Public Policy

In construing the law of doubtful meaning the policy which

induced its enactment, or which was designed to be
promoted thereby is a proper subject for consideration.
The policy of law, once ascertained should be given effect by
the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to
give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will
promote public policy.
A construction which would carry into effect the evident policy
of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation
which would defeat it. A decent respect for the policy of
the law must save the court from imputing to a selfdefeating, if not disingenuous, purpose.
Once that policy is legitimately ascertained, the proper source
for the court is to adopt that sense of the words which
promotes in the fullest manner the policy of the legislature
in the enactment of the law and to avoid a construction
which would alter or defeat that policy.
But, the supposed policy of a statute cannot prevail over its
plain language. (States v Eaves)
Considerations of a policy are entitled to weight in the
construction of statutes only in cases of doubtful
construction, and where meaning and intention of the
legislature appear to be opposed to the literal import of the
language of the act.
In construing the law, the legislative policy or intent behind the
enactment must be ascertained. Where the legislative
policy is so strong, as shown not only by the provisions of
the law under examination but also by the amendatory acts
thereto, a construction to carry out the evident policy of the
law must be undertaken.
ALTHOUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW IS
AN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY, THE
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
NEED TO CONSTRUE THE LAWS WHEN
ENFORCING AND ENACTING THE LAWS,
RESPECTIVELY.

Courts should respect contemporaneous construction placed by

executive officers charged with the enforcement of the
statute.
Congress is deemed to have been aware of the
contemporaneous and practical interpretation of the statute
by the officers charged with its administration and
enforcement and to have such interpretation as the
legislative intent. It is also a rule of statutory construction
that courts will and should respect contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by executive officers
whose duty is to enforce it and unless the same is clearly
erroneous, it ordinarily controls.
Rules and regulations issued by administrative officials to
implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the latter.
Long and continuous construction given by the government
officials are entitled to consideration. In view of the long
and continuous construction by the government officials,
the very fact that Congress has not seen fit to repeal or
change it is a potent argument in favor of sustaining the
construction.
The appraisal by the Commissioner of Customs made in
accordance with the authority granted him by Section 1377
of the Revised Administrative Code is presumed correct
unless the contrary is proven.
The final construction of statutes rest with the courts and not
with the executive; however courts should not totally
disregard executive construction except for the most cogent
reasons.
Executive construction is entitled to additional weight where it
has been impliedly indorsed by the legislature, although it
does not thereby become conclusive. Courts have also been
generally reluctant to overthrow a long-followed executive
construction where to do so would work injustice, unsettle
titles or disturb rights which have been vested by virtue of
such construction.
Reasonable and practical interpretation must be placed on
statutory provisions.

Construction by executive officers.

In determining the proper construction of ambiguous statutes
resort may be had to the contemporaneous construction
placed upon them by the officers charged with their
execution.

Executive Construction, kinds.

The duty of enforcing the law, which devolves upon the

executive branch of the government, necessarily calls for
the interpretation of its ambiguous provisions. Accordingly,
executive and administrative officers are generally the very
first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its
enforcement. These interpretations are in the form of rules
and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions and rulings.

It may be expressed or implied. An interpretation embodied in a

circular, directive or regulation is an expressed
interpretation. A practice or mode of enforcement of not
applying the statute to certain situations or of applying it in
a particular manner is an implied interpretation; it is
interpretation by usage or practice.

Not controlling and not binding on the courts, but the

construction given by the executive department should be
considered and given weigh, especially if such construction
has been uniform and consistent and has been observed and
acted on for a long period of time.
Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon
to execute or implement administrative laws, command
much respect and weight.

Construction by an Executive or Administrative officer directly

called to implement the law.

Construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the

chief legal adviser of the government.
It is in the form of opinions issued upon request of
administrative or executive officials who enforce the law.
In the absence of judicial ruling on the matter and unless
reprobated by the President, the opinions of the Secretary
of Justice are generally controlling among administrative
and executive officials of the government.

