitment
about the long-term future, whereas forgetting and betrayal denote inabilities.62
Capable persons can speak and designate themselves as the cause and the principle of what they do; they speak, they act and they narrate. Martin Blanchard
notes the novel rapprochement Ricoeur establishes between economics and virtue ethics by linking human capabilities to Amartyan Sens seminal work on
social capabilities.63
The witnesses of MEPs
EU membership empowers new actors. The witnesses of Irish, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish MEPs wrestling with the economic and social consequences
for their own citizens of the accession of ten poorer countries in 1999 illustrate
the challenges facing the capable human being.64 Greek MEPs Konstantinos
Hatzidakis and Yiannis Roubatis agreed that Greeks must say yes to enlargement
for ethical reasons, because the candidates are European like us even if it hurts us
because we are poor. According to Roubatis:
I travel all over Greece. There is an understanding that when we were accepted,
the Community assisted us; as European citizens we must do now the same
for others. The Greeks have a large Diaspora. They have worked as economic
refugees for 50 years. If anybody should be open to the enlargement process,
it should be us. . . . Some states like Germany, who are net contributors,
must be a little more patient. This is not philanthropy, for instance a German
company is building Athens new airport. Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland are well on the way to catching up economically with the other Member
States. Lets continue to make it possible. Then we will not have problems
with enlargement.
As it turned out, Greeces share of the aid increased substantially during the next
financial period (19992006).65 But with the exception of agricultural subsidies,
Greeks knew that this would be the last great handout from the EU.66 Spanish
MEP Iigo Mndez de Vigo revealed similar ambivalences:
On one hand we think, we must help these people. We were in the same
situation in 1981, we had Francoism, they had communism, it is a question
of solidarity. But of course, there is also a selfish feeling that it will hurt us
economically. In fact enlargement is not only about having the moral and
political will to compromise, but a great economic opportunity: a market of
a hundred million new consumers to conquer. Spain can export, we are good
business people.
Mndez de Vigo feared, somewhat contradictorily, that the Poles wanted integration primarily for economic reasons and to be protected from Russia, whereas the
aim of European integration is foremost political, about democracy, plurality and
freedom, and eventually a federation of states. Spanish MEP and president of the
Socialist Group Enrique Barn Crespo critiqued the low budgetary ceiling of
1.10 per cent of the EU GDP set by the European Council under the pressure of
Germany and Austria:
If we fix goals we must give ourselves the means to reach them. Our German
friends say they pay too much, but they do not mention that they obtain as
much help from the Structural Funds for the Eastern Lnder as Spain does.
Europe is a win-win project. When we start raising questions only in budgetary terms, the outcome becomes doubtful. Spain obtained a lot, and invested
very well.
For Irish MEP John Walls Cushnahan the structural policies were indispensable
for not only prosperity but also peace:
The EU overcame the legacy of two World Wars. Now we must overcome
the legacy of the Cold War. It is a difficult process, but the people of Ireland
understand that refusing to share the advantages they gained from their membership in the EU would be an abdication of responsibility.
According to Portuguese MEP Jos Barros Moura, Portugal made the best of the
structural funds to build infrastructure, ports, highways, to develop tourism, and
modernize agriculture:
Portugal is a success story, and we are asking for a seven-year long transition in the phasing out of aid. Accession meant for us material prosperity and
strengthening our democracy. It will be the same for the next countries who
join the EU. I believe that the Community method is the solution to guarantee
peace in Europe, which could function also in the Western Balkans. . . . The
problem is that the FrancoGerman reconciliation was motivated by the division of Europe. How can we replace this motivating factor? Not by finding
another common enemy, the Arabs or Muslims or anybody else. What I suggest is to make of the enlargement of the EU a great political project, while
keeping the transition long enough . . . Europe can be an important agent of
change to affirm a social European model in the international order, and help
regulate globalization in the world.
94
Both Cushnahan and Barros Moura stressed the self-confidence that their countries gained through their membership in the EU. This transformed Irelands relations with the UK: The Republic of Ireland became less obsessively preoccupied
with its painful past and could contribute more freely to the peace process in
Northern Ireland.67 As for Portugal, in the past it depended on Britains help to
assert itself against Spain, so that its political independence was fictitious. For
the first time the relations with Spain are normal and Portugal enjoys genuine political autonomy.68 In 1998 Portuguese President Jorge Sampao traveled to
Ukraine, convinced that Portugal should impart the benefit of its experience of
transformation to East European countries which want to achieve similar ambitions. Portuguese businessmen thought that their long experience in fighting red
tape under the Salazar dictatorship would serve them well in the new markets
opening in Eastern Europe.69
Civil society dialogues
While the official negotiations were progressing, civil society engaged in transformative dialogues of its own, from student exchanges to Internet dialogues. Some
events stressed instrumental rationality, others symbolic aspirations.70 Combining
the two strands of modernity is a difficult task, which the three debates on enlargement organized by the think tank Notre Europe (19982002) came close to achieving, perhaps because they took place over four years and learning could occur. The
first in Athens gathered 26 academics and policy-makers from Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovenia,
Switzerland and the UK around two very different interpretations of European
history. Henri Mendras LEurope des Europens contrasts the European-French
model characterized by individualism, the nation-state, industrial capitalism and
the legitimacy of democratic rule against the Russian model exemplifying the
primacy of society over the individual, the fusion of politics and religion and the
lack of industrialization before 1945. This Other Europe never experienced rule
by majority, only rule by unanimity and anarchy.71 Central and Eastern European
(CEE) participants and British historian Norman Davies took strong exception to
Mendras models, rejecting the distinction between Eastern autocracy and Western democracy, and the tendency to denigrate the East.72 Just during the twentieth century there was British military rule in Ireland, and fascist dictatorships
in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The Polish experience was much closer to
that of Ireland or Spain than many Western European countries are to each other.
Conversely, Davies argued, Greeces experience was more distant from Western
European countries than from some countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain,
as it was shaped by Orthodoxy and the Ottoman rule. What was most lacking
between Western, Central and Eastern Europeans was dialogue, without which
no identity could be forged.73
At the second seminar in 2000 in Brussels the participants from Central and
Eastern Europe focused their critiques on the inner workings of the EU. Why
should they adopt an economic and political model imposed from the outside

once more when the EU had not completed its own self-transformation regarding
the structural funds, the Common Agricultural Policy and the free movement of
people? Latvias Prime Minister Vaira Vike-Freiberga suggested that the EU postpone its institutional reforms so that the new Member States could participate.74
By 2002, the tone of the debate had become even more self-confident. Hungarian
and Polish participants made it clear that they were no longer participating in these
conversations as candidate countries, but as EU future members who, after accession, would enjoy the same rights as the current members.75 This is why Slovenian
ambassador to The Hague, Boris Frlec, and Slovakian diplomat Jn Penica, did
not let condescending treatment get to them either in 2002: once their countries
had become Member States, this would stop.76
Post-accession empowerment?
The last two rounds of enlargements are changing the EU, which is no longer
exclusively based on a narrow Western conception of modernity.77 As they
acceded, the EU-12 were perceived both as a promise and a threat on the job
market, and this perception applied to political values and practices also. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves got an ovation at the EP, however, when
he denounced the term of new Member State as anachronistic and devoid of
meaning in March 2008. Ilves spoke proudly of Estonias privilege to hold the
rotating presidency in 2018, and its capacity for innovation, and he made a strong
bid for a common energy policy backed up by an Energy Commissioner with the
negotiating clout of the Trade Commissioner. He reminded his audience that the
Baltic Sea Strategy to protect the environment and improve security in the region,
was born out of an initiative of MEPS including himself, and had become an official EU program including eight Member States representing 29 per cent of the
EU population.78
It is too early to assess the impact of cohesion policies on the EU-12, especially
in the case of Romania and Bulgaria who acceded in 2007; and this is best done
case by case.79 By 2006 the Economic and Social Cohesion policies represented
46 per cent of the EU budget (347 billion euros for the financial period 200713)
with the majority of the funds going to the EU-12.80 Protracted negotiations over
the next financial period 201420 have started: besides 27 conceptions of national
interests they confront two clashing principles: some Member States would like
to restrict the funds to poorer Member States in order to limit spending, whereas
other Member States and the Commission want to stick to the original goals of
development and solidarity for all.81 On the Council Poland has emerged as the
leader of the poorer Member States the main beneficiaries of the fund who
oppose UK Prime Minister David Camerons proposal to freeze the EU budget for
the next decade, a plan which Germany and France support. It takes a while to
find your feet, and old members dont necessarily help, a Polish diplomat says of
his countrys EU experience. He attributes Polands increased clout in part to the
strength of its economy. Poles have secured the presidency of the EP Jerzy Buzek
and the Commissions influential budget portfolio Janusz Lewandowski.82
96
Some new MEPs share the Polish sense of self-confidence.83 Asked whether
Bulgarians felt recognized during the negotiations for accession with the EU,
Bulgarian MEP Christian Vigenin who had joined the EP four months earlier
replied: I do not understand the question. On one hand, it was not a negotiation: We had to say yes. On the other hand, the sheer fact that Bulgaria was
negotiating was a form of recognition. Bulgaria brings its Cyrillic alphabet
and Slavic identity, and a tradition of close relations with Russia and Turkey to
the EU:
Being in the EU is much easier than being part of the Ottoman or Soviet
empires. Here countries respect each other much more than we are used to
doing in our region. You might lose a vote this time, but next time you might
win. Even if the big Member States exert a larger influence, they are much
more generous. They could decide on many issues if they wanted to. But Luxembourg has six MEPs and Malta four; this is quite a lot for their population
and GDP. We used to call ourselves a small, but beautiful country. Now we
are an EU middle-sized country.84
For Hungarian MEP Gyrgy Schpflin and Romanian MEP Gabriela Cretu, the
record was mixed. Accession was a great cultural achievement for Hungarians.
But severe disappointment ensued because the EU has done nothing to help Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, where people are persecuted on grounds of speaking
Hungarian, and in Romania. Schpflin could not even speak about this issue with
his Slovakian colleagues at the EP. How did EU membership affect Hungarian
self-understandings? Hungarians were so totally caught up in their internal affairs
that they could not contribute to the transformation of EU mindsets presently,
although in time they could represent the perspective of a semi-periphery country. The EU is a source of money, but the cohesion funds do not go where they
should because of corruption.85
After four months at the EP Cretu felt somewhat overwhelmed by the newness of her situation. The upside of the experience was that one gave up on perfectionism, at least in speech. If I cant find the right words, others will guess.
Cretu wanted to believe that EU membership would help Romanians become
more responsible: We are too closed on ourselves. One problem was that Romanians had lacked time to think of the past since 1989, with so many changes in
their situation. As a result we have looked for perpetrators instead of solutions.
Cretu regretted the inability to assess the positive aspects of the pre-1989 period
when there were more opportunities for women to participate, with more access
to university training, to childcare and jobs.86 She did not want to be perceived as
defending the pre-1989 regime, but she wished for a rainbow regime, nuanced
and balanced that would tame the market rather than promote a single market.
The Romanian revolution was capitalist: We divided state property, but only men
had access to the process of privatization because they belonged to the right networks.87 When Romanians became European there had been widespread optimism. Yet nobody knew what it meant. Now we have to apply EU law and it

is something else. We have two million Romanians who work abroad and feel
discriminated, and are not treated as EU citizens.88
Ricoeur theorizes identity formation as an act of imputation (of taking responsibility). His starting point is self-recognition by the capable human being, whereas,
in the agonistic dialectics of recognition, the opposing parties are primary for each
others transformation. Ultimately Ricoeur strikes a middle ground: capable persons can speak and designate themselves as the cause and the principle of
what they do; but learning to narrate oneself is also learning to narrate oneself
in other ways, and for an audience.89 David Pellauer comments that, according
to Ricoeur, recognition by others, even if it is not always given, is at the root of
the self-esteem that makes the capable human being willing to take responsibility
for her speech and deed. A few MEPs do not speak for entire political societies
although there is analogy (rather than strict identity) between individual and
collective self-recognition.90 Yet their responses illustrate to what extent the EUs
institutions and policies are expected to empower at the same time as the actors
claim their capacity to narrate and act out new identities.
Part III The case of Turkish accession

From alterity to membership: an existential question
Turkeys accession process is often articulated in terms of unsolvable alterity.91
Nevertheless, the destinies of Turkey and the rest of Europe have been intertwined
for over half a millennium during which the Ottoman Empire ruled over several of
the current EU Member States.92 Mustapha Kemal Attatrks modernizing policies
broke with Ottoman identities in the Turkish Republic founded in 1923, by changing the script, dress code, civil and penal codes, and the relationship between religion and state. Pursuing its Westernizing trajectory Turkey joined NATO in 1952
at the same time as Greece, and applied for EEC membership in 1959. The EEC
and Turkey signed an association agreement in 1963, which envisaged membership as soon as circumstances would permit, with the progressive establishment
of a customs union. The 1974 occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkey and the
1980 military coup brought the EEC-Turkey relationship to a standstill. After the
return to democracy Turkey applied for EC membership in 1987; and the Customs
Union entered into force in 1996. Three years later the EU recognized Turkeys full
eligibility for membership and in 2005 opened negotiations after recognizing that
Turkey met the political criteria for accession. So far, no country that has reached
this stage has been rejected for full membership, although the Commission added
a safeguard clause, which stipulated that the negotiations could be suspended if
the reform process in Turkey stalled.93 Over 3 million people of Turkish origin live
and work in EU Member States, and a sizeable number of them have naturalized
or carry dual nationality (25 per cent are in Germany). Thus, the bonds formed
between Turkey and much of Europe are multiple and substantial.94
Comparative studies of Europeanization are paying increasing attention to the
mutual impact of enlargement on candidate countries and Member States;95 for
98
Aaretti Siitonen the EP debate over Turkeys accession clearly acts as a proxy for
the wider debate on European identity.96 In France, which is one of the Member
States opposed to Turkeys full accession, at least for now, the dialogue on identity/ies is especially lively. Nicolas Monceau describes the Turkish candidacy as
revelatory of three main European conundrums: the definition of EU identity; of
EU borders; and meeting the democratic deficit.97 French opponents to Turkish
accession tend to dwell on cultural differences: the Islamic culture and the Asiatic
orientation of Turkey.98 Its supporters stress rational instrumentality: Turkeys
strategic location and its well-trained armed forces; its youthful and hardworking
people; its vast markets and its experience in dealing with immigrant integration.99
French MEP Michel Rocard argues for a Oui la Turquie on the dual ground of
instrumental and expressive rationality. The construction of a European Islam is a
historic opportunity; if the EU rejects Turkey it would define itself as a Christian
club and reject secularism. The debate is heated because it is often argued in existential terms by both supporters and opponents: Turkish reconciliation with the
Armenians, the Kurds, and solving the Cyprus problem would be a form of life
insurance for the EU according to Rocard.100 Whereas Annie Laurent argues that,
in the end the Turkish question raises a crucial issue: the identity of the Europe
under construction. For the EU to give up its Christian roots would be a form of
suicide; it must save itself.101
Narratives of self-recognition abound, but without recognition of, and by, the
Other, they fail to empower the capable actor. Scholars can contribute to more
fruitful debates by providing objective indicators to compare Turkish accession
with previous ones, by examining how the EU institutions and policies of recognition might be affected by Turkeys accession, and how the EU accession process
has become increasingly difficult regardless of the candidate country. This is the
topic of the next section, which revisits the EU tradition of enlargement empirically. It starts with a brief discussion of the non-relationship between Monnet
and Turkey. The last section examines specific obstacles Turkey and the EU will
have to overcome for Turkey to become a full Member State; and it draws from
Ricoeurs concept of the gift to make a few suggestions in order to unlock the
stalled process of recognition between Turkey and the EU.
Turkey and the tradition of EU accession
Monnet and Turkey
Teaching abroad educates the scholar as she struggles with an unexpected question: what did Jean Monnet think of Turkeys relationship with the European Communities? This question posed during a class on Monnets objectives and working
methods at Istanbuls Boazii University, is not easy to answer.102 Although Monnet called for the accession of Eastern and Central European countries, and for the
reunification of Germany within a united Europe already in the 1950s, there is
no reference to Turkey in his Memoirs large index, except for one brief mention
of US military support to Turkey and Greece in 1947.103 Nor is there any Turkish

name in his appointment books. The depository of his archives, the Jean Monnet
Fondation pour LEurope, has less than ten documents pertaining to Turkey and
none indicates what Monnet might have thought of Turkey and Europe.104
In the 1960s another accession request was on Monnets mind that of Great
Britain, which was fraught with controversies for over a decade. The most challenging task was to promote a positive outcome in which there would be neither
victors nor vanquished. Monnet dismissed the argument that the British were not
ready to become Europeans. How could anyone say this for certain? They would
become Europeans only inside the Community institutions, where day after day
a common view was hammered out.105 No one can ascertain either what Monnet
would think of the Turkish candidacy today. He lived long enough only to witness
the first enlargement to nine. The newcomers were joining a common enterprise
and would have to adapt their ways; he called the six to adapt to change as well.
Perhaps he would address the Boazii students as he did his last visitors: The
building of Europe is a great transformation, which will take a very long time . .
. nothing would be more dangerous than to regard difficulties as failures.106 One
thing is certain from reading his Memoirs and those of his collaborators: he never
thought of the European Communities as a Christian club. He was not a churchgoer and avoided matters of faith with his coworkers.107 Schuman, Adenauer and
De Gasperi, though staunch Catholics, were equally careful to dissociate the European project from a Christian enterprise.108 European unity would not progress
without the support of the secular left. Why lose precious allies such as Paul-Henri
Spaak in Belgium, Guy Mollet in France and the German Socialists by defining
European identity in religious terms, which would pit Christians and Jews, agnostics and believers against each other? In 1997, the EP reaffirmed that democracy,
the rule of law and respect for human rights are the definers of membership in the
European Union.109 Therefore, Turks need not get sidetracked by debates around
religious identity or adopt defensive postures regarding Islam, a religion that like
Christianity inspires quite diverse behaviors. There is compatibility between a
Muslim orientation and Europeanist stance.110 The essential ground to qualify for
EU membership is that of political principles and practices, and gradual implementation of the acquis.
Turkey and previous enlargements
Comparative studies of the Turkish accession negotiations with the Southern
European and the Eastern and Central European enlargements confirm that the
Turkish process is not as anomalous as Valry Giscard dEstaing once famously
argued.111 Tim Bthe, zgr Gencer and Seema Parkash found that virtually every
argument put forth against Turkish accession has been made in the past against
one or more of the current Southern European members of the EU. They conclude
that Turkey is, in economic, social and political dimensions, quite similar to these
countries when they acceded with much lower per capita incomes, large agricultural populations, and different religious traditions as in the Greek, Bulgarian and
Romanian cases. Likewise, the comparison with prior candidates for accession
100
shows that the EU has already helped Turkey move toward the key objective of
democratic consolidation, as it did in the case of Portugal, Spain and Greece.112
Since 1999 the Turkish Parliament has adopted over 50 new constitutional articles
to protect civil rights; it approved new civil and penal codes and abolished the
death penalty. The National Security Council, which used to be dominated by the
military, now has a civilian secretary-general, a majority of civilian members, and
acts only as an advisory body to the government. In 2002 the Kurdish language
became authorized on TV, radio and in certain school programs, although implementation has been spotty. Turkey has also undergone drastic economic reforms
to lower its public debt and control its inflation; it brought down its budget deficit
from 75 per cent of GDP in 2000 to just over 40 per cent in 2007. In 2005 the government introduced new heavy liras, whose appearance mirror that of the euro;
the economy grew at 6 per cent in 2009. Unemployment, however, remains high,
and farmers who represent 30 per cent of the population produce 8.7 per cent of its
GDP.113 Judges continue to interfere with freedoms of expression, association and
religion. As in most EU Member States, concrete Turkish practices are contradictory and unstable: at the same time as the Kurdish Nationalist Party was being
threatened with closure, a lively debate on multilingualism was taking place at the
Turkish Parliament in December 2010; and Irish MP (Sinn Fein) Joe Reilly was
sharing Irelands experience in conflict resolution at a conference on the Kurdish
issues in Istanbul.114
EU policies and institutions of recognition
Neither policies nor institutions of recognition should constitute a major obstacle
to Turkeys EU membership. The linguistic policy would be little affected by the
addition of one language, and there is a well-educated and multilingual elite in
Turkey. The cohesion policies will be a financial challenge given the large population of Turkey and the lower than EU average per capita GDP, although it is higher
than in Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey is already benefiting from pre-accession
funds. Long transition periods can help mitigate the fear of a potentially large
emigration from Turkey, reduce the agricultural sector, and relieve pressure on the
cohesion funds, which will diminish in any case before Turkey becomes a Member State according to Michel Rocard. He advocates for a well-prepared accession
in 2023, the year of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Turkish Republic, with
careful informing of public opinion; and he suggests that during this transition
period Turkey could send observers to all institutions and even vote in the Council
of Ministers on topics relevant to its interest, but without a veto right.115 The fear
that Turkey would dominate EU debates because of the size of its parliamentarian
delegation at the EP and the number of its votes on the Council is unwarranted.
Germany, with a similar population, has not been able to impose its views (nor
has it tried to unilaterally).116 On the Council a blocking minority requires four
Member States; and past experiences confirm that Member States rarely defend
interests alone but form coalitions in the iterated games of EU politics. At the EP
it hardly ever happens that national delegations vote unanimously rather than on

partisan lines, even in the case of the UK.117 As for the EU presidency, Turkey and
its diplomatic corps will have to wait its turn like the other Member States.
According to Lucie Tunkrov, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and
Poland faced a top-down process like Turkey as they strove to integrate the
acquis communautaire, a protracted and painful process.118 The EU-12 candidates complained bitterly about the wall of paper, 80,000 pages of acquis
communautaire including all the laws and regulations passed by the EU since
1958, divided into 31 chapters that must be negotiated separately.119 Therefore,
Turkey is not being treated dramatically differently from the previous CCs and
should not use it as an excuse to delay reforms and alienate its allies. On the
other hand, the Turkish government should behave as if there were no doubt
about the future accession given that political constellations do change.120 But
sa Lundgren compares the pre-accession aid given to Romania and Poland
65 and 51 euros per capita respectively whereas Turkey receives only seven
euros per capita. Financial support, or lack thereof, can also be perceived as lack
of moral support.121
New obstacle: the creeping nationalization of accession processes
Loyal cooperation still remains one of the EU goals according to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty: the offer of membership to any European state that qualifies. But
Christophe Hillion documents a new phenomenon the creeping nationalization
of the enlargement process since the last accessions motivated by past experiences of some candidates lack of preparedness for admission, mounting doubts
about the systemic sustainability of further expansion and increased demands
for democratic accountability.122 On the whole, these changes have entailed the
strengthening of Member States control over the conduct of the policy and raised
issues of credibility over the normative content of the whole process. There is a
discrepancy between the accession requirements and the membership obligations,
which are looser, and this has undermined the legitimacy of the Unions conditionality and the effectiveness of its transformation agenda. Through the introduction
by the Commission in 2006 of benchmarks, evaluation has become a quantitative exercise rather than an in-depth qualitative assessment, and non-fulfillment of
benchmarks may lead to suspension of the negotiations if the Council decides so
by unanimity. Member States have provided themselves with another emergency
brake by introducing the concept of absorption capacity, more recently renamed
integration capacity. The existence of such an emergency brake tends to suggest that accession is never guaranteed, even for candidates adhering strictly to the
rules of the game by respecting and implementing required reforms.123 Moreover,
certain Member States have introduced rules at the national level, which effectively make accession more difficult, such as the introduction in 2008 in France of
the constitutional requirement that referenda must take place on every new accession unless both chambers meeting in a Congress approve by a three-fifths majority the accession treaty, a steep requirement. Finally, the novelty since 2004 of the
open-ended accession negotiations framework generates a perverse incentive
102
by discouraging both the EU and the candidate countries from fulfilling the obligations they have committed to.124
Les questions qui fchent (the issues that provoke anger) vs. gifts
The previous section has argued that Turkey should be viewed as a normal candidate country. But, as of January 2010, Turkey and the EU had only closed one of
the now 35 chapters under negotiation (science and research) and opened 12 others. Since 2006 the Council, acting on a recommendation of the Commission, has
blocked eight chapters including those related to freedom of movement of goods,
financial services, agriculture, fisheries, transport policy and customs union.125
The reason given is Turkeys refusal to extend the Ankara Protocol on the customs
union with the EU to the Republic of Cyprus and to accept Cypriot vessels and
planes in its ports and airports (more on this shortly). On the Turkish side, the
slowing down of reforms can be explained by the EUs behavior toward Turkey,
election politics and Kemalist institutional resistance.126 Turks have become discouraged by the idea that accession may not be the end result of negotiations.127
The concept of the end of history popularized by Francis Fukayama (1989),
allegedly from his reading of Hegel, has little credence today. But Hegels story
of the evil and judging consciousnesses in Phenomenology of Spirit evokes
admirably the fractious interaction between the EU and Turkish actors.128 Turkey stands judged on three grounds primarily: the Armenian genocide, the lack
of respect for Kurdish minority rights and the Cypriot headache; although the
situation on the ground is evolving rapidly in regard to the first two questions.129
In Hegels metaphor the evil consciousness sets arbitrary rules for itself against
the requirements of universality, which the judging consciousness upholds. However, the judging consciousness is prisoner of another kind of particularism its
own self-righteousness. Prompted by the guilty party who confesses, the two
consciousnesses eventually overcome their painful alienation by recognizing that
solitude imposes a greater burden than recognition of self in the Other; mutual
recognition abolishes the hegemonic order. There is no need to embrace Hegels
metaphysical system of final fusion in the great I of the Spirit130 to acknowledge the power of this story of the clash and transformation of identities, which
offers an illuminating philosophical counterpoint to the more empirical studies
of Europeanization. Hegel and Taylor theorize a process of recognition driven
by negativity. Ricoeurs concern is to counter the risk that the process of reciprocal recognition never moves beyond misrecognition, which would be akin to a
refusal (of recognition) that feeds hierarchy and conflict. Even if recognition succeeds as a relationship, with the achievement of the equivalence of rights in the
justice system and of interests in the market place, the dispute is settled, but it is
merely spared from vengeance.131 Ricoeur wants more: to establish clearings,
or states of peace, that interrupt the insatiable pursuit of recognition, through
a different kind of exchange the practice of gift giving. It is true that the gift
may put pressure on the receiver to respond in kind. There are cases of gifts
gone wrong.132 But the genuine gift comes as a surprise, an act of agape that
breaks the commercial or juridical chain of equivalences. Thus it protects the perhaps endless struggle for recognition from turning into a mere lust for power and
shields it from the temptation of violence.
Such gestures, I said, cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light
the limits of the justice of equivalence, and opening space for hope at the
horizon of politics and of law on the postnational and international level, they
unleash an irradiating and irrigating wave that, secretly and indirectly, contributes to the advance of history toward states of peace.133
Lest Ricoeur be accused of utopianism, he argues that the gift is an exceptional
occurrence that does not necessarily resolve a conflict, but suspends it and substitutes for a relation of mutual recognition. In June 2005 the ten new Member States
surprised the 15 others by offering financial concessions to help bring about
an agreement on the 200713 financial perspective. EU President Jean-Claude
Juncker expressed his shame that the offer of sacrifices had to come from the
poorest Member States. MEPs Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Monica Frasson detected,
on the contrary, a sign of hope for Europe in this gesture: the newcomers understood the principle of solidarity, on which the EU rests.134 The negotiations of
Turkish accession thrive on negativity and indignation. In this context what could
the gift be? Who might be the giver? The gift comes unbidden, it is exceptional,
excessive, a surprise. It may even come under the guise of tragedy. It matters
how it is received.135
The gift of life: Hrant Dink
There was a mass protest in Istanbul after the assassination of the Armenian Turkish journalist and poet Hrant Dink by a nationalist Turk in January 2007. The large
funeral that followed, which included the participation of Turkeys Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdoan and Armenian officials, provoked a thaw at the state-level in the
relationship between Turkey and Armenia and intervened as a gift. In a book
published posthumously, Deux peuples proches, deux peuples lointains: ArmnieTurquie (Two close peoples, two distant peoples: Armenia-Turkey), Dink discusses the understanding needed between Armenians and Turks, in the name of
the survivors. He recommends a modern solution: the bilateral dialogue between
Turkey and Armenia over the living rather than the dead, which would free the
opportunities of the future. As in the FrenchGerman reconciliation, states may
decide policies, but only at the popular level can there be a healing of memory that
produces a new moral conscience.136 Once the borders have reopened between
Turkey and Armenia and diplomatic recognition follows, the only way to construct a shared future will be through the experience of the relationship, thanks
to dialogues of equals in the neighborhood coffee place, in the shops and on the
streets, with a focus on the present: The dialogue would become by itself a process of recognition and by the same token an implicit apology.137 Dink notes the
divergent narratives even among citizens of Armenian origin; the points of view
104
of the Armenian Turkish citizens do not necessarily overlap with the Armenians of
the Western European and American diasporas, nor with those of the three million
Armenians of the Republic of Armenia. Among ethnic Turks the basic problem is
not recognition or negation but understanding that can occur only in full
democracy; external interventions only slow down change for a society that does
not deny what it knows, but defends what it has been taught as the truth.138 Recognition hinges on the democratization of Turkey and in this respect the EU has
played a useful role. Dinks family has established a foundation in his memory,
which is dedicated to the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.139 In April
2010 Armenia suspended the ratifications of the protocols signed with Turkey
to reopen the borders between the two countries, establish diplomatic relations
and set up a joint history commission, because Turkey links the protocols to the
solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, i.e. the withdrawal of Armenian
troops from Azerbaijans province, which Armenia claims as its own. This has not
slowed down the efforts by Turkish intellectuals to push for an official recognition
of the Armenian genocide and offer of reparations, and to ask for forgiveness in
their own capacity.140
The gift of a creative political initiative in Cyprus?
The Cyprus issue seems even more intractable. At the 1997 Essen summit the
EU Council added a further criterion for accession: that all border and minority
conflicts should be solved within and between candidate countries. However, the
Republic of Cyprus was not held to this standard, partly as a result of a bargain
between Greece and the other Member States in 1995. Greece lifted its veto against
the disbursement to Turkey of EC compensatory funds for the customs union only
when the EU accepted to open negotiations for Cyprus accession.141 Since the
1974 Greek Cypriot nationalist coup against the Cypriot President Archbishop
Makarios, Cyprus has been divided into two zones. Although the coup failed, Turkey intervened twice as one of the three guarantor powers (beside Greece and the
UK who did not approve) on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriots, eventually moving 30,000 soldiers to the island and driving over 180,000 Greek Cypriots from the north. Meanwhile, 50,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the south to
the north and some 150,000 settlers from Turkey settled in the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey recognizes. Cyprus accession was a
missed opportunity for the EU, which failed to propose a solution to the divisions
on the island, claiming a division of labour with the UN.142 The UN Annan Plan
for reunification was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots in the Northern part, but
rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, a truncated Republic of Cyprus joined
the EU in 2004; and since then the positions have hardened. Although Turkey
signed the Ankara agreement, whereby the Republic of Cyprus would be able
to join the customs union with Turkey, it has not implemented it on the grounds
that Northern Cyprus is shut out of the free trade zone. It has been argued that the
political division of the island need not prevent its economic integration;143 but
this would be at best a form of negative integration and a far cry from the

democratic peace community envisaged by the EU founders. In 2008 the leaders
of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities started to meet under the
auspices of the UN, but they have not reached agreement on the issues of the fate
of the settlers, the compensation to the displaced owners for lost properties and the
presence of Turkish troops on the territory of an EU Member State.
One problem is that there are so many Cyprus.144 The academic literature
offers many contradictory narratives. Just to cite a few, William Mallinson
makes an unabashed case for restitution of stolen property since 1974 . . . a single government, parliament and judicial system free from the primitive ethnolinguistic-religious discrimination of former years, no discrimination, positive
or negative, withdrawal of foreign forces and repatriation of illegal settlers.145 By
contrast, James Ker-Lindsay suggests that the Greek Cypriots should accept their
tragic experience of displacement as a typical European experience, which their
EU partners know all too well, and use their memories to contribute to European
reconciliation and integration.146 Burak Akapar argues that Turkeys intervention prevented the interethnic strife in Cyprus from deteriorating into something
akin to Bosnia.147 Gilles Bertrand regrets the EU leaderships lack of political
involvement in the solution of the Cyprus division and that it failed to notice
the shift of position of the Turkish military, which had accepted to withdraw its
troops according to the Annan Plan.148 Michlis Stavrou Michaels Resolving the
Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History describes perhaps best a 35-year-long Hegelian-like process of misrecognition, which he calls a repetitious cyclical pattern
in which both sides have retreated to their entrenched positions in spite of civil
society groups efforts to promote rapprochement. The conflict is value- and interest-based and, as with most protracted disputes, requires innovative and multidimensional approaches capable of introducing, at key junctures as circumstances
change, new variables and parties, linking them at different levels into the central
peace process.149 Hegels metaphors leave no doubt as to who is in a position of
power. In his accounts the weaker party initiates transformation.150 But in the case
of Cyprus who should be the initiator is much less clear: the Greek Cypriots are a
majority on the island, but feel they are a small group in the international context;
Turkey feels unrecognized by its EU partners, but is considered a major regional
power.151 In this context what might be a gift comparable to the somewhat insane
French proposal to the FRG, five years after the end of WWII, to place its coal
and steel industries under the authority of a supranational body? Often a climate
of uncertainty and ambivalence demands risk-taking.152 Converging initiatives
by the political leadership and grassroots groups are needed, with a focus on the
present as Hrant Dink counseled; but only the parties directly involved can invent
gifts for the future.
106
Truth-telling and right-speaking
The question of the demos
Introduction
Questions of truth and lies haunt the EU. Hasnt the Commission been accused of
wanting to wipe the British Isles off European maps and forbid the sale of eggs
by the half-dozen?1 Academic critics of the secretive nature of the workings of
EU institutions abound also, and it is a widely shared view that the only alternative to unaccountable technocratic governance is public discussion and persuasive
justification by EU authorities of their actions.2 Yet the huge scholarly literature
on the EU democratic deficit rarely raises the issue of truth in politics, with
a few exceptions.3 This chapter ponders the democratic deficit of the European
Union by borrowing (not uncritically) from Jrgen Habermas discourse theory
and his discussion of truth and rightness in politics.4 Always preoccupied by
the link between validity and facticity (or objective facts) and the gap between
theory and practice, Habermas has not only developed a sophisticated theory of
communicative action, but also written extensively on empirical issues, from
German reunification to the EU and cosmopolitan governance, sometimes in the
more accessible form of interviews.5 Surprisingly, he makes little use of his discourse ethics to analyze the EU democratic deficit, with questions of truth relegated to more strictly philosophical essays.6 This is unfortunate as there has been
an almost obsessive focus on issues of truth, accountability and transparency
among EU decision-makers in the last decade. But Habermas interest in the EU
seems primarily motivated by the need to confront the disorders of globalization,
to develop an international model of governance based on regional powers, and to
provide an alternative to US unilateralism.7
Discourse ethics is discussed here both as a fledgling EU tradition and a heuristic device. Part I of the chapter presents essential elements of Habermas discourse
theory, and it emphasizes his discussion of the redemption of validity claims to
truth, rightness and truthfulness in communicative exchanges among people who
seek legitimate political agreements. Part II offers empirical evidence of the commitment of ECSC/EC/EU founders to redeem similar validity claims, from the
Schuman Declaration to the Spinelli proposal for a constitution and other initiatives for an EU constitution since the 1980s. Part III examines the relevance of
Habermas discussion of validity claims to analyze the legitimizing impact (or
Truth-telling and right-speaking 107
lack thereof) of direct democracy in the EU today and the drafting and ratification process of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. It does not assess the substantive
content of the Treaty, but rather whether the decision-making process met Habermas demanding standards for normative legitimacy.8 The chapter concludes by
examining the Greek 200911 fiscal crisis as an empirical illustration, showing
that the EU transnational system of governance acts as a spur to truth-telling and
truthfulness (but not necessarily rightness) among EU partners, and that this matters to democracy.
Part I Habermas discourse theory

Political legitimacy and the communication community
The legality of modern orders must be anchored in normative legitimacy; this
is the lesson of the Nazi experience for Habermas.9 Discourse ethics determines
the justice of commands and norms of action,10 by indicating a procedural path
to political legitimacy in diversified modern democratic communities so that its
members can genuinely agree to the decisions taken; but it does not define the content of the good life, which is best left to the deliberation of specific individuals
or communities.11 In the 1970s, Habermas harshly critiqued Western democracies
legitimation crisis: governments bought their citizens acquiescence through
formal democratic procedures and the material rewards of the welfare state, but
proved unable to create meaning and genuine assent. In a kind of thought experiment, Habermas imagined instead a communication community, situated in the
life-world of voluntary associations or civil society which puts normative
demands on the administrative and economic subsystems. The communitys
participants are motivated by the search for truth, and no force except the force
of the better argument is exercised. Consensus of the participants through argumentation makes a norm right.12 The influence of Kant on Habermas is evident,
but whereas for Kant the articulation of universal norms comes out of the solitary
exercise of ones reason, for Habermas only discursive and rational communication among the many can define legitimate political norms.
Habermas draws from the work of John Austin, John Searle and Karl-Otto
Appel, for whom language is an action to discuss the morality of communicative
action. It is debatable whether Habermas discourse ethics meets the standards
of a scientific theory of the reconstruction of language.13 What matters here
is that his theory sets some standards to assess the validity of speech acts in
politics. Habermas distinguishes between claims to truth, claims to rightness, and
claims to truthfulness.14 The success of a speaking act is measured by the others
acceptance of the validity of the utterance. Claims to truth refer to something in
the objective world of observable facts, for instance the sky is blue; claims to
rightness refer to something in the shared social world (norms of fairness), such as
it is wrong to kill; and claims to truthfulness to something in the speakers own
subjective world to which he has privileged access: Your friendship is precious to
me.15 Claims to truth or rightness are redeemed discursively by the speaker who
108
provides persuasive reasons for the hearer. In the case of claims to truthfulness the
speaker coordinates action with the hearers or obtains his/her consent through
consistent behavior. (In other terms, a person can convince someone else that he
means what he says only through his actions, not by giving reasons.)16 There is a
certain ambiguity in Habermas discussions of truth. Does truth stand for a rationally justified norm or the bold description of a fact? Probably both. According to
Habermas we need to organize our lives in common around truth-like statements,
which give it stability and legitimacy. In this chapter, truth-telling is understood as
a speech act that reveals either an objective fact, or a problem, so far obfuscated.
Also, whereas the individual can redeem claims to truth, claims to rightness are
handled best in the communication community. In other terms, right-speaking is
about the collective elaboration of rational political norms, or truth, in this argument. Ideally, consensus-building requires unfettered communication. In practice
this is rare, but the very search for agreement implies this presupposition.
Habermas also draws from the advances of modern psychology, especially Lawrence Kohlbergs theory of the development of moral consciousness, to ground his
discourse ethics more empirically. Only a few will reach Kohlbergs higher level
of postconventional morality where moral decisions are generated by universal
ethical principles that all humanity should follow rather than by fear or private
interest.17 But modern democratic constitutions, by recognizing and protecting
fundamental rights, reflect a degree of postconventional morality. Societies, like
individuals, can learn.18
In the last two decades Habermas shifted his attention from the possibilities/
conditions for grassroots engagement in civic debates to processes of laws, and
this move has blunted his critique of advanced capitalist democracies.19 Representative government rather than civil society is now considered the main political actor in the system, with public opinion able only [to] channel the use of
administrative power in certain directions; the law is the medium through which
political power communicates with the other spheres of action; voting is a
communicative act; and only in times of crisis can a parliament significantly
affect politics.20 Nevertheless, the discourse principle still summarizes Habermas idealized conception of practical discourse: a rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it
in a reasonable discourse.21
Truth in politics: controversies
In spite of its currency in public rhetoric, the notion of truth in politics has long
been controversial among theorists, from Machiavelli to Max Weber and Arendt.
After WWI Weber contrasted the ethics of conviction, which takes no account
of the consequences of a political action, to the ethics of responsibility: Let us
consider the duty of truthfulness. For the absolute ethic it holds unconditionally.
Weber condemned the publication of all German war documents in 1918 as irresponsible because it prompted the confession of guilt, one-sided, unconditional,
and without regard to consequences; in fact it obscured truth through abuse and

unleashing of passion; only an all-round methodical investigation by non-partisans could bear fruit. . . . But the absolute ethic does not ask for consequences.22
Arendt was a sharp critic of truth in politics on another ground, because its coercive aspects stifle the discussion of opinions. Factual truths, such as two plus two
makes four, and even rational truths, cannot be argued, whereas politics is about
opinions, the justness of which can only be tried in dialogue among men in the
plural.23 For her part, Dietz denounces the political navet of Habermas discourse ethics that privileges the theoretical fiction of an idealized communication
community; she argues for a more Machiavellian concept of politics, which takes
into account the concrete difficulties of shared life and the necessary evocations
and instrumental actions to convince or sometimes even frighten others into submission.24 The Machiavellian model has its limits; in some respect its deceptions
seem strangely out of place in a modern democracy. Not that they do not take
place; but they rarely secure power for the Prince for very long, as the Greek case
will show in this chapters conclusion. Dietz attenuates the sharpness of her critique by highlighting the fugitive quality of politics that eschews simple binary
distinctions: politics is a continuum, rather than the graveyard of communication principles; intelligibility, truth, truth-seeking and truth-telling have some
currency in it, but so does strategic speech-action.25
It is no easier to get rid of truth in politics theoretically than it is in practice. In
a surprising reversal, Arendt ends her famous essay Truth and Politics by claiming political relevance for truth: Conceptually we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that
stretches above us.26 Too many lies or obfuscations, and the ground on which
we stand is pulled from under our feet. Losing our bearing, our sense of reality,
we can no longer act. Weber also aspires to a reconciliation of sorts between truth
and politics. He writes that, in so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and
an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which
only in unison constitute a genuine man a man who can have the calling for
politics.27 Arendt and Webers equivocations are not unique and may explain the
lasting hold of Habermas discourse theory in academic debates in spite of so many
well-founded arguments on the dangers and pitfalls of seeking truth in politics.
Habermas discourse ethics has much to offer to a discussion of the EU democratic deficit because its very idealism taps into genuine popular aspirations
that have not changed over time. Political legitimacy rests on trust, and trust rests
on the perception that words describe verifiable facts, announce congruent deeds
and develop rational arguments in intelligible terms. This explains why public
discussions of the EU democratic deficit so often involve issues of truth vs. lies.
Communicative action is especially important at times of founding in generating
legitimate power.28 It does not offer irrefutable dogma nor a set of concrete policy
proposals, an interpretation Habermas would resist.29 Rather, it detects in our
social forms of life and in modern democratic institutions reasons to hope that a
public space of discussion could emerge, where the equal participation of all is
guaranteed under conditions of genuine symmetry, and it provides referential
concepts.30
110
Communicative action does more than lay the ground for just norms; it constitutes also a process of self-understanding, a detector of identity. Jaspers and
Habermas voiced their support for open and public debates on the past, after both
WWII and the end of the cold war in Germany, in contrast with Weber after WWI:
A coherent and truthful self-interpretation is supposed to make it possible for
us to take responsibility for our own life-history, Habermas writes.31 During the
1990 German reunification process he called for a public process of truth-seeking
and truth-telling about the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, in the mass media, schools
and adult-education programs, and also in the scientific and literary public spheres,
citizens fora, and official fact-finding commissions. Only at this price could the
German people articulate an honest collective self-understanding that simultaneously suffices as a norm for political justice and expresses the deeper aspiration of
a political community shaped by its history.32 He also asked for a referendum on
German reunification, prepared by open debates, but he was not listened to. Yet he
stuck to his discussion of constitutional patriotism, a concept he borrows from Dolf
Sternberger.33 Citizens gain a sense of shared political identity through their commitment to the rules and procedural principles of justice determined in the public
sphere rather than through a common history, or conception of the good life,34 and
this process of collective identity formation is feasible not only at the national but
also at the transeuropean level.35 Patchen Markell notes that Habermas concept
of constitutional patriotism suffers from internal contradictions at the theoretical level: it aspires to universality while being rooted in specific national liberal
traditions. He suggests that constitutional patriotism should rather be understood
as a habit or practice that can also critique or even resist the very identification
on which citizens also depend.36 I will return to this interpretation in the section
on direct democracy.37 Even if Habermas disappoints by not drawing from his
discourse ethics to discuss EU politics, he provides precious analytical categories, in addition to the concept of constitutional patriotism, to probe the quality of
discursive practices among EU leaders and citizens as they deliberate about their
shared future. To what extent have they redeemed or should they redeem validity claims to truth, rightness, truthfulness and intelligibility to ground legitimacy?
The next section examines this question in the ECSC/EC founding years.
Part II Truth and rightness in the EU political tradition?

