SECOND DIVISION

JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ

ANGELINA P. CIOCON,
MARIVIT P. CIOCON- Present:
HERNANDEZ, and
REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, BRION,
PERALTA,*
SERENO, and
- versus - REYES, JJ.
JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
General Santos City, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 20, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and
Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross
incompetence and inefficiency; violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code; violations of
pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial
Conduct per A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
The Antecedent Facts
Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al.
v. Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc., an
appealed case from the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 3.
Complainants alleged that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days from
receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30 September 2008, a
copy of the order was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which they
should have received within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants
alleged that the 30-day period within which to submit memoranda expired on 6
November 2008. Since the defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6

November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be deemed to have

waived their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the
case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed
to make his decision.
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit
their respective memoranda on 12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the
parties through registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that
the plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court
did not receive the registry return card on the notice to the defendants. On 10
December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a letter-request to the Post Office
of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the
defendants. However, the court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.
Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of
substantial justice, the defendants were given their last chance to submit their
memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same order, he
directed the plaintiffs to coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery
of the order to the defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with
the branch sheriff and the order was sent to the defendants, again by registered
mail, only on 17 June 2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr.
(Karaan) is engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge
Lubao asked this Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt for unauthorized practice of law.
Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubaos failure to
submit his comment on time to complainants administrative complaint is a
violation of the existing rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of
the law. As regards his alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that
Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the issues at hand.
The Findings of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) reported that a verification from the Docket and Clearance Division of its
Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous administrative complaints[1]
against judges from different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court.

In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show
that the orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad
faith. The OCA stated that the matters raised by complainants could only be
questioned through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of
an administrative complaint. The OCA stated that Karaan could not simply
assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been received by the
defendants without the registry return card which was not returned to the trial
court.
The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would
appear that Karaan was engaged in the practice of law. The OCA also noted the
numerous frivolous and administrative complaints filed by Karaan against
several judges which tend to mock the judicial system.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for
lack of merit. The OCA further recommended that Karaan be required to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for violation of Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint
against Judge Lubao for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This Court
likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt
for violating Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint
against Judge Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been assuming to be an
attorney or an officer of the court and acting as such without authority. He
alleged that he did not indicate any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance
Number in his documents. He further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against
Judge Lindo was not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for
reconsideration and compliance to the show cause order. Karaan reiterated that
he never represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and
that his paralegal services, rendered free of charge, were all for the public good.
He stated that he assists organizations which represent the interests of senior
citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited means.
In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the
motion for reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge Lubaos explanation that the
case was summarily dismissed by the municipal trial court without service of

summons on the defendants. Thus, Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the
order requiring all parties to submit their memorandum to give all concerned the
opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubaos
action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the claim of Karaan that he
could prove the receipt of the order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it
was not in the records of the case where Judge Karaan based his order.
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous
language, continually attributed all sorts of malicious motives and nefarious
schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his official function but failed
to substantiate his allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is just one of
the many cases Karaan filed against various judges in other courts where the
same pattern of accusations could be observed.
The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The
OCA noted Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then
making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would make him an
agent of the litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions
with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his clients. The OCA noted
that Karaans services, on behalf of the underprivileged he claimed to be helping,
fall within the practice of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared
liable for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment
for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that
a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against the
courts, judges or court employees will merit more serious sanctions.
The Ruling of this Court: We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the
motion for reconsideration of the Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution
dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no merit.
Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.[2] We agree with the OCA
that the remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the
denial of their motion for reconsideration of this Courts 24 November 2010
Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order. As
the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants
received the copy of Judge Lubaos order without the registry return receipt.
While Karaan claimed that he knew when one of the parties received a copy of
the order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of

the case when Judge Lubao issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants
their last chance to submit their memorandum. The records would also show
that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch
clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for
certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry
Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that
Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be
faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard considering
that the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily
dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants.
We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized
practice of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[3] the Court ruled that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.[4]
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.[5] Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in
Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a
special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the
plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint
and other pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact,
agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in
the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or
MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he
was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person
[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same
rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.
Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,[6] the OCA
recommended that Karaan be cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to