However, the President or the Executive Secretary, by authority

of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse
the construction of a statute given by a department
secretary.

enactment. However, the courts are the final arbiters as to

the proper construction of statutes. They are at liberty to
disregard legislative construction which in their judgment
is clearly a wrong exposition of the original act.

Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the

form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasijudicial power.

While legislative interpretation of a statute is not controlling,

courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language
thereof. Such legislative interpretation is entitled to respect,
especially if the executive department has similarly
construed the statute. The contemporaneous construction
of the law by two departments of the Government one,
the legislative branch responsible for its enactment, and the
executive branch responsible for its enforcement while
not controlling on the judiciary, is entitled to respectful
consideration. For the orderly and harmonious
interpretation and advancement of the law, the court
should, when possible, keep step with the other
departments.

The court in a case pointed out the distinction between an

interpretation by an executive officer charged with the
enforcement of a law and that handed down by an
executive official in an adversary proceeding: There is
indeed a basis for making such a distinction because the
position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement
of a law, is different from the one who must decide a
dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the
case for the side which he represents, upon which lies the
responsibility of decision. If he surrenders a plausible
construction, it will, at least it may, be surrendered forever,
and yet it may be right. Such rulings need not have the
detachment of a judicial, or semi-judicial decision, and
may properly carry bias. It may seem that they should not
be authoritative.

Legislative Construction
The fact that the interpretation of a statute is primarily a judicial
function does not preclude the legislature from indicating
its construction of a statute it enacts into law. It may thus
provide in the statute itself an interpretative or declaratory
clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how
its provisions should be construed. It may also define the
terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a
previous law, or pass a resolution indicating its sense or
intention as to a given statute. Legislative interpretation
may likewise take the form of an implied acquiescence to,
or approval of, an executive or judicial construction of a
statute.
The legislature, in indicating its construction of a law, cannot
limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution. For instance, it may not, by defining a term,
make the definition conclusive not only as regards the
statute which defines the term but also as regards to other
statutes or as used elsewhere. Nor can it validate a law
which violates a constitutional provision so as to prevent
an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall
be construed as not to contravene the constitutional
limitation. To do so would be to usurp judicial prerogative.
The construction of a statute by the legislature, as indicated by
the language of later enactments, is entitled to
consideration as an aid in the construction of the statute,
but is not generally regarded as controlling.
In order, however, that a statute may be taken as a legislative
construction of an earlier statute, it must be plain and
unequivocal that such was the intent of the legislature.
If it can be clearly gathered from a subsequent statute what
meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former
one, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its
meaning and will govern its construction.
Courts are not free to speculate on legislative intent where the
legislature placed its own construction on its prior

Judicial Construction
Judicial decision interpreting certain statutes should be taken
into consideration in construing similar subsequent
statutes. The presumption is that the legislature was
acquainted with, and had in mind, the judicial construction
placed on the prior enactment.
Where a statute is taken directly from a judicial decision, the
same should be construed in the light of the source from
where it comes, unless its language imperatively demands
a different interpretation.
However, the judicial construction placed upon a specific
provision of a statute prior to the enactment of a general
law on a given subject is not controlling where the two acts
are not essentially similar.
As to particular words and phrases, where they have acquired a
settled meaning thru judicial interpretation, and are used in
a subsequent statute upon the same or analogous subject,
they should be interpreted in the latter as in the former.
Excepted from this rule are cases where the object to which
the words are applied or the connection in which they
stand, require a different meaning, or where a contrary
legislative intention is made clear by other qualifying or
explanatory terms.
The construction made by foreign courts of a statute identical or
similar to local laws may also be resorted to. Where a
statute of a foreign state is before the local courts, the
construction placed upon the statute by the highest courts
of that state should be followed.
The decision of the Supreme Court applying r interpreting a
statute is controlling with respect to the interpretation of
that statute and is of greater weight than that of an
executive or administrative officer in the construction of
other statutes of similar import. The reason is that the
interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court forms part
of the statute itself and of the legal system and comes from
that branch of government entrusted with the duty to
construe or interpret the law. It is an invaluable aid in the
construction or interpretation of statues of doubtful
meaning.