Communicative action and the ECSC founding
The way a new political order is founded matters to its legitimacy. On this Habermas and Arendt agree. The 1950 Schuman Declaration acted like a speech-act
worthy of the idealized communication community: it defined in factual and intelligible terms a problem (the bloody rivalries among France and Germany), political objectives (peace, prosperity and a federation), and the means proposed (the
management of shared material interests, coal and steel, by a common European
authority). In addition the Declaration, which remains the EU founding document,38 proved truthful in so far as consequent action followed. It also opened

a political space for speaking rightly among the representatives of six nations,
which had fought each other recently (France still occupied part of the FRG in
1950). At the Paris conference the French and German delegations exhibited
considerably more concern for democratic accountability by insisting on a legislative body than their Benelux counterparts who prioritized the defense of
national economic objectives.39 The ratification debates on the Treaty of Paris in
the six future Member States parliaments were public and highly contentious.40
Adenauer called the ECSC Common Assembly the first sovereign Parliament
established on a supranational basis, undoubtedly stretching the truth.41 Already
on the second day of its existence, the Assembly, whose members hailed from
the Member States parliaments, started to campaign for direct elections in order
to gain fuller democratic credentials, with the ECSC High Authoritys backing.42
Election of the Assembly by universal suffrage was expected in the not too distant
future, which would give it greater authority to invent and propose to governments the further steps that were in prospect, as Schuman and Monnet stated
(italics by the author).43
In 1952 France proposed the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community
(EDC), flanked by a democratic and representative Political Community at the
request of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi. Members of the ECSC Assembly
drafted the EDC constitution, which was ambitious; it aimed at no less than a
full federal structure, according to Monnet who had first proposed the EDC idea
to French Prime Minister Ren Pleven.44 Although the French National Assembly
refused to ratify the EDC Treaty in 1954, UK MEP and political analyst Richard
Corbett comments that:
This episode was important despite its failure. The draft produced by the
Assembly sowed seeds that grew later. . . . The exploration of the institutional
issues involved helped to clarify some of the options. It generated much academic literature. In terms of examining different schools of integration theory,
it serves to show that before partial functional integration processes became
dominant, there was a significant attempt to proceed through the drafting of a
global constitution by a representative assembly.45
Rather than neo-functionalism, the operative terms among the ECSC negotiators
were federalism, prosperity and democracy,46 and by the standards of representative democracy there was nothing untoward in the negotiation and ratification of
the 1952 Treaty of Paris.47
Monnets discourse ethics
There is general agreement among scholars, however, that the traditional Monnet-method . . . has, on the whole, historically shunned public opinion and democratic accountability.48 Given his allegedly prominent role in shaping the political
ethos of European integration towards stealth,49 it is noteworthy that Monnet
took the trouble of defining a kind of discourse ethics in his Memoirs. Experience
112
rather than developmental theory had taught him that individuals are learning
political beings, but only under certain conditions:
To persuade people to talk together is the most one can do to serve the cause
of peace. But for this a number of conditions must be fulfilled, all equally
important. One is that the talks be conducted in a spirit of equality, and that
no one should come to the table with the desire to score off somebody else.
. . . The second condition is that everyone should talk about the same thing;
the third, finally, is that everyone should seek the interest which is common
to all. This method does not come naturally to people who meet to deal with
problems that have arisen precisely because of the conflicting interests of
nation-States. They have to be induced to understand the method and apply
it. . . . For this purpose goodwill is not enough . . . a certain moral power has
to be imposed on everyone the power of rules laid down by common institutions which are greater than individuals and are respected by States.50
Habermas and Monnet trust institutions more than the original goodness of the
human heart to support a lasting democratic order.51 And how to get there matters
a great deal; thus Monnet voted for the French 1958 constitution that included
the possibility of treaty ratification by referendum, for the creation of European
institutions requires popular approval.52 Over time he developed his own way to
redeem factual truth claims through the bilans (or balance sheets), which he used
to persuade decision-makers. Bilans did not come out of accounting procedures,
rather from the collegial drawing-up of precise evaluations of the problem at hand
with the help of the best available experts.53 Intelligibility was another preoccupation, and drafts might be rewritten many times for the sake of clarity. Monnet
trusted the common sense of citizens, a political virtue celebrated by Arendt,
because in contrast with superstition and gullibility, it helps disclose reality.54
Stories abound about his informal inquiries among people caught up with him in
a traffic jam or with an airport customs officer; and between 1957 and 1963 he
founded a number of organizations for the purpose of enhancing popular knowledge of the European integration process.55 Nevertheless, he did not have the time
to establish real communication with the popular strata of society, except on an
anecdotal basis.56 The popular influence, which random encounters exerted, was
a far cry from Habermas communicative power, which springs from the interaction between legally institutionalized will-formation and culturally mobilized
publics.57
As Dietz argues, in actual politics the dividing line between communicative
principles and strategic speech-action is blurred. At the moment of decision, communication ethics clashes with Webers ethics of consequence and the pursuit
of effectiveness. Monnet never sat down at the negotiation table without his own
draft, which often was accepted in the absence of any competition, whether the
argument seemed the best or not; and he relied on the pressure of hard work
to create a team spirit.58 Moreover, his view of the freedom of information was
peculiar according to Emanuele Gazzo, the founder of Agence Europe: access

to the inner workings of the HA was difficult, and Monnet did not like information
to be published before the HA had taken a decision.59
Assessing the so-called Monnet method in terms of truth-telling and rightspeaking produces ambiguous results. When the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ruled in 1954 against the HA for changing the steel pricing rules, Monnet quipped:
Good. That shows the institutions are working.60 But the supranational HA,
with the power of legislative initiative and the responsibility to rein in national
interests in favor of the putative European common interest, which Monnet and
his collaborators invented, has been critiqued for starting a tradition of elitism
and technocracy.61 French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges compares the HA and its
successor institution, the Commission, to Platonician institutions, the fruit of
Monnets apolitical vision that wished for a sacerdotal committee of experts to
deliver the European truth. In March 1999 Bourlanges rejoiced at the desacralization of the Santer Commission, which had just resigned under the threat of
an EP motion of censure; at last, politics had emerged with its contradictory and
legitimate options rather than spontaneous agreement.62 Yet Bourlanges did not
want to see the Commission lose its prerogative to initiate legislation, because it
represents the only source of coherence in the EU system.63
The politicians who responded to the legacy of WWII were astute strategists
for whom truth-telling and right-speaking practices mattered a great deal also,
because they meant the breaking away from the traditional intra-European politics
of domination. With the 1957 Rome Treaties, their original vision of European
federalism gave way to the primarily economic concerns of the common market.
There was no Schuman-like Declaration to explain this re-founding clearly;64 and
in the period between the 1954 rejection of the EDC and the 1992 difficult referenda over the Maastricht Treaty, EC/EU decision-makers paid little attention to
issues of popular accountability beyond parliamentary ratification. Assigning to
the ECSC founders the main responsibility for the EU democratic deficit too conveniently absolves the Member States governments from responsibility. Although
the European Communities enjoyed broad popular support initially,65 over the
next five decades the national leaders re-founded them again and again, by amending existing treaties rather than renegotiating new agreements from scratch, and
the Commission by spewing out countless regulations. Political conflicts became
adjudicated within the context of unintelligible norms closed to critical scrutiny.66
Several negative results (or close calls) on referenda ratifying new treaties eventually convinced the EU Member States executives to respond: transparency
became their motto, and constitutional Conventions replaced the secretive gatherings of bureaucrats and diplomats. The next section discusses the EPs central role
in this transformative process.
Truth-telling and the first attempts at constitution-writing:
the European Parliament as a communication community
Habermas has devoted relatively little attention to the EP; yet this is the only
forum where directly elected representatives of all member States of the EU meet
114
on a constant basis and echo the views of the electorates of the entire Union in
an unparalleled fashion.67 Thus it makes sense to consider the EP as a communication community of sorts where, on a daily basis, 736 participants (plus their
assistants and other staff) from 27 countries, representing 500 million people and
speaking 23 languages, debate on shared and conflicting interests along partisan
rather than national lines. Because of the technocratic nature of EC/EU legislation,
much of the EP business has been taken up with rather obscure debates not always
exciting to observe from the public gallery of the hemicycle, or in the committee
rooms;68 and some of its most meaningful work remains unseen by the public: the
writing of committee reports (the reports themselves are available to the public),69
political group work and the launching of projects transcending national borders.
These days the EP organizes lively, albeit ephemeral communication communities open to non-parliamentarians; it sponsors public hearings and workshops
engaging NGOs, academics and MEPs on many topics, ranging from Cultural
Diversity, Religions and Dialogues, to Conflict Resolution in Cyprus.70 When
it was first elected directly in 1979, not much was expected from the EP, although
it could tap into an unparalleled network of contacts across Europe given the high
proportion of former cabinet ministers and national parliamentarians among its
members.71 In spite of the high turnover in membership from one election to the
next, it steadily grew in influence thanks to the petits pas (small steps) of procedural revision, astute handling of its budgetary powers, and the large strides of
constitutional reforms.72
Indeed, the EPs three largest political groups, the Group of the European
Peoples Party, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats,
and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, have ceaselessly promoted
the constitutionalization of the EC/EU, speaking and acting as if they had taken
a Habermas 101 course on communicative action. Habermas, who has long argued
that economic motivations alone cannot mobilize popular political support, foresaw a kind of catalytic effect in an EU constitutional process. By replacing the
EC/EU treaties and their countless and obscure amendments with a single readable text through open debates, the process would accelerate the formation of a
European civil society with a shared political culture.73 But, because of its commitment to equality, Habermas discourse ethics suffers from a certain depersonalization as it leaves an important issue unexamined: who initiates communicative
action? The EP became a major political entrepreneur in the EC/EU politics
thanks to Arendt-like initiators.74 In 1984 Italian MEP Altiero Spinelli convinced
his colleagues to create an Institutional Committee and to propose to the European Council a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union (DTEU).75 Some of
the DTEU proposals made it into the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. But
this was not the constitution sought after. Belgian MEP Fernand Herman, another
devotee of the constitution, because it commits citizens whereas a treaty commits
only states, authored the next EP constitutional project. He critiqued the opacity of the EC/EU treaties, which means that anyone can interpret them anyway
they wish and blame Brussels. . . . On this basis it is impossible to obtain popular
support; and he drew inspiration from the US where a small group of enlightened

people started from scratch and produced a text, which is a monument of clarity.76 The 1994 Herman Report was conceived to appeal to citizens by its brevity
47 articles plus a bill of rights of 24 articles and its clear and understandable
style; but it never made it to the plenary: the term constitution, with its federalizing
and supranational overtones, excited controversy.77
The paucity of EU-political actors able to speak directly to a European public in
common language, reported by a European media, and considered by a European
public opinion, is a problem that besets MEPs.78 German Foreign Affairs Minister
Joschka Fischer (a former Habermas student) relaunched the EU constitutional process in May 2000, when he delivered his personal vision on the future of the EU
at Berlins Humboldt University, and uttered publicly the two taboo words of constitution and federalism. In order to prepare for EU enlargement Fischer proposed a
federal blueprint for a bicameral European legislature representing the nation-states
and the citizens, and a European government inscribed in a European constitutional treaty.79 Fischers speech called for rational arguments about important questions, which had been obfuscated since the rejection of the EDC; and it spurred a
highly publicized debate among senior leaders, including French President Jacques
Chirac and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, influential journalists and public opinion.80 Somewhat reluctantly, the European Council appointed a Convention on the
Future of Europe in December 2001 to draft a constitutional treaty.
The Convention and right-speaking
The publicly held Convention, with its 105 members plus alternates representing
28 nation-states parliaments and governments (including Turkey), the EP and the
Commission, broke with the EC/EU model of the International Governmental Conference (IGC) staffed with bureaucrats and diplomats and meeting behind closed
doors. The word truth was never mentioned, but the Convention was expected to
hold open and inclusive debates in which the force of the better argument would
prevail and produce a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TEC), a readable text defining EU norms, institutions and policies. It met the EPs long-term
goals of more transparency, democracy and efficiency.81 A first EU Convention,
whose name British MEP Andrew Duff liked for its revolutionary whiff, had
just drafted the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter was meant
to convey to EU citizens the fact that they live in a space governed by publicly
acknowledged and shared principles, an initiative that corresponds quite closely
to Habermas notion of constitutional patriotism.82 Some critiqued the absence of
voting at the first Convention, with all decisions taken by consensus, which gave
undue weight to the presidium and the drafting task force.83 Yet Austrian MEP and
legal expert Reinhard Rack, a member of both Conventions, rejoiced that the old
European working method, with topics discussed solely at the intergovernmental
level, without any transparency, had been left behind,
This is different: we make it clear when we do deals. The Convention
method is a group experience; success depends on the fact that the group feels
116
collectively responsible. . . . For instance we decided to fully integrate the

alternate members for continuity. We pleaded for and obtained the same rights
for the representative of candidate countries. Now we have to prove that the
Convention method will work. This is why its members have already started
acting as part of the mission even though they might have a national holy cow
to defend. At least one admits this is going to be a problem.84
Others were more reserved.85 But, by early 2003, the Conventions working groups
had agreed to replace the eight treaties with one constitutional treaty, to integrate
the Charter of Fundamental Rights into it, and to give the Union legal personality. As they began to discuss the sharing of powers among institutions, debates
became more heated. To cut through the stalemate, French chair Valry Giscard
DEstaing submitted a provocative text, to replace the rotating presidency with
a president elected by the European Council for up to two terms of two and a
half years each. Federalists worried that such a presidency would facilitate the
domination of the large Member States.86 The number of Commission members
was another apple of discord between large and small Member States. Eventually
the Convention managed to submit a single text without options to the European
Council, which signed it in Rome on 29 October 2004. The Convention process,
with its public plenary meetings, the presidiums proposals and the thousands of
amendments immediately posted on the Internet, was deemed a success, even if
the decisive role of the presidium in the decision-making process failed to meet
the requirements of full equality for all participants one central feature ensuring right-speaking in the Habermasian communication community.87 Part I of the
TEC, which defined EU values, goals and institutions and the sharing of competences between EU institutions and Member States, was quite readable.88 And so
was Part IIs Charter of Fundamental Rights. But the TECs Part III, which codified all the previously ratified treaties, was over 200 pages long and inaccessible to
the unschooled reader. Paradoxically Part III excited most of the strong negative
reactions in France and the Netherlands even though all its dispositions had long
since been ratified and implemented.89
Part III Lapses in truth-telling and direct democracy

From the intelligible TEC to the obscure Treaty of Lisbon
At the June 2005 EP plenary session in Strasbourg, profound dismay greeted the
French and Dutch referenda rejecting the TEC a few days earlier; three years later
a vast majority of MEPs voted for the unreadable Treaty of Lisbon. What had
happened? Hermeneutical inquiries start from the self-understanding of actors;
many MEPs are willing to speak on the record to the interviewer about their commitments, achievements and disappointments. Unavoidably, this phenomenological account must at times take on an anecdotal character, which need not eschew
the Habermasian analytical framework. At first, the TEC supporters tried to stay
faithful to their ideals of transparency and democratic participation. Polish MEP

Bronislaw Geremek, who had campaigned in France motivated by the dream of
European unity rather than constitutional reforms, was somewhat disenchanted,
a little bitter. I worked in vain. His first impulse was to stick to the Polish referendum set for October 2005, but Polish opinion polls changed his mind. He
called for a new Convention to organize debates before resuming the ratification
process.90
A group of young federalist activists called together the members of the EP
Federalist Intergoup (91 MEPs from 21 Member States) during the June 2005 plenary in Strasbourg, to assess the referenda results. The MEPs present stated their
resolve to pursue the ratification process for the sake of democracy: why should
France and Netherlands stop the whole process? German MEP Jo Leinen proposed to organize deliberative assizes in Brussels and all the Member States on
four or five major questions.91 French MEP Francis Wurtz preferred to switch to
a large popular debate through another convention. And Richard Corbett warned
that continuing the ratification process could mean, we are not listening, and
provoke a backlash of yet more negative popular reactions. There was a great
deal of self-reflection and anguish expressed. German MEP Martin Schulz said:
I recognize that I am lost. It is very difficult to speak . . . I am willing to accept
criticism against me personally and the EU institutions. But national governments
stand between us and the citizens, and all the setbacks are unfairly attributed to
Brussels. Czech MEP Jana Hybaskova pleaded with her colleagues not to stop
the ratification process for the sake of the 13 other Member States. If we had
explained the enlargement four or five years ago to the French, we would not have
got a no vote. Strikingly, at no point did the MEPs engage their attentive and
politely silent young audience in the conversation.
The EP held several hearings in 2006, but the idea of assizes vanished quickly
because several new Member States, especially Poland, would have used it to
reopen the whole package on the distributions of votes and seats in the EU
institutions.92 After a period of reflection, the European Council took over and
returned to the traditional intergovernmental method of the IGC, with 3 MEPs,
Andrew Duff, Elmar Brok and Enrique Barn Crespo in attendance. The Council
made it clear that the term constitution would not be used; and the proposals of
the TEC would be inserted in the new Treaty in the usual manner, i.e. by amending the existing treaty articles.93 The result was two treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon,
which took up most of the dispositions of the TEC, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union. The two rapporteurs to the EP, Richard Corbett and Iigo
Mndez de Vigo, acknowledged to their colleagues that the amending treaty was
much less clear than a codifiable treaty.94 The Treaty of Lisbon starts with the
following inscrutable clause:
1.
The Treaty on European Union shall be amended in accordance with the provisions of this Article. PREAMBLE 1) The preamble shall be amended as follows: (a) the following text shall be inserted as the second recital: DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of
Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and
118
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the
rule of law,; (b) In the seventh, which shall become the eighth, recital, the
words of this Treaty shall be replaced by of this Treaty and of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union,; (c) In the eleventh, which shall
become the twelfth, recital, the words of this Treaty shall be replaced by of
this Treaty and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.95
Experts from three Brussels think tanks wondered in their Joint Study why, in the
space of two years, the EU Council had moved from proposing a constitutional
treaty, coherent if not concise, drafted in full transparency by a representative
body of national and European elected officials, to the obscure document, substantially similar in content but totally different in form, that was now submitted for
national ratifications. They warned that, the estrangement of public opinion . . . is
not likely to diminish, given that the causes of that estrangement have been, if anything, aggravated by a very technocratic solution to the constitutional crisis.96
But Richard Corbett disagreed. This was shortly before the June 2008 Irish
referendum on the treaties. If the new treaties were a step back from the TEC, they
were a step forward from the current EU treaties:
The single readable text is to a degree lost. However, the consolidated versions are already fairly readable.97 One of the best ones is on the site of the
Irish Institute for European and International Affairs. The provisions taken
from the TEC are in yellow, what is new is in blue. The European Council has
not yet put out its consolidated official version. But the fact that there will be
a consolidated version, which is readable, is helpful. However the Irish will
have to ratify the non-consolidated version.
Wasnt the existence of two treaty versions (the first consisting of amendments
to the previous treaties, and the second consolidated in a fairly readable text)
confusing for the average citizen? Corbett answered that it was unavoidable and
customary when a treaty is amended:
It does not really bother most people who are not lawyers, journalists or academics. For better or worse the Irish will rely on summaries, explanations, TV
programs. They will not read the treaty. They will be aware that there are two
texts, but this will be no problem.98
Irish MEP Proinsias De Rossa, another TEC Convention member, was much less
confident about the Irish referendum, which had to be approved for the treaties to
go into effect in the EU: This treaty is almost completely new to Irish MPs. Part
of my work is to communicate with them, which is not easy as I am the single
representative for my party in the EP. . . . The Convention demonstrated what
superior solution you can obtain through a democratic process.99 In June 2008
the Irish people rejected the Treaty of Lisbon. On 2 October 2009 they approved
it in another referendum after the addition of several protocols that guaranteed

Irelands right to an independent tax policy, to neutrality, to a restrictive antiabortion law and a seat on the Commission. Nobody questioned whether this
was the same document that two dozen Member States parliaments had already
ratified.
Andrew Duff, who sat on both Conventions, wishes the problem of ratification had been discussed much more thoroughly at the Convention on the TEC,
but after the French and Dutch referenda there was no agreement to repeat this
experience. The imperative of reforming the enlarged EU was so important that
the method needed to change. Duff authored the True Guide to the Lisbon Treaty
(2007). Why insert true in the title of this clearly written 12-page booklet?
Because it corrects the many false guides written by charlatans. Obscurantists
deformed the TEC:100
For all its faults the Lisbon Treaty is the optimum that could be achieved in
the current political situation, although it fails to achieve greater standards of
clarity and transparency. Therefore it should be justified, explained so far as
it is possible to do so. A lot of people have not understood its content. The
German presidency [which drove the 2007 IGC treaty modification process]
consulted a lot of people including me. These were necessarily private conversations so that all parties could be frank about their inhibitions, which
would not have been possible in the glare of publicity; we also consulted
NGOs at the EP.101
The day after our conversation Duff was making his second visit in three weeks
to the Czech Parliament, which had not yet ratified the Treaty of Lisbon. This was
part of a continuous process of consultation. He noted that 26 parliaments and
the EP had already ratified that represented considerable democratic support
and was not bothered by the fact that only experts could understand the new
treaties: I am an expert. Parliamentarians are paid to do this complicated work.
What about Austrian MEP Johannes Voggenhubers claim at a workshop on constitutional reforms that, We live an existential lie in the EU, which was designed
to tame the princes, but it is not strong enough to do so and has become more
intergovernmental than transnational.102 Duff recused the accusation of lies: I
see the EU as a complicated recipe in which we have a lot of elements, federalist
and intergovernmental. The pot is being stirred all the time. I do not characterize
the EU as a system except that it is experimental. So there is a chance it will not
work.103 This is not a reassuring response for the citizen in search of certainty
and truth. MEPs Leinen and Barn Crespo, two other constitutional experts
who agreed with Duff that the IGC was the only method available after the negative referenda, acknowledged the huge price paid. Barn Crespo described the
Treaty of Lisbon as a rescue operation; Leinen called it a camouflage of the EU
project.104 Leinen added:
It looks like EU is coming from the back door, not the front door. We are
losing the public discourse. Since 1999 the EU has been very dynamic with the
120
enlargements, the EMU, the new treaties, Frontex and our security missions.
Perhaps we will pay a bigger price later for the lack of public debate.105
The EP had much to gain from the new treaties, which made it the co-legislator with the Council of Ministers on most policies. They entered into force on 1
December 2009; on 30 March 2010 the European Council published a new consolidated version, including the Irish protocols, with the following Note to the
reader: This text has been produced for documentary purposes and does not
involve the responsibility of the institutions of the European Union.106 Duff was
as dismissive as Corbett had been earlier of the mistrust two very different versions of the treaties might create among citizens: There is nothing suspicious
about consolidated texts. The latest version posted on 30 March 2010 has full
authenticity.107
Time will tell whether the substantive content of the Treaty of Lisbon mitigates
its abscond form, and whether it was right not to submit a modified TEC to a referendum once again in France and the Netherlands. After all, the Danes and the Irish
were asked to vote again on slightly modified Maastricht and Nice Treaties, which
they had first rejected and then approved. Irish MEPs De Rossa and Cushnahan
disagreed with the nave notion that the people speak once and for all. Politics
is not static. We should go back and attempt to persuade. We have always gone
back, otherwise we would not have regular elections.108 With the Treaty of Lisbon
the EU elites failed the test of truthfulness and intelligibility: they did not deliver
on their professed commitment to more transparency. This was their Weberian
moment when the ethic of responsibility took over the ethic of conviction: the
EUs institutions must be reformed to adapt to the enlargements. It is more surprising that Habermas, the theorist unencumbered by the pressures weighing on
the politician, endorsed the slimmed-down 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (403 pages in
the English consolidated version), which definitively sets the seal on the elitist
character of a political process which is remote from the populations, with the
future of Europe decided behind closed doors.109 Discourse ethics matters to the
formation of collective identity. An unreadable text is not a good foundation for a
democratic EU. On the other hand, the difficult ratification process by referenda
offered opportunities for communicative action that extended far beyond the usual
circle of deciders.
Direct democracy: elite ambivalences
Arguments on representative and direct democracy have yet to mesh in the EU
constitutional and normative debates.110 The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon states that the
Union shall be founded on representative democracy, and at the same time it
includes a provision for citizens initiatives supported by one million signatures
from a sufficient number of Member States, thus effectively enlarging the communication community. Habermas supports transeuropean referenda.111 There have
been more referenda on European integration than on any other topics, 47 in 25
European countries between 1972 and 2005,112 and two more in Ireland since.

Direct democracy is a topic almost as controversial as truth in politics, and it
does not always deliver the results its supporters hope for.113 Empirical evidence
shows that direct democracy improves both citizens subjective information (or
understanding) and objective (factual or true) information on political topics,
and increases participation (and right-speaking in this argument).114 One major
argument against EU constitutional referenda is the absence of a European demos:
the turn-out to EP elections is low, the party system remains nation-based, and
linguistic diversity and national identities present strong obstacles. Yannis Papadopoulos argues, however, that in highly heterogeneous Switzerland the demos
formed around the practice of direct democracy. It is not unfounded to think that
a similar evolution may occur one day at the European level.115 There is also a
great deal of difference between plebiscitary direct democracy, which refers to
the involvement of citizens in lawmaking at the end stage, when they only say
yes or no to a new measure, and deliberative direct democracy that can take the
form of active involvement in agenda-setting and policy-making.116 Clearly the
EU referenda called by national executives are closer to plebiscites that can easily
be manipulated, than are those initiated by the people.117 Some MEPs requested
during the Convention that referenda on the TEC should take place on the same
day in all Member States.118 If this were the case, attempts to use them for national
issues not related to European integration could become less effective. Moreover,
direct democracy must become a repeat game, as De Rossa and Cushnahan argue,
in order to offer learning opportunities for truth-telling and right-speaking.
Politicians usually dislike referendums because they take decisions out of
established hands, and elected leaders can never control or be responsible for
their outcomes.119 Yet negative referenda should not necessarily be interpreted
as symptoms of a defective democracy. When she was appointed minister for
European affairs, Elisabeth Guigou urged French President Mitterrand to launch
a referendum in 1992 on the Maastricht Treaty and she did not regret it in spite of
the mediocre result: In the last 45 years the habit had been to build Europe surreptitiously . . . It [the referendum] brought about what should have happened long
before: a public debate on Europe . . . Now we will have to go forward together,
with and thanks to the people.120
Direct democracy: civil societys involvement in France and the Netherlands
Can there be a learning process in discussing shared norms when citizens participate in a referendum once every decade or less?121 Emmanuel Todd writes of
the 2005 French referendum that the people of the no were taken for a ride
because the debates concerned mostly Part III of the Treaty that consisted of all
previous and already-ratified treaties, whereas the new and more readable Part I
on institutions and Part II on the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not attract
much attention.122 The TECs authors failed to explain convincingly that Part III
was not up for change; perhaps they did not dare to. On the other hand, Markells
understanding of constitutional patriotism as a set of practices redefining or even
opposing a proposed collective self-understanding fits nicely the lively 20045
122
French constitutional debates. In the months before the 2005 referendum the TEC
became a bestseller in France with 100,000 copies sold, while two commentaries
sold 170,000 copies. The ministry of European Affairs received 3,500 calls a day
in the weeks preceding the referendum. When French President Chirac engaged a
group of young voters on TF1 [French television channel] on 14 April 2005, 7.4
million people watched, and thousands attended meetings instead of the usual
few.123 Even after the failure of the referendum, over two-thirds of French respondents felt that the EU should have a constitution even if they were not convinced
that the TEC was the constitution. For Vivian Schmidt, one problem was that
the French spoke past one another. While those in favor discussed the Constitutional Treaty, those against focused mainly on the problems of France [unemployment and social inequalities], which they now blamed on EU policies. The votes
showed a major class cleavage between a large majority of high-income people
voting yes and blue collar workers voting no. Yet, equally important, the referendum is a sign that the voting public has finally become interested politically in
Europe, and wants greater input into EU decisions, especially those Europeanized areas like monetary policy and immigration policy.124
In the Netherlands the referendum on the TEC was the first Dutch experiment
with direct democracy. A poll taken in early 2005 showed that more than 80 percent had no idea what the TEC was about and two-thirds thought that it would
replace the Dutch constitution. Little surprise that only 30 percent of the Dutch
population was in favor of the TEC.125 The protection of national sovereignty and
the Dutch contribution to the Union budget seem to have trumped other concerns,
and there was also the negative ripple effect of the French referendum four days
before. It may explain why Dutch MEP Jan Marinus Wiersma did not read the
Treaty of Lisbon. People are not interested in such a text; Dutch are mostly worried about losing their sovereignty, and pragmatic questions such as protection of
the environment.126
The EU Member State with most experience in direct democracy is Ireland,
which must hold a referendum on every major EU treaty change.127 After the first
negative referendum on the 2000 Nice Treaty the Irish government decided to
organize a national forum to encourage public debates, an idea Irish MEP De
Rossa had unsuccessfully suggested earlier: The forum met once a month across
the country and engaged a small number of citizens before Nice II.128 His colleague and countryman Cushnahan describes himself as a truth-teller who challenged Irish selfishness on enlargement during the debates on Nice I by arguing,
We have a moral responsibility to help people in the Eastern and Central European countries, as we were helped in the past. He critiqued the selfishness of
neutrality by arguing that, We are not neutral, but non-aligned. The EU is worth
defending. In spite of his bluntness, he got reelected: Much better to say what
you believe and justify it than to obfuscate. . . . More transparency, not less, will
address citizens fears.129
Responsibility for the democratic deficit has been laid squarely at the feet of
EU political elites. But an egalitarian discourse would expect as much in terms
of discourse ethics from the people as from the leaders, i.e. the willingness to

redeem validity claims according to the standards of truth-telling and rightspeaking. Arendt raised the bar very high for civic virtue by arguing provocatively
that only those who have demonstrated that they care for more than their private
happiness would have the right to be heard in the conduct of the business of the
republic; and that this might spell the end of general suffrage as we understand it
today.130 If Arendt was harsh on those who sought freedom from politics, she
acknowledged the cognitive gap due to the progress of science and technology,
which constitutes a major obstacle to political engagement.131 Over five decades,
EC/EU decision-makers have balanced interests and set down their compromises
in the increasingly obscure language of law open only to experts understanding.
Talking about European integration became like talking about the interests of ballet or opera, politics as high culture, an exclusive exercise, apparently accessible only to those in the know.132 Senior EU official Pierre Defraigne admitted he
must simplify to explain the complex EU institutions and policies, especially
with youthful audiences, which is almost a form of lie.133 Leadership rhetoric
will not by itself answer the cognitive challenge. There is a great need for quality civic education on the EU in the schools of the Member States, mandated by
the national or state ministries of education.134 Even today, several EU Member
States have not made a basic introductory course to the EU history and institutions
compulsory for their school-age children.135 During the Convention a group of
senior EU leaders issued an open letter requesting that education and culture be
made part of the shared competencies of the EU and its Member States.136 But the
governments, torn between divergent loyalties, refused to make education more
than a supplementary competency of the EU, depending strictly on the good will
of the Member States. Of course, the search for truth and right-speaking may not
always (or often) be the citizens prime consideration, just as in the case of elected
officials. It will be interesting to watch whether the new right conferred to citizens
by the Treaty of Lisbon to propose legislative initiatives to the Commission elicits a sense of civic identity and stimulates involvement (as Monnet, Jaspers and
Habermas would expect).137
Conclusion: The brutality of truth-telling and the Greek fiscal crisis
There is in politics a certain agonistic character, which Arendts theory of action
confronts more effectively than Habermas discourse ethics. Indeed, truth-telling,
which reveals objective facts, can be brutal. One conundrum facing the EU is
that it has engaged willy-nilly in an almost uninterrupted process of re-founding
since the early 1990s. Technocratic issues, such as the fiscal and monetary policies of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), have become the pretext for
further deepening of the EU bond. Even if discourse ethics holds less currency
in the strategic debates of routine politics as Dietz argues, truth-telling and rightspeaking matter to the legitimacy of the processes of re-founding. The EMU has
its norms of rightness: the Eurozone Stability and Growth Pact requiring members
to control inflation, to keep their deficit below 3 percent of GDP, and their debt
below 60 percent of the GDP. Shortly after his election in October 2009 Greek
124
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou revealed that Greece had fudged its statistics
for over a decade and was in breach of the Eurozone Stability and Growth Pact.
Harsh words were exchanged publicly between Greek and German politicians, the
latter expressing reluctance to bail Greece out.138 As Greece proved increasingly
unable to borrow on the bond market at reasonable rates to finance its excessive
debt, the eurozone partners decided to constitute a fund of 750 billion euros, with
the help of the IMF, which not only Greece but all countries facing difficulties
could tap into as long as they dealt with their budget deficits and national debts in
a credible manner. In exchange Greece, Portugal, Spain and later Ireland adopted
tough austerity measures, from raising the retirement age to decreasing the
number of civil servants and cutting politicians salaries. Greece must also tackle
massive tax evasion in all sectors of society.139 On 16 July 2010, the Greek Parliament voted a major reform of pensions and raised the retirement age.
According to journalist Tony Barber, when Papandreou confessed to his fellow
leaders Greeces predicament, he struck them and diplomats as very impressive
and very honest. He basically said: My country is a corrupt country from A to
Z, recalls one European policy-maker present at the December 2009 dinner in
Brussels. This admission was an essential step in convincing his partners that
he was sincere about his determination to introduce fundamental reforms.140
For his part, Papandreou claimed no regret on going public with the 12.7 per cent
deficit figure that shocked global markets:
People have told me, you could have hidden this deficit. It would have been a
hidden time bomb ticking under the government. It would have exploded and
blasted our credibility. We chose instead to say Hey, were transparent. Well
accept the costs. This may have created a sense of short-term turmoil, but it
will turn out positively for Greece in the mid- and long term.141
According to Papandreou, Greeks understood that it was their patriotic duty
to support the very difficult reforms. Obviously, thats why people are unhappy
and feel the pain. Even though there are demonstrations, we also have a large
support.142 Greeks are not looking for scapegoats: These are problems of our
own making. . . . Were not asking for a bailout to continue bad practices. All
were telling them [the Germans] is support the changes we have to make.143
Papandreous rhetoric about popular support for his reforms would have stretched
credibility except for the 2010 spring opinion polls in Greece, and some firsthand observations in June 2010. The tenor of random conversations with Greeks
of diverse backgrounds could be summarized in a few words, It is our fault. We
must change. We lived well for the last twenty years but not responsibly. The EU
is putting pressure on us. We should use this crisis to modernize and enter the
twenty-first century. The crisis (the Greek word means judgment) seemed to be
experienced as an opportunity for re-founding.144 Yet there was no naivety: Greeks
know, through first-hand experience, of lawyers, doctors and architects who refuse
to give invoices for their services in order to evade taxation. And there were many
protests: in May 2010, every late afternoon small groups of demonstrators walked

down the main arteries of Thessaloniki and Athens screaming anti-government
slogans by megaphone. A few policemen walked by indifferently in the midst of
the crowd of workers, housewives and shoppers hurrying home. In spite of a few
violent incidents and three deaths, Greece felt safe. Opposition leader Kyriakos
Mitsotakis of New Democracy concluded that, People now are only going to listen to politicians who talk in a brutally explicit manner.145 In spite of the austerity
measures, Papandreous party, the Pasok, won the regional elections by a small
margin in October 2010. But the government failed to convince the self-employed
and well-to-do Greeks tax-payers to adhere to higher standards of truth-telling:
tax collection from private and business sources remained way below projection,
which threatens the attempt to re-found the national civic and social pact.146
The Greeks could not have fudged truth-telling, right-speaking and truthfulness
without the complicity of their EU partners. In 2005, EU policymakers had eased
the requirements of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact in response to the excessive budget deficits of France and Germany, a revision which observers now conclude was a significant mistake. Meanwhile, Greeces EU partners pretended all
along to believe the fudged Greek statistics, and the Greeks pretended to be doing
enough for us to believe them, says Lord Chris Patten, the UK Conservative who
was serving as the EU External Relations commissioner at the time.147 Regrettably
President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel failed to match publicly Papandreous
frankness with the EU leaders and his fellow citizens. There was little candor in
the French and German debates about the Greek bail out, which made it all the
easier to apply excessively harsh solutions.148
It is beyond the purview of this chapter to assess whether the Stability and Growth
Pact is based on norms grounded in truth and right-speaking. Let us assume that
both principled rhetoric and strategic speech-acts shaped them. At least they were
intelligible; but obfuscation, or lie-telling about their implementation, undermined
trustworthiness among the eurozone partners. Dishonest or honest public practices
take a political milieu to flourish. Habermas was surely not thinking of something
as crassly materialist as the Stability and Growth Pact when he was dreaming
up the communication community. But he could offer a precious contribution to
thinking through the current woes of the EMU, if he drew more specifically from
his discourse ethics to comment. Unfortunately he has abandoned some of the
historically sensitive tools that he deployed in the analysis of earlier periods,
precisely when he accounts for radical change in his immediate present.149 It is
also curious that scholars of EU studies have spent so little effort in theorizing the
role of truth-telling and right-speaking in the democratization of the EU except
for a few off-hand remarks that this matters. The EU norms, whether they are the
outcome of right-speaking or strategic compromises, hold in their embrace the
Member States and their peoples implacably and publicly. The difficult conversations on fiscal responsibility have continued among the 27 Member States. Ultimately everyone has to come clean, from the Greek government to the German
regional state banks and their toxic assets. For now, the EU Member States and
their citizens may not manage right-speaking too often; the common search for
truth does not motivate them, although calls for responsibility and self-reflection
126
still break through the cacophony of protests and accusations.150 At the time of writing it is impossible to predict the outcome of the painful process of EMU reform
in Greece and beyond. Their shared fate may yet convince EU leaders and citizens
to practice truth-telling and right-speaking with each other more consistently. This
would be a good step for this fledging transeuropean democratic order.
EU borders and the

enlarged mentality
Introduction
EU citizens want to understand where they are heading because to understand,
as Arendt put it so well, is the attempt to make oneself at home in the world.
The uncertainty regarding the EUs final borders coupled with the influx of over
one and a half million new immigrants every year provoke profound unease, and
the kind of creative incrementalism that allowed the founders to skirt intractable
issues, in order to keep pressing forward with more amenable ones, does not persuade any more. Like its illustrious American predecessor, the European revolutionary tradition seems jeopardized by a lack of memory and conceptual thought.
Whether the aversion to thinking stems from some allegedly innate attitude,
as Arendt argued in the case of the American Revolution, or from the desire to
avoid controversies for the sake of the founding, or yet more simply from the
exhaustion which besets the habitual thinker, is unclear.1 There is, however, a
thinking tradition in European integration, which this concluding chapter seeks
to retrieve and expose. The previous chapters contributed to the study of the formation of identity in European integration by offering stories of action articulated around four principles that motivated actors in the progressive EU founding
reconciliation, power as action in concert, recognition and truth-telling. Arendt,
Jaspers, Habermas, Ricoeur and Taylors reflections provided a wealth of theoretical resources to interpret these principles analytically. As Montesquieu argued,
political principles of action are no mere abstract values. Far from indicating rigid
rules of behavior, they are revealed phenomenologically by the actions of the communitys members. Specific principles build up specific political associations, and
as such they offer an ethical tradition to contemporary political actors. Therefore,
each chapter also pondered the relevance (or lack thereof) of one of four principles
of action to meet a current EU policy challenge, for instance the role of truth-telling in the EU constitutional process that led to the Treaty of Lisbon, or recognition
of the Other in Turkeys negotiations for accession to the EU. These principles
constitute an other- and action-oriented legacy, left by the ECSC/EC/EU elite and
grassroots founders to their descendants.
There is another inheritance, much less visible, which the most imaginative
European actors bequested rather unselfconsciously: the principle of the enlarged
128
mentality. The enlarged mentality, as Kant and Arendt discussed it, enables sound
judgment by taking in the perspective of others thoughtfully. Isaiah Berlin had
another word for it, fantasia.2 This mental exercise is an activity crucial to maintaining of the public sphere; yet it differs from the other principles of action in
that it is conditioned by the capacity to withdraw from the public sphere in order
to think, and to engage in a dialogue with oneself as well as with others.3 It calls
also for affective capacities that Arendt left under-theorized, although she claimed
to truly love the world and had thought of calling The Human Condition, out of
gratitude, Amor Mundi.4
Scholars have noted Arendts rather idiosyncratic way of interpreting other philosophers.5 Ronald Beiner responds that Arendts stated objective in her Lectures
on Kant was not simply scholarly fidelity, but philosophical appropriation.6 This
chapter follows a similar intellectual strategy as it ponders the definitions of borders
and issues raised by immigration in the EU from the point of view of the enlarged
mentality. Since the end of the Cold War and across an ever-enlarging territorial
space, the EU and its Member States have engaged in the twin pursuit of building
up external borders while erasing internal borders. This is a paradoxical exercise
that is simultaneously sense-making: to define ones borders is to define ones
identity.7 A disaggregated citizenship is emerging, with the practice and institutions of citizenship split into three components: collective identity, privileges of
political membership, and social rights.8 Myron Weiner highlights the fundamental moral contradiction between the notion of emigration that is widely considered
a matter of human rights, and immigration that remains a matter of national (and
EU) sovereignty. How to reconcile this conundrum, which Seyla Benhabib names
the paradox of democratic legitimacy?9 Arendts famous argument on the right
to have rights, which defines the right to citizenship as the basic human right,
does not solve the fundamental contradiction between the opposing imperatives of
state sovereignty and individual autonomy.10 Her concept of the enlarged mentality is more helpful for an analysis of political membership in the EU today, which
must consider very diverse categories of residents: EU citizens, legally resident
Third-country nationals (TCNs), asylum-seekers and refugees, each with different
legal status but living under the shared human condition.
This chapters Part I focuses on Arendts discussion of the enlarged mentality,
conscience and judgment, and her use of historical exemplars to make the invisible visible. Isaiah Berlin is much more sensitive to the hard ethical choices facing
the political actor, and his endorsement of a pluralism of values and fantasia act
like a welcome corrective to Arendts evocative but somewhat vague ethical pronouncements, although his argument figures here like a long footnote rather than
an extensive discussion. Part II draws from this analytical framework to probe the
ECSC/EC/EU putative tradition of thinking as the enlarged mentality, through
the witnesses of actors. Part III discusses the EU and Member States policies
on immigration by reviewing official, academic and grassroots efforts to think
through borders. Do their practices manifest the enlarged mentality? To what
extent is closure a realistic goal in human affairs, and if so at what price? And what
is the role of love or agape in the enlarged mentality?
EU borders and the enlarged mentality 129
Part I Thinking politics
Arendts dilemmas: thinking vs. acting

In 1933 Arendt fled from Germany, determined to renounce all intellectual life
because her colleagues who became fellow travelers of the Nazi regime so sorely
disappointed her.11 She concluded that intellectuals living in the isolation necessary for professional thinking are liable to a kind of dformation professionnelle,
and lack both political judgment and discernment about people.12 But later she
changed her mind: a certain kind of thinking was just as essential for politics as
action, especially under emergency conditions when action may become unfeasible. In her unfinished last work The Life of the Mind she adopts the Kantian
distinction between Vernunft (reason), which is done for its own sake, and Verstand (intellect), the activity reserved to scientists and professional thinkers who
engage in the pursuit of truth based on factual or rational evidence in order to
acquire knowledge or cognition. The ceaseless activity of thinking, as Vernunft, is
gratuitous and always contested; while connected with the quest for knowledge,
it consists in pondering the meaning of concepts and events and all these unanswerable questions which must be posed if we are to found civilization.13 The
enlarged mentality that proceeds from Vernunft does not require professional
training, rather the willingness to face factual reality; and by acknowledging the
presence of others and taking seriously their opinions, it makes shared life in the
polis possible and meaningful. The thinker-cum-actor forms her opinion on what
to do and who to be by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by
making present to her mind the standpoints of those who are absent:
This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those
who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different
perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or
to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but
of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more
peoples standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given
issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their
place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the
more valid my final conclusions, my opinion.14
The enlarged mentality combines the gifts of imagination and representation, and
ponders others points of view without losing self-consciousness.15 It should be
required from any sane person no matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent
or stupid, because of its purging quality, which frees the actorthinker from
the prison of social conformity and protects her from wrong-doing. This kind of
purging, however, has nothing to do with exclusion or the search for purity in
politics.16
Arendt argued daringly that Kants Sketch on Perpetual Peace was the natural
conclusion to his vast inquiry on esthetic judgment. A world at peace was the
130
necessary condition for the greatest possible enlargement of the enlarged mentality.17 Kant, who never left Knigsberg, exemplified thinkings capacity to break
boundaries; in 1795 he took the trouble to define the condition of universal hospitality although he kept it limited: strangers could not claim the right of a guest
to be entertained, which would mean becoming a member of the household for a
certain time, but simply to be treated without hostility so long as they behave in
a peaceable manner. The main point is that originally no one had more right to a
specific portion of the earth than another, so men must necessarily tolerate one
anothers company. This did not mean for Kant the erasure of state borders, rather
that for peace to be maintained representative republican states should federate
under a constitution that guarantees the freedom of each.18 This federation could
expand to new Member States through association, not a solution Arendt necessarily endorsed, as she was not a cosmopolitan thinker.19
Peter Steinberger critiques Arendt for not clarifying adequately how to distinguish a good from a bad judgment. Young-Bruehl, however, notes Arendts
reliance on exemplars, or historical figures, to clarify her standards for political excellence or, conversely, evil.20 This intellectual strategy goes a certain way
toward protecting Arendts thought from the accusation of moral relativism. What
follows is a brief sketch of Arendts discussions of four exemplars of judgment
and the enlarged mentality (or the lack thereof as the case may be), which she
pursued over two decades in several books.21 These exemplars illustrate the
importance of thinking in politics.
Arendts exemplars
Eichmann and Socrates
Adolf Eichmann masterminded the transport of Jews to concentration camps.
As she watched his trial in Jerusalem, Arendt concluded that there is a strange
interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil. By arguing that thoughtlessness,
not personal wickedness, explained the banal Eichmanns monstrous actions
he never realized what he was doing Arendt provoked a storm of controversies. But she remained convinced that the good judgment Eichmann lacked,
and which is the most political of mans mental abilities, depended on a certain
type of thinking.22 Clichs and stock phrases may have their use in daily life,
as they protect actors from thinking anew every detail of their conduct. If people
were responsive to the claim on their thinking attention all the time, they would
soon be exhausted; the tragedy is that Eichmann knew of no such claim. Eichmann
had a notion of conscience surprisingly he could even define Kants categorical
imperative accurately at his trial23 but increasingly his conscience spoke with
the voice of the society of Nazi parvenus around him. Eventually it went silent.
As a result, Eichmann was utterly incapable of grasping the impact of his actions
on others and mindlessly replaced Kants categorical imperative with the Nazi
regimes treacherous euphemisms and Hitlers orders.24
Socrates is Arendts anti-Eichmann who died for his commitment to prod

