Pakistan faced a crisis of confidence and identity in December 1971 after the debacle in the

war with India and the separation of East Pakistan. It lost more than half of its population
and about 15 percent of its territory. Over 90,000 of its troops were made Prisoners of War
and India also occupied some areas on the West Pakistan-India border and the Line of
Control in Kashmir. It was the end of the original (1947) Pakistan and the beginning of a
new Pakistan under difficult and troubled circumstances. However, the post-1971 Pakistan
could not attain a break from the past with reference to political management and
governance. Continuity and change have since marked the political scene of the country.

Political Continuity
The most prominent continuity is the struggle for translating democratic and participatory
norms into political institutions and processes. As in the past, ideological commitment to
participatory governance, respect of civil and political rights, the rule of law, and fair and free
elections was widely shared in the polity. However, these norms did not fully reflect in the
institutions and processes that were established in the post-1971 period. At the operational
level, democracy did not go beyond the formal level. Its quality was poor and it could not
fully accommodate the participatory pressures.
There were periods of civilian and constitutional rule (1972-1977, 1986-1999, 2002 to the
present) but the partisan considerations and power orientations of the ruling parties often
violated the spirit of democracy, although the democratic structure were retained. These
governments performed poorly in four key areas of democracy: the basic civil and political
rights and freedoms of individuals; the rule of law; checks against excesses by the
institutions of the state, societal groups and individuals; and free and fair electoral process.
The inadequacies in these areas were the main causes of failure of these institutions to
cope with the crisis of legitimacy and persist over time.
The second element of continuity pertained to the domineering role of the military
establishment in politics and governance. These trends began to manifest in mid-1950s and
the military assumed power by displacing a civilian government in a coup in October 1958.
The military staged the 2nd coup in March 1969. Its role expanded in the post-1971 period,
ruling directly for over 11years and 6 months ((July 1977-December 1985, October 1999November 2002). Even when the civilians were ruling the country and the military was on
the sidelines, the top brass influenced the nature and direction of politics and policy making
in the foreign policy and security domains. By 2004, the military has become a more
assertive political actor and it has expanded its role to the major sectors of Pakistani state
and society. The setting up of the National Security Council has provided a legal cover to
the militarys role in governance and policymaking.
Official interference in the electoral process is the third major political continuity from the
pre-1971 period. The ruling elite often used bureaucratic apparatus and state resources for
ensuring the success of the favourite candidates and the powerful local groups manipulated

the electoral process to their advantage in the 1950s and the 1960s. This practice continued
in the post 1971 period. Almost every election in the post-1971 period produced complaints
of official interference in the electoral process. There were complaints of selective official
manipulation of the 1977 elections. Some of the instances of manipulation were so glaring
that the opposition parties (Pakistan National Alliance) easily capitalised on them to launch
street agitation that ultimately swept aside the Bhutto government and brought the military
back to power. The 1985 elections were held on non-party basis which fragmented the
political process. In all the subsequent elections, there have been complaints of active
involvement of the Army/intelligence agencies.
One may argue that official interference was exaggerated by the defeated candidates and
parties. The fact of the matter is that Pakistans bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies
function in a manner in the course of general elections that creates serious doubts about
the credibility of the electoral process. The Election Commission has mostly been unable or
unwilling to deal effectively with such complaints. Indeed, it has invariably leaned heavily
towards Islamabads ruling elite. Consequently, all elections have evoked controversies
about their credibility which the defeated candidates often invoke to reject the election
results.
The electoral process also loses credibility because of the availability of non-electoral path
to power. The military regimes have regularly co-opted the political leaders and parties in
order to establish civilian governments of their choice. The ambitious people join hands with
the military rulers to assume positions of power and influence without going through the
electoral process. Further, co-optation may also facilitate electoral success if one has to
subsequently go through the electoral exercise. As long as the political leaders have the
option of accessing power though non-electoral and non-democratic channels, elections
become less relevant for power management.
Another political continuity from the pre-1971 to post-1971 period relates to the weak and
fragmented nature of the political forces. The political parties have weak organisational
structure and lack internal democracy. Many parties rely heavily on the leader who runs it in
a semi-dictatorial manner. Some political parties comprise a leader and a few vocal
associates who do not have popular following or party organisation. The ruling parties
invariably rely on the bureaucratic structure and state patronage to set up a widespread
organisational network.
A positive development during 1988-1999 was the development of a dominant two-party
system. The electoral experience during these years brought forward two major political
parties: Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. They had to build
partnership with regional and smaller parties to rule. None of the major parties was able to
rule effectively without cultivating partnership with the regional parties. This was a healthy
development because the electoral process produced two major political parties that had to
cultivate regional/local parties to stay in power. Such a culture of accommodation and

interdependence would have contributed to institutionalisation of democracy and

participatory governance. However, the coup in 1999 and the policies of the Musharraf
government to push these leading political parties to the periphery of the political system
stifled this trend.
Another example of continuity is the use of Islam for legitimacy and political mobilisation.
Both the civil and military governments have invoked Islam for these purposes. General Ziaul Haq relied heavily on Islam and highly orthodox and conservative Islamic groups for
seeking legitimacy for his military government and to deflect the participatory pressures.