Stare decisis

The legal maxim which requires that past decisions of the court
be followed in the adjudication of cases is known as stare
decisis et non quieta movere. It means one should follow
past precedents and should not disturb what has been
settled. The rule rests on the desirability of having stability
in the law. Accordingly, a ruling of the Supreme Court as to
the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent
cases involving similar questions. In other words, once a
case has been decided in one way, then another case,
involving exactly the same point at issue, should be
decided in the same manner. For the Supreme Court has
the constitutional duty of interpreting and applying the law
in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting
society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by
needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. The interest of the
State demands that there be an end to litigation.
A ruling of the Supreme Court, in order that it will come within
the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically stated
on an issue expressly raised by the parties; it must be a
direct ruling. Where the court resolved a question merely
sub silencio, its decision does not come within the maxim
of stare decisis, insofar as the question is concerned. Nor
does an opinion expressed by the way, not upon the point
in issue, fall within the maxim, for such is merely an obiter
dictum.
The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the
case to which it is applied are substantially the same.
Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare
decisis does not apply.
The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. The principle f stare
decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The
doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for
years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be
contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare
decisis does not and should not apply when there is a
conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of the
court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found
to be in violation of law in force. For more important than
anything else is that the courts should be right.
Only the Supreme Court can change or abandon a precedent
enunciated by it; it cannot be done by an inferior court, nor
even by the legislature except when the latter amend or
repeals the law itself. Hence, until the high tribunal shall
have overruled a principle or doctrine enunciated in the
case, inferior courts are bound to follow it. There is only
one Supreme Court whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings. If inferior courts feel that the doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court is against their way of
reasoning, they may state their personal opinion on the
matter but must decide the case in accordance with the
doctrine and not with their personal view. For inferior
courts to deviate from this rule will have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy.

Construction by the bar

A construction of a statute given to it by the Bar of the state for
many years is entitled to consideration and weight. There
are cases where the meaning publicly given a statute by
long professional usage is presumed to be the true one and
regarded as one which should not lightly be changed.
While the views of the legal profession are entitled to

much deference, they cannot control the judgment of the

courts.

Dictionaries and textbooks

In the construction of a statute, the courts may resort to legal,
scientific or general dictionaries, or to legal textbooks for
aid in determining the meaning to be assigned to words of
common usage or to technical terms
Where a statute does not define the words or phrases used
therein, nor does its purpose or the context in which the
words or phrases are employed indicate their meaning, the
courts may consult dictionaries, legal, scientific, or general,
as aid in determining the meaning to be assigned to such
words or phrases. While definitions given by
lexicographers are not binding, the courts have adopted, in
proper cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as
to the meaning of the particular words or terms used in a
statute, especially where no strong reason exists why their
dictionary meaning should not be adopted in the
construction of the statute.
However, a correct construction of legislative language may not
always be reached by a too dogmatic adherence to the
lexicographical definition. The purpose of a statute may
require a broader interpretation than what is to be drawn
from dictionary definitions.
Dictionaries generally define words in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptance and significance. Where the law does
not define the words used in a statute and the legislature
has not intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words, the Courts may adopt the ordinary meaning of
the words as defined in the dictionaries. For the intention
of the lawmakers, who are ordinarily untrained philologists
and lexicographers, to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed.
Definitions given by lexicographers as to a particular term
cannot always be adopted as an accurate meaning for
statutory words. The intention of the Legislature and the
object of the law must be taken into consideration.

Doctrine of Implications and Inferences

There is a doctrine that which is implied in a statute as much a
part of it as that which is expressed.
This doctrine is necessary for very rarely, if at all, are statutes
framed with minute particularity as to cover every
conceivable situation. It enables the courts to draw
inferences from the legislative purpose ad intention in such
a way as to determine whether certain minor or specific
things are covered by the general or broad terms used in a
statute. This is not judicial legislation; it is rather a method
of discovery of legislative intent thru the logical process of
deduction.
Thus, a statutory grant of power carries with it, by implication,
everything necessary to carry out the power or right and
make it effectual and complete.