Athenian passers-by to think about justice, freedom, in brief all that matters politically. He invented conscience and knew that living together with others begins
with living together with oneself; he practiced thinking as a two-in-one activity,
an inner dialogue between friends who cannot ever get away from each other. This
kind of thinking, to be distinguished from cognition and scientific knowledge, acts
as a kind of lie detector. Indeed, who would enjoy sharing her home with a liar or
murderer (or a xenophobe for that matter)?25 Thus thinking acts like an antidote to
an Eichmanns criminal conformism by bringing out the implications of unexamined opinions and thereby destroying them values, doctrines, theories and even
convictions. The potentially destructive impact of endless questioning arises less
from dedication to the examined life, than out of the desire to find results that
would make further thinking unnecessary.26 Solitude, which had always been
suspected of being antipolitical, proves to be the necessary condition for the good
functioning of the polis, a better guarantee than rules of behavior enforced by laws
and fear of punishment.27
Jaspers and world citizenship
Arendt writes poetically that in dark times illumination comes less from theories
and concepts than from the uncertain flickering light that some human beings will
kindle under almost all circumstances. Jaspers is one such man, a kind of modern
Socrates, who unified in his person the two apparently contradictory passions
for thinking and acting.28 More than once he left the academic sphere and its
conceptual language to address the general public on important political questions of the day. Although isolated by Nazism, he was not driven into solitude
and exemplified the personal quality of humanitas, which can be achieved only
by one who has thrown his life and his person into the venture into the public
realm. As the only successor Kant has ever had, he envisaged a framework
of universal mutual agreements, which eventually would lead into a worldwide
federated structure.29 He articulated a philosophical response to the negative
world solidarity, which technological progress and the threat of atomic warfare
have brought about, by discovering an empirically given historical axis situated
around the middle of the last millennium BC. This is when self-understandings
changed in similar ways from China to Greece. Peoples discarded mythologies
for the concept of a transcendent God, and great personalities appeared, who
would no longer accept to be mere members of their respective communities but
thought of themselves as individuals and designed new ways of life, the life of the
wise man, of the hermit, of the prophet. Sameness does not mean uniformity and
Jaspers did not mean to abolish national traditions, rather to pioneer a history of
Mankind through communication and a dialogue among traditions.30
Solomons understanding heart: imagination and representation
Benhabib worries that the distance implied in withdrawn thinking makes Arendts
conception of moral judgment dangerously intuitionist. Dana Villa argues, to the
132
contrary, that it is thinking withdrawal that makes it possible to hear the voice
of conscience.31 Most commentators, however, tend to skirt Arendts discussion of
conscience, a strangely religious notion in a secular thinker, to focus instead on her
treatment of imagination and representation, the two operations involved in judging.32 There is disagreement on whether imagination, a forward-looking creative
activity, or representation as the revisiting of tradition, is more essential for good
judgment.33 One suspects that Arendt valued both equally. Her King Solomon,
another exemplar of sound political judgment, asked for the gift of an understanding heart, or put in more secular terms, the faculty of imagination, that makes it
bearable to live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world. Imagination has to do with the faculty of representation, which permits one to see things in
their proper perspective, and serves as an inner compass.34 Arendt abandoned the
elusive term of understanding heart in her later works, and her discourse on the
inner life remains ambiguous: she critiques modern psychology and sociology
for explaining away the responsibility of the doer in terms of this or that kind of
determinism, but recommends the inner Socratic dialogue and self-examination.35
She stands firm that thinking solves conflicts of conscience, whereas feelings of
guilt merely indicate social conformity or non-conformity.36 All we have in the
end are her own words on conscience written shortly before her sudden death:
I shall show that my main assumption in singling out judgment as a distinct
capacity of our minds has been that judgments are not arrived at by either
deduction or induction; in short, they have nothing in common with logical
operations. . . . We shall be in search of the silent sense, which when it was
dealt with at all has always, even in Kant, been thought of as a taste and
therefore as belonging to the realm of aesthetics. In practical and moral matters it was called conscience, and conscience did not judge; it told you, as
the divine voice of either God or reason, what to do, what not to do, and what
to repent of . . . . In Kant judgment emerges as a peculiar talent which can be
practiced only and cannot be taught. . . . In Kant it is reason with its regulative ideas that comes to the help of judgment, but if the faculty is separate
from other faculties of the mind, then we shall have to ascribe to it its own
modus operandi, its own way of proceeding.37
It is regrettable that Arendt abandoned the expression of the understanding heart,
which indicates the strange alchemy between reason and affectivity in the exercise
of the enlarged mentality. A feeling can prompt conscience and the activity of
thinking. But friendship is political for Arendt. Rather than an agreeable exchange
between intimates, it constitutes a constant interchange of talk that unites citizens in a polis.38 Shin Chiba wonders rightly whether friendship as conversation
and debate is enough to create the social bond;39 and she argues that the Christian notion of agape should enrich our grasp of Arendts amor mundi: it need not
be confused with love of God or an unworldly stance; rather it encourages
altruism, kindness, and even courageous and self-sacrificial forms of love for
the heterogeneous and different, whereas the Aristotelian notion of friendship

cannot countenance a loving attitude toward a bad person.40 Agape can mean
also resistance to evil and thus always involves questions of justice. Although
Chiba attempts to rehabilitate love in politics, and sees it in perfect congruity
with the enlarged mentality, she has little to say about feelings.41 Iris Marion
Young is more sensitive to the affective aspect of the enlarged mentality. Different
life experiences and social positions make full empathy or symmetrical understanding impossible, but taking into account the other is an ethical aspiration best
achieved by listening and asking questions. Young invokes the idea of wonder and
moral humility to describe being open to something new.42
Berlin, who rejects Arendts agonal heroes and their uncompromising stands,
stresses humility as well. With customary modesty, he asserts that although he feels
an intuitive certainty about those rules that make it possible to live together, this
intuition has nothing to do with some form of a priori knowledge and cannot
justify intolerance toward other points of view.43 He claims to be a pluralist, not
a relativist: no culture that we know lacks the notion of good and bad; true and
false. . . . There are universal values, and this is the basis of the idea of human
rights.44 The most painful choices are not between good and evil, but good and
good, for instance between freedom and social justice (or in the case of immigration between the right to free movement and the national popular will).45 The
notion of having to choose between two desirable values is foreign to Arendts
heroic philosophy, but not to the politics of European integration.
Berlin has his version of the enlarged thought, fantasia, a concept that he
draws from the eighteenth-century Italian historian of culture Giambattista Vico.
He avoids foundational ambition, as Alex Zakaras writes, to argue that good
politics follows from proper self-understanding, which is itself bound up with the
human capacities for empathy and imagination.46 Berlin admired Vico, Herder
and Herzen for their attention to the variety of human experiences, and stressed
the incommensurability between cultures. Yet this gap could be bridged by an
effort of the imagination, an entering into the mind of other men. This kind
of knowledge, which German thinkers have called verstehen (and Arendt the
enlarged mentality), is not like knowing that the week has seven days, but rather
what it is like to be poor, to belong to a nation (or to be a refugee in this chapter).47
Both Berlin and Arendt experienced losing their homelands to totalitarianism, and
they mistrusted the aspiration to goodness in politics, as well as the search for
some definitive solution that could reconcile opposite ideals and abolish conflict.
Berlin advocates for the wicked Talleyrands surtout pas trop de zle as more
humane than the demand for uniformity of the virtuous Robespierre.48 Rather
than pursue perfection on this earth, he cautions, better to accept that human history, as a famous Russian thinker once remarked, has no libretto. Legislating for
the unknown consequences of consequences of consequences could only bring
more unknown consequences. For solutions tend to cause new problems.49
In political theory there is no finality either. Arendt did not live to complete her
theory of judgment and her readers must wrestle with somewhat contradictory
statements. Her Socrates exemplifies the importance of solitude to politics, but
Jaspers was political because he did not let Nazism reduce him to a solitary state.
134
She rejects all versions of final solutions, and yet praised the American founding
as the epitome of political participation. She outlaws feelings from politics, but
articulated a version of judgment that rested on the capacity to understand others
with patient endurance.50 There is no sense searching for perfect coherence in a
political thinker so attuned to the unpredictability of human action. The points that
matter most to this chapters argument are: that there is no ethical politics without
the other as a conversing partner outside, but also within; that mulling over public
issues is a civic responsibility; that this kind of thinking is not merely a cognitive
exercise, but also a matter for the understanding heart or the enlarged mentality;
and that the increasing blurring of boundaries between domestic and international
politics calls for the articulation of common frameworks of self-understanding
beyond national borders and cultures such as the (very different) ones Jaspers and
Berlin proposed.51
Part II Solitude in the ECSC/EC/EU politics

Monnets carnets roses
One of the best ways to comprehend what makes us think is to look for a model.
According to Arendt, we understand courage by having in the back of our minds
Achilles, or goodness by remembering Jesus or Saint Francis.52 Likewise, we understand recognition or reconciliation in the ECSC/EC/EU politics through an effort
of imagination, by recalling those who were moved by these principles of action.
So we may turn one last time to political actors, who revealed a glimpse of their
mental processes, to understand how they thought. The same pendulum movement
takes place in the life of the citizen and of the statesman between togetherness and
solitude, between acting and judging. Few political actors reveal the inner workings of their mental process. It can be safely conjectured that Arendt and Monnet
would have had little to say to each other had they met, the first being highly theoretical, cultured and categorical, the second concrete and pragmatic. Yet some of
their writings extol meditative practices more commonly found in religious treatises. Such practices, which have little to do with self-improvement and nothing
with concerns for the after life, were important enough to Monnet to figure in his
carefully crafted Memoirs.53 A secular thinker, Monnet adopted a lifestyle which
favored reflection; to think he needed the isolation of long solitary walks. He
writes of solitude, imagination and representation not as theoretical concepts but
as practices indispensable to the thinking through of international peace. Thus he
could not explain the source of the conviction that suddenly called for a halt to
his reflection and turned it into a decision:
To see it [the decision] clearly I have to concentrate which I can do only . . .
on long solitary walks. . . . When I leave the house, I take with me all the previous days thought and worries. But when I have walked for half an hour or
an hour, they begin to fade away, and I gradually start noticing things around
me, the flowers or the leaves on the trees. At that moment I know that nothing
can disturb me. I let my thoughts find their own level. I never force myself to
think about a given subject subjects come to me naturally because I always
follow the same line of thought, or rather, I follow only one at a time . . . Afterward, things are different. I come back to the world of action.54
At the height of the diplomatic crisis over the US proposal to rearm the FRG in
April 1950, the anxious President of the Commissariat au Plan chose to withdraw to the Swiss Alps for a two-week hiking trip with a mountain guide as his
sole companion. At night he penned down his private reflections in a spontaneous
and telegraphic style in a pink notebook (carnet rose), a life-long habit to make
sense of events and prod himself into action.55 Although he did not have a perfect
answer when he returned to Paris, he had so full an account of the reasons for
acting and so clear an idea of the direction in which to move, that from my point
of view the time of uncertainty was over.56
As he re-read his notes 25 years later Monnet was struck by how changed circumstances were, which made it difficult to remember the rigidity of minds in
the spring of 1950. Then, leaders and public opinion were locked in on a single
object, the cold war which was a much graver danger than the accumulation
of weapons. Mental warring had to be opposed by imagination. Monnet knew
nothing of notions such as the enlarged mentality or fantasia, but he struggled
to represent to himself the French and German points of view, and engaged in
what he called lateral thinking. Rather than find solutions to problems as they
were conventionally articulated, better to think through how to modify the circumstances that created them. He concluded that the context must be enlarged, the
FrancoGerman problem become a European problem.57
Monnets carnets roses cover a wide range of concerns, from admonitions on
work habits and personal finances that guarantee the independence of the public
actor, to commentaries on very diverse authors obviously read with some care,
whether it was Pascal or the FrancoGerman student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit.58
Occasionally they record serious disappointments:
I have pursued the creation of shared institutions thinking that institutions
would bring men closer. It is true, it must be the goal, but it is not the method
because institutions for coal and steel become only that instead of institutions
for men. It is true that they create new habits, bureaucracies and national
political institutions, but much too slowly. To go faster we must impact the
existence, the very interest of the people.59
Monnet had proved a perfectionist when it came to the drafting of his proposals;
experience helped him give up the illusion of perfect outcomes. He told one of
his last visitors, Thierry de Montbrial: The Schuman Plan [for the ECSC] was
idiotic, but it was the starting point to everything.60
Arendt detects a third mental activity beside thinking and judging: willing, which deals with the future and political projects. She never makes it fully
clear how willing relates to action, although she writes that men of action may
136
perhaps be in a better position to come to terms with the problem of the will
than men of thought who seem unable to conceive of radical novelty.61 In contrast
with what Arendt suggests in The Life of the Mind, thinking, willing and judging
need not be conceived of as three mental activities autonomous of one another,
but rather as intersecting links connecting the place of solitary thinking to the
space of appearance.62 Different individuals, however, may perform each activity.
Robert Schuman took with him the draft proposal for the ECSC, which Monnet and his collaborators had thought through, as he left by train for his regular
weekend retreat at Scy-Chazelle near Metz in April 1950. He was in the habit of
withdrawing to judge; but only willing could transform the thought into public
action.63 Upon his return to Paris, Schuman told his assistant Bernard Clappier:
Ive read the proposal. Ill use it. Those few words were enough. The idea had
entered the political arena.64
Where is the understanding heart in the cerebral reflections on thinking, solitude and action of the European founders? As we noted in Chapter 2, the theater of
politics does not allow for self-revelatory discourses on private emotions, even if
feelings play a powerful role in motivating grassroots actors and their representatives. Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, but not Monnet
or Spaak, were motivated by Catholic social thought, which insisted on social
reforms in the name of neighborly love. The ECSC dispositions in favor of workers and the system of solidarity established between poorer and richer regions
institutionalized some of these concerns.
The enlarged mentality and contemporary thinking actors
Jacques Delors is often compared to Monnet for the creativity he brought to his
work, but also because he was equally atypical of his home country and its politics, putting himself through school and occupying only briefly two elected positions.65 George Ross, who observed the Delors cabinet at the EU Commission at
close range for several months, noted chef de cabinet Pascal Lamys systematic
efforts to free the presidents time for reflection and a broadening of mental horizons.66 Crises prompted the Socratic inner dialogue of conscience. A Catholic,
Delors refused to refer to his faith in public. But to avoid discouragement in times
of setback or failures, he started with autocriticism, not to call it an examen de
conscience, and tried to find out whether the direction he proposed was the right
one, whether the method had been appropriate. Perpetually caught in the dialectical movement between reflection and action, he feared losing the necessary
conceptual basis when he devoted too much time to action. By the same token
he wanted to test his ideas against the harsh test of facts.67 Original ideas might be
born in solitude, but their development is social; Monnet and Delors wrote their
Memoirs in a dialogue with close collaborators. Yet their marginality may have
been what protected them from stereotypical thinking and acting.
Thinking is not the prerogative of professional thinkers or politicians, as
Arendt reminds us. Participation starts in the mind of the beginner, with an effort
to acquire understanding, to mull it over in an internal dialogue and dialogues

with others, which are inseparable from the willing of projects. The European
Council approved a new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union at
its December 2000 Nice summit. Meanwhile, in a separate initiative, a group of
continental European citizens became aware, after frank exchanges with British
citizens, of the importance of the Magna Carta as a starting point for democracy in
the British Isles. They were also struck by two speeches of Vclav Havel to the EP,
which proposed the drafting of a clearly understandable document to describe the
values and ideas on which united Europe rests, and that each European child could
learn by heart. In order to ponder this over in the company of others they decided
to withdraw for a days retreat on 6 November 1999 to Schengen in Luxembourg,
and reflect on the moral, spiritual and emotional dimension of Europe. Their
deliberations prompted them to write a Charter of the Europeans in French, German and English. The 88 signatories included the three mayors of the neighboring communes of Schengen (Luxembourg), Perl (Germany) and Apach (France),
along with British, French, German, Luxembourger, Polish and Swiss citizens.
They committed to promote a cosmopolitan Europe that practices and defends
the personal worth of every citizen, and the importance of cooperation with
the peoples of other continents by drawing from the experiences of the past and
responding to their needs and expectations for development. The Schengen signatories sent their Charter, not as an alternative to the EU Charter a very important document but as a modest initiative to contribute to the debate on the
future of Europe, to their MEPs, national MPs and members of their national governments, as well as to a wider public including the press.68 What strikes the reader
of the two Charters is that one spells out the rights of the Europeans, whereas
the second, in a more participatory vein, primarily stresses personal and active
commitment to the practice of certain public principles.
Thinking borders at the European Parliament
Without the support of a large full-time staff and extraordinary energy, is it possible to combine thinking with acting in the space of appearance? Scholars have
devoted much attention to the tension between thought and action in Arendts
work,69 and she acknowledged the impossibility of combining the two in a world
where one is never alone and always too busy to think. In EU politics the frequent
recourse to Wise Men and other expert committees delegates thinking to specialized instances.70 Some MEPs react with surprise at being asked how they do
their thinking. Portuguese MEP Paulo Casaca quickly responds, You are right,
this is a problem. . . . . Apart from plane trips what is the solution? What is lacking here is a space for shared reflection. We discuss a lot, but at a rhythm, with
methods that do not facilitate the flow of ideas.71 Besides traveling, the writing
of reports and political groups retreats provide opportunities for reflection.72 To
think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains ones imagination to go
visiting.73 The borders under consideration vary, but the need for withdrawal is
a constant. Austrian MEP Maria Berger ponders speeches and articles, especially
on difficult issues, also as she travels; but it may be in my bathtub that I am in
138
my most creative state. I get all kinds of ideas which my poor collaborators must
handle the next day, she says jokingly. The border between the Czech Republic
and Austria was on her mind in 2002. She courageously supported Czech accession in spite of some unresolved bilateral issues and the ambivalences of her Austrian constituents.74
Italian MEP Emma Bonino bemoans the EU neglect of the non-EU Mediterranean countries: We do not want their agricultural products, their textiles or
their people. She claims to understand much more quickly when she is on the
ground.75 This prompted her relocation to Cairo in 2001, on a part-time basis, to
understand Egypt and Egyptians better, to read their press, and with the objectives of learning the Arabic language and culture. The ten days she spent there
every month provided more time for reflection and reading. But how to be present
to the EP at the same time? Boninos response indicates the losses involved in any
choice. She was content to follow all the amendments to parliamentary proposals
by Internet; moreover, there is not a lot of constituency work for Italian MEPs who
are elected on a national list, and the Radical Party to which she belongs makes
intensive use of electronic communication.76
EP French Vice-President Catherine Lalumire had to face the the wavering of
Western European minds after Titos death, when she was Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe.
Our philosophical and political vigilance had lost its edge. We hesitated. In
the case of Bosnia, a multicultural, multilingual, multireligious state, which
lived at peace with itself for a long time, certain European countries took sides
for the Muslims, others for the Croats, others for the Serbs without stressing
enough the possibility to live together in spite of differences.77
Apparently Western European minds had forgotten Arendt and Monnets practices of enlarged thinking, this representative mode of thinking that taps into the
imagination and permits one to ponder an issue from several standpoints in order
to reach a more valid opinion. Lalumires many travels to the Western Balkans
strengthened her conviction that ideas matter as much as material interests in politics; and she regrets never having devoted enough time or effort to clarify her
own ideas:
Ideas do not arise without effort. They come out first from information
through contacts, personal and by reading. Every so often solitary reflection
allows the thinker to take stock. I have not had the will to do this. I had the
privilege to be offered fascinating and concrete tasks first in academia and
then in politics, which devour individuals. After 1981 it never stopped.78
In 2002 what message could the EU send to the world? Lalumire spoke of her
embarrassment at not having reflected on this question enough. The answer was
not evident and would require several months of work. She thought aloud for her
interviewer:

What matters most to me in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
is the protection of a certain conception of man in a world where Europe has
no monopoly of values. Solidarity is part of this conception. . . . JudeoChristian thought, GreekRoman and Arabic traditions have converged in very
rich thinking traditions that have fertilized each other. We could say as in
the US, may the best win. But in Europe we say: careful. The one who has
received much in talent and money must share. The states task is to reestablish a balance between those who have a lot and those who have very
little. Europe could spread this message through peaceful means, through a
work of dialogue, and exchanges with other regions of the world. But its
medium-sized and small Member States and to some extent the large Member
States, are afraid of responsibility. How to balance the protection of minorities with majority rule; how to combine the recognition of the other with fair
democratic representation are the major dilemmas we face within the EU and
beyond.79
Lalumire posed questions of civic membership and rights, to which no permanent
answers exist, and yet which cannot be avoided. Scholars, bureaucrats and politicians used to address the issues of immigration and enlargement separately; today
there is growing recognition that both deal with membership and thus require
an integrated form of theorizing.80 Thinking through the framing of EU internal
and external borders is no simple matter, considering the varieties of status under
which people migrate to and within the EU.81 Who then should judge? In Interpreting Political Responsibility, John Dunn argues that three groups of people,
amateur, professional and official social theories, should take responsibility in
a democratic society in the face of varyingly and elusively demarcated predicaments. Each of these social theories has deficiencies, but the true heresy is
to presume that only one of them holds authentic and final authority.82 Dunns
distinction between social theories is somewhat artificial: more often than not the
three groups of grassroots organizations, academic and official actors overlap in
real life.83 But it helps bring some theoretical order to a very complex set of questions, and therefore structures the discussion of migration and membership in the
last part of this chapter.
Part III Judging and Europes borders

Professional social theory: spectators and advocates
Spectators rather than actors endow politics with meaning according to Kant and
Arendt. The existential ground for the onlookers insight is his disinterestedness,
his nonparticipation. The spectator sees the whole and judges with impartiality,
the actor only his part. It is clear that Arendt aspired to a joining of the spectator
with the actor.84 From the relative isolation of academia some scholars find it easier than politicians and bureaucrats to adopt the broader standpoint of the enlarged
mentality, although this makes it more difficult to reach unambiguous conclusions
140
on concrete policies; others privilege giving a voice to the silenced, veering sometimes into outright advocacy. Yet others attempt to combine the voices of the actor
and the spectator.85
In Immigration and European integration: Beyond fortress Europe? Andrew
Geddes acts as the detached analyst to think through EU borders from the standpoints of multiple actors, from EU-based and national decision-makers to NGO
activists. In the last 30 years the EU population has swelled by 26 million newcomers not born in the EU; at the same time, boundary buildup coincided with
boundary erasure as the EU enlarged to include 15 other Member States and more
than 130 million people between 1995 and 2007, with millions since moving
between Member States. The large scale of movement across Europes borders
makes it an unlikely fortress.86 The analytical category of immigration policies
has become so broad as to be effectively meaningless; there are many forms of
migration, some deemed voluntary, such as labor and family migration, and others provoked by persecution, such as asylum-seeking migration. Regrettably, a
substantial elision has occurred in the public debate between free movement of
people, immigration and asylum.87
Thus the 2010 debate on the expulsion of 15,000 Roma migrants from France
after several violent incidents revealed a great deal of confusion: the Romas are
EU citizens and the legality (or lack thereof) of their expulsion had little to do with
the protection of human rights in general; it was about enforcement of EU law,
which will allow full freedom of movement only in 2014. Discrimination against
the Romas is no longer a merely French, Romanian or Bulgarian responsibility
but an EU responsibility as well. EU citizenship relentlessly gnaws at the foundations of national membership and identity, as it decouples citizenship from
ethnos or Volk.88 Seyla Benhabib notes the dynamic toward narrowing the divide
separating human rights from political rights in regard to long-term Thirdcountry
nationals (TCNs) in the EU, which the Romas are not, of course. But this may
mean that access to EU borders will be more severely restricted to new non-EU
candidates for immigration.89
Andrew Davison, Himadeep Muppidi, Freya Irani and Dror Ladins transformative global hermeneutics offers an imaginative and abstract interpretation of
what the enlarged mentality could mean under globalized conditions: they ask
the subject (in this case Europe) to quit its provincial outlook and to let its
own self-understanding be reshaped by Others understanding. Understanding is
always relational vis--vis not only the otherness of ones tradition, but also the
otherness of Others. This is not to say that the Other has it always right, but that
the Other should have a part in illuminating the European self to itself. To know
borders requires hermeneutic codescription.90 But what about those silenced? At
an anti-expulsion conference entitled Les Roms, Et qui dautre? (Romas, And
Who Else?), which took place in Montreuil, a Paris working-class neighborhood,
with the participation of noted French scholars Balibar, Jacques Rancire and Luc
Boltanski, a young militant from Montreuil lambasted the organizers for not having invited anyone from the local community to come and speak, and also for the
fact that people only cared about the Roma when it became a national issue.91

Global hermeneutics, instead of silencing subaltern silence, provides another way
to understand how such silences have come to be (through erasure or resistance)
and to be understood.92
Ayten Gndodu wrestles with another challenge: how to establish the universality of legal norms without getting trapped into a homogenizing and potentially
authoritarian worldwide value system? Drawing from Arendts discussion of Jaspers humanitas, she suggests that humanitas rather than nature or history should
be considered the ground of human rights, the universality of which is always
in the making. Humanitas is an ongoing, fragile and yet significant achievement
of political action. It is a mindset, which can help us think of the universality of
human rights in terms other than moral universalism, as the beginning of a beginning.93 Gndodu and other social scientists speak on behalf of the silenced,
asylum seekers and undocumented migrants.94 They denounce the hundreds of
camps holding migrants in the EU, Libya and Morocco.95 They protest against the
gradual detachment of human rights from citizenship and claim with Arendt that
citizenship is the basic human right and only effective protection against rightlessness.96 Naturalization lifts a barrier, which is both legal and emotional.97 But
scholarly advocates could put more effort in justifying their cosmopolitan assumptions that unlimited free movement is an inalienable human right, and in meeting
arguments to the contrary.98 Borders should not be considered an absolutely antidemocratic institution, as Raymond Duvall, Gndodu and Kartik Raj argue,99 as
long as a large majority of citizens hold on to them for their definition of political
identity. In fact, some thinkers and activists from the EU neighborhood countries
press the EU to define its borders more clearly in order to create the predictability
indispensable to politics.100
Other scholars focus on the recolonization of immigration, and detect a
strong link between former colonial policies and current immigration policies.101
Regimes of border control adapt a range of technocratic methods from colonialism, e.g. techniques of mapping, documentation, policing, surveillance, containment, control, and exploitation in order to shape a more unified national
community and culture by controlling and even excluding, when necessary, the
Other.102 Algeria in France shows that, at the same time, the growth of supranational European bodies, like the European Court and the European Parliament,
has actually served in many cases to protect the rights of immigrants and refugee
populations.103 Scholars stick to the cold language of reason to advocate passionately certain points of view. One misses, however, more interdisciplinary dialogues on migration issues in the EU that would take into account all categories of
EU migrants with fantasia.104 To paint Europe with a broad brush as the imperial
continent par excellence, is a failure of the enlarged mentality. Some EU Member
States were colonized for centuries, such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary,
Malta and Romania, not to mention all the Central and Eastern European countries, which fell under Soviet hegemony after WWII. Could they be encouraged
to draw from their own experience to articulate humane policies towards other
formerly colonized people?
142
Official social theory: the Commission on the right to have rights vs. the
Member States sovereignty
Today, EU experts and bureaucrats expend an enormous amount of energy on drafting laws and policies on immigration and demonstrate considerable Verstand (the
intellect as cognition); but Vernunft (the disinterested and speculative form of thinking that prepares the mind for judgment according to Arendt) has too little to do with
policy-making. The ECSC/EC founders conveniently left the issue of civic membership pending by agreeing that the Communities were a work in progress and that
no one could predict their final borders. Nevertheless, the first Treaties laid down
one clear principle: freedom of movement for ECSC/EC workers and their families
across Member States borders. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, citizenship in a
Member State confers EU citizenship automatically, with the right to free movement
and residence across the Union for workers, their families, students and retirees; the
right to vote in local and European elections; to appeal to the EP and the Ombudsman; and to benefit from EU diplomatic representation when residing outside of
the EU. According to Willem Maas the conferring of these rights, which transcend
the traditional distinction in international law between insiders and outsiders, is evidence of the founders commitment to create a community of people, not a mere
common market. But in spite of the founders initial pledge to make a contribution
to world peace in the Schuman Declaration (italics by the author), the new order has
remained clearly European, not cosmopolitan. In January 2006 the EP approved by
the thinnest of margins a report on EU citizenship merely recommending a form of
citizenship that grants political rights to anyone residing legally on a long-term basis
in the EU irrespective of original nationality.105 EU citizenship still excludes the
right to citizenship for long-term TCNs, leaving them in a state of civic limbo.106
This was not always meant to be the case. The 1999 Tampere European Council announced the EU commitment to coordinate migration and asylum policies
at the Community level. As a result, Council directives proclaimed the principle
of fair treatment to legally residing TCNs and the granting of rights to long-term
residents as near as possible to those of EU citizens. In the spirit of promoting
the common interest among the EUs 15 Member States, the Commission proposed implementing measures. But the Member States resistance to granting
equal political rights to TCNs has remained steady. The Commission argued also
that adaptation of TCNs to the receiving country should take place without the
loss of the immigrants cultural identity; and the Spanish government presented
an amendment to this effect to the Councils 2004 Common Basic Principles on
Integration; it was rejected.107 When EU Member States object to such a measure,
they question in effect their residents ability to think from several standpoints
and perspectives, which Arendt theorized as a basic human capacity and a protection against evil-doing. This kind of enlarged mentality is construed today as
a political threat to national identities instead of a contribution to the receiving
country; yet one aim of EU policies is that everyone, newcomers and native-born,
should be multilingual.108 It is fair to note that the strongest resistance to something
like Balibars notion of a community of fate, a place where individuals happen
to belong,109 has come from the Member States, not the EU institutions in

Brussels.110 But the Commission units that deal with migration and asylum have
tended to be followers rather than leaders.111
As government officials and experts strive for closure to the difficult debates on
asylum and migration in order to avoid more populist backlash, they engage in the
language of perfectionism, which Arendt and Berlin warned against. Sergio Carrera remarks that integration is used as a legal condition to safeguard the notion
of the perfect citizen of the nation-state, in direct opposition with the legal status of foreigner.112 Perfectionism and security belong together in public debates
over the rights of migrants.113 In Summer 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy
responded fiercely in a speech in Grenoble to the violence committed by youths
after the French police killed two young men, one Roma, and another of North
African descent in separate incidents. French nationality is earned, and one must
prove oneself worthy of it, he said. He ordered 300 camps where Romas from
Bulgaria and Romania were staying to be closed down, and vowed to deny automatic citizenship at 18 to French-born children of foreigners if they were juvenile
delinquents, and to strip foreign-born citizens of French citizenship if they had
been convicted of threatening or harming a police officer. A few weeks later, the
French National Assembly was examining a law to this effect. After a tepid first
reaction European Commissioner of Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship
Viviane Reding critiqued the French government publicly for failing to translate
properly into French law EU legislation on free movement, and for targeting a
specific ethnic group (the Romas) against the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Apparently there was a monumental row between President Sarkozy and Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso at the September 2010 European Council,
with Sarkozy protesting that Brussels should not impinge upon the rights of a
great nation. Meanwhile, the EP voted a resolution protesting against the French
policy because it targeted a specific ethnic group.114
President Sarkozy spoke and acted impulsively; his Grenoble speech followed
only two days after violent incidents. There was little effort made to encourage the
French people (or their Roma guests for that matter) to ponder the tragic events
that led to two deaths and the destruction of physical property. As Berlin could
point out, there will be no easy reconciliation between the two positive values of
the transeuropean rule of law and national sovereignty. Sarkozys threat to denaturalize certain migrants for committing criminal acts did not become law, but it
shows that too little has changed in a Europe where denaturalizing is an old tradition anchored in national sovereignty. Arendt mentions in chronological order
the millions of Russians, the hundreds of thousands of Armenians, thousands of
Hungarians, and hundreds of thousands of Germans who were made stateless after
WWI.115 This is why she concluded that, under modern conditions, the only sure
backing of human rights is the right to have rights, i.e. citizenship in a state.116
Amateur social theory: the heart and the enlarged mentality
European grassroots activists contributed after WWII to the affective healing crucial in lasting political reconciliations. They may be best situated to embrace the
144
affective side of the enlarged mentality today. Arendt worried that the spectacle
of suffering might provoke passionate and mindless popular outbursts, such as
the Sans-Culottes movement during the French Revolution, which did not create
stable institutions. Therefore she offered a very cerebral version of the enlarged
mentality; and this is how she suggested in 1965 that her students look at slum
dwellings:
Suppose I look at a specific slum dwelling and I perceive in this particular
building the general notion which it does not exhibit directly, the notion of
poverty and misery. I arrive at this notion by representing to myself how I
would feel if I had to live there, that is, I try to think in the place of the slumdweller. The judgment I shall come up with will by no means necessarily be
the same as that of the inhabitants, whom time and hopelessness may have
dulled to the outrage of their condition, but it will become for my further
judging of these matters an outstanding example to which I refer. . . . Furthermore, while I take into account others when judging, this does not mean that
I conform in my judgment to those of others, I still speak with my own voice.
. . . But my judgment is no longer subjective either.117
Arendts enlarged mentality takes in the slum dwellers situation. But the gazer
remains an outsider. Her better than subjective point of view might even trump
that of the dweller whose thinking could have been dulled by her living conditions. It is doubtful whether Arendt ever gazed at a slum dweller, and the clarity
she demonstrated in her analysis of totalitarianism was missing on matters of race
and class. Balibar has a less aristocratic interpretation of the enlarged mentality: while the unitary concept of a single Europe is vanishing in a dissemination
without recourse, he is convinced that there is more to be gained than lost in this
process in terms of the capacity of thinking.118 In We, The People of Europe?
he would have people think as part of a collective effort to construct citizenship
in a community of fate rather than of descent, and to rewrite the marks of sovereignty.119 One of the tasks of his worksite of citizenship lays in the organized
demand addressed by citizens to the state for a new public education program of
Enlightenment based on the comparative study of religions and moral and legal
systems. This would allow each of us to think other peoples thoughts instead of
ignoring them and fearing them (which does not mean thinking as others do).120
Migration produces new forms of transnational community and solidarity as
well as nationalist anxieties and xenophobic desires for stability.121 Anthony Lang
describes Arendts revolutionary councils as structures that give individuals the
means to engage in political action, rather than new institutions of governance.
The global protesters in Seattle in 1999 created something like revolutionary
councils.122 The same could be said of the 80,000100,000 people who demonstrated in Paris against the systematic expulsion of illegal Romas back to Bulgaria
and Romania on 3 September 2010. French public opinion, which had supported
Sarkozy a few months earlier, swung back against him. Liz Fekete documents
how the childrens rights lobby has mobilized to form national and European

consortia. New umbrella organizations such as Rseau Education Sans Frontires
in France and Belgium have emerged, as have spontaneous anti-deportation initiatives carried out by teachers, the medical professions and residents committees. Such grassroots initiatives are not ideologically driven, but deploy arguments
of resistance that stretch back to the resistance movements in occupied Europe
during the Nazi period. Above all, these actors demand that governments adopt
a child-centered perspective as they apply the law. They represent by providing the media with human-interest stories, and prove imaginative as they turn
to art and theater to attract public attention.123 Paul A. Silverstein discusses the
infranational differences of ethnicity and religion as a framework for inventing
new modes of political contestation and new possibilities for the enactment of
civil society in France, from the creation of a charter for a supranational Berber
entity to jointly petitioning the Council of Europe for collective rights for French
immigrants and linguistic minority groups.124 This is a tale of two Europes. The
first Europe consists of government-created bureaucratic machines that reduce
officials to automatons. The second consists of ordinary people, often acting in
defiance of the law.125 Something like Chibas political agape motivates these
actors as well as rational considerations.
In the Netherlands 84-year-old Joty ter Kulve-van Os can no longer be silent
as she confronts the experience of discrimination of some of her TurkishDutch
friends. Life experience and reflection convince her that the legacy of colonialism
and immigration are interrelated issues. A survivor of the WWII Japanese concentration camp in Indonesia, she grew up in Linggarjati on West Java; Dutch officials
and Indonesian liberation leaders held talks in her family home in 1946, which
could have signified a peaceful transition to Indonesian independence had the
Dutch Parliament not rejected the agreement. The van Os home is now an Indonesian national museum, the Gedung Perundingan, which has become a symbol of
the Indonesian fight for independence; and ter Kulve and her brother have created
the association, The Friends of Linggarjati, to support the museum.126 On 30
October 2010 she posted on the associations Internet site a thought piece entitled
Does Immigration have a future? to prod the enlargement of the Dutch mentality. It came easily to its author as she has given a lot of thought to the issue, and
her roots are deeply embedded in the story of migration, which characterizes so
much of the upheaval in the past half-century:
Turkish immigrants run eighteen thousand of Hollands small businesses,
which provide work for sixty thousand people. Talk with them and you find
that many feel increasingly threatened. . . . This anti-immigrant wave is rolling across Europe. . . . Such sentiments [like those expressed by German
Chancellor Merkel on the failure of multiculturalism, and the Christian identity of Europe] seem oddly out of place from a Germany and Europe whose
ancestors happily settled in Africa and Asia reaping the rewards of those fertile lands and their hardworking citizens. . . . The reality is that Europe has
become a multicultural, multiethnic society in the past sixty years. We cannot
go back to the purity of a strictly Caucasian culture. We profited from the
146
hard work of foreign immigrants. . . . What short memories we have! . . . Our

former nationalistic worldview, as rich as it has been, is now too narrow a
perspective for life in a globalized world. In fact, as a guiding philosophy for
a people, its become detrimental.
Ter Kulve advocates for a Dutch historical memory, which would take into full
account the Linggarjati agreements, which are not taught in the countrys schools.
The new curriculum should include, like Balibars proposal, the study of other
peoples, countries and cultures; the encouragement of an atmosphere where
continued historic resentments and prejudices are acknowledged and resolved;
the learning of the art of true listening to other people so as to understand the
deeper significance of what they say and do; the readiness to see and admit ones
shortcomings, as well as those of ones nation; and to apply Socrates advice of
know thyself. For only when one knows oneself, the good and the bad side, does
one truly understand the other person, country or culture.127 Her piece provoked a
flood of reactions from people of all backgrounds, Indonesian and Dutch.128
Conclusion: looking for understanding hearts
At the regional level, the EU is moving toward complete freedom of movement.
This is an achievement worth celebrating.129 The EU must now abolish discrimination based on nationality for TCNs also (discrimination based on religion, ethnicity and race is already illegal), with the awareness that sound relationships
develop over time through mutual acquaintance. It seems legitimate for the EU to
enforce a transitional period (as in the US) for its TCNs to be eligible for naturalization. The immediate and complete lifting of border controls is not the policy
advocated here, but rather that of porous borders where citizenship follows
access to residency.130 Total freedom of movement across the world would be one
of those perfect solutions (in the abstract) that cause more problems than they
solve in the short term. It should remain the long-term goal that incremental steps
will implement. When Berlin denounces the excesses of Arendtian agonal positions, he is after a certain form of hubris. Contrary to thinking, judging assesses
a contingent situation, adjudicates a specific case without pretense to universality. The standpoint of the judging actor is always limited in spite of her best
efforts toward enlargement, hence Dunns insistence that amateur, professional
and official social theories, should all take responsibility in a democratic society.
Could someone say every so often, as Joty ter Kulve-van Os suggests, I made a
mistake? In choosing between equally desirable but conflicting political values,
a certain humility is necessary: A little dull as a solution, you will say? Berlin
asks. Not the stuff of which calls to heroic action by inspired leaders are made?
Yet if there is some truth in this view, perhaps this is sufficient.131 Except under
conditions of emergency (natural disasters, war and dictatorial rule), middling
positions give plenty to act on.
This book has discussed some ECSC/EC/EU principles of action
reconciliation, power as action in concert, recognition of the Other and

truth-telling in dialogue with political theorists. The EU has no corner on such
principles, which do not indicate rigid rules of behavior, but a set of practices
and experiences. Each storyteller would weave the tales differently, selecting
what seemed most important for understanding. Pondering principles of action
does not produce definitions or other results, and yet it can deeply alter ones
relationship to ones own reality, so that, for example, somebody who had pondered the meaning of house might make his own look better.132 After WWII,
actors and thinkers determined to confine feelings to the private realm and promote reason-based politics in the public sphere; totalitarian rule had proved the
tragic and destructive power of passion. But the resurgent populist movements in
Europe make it clear: politics must do justice to the emotions as well as reason.
The withdrawn place where the thinking actor weighs contradictory interests from
different points of view is the space where reason can confront passion, where
belonging can engage with the other and strongly held conviction meet opposing claims. Arendt did not choose between estrangement and rootedness; both
were part of her lot in life. Very differently, but no less insistently, Berlins fantasia
bars the way to unreflective cultural attachments and permits entrance into other
peoples worlds.
Arendt, Berlin, Habermas, Jaspers, Ricoeur and Taylor take stock of historical
and political legacies to define identity as a set of practices rather than ascriptive features; this is the hermeneutical path followed here. The older statesmen
and their young assistants, who founded European integration after WWII, knew
from grim experience that politics aims at improvements, never final solutions.
Their very willingness to embrace uncertainty has not been well explained and
causes disquiet among EU citizens. Arendt sought solace in understanding, an
exercise open to all those who are willing to think, and which does not depend
on formal education or erudition. She called it the attempt to make oneself at
home in the world. But there is little sense of the enlarged mentality in the current controversies over EU borders and membership, as statesmen and citizens
can claim pressing obligations to avoid engaging in the internal dialogue, which
prepares the mind and psyche for judging and action. There is need for more of
Arendts thought-things, (the creative use of arts and founding narratives) to
support the positive impulses behind European integration: traveling exhibitions
about the origins of the European communities; documentaries on the negotiation
processes; stories about the enlargements.133
Whether European integration should continue as a political project is a matter
of opinion, a politically contested question, which must be settled at the voting
booth in the end. This book has retrieved traces of the principles of action that
inspired past and current EU institutions and policies from the stories of European witnesses. Mulling over original ethical commitments and practices is
crucial to the process of identity building in any political association, and this
book has offered evidence of public practices that transcend the legacy of violent
conflict resolution of the European continent. The fact that citizens, politicians
and thinkers confronted the long term consequences of wars, international and
civil, and created future-oriented programs of cooperation (Chapters 2, 3, 4); that
148
some actors in the Western Balkans are initiating reconciliatory processes and
getting support from the EU (Chapter 3); and that Turkish actors engage in daily
exchanges with other Europeans in all sectors of society (Chapter 5), is extraordinary in light of European history. This need not blind us to other realities:
creating a Common Foreign Policy, strengthening monetary and fiscal solidarity
among Member States of unequal wealth, bridging the gap between institutions
and citizens, and defining borders, will remain messy and unpredictable processes
(Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7).
The suggestion that Europeans remember the traces of reconciliation, power as
action in concert, recognition of the Other, truth telling, and the enlarged mentality in their recent past may be critiqued as another form of hubris. Perhaps, and
yet too little is made of the practices that helped keep the peace for over half a
century and contributed to making the European continent into a magnet for millions of immigrants. To let go of this legacy because of the intractability of current
issues would be to give up on the fierce determination of European founders, from
Robert Schuman and Irne Laure to Hrant Dink, to build a future worthy of the living. It would leave the European peoples, deprived of their treasure, even more
disoriented than today. To draw from the memory of proactive and connecting
policies and innovate at the same time, a want ad should be posted on the Internet:
Looking for understanding hearts. Arendts poetical expression captures admirably the human capacity for representation and imagination so crucial to politics.
As peoples in the EU and beyond wrestle to understand their world, they might yet
make themselves at home in it and, once again, become empowered to act.
Appendix
List of interviews
Grassroots interviews:
Testimonies of grassroots actors come from interviews with the author, autobiographies and memoirs, one volume of witnesses edited by French philosopher
Gabriel Marcel, journal articles and e-mail correspondence with the author. For
these references, see notes and bibliography.
Elite interviews:
I.
Interviews of close collaborators of Jean Monnet
Archives of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour lEurope, Lausanne, Switzerland.
See first the name of interviewer(s) and then the name of interviewee. The country
indicates the nationality of the interviewee.
1979
Franois Fontaine and
Jacques-Ren Rabier
Fernand Javel
22 March
France
1981
Antoine Mars
Jacques-Ren Rabier
Jean Fourasti,
1 October
6 May
France
France
II. 1984
Interviews of 17 negotiators of the Treaties on the EEC and Euratom and Max
Kohnstamm
Conducted by Roberto Ducci and Maria Grazia Melchionni. I have consulted both
the original interviews and the edited volume by Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.
Achille Albonetti
26 November
Italy
Franco Bobba
11, 13 February
Italy
Roberto Ducci
22 October
Italy
Maurice Faure
20 September
France
150 Appendix
Emanuele Gazzo
Hans von der Groeben
Johannes Linthorst Homan
Max Kohnstamm
Robert Marjolin
Ulrich Meyer-Cording
Emile Nol
Pierre Pescatore
Robert Rothschild
Jean-Charles Snoy et dOppuers
Pierre Uri
Ernst van der Beugel
Pierre Werner
26 May
22 May
1, 2 March
27 September
21 September
23 May
22 September
21 May
28 May
25 May
21 September
26 September
21 May
Belgium
Germany
Netherlands
Netherlands
France
Germany
France
Luxembourg
Belgium
Belgium
France
Belgium
Luxembourg
III. 1995
Interviews of Members of the European Parliament
All interviews below conducted by the author unless otherwise indicated.
Otto von Habsburg
5 May
Germany
Fernand Herman
4 May
Belgium
Leo Tindemans
5 May
Belgium
Carol Tongue
10 September
United Kingdom
(interview conducted
by Hlne-Marie Blondel)
EP Staff
Arthur Hildebrandt
5 May
Netherlands
(Secretariat of the Group of the European Peoples Party at the EP)
European Commission
Pierre Defraigne
4 May
Belgium
(Director for NorthSouth Relations in the Directorate General for External Relations)
IV. 1999
Members of the European Parliament
Gordon J. Adam
10 March
Enrique Barn Crespo
24 March
Jos Barros Moura
10 March
Maria Berger
23 March
Jean-Louis Bourlanges
7 April
(by telephone)
Daniel Cohn-Bendit
10 March
John Walls Cushnahan
16 March
Ben Fayot
23 March
Riccardo Garosci
11 March
Konstantinos Hatzidakis
9 March
United Kingdom
Spain
Portugal
Austria
France
Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Italy
Greece
Appendix 151
Fernand Herman
Nils Anker Kofoed
Catherine Lalumire
Iigo Mndez de Vigo
Jan Mulder
Arie M. Oostlander
Pertti Paasio
Doris Pack
The Lord Plumb
Reinhard Rack
Viviane Reding
Michel Rocard
Yiannis Roubatis
Yvonne Sandberg-Fries
Axel Schfer
Johannes Swoboda
Leo Tindemans
Helena Vaz Da Silva
Ivar Virgin
8 February,* 8 March
11 March
23 March
9 March
9 March
10, 14 April (by e-mail)
16 March
10 March
17 March
28 April (by telephone)
22 March
23 March
16 March
14 April (by telephone)
7 May (by telephone and fax)
9 March
Belgium
Denmark
France
Spain
Netherlands
Netherlands
Finland
Germany
United Kingdom
Austria
Luxembourg
France
Greece
Sweden
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Portugal
Sweden
*Group conversation
Former Commission President
Jacques Delors
25 March
Commission officials
Marc P. E. Vanheukelen
3 March
Rutger Wissels
5 March
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Former collaborators of Jean Monnet