Political Changes
Political continuity was accompanied with a number of changes in the post-1971 period.
The first major change was the beginning of a generational shift, replacing those who rose
to political eminence in the immediate aftermath of independence. The PPP that assumed
power in December 1971 obtained support mainly from the non-elite sections and marginal
groups in the polity, although it cultivated some feudal and traditional elite.
The generational change in the assemblies and governments became more visible in the
post-1985 period. A pre-dominant majority of the current members of the national and
provincial assemblies began their political careers at the provincial and national levels
during the period of General Zia-ul Haqs military rule and later.
The second major change relates to a greater emphasis on territorial nationalism and
cultural pluralism in Pakistan. The Pakistani state relaxed on monolithic nationalism, as
advocated in the pre-1971 period, and adopted a more accommodating attitude towards
regional and linguistic identities. Another significant change was the growing emphasis on
the need to establish participatory government, provincial autonomy and rights, civil and
political freedoms and good governance. Though these principles did not fully materialise,
the repeated emphasis on these norms kept the military governments under pressures and
contributed to their decision to return to civilian and constitutional rule.

Phases of Governance
The post-1971 period can be divided into four major phases: 1972-77, 1977-88, 1988-1999,
and 1999 to the present. The first phase, 1972-77, was dominated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
who assumed power on December 20, 1971, after General Yahya Khan resigned in the
wake of Pakistans military debacle in East Pakistan.
Bhutto adopted socialist agenda and nationalised key industries. His major achievement
was the assertion of civilian supremacy over the military and the making of the 1973
parliamentary constitution. These successes could partly be attributed to Pakistans
traumatic military defeat and the break up in December 1971.

The 1973 Constitution established liberal democratic and parliamentary institutions and
processes. However, these could not acquire sustainability because Bhuttos authoritarian
and personalised governance did not let the institutions and processes grow in the
democratic spirit as enshrined in the constitution. He introduced several amendments in the
constitution that compromised civil and political rights and independence of judiciary and
gradually closed the political system to his adversaries. He compromised his efforts to
assert civilian supremacy over the military by using the latter in Balochistan to advance his
political agenda.
The second phase, 1977-88, witnessed the disruption of whatever was achieved in terms of
constitutionalism and civilian institutions. Pakistan underwent the longest military rule in its
history and the military government used Islamic orthodoxy and highly conservative groups
to build support for itself and to undercut the political adversaries questioning the right of
General Zia-ul Haq to rule the country under martial law. He returned the country to civilian
rule after ensuring continuity of his rule by constitutional engineering, cooptation of a section
of the political elite and holding a carefully regulated party-less elections.
The demise of General Zia-ul Haq in August 1988 opened up the political system and
enabled civilian leaders (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) to run the country for the next
11 years. It was a return to democratic rule, although the quality of democracy continued to
be poor. The highly personalised and authoritarian style of governance of the civilian
leaders did not allow the democratic institutions to take firm roots in the polity. The
complaints of partisan use of state apparatus and resources and poor governance caused
much alienation in the polity. The cut throat power struggle between the PPP and the PMLN
caused sharp polarisation and undermined the basic requisites of democratic and
constitutional governance. These civilian governments were also under pressure from the
military that jealously guarded its professional and corporate interests from the sidelines.
Democracy and its institutionalisation suffered another setback when, in October 1999, the
military returned to power after dislodging the civilian government. This stalled the growth of
civilian and democratic institutions and processes. Like the previous military regime, the
military government of General Pervez Musharraf introduced a host of administrative,
political, legal and constitutional changes and returned the country to civilian rule after
ensuring continuity of policies and some key persons of his military regime. The constitution
was amended through an executive order to bring it in line with the military regimes political
priorities. A carefully tailored civilian government has been ruling the country since
November 2002 under General Pervez Musharrafs tutelage, who combines Presidency
with the office of Army Chief.
Pakistani political system has not made sustainable strides in the direction of
constitutionalism and participatory governance. Democratic institutions could never function
continuously and long enough to enable these to make mid-course corrections and mature
over time. Pakistans cyclical return to military rule after brief spells of civilian rule have

continued to cause political discontinuity. The military regimes uprooted civilian institutions
and attempted to restart the political process after introducing a host of changes reflecting
their military background and political agenda.
Since the military has developed a permanent stake in exercise of power, viable and
autonomous political institutions cannot grow in Pakistan. Furthermore, the civilian rulers
also do not pay much attention to protecting basic civil and political rights and freedoms, the
rule of law, constitutional restraints on the authority of the state. They often resort to highly
partisan and non-judicious use of state power and resources, authoritarian political
management and poor governance and a lack of respect for political adversaries. Given
such a disposition of the civil and military rulers, democratic institutions and processes are
unable to function over time to acquire maturity and salience. Politics and governance tend
to be subservient to the whim and partisan interests of the people in power. Political
institutions are unable to strike roots at the popular level and thus lack the requisite
sustainability.