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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L25366March29,1968
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
JOSEBUAN,accusedappellant.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
FelipeC.MagatandAmadoD.Dyocoforaccusedappellant.
REYES,J.B.L.,Actg.C.J.:
DirectappealbytheaccusedfromanorderoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacan,initsCriminalCaseNo.
5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence), overruling a motion to
quashonthegroundofdoublejeopardy.
Strippedtoessentials,thecasearoseinthiswise:
TheaccusedwasdrivingapassengerbusoftheLaMallorcaCompanyonJuly23,1962,alongtheMacArthur
Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence and recklessness, the
vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and
causingittoturnturtle,andinjuringitspassengers.Sixofthelattersufferedslightphysicalinjuriesrequiringmedical
attendancefor5to9days:threeotherriderscameoutwithseriousbodilyinjuriesthatneededmedicalattentionfor
30to45dayswhilethejeepwasdamagedtotheextentofP1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accusedappellant, one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence,intheJusticeofthePeaceCourtofGuiguinto,forwhichhewastriedandacquittedonDecember16,
1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the
information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.Admittedly,bothchargesreferredtothesamehighwaycollision.
WhentheaccusedwasarraignedintheCourtofFirstInstance,hiscounselmovedtoquashthechargeson
the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to secure reconsideration, the
accusedappealedtothisCourt.
Soleissuebeforeus,therefore,iswhetherthesecondcaseplacedtheappellanttwiceinjeopardyforthe
sameoffense,andisbarredbythepreviousacquittal.
WeagreewiththeappellantthattheCourtbelowerredinnotdismissingtheinformationfor"seriousphysical
injuriesanddamagetopropertythroughrecklessimprudence,"inviewoftheappellant'spreviousacquittalbythe
JusticeofthePeaceCourtofGuiguinto,Bulacan,forthesameimprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence,theaccusedmaynotbeprosecutedagainforthatsameact.Fortheessenceofthequasioffenseof
criminalnegligenceunderarticle365oftheRevisedPenalCodeliesintheexecutionofanimprudentornegligent
actthat,ifintentionallydone,wouldbepunishableasafelony.Thelawpenalizesthusthenegligentorcarelessact,
nottheresultthereof.Thegravityoftheconsequenceisonlytakenintoaccounttodeterminethepenalty,itdoesnot
qualifythesubstanceoftheoffense.And,asthecarelessactissingle,whethertheinjuriousresultshouldaffectone
personorseveralpersons,theoffense(criminalnegligence)remainsoneandthesame,andcannotbesplitinto
differentcrimesandprosecutions.ThishasbeentheconstantrulingoftheSpanishSupremeCourt,andisalsothat
ofthisCourtinitsmostrecentdecisionsonthematter.

Thus,inPeoplevs.Silva,L15974,January30,1962,whereastheresultofthesamevehicularaccidentone
mandied,twopersonswereseriouslyinjuredwhileanotherthreesufferedonlyslightphysicalinjuries,weruledthat
theacquittalonachargeofslightphysicalinjuriesthroughrecklessimprudence,wasabartoanotherprosecution
for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the
dismissalbytheMunicipalCourtofachargeofrecklessdrivingbarredasecondinformationofdamagetoproperty
throughrecklessimprudencebasedonthesamenegligentactoftheaccused.InPeoplevs,Belga,100Phil.996,
dismissalofaninformationforphysicalinjuriesthroughneedlessimprudenceasaresultofacollisionbetweentwo
automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless
imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was
reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court
regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing
category,orthatthecomplainantswerenottheindividuals.
AsfortheSpanishjurisprudence,CuelloCalon,inhisDerechoPenal(12thEd.),Vol.I,p.439,hasthisto
say:
1wph1.t

Auncuandodeunsolohechoimprudenteseoriginenmalesdiversos,comoelhechoculposoesuno
solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De
acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y
ademasdaos,noresponderadedosdelitosdelesionesyunodedaosporimprudencia,sinodeunsolo
delitoculposo.
ThesaidauthorcitesinsupportofthetextthefollowingdecisionsoftheSupremeCourtofSpain(footnotes2
and3).
8octubre1887,18octubre1927.
Siconelhechoimprudentesecausalamuertedeunapersonayademasseocasionandaos,existe
un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se produjeron tres
delitos,dosdehomicidioyunodedaos,comotodossonconsecuenciadeunsoloactoculposo,nocabe
penarlosporseparado,2abril1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
becauseArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCodeallowsonlythecomplexingofgraveorlessgravefelonies.Thissame
argumentwasconsideredandrejectedbythisCourtinthecaseofPeoplevs.Diaz,supra:
...Theprosecution'scontentionmightbetrue.Butneitherwastheprosecutionobligedtofirstprosecute
theaccusedforslightphysicalinjuriesthroughrecklessimprudencebeforepressingthemoreseriouscharge
ofhomicidewithseriousphysicalinjuriesthroughrecklessimprudence.Havingfirstprosecutedthedefendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant,theprosecutingattorneyisnotnowinapositiontopressinthiscasethemoreseriouschargeof
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
recklessimprudenceofwhichthedefendanthasbeenpreviouslyclearedbytheinferiorcourt.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the
JusticeofthePeace(nowMunicipal)CourtofGuiguinto,Bulacan,ofthechargeofslightphysicalinjuriesthrough
recklessimprudence,preventshisbeingprosecutedforseriousphysicalinjuriesthroughrecklessimprudenceinthe
CourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovince,wherebothchargesarederivedfromtheconsequencesofoneandthesame
vehicularaccident,becausethesecondaccusationplacestheappellantinsecondjeopardyforthesameoffense.
WHEREFORE,theorderappealedfromisreversed,andtheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacanisdirectedto
quashanddismissthechargeinitsCriminalCaseNo.5243.Nocosts.Soordered.
Dizon,Makalintal,Bengzon,J.P.,Zaldivar,Sanchez,AngelesandFernando,JJ.,concur.
Castro,J.,tooknopart.
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