Max Kohnstamm
19 March
Netherlands
Jacques-Ren Rabier
3 March
France
Henri Rieben
22 February
Switzerland
(I had subsequent conversations with Mr. Kohnstamm, Mr. Rabier and Professor
Rieben)
Academic and legal expert
Jean-Victor Louis
5 March
Belgium
V. 2002
Maria Berger
15 May
Emma Bonino
15 May
Jean-Louis Bourlanges
14 May
John Walls Cushnahan
16 May
Konstantinos Hatzidakis
15 May
Catherine Lalumire
16 May
Austria
Italy
France
Ireland
Greece
France
152 Appendix
Reinhard Rack
Michel Rocard
14 May
15 May
Austria
France
Representatives of candidate countries and diplomat in The Hague

Jan iek
(Deputy Head of mission)
29 May
Czech Republic
Boris Frlec (Ambassador)
29 May
Slovenia
Allenka Jerak (Consul)
29 May
Slovenia
Mustafa Kamal Kazi (Ambassador)
29 May
Pakistan
Jn Penica (Second Secretary)
28 May
Slovakia
VI. 2005
Bronislaw Geremek
Srgio Marques
Reinhard Rack
VII. 2008
Andrew Duff
Paulo Casaca
Richard Corbett
Enrique Barn Crespo
Gabriela Cretu
Proinsias De Rossa
Bronislaw Geremek
Jo Leinen
Miguel Angel Martnez Martnez
Doris Pack
Michel Rocard
Gyrgy Schpflin
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides
Kristian Vigenin
Jan Marinus Wiersma
9 June
8 June
7 June
Poland
Portugal
Austria
3 December
12 March
13 March
11 March
11 March
11 March
13 March
12 March,
4 December
4 December
13 March
3 December
10 March
13 November
12 March
11 March
United Kingdom
Portugal
United Kingdom
Spain
Romania
Ireland
Poland
Germany
Spain
Germany
France
Hungary
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Netherlands
Members of the Staff to the European Parliament

Pascal Fontaine
4 December
France
(Special Adviser to the European Peoples Party and European Democrats Group)
Ambroise Perrin
12 November
France
(Special Adviser to the Socialist Group)
Uwe Staffler
11 March
Italy
(Assistant to Italian MEP Lili Gruber)
Ali Yuartaggl
3 December
France and Turkey
(Special Adviser to the Green Group)
Appendix 153
Council of the European Union
Robert Cooper
4 December
United Kingdom
(Director-general for External and Politico-military Affairs)
Association pour le Muse de lEurope

Antoinette Spaak
12 November
(Chair of the Board of the Association and former MEP)
Academics
Bashkim Iseni
Andrej Rahten
14 March
15 March 2009
Belgium
Switzerland
Slovenia
1999 Questionnaire for elite interviews

1) Do you think that European integration remains a peacemaking project; where
do enlargement and regionalization fit in this context?
2) Jacques Delors would like enlargement pushed back until the EMU is well in
place; Timothy Garton Ash thinks it should be a speedy process for the sake
of peace; how would you arbitrate this debate?
3) The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt writes that a political
community rests on the human capacity for speech and action, but also on
the ability to promise and forgive; it seems clear that promise and forgiveness
played a role in the early years of European integration. Do you agree; is this
role still needed today?
4) Many criticize the process of European integration for its elitist aspect. Do
you agree? What is the role of the citizen in the enlargement program?
5) The European Community remains the main pillar of the EU. How do you
define a political community; is this definition applicable to the EU? What are
the respective roles of the regions, the EU administration and the nation-states
in this community?
6) How do you visualize an enlarged EU? New members are asked to undergo
significant changes, but how will these new members change the EU? Are the
people of the EU, and especially of your country, aware of the possible need
to change in order to enlarge?
7) The German philosopher Jrgen Habermas is a partisan of constitutional
patriotism: Europeans will learn to act and feel as such by accepting the rule
of law and common institutions. In contrast, Charles Taylor thinks the citizen
needs to develop an affective attachment to the homeland, out of a common
history, myths, traditions. What do you think, especially in the light of the
experience of your country with the EU?
2008 Questionnaire for elite interviews
1) On 9 May 2000, Jacques Delors recalled the thought of Hannah Arendt
on political forgiveness and promise to urge the EU to draw from the
154 Appendix
2)
3)
4)
5)
reconciliatory heritage of the Coal and Steel Community. Such principles,

which Robert Schuman shared, could powerfully affect the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo according to Delors. Do you agree? Do you know of EU
programs promoting forgiveness (reconnection with the other in spite of the
past) and promise (treaty; agreement) in Kosovo, or between Serbia and
Kosovo? Or should the EU focus primarily on security, judicial and economic
development as it does today?
Democratic legitimacy rests on a certain quality of truth-telling according
to the philosopher Jrgen Habermas. The Treaty establishing a Constitution
of Europe was meant to improve democratic legitimacy by proposing a readable text thanks to the work of an open Convention. Does the Treaty of Lisbon
and its negotiation process meet the requirement of truth-telling? Explain
your yes or no. If no, what could have been the alternative?
Political power is generally understood as the capacity to get things done, by
force if necessary. But Arendt interpreted power as a form of action in concert implying equality and mutuality. The founding of the European Communities can be interpreted as a form of Arendtian power. What EU policies
exemplify best today power as Arendt understood it? Where is the EU too
weak as the American political scientist Robert Kagan argues? Any comment on the CFSP?
In April 1950 Monnet retreated for two weeks to the Swiss Alps to think
through his proposal for the ECSC. Arendt stressed the importance of thinking to political judgment. What is the most challenging issue to think through
on your current agenda? How do you find time?
Do you support full EU membership for Turkey if it complies with the
Copenhagen criteria?
Notes
1 Principles of action or clichs? Why hermeneutics matters to

1 The author has translated the texts in French cited in this book into English unless
the name of another translator is indicated in the bibliography. The endnotes provide
the title of the work of the political theorists cited, but in all other cases only the
name of the author cited, the date and the page number. For full references, see the
bibliography.
2 Tocqueville, 1969, 12.
3 The Philadelphia Convention and the work of the American Founding Fathers have
inspired lively commentaries for over two hundred years. See, for instance, Wolin,
1989.
4 Jean Monnet, who helped conceive the Robert Schuman Declaration on the European
Coal and Steel Community, has been a frequent target of misinterpretations. Thus it
is surprising to read that he supported the notion of the European Community as a
public utility state, with no source cited. Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003, 8. Monnet
never used this term. This book will argue for a closer historical and political reading
of Monnets intents and actions. See Chapters 2, 4, 6 and 7.
Some excellent studies on the ideas and ideals of European integration began
to appear at the turn of the century. See, inter alia, Laffan, 1996; Obradovic, 1996;
Weiler, 1999, especially chapters 7 and 10; Gardner Feldman in Banchoff and Smith,
1999; Manners, 2000; and Pond, 2002. For other titles see this chapters section on the
European visions of the good.
5 The terminology of the institutions standing for European integration is complex. I
refer to the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for the period 19508;
to the European Communities (EC) for the period 195792; and to the European Union
(EU) after 1992. When I write of the ECSC/EC/EU, I am referring to the 60-yearlong history of European integration. I prefer this awkward collection of acronyms
to the term Europe in order not to conflate the two, a rather hegemonic conceptual
practice, as Thomas Risse readily acknowledges, given the fact that several European
countries do not belong to the EU. Risse in Wiener and Diez, 2009, 154. On the European Economic Community (EEC), see Chapter 4.
6 Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998.
7 There is a dearth of research on the founding of ECSC as a reconciliatory experience.
However, the scholarly literature on the EU as a promoter of reconciliation has grown
exponentially in the last half-decade. For detailed references on this, see Chapter 2.
8 Former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzles puzzled over the definition of the
European Union in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which he helped negotiate: We needed
to define what it is, or no one would understand us. Hence, like curious children who
question their parents, we asked ourselves, the forefathers of the invention: What is
156
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Notes
this? Imagine the difficulties we encountered when EU advocates, Euroskeptics, and
other political fauna from 12 countries attempted to define the new creation. Finally,
we decided that the European Union is a union of peoples. Exhausted by the effort,
we had to hush the questioning child because we were having difficulties finding the
answer to the next question: What do we mean by a union of peoples? Gonzles,
1999, 31.
See, inter alia, Bahcheli, Couloumbis and Carley, 1997; Piening, 1997; Dallmayr,
2001, 216; Moon and Suh, 2007, 3248.
Moravcsik, 1998, 500.
Jacques-Ren Rabier, one of Jean Monnets closest collaborators and later the initiator of the Eurobarometers, warns strongly against monocausal explanations of the
European integration process. Rabier, 1999, interview.
Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 295, 497, 1635, 55, 21, 82, 148, 460.
These references only indicate a few relevant passages in this long and brilliant book.
Jrgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida pose the same question as they ponder whether
the most significant historical achievements of Europe forfeited their identityforming power precisely through the fact of their worldwide success. Habermas and
Derrida in Levy, Pensky and Torpey, 2005, 8.
Kearney, 2004, 5, 4; Dosse, 1997, 626.
Hannah Arendt has attracted the attention of many excellent scholars. In this book I
draw primarily from the commentaries of Ronald Beiner, Seyla Benhabib, Margaret
Canovan, Mary G. Dietz, Jrgen Habermas, Melvyn A. Hill, Annabel Herzog, Melvyn
A. Hill, Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, George Kateb, D. L. Marshall,
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Paul Ricoeur, Leslie Paul Thiele, Dana R. Villa, Elisabeth
Young-Bruehl and Linda Zerilli.
Jaspers, The European Spirit, 46; Jaspers, The Future of Germany, 150; Jaspers, The
Question of German Guilt.
Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 4412.
Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays and The Divided West;
Oddvar Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; Scheuerman, 2008a, 13351.
Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism,
198.
Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 11; Jahanbegloo, 1992.
Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 14950.
Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 21.
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, 33.
de Schouteete, 2000. See Chapter 1, Concept and Action.
Laffan, 1996; Obradovic, 1996; Wolton, 1993.
In a 1999 speech in Strasbourg Cathedral former Commission President Jacques Delors
called on his audience to give a soul to Europe, which he equated with meaning,
and spiritual strength. Delors, 1999. See also Delors, 2006.
Romano Prodi used similar language when he accepted his appointment as new
Commission President by the European Council in April 1999. He declared to the
Financial Times his hope that during his presidency the EU will begin to develop
. . . a common European soul. For that you need a very high, top level commission,
not in terms of bureaucracy, but in terms of common feeling and understanding of
what is happening. Prodi compared the common European soul to a common will.
Peter Norman, Lionel Barber, James Blitz, In search of a soul for Europe, Financial
Times, Weekend 30 September, 1 October, 2000.
Abls in Lequesne and Smith, 1997, 545.
Arendt, On Revolution, 212.
See, inter alia, on democratic theory, Oddvar Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; Siedentop,
2001; Elbe, 2003; Morgan, 2005.
For theoretical and methodological studies, see Wiener and Diez, 2009; Cini and
Notes 157
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Bourne, 2006. Most textbooks on the EU published in the English language in the last
five years include a chapter on methodological approaches, which is new.
Parsons, 2003, 133, 102.
Elbe, 2003, 107, 121.
Reflection Group on The Intellectual, Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe,
Concluding Remarks, October 2004.
Derrida, 1992, 48, 7689. I am indebted to Ian Manners for these references. See
Manners, 2006, 127.
The successful drive by the EU to promote the abolition of the death penalty constitutes the empirical evidence of a power diffusing norms not by force but through a
process of contagion, informational and procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filtering. Manners, 2002, 23558, 245, 251.
See, inter alia, Frederica Bicchi, Adrian Hyde-Price, Helene Sjursen, Erik Oddvar
Eriksen, Michael Smith in Sjursen, 2006a, 169327; and Pace, 2007, 104164.
Manners, 2002, 251.
Morgan, 2005, 142, 1612, 164, 169.
The EU Commissions Eurobarometers poll representative samples of citizens in all
member and candidate states. They include regularly repeated questions on the EU
institutions and the functioning of democracy, and additional questions on topics considered important at the time of the survey, such as unemployment, the roles of sexes,
consumer behavior, and education.
Green, 2007; Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 2004.
Green, 2008, 23, 25; Risse in Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 2004, 2534.
I am indebted for this distinction to John Gray, 2007, 268.
Aristotle, Politics.
Arendt, Essays in Understanding 19301954, 308.
Madison, 1999, 70511.
Anderson, 1991, 7.
Ricoeur, Memory, 52.
Arendt writes of imagination that it is the only inner compass we have. Far from
being irrational it enables us to see things in their proper perspective, from far enough
to be without prejudice, but close enough as though it were our own affair. Arendt,
Essays in Understanding, 323.
Young-Bruehl, 2004, 406, 404.
Bernard Crick of London University admits being embarrassed by Arendts admiration of the American Founding Fathers and offers this explanation: Every German
American does it once in gratitude. Ibid., 403.
Montesquieu, 1989, 21.
Berlin, Against the Current, 141.
Arendt, Between Past and Future, 6.
For more on Arendt and Montesquieu, see Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. II,
2012.
Canovan, 1992, 172.
Kalyvas, 2008, 250.
For an outstanding analysis of Arendts principles of action, read Kalyvas, 2008,
24153.
For Kalyvas the principles must be retrieved through widespread, informal and extraconstitutional processes of persuasion and contestation. Ibid., 252. Arendt would ask
for more theoretical engagement. She bemoans the failure to remember of the American revolutionaries and their successors: as a result Americans came to confuse free
enterprise with freedom, and the American Revolution remained sterile in terms of
world politics. Arendt, On Revolution, 209, 211.
Weiler, 1999, 4.
The Schuman Declaration in Fontaine, 2000, 367.
158
Notes
56 Ricoeur, Memory, 279.

57 Alasdair MacIntyre stresses that the behavior of political actors cannot be understood
independently from their intentions, which are themselves linked to specific settings,
be they a practice, a historical context or an institution. MacIntyre in Sandel, 1984,
128.
58 Berlin, Against the Current, 138.
59 Ricoeur, Memory, 2345, 21.
60 Arendt, The Human Condition, 184; Men in Dark Times, 21.
Charles Taylor writes; Making sense of my present action . . . requires a narrative
understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a
story. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 48.
61 Ricoeur insists on the plausibility of the testimony in Memory, n. 24, 531.
Arendts stories did not always score very high for accuracy. Margaret Canovan
finds the story told in On Totalitarianism something of an embarrassment: a brilliant, ambitious and highly questionable interpretation. . . . But it reveals insights from
which we can learn even if the story lacks persuasiveness. Canovan, 1992, 27980.
62 Maxwell, 1996, 70.
63 Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.
64 Having turned to memoirs, essays and interviews of European initiators to learn about
the ECSC/EC/EU tradition, I assume that these documents are not mere acts of
deception, but the genuine expression of their authors views.
65 Maurice Halbwachs most famous work is The Collective Memory.
66 Ricoeur, Memory, 3937, 411.
67 Gaffney, 1999; Shriver, 1995; Schmidt, 2006.
68 The tricky question of levels of analysis will be revisited in the next chapters. Here it
should be understood that when the name of an agent is a nation, such as Italy signed
a treaty, it represents the Italian governments official action. See also pages 856, 87,
88, 92, 181 n. 61.
69 Ricoeur, Memory, 166.
70 These narratives do not copy the event recorded, but stand for it. Ricoeur,
Memory, 279.
71 Arendt, On Revolution, 20713 and 2723. See also Chapter 4.
72 In order to make the comparison with Habermas convincing, it is necessary to disassociate Habermas model of constitutional making from his broader theory of
discourse ethics according to Kalyvas, 2008, 251. This seems a high cost to pay.
73 Habermas, Justification and Application, 358.
74 For Arendts discussion of German values, see Arendt, Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, in Responsibility and Judgment. On action, see Arendts endorsement of the
Resistances proposals for the postwar reintegration of Germany in a united Europe in
Essays in Understanding, 11420.
75 See, inter alia, de Gruchy, 2002; Shriver, 1995; Wink, 1998.
76 On forgiving and promising, see Arendt, The Human Condition, 23647; On Revolution, 164.
77 Balibar, 2002, 801; Glucksmann, 1997, 32, 19.
78 Pjer Zalica, Fuse (Gori vatra). Global Lens Festival, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis,
1 October, 2005.
79 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 308.
80 While expressing repeatedly his admiration for the new European politics of peace, a
blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration on both sides of the Atlantic,
Kagan argues that Europeans could step out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into
the Kantian paradise of international law only thanks to the military protection of the
United States. Kagan, 2004, 97, 75.
81 Arendt, The Human Condition, 199205.
82 For the interviews, see Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.
Notes 159
83 Nicolaidis, 2004, 102.
84 The bitter spat between Germany and Polands leaders at the EU Summit of 22 June
2007 was unusual but not exceptional. Polands Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski
argued that his country deserved more voting rights in the new EU Reform Treaty
because without the bloodshed caused by Germany in WWII Poland would have 66
million people, not the 38 million it has today. German foreign minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier responded that the Polish argument was an unjustified use of historical
prejudices and likely to fuel new tensions. Hugh Williamson and Jan Clenski, Germany hits at Poles war claim, Financial Times, Thursday 28 June 2007. See Chapter
6 for similarly tough-worded exchanges between the representatives of Greece and
Germany in 2010.
85 The acquis communautaire is the EU term for all the laws and regulations approved
since 1958.
86 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. I, 4.
87 Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 2006, 286, 2913.
88 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 308. See also Taylor, Sources of the Self, 34, 47.
2 After the deluge: the principle of reconciliation
1 Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009, 12.
The Spring 2008 Eurobarometers 69 confirms this trend: Peace, human rights and
respect for human life are the three most important values for Europeans. Two of these
human rights and peace are also, along with democracy, those that best represent
the European Union in their eyes.
2 Glucksmann, 1997, 32, 19.
Catherine Lalumire acknowledged the stress put on economic questions when the
European Communities were created; she learned about the reconciliatory aspect of
European integration only when she joined the Mitterrand government in the 1980s
after several decades of political involvement as a senior French civil servant and legal
expert. Lalumire, 1999, interview.
3 The Copenhagen criteria are respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
alongside administrative capacity and a market economy.
4 For interesting discussions on when European reconciliation started and divergent
memories, see Rosoux in Mink and Neumayer, 2007 and Geremek in Wiersma and
Swoboda, 2009.
Like this author, Diez, Albert and Stetter choose the founding of the European Coal
and Steel Community as the starting point of state-led initiatives for reconciliation.
Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 2, 4.
Others argue for the 1957 Treaties of Rome, or the 1963 FrenchGerman Treaty of
the Elyse, or 1989 as the start of the reunification of the whole of Europe. Making
the Elyse Treaty the starting point is to forget that European reconciliations from the
beginning involved more than two states.
5 Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 66.
6 Mink and Neumayer, 2007, 252, 19.
7 Attali, 1994, 10.
8 Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, 72, 7680.
9 Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 70.
10 Arendt, On Violence, 51.
11 Rumelili, 2007, 107; Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 337.
12 Mink, 2007, 34.
13 Haas, 1958.
14 See, inter alia, Obradovic, 1995; Laffan, 1996; Manners, 2002; Morgan, 2005;
Parsons, 2003.
160
Notes
15 Gardner Feldman, 1999a and 1999b; Guisan, 2003 and 2005; Pond, 2002 and 2006.
16 Rumelili, 2008, 102, 1045.
For recent works on the EU as a promoter of peace and reconciliation, see Tocci,
2004 and 2007; Manners, 2006; Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008; Diez and Tocci, 2009;
Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem, 2009.
17 Pace, 2007 and 2008b; Tocci, 2004.
18 Pond, 2002 and 2006; Rumelili, 2007 and 2008.
Czech President Vclav Havel was a major initiator of the rapprochement, which culminated with the German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly
Cooperation signed in 1992, and continued after the Velvet Divorce between the
Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.
19 Tocci, 2007, 174; Hayward and Wiener, 2008, 33.
20 Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 45; Rumelili, 2007, 120; Hayward, 2007, 679.
21 Jarausch, 2007, 11.
Jacques Derrida and Jrgen Habermas suggest that the lack of European memory
may be due to an all too successful exorcism of past conflicts. Habermas and Derrida,
2005, 8.
22 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 308. Some scholars who mistrust the liberating
power of forgiveness discuss reconciliation in similar terms. See Brudholm, 2008,
116; and for a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see Prager in Prager and Govier,
2003.
23 Arendt in Young-Bruehl, 2004, 405.
24 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 318. For more on Arendt and story-telling, see also
Hill, 1979, 28798.
25 Diez, Albert and Stetter conceptualize the influence of the EU on border conflicts by
distinguishing between the EU compulsory impact on policy, its connective impact
on society, its enabling impact through the financing of common activities, and its
constructive impact on the underlying identity-scripts of conflicts. These four pathways are interconnected. Albert, Diez and Stetter in Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008,
249. Tocci discusses conditionality as a mechanism whereby a reward is granted
or withheld depending on the fulfillment of an attached condition, on the basis of five
case studies. The other mechanisms through which the EU exerts its influence are
social learning and passive enforcement, or rule application. Tocci, 2007, 1027.
Of course, these scholars do not argue that the EU always plays a positive role to
promote peace, rather they provide analytical frameworks to assess the effectiveness
(or lack thereof) of the EUs current policies and strategies for peace-making.
26 For a more elaborate discussion of the relationship between acting and thinking in
politics, see Chapter 7.
27 Milward, 1984, 465.
28 Judt, 2005, 1362.
29 Barrington Moore, Jr. in Couture, Nielsen and Seymour, 1996, 124, 125 and 1312.
30 Boismorand, 2007,189206.
Jacques Maritain cites German poet Heinrich Heine who reminded his French
friends in the early nineteenth century that German grievances had more ancient roots
than the French cared to remember. German memories reached as far back as 900 AD
when the French beheaded Konrad of Staufen in Napoli. You have surely forgotten
this incident long since, wrote Heine. But we forget nothing. You see that if ever the
idea comes to us to make contact with you we will not lack plausible justifications . . .
Remain on your guard. Maritain, 1993, 172.
31 Historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in Roussel, 1996, 491.
32 Keylor, 1992, 286.
33 Arendt, Essays, 216.
34 Maritain, 1993, 34, 46.
35 Rieben, 1987, 538.
Notes 161
36 Citations from the Schuman Declaration. Fontaine, 2000, 36.
In spite of the long-standing enmity between France and Germany, there were
several attempts at European reconciliation, mostly initiated at the elite level, after
WWI. The first initiative was French and aimed at fitting Germany into a framework of international economic agreements. Gillingham, 1991a, 1. In 1918 French
Minister of Commerce Etienne Clementel, assisted by Jean Monnet, proposed to his
AngloSaxon allies to keep in place the system of wartime economic cooperation,
and to progressively include Germany in it. But Britain and the United States were
not interested; and in the face of this abrupt return to economic nationalism, France
was driven to exact more reparation payments from Germany, and in 1923 its armed
forces even occupied the Ruhr to ensure the supply of German coke and coal to the
Alsace-Lorraine steel mills. The 1925 Locarno Agreement, which conceded the permanence of the German loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the permanent demilitarization
of the Rhineland in exchange for the evacuation of allied troops from the Cologne
zone and a scaling down of the occupation forces elsewhere in the Rhineland, was
another important step in the rapprochement between Germany and France. US
business and finance circles supported the 1924 Dawes Plan, which injected a huge
amount of American capital into Germany to help the Germans pay war reparations
and more. As a result, the International Steel Cartel was formed in 1926 and remained
an active forum for exchanges between French and German steel producers even in the
1930s. The 1929 Wall Street crash put an end to the Dawes Plan. For William Keylor,
the evidence of a genuine French desire to cooperate economically with Germany,
particularly in the critical metallurgical sector (where French iron ore complemented
German coking coal) suggests an opportunity for Franco-German reconciliation that
was tragically lost. Keylor, 1992, 83, 122, 92.
37 Schuman, 1964, 88, 91, 106.
38 Poidevin, 1986, 208.
39 Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002, xxxi; Herf in ibid., 27594. For a similar argument, see
Wolffsohn, 1993.
40 On transitional justice in Europe, see Allcock, 2009; Kostovicova, 2010; and Suboti,
2009.
41 The Western Allies did not stop Hitler in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia,
the Japanese in Manchuria, or Mussolini in Abyssinia. They remained deaf to all
alarm signals. Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, 907.
42 Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 12.
43 Jaspers, The Question, 22.
44 Ibid., 603.
45 Ibid., 11823.
Metaphysical guilt assumes a realm of world solidarity where every person feels
responsible for any wrong committed anywhere.
46 Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 689.
47 Jaspers war and postwar experiences convinced him that philosophy could not be
dissociated from politics: It was no accident that National Socialism, as well as Bolshevism, saw in philosophy a deadly spiritual enemy. . . . Only after I became deeply
stirred by politics did my philosophy become fully conscious of its very basis, including its metaphysics. Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 70.
48 Judt, 2005, 271.
49 For positive evaluations of Adenauers record on this score, see Habermas in
Krzemiski, 1994, 24, 26; Herf in Hedetoft and Herf, 2002, 2779; Wighton, 1963,
17.
Jaspers and Arendt were harshly critical of Adenauer. See Arendts letter to Jaspers in Kohler and Saner, 1992, 479. Jaspers, however, felt that West Germany owed
Adenauer a debt of gratitude for helping prevent a communist take over. Jaspers,
The Future of Germany, 256.
162
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
Notes
Adenauer, 1967, 127.
Adenauer, 1966, 39.
Ibid.
Adenauer 1967, 141, 145.
For an estimation of the value of the compensations paid by the FRG before reunification and by Germany since, see Shriver, 1995, 89.
In November 2007 Germany declared its willingness to discuss making extra
pension payment to Holocaust survivors because at the time of the 1952 agreement,
the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union and the expenses of caring for them into
their old age had not been taken into account. Anshel Pfeffer, Germany says willing
to discuss Holocaust survivors pensions, Haaretz, 15 November 2007.
There is an ongoing debate on whether the Europeans, and especially the Germans,
have atoned adequately. In the last 30 years there has been a surge in narratives of
repentance, which have become like a duty to memory. Kattan, 2002, 19. Some
object to this culture of penitence. Bruckner, 2006, 379.
Arendt, The Human Condition, 23647.
In an interview on German TV in 1964, Arendt explained how she argued with
many of her former acquaintances who had fallen in their own trap during the Nazi
period when she returned to Germany in 1949. I am not particularly agreeable, nor
am I very polite; I say what I think. But somehow relations were set straight again with
a lot of people who were neither murderers nor informers. Arendt, Essays, 1415.
She renewed her friendship with her former mentor and lover, Martin Heidegger, who
never admitted to any culpability for his pro-Nazi attitude in the 1930s, and she helped
publicize his work in the US. In contrast, Jaspers could never bring himself to renew
his acquaintance with his prewar colleague, Heidegger.
Peter Digeser argues that forgiveness is not about eradicating resentment, which may
be too demanding or too intrusive for politics, but about restoring a relationship
which has gone wrong. It requires that the transgressor, once forgiven, be treated in a
different way . . . [It] entails a particular kind of conduct. Digeser, 1998, 701, 704.
Ricoeur, Memory, 501. According to Ricoeur, if forgiveness re-establishes a horizontal relationship of equality between forgiver and forgiven, it leaves untouched the
vertical relationship between the height of forgiveness and the depth of the fault.
Brudholm, 2008; Kateb, 1984, 35.
The hallmark of politics for Arendt is that it is non-violent, not that it eliminates the
conflicts endemic to the human condition.
Vladimir Janklvitch thinks on the contrary that forgiveness exists for desperate and
incurable cases. Janklvitch cited by Olivier Abel, 1996, 223.
Digeser, 1998, 707.
Schaap in Lang and Williams, 2005, 80.
Lang and Williams, 2005, 226.
Young-Bruehl, 2006, 140, 143.
Monnet headed the Commissariat-General of the French Modernization and Investment Plan, a state agency directly accountable to the prime minister, which had been
set up by decree in 1946, and he worked in that capacity for ten prime ministers until
he was appointed president of the High Authority of the ECSC in 1952.
Duchne, 1994, 205.
Acheson, 1969, 382.
Arendt, The Human Condition, 178; The Origins of Totalitarianism, 4789.
Poidevin 1986, 260.
Schuman, 1964, 166.
Syndicated columnist James McCartney wrote in terms reminiscent of Arendt:
Notes 163
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
When I was an American soldier in Europe in World War II, it was impossible to
imagine that France and Germany in my lifetime, would not only become allies, but
leaders in a drive to unite all of Europe. . . . The French and the Germans success so far
in looking forward rather than back can give hope. The French and the Germans have
already proved that miracles do happen. James McCartney, Collaboration Between
Longtime Enemies France, Germany Political Miracle, St Paul Pioneer Press, 15
June 1992.
Monnet did not talk about forgiveness, but of promise and the future. In Luxembourg
we felt that we were building a new community. Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
In terms of law and politics, Europes first experiment in supranationalism was . . . a
latter-day equivalent of the American Articles of Confederation a forerunner to a far
stronger and more permanent union. Gillingham, 1991a, 363.
Early business travels to Britain and the United States on behalf of his familys brandy
firm had shaped Monnets political philosophy. He held AngloSaxon democracies
in great esteem and believed that, The British have a better understanding than the
Continentals of institutions and how to use them. Continentals tend to believe that
problems are solved by men. Undoubtedly, men are important; but without institutions, they reach no great and enduring decisions. This the British have long understood. That is why, unlike many people, I had no fear that their accession would upset
the working of the Community. Monnet, 1978, 451.
Rabier, 1999, interview.
Material symbols mattered also. The French Stationary Office had the Treaty of Paris
printed on Dutch vellum with German ink; it was bound in Belgian parchment with
Italian silk ribbons and Luxembourg glue. Monnet, 1978, 356.
Ibid., 3567.
Articles 546 and 656 in the 1952 Treaty of Paris on the ECSC.
Monnet, 1978, 313.
Arendt critiques state sovereignty in an ambiguous manner. On one hand, when
a single entity, whether an individual or a collectivity bound by an identical will,
claims sovereignty, this implies hierarchy and is antithetical to politics. On the other
hand, sovereignty assumes, in the case of many men mutually bound by promises, a
certain limited reality. The Human Condition, 245.
There was a retreat from supranationality in the European treaties following the first
Treaty of Paris. The Council of Ministers representing the Member States became the
main legislator. From then on the Community procedures owe much to traditional
diplomacy. In the Council the debates are not public and legislation that requires
unanimity can easily become bogged down and deadlocked. Louis, 1995, 42.
According to the usual rules of international law, states have an equal right to interpret
the treaties, which they have ratified, in order to have their sovereignty protected; in
case of conflict they rely on arbitration.
The ECJ followed the basic principles of equality, freedom, solidarity and unity in
its rulings and relied on the functional or teleological method of interpretation
to choose the interpretation most conducive to further the overall aims of the treaties. Borchardt, 1994, 5861. As its role became increasingly controversial, the court
eventually moderated its constitutionalizing ardor. For more on the early years at the
ECJ, see the comments by G. Frederico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for
Europe in Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991. Mancini was a member of the European
Court of Justice.
According to the 1949 German Basic Law, the Federal Republic is ready to transfer
sovereign rights to international institutions, and to accept those limitations upon its
sovereign rights which will produce and secure a lasting peaceful order in Europe and
among the nations of the world, in Adenauer, 1955, 11. The 1946 French Constitution
stated that, subject to reciprocity, France may agree to limit its sovereignty where
164
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
Notes
necessary for organization and defense of peace. And the 1958 French Constitution
refers to the statement on shared sovereignty in the 1946 Constitution. The 1953 Dutch
Constitution included a provision for transfer of sovereignty to the Community. The
1956 Luxembourg Constitution, the 1948 Italian Constitution, and the Danish Constitution since 1953 contain similar clauses. Louis, 1995, 17180.
Alan Keenan highlights the theoretical tension between the requirements of
stability vested in the good constitution and natality in Arendts thought. Keenan,
1994, 309.
Monnet drew from his experience with the League of Nations, an organization expected
to last forever, the lesson that, It was important never to break up with anyone so that
the process could continue. But it was no point working under the illusion that results
would be definitive. Nothing is definitive in life. Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
Schuman, 1964, 186.
See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this problematic aspect of Arendts theory of public
action.
Gardner Feldman 1999b, 70.
It is important to note that Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer supported the doctrines
of social Catholicism, which emphasizes social justice and the economic rights of
working people. For more on this and De Gasperi, see Capperucci, 2009; Cau, 2009;
Lorenzini, 2009; Taverni, 2009.
Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
Ibid.
Steiner in Jarausch and Lindenberger, 2007.
Daltrop, 1982, 10.
Gillingham in Brinkley and Hackett, 1991b, 152.
Gillingham, 1991a, 355.
Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994, 6502.
According to Dirk Spierenburg, the initially skeptical Dutch representative on the first
HA, and French historian Raymond Poidevin, The Luxembourg melting-pot forged
a European team that was more often than not capable of looking beyond the national
horizon and serving a broader cause. Many of its members, imbued with this new
spirit and fortified by their experience, made substantial contributions to the establishment of the new Communities before leaving Luxembourg for Brussels when the High
Authority ceased to exist. Ibid., 6545.
Wallensteen, 2007, 26672.
Gardner Feldman discusses three other variables: history as the willingness to confront
the past; institutions as the building of a new framework for relationship between
former enemies; and leadership or the agency of visionary societal actors. Gardner
Feldman, 1999a, 3346.
Guisan, 2003, 34, 38; Roussel, 1996, 519.
Cini in Schain, 2001, 32; Judt in Schain, 2001, 7. The Marshall Plan had a number of
indirect effects: it facilitated the gradual reintegration of West Germany into the West
European fold and improved the economic conditions that made future efforts at
cooperation more promising. It established transnational elite contacts, both formal
and informal, which facilitated transnational socialization with a preference for
institutionalized multilateral cooperation in place of the earlier preference for ad hoc
bilateralism. Cini in Schain, 2001, 32.
Roussel, 1996, 51819.
Monnet, 1978, 3523.
Monnet, 1978, 462 and 390; speech to the ECSC Assembly in Monnet, 1955, 64.
Gillingham, 1991b, 156; Milward, 1984, 420.
However, the ECSC did not establish the beginning of supranational governance,
which Monnet had hoped for. Nor did it manage to dismantle the German coal and
steel cartels. Gillingham, ibid.
Notes 165
110 Dominique Mosi critiques the persistent academic resistance to account for emotions
in international relations. Mosi, 2008, 44.
111 Monnet, 1978, 291.
Men who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected to a new set of
obligations, adapt their behavior and become different. If the new context is better,
they themselves become better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community, and the process of civilization itself. Ibid., 38990.
112 Adenauer, 1966, 331.
113 Jacques-Ren Rabier, a senior French civil servant, was Monnets directeur de cabinet
in the French Planning Commission (Commissariat du Plan) and at the ECSC High
Authority. He became directeur de cabinet of Monnets successor, Ren Mayer. In
1960 he became head of the Directorate X, responsible for information and the press
relations of the three European communities (EEC, Euratom and ECSC). Rabier took
early retirement in 1973 but volunteered for the Commission. In this capacity he created the Eurobarometer after training in polling methods in the US with Ronald Inglehart, and he remained active with Directorate X until 1990. Max Kohnstamm became a
diplomat for the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry after spending much of the war years
in prison. In 1952 he joined Monnet in Luxembourg and became secretary-general
of the ECSC. When Monnet retired from the presidency of the ECSC, Kohnstamm
helped him set up the Comit dAction pour les Etats-Unis dEurope and became its
first secretary-general and eventually its vice-president. He was the first president of
the European Institute in Florence from 1974 to 1981.
114 Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
115 Rabier and Kohnstamm, 1999, interviews.
116 Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
117 The citations of Kohnstamm in the text and this note are excerpts of the 1999 interview
with the author.
One day Franz Etzel, the ECSC German vice-president, sent to Kohnstamm a
former German officer for a job interview. When the man entered he insisted to tell
me all about his career in the Wehrmacht. I replied that this was none of my business.
We were here for the futures sake, not to remain bound to the past. But my German visitor insisted to tell me how he had served under seven German generals in
France, North Africa and Russia. He wanted me to know about his past so that things
would be clear between us. I did not have anything to forgive him. We became great
friends.
118 I knew I had a real friendship with a German when we could talk about the concentration camps, says Rabier of his early years with the ECSC in Luxembourg. Rabier,
1999, interview.
119 Schuman, 1964, 49, 44, 26, 125.
120 Maurizio Cau, 2009, 433. Paolo Pombeni and Giuliana Nobili Schiera have edited the
complete works of De Gasperi in three volumes, 2007, 2008, 2009.
121 See Capperucci; Cau; Lorenzini; Taverni in the excellent special issue of Modern
Italy, 2009 on De Gasperi.
122 Monnet, 1978, dedication and 288.
123 Rabier, 1999, interview.
124 Fourasti, 1981, Mars interview.
125 Monnet, 1978, 3412.
126 The French revolutionary politics of purity, with its misplaced emphasis on the heart
as the source of political virtue, ended up devouring its own children. Arendt, On
Revolution, 86, 87.
127 Canovan, 1992, 197.
128 Bloomfield, 2006, 278. For an analysis that stresses the interaction between elite and
grassroots processes of reconciliation, see Margaret Smith, 2005.
129 Maas, 2007; Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009.
166
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
Notes
The foundation of the ECSC was legitimate but it did not call upon civic participation of the many, although it did enjoy popular support. Hewstone, 1986.
According to Arendt, opinion cannot be represented and political parties promote
interests rather than public happiness. On Revolution, 2678.
Arendt, On Violence, 84. For critical comments, see Canovan, 1978, 56; Kateb, 1984,
115.
Isaacs, 1994, 159.
Rabier, 1999, interview.
Bouvet et al., 1998, 16.
Rocard and Herman, 1999, interviews.
Luttwak in Johnston and Sampson, 1994, 4951.
Ibid., 52, 55.
Giroud in Giroud and Grass, 1988, 156.
Lean, 1988, 3523.
Hovelsen, 1960, 58.
Laure in Piguet, 1985, 434, 47.
Marcel, 1971, 13, 21.
Montville, 1991, 183.
A DVD of Laures story, For the Love of Tomorrow, has been used in many situations of conflict around the world.
Barn Crespo, 1999, interview.
Cohn-Bendit, 1999, interview. Daniel Cohn-Bendits parents were German Jews who
fled to France in 1933 like Arendt. Their son has dual French and German citizenship,
and was a German MEP in 19949; he was re-elected in June 1999 as a French MEP.
Rack, 1999, interview.
Virgin, 1999, interview.
Berger and Herman, 1999, interviews.
Bourlanges, 1999, interview.
Pond, 2002, 10.
Ibid., 11.
Haig Simonian and Robert Anderson, Schrder forced to cancel Czech trip,
Financial Times, Friday 1 March 2002; Robert Anderson, Czechs reject idea of compensation for 2.5m expelled Sudeten Germans, Financial Times, Wednesday 10 April
2002.
Lalumire, 2002, interview.
Berger, 1999, 2002, interviews.
See report by Ulf Bernitz, Jochen A. Frowein, Lord Kingsland/QC, Common Conclusions, 2 October 2002.
Pack, 1999, interview.
See bibliography for the two Communications from the Commission on the EU
relations with the Middle East and the peace process, September 1993, and Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan, 2008, 285.
Ibid.
Rabier, 1999, interview. The interview took place before the earthquakes in Greece
and Turkey, which provoked a thaw in the relationship.
According to John Gillingham, a tradition of economic cooperation took hold
in the heavy industry of Western Europe during the 1930s. This form of business
diplomacy and industrial self-government would create habits of cooperation, and
a framework around which, after a generation of conflict, failure, and little overall
progress toward solving the Ruhr problem, a satisfactory Franco-German settlement
would be built. Gillingham, 1991a, 28, 30, 44.
Delors, 1999, interview.
Ibid.
Notes 167
163
164
165
166
167
Delors, 2000a and b.

