Public Policy Arguments

Furthermore, Phoebe Simms is not the sort of hardened, dangerous and vicious
criminal the law was designed to punish. She was a nave, scared young woman, caught
in and trying to extricate herself from an unpredictable and potentially violent situation.
She accepted the weapon with no intention of using it in any way. She did not brandish
it. She did not threaten anyone with it. She is not a threat to the publics safety. Thus
neither the law nor the public policy behind the law supports her conviction under the
statute. For both reasons, the facts in this case clearly do not substantiate the charge
against her, and this court should grant Phoebe Simms motion to dismiss.

Moreover, it is in the interest of public policy to recognize the University's right to

exclude individuals whose conduct impedes the free flow of information between
professors and students. Concerning this right and the far reaching implications of failure
to enforce it, the dissent in Intel stresses that "creative individuals will be less inclined to
develop intellectual property if they cannot limit the terms of its transmission." Intel, 71
P. 3d at 325. The defendants' actions have already stymied some of the intellectual
discourse of the University and failure to grant summary judgment would leave the gate
wide open for continued and even greater harm. Public institutions, like the University, as
well as businesses and individuals should be as able to protect the content and integrity of
their communications systems as securely as the contents of the documents contained
within their file cabinets. It is imperative that this court recognize and protect that vested
right.

Finally, it is of utmost concern that this Honorable Court adopt a bright-line

standard for assessing whether a canine is sufficiently reliable and well-trained.
Narcotics canines are currently given an inordinate amount of power in establishing bases
for subsequent searches. In essence, they are called upon by law enforcement to make
precise determinations using inevitably flawed instruments. 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, this and other courts are presently relying upon subjective
testimony of handlers and trainers to establish objective facts surrounding probable cause
and searches of person and property. Michael Bell, Ceballes, Place, and Economic Rintin-tincentives: The Effect of Canine Sniff Jurisprudence on the Demand for and
Development of Search Technology, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 278, 279 (2007).
To establish that Miley meets the well-trained and sufficiently reliable
standards would depart from the heightened standard hereby requested, and establish an
abysmally lower standard of admissibility than is currently in place. Such precedent
would permit the most inept of canines to be qualified for purposes of determining
whether a search is lawful. Our forefathers and predecessors thought it pertinent to
elucidate certain protections afforded against unlawful searches and seizure. Such
forethought necessarily implicates a heightened standard of scrutiny in assessing the
permissibility of such intrusions upon person and property. See Aguilar v. Spinelli, 378
U.S. 108, 115 (1964). Accordingly, as a matter of public concern, this court should
determine Miley to be wholly inefficient for purposes of establishing probable cause and,
moreover, should establish a bright-line standard which would serve to guide subsequent
courts in determining when and where such reliability and proper training is present.