Similarly, where a statute grants a right or imposes a duty, it

also confers, by implication, every particular power and
every reasonable means necessary for the exercise of that
right or the performance of that duty.

Restrictions on the doctrine

Generally, the court may not by implication read into a statute
that which is not intended to be there. They may not make
an implication which the language of the statute may not
warrant. Words may not be implied in a statute where there
is no plain necessity for such implication. Authority may
not be implied in the face of an express mention and of
ejusdem generis which are treated in the earlier parts of
this work.
PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION
In general. Numerous presumptions have been availed of by the
courts as aids in the construction of statues.
Such presumptions have been availed of by the courts as aids in
the construction of statutes.
Such presumptions are applicable only when there is some
doubt as to the intention of the legislature. Hence, if the
legislative intent is plain or clear, it is not necessary to
apply any presumption of law. They only aid in the
interpretation of a statute if its meaning does not otherwise
appear. Needless to say, presumptions yield to express
legislative declarations.
When two conflicting presumptions apply to the same situation
as aids to determine legislative intent, one offsets the other
and the courts should not apply either of them.
Presumption that the legislature acted within the scope of its
authority
It is the duty of the courts to assume that the law-making power
was acting within the scope of its authority. They shall not
presume the limits of its power or to encroach upon the
powers properly belonging to the executive and judicial
departments. Hence, if a statute admits of more than one
interpretation, one of which would place the statute outside
of the legislative competence and the other would place it
within the limits of legislative competence, the courts shall
adopt the latter interpretation.
Presumptions against violation of international law
In construing a statute, it shall be presumed that it is in harmony
and in agreement with the rules and principles of
international law. Hence, a statute shall not be given
construction which will do violence against rights and
obligations secured by treaties.

Presumption against unconstitutionality

Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute, and the burden of proof is on
him who claims that a statute is unconstitutional. The court
is considering the validity of a statute should give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within
the fundamental law.
Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the
title, or the Act, the legislation should be sustained.
Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional
until the contrary is clearly shown. Generally, the Supreme
Court will not pass the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature unless the question is raised in an appropriate
manner and argued by the parties.
A statute should not be interpreted in a manner that would
render its application violative of a constitutional
inhibition. Strict construction to prevent retroactive
operation has often been applied in order that the statute
would not violate contractual obligations or interfere with
vested rights. Prospective operation will be presumed
where a retroactive operation would produce invalidity.
Presumption against inconsistency
The legislative mind is presumed to be consistent, hence, its
enactments are presumed to be consistent with each other.
Presumptions are indulged against contradictory statutes or
provisions of a statute.
Presumption against injustice
In case of doubt in the construction of a statute, it shall be
presumed that the legislature intended right and justice to
prevail. Presumptions are indulged against unjust or harsh
consequences.
The court shall not presume that the legislature intended a
violation of a settled principle of natural justice or an
undue interference with vested property rights. Neither
should the court presume that the legislature intended a law
to work hardship upon the people.
Presumption as to the motive of the legislature
It is presumed that the legislature acted from honorable motives
in accordance with reason and common sense.
Presumptions also exist that the legislature acted in good faith;
that it acted from patriotic and just motives; that it acted with a
desire to promote the common weal. The courts cannot impute
to Congress an intention to disregard the civil and political
liberties of the people.
Presumption in favor of beneficial operation of statutes

This is especially true in our jurisdiction where the generally

accepted principles of international law form part of the
fundamental law of the land.

It shall be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid

and permanent statute which would have the most
beneficial effect that its language permits.

Presumption against extra-territorial operation of statutes

Presumption against inconvenience

The presumption is that a statute is confined in its operation

within the territorial limits of the state enacting it. In no
case shall the court, in case of doubt, impute to the
legislature an intent of giving an extra-territorial effect to a
statute.