Ibid.
Delors, 2006, 1920.
Geremek, 2008, interview.
Arendt contrasted favorably the free play of debates over opinions against the
coercive assertion of truth in politics. Between Past and Future, 23549.
3 Remembering the principle of reconciliation: applications

1 Hartmann in Petritsch and Dzihi, 2010, 3023.
2 Petritsch and Dzihi, 2010, 22, 17.
3 The section on Kosovo and Serbia includes excerpts of an article published in The
Journal of Common Market Studies (May 2011), and I thank the editors for being able
to use it.
4 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 308. Arendt argues provocatively that forgiving
has so little to do with understanding that it is neither its condition or its consequence.
Ibid.
5 Ibid., 30727.
6 Monnet, 1955, 69.
7 Maximos Aligisakis, Comprendre les Balkans pour agir autrement, Le Temps,
Tuesday 13 April 1999.
8 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 214, 216.
9 Moll, 2008, 48, 40.
10 This account draws from Blitz, 2006; Drens, 2008; Iseni, 2008; Kurspahi, 2006;
Pond, 2006; Samary, 2008.
11 Ramet, 2005.
12 Roux, 1999, 6270, 1069.
13 Pond, 2006, 114; Drens, 2008, 23844.
14 Ahtisaari, 2007.
15 Gallak, V. (2008) EU Arrives in Kosovo, but Divisions Linger, eYugoslavia, Thursday 18 December. Available HTTP: <http://www.eyugoslvia.com> (accessed 25 June
2008).
16 Bancroft, I. (2008) A New Frozen Conflict? Guardian, Monday 9 June. Available HTTP: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/09/Kosovo.eu>
(accessed 25 June 2008).
17 The figures come from the Commissioner for Human Rights Report to the Council of
Europe, 2 July 2009 and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 2010 Report. Both the
Commissioner and the UNHCR warn that these figures may not be entirely reliable.
18 UN High Commission for Refugees Report on South-Eastern Europe, 2008. Balfour,
2008.
19 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 2558. Eichmanns trial was important because for
the first time Jews sat in judgment of the crimes committed against their people. On
the other hand, the defendant had been brought to justice by an act of kidnapping
in flagrant contradiction with international law. The mitigating circumstance is that
there was no true alternative. Like Jaspers, Arendt would have preferred for Eichmann
to be tried for crimes against humanity in an international court. Ibid., 258, 2634,
2745.
20 Pond, 2006, 117, 25460.
21 Suboti, 2009, 5, 192. Although Suboti critiques the use of transitional justice by
domestic actors in Serbia especially, she does not argue against transitional justice:
the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia removed
criminals from Western Balkans politics, documented their deed and defined them as
wrong. Ibid., 191.
168
Notes
22 For more on this, see Defrance and Pfeil in Mink and Neumayer, 92103.
23 Pond, 2006, 267; Pack, 2008, interview; and more information available online. Available HTTP: <http://www.cdsee.org/jhp/contact.html> (accessed 13 April 2009).
24 Smith, 2005, 197204, 11.
25 Ingrao and Emmert, 2009.
26 I thank Margaret Smith for providing me with the 2010 Editors Project Statement for
the Washington Leadership Group for the Scholars Initiative.
27 Dan Bilefsky, Ethnic Albanians Chart Kosovo Path, International Herald Tribune,
Wednesday 5 March 2008.
28 Ibid.
29 F. Bytyci, Kosovo Trepa Lead, Zinc Mines Sale Still on Horizon, Guardian, Friday 6 June 2008. Available HTTP: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/
7564658> (accessed 5 July 2008).
The EU Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo announced in February 2010 that it
had successfully completed two EU-funded projects of around 1.6 million to make
the Stantrg/Stari Trg mine safer. The mine belongs to the Trepa/Trepa Mining Complex and its final status is pending. Available HTTP: <http://www. delpern.ec.europa.
eu/?cid=1,103,741> (accessed 10 July 2010).
30 Moll, 2008, 36.
One major difference between the ECSC and the KosovoSerbia cases is that France
and the FRG had internationally respected governments in 1950, whereas a December
2010 Council of Europe inquiry report accused Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Tai
of being linked to a mafia-like network which killed Serb prisoners to harvest their
kidneys after the Kosovo war. Tais party came first in the parliamentarian elections
held in Kosovo two days before the publication of the report. He was seen as becoming
more moderate and, on being elected prime minister in 2008, he made an attempt to
reach out to Kosovos dwindling Serbian minority by switching to speaking Serbian
as he called on the Serbs to consider Kosovo their home. Available HTTP: <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/Kosovo-prime-minister-like-mafia-boss>
and <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3524092> (accessed
15 January 2011).
31 I thank Bashkim Iseni for this important insight.
32 Iseni, 2008, interview.
33 See Chapter 2 for more on this.
34 Pond, 2006, 2413.
35 Balfour, 2008, 46.
36 EP news service, May 28, 2008.
37 Pack, 2008, interview.
38 Serb leader Tadi apologizes for 1991 massacre. Available HTTP: <http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11689153#story_continues_2> (accessed 8 December
2010).
39 Drens, 2008, 9.
40 On the lack of forgiveness in Kosovo and Serbia, see Nora V. Weller, The Failure to
Face the Past in Relation to Kosovo, in Petritsch and Dzihi, 2010, 26585. In the
same volume Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran Dzihi make the point that coming to
terms with the past requires an international and stabilizing factor, presently the EU,
and time, a stable state and, before all, political will. Ibid., 17.
41 Marcel, 1971, 14156; Hovelsen, 1959, 379. For more on this, see Chapter 2.
42 Arendt, On Revolution, 267.
43 Pond, 2006, 237, 211, 281.
44 Kostovicova in Petritsch and Dzihi, 2010, 2912.
45 Anstis, S. (2008) The Fight for Ethnic Reconciliation and Peace in Kosovo.
Available HTTP: <http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1348/1/>
(accessed 25 October 2008)
Notes 169
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Moll, 2008, 35.

Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu, 2006, 28690.
Kattan, 2002, 116.
See Chapter 1 for more on this.
Pellauer, 2007, 91.
Ricoeur discusses the capable human being in Oneself as Another (1992). According to Richard Kearney, he views capability as a potentiality. Even if mental illness
or imprisonment prevents a person from acting, this person is still worthy of respect
because she retains this capacity as a possibility. Kearney, 2004, 168.
Fogu and Kansteiner, 2006, 289.
Ricoeur, Memory, 78, 91.
Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 152.
Great funerals, which gather an entire people, illustrate collective mourning behaviors that start from the expression of affliction and end with the complete reconciliation with the lost object. Ricoeur, Memory, 78.
For more on this, see Auer, 2010; Elbe, 2003; and Mink, 2007.
Europe needs to engage its citizens by making its polity more political; that is, by
opening it to fierce political contestation about its aims, and the ways in which best to
achieve them. Auer, 2010, 1184.
Geremek, 2008, interview; and Geremek in Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 41, 38.
According to Tony Judt, by 1989 the Communists had provoked enough suffering
and injustice of their own to forge a whole new layer of resentments and memories . . . .
Europe might be united, but European memory remained deeply asymmetrical. The
taboo that prevented the comparison of Stalinism with Nazism was lifted after 1989.
Some Western European intellectuals resisted this because Communism was a failed
variant of a common progressive heritage. Judt, 2005, 823, 826. Characteristically,
Arendt resisted the taboo and compared Nazism with Communism in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, which made her internationally known in the late 1940s.
For instance, WWI carries traumatic memories for the British, French or Germans,
whereas for most Central Europeans, that war is primarily associated with the birth
(or rebirth) of national sovereign states. Geremek in Wiersma and Swoboda, 2009, 36,
and Geremek, 2008, interview. Meanwhile, Western Europeans celebrate European
integration, but the fights for freedom in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Prague, and in
Poland between 1980 and 1989 have been forgotten. Geremek, ibid.; and Auer, 2010.
Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009.
Wiersma and Swoboda in ibid., 12, 21, 27.
Wiersma, 2008, interview.
Milan Zemko, Lzl Szarka and Stefan utaj in Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 17191.
There is an important Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which has been struggling for
the recognition of its rights. A law on language entering into effect on 1 September
2009 will bar Hungarian-speaking Slovaks from using their language in public in districts with less than 20 per cent ethnically Hungarian inhabitants. Karl-Peter Schwarz,
5000 Euro Strafe fr Ungarish, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Friday 24 July
2009.
Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 168.
Swoboda and Camens in ibid., 250.
Ibid., 24950. Pinior is a former Solidarnosc student activist.
Martnez Martnez in ibid., 20713.
Laurinaviius in ibid., 1267.
Fontaine, 2008, interview. Fontaines book was published simultaneously in French,
English and German in 2009.
Fontaine, 2009, 31755.
Perrin, 2008, interview.
170
Notes
71 Perrin has collected other memories, which are hidden away for now in a basement
room of the EP building and not yet filed: the roses President Mitterrand received on
a visit to the Parliament, the agendas of Group meetings, gifts from visitors, lists of
former MEPs, and much more, because one day the boxes will open. Ibid.
72 Ricoeur, Memory, 284. The exhaustive index of Ricoeurs book does not include the
word museum.
73 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 218.
74 Martnez Martnez and Spaak, 2008, interviews.
75 In February 2011 Martnez Martnez wrote that he was now confident that the
Museum would open under the foreseen schedule. He took it for granted that the
2.5 million in the 2011 budget would be secured, and was shortly addressing the EPs
Budget Committee with his colleague Pttering on the subsequent years of funding. A
Museum Director and a staff have been hired, and an architectural proposal out of 12
finalists will soon be chosen. E-mail to the author, 23 February 2011.
76 According to Martnez Martnez, the Germans have made the most successful effort at
remembering, as the magnificent Bonn Museum on German History demonstrates;
the other two countries making the most dedicated effort to create a national memory
are the Netherlands and Austria. Martnez Martnez, 2008, interview.
77 All the citations are from Martnez Martnez, 2008, interview.
78 Spanish national amnesia during the democratic transition was not the result of an
agreement to let us forget, according to Martnez Martnez. It was about a relationship of force, which would permit nothing else. As the opposition, we succeeded in
obtaining a constitution that allowed us to work with those who still controlled political power and military force. They accepted to play the democratic game . . . but not
one judge was fired; the policemen who had tortured me were not fired. . . . Little by
little the relationship changed, a new generation was born and those who had committed crimes died. Now there is a law on historical memory, more than anything else
to avoid a falsification of memory by so-called historians, to make it legally impossible to declare that the Franco dictatorship was not fascist. Martnez Martnez, 2008,
interview.
79 Report of the Committee of Experts on the House of European History, 2008, 5. I
thank Mr. Martnez Martnez for providing me with a copy of the Report.
80 Ibid., 19, 21, 23.
81 Ibid., 12. Italics added by the author.
82 Proposals include some of the following questions: Can Turkey become a full member of the EU? Why is the EU incapable of arousing any real enthusiasm among the
general public in the Member States? How can the EU react to the demographic change
affecting all its Member States?
83 Spaak, 2008, interview.
One room in the exhibit featured the stories of 27 EU citizens (and couples) from
the 27 Member States. Stories included: Inge and Klaus Strmer who escaped from
East Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1962; Fanourios Pantelogiannis
who works with the Union of Cyprus municipalities attached to EU Committee of
Regions and thinks that EU accession offers the only way out of the islands divisions;
Rumen Borissov who founded an organic yogurt-making firm in 1997 with his wife
and exports today well beyond Bulgarian borders; and Roger Lavis from the United
Kingdom who managed the coordination of the French and British building sites
during the construction of the tunnel under the Channel.
84 Antoinette Spaak opposed the inclusion of the word Christianity among the values
mentioned in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, preferring the term
spiritual values.
85 With 350,000 visitors a year, many of them young people, the EP would offer an excellent site to give the young a memory of Europe. Spaak, 2008, interview.
86 Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 152.
Notes 171
87 The names of the two teachers interviewed and whose classes were observed have
been changed.
88 Moll, 2008, 40; Lvy, 2007, 262.
89 Arendt, On Revolution, 789.
90 Rosoux in Mink and Neumayer, 2007, 2256.
91 Dewitte, 2008, 16870.
92 Mill, 2008, 65.
93 Because of space limitations, this point is only mentioned here. For a brief but strong
critique of Western academic hegemony in analyses of EU foreign policy, see
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 3078.
94 Vembulu, 2003, 230, 5, 512. French President Nicolas Sarkozys suggestion in 2009
that African countries could imitate the ECSC was not very well received. B. Hall and
B. Jopson, Sarkozy seeks peace role in Africa with shared mines plan, Financial
Times, Thursday 26 March 2009.
95 Mustafa Kamal Kazi, 2002, interview.
4 Of power and purgatory: building the European Communities
1 Kagan, 2004. Kagan celebrates certain European accomplishments and compares
the European reconciliations to the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of
world-historical importance. Kagan, 2004, 559 and 97.
2 I am indebted to Andrew Kalyvas for the distinction between political outcomes and
Arendts principles of action as an enabling condition. Kalyvas, 2008, 253, n. 94.
3 Franois Duchne in Kohnstamm and Hager, 1973, 6.
4 Lukes, 1991, 923.
5 Lang and Williams, 2005, 2. For recent studies on Arendt and international relations,
see Hayden, 2009; and Owens, 2007.
6 Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 132. For more on productive power, see also Muppidi in
ibid., and Adler in ibid.
7 Arendt, On Violence, 35, 44.
Arendt wrote On Violence in part as a response to Fanon and Sartres advocacy of
violence during decolonization. Here she has more to say about power than violence,
which she discusses relatively briefly. For a good critique, see Frazer and Hutchings,
2008, 90108. See also Owens, 2007, especially Chapters 1 and 2.
8 On Violence, 1416, and The Human Condition, 200.
9 On Violence, 512. For a good commentary on Arendts discussion of the justifiable
uses of violence, see Owens, 2007, 223.
10 On Violence, 56.
11 Ibid., 56. For a commentary on Arendts model of federalism and sovereignty in
international relations, see Klusmeyer in Lang and Williams, 2005, 1418.
12 Monnet, 1978, 323.
13 Kohnstamm in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 363. Maria Grazia Melchionni, an Italian
academic, and Roberto Ducci, a senior Italian diplomat, interviewed 17 of the negotiators of the Rome Treaties in 1984, and their book is a highly readable collection of
witnesses. Most exhibit a remarkable capacity for self-reflection and irony about
their own foibles; all are informative about the major points of contention, but also
about less known yet important details of the negotiations.
14 Read Arendt on the council system in On Revolution, 24773; On Violence, 1419;
Between Past and Future, 39.
15 For commentaries on the council system see, inter alia, Sitton in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1984, 30729; Kalyvas 2008, 25491.
Dietz reminds us that we should not be taken in by the apparent spontaneity of
civic movements. The Czechoslovak Manifesto, Charter 77, which came as a surprise
172
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Notes
to the Communist government, was the outcome of years of work and many months
spent on the drafting of the document. Dietz, 2002, 180.
Ricoeur, 1996, 160, 161.
Schell, 2006, xxixxix; Dietz, 2002, 17980.
Gorham, 2000, 132.
Upon his retirement from the ECSC, Monnet organized the Committee of Action
for the United States of Europe, a think tank and lobby group drawing its membership
from political parties and trade unions, but not business circles. It worked to convince
senior government leaders to support further steps toward European integration from
1956 to 1974.
Arendt, On Revolution, 272; On Violence, 78.
John F. Sitton notes that most of the Arendtian examples of council democracy were
attempts at socialist revolutions. The revolutionaries recognized that the economy is
a political system in the Arendtian sense, and their struggles acknowledged this fact.
Arendt made the erroneous assumption that technological problems allow only one
right answer one that can be determined with certainty especially in an era of material abundance and are therefore not political questions. Sitton in Hinchman and
Hinchman, 1994, 3204. For more on Arendts neglect of the social, see in the same
volume, Hanna F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 26188.
On this see also Dietz, 2002, 162; Benhabib, 1996, 145; Kateb, 1984, 34; Pitkin,
1994, 2756.
Taylor, Sources of the Self, 13.
Taylor attributes the change from the ethics of honor to the ethics of the ordinary life
to religious influences: With the Reformation, we find a modern, Christian-inspired
sense that ordinary life was on the contrary the very center of the good life. The crucial
issue was how it was led. Ibid.
Ibid., 549, n. 14.
Andrani, 1999, 35. According to Andrani the European communitarian spirit sank
its roots most deeply in countries that already had a strong national culture of compromise, such as the Netherlands. Countries with majoritarian and confrontational political cultures, such as France or the UK, were more resistant.
Arendt values plurality and the distinctiveness of human beings. But her agonistic
politics, which prompt the political actor to reveal herself as who she is in the space of
appearance, spontaneously and regardless of consequences, seem inhospitable to the
principle of compromise. See The Human Condition, 17980, 194.
Monnet thought it essential not to separate artificially political questions from economic issues, because this distinction is contrary to the teaching of history and to the
necessities of governmental life. Monnet in Rieben, 1987, 284. For more on the influence of Catholic social thought on Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi, see Chapter
2.
Snoy et dOppuers in Melchionni and Ducci, 167.
Catholic social thought is not a topic that has provoked much interest among Anglo
American political scientists, although in the last two decades many more scholarly
analyses have appeared in English, perhaps because of the renewed interest in the link
between religion and politics. See, for instance, Kselman and Buttigieg, 2003; and
Kaiser, 2007.
Kalyvas, 2008, 262.
Pinior, 2008, interview.
Dietz, 2002, 175.
Ibid., 163, 176.
Dietzs e-mail to the author, 25 September 1999.
Monnet, 1978, 323; Duchne, 1994, 351.
Monnet, 1978, 295; George W. Ball in Duchne, 1994, 13.
Notes 173
37 Cohen, 1998, 645.
38 For a left-leaning philosophical interpretation, see Mounier, 1935; for the outlook of
an economist, Perroux, 1942. Franois Perroux exerted a strong influence on both
Reuter and Pierre Uri, another close collaborator of Monnet.
39 Cohen, 1998, 652, 651.
Although Ptains minister Pierre Laval closed Uriage down in 1942, the schools
former teachers were tainted by association even when, like Reuter and Hubert BeuveMery, they had become French resistants early on. Thus some historians underline the
fascist origins of European integration. See Weber, E. Frances Downfall, Atlantic
Monthly, October 2001, 122. See also Laughan, 1998. Laughan calls the philosopher
Emmanuel Mounier, and the politicians Robert Schuman and Paul-Henri Spaak fascist federalists in his second chapter entitled Fascists and Federalists. For a more
balanced analysis of Uriage, consult Comte, 1991.
40 Cohen, 1998, 6557. These ideas led to the creation of the cole nationale
dadministration in 1945.
41 Duchne, 1994, 363.
42 Monnet, 1978, 295.
43 Whereas Michael Sandel claims Arendt as a communitarian, this is not Canovans
view. See Sandel, 1984, 11; Canovan in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994, 193.
44 Manners, 2010, 823.
45 For a complete text of the Rome Treaties in the 1958 version, see Minet, 1962.
46 For Ducci, building the next stage of European integration on Euratom only would
have been folly, because the basic principle of the enterprise was equality; it was
obvious that France could not renounce what Britain had, and wanted to preserve its
right to be more than equal by developing its own nuclear weapons system. Ducci in
Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 414.
47 Other narratives of the negotiations draw primarily from diplomatic documents and
state archival funds. See Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998; Parsons, 2003.
48 Snoy et dOppuers in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 165. Jean-Charles Snoy et
dOppuers was a lawyer and senior diplomat who headed the Belgian delegation to the
Brussels negotiations on the Treaties of Rome.
49 Spaak, 1972, 229, 230.
50 Albonetti, an Italian economist and Roberto Duccis assistant, called this first report a
costume of harlequin; it was a juxtaposition of the six delegations positions, which
made any synthesis by the chair impossible in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 464.
51 Spaak, 1972, 238.
Carl Friedrich Ophls represented Germany, Jean-Charles Snoy et dOppuers Belgium, Flix Gaillard France, Ludovico Benvenuti Italy, Lambert Schaus Luxembourg,
and Verryn Stuart the Netherlands.
52 Albonetti in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 464. The heads of delegation met every
two weeks to discuss the report in the making. Pierre Uri, whom Spaak had chosen as
rapporteur, stresses the important role imagination played to overcome differences.
An economist, Uri was a close collaborator of Jean Monnet (194755). Spaak had
required his help, and Uri drafted the Spaak Report and many of the subsequent proposals for the EEC. Uri in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 263.
53 Spaak, 1972, 239.
Von der Groeben was a German economist responsible for European Affairs at the
FRGs Ministry of the Economy. He accepted to work with Uri as co-editor of the
Spaak Report under the condition that Uri would not be allowed to present any proposal without his agreement. Van der Groeben in Ducci and Melchionni, 2007, 117.
Uri claims, Le rapport Spaak cest moi (The Spaak Report, thats me). Uri in ibid.,
265.
54 Rapport Spaak in Gerbet, de La Serre et Nafilyan 1998, 92. For the complete version, see Comit intergouvernmental cr par la Confrence de Messine, Rapport des
174
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Notes
Chefs de Dlgation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangres, Bruxelles, 21 avril 1956:
Secrtariat.
Snoy et dOppuers in Melchionni and Ducci, 170; and Ducci, ibid., 403. For more
on this, see the comments of Johannes Linthorst Homan, a Dutch senior civil servant
who led the Dutch delegation during the 19567 negotiations in Brussels, and von der
Groeben and Ducci in ibid., 65, 116, 426.
Pineau and Rimbaud, 1991, 211; Spaak, 1972, 240.
Roberto Ducci recalls that, the Italian government was embarrassed. Having
thought that the meeting would last until the evening, it did not know what to do with
its illustrious guests who had already concluded the agreement. Ducci in Melchionni
and Ducci, 2007, 172.
Von der Groeben in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 117.
Gazzo in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 202.
Milward, 1992, 1956.
Ibid., 208.
In subsequent years Milward adopted a more nuanced approach by suggesting a
dialogue between the four major ideas of the causes of European integration including those advanced by people interested in ideas who search for motivations hidden
behind the public record. Milward in Gowan and Anderson, 1997, 9.
Craig Parsons argues that the community model triumphed in France during the
EEC negotiations thanks to French pro-community leadership; this case provides
the empirical evidence for his argument on the causal process of the institutionalization of ideas. Parsons, 2006, 2, 10216.
Nol in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 2923. Emile Nol was a close collaborator of
French Prime Minister Guy Mollet during the Rome Treaties negotiations and was
secretary-general of the EEC Commission from 195887.
Milward, faithful to his thesis that European integration was primarily a tool for
the nation-state to prevent decline, writes that in France foreign policy was first and
foremost formed by the possibilities of domestic economics and social development.
At the crucial moment it was not even made by the diplomats. But he acknowledges
that both French interest groups and the state apparatus were very divided on whether
a common market would serve the national interest, and that his hypothesis may be
too simple. Milward et al, 1993, 189, 186.
Marjolin, 1989, 288.
Verret was inspecteur gnral de lconomie nationale, and adviser on economic
affairs in the cabinet of Prime Minister Guy Mollet.
Nol in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 3045.
Spaak, 1972, 246.
The Protocol on certain provisions relating to France quickly became obsolete. Once
De Gaulle decided to devalue the Franc in 1958, French industry no longer needed
special protection. According to Marjolin it took six months to negotiate the protocol,
which was never implemented. It was forgotten, nobody talked about it again . . . it
was necessary for the [French] ratification. Marjolin in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007,
329.
Bobba in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 29. Franco Bobba, an economist, was a member of the Italian delegation, and later became a Director-General at the Commission
(195867).
Marjolin, 1981, 41.
Marjolin 1989, 300. Interestingly, many of the 18 personalities interviewed in Melchionni and Ducci mention the future relationship of the EEC with the emancipating
colonies as a major point of contention.
Snoy et dOppuers in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 1723. Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960 only, and Snoy dOppuers comments make it clear that the
process of decolonization was quite distinct from European integration in the minds of
Notes 175
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
some of the negotiators. However, the FRG had to be convinced that EEC membership would not make it a colonial power again, and that it should contribute generously
to the expensive aid package to overseas territories. Ibid.
Linthorst Homan in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 523.
Nol in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 309.
The six settled on an investment fund for overseas territories of $581 million over five
years with France and the German Federal Republic contributing 200 million each.
Frances M.B. Lynch in Milward et al, 1993, 85.
Dietz, 2002, 162.
Ducci in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 431.
Uri suggested, for instance, increasing the size of import contingents in a geometrical progression, with changes occurring once a year, instead of eliminating import
quotas. The first solution meant a rapid but gradual and progressive liberalization for
each product as well as national economies; the second would have meant a progressive change for national economies, but abrupt changes for some sectors or products,
which governments would have resisted in sensitive cases. Uri in Melchionni and
Ducci, 2007, 280.
Berthoin, 2001,1201.
Klusmeyer in Lang and Williams, 2005, 144.
For Arendts ideas on the federal principle at the global level, see Thoughts on
Politics and Revolution, in Crises of the Republic, 130, 133.
For Pescatore this was evidence, even the philosophical proof, that an international
treaty is most of all an intellectual work and an act of the will; the material expression
is less important. Pescatore in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 100. Pescatore, a lawyer and academic, represented Luxembourg on the Institutional Committee and later
became a member of the EEC Court of Justice.
Wrongly Perry Anderson interprets this incident as an act of diplomatic inexperience and disregard for the popular will. Anderson, 2009, 539.
Balibar, 2004, 2345.
Rocard, 2002, interview.
The Messina conference was considered a success by its participants because, None
of the delegations had this feeling so frequent in international conferences: The other
has won and I lost. Rothschild in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 219. Rothschild was
Spaaks chef de cabinet during the negotiations on the Rome Treaties.
Van der Groeben in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 126.
On aid to the Mezziogiorno, see Bobba in ibid., 39. The Bank was a compensating mechanism against the liberal aspects of the common market, and in the early
years of the EEC 50 per cent of its investment went to Italy. Albonetti in ibid., 460.
Paradoxically, most of the other points of contention would rapidly become obsolete,
such as the disposition of article 227 protecting Italian workers from the competition
of Algerian workers. Two years later Algeria became independent and was no longer
covered by the Treaty of Rome. Ducci in ibid., 4279.
The discussion was the worst possible horse dealing because everybody offered
something and wanted to get something in return. Ernst van der Beugel in Melchionni
and Ducci, 2007, 356. Van der Beugel was an economist and the Dutch secretary of
state during the negotiations.
Maurice Faure in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 252. Faure headed the French delegation to the Brussels negotiations.
Marjolin, 1981, 37; Ducci in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 427.
Arendt, On Revolution, 255, 270; The Human Condition, 243. For more on this, see
Chapters 2 and 3.
On the basis of extensive empirical evidence (EEC/EU polling data 19702002)
176
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
Notes
Michael David Green detects a shared European identity, but this form of identity
cerebral rather than emotive, instrumental rather than devoted is unlikely to inspire
the sort of passions associated with nationalism. Green, 2007, 163. See also Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 2004, for similar conclusions. Ulrike Hannah Meinhoff,
however, highlights the role of emotions, feelings and attitudes in processes of identity formation. Meinhoff in Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 215.
Monnet, 1978, 334.
See Guisan, 2000, 1415, and 2003, 11015 on this.
Snoy et dOppuers 1989, 117; and Ducci in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.
Pineau and Rimbaud, 1991, 215.
Milward, 1992, 196.
Haldas, 1987, 89.
Robert Rothschild in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 229.
Spaak, 1972, 242.
Spaak, 1969, 99. Translation by the author.
Dinan, 1994, 426.
Arendt argues that sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and
mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. The Human Condition,
234.
Pescatore, 1974, 49, 46.
For a much more detailed treatment of the negotiations and consultations with
home constituencies, see Melchionni and Ducci, 2007; for a summary in English, see
Guisan, 2000, 12472.
For commentaries on faith and devotion see Spaak, 1972, 2078; Marjolin, 1989,
256, 285.
These are Rocards terms in Rocard, 1999, interview.
Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998.
Lukes, 1991, 215; Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 12.
For more on this see Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, and Guisan, 2000, 2003.
On the EU Commissions institutional power, see Barnett and Finnemore, 2004.
For more on structural power, see Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 18.
For more on this, see Chapter 5 on enlargement.
Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 20.
Barnett and Duvall acknowledge that the power that works through social relations
of constitution (rather than interaction) can be interpreted as either Arendts power
with or Webers power over. This is the case of both structural and productive power
according to their typology. Ibid., 10.
For more on Habermasian dialogues in European integration, see Chapter 6 on the
EU democratic deficit.
Some IR theorists call the confluence of expected and unexpected factors that permit
the implementation of a new policy a policy window. A policy window cannot be
created; it may open for a very short time; and the item to be pushed onto the agenda
at that particular time must be ready; its aspects must have been worked out beforehand. Van Reisen, 2009, 21, 29.
Uri in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 270. To take advantage of the opportunity one
must have a ready-to-go project, which was the case in 1956. Ibid., 271; Parsons,
2003, 111, n. 112.
Duchne, 1974; Monnet, 1955, 278. For a succinct discussion of civilian power as
one of six EU myths, see Manners, 2010, 725.
Casarini and Musu, 2007, xvii-xviii.
This tax policy is quite unrelated to the Irish banks failures, but has long caused
Notes 177
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
unease among Irish EU partners on the ground of unfair competition in attracting

foreign investments.
Gideon Rachman, The Irish bail-out and sovereignty, Financial Times, Friday 19
November 2010; William Richard Smyser, Political decision needed on case for
saving euro, Financial Times, Monday 22 November 2010.
Gideon Rachman, How Germany could kill the euro, Financial Times, Tuesday 23
November 2010.
Philippe Ricard, LEurope rpond aux marches par une riposte massive, Le Monde,
Tuesday 11 May 2010; Patrick Roger, Les tats redoutent la tutelle de Bruxelles sur
leur budget and Bruxelles veut un droit de regard sur le budget des tats; Clment
Lacombe, Athnes sattaque lvasion fiscale, sport national, Le Monde, Friday 15
May 2010.
Richard Edgar, Gideon Rachman, Chris Giles and Patrick Jenkins, Searching for
Global Solutions, Financial Times, Monday 24 January 2011.
Slovakia turns to FT for comfort over Greek bail out, EurActiv.com, 18 August
2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/euro/slovakia-turns-ft-comfortover-greek-bailout-news-496926> (accessed 20 August 2010).
Arendt, On Revolution, 79. Solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide action,
compassion is one of the passions, and pity is a sentiment. Arendt had little time for
passion and sentiment.
Martin Wolf, Ireland upends the German perspective on the eurozone, Financial
Times, Wednesday 24 November 2010.
Secret Committee paving way for euro reform, EurActiv.com, 25 January 2011. The
committees proposals were poorly received by other eurozone members because of
the ever-tougher fiscal measures demanded by Berlin and the lack of consultation
by the French and German governments. Peggy Hollinger and Peter Spiegel, Wider
powers for eurozone reform given French nod, Financial Times, Tuesday 15 February 2011.
Wood and Quaisser, 2008, 115; Rogers, 2009, 832.
Franois Duchne, Jean Monnet, First Statesman for Interdependence, Lecture at
the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Monday 14 November 1994.
Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 118.
Kohnstamm, 2001, correspondence and conversations with the author.
Lucarelli in Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, 18.
Kagan, 2004, 152.
Duchne, 1972, 1973; Galtung, 1973.
Kagan, 2004, 55. For critical comments on Kagans argument, see Henrikson, 2003;
Zaretsky, 2003. See also Jrgen Habermas, Alain Touraine, tienne Balibar, Ulrich K.
Preuss and Steven Lukes contributions in Constellations (2003) 16 (3). And Lindberg,
2004.
For more on this, see Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991.
Beck, 2006, 48.
For a critique of the imperial argument, see Andrani in Lindberg, 2005, 778.
Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002, 772.
McCormick theorizes the EU as a European superpower, which has broken the
mould of traditional conceptions of great power politics and offers a model of the
role of military power in international relations distinct from the US. Thus the EU
approaches terrorism as a question of law enforcement rather than war. McCormick,
2007, 79, 61.
Laidi, 2005.
Nicolaidis, 2005, 114, 94.
Manners, 2002.
Laidi, 2005, 40.
Sjursen in Sjursen, 2006a, 243.
178
Notes
146 The 2000 Cotonou Agreement is controversial because the EU shifted its policies,
from aid to encouraging free trade within the ACP zone and with the EU, with an
emphasis on political conditionality. Also the EU Agricultural Policy (CAP), although
it is being reformed, has long excluded import of ACP agricultural products covered
by the CAP; the EU exports of food to Africa have displaced local production and
encouraged dependency. McCormick, 2005, 2301, 222.
147 McCormick, 2005, 215; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 197.
148 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 17489, 2201.
149 In some areas such as missiles and helicopters, research and development happens almost exclusively at the European rather than the national level. Seth Jones,
2007, 4.
150 Manners in Sjursen, 2006a, 183, 189, 192; Norheim-Martinsen, 2007, 28.
151 Norheim-Martinsen, 2007, 7, 42. A systematic review of the impact of ESDP missions abroad has yet to be written although there is much new scholarship on specific
deployments. For more on this, see Ginsberg and Smith in Meunier and McNamara,
2007.
Debates on whether the EU and its Member States spend enough on their defense
will not abate soon. See the opinion piece of Danish former Foreign Affairs Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jense, Europes Myopic Defense Cuts, 26 November 2010.
Available HTTP: <http://www.project-syndicate.org> (accessed 10 December 2010).
152 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 148, 153.
153 Van den Hoven in Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, 185200.
154 Lamy, 2002, 85100.
155 Pace, 2008a, 4434.
156 For another critical perspective with proposals for reforms, see Missiroli in Whitman
and Wolff, 2010.
157 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 208; Rupnik, 2007, 152.
158 Cooper, 2008, interview.
159 Arthur Krebbers, Robert Cooper, working hard for the EU, Caf Babel, 12 November 2005. Available HTTP: <http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/1526/ robert-cooperworking-hard-for-the-eu.html> (accessed 10 December 2010).
Derek Beach studied negotiation processes empirically rather than normatively, to
discover why negotiations in the intergovernmental Council are not locked in a perpetual joint decision trap, where high transaction costs systematically result in inefficient,
lowest common, denominator outcomes or deadlock. He concludes that the Council Secretariat gives crucial leadership to overcome high transaction cost. One such
instance is the Council Secretariats successful effort to obtain a budget increase for
the CFSP in 2005. But such interventions succeed only if there is a degree of common
interests among Member States. Beach in Naurin and Wallace, 2008, 219, 22430.
Frederica Bicchi finds one of the most intriguing findings of her study of EU Mediterranean political and security policies to be the way in which fellow Member States
and EC/EU institutions represent not only valuable sources of information, but also
and more importantly trusted partners in the process of knowledge creation. The
decision-making process is often like a collective journey in the dark, and Member
States share their puzzlement as much as their preferences on securitization policies.
Bicchi, 2007, 141, 1867.
161 Cooper, 2003, 36.
The socialization effect should not be exaggerated. EU Member States foreign
affairs ministries watch jealously their shrinking monopoly over policy. Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan, 2008, 146; Lalumire, 2002, interview.
In spite of his opposition to Kosovos unilateral declaration of independence from
Serbia, Spanish MEP Barn Crespo agreed with this assessment. Interview, 2008.
Notes 179
163 Arendt, On Revolution, 270, 261.
164 Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson detect multinational, multicultural, social
and academic plurality within the committees; it is this lack of a hierarchical structure that gives the committees systems decisional process its deliberative quality.
Joerges and Everson in Oddvar Eriksen and Fossum, 2000, 184.
Louis, 1999, interview and e-mail on 31 July 2003.
166 Kohnstamm, 2003, phone interview; Casaca, 2008, interview.
167 Jo Leinen and Enrique Barn Crespo agreed with Coopers assessment; Michel Rocard
did not because he was convinced that the maintenance of the rule of unanimity on
issues of foreign affairs and defense would mitigate any institutional change. Interviews, 2008.
169 Cooper, 2003, 13940.
170 Cooper takes a stab at this by arguing that, in the end, what impacts foreign policy
most is domestic politics. He cites the transformation of Europe after 1989 due to the
changing political objectives in the Soviet Union. Ibid, 108.
171 Klusmeyer in Lang and Williams, 2007, 140.
172 Geremek, 2009b, 47.
173 Geremek was a senior adviser to Lech Walesa and Solidarity, and lost his academic
position as a result. Later he became the Polish foreign affairs minister and negotiated
the accession of Poland to the EU.
174 Geremek, 2009b, 456.
175 This is an idea that Lyotard, Heidegger and Levinas evoke also. Ricoeur, 1996,
1667.
176 Ibid., 1656, 168.
5 Enlargements and the recognition of the Other: the case of Turkey
1 Schuman Declaration in Fontaine, 2000, 36.
2 For democratization studies, see Linz and Stepan, 1996. For EU-focused studies of
enlargement processes see Mayhew, 1998; Baun, 2000; Drevet, 2001. On the enlargements as foreign policy, see Biscop and Lembke, 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan,
2008; Lucarelli and Manners, 2006.
3 For an excellent literature review of Europeanization studies, see Tunkrov in Tunkrov and aradin, 2010, 1213. On the reciprocal impact of enlargement processes, see
Sjursen, 2006c, 115.
4 See Jacques Delors speech at Aspen Institute, Berlin, November 1999 in Delors,
2006, 27. Helene Sjursen finds debatable to what extent Europe was united before
the Cold War. Sjursen, 2006b, 211.
5 Taylor, Hegel, 1975; Hegel and Modern Society, 1979; The Politics of Recognition
in Gutmann, ed. Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition, 1992a; The Ethics of Authenticity, 1992b; Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism
and Nationalism, 1993; and Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 2005.
6 I draw here primarily from Taylor and Ricoeur although other contemporary political
thinkers, such as Judith Butler, Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, Julia Kristeva, Emmanuel
Levinas and Tsvetan Todorov, offer important analyses of the concept of recognition
also.
7 Beside the Schuman Declaration, see Monnets 1954 speech to the joint Assemblies of
the ECSC and the Council of Europe in Monnet, 1955, 70.
8 In a fine study of Czeslaw Milosz, Jan Patoka and Istvn Bib, Esprits dEurope,
Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine condemns the term enlargement as symbolic of Western arrogance. The civilizational project has turned into the eastward export of juridical and economic norms. Laignel-Lavastine, 2005, 27.
180
Notes
9 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 218.

10 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 212.
11 For an interesting critical discussion of the respective advantages of Frasers statusbased model of recognition and Honneth and Taylors identity-based models, see
Zurn, 2003.
12 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 15.
14 Taylor, Politics of Recognition, 257.
16 Taylor, Essays on Canadian Federalism, 1501. See Chapter 1 on asymmetrical federalism, 5.
18 Taylor, Essays on Canadian Federalism, 194.
19 Taylor, Politics of Recognition, 73, 67.
20 Taylor, Essays on Canadian Federalism, 169, 198.
21 Marjolin, 1981, 43.
22 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society,12634.
23 Zurn, 2003, 530. Nevertheless, Taylor addresses communities as if they were the subjects of history.
24 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 40.
25 The acquis communautaire is a French term used to designate the administrative rules
and laws passed at the EU level, which apply in all Member States. The later countries
accede, the more onerous the process becomes for them as the acquis, which is over
80,000 pages long and they had no part in shaping, keeps developing.
26 Agenda 2000 is the 1997 Commission Report, which rated the readiness for negotiations on accession of the 12 candidate countries.
27 E-mails to the author, April 10 and 14, 1999. A majority of the EP supported the constitutional position. In this way the Union will be given an appropriate shape and
the maniacal obsession with economic aspects will be overcome, according to the
opinion piece sent to the author by Oostlander (1997) Sprinters and Handicaps in the
Race towards Enlargement.
28 See EP Report co-authored by Barn Crespo/Oostlander on enlargement, 4 December
1997. A4-0368/97.
29 Hardimon, 1994, 20.
30 Taylor, Essays on Canadian Federalism, 181, 192.
31 Dominique Wolton explains how Westerners born during the Cold War, as he was,
grew up with the assumption that the Iron curtain had fallen for 200 years. Wolton
in Delors, 1994, 261.
32 Oostlander e-mail to the author, 16 April 1999.
33 Taylor writes that, from Hegels principle that there can be no disembodied spiritual
life it follows that he cannot accept a definition of freedom like that of the Stoics,
which sees it as an inner condition of man unaffected by his external fate. . . . Freedom
is only real (wirklich) when expressed in a form of life; and since man cannot live on
his own, this must be a collective form of life in Hegel and Modern Society, 51.
34 Galloway, 2001, 59; Dony, 2008, xxxii.
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty determines qualified majority by at least 55 per cent of the
Member States (or 15 Member States) representing 65 per cent of the population with
a blocking minority of four Member States. But, until 2014, the 2000 Nice Treatys
rules will apply with a transitional period extending until 2017. Dony, 2008, xxxiii.
35 Galloway, 2001, 46.
36 Peter Norman and Michael Smith, EU summit ends in struggle between big and small
states, Financial Times, Monday 16 October 2000.
37 For a critical view of the symbolic function of the national Commissioners, see Andrew
Duff, 2009, 1667.
Notes 181
38 See for instance the harsh dialogue between the evil and judging consciousnesses in
the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel, 1977, 4029.
39 Monnet, 1978, 51015.
40 Mar Fernndez, 2008, 3.
For a balanced discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of the European Council presidency and the potential consequences of its abolition, see also de Schoutheete
and Wallace, 2002; Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2003.
41 Moreau Defarges in O Nuallain, 1985, 135.
42 Dinan, 1994, 144.
For a comparative discussion of the small presidencies of Austria (1998),
Denmark (2002), Finland (1999) and Portugal (2000), see Guisan, 2000 and 2003. See
also the excellent in-depth reports of EU presidencies by the think tank Notre Europe.
Available at HTTP: <http://www.notre-europe.asso.eu.>.
43 Klemeni, 2007, 2 and 3.
44 Rahten, 2009, interview.
45 Barber, T. Madrid treads carefully to make success of new rules, Financial Times,
Monday 4 January 2010.
46 Schpflin, 2008, interview.
48 Gazzola, 2006, 394.
49 For some preparatory meetings of the Council, however, there is a new system of
interpreting upon request. Ibid., 410.
50 Peter Norman, Exclusion of German leads to EU boycott, Financial Times, Weekend 3 and 4 July 1999 and Reuters, Brussels, Finns fear language dispute, Financial
Times, 25 August 1999.
51 To save expenses the EP uses a relay (pivot) system whereby the lesser-known
languages are first translated into German, French or English and then to all other
languages, with 69 interpreters at work in 23 cabins during the plenaries. This is not
full equality even with all the MEPs able to speak, listen, read and write in their own
languages. Those whose language is one of the pivot tongues are advantaged over
those who receive a twice-mediated translation.
52 Gazzola, 2006, 410; Lalumire, 2002, interview.
The translation and interpretation costs in the EU institutions was 1123 million
in 2005, 1 per cent of the annual general budget of the EU or 2.28 per person per
year. Available HTTP: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Sides/getDOC.do?language
=EN&type=IM-Press&reference=20071017FCS11816> (accessed 10 July 2010).
54 Delors, 1994, 226.
55 Bache, 1998, 157, 67.
56 Delors, 1994, 232.
57 Bache, 1998, 11718; Allen in Baun and Marek, 2008.
58 John Newhouse, 1997.
59 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig in Wiener and Diez, 2009, 801; and
Thomas Risse in ibid., 7.
60 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 1049.
61 Ibid., 147. Collectivities narrate themselves and say we just as an individual might
say I. Ibid., 104. See also 1345.
62 Ibid.,147.
63 Blanchard, 2007, 3756. For other helpful commentaries on The Course to Recognition, see Ferguson, 2010; Laitinen, 2007; and Pellauer, 2007.
64 The citations of MEPs Roubatis, Hatzidakis, Mndez de Vigo, Barn Crespo, Cushnahan and Barros Moura are from interviews with the author in 1999.
65 Michael Smith, Germany, Italy and Greece to benefit, Financial Times, Friday 2
July 1999.
182
Notes
66 The Commission expected Greece to be prosperous enough by 2006 to do without the