serve an imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of
P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or
other offense against the courts, judges or court employees will merit further
and more serious sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a memorandum
be issued to all courts of the land to notify the judges and court employees of
Karaans unauthorized practice of law and to report to the OCA any further
appearance to be made by Karaan. However, the records would show that
Karaan is already 71 years old. In consideration of his old age and his state of
health, we deem it proper to remove the penalty of imprisonment as
recommended by the OCA and instead increase the recommended fine to
P10,000.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Courts Resolution
dated 24 November 2010 dismissing the complaint against Judge Antonio C.
Lubao for being judicial in nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of
indirect contempt under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance
and information. The courts and court employees are further directed to report
to the Office of the Court Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C.
Karaan, Sr. before their sala.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013 - IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and passed the same years bar examinations with a
general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so
on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province
for a vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had
not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively
involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief
[that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer;8 and the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten.9cralaw virtualaw library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw
virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on
the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended

that the instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for
his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a
penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it
was not a third party who called this Courts attention to petitioners omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the
passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot
ka kung anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the
same time, its a combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna
happen. And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll
and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For
this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown
that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil
Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the

Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court
will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability
for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies
this behavior by characterizing his acts as neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.22cralaw virtualaw
library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of
law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to
know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated
under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification.
At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of
this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as
constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however,

of law by ones assuming to

such without authority, may
is punishable by fine or
is in the nature of criminal

contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer
himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
lawyers duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar,
they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards
of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During
the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During
the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed
in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, PerlasBernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 - SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for
his failure to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts: In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado
(complainant) called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of
indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed
in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court
that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's
compliance and received the following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from
Prof.
Myrna
S.
Feliciano
(Prof.
Feliciano),
MCLE's
Executive
Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll
Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the
requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from
the MCLE requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE
Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE
Committee for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes),
Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of
the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14
August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the
Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance
Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April
2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of
Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January
2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent
neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period
from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk
of Court to furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The
Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days from
notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged
that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He
stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be
granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent
by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to

Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the
Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled
Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He
further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except
for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had
been practicing law for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme
Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she
took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court
but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of
the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the
canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING
CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona
conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other
laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and
the senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee
on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the
Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that
prepared and orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against
PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances
before the Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL
REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have
exemptions from the MCLE;

xxxx
x x x x6
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO in the national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board
when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other
counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading
generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO
HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR
ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and
validity of the 2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From
Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning,
Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to
undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the
alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and
Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported
that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance
Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the
request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of
his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that
according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from
compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter
No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof
to establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that
respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to
indicate in all their pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The
OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his
"MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section
12 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the
pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of
the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply
with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section
12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period
shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation
of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of NonCompliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported
that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be
filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the
MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance
period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a
lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed
could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the

Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be
directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing
Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure
to comply with the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April
2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to
14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14
April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the
MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14
April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the
four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an
application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE
Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and
Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the
Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application
did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the
application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano,
when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and

Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of

respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied
with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration
was sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice
Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply
with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with
his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to
the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to
comply with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was
reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a
Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and
Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement
in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar
Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered
with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those
dates.
Section
12(5)
of
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

the

MCLE

Implementing

Regulations

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will
receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or
otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written
in capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the
MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of
the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall
pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of
the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP
Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is
still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court
has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with
the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for
exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly
wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that
his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again
reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his
motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court
that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was
beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to

comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to
inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the
status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he
was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for
exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application
for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for
reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent
still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In
addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration
before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of
the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE
Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a
lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from
using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and
from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six
months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is
also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law until
such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors,
and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his
reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence,
we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and
to suspend him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully
complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required
non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on
matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to
applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has
fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be
also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate
actions.
SO ORDERED.
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.
BM 2112 Muneses
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses
(petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be
granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.
On l.eave. I
Resolution 2 B.M. No. 2112
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to
practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America
(USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several
documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul
General Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of
same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of
same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of
membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was
confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay)
who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits
of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March
1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention
for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On
July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intended to resume his practice of law.
Resolution 3 B.M. No. 2112
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership
in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship

under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice
his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3
It can not be overstressed that:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of
the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement
and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer
1 Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
contrary
notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
2 Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner,
B.M. No. 1678,
December 17, 2007.
3 R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.

Resolution 4 B.M. No. 2112

of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original
or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of
annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of
the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

4 Supra note 2.
Resolution 5 B.M. No. 2112
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,
particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily
complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts
the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is
hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the
Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the
necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the
practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.