Where a statute is ambiguous and admits of more than one

construction, one of which leads to great inconvenience,
the court may adopt some other construction in order to
avoid such results.
Presumption against absurdity

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurdity

or that its enactments produce absurd results.

Repeals by implication are not favored; hence the presumption

against implied repeals.

Absurdity is meant anything which is so irrational, unnatural, or

inconvenient that it could not have been intended by a sane
person possessing ordinary intelligence and discretion.

Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared

unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.
Before there be such repeal, the statutes must cover the
same subject matter and their provision irreconcilable.
Moreover, a later statute, broad in scope as to encompass
matters set forth in a special law cannot repeal the latter
unless such purpose is clear and evident. Generalia
specialibus non derogant.

Presumption against useless, impractical or meaningless

legislation which is impossible or incapable of execution or
performance have been applied.
Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed
to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in
the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect
whatsoever thereon.

A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repeal

by a general law unless the intent to repeal is manifest.
This is true even if the scope of the general act is broad
enough to include that of the special law.
Presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction

Presumption against ineffectiveness of statutes

Presumptions are indulged against a construction which would
render a statute ineffective or inefficient.
Where the language of the law is susceptible of two or more
constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective
or inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to
the evident intent of the legislature, the latter construction
must be made there being a presumption against the
ineffectiveness of statutes.
Presumption as to public policy
A statute will be presumed to be in accordance, not to be
intended to conflict, with the public policy of the state.
It will be presumed that the legislature intended to favor and
foster, rather than to contravene, that public policy which is
based on the principles of natural justice, good morals, and
the settled principles of law.
Presumptions against irrepealable laws
The legislature is presumed not to intend its enactment to be
irrepealable or to divest the state of any portion of its
sovereignty.
Presumption against repeal
From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger.
A special law is not regarded as having been amended or
repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter
is manifest. Generalia specialabus non derogant. And this
is true although the terms of the general act are broad
enough to include the matter in the special statute. At any
rate in the event harmony between provisions of this type
in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific
provision controls unless the statute, considered in its
entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the
legislature.
Presumption against unnecessary changes in the laws
Although it may be presumed that by enacting a state the
legislature intended some change in the existing law, it is
also presumed that the legislature did not intend to make
any alteration in the existing law beyond what is implicitly
declared either expressly or by necessary implication.
Presumption against implied repeals

Where a particular construction has been placed in a statute by

the court, and the legislature at is subsequent session has
left that statute materially unchanged, it is presumed that
the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation.
When a statute is re-enacted or revised after it has received
judicial construction, it is presumed that the legislature
intended that construction to continue.
Presumption as to existing laws
It is presumed that the legislature had full knowledge of prior
and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the
statue and acted in accordance with respect thereto.
Laws are presumed to have been passed with full knowledge of
all existing laws on the subject.
When there are two laws on the same subject enacted on
different dates, every effort must be utilized to make all
acts stand and harmonize; and the later law cannot be
presumed to have been passed to abrogate any former law
relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy is clear,
convincing and irremediable.
Presumption in favor of exceptions to general language
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
general language which would avoid injustice, oppression
or absurdity, if a literal construction is adopted.
Presumption as to jurisdiction of courrs
It is presumed that the legislature by its enactments does not
intend to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of superior courts,
or to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless there are
express words or a necessary implication to that effect.
Presumption as to foreign laws
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the laws of other states
will be presumed to be in accordance with those of the
state of the forum.
The foregoing presumptions are not exclusive. There are other
presumptions that have been resorted to by the courts to aid
them in the construction of statutes. Thus, it has been
presumed that the legislature, in passing a statute, knew its
own intention, and knew the rules of statutory construction.
It has also been presumed that the legislature acted with
deliberation, with knowledge of the effect of its act and
with a purpose in view and that the provisions of the act

were formulated in harmony therewith. It has also been

presumed that the legislature understood and intended the
meaning of the words and phrases it used in a statute, and
used them in their ordinary and common meaning and
acceptation.

Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the

latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.