aid which would be redirected toward Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia
and Estonia who may have joined by then. Demetris Nellas, Paydirt: How Greece
Will Spend its EU Trillions, Odyssey, 6 (5), May/June 1999.
67 Cushnahan, 1999, interview.
68 Barros Moura, 1999, interview.
69 Peter Wise, Portugal takes on mentor role to eastern Europes economies, Financial
Times, Thursday 23 April 1998.
70 For more on this, see Guisan, 2003, 1846.
71 Mendras, 1997. For a report of the first seminar, see Arnaud, 1999.
72 See Davies, 1996. Alan Mayhew, a senior EU official from Britain working on enlargement, writes that, this sort of myopia was never shared by the citizens of Central
and Eastern Europe, who could not bring themselves to feel that the Yalta division of
Europe was a normal condition of the Continent. Mayhew, 1998, 3.
73 Arnaud, 1999, 28, 24.
74 Arnaud and Jouen, 2001. Report on the second seminar.
75 Danuta Hbner in the third report by Arnaud and Zaborowska, 2002. The three reports
are available at HTTP: <notre-Europe.asso.eu>.
76 Frlec and Penica, 2002, interviews.
77 Delanty and Rumford, 2005, 20.
78 Estonia President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Address, EP Plenary Session, Strasbourg,
March 11, 2008. The author was present and the address summary is based on her
notes. See also EU Baltic Sea Strategy, Report for the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
2009, and the Commission Communication on the EU Baltic Sea Strategy.
79 For an evaluation, see the excellent Baun and Marek, 2008, with ten case studies on
ten Member States, from the UK to Lithuania and Greece.
Whereas earlier social and economic cohesion policies supported large infrastructure projects, since 2006 the Lisbon Agendas objectives of growth, competitiveness
and employment trump other goals, at the risk of stressing efficiency at the expense of
equity, although the new Member States have been granted a transitional period during which the implementation of the Lisbon goals is voluntary. David Allen questions
whether the cohesion policies are succeeding in bringing the EU closer to its citizens:
during the pre-accession period there was little chance for the applicants to do anything other than receive instructions and possibly be confused and intimidated by the
Commission bureaucracy. Allen in Baun and Marek, 2008, 31. And, because of the
economic crisis, some cities and regions in the new Member States are now borrowing
heavily to finance their part of EU-backed projects. Stanley Pignal, Cohesion for a
reason, Financial Times, Friday 3 December 2010.
80 Allen in Baun and Marek, 2008, 26.
81 Stanley Pignal, Cohesion for a reason, Financial Times, Friday 3 December 2010.
See also Financial Times other reports on the Cohesion funds, Tuesday 30 November
2010Thursday 2 December 2010. Available HTTP: <http:// www.ft.com/eu-funds>.
82 Joshua Chaffin, Poland finds it feet on the European stage, Financial Times, Thursday 23 December 2010.
83 The citations of MEPs Vigenin, Cretu and Schpflin are from interviews with the
author in 2008.
84 Vigenin, 2008, interview.
85 Schpflin, 2008, interview.
86 According to Cretu, 38 per cent of Romanian MPs were female in 1989 and only 8 per
cent in 2008.
87 Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prgl theorize a patriarchal EU, whose neoliberal
market project validates and constructs rational, autonomous, economic man as the
hegemonic type of masculinity. The EU criteria for enlargement took on inherently
gendered-biased indicators, for example they did not take into account unpaid work,
Notes 183
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
predominantly done by women. Locher and Prgl in Wiener and Diez, 2009, 186 and
194.
All the citations are from Cretu, 2008, interview.
Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 101.
Pellauer, 2007, 12830, 113.
The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe has been described as a
duality of admiration and contempt, Akapar, 2007, 324; the negotiations between
the EU and Turkey a reciprocate challenge, Vrez and Chaponnire, 2005, title
and 8.
For a brief and well-argued survey of the long relationship between the Ottoman
Empire/Turkey and Europe, see Deringil, 2007. When an identity crisis has lasted
for some 200 years, it is no longer a crisis, it is your identity, Deringil, 2007, 721.
Tunkrov in Tunkrov and aradin, 2010, 10.
For more information on Turkish immigration to the EU, see Gliek, 2006.
Sjursen in Sjursen, 2006b, 6, 1114.
Siitonen, 2008, 130. For a similar observation, see Hurd-Shakman, 2006, 401.
Monceau, 2009, 16; see also Akagl and Vaner, 2005, 9; Coutel, 2005, 56.
Laurent, 2005, vii.
Vrez and Chaponnire, 2005; Kirici, 2007a and 2007b.
Rocard, 2008, 96.
Laurent, 2005, 1523.
For more on this, see Guisan, Jean Monnet ne derdi, Radikal, Saturday 21 January
2006. Radikal is a Turkish daily published in Istanbul.
For Monnet on Central and Eastern Europe, see Speech to the ECSC Common Assembly, 20 May 1954 in Monnet, 1955, 70; and Andr Fontaines interview of Monnet,
La cration des Etats-Unis dEurope peut seule stabiliser les rapports EstOuest, Le
Monde, Thursday 16 June 1955. On Turkey and NATO, see Monnet, 1978, 2645.
E-mails to the author from Franoise Nicod, archivist at the Fondation Jean Monnet
pour lEurope, 17 and 18 November 2005. I thank Ms. Nicod for this information.
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was one prominent figure who encouraged the inclusion of Turkey in a unified Europe already in the 1930s, in part on the urging of
Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos. But today there is little memory of
Coudenhove-Kalergis stand in Turkey and beyond. See Barlas and Ergven, 2009,
43842.
Monnet, 1978, 449, 45960.
Ibid., 521.
Fourasti, 1981, interview.
Schuman, 1964, 72.
See Barn Crespo and Oostlanders 1997 EP Report on the Strategy for Enlargement.
Onar in Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem, 2009, 58. Edel Hughes argues that a hidden religious obstacle remains in the case of Turkey, and that there is an increasing
tension between legal pluralism and illiberal secularism in the EU. Hughes, 2011, 7,
9.
Valry Giscard dEstaing in Bureau europen, Brussels, Pour ou contre ladhsion
turque lUnion europenne, Le Monde, 9 November 2002.
Bthe, Gencer and Parkash, 2009, 2.
Sources for statistics: CIA The World Factbook 2010; Turkish Statistical Institute;
World Bank.
Amanda Paul, The nose dive of Turkish-Euro-Atlantic relations, Thursday 22
December 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-230314the-nosedive-of-turkey-euro-atlantic-relations.html> (accessed 28 December 2010).
Joost Lagendijk, Two languages, multiple misunderstandings, Thursday 22
December 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-230432two-languages-multiple-misunderstandings.html> (accessed 28 December 2010).
184
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
Notes
zgr gret, Begin dialogue over Kurdish issue Irish politician urges Turkey,
Monday 21 December 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/n.php?n=8216you-can-win-a-war-but-you-still-can-lose-peace8217-says-irishpolitician-2010-12-21> (accessed 28 December 2010).
Rocard, 2008, 150.
For a similar argument on Turkeys weight in the EU institutions, argued more mathematically, see Pahre and Ucaray-Mangitli, 2009. According to the authors Turkey
might delay decisions, but it would not be able to initiate new policies unilaterally in
the Council.
If it acceded in 2015, a most unlikely event, Turkey would have more voting rights
on the Council of Ministers than France, the UK and Italy, and 82 MEPs against 74 for
France, the UK and Italy.
Galloway, 2001, 913; Rocard, 2008, 801.
Drevet, 2001, 134. During accession negotiations the Commission publishes a yearly
report based on information provided by the candidate country. On this basis, a Council working group prepares another report, which the Council examines and then sends
back to the candidate country with amendments. Indeed, each Member State can raise
specific objections, which complicates the process considerably. The negotiation continues on each chapter through a back and forth exchange between the Commission,
the Council and the candidate country until the Treaty of accession is agreed upon and
signed. It enters into force once the EP, the Member States and the candidate country
have ratified it
Lundgren in Sjursen, 2006b, 124.
Hillion, 2010, 6.
Ibid., 29.
Ugur, 2010, 985.
Hughes, 2011, 1.
Somewhat surprisingly Perry Anderson writes that, within the EU the official consensus that it [Turkey] should become a member-state in full standing has for some
time now been overwhelming. Anderson, 2009, 393. Other scholars put the onus for
the slow down in the negotiations squarely on the EU partners. European secularists
and Christian exclusivists have trouble accepting a different kind of secularism in
Hurd-Shakman, 2006, 401. See also Ugur, 2010.
Patton, 2007.
Bthe, Gencer and Parkash, 2009; Akapar, 2007, 181.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 383409.
On the questions that anger, see Rocard, 2008, 6377. On the Armenian genocide, see
following pages of this chapter; on the Kurdish issue see Kirici The Kurdish issue in
Turkey: Limits of EU reform, and Turkeys Kurdish Challenge.
Hegel, Phenomenology, 409.
Ricoeur, Recognition, 223.
Ibid., 241.
Ibid., 245.
Elonore Sulser, Les nouveaux members montrent leur attachement lUnion,
Le Temps, Monday 29 June 2005.
An earthquake of high intensity devastated Turkey in August 1999, leaving half a million people homeless and tens of thousands buried. There was a massive outpouring of
aid from Greece, which Turkey reciprocated when Greece was struck by an earthquake
in September 1999. Siitonen, 2007, 80. This was the beginning of the earthquake
diplomacy between the two countries, and Greece removed its veto against granting
Turkey candidate status.
Dink, 2009, 119.
Notes 185
137 Ibid., 1018, 174.
138 Ibid., 5964, 150.
139 Information on the Turkey-Armenia Studies Programme and Projects, Available
HTTP: <http://www.hrantdink.org/faaliyetler.asp?bolum=5> (accessed 3 January 2011).
One of the Foundations aims is the normalization and development of Turkeys relations with its most distant neighbor Armenia. The main target is to increase direct contact and mobility between the two countries and the creation of initiatives for the further
development of relations. With the additional support of the Heinrich Bll Foundation,
ten journalists from Turkey travelled to Armenia in May 2009. In return nine columnists
from Armenia visited Turkey in October 2009. During their week-long stay the participants met with top officials, attended the Turkey-Armenia football game in Bursa, and
met also representatives of the Armenian community and the ten Turkish journalists who
had earlier visited Armenia. A communication network has been established to help the
participating journalists share and diffuse news of mutual interest.
140 Guillaume Perrier, Erevan gle les protocols signs avec Ankara and Le gnocide
armnien admis par des intellectuels turcs. Pour la premire fois, des manifestations
sont organises Istanbul pour commmorer le dbut du grand massacre, Le Monde,
Saturday 24 April 2010.
141 Rumelili in Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 103.
142 Tocci, 2007, 30 and 32.
143 Lauhl Shaelou, 2009, 32232, 286,
144 Diez and Tocci, 2009, 295.
145 Mallinson, 2010, 83.
146 Ker-Lindsay in Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem, 2009, 237.
147 Akapar, 2007, 179.
148 Bertrand in Monceau, 2009, 1201. For other narratives, see books on Turkeys accession cited in this chapter. All include at least one chapter on Cyprus. See also Tocci,
2004.
149 Michael, 2009, 199, 201.
150 Hegels story of the master and the slave illustrates the pitfall of one-sided and involuntary recognition. In the early and undeveloped stage of history lack of recognition
leads to armed struggle and defeat of the weaker party, who accept enslavement to
escape death. However, this does not work even for the master because, his vis--vis
is not seen to be a real self, but has been reduced to subordination to things. Recognition by him is therefore worthless; the master cannot really see himself in the other.
. . . His integrity is thus radically undermined just when it seemed assured. Paradoxically, servitude prepares the ground for the emancipation of the slave who faces a real
human being even if this person does not recognize him. Whereas the master is transformed into a mere consumer, eventually the slave comes to see his integrity in his
work, which transforms the world. Therefore, achieving integrity involves traveling
both of these paths, recognition and work. Taylor, Hegel, 154, 156.
151 I thank Theofanis Stavrou for drawing my attention to the question of hierarchy, real
and perceived, and I agree that perception is as important as concrete, objective facts
in politics.
152 Michael, 2009, 206.
6 The question of the demos: truth-telling and right-speaking
1 European Commission, The EU in the United Kingdom. Available HTTP:
<http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/euromyths/index_en.htm> (accessed 11 July
2010).
2 On the EU institutions secretive nature see Booker and North, 1996; Anderson, 2009.
On the EU democratic deficit, see Chryssochoou in Stavridis and Verdun, 2001, 249.
186
Notes
3 For a discussion of truth in EU politics, see Boylan, 2008; Schmidt, 2006; and Guisan,
2003.
The democratic deficit is a notoriously fickle concept with no all encompassing
definition of the term. Stavridis and Verdun, 2001, 213; Judge and Earnshaw, 2008,
80. For more complete references on this topic, see Wiener and Diez, 2009; Dehousse,
2009; Saurugger, 2009.
One major debate in the literature on democracy and the EU is whether institutions
or the formation of a shared political culture matter most to the shaping of a genuine
EU political community, and what should come first. See the dialogue between Habermas, 1992b, and Taylor, 1992c, in Lenoble and Dewandre; Grimm in Gowan and
Anderson, 1997; Chevnement, 2006. For other inquiries, see inter alia, on EU treaties
and institutions: Birkinshaw and Varney, 2010; Dehousse, 2002; Dony, 2008; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2001; Weiler, 1999; on the assessment of EU political identity(ies):
Green, 2007; Hermann, Risse and Brewer, 2004; on direct democracy in Europe: Hug,
2002; Papadopoulos, 2002; Pllinger et al., 2007; Setl and Schiller, 2009; and on
the impact of European integration on national democracies: Sjursen, 2006b; Schmidt,
2006; Zeff and Pirro, 2006.
4 Habermas basic research program is to articulate an expanded conception of rationality beyond instrumentality and empiricism. McCarthy, 1982, 272.
5 On the link between theory and practice in Habermas, see McCarthy, 1982, 273. On
Habermas treatment of empirical political issues, see inter alia, Habermas, Autonomy
and Solidarity; A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany; The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays; Times of Transition; Europe: The Faltering Project.
6 See, for instance, Habermas, Truth and Justification, 23775.
7 See Habermas and Derrida, February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for
a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe, in Levy, Pensky and Torpey
2005, 313. Also Habermas, Times of Transition and Europe: The Faltering Project.
For excellent commentaries on Habermas discussions of European integration, see
William E. Scheuerman, 2008a and 2008b; and John P. McCormick, 2007.
8 For commentaries evaluating the substantive content of the reforms brought about the
Treaty of Lisbon, see Chapters 4 and 5. See also Boylan, 2008, 2228; Dehousse, 2006
and Duff, 2009.
9 Hunyadi, 1990, 472.
10 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 196.
11 Moon in White, 1995, 143.
12 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 38, 36, 105.
13 Alford, 1985.
14 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 58.
15 For an excellent discussion of Habermas moral theory, see Hunyadi, 1990.
16 Habermas, Moral Consciousness, 59.
17 Habermas draws also from Jean Piagets research on motivational development.
For more on this, see Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 95; and Moral Consciousness,
11694.
18 Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity, 223. For two good summaries and critiques of
Kohlbergs developmental theory and Habermas use of it, see Outwhaite, 2009, 503,
and McCarthy, 1982, 24671. It is doubtful, for instance, whether societies can learn
like individuals.
19 Habermas mentions grassroots involvements in European integration, but does not
give them detailed attention. See Habermas in Eriksen and Fossum, 2000, 36.
William E. Scheuerman rightly wonders whether Habermas later model of democracy has become defensive with deliberative publics, NGOs and even legislative
bodies, mostly at rest. Scheuerman, 2008a, 89.
20 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 23952; A Berlin Republic, 77; Between Facts
and Norms, 380, 357.
Notes 187
21 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 107. On this see also Rehg, 2007. For a revised
and concise description of the communication community, see Habermas, Between
Facts and Norms, 44750. Habermas specifies that the judicial and executive powers
focus on justification and application whereas only the legislative branch, based
in civil society, creates new norms. Ibid., 192 and 439.
22 Weber, 1973, 120.
24 Dietz, 2002, 14951. For a similar argument see also Williams, Wight and Kapferer,
2000, 59.
25 Dietz, 2002, 154, 158. Habermas establishes a clear distinction between the law that
requires a normative perspective and power an instrumental one. Between Facts and
Norms, 482. So it is not entirely fair to critique Habermas for excluding the strategic
from the politics. See also on the role of strategic action to maintain power, Habermas, Hannah Arendts Communications Concept of Power, 2212.
27 Weber, 1973, 127.
28 Habermas, Hannah Arendts Communications Concept of Power, 2212.
29 Habermas, A Berlin Republic, 723.
30 Cusset, 2001, 119120; Williams, Wight and Kapferer, 2000, 58.
31 Habermas, A Berlin Republic, 18.
32 Ibid., 1820.
33 Williams, Wight and Kapferer, 2000, 46.
34 Constitutional patriotism responds to the German experience of democratic re-founding where the recourse to a historical democratic tradition (Arendts lost treasure)
was not feasible because of the Nazi past. Pensky in White, 1995, 657.
35 Between Fact and Norms, 4945, 500. Habermas does not recommend the defeatist proposition of abolishing the nation-state but its transformation. An alternative
to the abdication of politics would be if politics were to follow the lead of the markets by constructing supranational political agencies. Europe in transition toward the
European Union provides a suitable example. The Inclusion of the Other, 123. This
suggestion indicates a retreat from the more radically participatory positions of Legitimation Crisis although Habermas was commenting on democracy in the nation-state
there.
36 Markell, 2000, 54. See also Auer, 2010, 1174.
37 In his proposals for a continental federal system that serves a European-wide civil
society, Habermas will reveal himself to be something of a Eurofederalist. J.P.
McCormick, 2007, 211.
38 Fontaine, 2000.
39 Rittberger, 2005, 7881, 924, 1067.
40 Banchoff in Banchoff and Smith, 1999, 18690; Isernia, 2008.
41 Adenauer in Corbett, 1998, 14. Except for examining and approving the High Authoritys yearly report and the budget, the Assemblys members had a consultative role and
did not initiate legislation.
42 Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 301.
43 Schuman, 1964, 145; Monnet, 1978, 401.
44 Monnet, 1978, 394.
The statutes of the EPC established two parliamentary chambers: the Peoples Chamber elected directly by the people of Europe and the Senate elected by the national
parliaments. The Parliament would initiate legislation, vote laws and approve the budget of the Community. The European Executive Council, whose members were to be
called ministers of the European Community, with its president elected by the Senate,
would be responsible before the two Chambers. A Court of Justice would interpret the
law, and a Council of national ministers would serve as a link between the European
executive and their national governments. Gerbet, de La Serre, Nafilyan, 1998, 803.
188
Notes
45 Corbett, 1998, 10.

46 Rittberger, 2005, 10513.
47 For more on this, see J.P. McCormick, 2007, 28891. Berthold Rittberger argues
that on the basis of available evidence it is difficult to discriminate between communicative and strategic action in the discussions that led to the setting up of the Assembly. He concludes that, in either cases, the outcome would have been the same.
Rittberger, 2005, 1035
48 Featherstone, 1994, 150; Hug, 2002, 1; Joly, 2007, 111; Verdun and Stavridis, 2001,
216.
49 Bellamy and Attuci in Wiener and Diez, 2009, 198.
50 Monnet, 1978, 4745.
51 The legal order of democratic constitutional states embodies a moral content, and
for the realization of that content it is not dependent solely on the goodwill of those it
addresses. Habermas, A Berlin Republic, 72. Markell notes that Habermas renounced
his earlier gestures toward the possible self-sufficiency of universal norms for the
constraining power of law. This is so because individual shoulders are too weak to
shoulder alone the burden of normativity in a postmetaphysical age where morality
has become detached from customary practices that once gave it its strong motivating force. Markell, 2000, 468.
52 Monnet in Roussel, 1996, 7234.
53 Duchne in Brinkley and Hackett, 1991, 203.
54 Arendt, The Human Condition. Jean Fourasti remembers how Monnet sent one of his
junior collaborators to find out what the French finance minister thought on a specific
issue. The envoy came back saying that the minister and his aides were away and that
the only person he had met was a workman painting the ministers office. So what did
the painter say? asked Monnet. This was typical of him . . . At least ask the painter for
his opinion. Of course, it was said in jest, but purposefully so. It was part of all that Monnet had instilled in us: anybody has interesting things to say on any topic. Everybody
laughed . . . but it made an enormous impression on us. Fourasti, 1981, interview.
55 Petit, 2006, 6668.
56 Rieben, 1999, interview.
57 Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 251.
58 Monnet, 1978, 3235.
59 Gazzo states that, I managed to create an information bulletin that practically disturbed everybody because the information was . . . checked for accuracy. Gazzo in
Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 188.
60 Duchne, 1994, 241.
61 See Featherstone, 1994, for a well-argued case.
62 Edouard Delruelle argues that communicative action does not provide ethical norms
for political judgments. This conclusion reorients the search for political identity
toward self-interrogation and the acknowledgment of social lifes fundamental alterity. Delruelle, 1993, 915.
63 Bourlanges, 1999, interview.
64 The EU celebrated its Fiftieth Anniversary in 2007. By then the ECSC, founded for 50
years, had expired. Monnet, who first opposed the idea of the common market, was not
involved in the EEC negotiations. Von der Groeben in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007,
1223; Kohnstamm in ibid,; 36780; and Anderson, 2009, 25.
65 Even before the advent of the Eurobarometers in 1974, polls provided rich data on
public attitudes toward European integration. Throughout the 1950s they revealed a
high level of support for European unification: an average of 76 per cent in West
Germany; 59 per cent in Italy; 56 per cent in France; and 67 per cent in the UK.
Hewstone, 1986, 20.
66 The institutions of the European Union are based on the legal foundation of international treaties, but they exercise decision-making powers which intrude so deeply into
Notes 189
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
the social relations of the Member States that they can no longer be legitimized on this
basis alone. Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project, 111.
Siitonen, 2008, 2, 34. For similar assessments, see Wessels and Diedrichs in Banchoff
and Smith, 1999, 140; Rittberger, 2005, 1.
Marianne Van de Steeg, who starts from Habermas notion that the public sphere
should be conceived as a network of multiple overlapping public spheres, does not
mention the European Parliament in her review of the vast array of EU public spheres,
from small groups of citizens who meet each other regularly for discussion in cafs
and conferences to a more abstract public sphere capable of reaching thousands of
newspaper readers. Van de Steeg, 2006, 610. The lack of attention to the EPs political role is even more surprising in quality book-length studies of EU politics from a
discourse-theoretical perspective. See Oddvar Eriksen and Fossum, 2000, which does
not have a chapter on the EP; and J.P. McCormick, 2007, 2657.
Few, except for technicians and lobbyists, will listen to the Cox Report on Taxation
of energy products, Proposal for a Council Directive on restructuring the Community
framework for taxation of energy products or the Camison Asensui Report on Liquid-fuel tanks and rear underrun protection, Proposal for a EP and Council Directive
amending the Council Directive 70/221/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to liquid-fuel tanks and rear underrun protection of motor
vehicles and their trailers. EP Agenda, Tuesday 9 March 1999.
It is one thing to make the information available, another to encourage and enable EU
citizens to seek it out and read it critically. J.P. McCormick, 2007, 278.
There were 24 hearings in 2004, 80 in 2007, which engaged MEPs in exploratory dialogue and provided them with supplementary sources of advice and information.
Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 224. The three workshops and public hearings, which
the author attended during the Brussels EP plenary sessions in March and November
2008, were informative and thought-provoking, with good audience participation.
There are many examples. For instance, Belgian MEP Fernand Herman became
involved in European politics because his experience as a Belgian minister of the
economy convinced him that the pole of power had shifted. When he was first elected
to the EP in 1979, he was somewhat naive about the possibility of influencing decisions as the EP had only consultative powers. But we worked successfully for fifteen
years to obtain real authority. Herman, 1995, interview. MEP Leo Tindemans served
as prime minister of Belgium (19748) and foreign affairs minister (19819) before
being elected MEP in 1989. He says that, he had dreamed since his youth to become
foreign affairs minister and that he could have remained in this position in 1989. But
my party asked me to head the ticket for the elections to the EP. I decided that if I was
elected I would accept this mandate to show that even a senior cabinet minister could
leave executive responsibilities to build the European Community. Tindemans, 1999,
interview.
Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 38.
Habermas, Times of Transition, 90 and 101.
Judge and Earnshaw, 2008.
Corbett, 1998, 151.
Herman, 1999, interview. Herman appeared unaware that constitutional interpretations still provoke heated debates in the US today. The rejected Treaty on the EDC
Political Community constitutes one monument of clarity in the European integration founding process. See text in Gerbet, de La Serre, Nafilyan, 1998, 803.
Rapporteur Fernand Herman, Deuxime rapport de la commission institutionelle,
February 9, 1994, A3-0064/94.
Some MEPs did not care whether the EP proposed a constitution or a treaty as long
as it was readable. Rocard, 1999 and Mndez de Vigo, 1999, interviews.
On rhetoric in the EU, see Schmidt, 2006, 41. Political discourse is a formative moment
of politics, even a causal element, and it has an important legitimizing role to play in
190
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
Notes
the European Union according to John Gaffney in Banchoff and Smith, 1999, 209 and
199. Gaffney distinguishes between five types of EU level discourses, from those of
the European bureaucracy to those of national leaders about Europe. He examines the
potential for a sixth type of discourse originating in European party families. Ibid.,
204.
Fischer, 2000, From Confederacy to Federation Thoughts on the finality of European integration. To have transformative power a discourse must combine cognitive arguments that address issues of facts and truth, albeit always an interpreted
truth, and normative arguments that reflect a logic of appropriateness with accepted
public values. Schmidt, 2006, 2512.
For an excellent collection of commentaries on the constitutional debates, see
Dehousse, 2002. On public opinion: Eurobarometer 53 registered an EU average of
70 percent of respondents for a European constitution, with levels of support ranging
from 88 percent in the Netherlands to 47 percent in the United Kingdom, based on
polls conducted from 5 April to 23 May 2000. See Internet address in the bibliography
under European Commission.
Transparency aims at making operations and practices and decision making as visible
as possible so that those who may wish to participate and contribute can do so in a
constructive fashion with reliable date and at no deliberate disadvantage. Birkinshaw
and Varney, 2010, 2301.
For lively and informed discussions of the merits and flaws of constitutional patriotism when applied to the EU see Gowan and Anderson, 1997; Lenoble and Dewandre,
1992. For comments of MEPs on the same issue, see Guisan, 2003, 2245.
Deloche-Gaudez in Dehousse, 2002, 21017.
Rack, 2002, interview.
Jean-Louis Bourlanges was against deciding by consensus instead of voting: One
could have at least indicative voting. Irish MEP and Convention member John Walls
Cushnahan wondered whether the Convention would manage to make decisions.
Bourlanges and Cushnahan, 2002, interviews.
Elonore Sulser, Giscard dEstaing secoue la Convention sur lavenir de lEurope en
voulant donner plus de poids aux grands pays; Thomas Ferenczi, On ne peut plus
continuer faire des phrases et brasser des ides gnrales, Le Temps, Thursday 24
April 2003.
Habermas discourse ethics is silent on the issue of leadership, which was the presidiums responsibility.
The TEC expanded qualified majority voting into policy areas, which had previously
been decided by unanimity among Member States; it created a European Councils
presidency whereas the Council of Ministers kept its rotating presidency; the Council
of Ministers double majority voting system would require three-fifths of EU population and a majority of Member States instead of the complicated calculations of the
2000 Nice Treaty. The EP became co-legislator with the Council in most policy areas;
one million citizens from a sufficient number of states could send legislative proposals to the Commission; Commission members were to be reduced to two-thirds of
the Member States after 2014 on a rotational basis. The new EU minister of Foreign
Affairs, also a Vice-President of the Commission, would chair the Foreign Affairs
Council. Judge and Earnshaw, 2008, 5962.
Honors students taught by the author at the University of Minnesota drew beautiful
wall posters explaining the treaty after reading the TECs Parts I and II and a couple of
lectures.
Marques, 2005, interview.
Geremek, 2005, interview. Geremek proposed a third Convention, which would debate
three questions social Europe, political Europe, and Europes borders with the
real involvement of civil society, but not write a new constitutional text. Bronislaw
Geremek, Et maintenant, Que faire? Le Monde, Friday 17 June 2005.
Notes 191
91 The author attended the Federalist Intergroup meeting in the Strasbourg EP on Wednesday 8 June 2005. The citations are from her notes.
92 De Rossa, 2008, interview.
93 Council of the European Union, 2007a, 16 and 20; Judge and Earnshaw, 2008,
635.
94 Boylan, 2008, 223.
95 European Council, 2007b, Treaty of Lisbon, OJEU, 2007/C 306/10. Available
HTTP: <http:europa.eu/Lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm> (accessed 12 November 2010). Original version before consolidation.
96 Joint Study by CEPS, Egmont The Royal Institute for International Relations European Policy Centre, November 2007, 145, 147.
97 Consolidated means rewritten in plain English (or any of the 23 official EU languages). The practice started with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The English version of
the consolidated Treaties was published by the Council in the Official Journal of the
European Union on 30 March 2010. OJC 83. Unofficial versions of the Treaties had
already appeared on Internet in a number of languages.
98 Corbett, 2008, interview.
99 De Rossa, 2008, interview.
100 In 2009 Duff published a longer and very readable commentary of the Lisbon Treaty,
Saving the European Union: The logic of the Lisbon Treaty.
101 Duff, 2008, interview.
102 Johannes Voggenhuber spoke at an EP seminar on constitutional affairs on 13 November 2008, which the author attended. Citation from the authors notes.
103 Duff, 2008, interview.
104 Barn Crespo and Leinen, 2008, interviews.
105 Leinen, 2008, interview.
106 European Council, Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, OJC
83, 30 March 2010.
107 Andrew Duff, e-mail to the author, 14 December 2010.
108 Cushnahan 2002, interview.
109 Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project, 81.
110 Smismans, 2007, 606; Judge and Earnshaw 2008, 2967.
111 Habermas, Times of Transition, 101. Habermas endorsement of transeuropean referenda on EU constitutional reforms implies the imperative of transeuropean debates,
which would facilitate not only the elaboration of just norms but also the formation of
shared political self-understandings. Europe: The Faltering Project, 1034 and 578.
But Habermas fails to refer to the vast literature on direct democracy or to discuss a
major dilemma: how to handle the tension between wide-ranging debates over complex issues and the fact that in the end people can say only yes or no. For more on this
dilemma, see Boylan, 2008, 221; Dehousse, 2006, 160.
112 Kaufmann in Pllinger et al., 2007, 151.
113 Bickford, 1996, 5, 2. But neither can representative democracy guarantee good decisions all the time as Butler and Ranney argue in 1994, 261.
114 Benz and Stutzer in Pllinger et al. 2007, 1259. Scholars define carefully the conditions under which direct democracy may be an opportunity for genuine communicative action, with frequent references to Switzerland, which is considered the main referendum country. Svensson in Pllinger et al., 2007, 171; Setl and Schiller, 2009,
6. The Marburg Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe suggests the following
guidelines: citizens must have the right to launch a popular initiative and referendum
process themselves; popular referendums must be binding; there must be no minimum turn out; all donations and campaign funds must be declared; both sides on a
referendum campaign must be allocated space and time in the media; and the role of
government and of public debates in the referendum campaign must be clearly defined.
Kaufmann, Bchi, Braun, 2008, 109.
192
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
Notes
Papadopoulos, 2002, 15.
Haskell, 2001, 50.
Walker, 2003, 1202.
Dehousse, 2006, 158.
Butler and Ranney, 1994, 259. Some of the MEPs interviewed (Herman; Geremek;
Lalumire) agreed with Arendt that under present conditions direct democracy may
only have a chance, if at all, in a small country or in small, well-defined sectors of the
mass societies of the large powers. On Violence, 84.
Guigou, 1994, 17, 201.
Catherine Lalumire was not as pleased as Guigou with the French referendum on
Maastricht: It was a close call, we got a real fright. Lalumire, 2002, interview.
Alain Menusier, Le people du non sest fait rouler dans la farine, LHebdo, 22, 2
June 2005.
See Dehousse, 2006 on this; and Batrice Houchard, Les Franais sont fous de la
Constitution, Le Temps, Tuesday 24 May 2005.
Schmidt, 2006, 1868, 190.
Boylan, 2008, 220.
Wiersma, 2008, interview.
A 1987 ruling by the Irish Supreme Court (Crotty case) stipulates that significant
changes to the European Union treaties require an amendment to the Irish Constitution which is always changed by means of a referendum before being ratified by
the state. Legal opinion is divided on whether the Crotty ruling obliges the government
to systematically defer to the Irish people whenever there is a significant new development in the EU legal setting. Nevertheless, as a result of this legal precedent, Ireland
has always held a referendum on every new European treaty. Available HTTP: <http://
www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/ireland-mulls-calling-another-eu-referendum-news498975> (accessed 21 October 2010).
De Rossa, 2005, interview. For more on this, see Laffan, 2008. The Irish rejected the
Nice Treaty (Nice I) in a 2001 referendum with only 34 percent of voter participation,
and accepted it with revisions the following year (Nice II).
Cushnahan, 2002, interview.
Canovan in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994, 199.
Defraigne, 1995, interview.
Since 2000 the EU Commission and the Council of Europe have collaborated in
the Youth Partnership to develop citizenship training programs and research activities in this field. But citizenship education is not universally taught in Europe, and
is usually related to national rather than European citizenship. Dolejsiov and
Garcia Lpez, 2009, 5, 1314. Also, teaching on European integration takes place
mostly at the university level. For more on this, see Smith, Belot and Georgakakis,
2004.
In the aftermath of the 2005 referendum French MP Michel Herbillons report to the
French National Assembly requested that the teaching of basic knowledge on EU institutions and European culture be made part of the new Fillon law on education. Patrick
Roger, Trois mois de campagne sur lEurope ne compensent pas cinquante ans de
silence, Le Monde, Friday 1 July 2005.
Richard von Weizscker, Lettre ouverte la Convention europenne, Le Temps,
Wednesday 7 May 2003.
The first petition hit the one million signatories target and was handed to European
Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso in October 2010. It calls for a moratorium on all new GM crop production in Europe until a proper safety regime has
been put in place. Spearheaded by Greenpeace in March 2010, the initiative followed
the authorization by the Commission of a BASF antibiotic-resistant GM potato that
Notes 193
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
month. Available HTTP: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/cap/first-citizens-initiativecall-gm-crop-freeze-news-498524? utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign

=1a2165b887-my_google_analytics_key&utm_medium=email> (accessed 10 July
2010).
Nancy Isenson, Germany denies accusations it failed to pay WWII reparations to
Greece, Deutsche Welle, 25 February 2010. Available HTTP: <http://dw-world.de/
dw/article/0,5284838,00.html> (accessed 3 August 2010). Habermas published a long
commentary Europa: Wir brauchen Europa! at the height of Greek crisis, which
chastised German indifference toward the shared EU fate. Die Zeit-Online, 25 May
2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/index> (accessed 10 June 2010).
Philippe Ricard, LEurope rpond aux marches par une riposte massive, Le Monde,
Tuesday 11 May 2010; Patrick Roger, Les Etats redoutent la tutelle de Bruxelles sur
leur budget and Bruxelles veut un droit de regard sur le budget des tats; Clment
Lacombe, Athnes sattaque lvasion fiscale, sport national, Le Monde, Friday 15
May 2010.
Tony Barber, Tall ambition, flawed foundations, Financial Times, Tuesday 12 October 2010.
Anthee Carassava, Rewriting a Greek Tragedy, Newsweek, 16 April 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/15/rewriting-a-greek-tragedy.html>
(accessed 4 August 2010).
Paul Solman, Interview with George Papandreou, PBS News, 1 July 2010. Available
HTTP: <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/greek_07-01.html>
(accessed 31 August 2010).
David Gardner and Kerin Hope, A marathon to sprint, Financial Times, Friday 30
July 2010.
Authors random conversations in French and Greek in Thessaloniki, Athens, and
Karistos, Eubia, 29 May6 June 2010. The interlocutors included a student graduating
in elementary education and unsure to find employment even on an isolated island, a
partially employed car mechanic, a freshly graduated and unemployed forestry engineer, a senior adviser to opposition leader Antonis Samaras, a housewife, and a retired
saleswoman. Likewise, Professor Theofanis Stavrou noted the capacity for self-reflection among the Greeks he met during his stay in Athens, May 2010 (conversation with
the author, November 2010, University of Minnesota).
David Gardner and Kerin Hope, A marathon to sprint, Financial Times, Friday 30
July 2010.
Kerin Hope, Papandreou raises stakes in local polls, Financial Times, Thursday 4
November 2010
Tony Barber, Tall ambition, flawed foundations, Financial Times, Tuesday 12 October 2010.
As Philip Stephens writes, the public debt of Greece, Ireland and Portugal adds up to
about $960bn, or about 7 per cent of eurozone output. Underwriting the debt by issuing Eurobonds would end the panic in financial markets. Fixing the problem in other
words, is politically painful, but perfectly possible economically. The missing ingredients are trust and political will. Europes return to Westphalia, Financial Times,
Friday 24 June 2011.
J.P. McCormick, 2007, 24. McCormick argues that Habermas fails to take on in his
analysis of European integration the more pessimistic possibility on the states transformation outlined in Legitimation Crisis; his overly ideational account of the emergence of the modern nation-state overlooks structural constraints and weakens his case
that the EU could morph into a kind of transnational Sozialstaat. McCormick fills in
the blanks by imagining a Sektoralstaat, 18492 and 27986.
Nine Greek scholars, including political scientists Theodoros Couloumbis and George
Pagoulatos, wrote a letter entitled Political Questions to their fellow citizens. They
offered it as a petition, open to others signatures. They called Greeks to quit navel
194
Notes
gazing and to ask themselves whether they would be better off on their own without
external intervention, and why they should expect other peoples to save them if they
did not make the necessary efforts to recover. Other questions: As a people do we
not carry responsibilities for the current situation? Have our constant demands for
pleasing electoral promises not encouraged political parties to undertake too many
obligations? Have excessive levels of individual indebtedness and hyper consumption not contributed to todays predicaments? Kathimerini, Wednesday 15 June 2011
(translation by Hlne Guisan).
7 EU borders and the enlarged mentality
1 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 4.
2 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 2413; Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity,
62.
3 Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994, 331.
4 Kohler and Saner, Arendt and Jaspers, Correspondence, 264.
5 Arendts reading of Kant was highly selective, not to say perverse, writes the sympathetic Arendtian scholar Margaret Canovan, 1990, 160. See also Young-Bruehl,
Reflections on Hannah Arendts The Life of the Mind; and Beiner, Judging in a
World of Appearances: A Commentary on Hannah Arendts Unwritten Finale, in
Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994; and Robert J. Dostal, Judging Human Action:
Arendts Appropriation of Kant, in Beiner and Nedelsky, 2001.
6 Beiner in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994, 382.
7 Geddes, 2008, 18, 172; Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera, 2009, 1 and 11.
8 One can have one set of rights but not another, Benhabib, 2004, 146. For more on
this, see Benhabib, 2004, 14761.
9 Weiner, 1995, 171; Benhabib, 2004, 438.
10 Cotter in Lang and Williams, 2005, 98, 100. For other commentaries, see Benhabib,
2004; Davison and Muppidi, 2009; and Gndodu, 2006.
11 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1011.
12 Young-Bruehl, 2004, 443.
13 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 1316, 615.
15 Canovan detected two alternative positions in Arendts theorizing of the political relevance of thinking. The first was associated with Plato and Heidegger and suggested
that philosophical excellence could be bought only at the cost of tyrannical sympathies
in politics; the second was associated with Socrates and Jaspers and suggested that, on
the contrary, authentic philosophy is communicative and not oriented toward exclusive truth. Canovan, 1990, 162.
16 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 214 and 13.
It is not easy to distinguish the exact relationship between thinking and judgment
in Arendts work. Beiner solves the difficulty by detecting two theories of judgment:
the first, which discusses judgment primarily from the point of view of the actor, and
the second after 1971 when judgment becomes an autonomous contemplative activity
detached from politics, almost a kind of memory. Beiner, 1982, 912 and 109. Marshall draws from the newly available Arendts Denketagebuch to argue to the contrary
that Arendt understood judging as something undertaken by both the spectator and
the actor. Marshall, 2010, 370.
17 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 74. Allan W. Wood agrees with Arendt that the Sketch on
Universal Peace should be read as addressing Kants chief concerns, not as a departure
from more philosophical concerns. This is a new approach in scholarly critique.
Wood in Cheah and Robbins, 1998, 68.
For a similar argument, see Jol Lefebvre, 1985, 1011.
Notes 195
18 Kant, E. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Kants Political Writings,
93130.
Perpetual Peace is not an easy text to decipher and there has been much speculation
as to what Kant meant by the terms cosmopolitan right or world citizenship (Weltbrgerrecht). Clearly Kant was not recommending a world state but a federation of
republics with representative systems. He is regarded as an early critic of colonialism
and Lefebvre interprets Kant as advocating mens right to free movement across the
planet. Lefebvre, 1985, 35.
19 As Benhabib notes, Arendt was skeptical about the ideals of world government and
stressed the importance of national borders for political stability. Benhabib, 2004, 61.
See Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 81; The Human Condition, 1912. Annabel Herzog argues, however, that Arendt was a cosmopolitan thinker for whom action meant
transgressing necessary borders, not ignoring them. She had little interest in institutions although she favored federalism over a unitary world government. Herzog, 2004,
33, 36.
20 Steinberger, 1990, 816; Young-Bruehl in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994, 347.
21 See Arendts Essays in Understanding, On Revolution, Men in Dark Times, Eichmann
in Jerusalem, The Life of the Mind, I and II, Responsibility and Judgment and The
Promise of Politics.
22 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 287,126.
For an excellent discussion of the controversy over Arendts use of the term banality of evil, see Amos Elon, 1997.
23 Eichmann said, . . .the principle of my will must always be such that it can become
the principle of general laws. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 136.
24 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 4; Eichmann in Jerusalem, ibid.
25 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 1924.
Arendt is fond of quoting Socrates words in Platos Georgias: I would much rather
that the whole world be not in agreement with me and talk against me than I, who am
one, should be in discord with myself and talk in self-contradiction. Between Past
and Future, 299, n. 13.
26 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 1923, 1757.
27 Arendt, Philosophy and Politics, 86, 89.
28 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, ix; The Life of the Mind, I, 167. Jaspers, a gentile, lived in
internal exile under Nazism with his Jewish wife; German defeat saved them from
imminent deportation. For more on this, see Chapter 2.
29 Men in Dark Times, 734; 93.
Jaspers remained unviolable, untemptable, unswayable, and with a certain
cheerful recklessness he exposed himself to the currents of public life while remaining independent of all the trends and opinions that happen to be in vogue at the time.
Ibid.,767.
30 Ibid., 889. See Chapters 2 and 6 for other discussions of communication in Jaspers
political thinking.
31 Villa in Beiner and Nedelsky, 2001, 302.
32 For an excellent review of recent scholarly comments on Arendts theory of political judgment, see Marshall, 2010. Although Marshall does not discuss the enlarged
mentality specifically, his account in six points of what the practitioner of Arendtian
judgment is able to do fits the concept rather neatly, i.e.: the actor is able to make
it possible to reveal the world more fully by crafting idioms in which new perspectives are communicable in the long-term; . . . increase the responsiveness and political
sustainability of discursive negotiation as a process for collective decision-making.
Marshall, 2010, 387.
33 Linda Zerilli stresses the productive role of imagination, which brings into being
the new and affirms human freedom. Zerilli, 2005, 163, 183. Like action, judgment
is creative. But Leslie Paul Thiele warns against the ethical vacuum that imagination
196
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
Notes
unmoored from understanding could suggest. Arendt would chafe at the political aesthete whose imagination was undisciplined by worthy examples, shared stories, and
common sense. Reliance on stories, both retrospective and prospective, is essential to
guide moral action. Thiele, 2005, 71112.
Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 3223.
Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 2902. For more on Arendts criticism of psychoanalysis, see Young-Bruehl, 2006, 85.
Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 107.
Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 21516.
Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 107.
In her doctoral dissertation Arendt had considered the possibility of establishing a
social life on the basis of Augustinian neighborly love, but she ruled against it later,
and turned to amor mundi, a more political concern for the world.
Chiba, 1995, 507, 521.
Ibid., 510, 52532.
Iris Marion Young, 2001, 219.
Berlin to Jahanbegloo, 1992, 108, 113.
Ibid., 37, 39.
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 170.
Zakaras, 2004, 496.
Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 62.
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 40. Robespierres compassion for the poor unleashed
the Terror according to Arendt, On Revolution, 501.
Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 201, 14.
Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 327, n. 21.
For Jaspers vision, see Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 88; for Berlins, see Giambattista
Vico and Cultural History in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 4969.
Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 1678; Lectures on Kant, 76, 84.
See Mitterrands public comments on Monnet as a man of silence who drew strength
and clarity from his practice of daily meditation. Mitterrand in Roussel, 1996, 914.
Monnet, 1978, 2889.
Roussel, 1996, 694, 773.
Monnet, 1978, 289.
Ibid., 28996.
People made fun of Monnets health regimen, but it was part of keeping a balanced
detachment. Duchne, 1994, 348. Monnets private secretary Franoise Schonfeld
transcribed the carnets roses, which are held at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour
lEurope in Lausanne, Switzerland. Their content, once published, will challenge the
usual assumption that Monnet did not read or write. Ibid., 349, 353.
Monnet in Roussel, 1996, 711. This note is dated 12 July 1956 (in the carnets roses).
Ibid., 909.
The Life of the Mind, II, 198. Young-Bruehl calls the book, a treatise on mental good
governance where the three mental faculties of thinking, willing and judging check
and balance each other like three branches of government . . . But the image of interfaculty relations is incomplete. Hannah Arendt did not live to write the Judging section and so the relation of this faculty to Thinking and Willing is not presented. The
ideal good governance, equalities between the faculties is clear, but the constitution
for the mental republic was not drawn up. Young-Bruehl, 2004, 458.
According to Arendt the three mental activities are autonomous, not only with respect
to each other, but also vis--vis intellectual cognition. This autonomy is asserted by
means of the distinction between truth and meaning. Beiner, 1982, 1289.
The price of action is the loss of mental freedom. But action can gain for men political
freedom, as Arendt argues in the final pages of Willing. Young-Bruehl in Hinchman
and Hinchman, 1994, 347.
Notes 197
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
Monnet, 1978, 299.

Drake, 2000, 268, 253.
Ross, 1995, 634.
Delors, 1994, 3201, 386.
Philippe Lasserre, Un colloque Schengen, au coeur de lEurope, Changer International, 293, JanuaryFebruary 2000; Charte des Europens, Antenne Lorraine Trois
Frontires du Rarmement Moral, 37, rue Drogon, 57970 Yutz, France; e-mails from
Charles Danguy to author, 4 August and 9 December 2000.
See especially Abensour, 2006; Beiner, 1982; Canovan, 1990 and 1992; Kateb, 2006;
Marshall, 2010; Valle, 1999; Zerilli, 2005.
Some reports made a difference to EU politics such as the Werner Report on the Economic and Monetary Union (1970) and the Tindemans Report on the European Union
(1976). The latest, Project Europe 2030 Report by EU Wisemen written by a
nine-member Reflection Group (with two female members only) seems to have provoked little public debate since its publication on 9 May 2010.
Casaca, 2008, interview.
Berger, 2002; Barn Crespo, 2008, interviews.
Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 43; Herzog, 2004, 36.
Berger, 2002, interview.
Emma Boninos 1997 visit to Afghanistan when she was EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid was more informative than reading many books and reports. Bonino, 2002,
interview.
Ibid. Bonino taught at the American University of Cairo in 20015.
Lalumire, 1999, interview.
Lalumire, 2002, interview. Lalumire joined the Mitterrand government in 1981. She
was Secretary-General of the Council of Europe (198994), MEP (19942004) and
vice-president of the EP (20014).
Ibid.
Geddes, 2008, ix.
Some migrants hold EU citizenship and have the right to complete freedom of movement following accession, sometimes after transitional periods. Some Member States
imposed no transitional period, to open up their borders fully to EU citizens from
other Member States after the 2004 enlargement, such as the UK and Sweden. Others,
such as Austria, established a seven-year transition period in 2004. The same is true of
France where the Romas from Romania and Bulgaria will have the unimpeded right to
move only in 2014. Other migrants are Third-country nationals (TCNs) with no such
rights even if they are married to, or children of, EU citizens. Others are short-term
workers, refugees and asylum seekers.
Dunn, 1990, 201, 205, 208.
The questions of migration and identity not only cross geographic boundaries, but
also transcend the formal political institutions of state bureaucracies, political parties, and labor unions. . . . As such, events occurring within the formal political arena
join . . . highly informal cultural practices, as equally salient spaces where sentiments
of allegiance and loyalty are constituted, where political forms and subjectivities are
contested. Silverstein, 2004, 8.
Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 545, 75.
For a scholarly approach, see Geddes, 2008; for a more activist stand, Fekete, 2009; for
a combination of both, Hoffman in Davison and Muppidi, 2009; Gndodu, 2006.
Geddes, 2008, 8, 188.
Ibid., 23.
EU popular opinion makes little distinction between migrants from within the EU
and from further afield, whereas Brussels policy-makers dont even think of people
relocating from one EU country to another as migration. Stanley Pignal, EU faces
threat to the migration principle, Financial Times, Wednesday 29 September 2010.
198
Notes
88 Crepaz, 2008, 209. Citizens from other EU Member States have a right to enter France
without a visa, but a multi-year transition period was put in place for citizens of the
new Member States (until 2014 for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens), which does
not permit them to stay beyond a three-month visit unless they obtain a special permit,
which the Romas under expulsion order had not done.
Jim Cohen, Frances Anti-Sarkozy Season Begins with a Strong Showing In the
Streets Against Racism, 6 September 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.truthout.org/frances-day-without-immigrants-march-1-2010-not-quite-advertised57491>
(accessed 10 September 2010).
89 Benhabib, 2004, 167.
90 Davison, Muppidi, Irani, and Ladin in Davison and Muppidi 2009, 1012 and 106. The
authors contrast their global hermeneutic approach to European identity with Anthony
Pagdens work that constitutes an effort to understand from within. By projecting
European identity as ending with Europe itself and also as universal, he [Pagden]
cannot but equate Europe with the universal, since there is nothing left toward which
Europe must move. Ibid., 856. See also Pagden, 2002. For two good perspectives
from without, see R. Pavananthi Vembulu, Understanding European Integration, and
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.
91 Les Roms. Et qui dautre? Anti-expulsion conference, 13 September 2010.
Available HTTP: <http://www.ladialectique.wordpress.com/2010/09/13/les-romset-qui-dautre-anti-expulsion-conference-in-the-parisian-banlieue-with-jacquesranciere-etienne-balibar-luc-boltanski-and-others/html> (accessed 10 October 2010).
92 Davison, Muppidi, Irani and Ladin in Davison and Muppidi, 2009, 1034.
93 Gndodu, 2006, 21.
94 Duvall, Gndodu and Raj in Davison and Muppidi, 2009; Hoffman in ibid.; Fekete,
2009.
95 Duvall, Gndodu and Raj in Davison and Muppidi, 236.
96 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2907.
97 Crepaz, 2008, 256.
98 For useful discussions of this oxymoron, see Bartram, 2010; Messina and Lahav, 2006,
61617; Weiner, 1995, 169.
99 Duvall, Gndodu and Raj in Davison and Muppidi, 238, 236.
100 Zourabichvili, 2008, 16174.
101 Hoffman, 2009, 245. See Hoffman in Davison and Muppidi, 2009, for other relevant
references, and a discussion of links between the legacy of colonialism and the policies of exclusion currently pursued in the US and France.
102 Ibid., 246, 263. Also, for an interesting discussion of Arendt on imperialism and borders, see Herzog, 2004.
103 Silverstein, 2004, 233.
104 Benhabib is careful to distinguish between the many categories of EU migrants from
the point of view of rights in each EU Member State. See table in Benhabib, 2004,
15761.
105 Maas, 2007, 610, 98.
Elizabeth Meehan also detects in the Maastricht Treatys article 8 on EU citizenship
an important step toward correcting the EU democratic deficit. See Meehan, 1993.
106 Geddes, 2008, 104.
107 Carrera, 2009, 54, 76.
108 Integration is becoming linked with admission procedures abroad. For instance,
immigrants to the Netherlands are now required to demonstrate a mastery of Dutch
even before they come to the country. This requires taking language courses overseas that not all candidates for immigration can afford. The Dutch integration tests
for new immigrants are written up by private companies, with the content of the test
not revealed in advance because one must feel Dutch. The tests have become more
stringent over time, which has lowered drastically the number of applications for
Notes 199
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
residency. de Groot, Kuipers and Weber in Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera, 2009,
638. See Besseling for more on immigration to the Netherlands in ibid.
Balibar defines the community of fate as any place where individuals and groups
belong, wherever they happen to live, therefore to work, bear children, support relatives, find partners for every sort of intercourse. Balibar, 2001, 28.
It was the 2008 French-designated pact on immigration that marked a shift in power
from the EU institutions to national governments, and this could surprise people
who suspect the European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of
Justice of constantly finding new ways to grab control of sensitive policy areas. Tony
Barber, Europes uncommon immigration policy, Financial Times, Wednesday 17
September 2008.
Geddes, 2008, 7. The 2007 Commissions second Handbook on Integration skirted
important ethical debates, according to Sergio Carrera, as it defines integration pragmatically, by outcomes in terms of social and economic mobility, education, health,
housing, social services and societal participation, and recommends setting aside
any wider conceptual debate. How to assess best and worst practices is not thought
through. Carrera, 2009, 867.
Ibid., 441.
There has been a shift of responsibility to the executive branch, especially to the interior ministries of Member States. Brussels-based officials and national officials meet
behind close doors to architect the EU policies on Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ),
and emphasize security as a result of changing conceptualization of security and the
blurring of the distinction between internal and external security. Geddes, 2008, 7.
Roms: du fait divers la dispute diplomatique, Le Monde, 14 September 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.lemonde.fr/article/2010/09/14/1411153.html> (accessed 15
September 2010).
Oana Lungescu, Viviane Redings BBC interview on Roma deportation, 14 September 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11306243>
(accessed 15 September 2010).
Mike Corder, EU calls Frances Gypsy expulsions a disgrace, AP, 15 September
2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jdw
Oflf-Hw9HIzkznvHidLHIKyY8AD9I7RAVO0> (accessed 16 September 2010).
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 278. For commentary, see Cotter in Lang and Williams, 2005, 99100.
Origins of Totalitarianism, 2956; Cotter, 10910.
Arendt in Beiner, 1982, 1078.
Balibar, 1998, 226.
Balibar, 2004,1989, 202.
Ibid., 2012.
Hoffman in Davison and Muppidi, 2009, 261.
Lang in Lang and Williams, 2005, 1801.
Fekete, 2009, 17789.
Silverstein, 2004, 1011, 233.
Fekete, 2009, 191.
De Pous-de Jonge, 2009, 1089.
The full text was posted on 30 October 2010. Available HTTP: <http://www.linggarjati.org>.
An Indonesian professor is translating ter Kulves paper for a special issue of Journal
Etika on the themes of multicultural society, national identity and democracy. The
Indonesian embassy organized a seminar with the association of Indonesian students
in Groningen and senior personalities from Indonesia, including the chief editor of
the Jakarta Post in December 2010; but few Dutch attended, perhaps because of late
notice and the holiday period. Emails of ter Kulve to the author, 15 and 17 January
2011.
200
Notes
129 Michael Loriaux has written a fascinating book on the European Union as a project
of frontier deconstruction. He makes of the Rhineland region the primary site of
this process although he acknowledges that this casts a shadow on the states of the
periphery. Loriaux, 2008, 3249.
130 Benhabib, 2004, 221.
131 Berlin, 1991, 19.
132 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, I, 171. For commentary, see Pitkin, 1998, 276.
133 On thought-things, see Arendt, The Life of the Mind, II, 20717.
Bibliography
Abel, O. (ed.) (1996) Le pardon. Briser la dette et loubli, Paris: ditions Autrement.
Abls, M. (1997) De lEurope politique en particulier et de lanthropologie en gnral,
in Lequesnes and Smith, Interprter lEurope, 3358.
Abensour, M. (2006) Hannah Arendt contre la philosophie politique? Paris: Sens & Tonka.
Acheson, D. (1969) Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York:
Norton.
Adenauer, K. (1955) World Indivisible, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, New York:
Harper and Brothers.
(1966) Memoirs, vol. I, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
(1967) Mmoires, vol. II, trans. Genevive Teissdre and Georgette Chatenet, Paris:
Hachette.
Adler, E. and Berstein, S. (2005) Knowledge in power: the epistemic construction of
global governance, in Barnett and Duvall, Power in Global Governance, 294318.
Ahtisaari, M. (2007) The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement,
Available HTTP: <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html> (accessed 22
January 2009).
Akagl, D. and Vaner, S. (2005) LEurope avec ou sans la Turquie, Paris: ditions
dOrganisation.
Akapar, B. (2007) Turkeys New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU
Membership, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Albert, M., Diez, T., and Stetter, S. (2008) The transformative power of integration:
conceptualising border conflicts in Diez, Albert and Stetter, The European Union and
Border Conflicts, 1332.
Alford, F. (1985) Is Jrgen Habermass Reconstructive Science Really a Science? Theory
and Society, 14: 32140.
Allcock, J.B. (2009) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in
Ingrao and Emmert, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, 34689.
Allen, D. (2008) Cohesion Policy Pre- and Post-Enlargement in Baun and Marek, EU
Cohesion Policy after Enlargement, 1533.
Anastasakis, O., Nicolaidis, K., and ktem, K. (eds) (2009) In the Long Shadow of Europe:
Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers.
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, 2nd edn, London and New York: Verso.
Anderson, P. (2009) The New Old World, New York and London: Verso.
202
Bibliography
Anderson, S.B. (2008) Crafting EU Security Policy, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne
Rienner.
Andrani, G. (1999) LEurope des incertitudes, Commentaire, Spring 1999: 2338.
Andrani, G. (2005) Imperial Loose Talk in Lindberg, Beyond Paradise and Power,
6380.
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
(1970) On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
(1972) Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence,
Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
(1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York and London: Harcourt Brace.
(1978) The Life of the Mind, San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt Brace.
(1982) Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy, ed. and essay Ronald Beiner, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
(1990) Philosophy and Politics, Social Research, 57 (1): 73103.
(1992) Eichmann in Jerusalem, New York: Penguin Books.
(1993) Between Past and Future, New York: Penguin Books.
(1994) Some Question of Moral Philosophy, Social Research, 61 (4): 73963.
(1995) Men in Dark Times, San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt Brace.
(2003) Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books.
(2005a) Essays in Understanding 19301945: Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism,
2nd edn, New York: Schocken Books.
(2005b) The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books.
(2006) On Revolution, with an introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin
Books.
Aristotle (1958) The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Arnaud, J.-L. (1999) Reuniting Europe or Europes Quest for Identity/ies, Paris: Notre
Europe.
Arnaud, J.-L. and Jouen, M. (2001) Reuniting Europe, Paris: Notre Europe.
Arnaud, J.-L. and Zaborowska, M. (2002) Enlargement of the European Union: Towards a
large area of solidarity and cooperation, Paris: Notre Europe.
Attali, J. (1994) Europe(s), Paris: Fayard.
Auer, S. (2010) New Europe: Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (5): 116384.
Bache, I. (1998) The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multilevel Governance
or Flexible Gatekeeping? Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Bahcheli, T., Couloumbis, T. and Carley, P. (1997) GreekTurkish Relations and US Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Balfour, R. (ed.) (2008) The Balkans in Europe: Containment or Transformation? Twelve
Ideas for Action, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
Balibar, . (1998) The Borders of Europe in Cheah and Robbins, Cosmopolitics,
21629.
(2001) Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty: Citizenship and Civility in the Era of
Global Violence, Constellations, 8 (1): 1529.
(2002) Politics and the Other Scene, London and New York: Verso.
(2004) We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Ball, G.W. (1994) Foreword in Duchne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, 913.
Bibliography 203
Banchoff, T. and Smith, M.P. (eds) (1999) Legitimacy and the European Union: The contested polity, London and New York: Routledge.
Banchoff, T. (1999) National identity and EU legitimacy in France and Germany, in
Banchoff and Smith, Legitimacy and the European Union: The contested polity, 18098.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (ed.) (2004) From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Barlas, D. and Ergven, S. (2009) Turkey and the Idea of European Union during the
Interwar Years, Middle Eastern Studies, 45 (3): 42546.
Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in
Global Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (eds) (2005) Power in Global Governance, Cambridge, UK and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bartram, D. (2010) International Migration, Open Borders Debates, and Happiness,
International Studies Review, 12 (3): 33961.
Baun, M.J. (2000) A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Baun, M.J. and Marek, D. (eds) (2008) EU Cohesion Policy after Enlargement, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Beach, D. (2008) The Facilitator of Efficient Negotiations in the Council: the Impact of
the Council Secretariat in Naurin and Wallace, Unveiling the Council of the European
Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels, 21937.
Beck, U. and Grande, E. (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe, trans. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge,
UK and Malden, USA: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (2007) Reinventing Europe A Cosmopolitan Vision, in Rumford, Cosmopolitanism and Europe, 3950.
Beiner, R. (1982) Hannah Arendt on Judging in Arendt, Lectures on Kants Political
Philosophy, 89156 and 16474.
(1994) Judging in a World of Appearances: A Commentary on Hannah Arendts
Unwritten Finale in Hinchman and Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays,
365387.
Beiner, R. and Nedelsky, J. (eds) (2001) Judgment, Imagination and Politics: Themes from
Kant and Arendt, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D. (2003) Legitimizing the Euro-polity and its Regime:
The Normative Turn in EU Studies, European Journal of Political Theory, 2 (1):
734.
Bellamy, R. and Attucci, C. (2009) Normative Theory and the EU: Between Contract and
Community in Wiener and Diez, European Integration Theory, 198220.
Benhabib, S. (1996) The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
(2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge, UK and
Benz, M. and Stutzer, A. (2007) Direct Democracy and Citizens Information about
Politics in Pllinger et al, Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects
12542.
Berlin, I. (1980) Against the Current, New York: The Viking Press.
(1991) The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, New
York: Knopf.
Berthoin, G. (2001) Mondialisation et pouvoir politique en Europe in Fondation Robert
Schuman et Association Jean Monnet, HierAujourdhuiDemain, 11824.
204
Bibliography
Bertrand, G. (2009) Le fiasco chypriote, mauvais signe pour lelargissement de lUnion

europenne la Turquie et aux tats ouest-balkaniques in Monceau, LEurope au miroir
de la Turquie, 10323.
Besselink, F.L.M. (2009) Integration and Immigration: The Vicissitudes of Dutch Inburgering in Guild, Grooenendijk and Carrera, Illiberal Liberal States, 24157.
Bicchi, F. (2007) European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Bickford, S. (1996) The Dissonance of Democracy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Birkinshaw, P. and Varney, M. (2010) European Union Legal Order After Lisbon, Austin:
Kluwer Law International.
Biscop, S. and Lembke, J. (eds) (2008) EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance,
Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
Blanchard, M. (2007) Review of Ricoeurs The Course of Recognition, Ethics, 117 (2):
37377.
Blitz, B.K. (ed.) (2006) War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bloomfield, D. (2006) On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation, Berghof Report 14,
Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
Boismorand, P. (2007) Magda et Andr Trocm: Figures de rsistances, Paris: Les ditions
du Cerf.
Booker, C. and North, R. (1996) The Castle of Lies, London: Duckworth.
Borchardt, K.-D. (1994) The ABC of Community Law, Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities.
Bouvet, L., Delors, J., Kluxen-Pyta, D., Lamers, K. and Rovan, J. (1998) FranceAllemagne: Le Bond en Avant, Paris: ditions Odile Jacob.
Boylan, T.S. (2008) Did the Treaty of Lisbon Need a European Version of the Federalist
Papers? Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, 3 (2): 21346.
Brinkley, D. and Hackett, C. (eds) (1991) Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity, New
York: St Martins Press.
Bruckner, P. (2006) La tyrannie de la pnitence: essai sur le masochisme occidental, Paris:
Grasset.
Brudholm, T. (2008) Resentments Virtue: Jean Amry and the Refusal to Forgive, Philadelphia: Temple University.
Buchman, F. (1961) Remaking the World: The Speeches of Frank N. D. Buchman, London:
Blandford Press.
Bthe, T., Gencer, . and Parkash, S. (2009) The Promise of Turkish EU Membership:
A Comparative Analysis, Paper presented at the 11th Biennial Conference, EUSA, Los
Angeles, 2325 April.
Butler, D. and Ranney, A. (eds) (1994) Referendums around the World, Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute.
Canovan, M. (1990) Socrates or Heidegger? Hannah Arendts Reflections on Philosophy
and Politics, Social Research, 57 (1): 13565.
(1992) Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
(1994) Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and The Public Realm in Hinchman and
Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, 179205.
Capperucci, V. (2009) Alcide De Gasperi and the problem of reconstruction, trans. Henry
Monaco, Modern Italy, 14 (4): 44557.
Carrera, S. (2009) In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection Between
Bibliography 205
Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the EU, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers.
Casarini, N. and Musu, C. (eds) (2007) European Foreign Policy in an Evolving
International System: The Road Towards Convergence, Basingstoke, UK and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Cau, M. (2009) Alcide De Gasperi: a political thinker or a thinking politician? trans.
Henry Monaco, Modern Italy, 14 (4): 43144.
Chakrabarty, D. (2000) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
Difference, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Chandler, D. and Heins, V. (2006) Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities
and Paradoxes, London and New York: Routledge.
Cheah, P. and Robbins, B. (eds) (1998) Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the
Nation, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Checkel, J.T. and Katzenstein, P.J. (eds) (2009) European Identity, Cambridge, UK:
Chevnement, J.-P. (2006) La faute de M. Monnet: La Rpublique et lEurope, Paris:
Fayard.
Chiba, S. (1995) Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship and Citizenship, The Review of Politics, 57 (3): 50535.
Chryssochoou, D.N. (2001) The Nature of Democracy in the European Union and the
Limits of Treaty Reform in Stavridis and Verdun, Democracy in the Three Pillars of
the European Union, CPEE Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 24564.
Cini, M. (2001) From the Marshall Plan to the EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences in
Schain, The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, 1337.
Cini, M. and Bourne, A.K. (eds) (2006) Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies,
Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cohen, A. (1998) Le Plan Schuman de Paul Reuter: Entre Communaut nationale et
Fdration europenne, Revue franaise de science politique, 48 (5): 64563.
Comte, B. (1991) Une utopie combattante. Lcole des cadres dUriage 19401942, Paris:
Arthme Fayard.
Cooper, R. (2003) The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century,
New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
Corbett, R. (1998) The European Parliaments Role in Closer EU Integration, New York:
St Martins Press.
Cotter, B. (2005) Hannah Arendt and The Right to Have Rights in Lang and Williams,
Hannah Arendt and International Relations, 95112.
Coutel, C. (2005) Orienter lEurope: La Turquie et nous, Nantes, France: ditions Pleins
Feux.
Couture, J., Nielsen, K. and Seymour, M. (eds) (1998) Rethinking Nationalism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 22, Calgary: Calgary University
Press.
Crepaz, M.M.L. (2008) Trust beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State and Identity
in Modern Societies, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Cusset, Y. (2001) Habermas: Lespoir de la discussion, Paris: ditions Michalon.
Dallmayr, F. (2001) Peace Talks who will listen?, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Daltrop, A. (1982) Politics and the European Community, Harlow, UK: Longman.
Davies, N. (1996) Europe: A History, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Davison, A. and Muppidi, H. (eds) (2009) Europe and its Boundaries: Words and Worlds,
206
Bibliography
Within and Beyond, Lanham, MD, Boulder, CO, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Davison, A., Muppidi, H., Irani, F., and Ladin, D. (2009) Europe and its Boundaries:
Toward a Global Hermeneutic Political Theory in Davison and Muppidi, Europe and
its Boundaries, 83111.
Defrance, C. and Pfeil, U. (2007) Au service du rapprochement franco-allemand.
Dialogues dhistoriens de part et dautre du Rhin in Mink and Neumayer, LEurope et ses
passs douloureux, 92103.
De Gasperi, A. (20062009) Scritti e discorsi politici, vol. I, II, III. Scientific coordination
by Paolo Pombeni, editing coordination by Giuliana Nobili Schiera. Critical edition produced by the Autonomous Province of Trento and the Trentino Institute of Culture (later
Fondazione Bruno Kessler). Bologna: Societ editrice il Mulino.
Dehousse, R. (ed.) (2002) Une Constitution pour lEurope? Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
(2006) The Unmaking of the Constitution: Lessons from the European Referenda,
Constellations, 13 (2): 15164.
(ed.) (2009) Politiques europennes, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Delanty, G. and Rumford, C. (2005) Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization, London and New York: Routledge.
Deloche-Gaudez, F. (2002) La convention pour llaboration de la Charte des droits fondamentaux: Une mthode constituante? in Dehousse, Une Constitution pour lEurope?
177226.
Delors, J. (1994) Lunit dun homme. Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton, Paris: ditions
Odile Jacob.
(1999) Esprit vanglique et construction europenne. Available HTTP: <http://
www.notre-europe.asso.fr> (accessed 2 July 2000).
(2000a) Le pardon et la promesse. Lhritage vivant de Robert Schuman, Available
HTTP: <http://notre-europe.eu/en/editorials/publication/archives-appearances-jacquesdelors> (accessed 12 January 2009).
(2000b) Europartenaires. Available HTTP: <http://notre-europe.eu/en/editorials/
publication/archives-appearances-jacques-delors> (accessed 12 January 2009).
(2006) LEurope tragique et magnifique. Les grands enjeux europens, Paris: ditions Saint-Simon.
Delruelle, E. (1993) Le Consensus impossible: Le diffrend entre thique et politique chez
H. Arendt and J. Habermas, Bruxelles: ditions Ousia.
Deringil, S. (2007) The Turks and Europe: The argument from history, Middle Eastern
Studies, 43 (5): 70923.
Drens, J.-A. (2008) Le Pige du Kosovo, Paris: ditions Non Lieu.
Dewitte, J. (2008) Lexception europenne: Ces mrites qui nous distinguent, Paris:
ditions Michalon.
Dews, P. (ed.) (1999) Habermas: A Critical Reader, Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishers.
Dietz, M.G. (2002) Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt and Politics, New York: Routledge.
Diez, T., Albert, M. and Stetter, S. (eds) (2008) The European Union and Border
Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Diez, T. and Tocci, N. (2009) Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Bibliography 207
Digeser, P. (1998) Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures,
Political Theory, 26 (5): 70034.
Dinan, D. (1994) Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community, 2nd
edn, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Dink, H. (2009) Deux peuples proches, deux peuples lointains: ArmnieTurquie, trans.
Emre lker and Dominique Edd, Paris: Actes Sud.
Dolejsiov, D. and Garcia Lpez, M.A. (2009) (eds) European Citizenship in the process
of construction . . . Challenges for citizenship, citizenship education and democratic
practice in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Dony, M. (2008) Aprs la rforme de Lisbonne. Les nouveaux traits europens, Bruxelles:
ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles.
Drake, H. (2000) Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European leader, London and New
York: Routledge.
Drevet, J-F. (2001) Llargissement de lUnion europenne, Jusquo? Paris:
LHarmattan.
Duchne, F. (1972) Europes Role in World Peace in Mayne, Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen
Europeans Look Ahead, 3247.
(1973) The European Communities and the Uncertainties of Interdependence in
Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? ForeignPolicy Problems before the EC,
121.
(1991) Jean Monnets Methods in Brinkley and Hackett, Jean Monnet: The Path to
European Unity, 184209.
(1994) Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.
Duff, A. (2009) Saving the European Union: The Logic of the Lisbon Treaty, London:
Shoehorn Media.
Dunn, J. (1990) The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Duvall, R., Gndodu, A. and Raj, K. (2009) Borders, Power and Resistance: Bounding and Challenging Europe, in Davison and Muppidi, Europe and its Boundaries,
22541.
Elbe, S. (2003) Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective, London and New York: Routledge.
Enright, R.D. and North, J. (eds) (1998) Exploring Forgiveness, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Elon, A. (1997) The Case of Hannah Arendt, The New York Review of Books, 6 November, 259.
European Commission (1993a) Communication from the CommissionFuture Relations
and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East, COM (1993) 375, 8
September.
(1993b) Communication from the CommissionEC Support to the Middle East
Peace Process, COM (1993) 458, 29 September.
(1997) Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union, Bulletin of the European
Union, Supplement 5/97, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities.
(2000) Preliminary results of the Eurobarometer 53, 24 July. Available HTTP: <http://
europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html> (accessed 19 August 2000).
(2003) How the European Union works: A citizens guide to the EU institutions, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
208
Bibliography
(2008) Eurobarometer 69. 24 June. Available HTTP: <ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/

archives/eb/eb69/eb69_en.htm> (accessed 12 June 2009).
European Parliament (1994) Deuxime rapport de la commission institutionelle, Rapporteur Fernand Herman, 9 February, A3-0064/94.
(1997) Report on the Enlargement of the European Union, Rapporteurs Enrique
Barn Crespo and Arie M. Oostlander, 4 December, A4-0368/97.
(2002) Common Conclusions, Expert Report by Bernitz, U., Frowein, J.A. and
Lord Kingsland/QC, 2 October. Available HTTP: <http://www. europarl.eu.int/studies>
(accessed 2 November 2002).
European Council (2007a) The Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal of the European
Union, 2007/C 306/10. Available HTTP: <http:europa.eu/Lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_
en.htm> (accessed 12 November 2010).
(2007b) Presidency Conclusion Brussels European Council 21/22 June 2007,
11177/1 Rev1, Brussels.
(2010) The Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, OJC 83,
30 March. Available HTTP: <http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm>
(accessed 12 November 2010, consolidated version).
Featherstone, K. (1994) Jean Monnet and the Democratic Deficit in the European
Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32 (2): 14970.
Fekete, L. (2009) A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe,
Sidmouth, UK: Pluto Press.
Ferguson, D. (2010) Beyond the Struggle: Paul Ricoeurs Revision of Recognition, Ottawa:
Library and Archives Canada.
Fischer, J. (2000) From Confederacy to Federation Thoughts on the finality of European integration, 12 May, Humboldt University, Berlin. Available HTTP: <http://www.
auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r000512c.htm> (accessed 20 July 2000).
Fondation Robert Schuman and Association Jean Monnet (eds) (2001) Europe: Hier
Aujourdhui Demain, Paris: Economica.
Fontaine, P. (2000) A new idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration, 19502000, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Fontaine, P. (2009) Voyage to the Heart of Europe 19532009: A History of the ChristianDemocratic Group and the Group of the European Peoples Party in the European Parliament, trans. David Harris and Julie Barnes, Brussels: ditions Racine.
Fogu, C. and Kansteiner, W. (2006) The Politics of Memory and the Poetics of History in
Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu, The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, 284310.
Fransen, F.J. (2001) The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the
European Community, Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press.
Frazer, E. and Hutchings, K. (2008) On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon,
Contemporary Political Theory, 7: 90108.
Fukayama, F. (1989) The End of History? The National Interest, 16 (Summer): 318.
Gaffney, J. (1999) Political rhetoric and the legitimation of the European Union in Banchoff and Smith, Legitimacy and the European Union: The contested polity, 199211.
Galloway, D. (2001) The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Realities and Illusions of Power in the
EU, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Galtung, J. (1973) The European Community: A Superpower in the Making, Oslo: Universitetsvrlaget.
Gardner Feldman, L. (1999a) The Principle and Practice of Reconciliation in German
Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 75 (2): 33356.
Bibliography 209
(1999b) Reconciliation and Legitimacy: Foreign relations and enlargement of the
European Union in Banchoff and Smith, Legitimacy and the European Union: The
contested polity, 6690.
Gazzola, M. (2006) Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy
Evaluation for the European Parliament, Language Policy, 5: 393417.
Geddes, A. (2008) Immigration and European Integration: Beyond fortress Europe? 2nd
edn, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Gerbet, P., de La Serre, F. and Nafilyan, G. (eds) (1998) LUnion politique de lEurope:
Jalons et textes, Paris: La documentation franaise.
Geremek, B. (2009a) Common Memory and European Identity in Swoboda and Wiersma,
Politics of the Past: The Use and Abuse of History, 3142.
Geremek, B. (2009b) Une voix en Europe, Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour lEurope
et Paris: Economica.
Gillingham, J. (1991a) Coal, steel and the rebirth of Europe, 19451955, Cambridge, UK
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
(1991b) Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal in Brinkley and Hackett, Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity,
12962.
Ginsberg, R. H. and Smith, M. E. (2007) Understanding the European Union as a Global
Political Actor: Theory, Practice, Impact in Meunier and McNamara, Making History:
European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty, 26781.
Giroud, F. and Grass, G. with Wintzen, R. (1988) Ecoutez-moi: ParisBerlin, aller, retour,
Paris: Maren Sell & Cie.
Glucksmann, A. (1997) Le Bien et le Mal: Lettres immorales dAllemagne et de France,
Paris: Robert Laffont.
Gonzles, F. (1999) Europe Union and Globalization, Foreign Policy, 115: 2842.
Gorham, E.B. (2000) The Theater of Politics: Hannah Arendt, Political Science and Higher
Education, Lanham MD, Boulder CO, New York, Oxford: Lexington Books.
Gowan, P. and Anderson, P. (1997) The Question of Europe, London and New York:
Verso.
Gray, J. (2007) Are We Born Moral? The New York Review of Books, 10 May: 268.
Green, D.M. (2007) The Europeans: Political Identity in an Emerging Polity, Boulder, CO
and London: Lynne Rienner.
(2008) Who are the Europeans? EUSA Review, Summer.
Grimm, D. (1997) Does Europe Need a Constitution? in Gowan and Anderson, The
Question of Europe, 23958.
Groot de, G.R., Kuipers, J.-J. and Weber, F. (2009) Passing Citizenship Tests as a Requirement for Naturalisation: A Comparative Perspective in Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera,
Illiberal liberal States, 5177.
Gruchy de, J.W. (2002) Reconciliation: Restoring Justice, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press.
Guigou, E. (1994) Pour les Europens, Paris: Flammarion.
Guild, E., Groenendijk, K. and Carrera, S. (eds) (2009) Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Guisan, C. (2000) Lost Treasure? An Arendtian Study of the Ethical Politics of Contemporary European Integration, PhD. Thesis. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services.
(2003) Un sens lEurope: Gagner la paix (19502003), Paris: Odile Jacob.
(2005) Winning the Peace: Lost Treasure of European Integration? Rivista di Studi
Politici Internazionali, 287 (3): 45370.
210
Bibliography
(2011) From the European Coal and Steel Community to Kosovo: Reconciliation and
its Discontents, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(3): 54162.
Gliek, A.R. (rapporteur) (2006) The Turkish presence in Europe: migrant workers and
new European citizens, Report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 11083. Available HTTP:
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC11083>
(accessed 15 December, 2010).
Gndodu, A. (2006) Right to Have Rights: Arendt and Agamben on Politics of Human
Rights, Presentation at the University of Minnesota Political Theory Colloquium, 3
March.
Gney, A. (2008/9) EU Enlargement towards Turkey: Challenges and Prospects, Cyprus
Center of European and International Affairs. Available HTTP: <http://www.cceia.unic.
ac.cy> (accessed 25 May 2009).
Haas, E.B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1975) Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston, MA: Beacon
Press.
(1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt
and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
(1992a) Autonomy and Solidarity, ed. and trans. Peter Dews, London and New York:
Verso.
(1992b) Citoyennet et identit nationale: Rflexions sur lavenir de lEurope in
Lenoble and Dewandre, LEurope au soir du sicle, 1738.
(1993) Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
(1994a) The Past as Future, ed. and trans. Max Pensky, Lincoln, NE and London:
University of Nebraska Press.
(1994b) Hannah Arendts Communications Concept of Power, trans. Thomas
McCarthy in Hinchman and Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, 211 29.
(1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, trans. William Rehg, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
(1997) A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany, trans. Steven Rendall, Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press.
(1998) The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. and trans. Ciaran
Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
(2000) Beyond the nation-state? On some consequences of economic globalization
in Oddvar Eriksen and Fossum, Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through
Deliberation?, 2941.
(2001) The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, ed. and trans. Max Pensky,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
(2003) Truth and Justification, ed. and trans. Barbara Fultner, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
(2006) Time of Transitions, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky, Cambridge,
UK and Malden, USA: Polity.
(2009) Europe: The Faltering Project, trans. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge, UK and
Malden, USA: Polity.
Habermas, J. and Derrida, J. (2005) February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together:
Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe, in Levy, D., Pensky, M.
and Torpey, J. (eds) Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe, 313.
Haldas, G. (1987) La Lgende des repas, Paris: Juillard et Lge dHomme.
Bibliography 211
Halbwachs, M. (1950) The Collective Memory, trans. Francis. J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi
Ritter, 2nd edn, New York: Harper Colophon.
Hallstein, W. (1962) United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardimon, M.O. (1994) Hegels Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hartmann, F. (2010) (Re)Constructing Europe and the Balkans in the Shadow of Their
Pasts in Petritsch and Dzihi, Conflict and Memory: Bridging Past and Future in [South
East] Europe, 30120.
Haskell, J. (2001) Direct Democracy or Representative Government? Dispelling the Populist Myth, Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press.
Hayden, P. (2009) Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory,
London and New York: Routledge.
Hayward, K. (2007) Mediating the European Ideal: Cross-border Programmes and
Conflict Resolution on the Island of Ireland, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45
(3): 67593.
Hayward, K. and Wiener, A. (2008) The influence of the EU towards conflict transformation on the island of Ireland in Diez, Albert and Stetter, The European Union and Border
Conflicts, 3263.
Hedetoft, U. and Hjort, M. (eds) (2002) The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity,
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New York:
Clarendon Press.
Henrikson, A.K. (2003) Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently: An
Atlanticists Rejoinder to the Kagan Thesis, EUSA Review, 16 (3): 110.
Herf, J. (2002) Traditions of Memory and Belonging: The Holocaust and the Germans
since 1945 in Hedetoft and Hjort, The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity,
27594.
Herrmann, R.K., Risse, T. and Brewer, M.B. (eds) (2004) Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Herzog, A. (2004) Political Itineraries and Anarchic Cosmopolitanism in the Thought of
Hannah Arendt, Inquiry, 47: 2041.
Hewstone, M. (1986) Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A SocialPsychological Study in Four Member States, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Hill, M.A. (1979) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, New York: St Martins Press.
Hillion, C. (2010) The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, Report 6,
Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy. Available HTTP: <http:// www.sieps.
se> (accessed 23 November 2010).
Hinchman L.P. and Hinchman, S.K. (eds) (1994) Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Hoffman, M.N. (2009) Securing the Absent Nation: Colonial Governance in the New
World Order in Davison and Muppidi, Europe and its Boundaries, 24370.
Hovelsen, L. (1959) Out of the Evil Night, trans. John Morrison. London: Blandford Press.
Hug, S. (2002) Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums and European Integration, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hughes, E. (2011) Turkeys Accession to the European Union: The Politics of Exclusion?
London and New York: Routledge.
212
Bibliography
Hunyadi, M. (1990) Une morale post-mtaphysique. Introduction la thorie morale de

Jrgen Habermas, Revue de thologie et de philosophie, 122 (4): 46783.
Ingrao, C. and Emmert, T.A. (eds) (2009) Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars Initiative, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
Isaacs, J. (1994) Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics, American
Political Science Review, 88 (1): 15668.
Isernia, P. (2008) Present at creation: Italian mass support for European integration in the
formative years, European Journal of Political Research, 47: 383410.
Iseni, B. (2008) La question nationale en Europe du Sud-est. Gense, mergence et dveloppement de lidentit nationale albanaise au Kosovo et en Macdoine, Bern: Peter Lang.
Jahanbegloo, R. (1992) Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, London: Peter Halban.
Jarausch, K.H. (2007) Nightmares or Daydreams? A Postscript on the Europeanization
of Memories, Lecture at the Center for German & European Studies, University of
Minnesota, Twin Cities, 28 September.
Jarausch, K.H. and Lindenberger, T. (eds) (2007) Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing
Contemporary Histories, New York: Berghahn Books.
Jaspers, K. (1948) The European Spirit, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, London: SCM Press.
(1967) The Future of Germany, trans. E.B. Ashton, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
(1978) The Question of German Guilt, trans. E.B. Ashton, Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press.
Joerges, C. and Everson, M. (2000) Challenging the bureaucratic challenge in Oddvar
Eriksen and Fossum, Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation?, 16488.
Joint Study by CEPS, EgmontThe Royal Institute for International RelationsThe European Policy Centre (2007) The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional
Reforms. Available HTTP: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/SD/Joint_Study_complet.
pdf> (accessed 4 August 2010).
Johnston, D. and Sampson, C. (eds) (1994) Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft,
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joly, M. (2007) Le mythe Jean Monnet: Contribution une sociologie historique de la
construction europenne, Paris: CNRS ditions.
Jones, S.G. (2007) The Rise of European Security Cooperation, Cambridge, UK and New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Judge, D. and Earnshaw, D. (2008) The European Parliament, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Judt, T. (2001) Introduction in Schain, The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, 19.
(2005) Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, New York: The Penguin Press.
Kagan, R. (2004) Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,
2nd edn, New York: Vintage Books.
Kaiser, W. (2007) Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge,
UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kalyvas, A. (2008) Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl
Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, E. (1985) Pour la paix perptuelle suivi dun choix de textes sur la paix et la
guerre drasme Freud, ed. and trans. Jol Lefebvre, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
Lyon.
Kant, E. (1994) Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge UK,
New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 213
Kateb, G. (1984) Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Allanheld.
(2001) The Judgment of Arendt in Beiner and Nedelski, Judgment, Imagination
and Politics, 12138.
Kattan, E. (2002) Penser le devoir de mmoire, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Kaufmann, B., Bchi, R. and Braun, N. (2008) Guidebook to Direct Democracy in
Switzerland and Beyond, Marburg, Germany: The Initiative & Referendum Institute
Europe.
Kaufmann, B. (2007) Prospects for Transnational Direct Democracy Exploring the
New European Approach to Citizens Power beyond the Nation-State in Pllinger et al,
Direct Democracy in Europe, 14362.
Kearney, R. (2004) On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva, Aldershot, UK and Burlington,
VT: Ashgate.
Keenan, A. (1994) Promises, Promises: The Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of the Political in the Work of Hannah Arendt, Political Theory, 22 (2): 297322.
Keohane, R.O. and Hoffmann, S. (eds) (1991) The New European Community: DecisionMaking and Institutional Change, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ker-Lindsay, J. (2009) The deceiving shadow of the EU? Contradictory perceptions of
The European Solution for Cyprus in Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem, In the Long
Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism, 21938.
Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. (2008) The Foreign Policy of the European Union,
Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Keylor, W.R. (1992) The Twentieth Century World, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kirici, K. (2007a) Three way approach to meeting the challenges of migrant incorporation in the European Union: reflections from a Turkish perspective, Paper for
CARIM, European University Institute, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies.
(2007b) Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration, Mediterranean Politics, 12 (1): 917.
(2010) Turkeys Kurdish Challenge in Stansfield and Lowe, The Kurdish Policy
Imperative, 5878.
(2011) The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of EU Reform, South East Europe
Politics and Society, forthcoming Spring.
Klemeni, M. (2007) A star pupil playing it safe in the EU: An inside view of the first
Slovenian EU Council Presidency, JanuaryJune 2008, tudes and Recherches, 61,
Notre Europe. Available HTTP: <http://www.notre-europe.asso.eu> (accessed: 7 January 2010).
Klusmeyer, D. (2005) Hannah Arendts Critical Realism: Power, Justice and Responsibility in Lang and Williams, Hannah Arendt and International Relations, 11378.
Kohler, L. and Saner, H. (eds) (1992) Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers Correspondence
19261969, trans. Robert and Rita Kimber, San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt
Brace.
Kohnstamm, M. and Hager, W. (eds) (1973) A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community, New York and Toronto: John Wiley & Sons.
Kostovicova, D. (2010) Civil Society in the Western Balkans: Vehicle for or Obstacle to
Transitional Justice? in Petritsch and Dzihi, Conflict and Memory: Bridging Past and
Future in [South East] Europe, 28794.
Krzemiski, A. (1994) More Humility, Fewer Illusions A Talk between Adam Michnik
and Jrgen Habermas, The New York Review of Books, 24 March: 249.
214
Bibliography
Kselman, T. and Buttigieg, J.A. (eds) (2003) European Christian Democracy: Historical
Legacies and Comparative Perspectives, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Kurspahi, K. (2006) From Bosnia to Kosovo and Beyond: Mistakes and Lessons in
Blitz, War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, 7886.
Laffan, B. (1996) The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 34 (1): 81102.
(2008) Ireland and the EU Post-Lisbon, Notre Europe. Available HTTP: <http://
notre-europe.asso.eu> (accessed 15 December 2010).
Laidi, Z. (2005) La Norme sans la Force: Lnigme de la puissance europenne, Paris:
Presses de Sciences Po.
Laignel-Lavastine, A. (2005) Esprits dEurope: Autour de Czeslaw Milosz, Jan Patoka,
Istvn Bib, Paris: calmann-lvy.
Laitinen, A. (2007) Review of Ricoeurs The Course of Recognition, Redescriptions, 11:
22431.
Lamy, P. (2002) LEurope en premire ligne, Paris: ditions du Seuil.
Lang, A.F., Jr. and Williams, J. (eds) (2005) Hannah Arendt and International Relations:
Readings Across the Lines, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laughan, J. (1998) The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea,
London: Warner Books.
Lauhl Shaelou, S. (2010) The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration, Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Laurent, A. (2005) LEurope malade de la Turquie, Paris: Franois-Xavier de Guibert.
Laurinaviius, C. (2009) The Interpretation of the Soviet Unions History: The Baltic
Dimension in Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 1218.
Lean, G. (1988) On the Tail of a Comet, Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard.
Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W. and Fogu, C. (eds) (2006) The Politics of Memory in Postwar
Europe, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
Lefebvre, J. (1985) Introduction in Kant, Pour la paix perptuelle suivi dun choix de
textes sur la paix et la guerre drasme Freud, 546.
Leithner, A. (2009) Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory and National Interest, Boulder, CO and London: FirstForumPress.
Lenoble, J. and Dewandre, N. (eds) (1992) LEurope au soir du sicle: Identit et dmocratie, Paris: ditions Esprit.
Lequesnes, C. and Smith, A. (eds) (1997) Interprter lEurope, Paris: LHarmattan.
Levy, D., Pensky, M. and Torpey, J. (eds) (2005) Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe,
London and New York: Verso.
Lvy, L. (2007) Postface in Mink and Neumayer, LEurope et ses passs douloureux,
2612.
Lindberg, T. (ed.) (2004) Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of
a Troubled Partnership, London and New York: Routledge.
Linz, J.L. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and PostCommunist Europe, Baltimore, MA and London: The John
Hopkins University Press.
Locher, B. and Prgl, E. (2009) Gender and European Integration in Wiener and Diez,
European Integration Theory, 18197.
Lorenzini, S. (2009) The roots of a statesman: De Gasperis foreign policy, trans. Henry
Monaco, Modern Italy, 14 (4): 47384.
Bibliography 215
Loriaux, M. (2008) European Union and the Deconstruction of the Rhineland Frontier,
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Louis, J.-V. (1995) The Community Legal Order, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Lucarelli, S. and Manners, I. (eds) (2006) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge.
Lucarelli, S. (2006) Introduction in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in
European Union Foreign Policy, 118.
Lukes, S. (1991) Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Luttwak, E. (1994) FrancoGerman Reconciliation: The Overlooked Role of the Moral
Re-Armament Movement with Steele, D., Appendix in Johnston and Sampson, Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, 3763.
Lynch, F.M.B. (1993) Restoring France: the road to integration in Milward et al., The
Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and theory 19451992, 5987.
Maas, W. (2007) Creating European Citizens, Lanham, MD, Boulder, CO, New York and
Toronto, Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
MacIntyre, A. (1984) The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition in Sandel, Liberalism and Its Critics, 12548.
McCarthy, T. (1982) The Critical Theory of Jrgen Habermas, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press.
McCormick, J. (2005) Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
(2007) The European Superpower, Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
McCormick, J.P. (2007) Weber, Habermas and Transformations of the European State:
Constitutional, Social and Supranational Democracy, Cambridge, UK and New York:
Madison, G.B. (1999) Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur in Popkin, The Columbia
History of Western Philosophy, 70511.
Magnette, P. and Nicolaidis, K. (2003) Grands et petits pays dans lUnion europenne:
Rinventer lquilibre, Study 25, Notre Europe. Available HTTP: <http://notre-europe.
asso.eu> (accessed 21 June 2009).
Majone, G. (2009) Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty, Cambridge, UK
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mallinson, W. (2010) Partition through Foreign Aggression: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus,
Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs XX, Minneapolis, MN: Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota.
Mancini, G. F. (1991) The Making of a Constitution for Europe in Keohane and Hoffmann,
The New European Community: Decision-Making and Institutional Change, 17794.
Manners, I. (2000) Substance and Symbolism: An anatomy of cooperation in the New
Europe, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
(2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 40 (2): 23558.
(2006) Normative Power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads in Sjursen,
What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective, Journal of European
Public Policy, 18299.
(2008) The Normative Ethics of the European Union, International Affairs, 84 (1):
4560.
216
Bibliography
(2010) Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (1): 6787.
Marcel, G. (ed.) (1971), Plus dcisif que la violence, Paris: Plon.
Mar Fernndez, A. (2008) De quelles marges de manoeuvre dispose une Prsidence
de lUnion? Bref 9, Notre Europe. Available HTTP: <http://notre-europe.asso.eu>
(accessed 7 January 2010).
Maritain, J. (1993) LEurope et lide fdrale, Paris: Mame.
Marjolin, R. (1981) Europe in Search of its Identity, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
(1989) Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 19111986, trans. William Hall, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Markell, P. (2000) Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On Constitutional Patriotism,
Political Theory, 28 (1): 3863.
Marshall, D.L. (2010) The Origin and Character of Hannah Arendts Theory of Judgment, Political Theory, 38 (3): 36793.
Martnez, M.A. (2009) Resistance and Exile in Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics of the
Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 20714.
Maxwell, J.A. (1996) A Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, Thousand
Oaks, CA, London and New Delhi: Sage.
Mayhew, A. (1998) Recreating Europe: The European Unions Policy towards Central and
Eastern Europe, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mayne, R. (ed.) (1972) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London:
Fontana.
Meehan, E. (1993) Citizenship and the European Community, London and Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Meinhof, U.H. (2004) Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victims, and the Threat of the
Other in Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, Transnational Identities: Becoming European
in the EU, 21444.
Melchionni, M.G. and Ducci, R. (eds) (2007) La Gense des Traits de Rome: Entretiens
indits avec 18 acteurs et tmoins de la ngociation, Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet
pour lEurope et Paris: Economica.
Mendras, H. (1997) LEurope des Europens, Paris: Gallimard.
Messina, A.M. and Lahav, G. (eds) (2006) The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and
Policies, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
Meunier, S. and McNamara, K. (eds) (2007) Making History: European Integration and
Institutional Change at Fifty, The State of the European Union, Vol. 8, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Michael, M.S. (2009) Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mill, J.S. (1991) On Liberty with The Subjection of Women and Chapters on Socialism,
ed. Stefan Collini, Cambridge, UK, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University
Press.
Milward, A.S. (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 194551, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(1993) Conclusions: the value of history in Milward et al, The Frontier of National
Sovereignty: History and theory 19451992, 182201.
(1997) The Springs of Integration in Gowan and Anderson, The Question of Europe,
520.
Bibliography 217
Milward, A.S., Lynch, F.M.B., Romero, F., Ranieri, R. and Srensen, V. (1993) The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and theory 19451992, London and New York:
Routledge.
Milward, A.S. and Srensen, V. (1993) Interdependence or integration? A national choice
in Milward et al, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and theory 19451992,
132.
Minet, P. (1962) Full Text of the Treaty of Rome and an ABC of the Common Market, London: Christopher Johnson.
Mink, G. and Neumayer, L. (eds) (2007) LEurope et ses passs douloureux, Paris: La
Dcouverte.
Missiroli, A. (2010) The ENP in Future Perspective in Whitman and Wolff, The European Neighborhood Policy in Perspective, 25970.
Mosi, D. (2008) La Gopolitique de lmotion: Comment les cultures de peur, dhumiliation
et despoir faonnent le monde, Paris: Flammarion.
Moll, N. (2008) La rconciliation franco-allemande et les Balkans: une motivation, pas un
modle, LEurope en formation, 34950: 3354.
Monceau, N. (ed.) (2009) LEurope au miroir de la Turquie, Politique europenne, 29:
7123.
Monnet, J. (1955) Les Etats-Unis dEurope ont commenc: La Communaut europenne du
charbon et de lacier. Discours et Allocutions 1952-1954, Paris: Robert Laffont.
Monnet, J. (1978) Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne, New York: Doubleday.
Montesquieu, C. (1989) The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller,
Harold S. Stone, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Montville, J.V. (1991) The Arrow and the Olive Brach: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy
in Volkan, Montville and Demetrios, The Psychodynamics of International Relations,
16175.
Moon, C. and Suh, S. (2006) Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of
Identity and Nationalism in Asia, Global Asia, 2 (1): 3248.
Moon, J.D. (1995) Practical discourse and communicative ethics in White, The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, 14364.
Moore, B., Jr. (1998) How Ethnic Enmities End in Couture, Nielsen and Seymour,
Rethinking Nationalism, 109132.
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Moravcsik, A. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) Liberal Intergovernmentalism in Wiener
and Diez, European Integration Theory, 6787.
Moreau Defarges, P. (1985) La Prsidence du Conseil des Ministres des Communauts europennes: Rapport national sur la France in O Nuallain, The Presidency of the
European Council of Ministers: Impacts and Implications for National Governments,
11937.
Morgan, G. (2005) The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European
Integration, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Moscovi, P. (2001) LEurope, une puissance dans la mondialisation, Paris: Seuil.
Mounier, E. (1935) Rvolution personnaliste et communautaire, Paris: Fernand Aubier.
Mller, J.-W. (2006) On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism, Contemporary Political Theory, 5 (3): 27896.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (2008) Kosovo and Serbia:
Democracy and Reconciliation after Independence. Available HTTP: <http://www.ndiaction.org/node/299> (accessed 22 November 2008).
218
Bibliography
Muppidi, H. (2005) Colonial and postcolonial governance in Barnett and Duvall, Power
in Global Governance, 27393.
Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. (2008) Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games
Governments Play in Brussels, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Newhouse, J. (1997) Europe Adrift, New York: Pantheon Books.
Nicolaidis, K. and Howse, R. (eds) (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of
Governance in the United States and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Nicolaidis, K. and Howse, R. (2002) This is my EUtopia . . .: Narrative as Power, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4): 76292.
Nicolaidis, K. (2004) We, the Peoples of Europe . . ., Foreign Affairs, 83 (6): 97110.
(2005) The Power of the Superpowerless in Lindberg, Beyond Paradise and Power,
93120.
Nye, J.S., Jr. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: PublicAffairs.
Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2007) European Strategic Culture Revisited: The Ends and
Means of a Militarised European Union, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
Obradovic, D. (1996) Political Legitimacy and the European Union, Journal of Common
Oddvar Eriksen, E. and Fossum, J.E. (eds) (2000) Democracy in the European Union:
Integration through Deliberation? London and New York: Routledge.
Onar, N. (2009) The lure of Europe: Reconciling the European other and Turkish/Greek
selves in Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and ktem, In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks
and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism, 4772.
O Nuallain, C. (ed.) (1985) The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers: Impacts
and Implications for National Governments, London: Croom Helm.
Orbie, J. (ed.) (2008) Europes Global Role: External Policies of the European Union,
Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Outwaithe, W. (2009) Habermas: A Critical Introduction, 2nd edn, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Owens, P. (2007) Between War and Politics: International Relations and the Thought of
Hannah Arendt, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pace, M. (2007) The Construction of EU Normative Power, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 45 (5): 104164.
(2008a) Profile: A Tale of Two Egypts, Mediterranean Politics, 13 (3): 43944.
(2008b) The EU as a force for good in border conflict cases? in Diez, Albert and
Stetter, The European Union and Border Conflicts, 20319.
Pagden, A. (2002) The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge,
UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pahre, R. and Ucaray-Mangitli, B. (2009) The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European
Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (2): 35784.
Pllinger, Z.T., Kaufmann, B., Marxer, W. and Schiller, T. (eds) (2007) Direct Democracy
in Europe: Developments and Prospects, Wiesbaden: Verlag fr Sozialwissenschaften.
Papadopoulos, Y. (2002) Peut-on imaginer dorganiser des rfrendums lchelle europenne et quelles conditions? Policy Paper 2, Notre Europe. Available HTTP: <http://
notre-europe.europa.eu> (accessed 11 February 2003).
Parsons, C. (2003) A Certain Idea of Europe, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University
Press.
Bibliography 219
Patton, M.J. (2007) AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What happened to the EU Process?
Mediterranean Politics, 12 (3): 33958.
Pellauer, D. (2007) Ricoeur: A Guide for the Perplexed, London and New York: Continuum.
Pensky, M. (1995) Universalism and the situated critic in White, The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, 6794.
Perroux, F. (1942) Communaut, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Pescatore, P. (1974) The Law of Integration: Emergence of a new phenomenon of international relations, based on the experience of the European Communities, Leiden: A. W.
Sijthoff.
Petit, I. (2006) Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a EuroIdentity, European Law Journal, 12 (5): 66179.
Petritsch, W. and Dzihi, V. (eds) (2010) Conflict and Memory: Bridging Past and Future
in [South East] Europe, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Piening, C. (1997) Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, Boulder, CO and
London: Lynne Rienner.
Piguet, J. (1985) For the Love of Tomorrow: The Story of Irne Laure, trans. Joanna Sciortino, London: Grosvenor.
Pineau, C. and Rimbaud, C. (1991) Le grand pari: Laventure du trait de Rome, Paris:
Fayard.
Pitkin, H.F. (1994) Justice: On Relating Private and Public, in Hinchman and Hinchman,
Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, 26188.
(1998) The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendts Concept of the Social, Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Poidevin, R. (1986) Robert Schuman: homme dEtat, 18861963, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.
Pond, E. (2002) The Rebirth of Europe, 2nd edn, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
(2006) Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Popkin, R.H. (ed.) (1999) The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press.
Pous de-Jonge de, H. (2009) Reaching for a new world, Caux: Caux Books.
Prager, C.A.L. (2003) Introduction and Aspects of Understanding and Judging Mass
Human Rights Abuses in Prager and Govier, Dilemmas of Reconciliation, 126 and
197219.
Prager, C.A.L. and Govier, T. (eds) (2003) Dilemmas of Reconciliation, Waterloo, Ontario:
Wilfred Laurier University Press.
Ramet, S. (2005) Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav
Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Reflection Group on The Intellectual, Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe
(2004) Concluding Remarks, Available HTTP: <http://www.iwm.at/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79&Itemid=286> (accessed 9 November
2008).
Rehg, W. (2007) Insight and Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jrgen Habermas, Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1996) Pouvoir et violence in Colloque Hannah Arendt, Politique et pense,
Paris: ditions Payot & Rivages, 15578.
220
Bibliography
(2004) Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
(2005) The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Risse, T. (2004) European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned? in
Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU,
24771.
(2009) Social Constructivism and European Integration in Wiener and Diez, European Integration Theory, 14459.
Rittberger, B. (2005) Building Europes Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond
the NationState, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rocard, M. (2008) Oui la Turquie, Paris: Hachette Littratures.
Rogers, J. (2009) From Civilian Power to Global Power: Explicating the European
Unions Grand Strategy Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 47 (4): 83162.
Rosoux, V. (2007) Mmoire(s) europennes(s)? Des limites dun pass aseptis et fig in
Mink and Neumayer, LEurope et ses passs douloureux, 22232.
Ross, G. (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Roussel, E. (1996) Jean Monnet, Paris: Fayard.
Roux, M. (1999) La guerre du Kosovo. Dix cls pour comprendre, Paris: La Dcouverte.
Rumelili, B. (2007) Transforming Conflict on EU Borders: The Case of GreekTurkish
Relations, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (1): 10526.
(2008) Transforming the GreekTurkish conflicts: the EU and what we make of
it! in Diez, Albert and Stetter, The European Union and Border Conflicts, 94128.
Rumford, C. (ed.) (2007) Cosmopolitanism and Europe, Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press.
Rupnik, J. (ed.) (2007) Les Banlieues de lEurope: Les politiques de voisinage de lUnion
europenne, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Samary, C. (2008) Yougoslavie: de la dcomposition aux enjeux europens, Paris: ditions
du Cygne.
Sandel, M.J. (ed.) (1984) Liberalism and Its Critics, New York: New York University
Press.
Sarigil, Z. (2007) Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military, Mediterranean Politics, 12 (1): 3957.
Saurugger, S. (2009) Thories et concepts de lintgration europenne, Paris: Presses de
Sciences Po.
Schaap, A. (2005) Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Lang and Williams, Hannah Arendt and International Relations, 6793.
Schain, M. (ed.) (2001) The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, New York: Palgrave.
Schell, J. (2006) Introduction in Arendt, On Revolution, xi-xxix.
Scheuerman, W.E. (2008a) Frankfurt School Perspectives on Globalization, Democracy,
and the Law, London and New York: Routledge.
(2008b) Global Governance without Global Government? Political Theory, 6 (1):
13351.
Schilpp, P.A. (1981) The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, La Salle, IL: Open Court
Publishing.
Schmidt, V.A. (2006) Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bibliography 221
Schoutheete de, P. (2000) The Case for Europe: Unity, Diversity and Democracy in the
European Union, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
Schoutheete de, P. and Wallace, H. (2002) Le Conseil europen, Study 19, Notre Europe.
Available HTTP: <http://www.notre-europe.asso.eu> (accessed 21 June 2009).
Schuman, R. (1964) Pour lEurope, Paris: Nagel.
Setl, M. and Schiller, T. (eds) (2009) Referendums and Representative Democracy:
Responsiveness, Accountability and Deliberation, London and New York: Routledge.
Shakman Hurd, E. (2006) Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the prospects
for Turkish accession, Review of International Studies, 32 (3): 40118.
Siedentop, L. (2001) Democracy in Europe, New York: Columbia University Press.
Shriver, D. (1995) An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, New York: Oxford University Press.
Silverstein, P.A. (2004) Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation, Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press.
Siitonen, A. (2008) The Debate on Turkey: The perspective of the European Parliament on
Turkeys affiliation with the European Union, 33, University of Turku, Finland: Publications of the Department of Contemporary History.
Sitton, J.F. (1994) Hannah Arendts Argument for Council Democracy in Hinchman and
Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, 30729.
Sjursen, H. (ed.) (2006a) What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective,
Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2): 169327.
(ed.) (2006b) Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity, London and
New York: Routledge.
(2006c) Introduction: Enlargement and the nature of the EU polity in Sjursen,
Questioning EU Enlargement, 115.
Smismans, S. (2007) New Governance The Solution for Active European Citizenship, or
the End of Citizenship, Columbia Journal of European Law, 13 (3): 595622.
Smith, A., Belot, C. and Georgakakis, D. (eds) (2004) Enseigner lEurope, Politique
europenne, 14: 1213.
Smith, M.E. (2005) Reckoning with the Past: Teaching History in Northern Ireland, Lanham, MD, Boulder, CO, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington Books.
Snoy et dOppuers, J.-C. (1989) Rebtir lEurope: Mmoires, Paris, Louvain, La Neuve:
DuculotFondation Jean Monnet pour lEurope.
Spaak, P.-H. (1969) Combats inachevs. De lespoir aux dceptions, vol. II, Paris: Fayard.
(1972) The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 19361966, trans. Henry Fox,
Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company.
Spierenburg, D. and Poidevin, R. (1994) The History of the High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
Stansfield, G. and Lowe, R. (2010) The Kurdish Policy Imperative, London: Chatham House.
Stavridis, S. and Verdun, A. (eds) (2001) Democracy in the Three Pillars of the European
Union, CPEE Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 10 (3): 213349.
Steinberger, P.J. (1990) Hannah Arendt on Judgment, American Journal of Political Science, 34 (3): 80321.
Steiner, A. (2007) Economics of West European Integration? Proving the Benefits 1952
1973 in Jarausch and Lindenberger, Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories, 194205.
Stetter, S., Albert, M. and Diez, T. (2008) Conclusion in Diez, Albert, Stetter, The European Union and Border Conflicts, 22036.
222
Bibliography
Suboti, J. (2009) Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Ithaca, NY and
London: Cornell University Press.
utaj, S. (2009) History and National Identity in Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics of the
Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 193204.
Svensson, P. (2007) Voting Behaviour in the European Constitution Process in Pllinger
et al, Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects, 16373.
Swoboda, H. and Hamans, C. (2009) Memory is a Loaded Gun: An Epilogue in Swoboda
and Wiersma, Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 24353.
Swoboda, H. and Wiersma, M. (eds) (2009) Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, Brussels: The Socialist Group in the European Parliament and Renner Institut.
Swoboda, H. (2009) My Personal Encounters with History in Swoboda and Wiersma,
Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 22936.
Szarka, L. (2009) A Common Past, a Divided History in Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics
of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 18192.
Taverni, B. (2009) For Italy in a changing world: the political apogee of Alcide De Gasperi, 19481954, trans. Henry Monaco, Modern Italy, 14 (4): 45971.
Taylor, C. (1975) Hegel, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
(1979) Hegel and Modern Society, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
(1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
(1992a) Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
(1992b) The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1992c) Quel principe didentit collective in Lenoble et Dewandre, LEurope au
soir du sicle, 5966.
(1993) Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism,
Montreal: McGillQueens University Press.
Tel, M. (2006) Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World
Order, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Thiele, L.P. (2005) Judging Hannah Arendt: A Reply to Zerilli, Political Theory, 33 (5):
70614.
Tocci, N. (2004) EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or
Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Tocci, N. (2007) The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the backyard, London and New York: Routledge.
Tocqueville, A. (1969) Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence,
Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Tunkrov, L. and aradin, P. (eds) (2010) The Politics of EU Accession: Turkish challenges
and Central European experiences, London and New York: Routledge.
Ugur, M. (2010) Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility:
Explaining the Deadlock in EUTurkey Accession Negotiations, Journal of Common
UN High Commission for Refugees (2008) Report on South-Eastern Europe, Available
HTTP: <http://www.unhcr.org> (accessed 15 April 2009).
Valle, C. (1999) Hannah Arendt, Socrate et la question du totalitarisme, Paris: ellipses.
Van den Hoven, A. (2006) European Union regulatory capitalism and multilateral trade
negotiations in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, 185200.
Bibliography 223
Van de Steeg, M. (2006) Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of
the content of the debate on the Haider case, European Journal of Political Research,
45: 60934.
Van Reisen, M. (2009) Window of Opportunity: EU Development Cooperation after the
End of the Cold War, Trenton, NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press.
Vembulu, R.P. (2003) Understanding European Integration: History, Culture and Politics
of Identity, Delhi: Aakar Books.
Verdun, A. and Stavridis, S. (eds) (2001) Introduction: Democracy in the European
Union, CPEE Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 10 (3): 21326.
Vrez, J.-C. and Chaponnire, J.-R. (2005) Turquie et Union europenne: un dfi rciproque, Paris: ellipses.
Villa, D.R. (1996) Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
(1998) The Philosopher versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and Socrates, Political
Theory, 26 (2): 14772.
(ed.) (2000) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge, UK and New
York: Cambridge University Press.
(2001) Hannah Arendt: Modernity, Alienation and Critique in Beiner and Nedelsky,
Judgment, Imagination, and Politics, 287310.
Volkan, V.D., Montville, J.V. and Demetrios, J.A. (1991) The Psychodynamics of International Relations, vol. II, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Walker, L.C. (2003) The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallensteen, P. (2007) Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, 2nd edn, Thousand Oaks, CA, London and New Delhi: Sage.
Weber, M. (1973) Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Weiler, J.H.H. (1999) The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor?
and other essays on European integration, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Weiner, M. (1995) The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights,
New York: HarperCollins.
Weller, N.V. (2010) The Failure to Face the Past in Relation to Kosovo in Petritsch
and Dzihi, Conflict and Memory: Bridging Past and Future in [South East] Europe,
26586.
Wessels, W. and Diedrichs, U. (1999) The European Parliament and EU legitimacy in
Banchoff and Smith, Legitimacy and the European Union: The constested polity,
13452.
White, S.K. (ed.) (1995) The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, Cambridge, UK and
Whitman, R.G. and Wolff, S. (eds) (2010) The European Neighborhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Wiener, A. and Diez, T. (eds) (2009) European Integration Theory, 2nd edn, Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiersma, J.M. (2009) Witness, not Victim in Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics of the Past:
the Use and Abuse of History, 23742.
Wighton, C. (1963) AdenauerDemocratic Dictator: A Critical Biography, London: Frederick Muller.
224
Bibliography
Williams, H., Wight, C. and Kapferer, N. (eds) (2000) Political Thought and German
Reunification: The New German Ideology?, New York: St Martins Press.
Wink, W. (1998) When the Powers Fall: Reconciliation in the Healing of Nations, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Wolffsohn, M. (1993) Eternal Guilt? Forty Years of GermanJewishIsraeli Relations,
trans. Douglas Bokovoy, New York: Columbia University Press.
Wolin, S. (1989) The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.
Wolton, D. (1993) La dernire utopie, Paris: Flammarion.
Wood, A.W. (1998) Kants project for Perpetual Peace in Cheah and Robbin, Cosmopolitics, 5976.
Wood, S. and Quaisser, W. (2008) The New European Union: Confronting the Challenges
of Integration, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
Young, I.M. (2001) Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged
Thought in Beiner and Nedelsky, Judgment, Imagination, and Politics, 20528.
Young-Bruehl, E. (1994) Reflections on Hannah Arendts The Life of the Mind in Hinchman and Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, 33564.
(2004) For Love of the World, 2nd edn, New Heaven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
(2006) Why Arendt Matters, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
Zakaras, A. (2003) Isaiah Berlins Cosmopolitan Ethics, Political Theory, 32 (4):
495518.
Zaretsky, E. (2003) Global Rift: Robert Kagan and the Europe/America Divide, Constellations, 10 (3): 35863.
Zemko, M. (2009) HistoryA Fundamental Pillar of National Identity in Swoboda and
Wiersma, Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History, 17180.
Zeff, E.E. and Pirro, E.B. (eds) (2006) The European Union and the Member States, 2nd
edn, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
Zerilli, L.M.G. (2005) We Feel our Freedom: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought
of Hannah Arendt, Political Theory, 33 (2): 15888.
Zourabichvili, S. (2008) Les cicatrices des Nations, lEurope malade de ses frontires,
Paris: Bourin diteur.
Zurn, C.F. (2003) Identity or Status? Struggles over Recognition in Fraser, Honneth, and
Taylor, Constellations, 10 (4): 51937.
Index
Abls, M. 7
accession 84; candidates for 83,
87; creeping nationalization of
accession processes 1012; Turkeys
accession 97105; see also enlargement
Acheson, D. 32
action: communicative 1078, 10910,
11011; principles of see principles of
action; thinking vs. 12934; willing
and 1356
Action Committee for the United States of
Europe 63, 172
action in concert see power as action in
concert
Adenauer, K. 26, 34, 69
affective element of enlarged
mentality 1436
agape 102, 1323
agricultural vs. industrial products in
CAP 72
aid 78, 81, 91
Akapar, B. 105
Albonetti, A. 173
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe 114
alterity 978; see also recognition of the
other
amateur social theory 139, 1436
Anderson, B. 10
application 15; judging and Europes
borders 13948; lapses in truth-telling
and the Lisbon Treaty and direct
democracy 11326; power as action in
concert and EU foreign policy 7682;
recognition and Turkish accession
97105; reconciliation and Western
Balkans and EU memories 404, 4559
Arendt, H. 3, 4, 7, 910, 13, 1415,
30, 36, 55, 66, 712, 109, 123, 134,
147, 162; conscience 1304, 136;

elementary republics 37, 51; enlarged
mentality 19, 128, 12934, 144;
European integration 4, 29, 434, 64,
69; exemplars 1304; forgiveness 16,
17, 278, 434; judging 12832;
natality 17, 29; oases in the desert
367, 512; power 60, 613; presentday relevance of 401; principles of
action 1011; promise 16, 17, 278,
434; remembrance 456; the right to
have rights 143; slum dwellings 144;
solidarity 58; thinking 12934;
understanding 17, 23, 456, 127,
1468; victors justice 48; willing,
thinking, judging 1356, 196
Aristotle 9
Armenia 1034, 185
armistice of 1918, 90th Anniversary
of 578
Association pour le Muse de lEurope 57,
170
asylum policies 1423
authenticity, search for 85
balance of power 76
Balibar, . 144
Balkans, Western 44, 45, 4652
Baltic Sea Strategy 95
Barnett, M. 601, 73
Barn Crespo, E. 40, 93, 119
Barros Moura, J. 934
Bene decrees 42
Benhabib, S. 128, 195, 198
Benthamian and affective logics 41
Berger, M. 401, 42, 1378
Berlin, I. 3, 56, 10, 12, 133, 146
Bertrand, G. 105
bilans (Monnets balance sheets) 112
226
Index
Bonino, E. 138
borders 19, 12748; European Parliament
and thinking borders 1379; judging
and Europes borders 13948
Bourlanges, J.-L. 41, 113
Brewer, M.B. 9
Brudholm, T. 28
Brussels European School II 578
brutality of truth-telling 1236
Bulgaria 96
Canada 5, 856
Canovan, M. 11, 36
capable citizen 523, 912
Casaca, P. 137
Catholic social thought 64, 136, 164, 172
Charter of the Europeans 137
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union 12, 115, 116, 137
Chiba, S. 1323
Christianity 57, 98, 99, 170
citizenship 141; disaggregated 128;
migrants rights and Member States
sovereignty 1423
citizenship education 123
civil society: direct democracy in
France and the Netherlands 1213;
migration and 1436; transformative
dialogues 945; see also grassroots
initiatives
Clappier, B. 32
clashes of understanding 529
cohesion funds 91, 100
cohesion policies 901, 957, 182
Cohn-Bendit, D. 40
Cold War 56
collective memory 23, 67, 1215, 45,
127
colonialism 141
commemorations 523, 578
Commission 69, 801, 889, 113;
migrants rights and Member States
sovereignty 1423
committees/councils 63, 80
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 72,
86
Common Assembly (ECSC) 111
Common Foreign and Security Policy 18,
7682
common sense 112, 118, 129
communication community 1078;
European Parliament as 11315
communicative action 1078, 10910; and
the founding of the ECSC 11011
communicative power 112

Communism 534, 567, 66
community 656
Community Building Mitrovica (CSM) 52
community of fate 142, 144, 199
compromise, principle of 70
compulsory power 601, 734
Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies:
A Scholars Initiative 49
conscience 132
constitution: first attempts at writing
11315; TEC see Treaty for Establishing
a Constitution for Europe
constitutional patriotism 110
Convention on the Future of Europe
11516
Cooper, R. 7980, 801
Copenhagen criteria 21, 87, 159
Corbett, R. 111, 117, 118
Council of Ministers 69, 7980, 889, 90
council system 623, 144
creeping nationalization of accession
processes 1012
Cretu, G. 967
criminal guilt 26
crises: financial crisis of 2010 745; fiscal
crisis in Greece 1236
Cushnahan, J.W. 934, 122
Cyprus 97, 102, 1045
Czech Republic 41, 42
Davies, N. 94
Davison, A. 140
Dawes Plan 161
De Gasperi, A. 35
De Gaulle, C. 72
De Rossa, P. 118, 120, 122
Defraigne, P. 123
deliberative and plebiscitary direct
democracy 121
Delors, J. 7, 13, 434, 136, 156
democratic consolidation 83; and
Turkey 100
democratic deficit 67, 106, 109, 113, 186
Derrida, J. 8
development aid, and drug pricing 789
Dietz, M.G. 64, 109, 112, 172
Dink, H. 1034
direct democracy 1203
discourse theory 5; Habermas 106,
10710; Monnets discourse ethics
11113
Draft Treaty establishing the European
Union (DTEU) 114
Index 227
Ducci, R. 67, 69, 73

Duchne, F. 76, 77
Duff, A. 115, 119, 120
Dunn, J. 139
Duvall, R. 601, 73
Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) 75, 1236
economic relations, fair reorganization
of 301, 4950, 635, 68, 91
economic and social cohesion policies
901, 957, 182
Egypt 79
Eichmann, A. 1301
Elbe, S. 7
elementary republics 37, 512
elite testimonies 1213, 336
empowerment: and EU foreign policy 77;
post-accession 957
enlarged mentality, principle of 1112, 19,
12748; amateur social theory 1436;
and contemporary thinking actors
1367; judging and Europes
borders 13948; solitude in the
ECSC/EC/EU politics 1349; thinking
politics 12934
enlargement 18, 83105, 139; creeping
nationalization of accession
processes 1012; in 2004 and 2007
915; post-accession empowerment
957; tradition of EU accession
98102; Turkish accession 97105
EULEX 47
European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) 12, 66
Eurobarometers 9, 157
European Charter of Fundamental
Rights 12, 115, 116, 137
European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) 1, 12, 46; communicative
action and founding of 11011; context
for its founding 234; principle of
reconciliation and founding of 16, 2140
European Commission see Commission
European Common Foreign and Security
Policy (ECFSP) 18, 7682
European Council, rotating presidency
of 8990
European Court of Justice (ECJ) 30,
6970, 163
European Defense Community (EDC) 35,
36, 66, 111
European Economic Community (EEC) 2,
12; founding of 17, 6674
European Financial Stability Facility

(EFSF) 75
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
79
European Parliament (EP) 501, 69, 889;
as a communication community 11315;
thinking borders 1379
European Political Community 35, 66
European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) 78
European Union (EU) 2; clashes of
understanding 529; power 7482;
role in Western Balkans 501; see
also enlarged mentality, European
Neighborhood Policy, eurozone, foreign
and security policy, identity, institutions
of recognition, memory, power as action
in concert, reconciliation, recognition of
the other, truth-telling
eurozone 75, 1236
event-principle 39
exceptionalism, European 59
exemplars 1304
expressive aspirations 857
fair reorganization of economic
relations 301, 4950
fantasia 5, 128, 133; see also enlarged
mentality
Faure, M. 68
federalism 65, 115
financial crisis of 2010 745
fiscal crisis in Greece 1236
Fischer, J. 115
Fontaine, P. 54
foreign and security policy 18, 7682
forgiveness 4, 16, 17, 36, 401, 434,
4950, 88, 165; founding of the
ECSC 16, 2730, 34, 35, 39
founding stories 23, 1012, 1415,
1478
Fourasti, J. 36, 188
France 24, 86, 125, 161; pro-community
leadership 7; referendum on the
TEC 116, 117, 1213; sacred cows and
the Rome Treaties negotiations 689;
sovereignty and migrants rights 143;
and Turkeys accession to the EU 98
Franco-German Office for Youth 52
Fraser, N. 845
Friends of Linggarjati 145
friendship 31, 712, 75, 1323, 164, 165
Frlec, B. 95
Fuse 16
228
Index
Gardner, Feldman, L. 22, 30, 32

Gazzo, E. 67, 112, 188
Geddes, A. 140
Gedung Perundingan (Indonesian national
museum) 145
Geremek, B. 44, 81, 11617
Germany 33, 86, 125; attempts at
European reconciliation after World
War I 161; and Czech accession to
the EU 42; disagreement with Poland
at EU Summit 159; International
Ruhr Authority 24, 33; question of
German guilt 257; reconciliation
processes with other countries 41;
reunification 110; Western Allies and
postwar Germany 24
gifts 1025
global hermeneutics 1401
Gonzles, F. 1556
good, European visions of the 610
Gorham, E. 63
grassroots initiatives 512; enlarged
mentality 1436; founding of the
ECSC 3640; see also civil society
Great Britain 99
Greece 75, 92, 104; fiscal crisis 1236
Green, M.D. 9
Group of the European Peoples Party in
the EP 54, 114
Group of the Progressive Alliance of
Socialists and Democrats in the EP
545, 114
Guigou, E. 121
guilt: forms of 26; German 257; and
purification 26
Gndodu, A. 141
Habermas, J. 3, 45, 15, 19, 114, 120, 125,
187; discourse theory 106, 10710
Hadi, G. 48
Haldas, G. 71
Haradinaj, R. 48
Hartmann, F. 45
hate 245, 31, 423, 46, 54, 1623
Hatzidakis, K. 92
Hegel, G.W.F. 845, 87, 102, 105, 181,
185
Heidegger, M. 162
Heine, H. 160
Helsinki European Council 23
Herman, F. 41, 11415, 189
Herman Report 11415
hermeneutics 610, 14; global 1401
Herrmann, R.K. 9
High Authority of the ECSC 30, 31, 33,

69, 113
Hillion, C. 101
history: EU clashes of understanding
529; comparing histories between the
ECSC and the Western Balkans 467;
memory and 3; museums of European
history 557; scholars initiatives 489;
the use and abuse of 534
hope vs. fear 81
House of European History 557, 170
Hovelsen, L. 38, 51
human agency 6
humanitarian aid 78
humanitas 131, 141
humility 589
Hungary 41, 96
ideational motivations 12, 3, 710
identity 13, 910, 14, 1920, 1278,
1458
Ilves, T.H. 95
imagination 10, 129, 1314
immigration policies 19, 13948; and
perfectionism 143
Institutional Committee on Rome
Treaties 6970
institutional power 601, 734
institutions of recognition 87, 8890,
1001
instrumental rationality 857
integration capacity of EU 101
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 117,
119
International Bureau of Liaison and
Documentation 37
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 48
International Ruhr Authority 24, 33
Irani, F. 140
Ireland 75, 934, 11819, 122, 124
Isaacs, J.C. 37
Iseni, B. 50
Islam 98, 99
Israel: German reparations to 267;
regional cooperation with 43
Jaspers, K. 3, 4, 256, 27, 48, 131
Jewish organizations 267
judgment 12930, 132, 134, 1356,
194; judging consciousness and
evil consciousness in processes of
recognition 102, 185; judging and
Europes borders 13948
Index 229
Kagan, R. 17, 76, 158
Kalyvas, A. 11
Kant, I. 107, 12930, 195
Karadi, R. 48
Kateb, G. 28
Kazi, M.K. 59
Ker-Lindsay, J. 105
Kohlberg, L. 108
Kohnstamm, M. 13, 31, 334, 62, 76,
165
Kosovo 44, 45, 4652
Ladin, G. 140
Lalumire, C. 42, 1389
language, policy and translation of 70, 90,
181
Laure, I. 389, 51
Laurinaviius, . 54
Leinen, J. 11920
Lisbon Treaty 12, 19, 90, 11620
Lithuania 54
Locarno Agreement 161
logics of European integration 401
Louis, J.-V. 80
Lukes, S. 60, 73
Luttwak, E. 38
Maastricht Treaty 142
Machiavellian model 109
Mallinson, W. 105
Manners, I. 8, 77
Marcincin, A. 75
Maritain, J. 25
Marjolin, R. 71, 86
Markell, P. 110
Marshall Plan 24, 32, 164
Martnez Martnez, M.A. 54, 556, 170
McCormick, J. 77, 177
Member States 2930, 83, 87; accession
negotiations 101; and cohesion
funds 91; Europeanization 978; and
founding the EEC 6872; and EU
foreign and security policy 789; the
gift and offer of financial concessions
by 2004 Member States 103; national
interests 689, 701; representation in
EU institutions 8890; sovereignty and
migrants rights 1423
(MEPs) 13, 158; and direct
democracy 121; and memory and
history 537; and recognition of
the other 924, 967, 100; and
reconciliation 401; and thinking
1379; and truth-telling 11520;

witness of 924
memory 3, 56, 456, 127, 1478;
collective 14; documenting 1213;
EU clashes of understanding 529;
limit experiences 14; the work of
and the capable citizen 523; writing
memories 1415
Mndez de Vigo, I. 923
Mendras, H. 94
Merkel, A. 75
Messina Conference 668
metaphysical guilt 26
methodical politics 645, 6970, 81
methodological strategy 13
Michael, M.S. 105
Middle East economic area 43
migration 19, 13948
military power 78, 81
Miloevi, S. 47, 48, 49
Milward, A. 678
Moch, J. 36
Moll, N. 46
Monceau, N. 98
Monnet, J. 19, 356, 656, 71, 155,
162; carnets roses 1346; discourse
ethics 11113; founding of the
ECSC 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 356; and
Turkey 989
Montesquieu, C. 10
moral guilt 26
Moral Re-Armament movement
(MRA) 389
moral theory 910
Moravcsik, A. 2
Morgan, G. 89
Morgenthau Plan 24
multiculturalism 86
multilingualism 90
Muppidi, H. 140
museums of European history 557
natality 17, 29
national interests 689, 701
Nazism 267
neo-functionalism 223
Netherlands, The: and immigration 1456;
referendum on the TEC 116, 117, 1213
NGO Peace Doves 52
90th Anniversary of the 1918
armistice 578
Nol, E. 174
non-discrimination vs. trade preference 86
Normative Power Europe (NPE) 8, 77
230
Index
Notre Europe debates on enlargement

945
Nuremberg trials 32, 34
official social theory 139, 1423

Oostlander, A. 87, 88
ordinary life, politics of 614
Organization of European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) 32
Ottoman Empire 97
Pace, M. 79
Pack, D. 42
Papandreou, A. 124
Paris Treaty 16, 21, 2930, 62, 111
Parsons, C. 7
peace-making, theories of 223, 302,
367
Perrin, A. 545
Pescatore, P. 175
Petersen, P. 39
phenomenology 10
phronesis 6
Pinior, J. 64
Pitkin, H.F. 63
Pleven Plan 36, 111
pluralism 5
Poland 41, 95, 159
political guilt 26
political legitimacy 1078, 109
political principles 1011; see also
principles of action
political theorists 36
politics of ordinary life 614
Pond, E. 41
porous borders 146
Portugal 934, 124
power as action in concert, principle
of 1112, 1718, 6082, 1468; EU
power 7482; founding of the EEC 17,
6674; typologies of power and 601,
734
principles, political 1011
principles of action 1112, 15, 127, 146
8; see also under individual principles
Prodi, R. 7, 156
productive power 601, 734
professional social theory 13941
promise 16, 17, 2730, 34, 401, 434,
4950
Penica, J. 95
public opinion 9, 113, 188
Quebec 5; and non-recognition 856
Rabier, J.-R. 13, 33, 34, 43, 165

Rack, R. 40, 11516
Rahten, A. 89, 90
recognition of the other, principle
of 2, 1112, 18, 83105, 1468;
founding practices of in European
integration 868; institutions of
recognition 87, 8890, 1001; policies
of recognition 901, 1001; theorizing
the politics of recognition 848; Turkish
accession 97105
RECOM 51
reconciliation, principle of 2, 1112, 15,
1617, 2144, 1468; applications 15,
17, 404, 4559; chain reaction of
reconciliations 412; EU clashes of
understanding 529; founding of
the ECSC 2140; KosovoSerbia
relationship 4652; relevance of postWorld War II experiences for current
conflicts 404; self-transformation
3340, 512; theories of peacemaking 223, 302, 367
referenda 117, 11819, 120, 1203
relationships 712
religion 98, 99
repentance 28
representation 129, 1314
resource transfers 901
Reuter, P. 656
revolutionary councils 623, 144
Ricoeur, P. 2, 3, 56, 13, 28, 55, 578,
84; capable human being 523, 912;
gifts 1023; self-recognition 97
Rieben, H. 13
right-speaking 1112, 19, 10626;
Convention on the Future of Europe
and 11516; in the EU political
tradition 11016
rightness, claims to 1078
Risse, T. 9
Rocard, M. 98, 100
Romania 41, 967
Romas 140, 143
Rome Treaties 4, 12, 65, 6674, 83, 91,
113
Rothschild, R. 175
Roubatis, Y. 92
Rovan, J. 37
Russia 54
Saar, the 24, 33
Sarkozy, N. 75, 143
Schpflin, G. 96
Index 231
Schoutheete, P. de 6
Schuman, R. 25, 28, 29, 30, 35, 136
Schuman Declaration 1112, 16, 22, 289,
83, 11011
security-based argument 8
security and foreign policy 18, 7682
self-interpretation 6
self-recognition 912, 97
self-transformation 3340, 512
Serbia 45, 4652
Sittlichkeit 87, 88
Sitton, J.F. 63
skepticism 434
Slovenia 8990
Snoy et dOppuers, J.-C. 64
social theories 13946; amateur 139,
1436; official 139, 1423;
professional 13941
Socialists 534
Socrates 1301
soft messianism 589
Solana, J. 79
Solidarity 64, 81
solitude 131, 133; in ECSC/EC/EU
politics 1349
Solomon, King 132
soul for Europe 7, 156
sovereignty 62; founding of the
EEC 701, 73; Member States and
migrants 1423
Spaak, A. 57
Spaak, P.-H. 667, 68, 71, 72
Spaak Report 667
Spain 124
Spasi, S. 512
spectators 13941
Stability and Growth Pact 50, 1234, 125
story-telling 23, 1302, 1478
structural power 601, 734
Suboti, J. 48
Swoboda, H. 53
trading agreements 77
transitional justice 45, 48, 167
translation, tradition of 70
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe (TEC) 12, 11520, 190;
referenda on 117, 11819, 120, 1203
Treaty on the Functioning of the
Union 117
Trepa/Trepa Mining Complex 4950
truth, rightness and truthfulness, claims
to 1078
truth-telling 1112, 19, 10626, 1468;
brutality of and the Greek fiscal
crisis 1236; controversies and truth
in politics 10810; in the EU political
tradition 11016; Habermass discourse
theory 10710; lapses in 11620;
principle of 11, 12; see also right
speaking
Turkey 18, 185; accession to the EU
97105; and previous enlargements
99100
Tai, H. 168
Tadi, B. 51
Taylor, C. 3, 45, 63, 83, 846, 87, 88
Ter Kulve-van Os, J. 1456
Tesanj 16
testimonies 1215; elite 1213, 336
thinking, principle of see enlarged
mentality
Tindemans, L. 189
Tocqueville, A. de 1
totalitarianism 63
Weber, M. 1089
Weil, S. 64
Weiner, M. 128
Western Balkans 44, 45, 4652
Wiersma, J.M. 534
willing 1356, 196
world citizenship 4, 131
World Trade Organization (WTO) 778
understanding 14, 17; clashes of 529

understanding heart 1314, 1468
United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) 47, 52
United States of America (USA) 10, 50;
role in founding the ECSC 323
universal hospitality 130
Uri, P. 69, 173, 175
Van de Steeg, M. 189
Van der Beugel, E. 175
Verhofstadt, G. 59
Vernunft and Verstand 129
Vico, G. 133
Vigenin, C. 96
violence vs. power 612
Virgin, I. 40
Von der Groeben, H. 173
Young, I.M. 133

Young-Bruehl, E. 10

Guisan, A Political Theory of Identity PDF

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Guisan, A Political Theory of Identity PDF

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

A Political Theory of Identity in

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Routledge advances in European politics

10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

22 Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

23 The Changing Face of European Identity

35 Britain and the Balkans

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

36 The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

47 National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

48 Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980

58 The European Union and Global Social Change

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

59 Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe

70 Europeanization and Foreign Policy

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

71 EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts

Memory and policies

First published 2012

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

2012 Catherine Guisan

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Principles of action or clichs? Why hermeneutics matters to

After the deluge: the principle of reconciliation

Remembering the principle of reconciliation: applications

Of power and purgatory: building the European Communities

Enlargements and the recognition of the Other: the case of

The question of the demos: truth-telling and right-speaking

EU borders and the enlarged mentality

Appendix: list of interviews and questionnaires for elite

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

I had the privilege to be taught from birth to be a European. My well-rooted

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

xviii List of abbreviations

Principles of action or clichs?

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration 3

Political theorists and the ECSC/EC/EU politics

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Jaspers and Arendt: actors and thinkers in dark times

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration 5

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration

European visions of the good: political perplexities

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013

Why hermeneutics matters to European integration 7

Downloaded by [Aligarh Muslim University] at 02:23 23 September 2013