Article

Bernes Theory of Cathexis

and Its Links to Modern
Neuroscience

Transactional Analysis Journal

2015, Vol. 45(1) 48-58
International Transactional Analysis
Association, 2015
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0362153714566596
ta.sagepub.com

Irene Messina and Marco Sambin

Abstract
Eric Bernes energy theory describes free cathexis and unbound cathexis as two forms of psychic
energy. The authors suggest possible links between Bernes theory of cathexis and recent models
of brain functioning. They propose that neural systems involved in mental processes associated
with voluntary attention may be connected to free cathexis. The default system, which is activated
during a resting state when attention is not required for a specific task but is free to wander, is
proposed as the neural substrate of unbound energy. The authors explore this hypothesis and consider evidence of default system involvement in there-and-then processing, self-projection, and
spontaneous attention.
Keywords
neuroscience, brain, cathexis, psychic energy, default system, voluntary attention, semantic,
self-projection, spontaneous attention

From the beginning, transactional analysis has been characterized by its openness to and integration
with various other fields, including neuroscience. For example, early on, in Transactional Analysis
in Psychotherapy, Eric Berne (1961) explored the field of neurology. In particular, he cited Penfields experiments about brain functioning as empirical evidence of the existence of ego states.
In these experiments, during the stimulation of specific areas of the brain, the subject lived two different, incongruous experiences at the same time: one in the past and one in the present. Thus the
subject was actor and observer simultaneously (Penfield & Roberts, 1959).
Bernes interest in neurology is clear in his description of the three psychic organs: exteropsyche,
neopsyche, and archaeopsyche. He hypothesized that these served as the organic basis of the phenomenological expression of different ego states. These ideas represented an initial approach to considering the biological foundation of the psychological dynamics observed in therapy. Nevertheless,
discussing the possibility of describing these processes from a neurological point of view, Berne
(1961) wrote, While this implication can be thought of in neurological terms, a physiological verification is not yet possible, so that here we shall confine ourselves to considering the psychological
phenomena (p. 39).

Corresponding Author:
Irene Messina, LIRIPAC, via Belzoni 80, Padua, Italy.
Email: irene-messina@hotmail.com

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Since Bernes time, the field of neuroscience has changed considerably. Innovative technologies,
such as neuroimaging, have opened up new possibilities for the scientific study of complex psychological phenomena. For example, emotions (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Panksepp, 1998),
unconscious processes (Zellner, 2011), and psychotherapy efficacy (Messina, Sambin, Palmieri,
& Viviani, 2013) are now the concern not only of psychology but also of neuroscience. In transactional analysis, a few contributions have been proposed in this direction, with intriguing hypotheses
about neurological substrates of ego states (Hine, 2005; Oller-Vallejo, 2005).
At the same time that the new technologies were being developed in neuroscience, new theoretical models of brain functioning were also being hypothesized. For instance, whereas the classical
neuropsychological approach identified specific areas of the brain and associated them with single
psychological functions, more current research in cognitive neuroscience has begun to describe the
brain as a complex system in which mental states seem to emerge out of the activation and deactivation of brain networks (Posner & Di Girolamo, 2000).
However, this does not mean that behavior is determined by the brain. Rather, neuroscientific
findings are converging to suggest new epistemologies of mind-brain interaction in which structures
and functions of the brain are viewed as shaped by mental processes. Specifically, studies have
demonstrated that experiences influence the transcriptive functions of genes (Kandel, 1999) and,
in this sense, organize the brain (Allen, 1999). The recursivity between brain and experience (especially in the case of relational experiences) is key to understanding the development and maintenance of ego states, feelings, rackets, scripts, and behaviors (Allen, 2000).
Nowadays, modern technology and new theoretical approaches are facilitating the integration of
clinical psychology and neuroscience, which could be powerful for validating models of the functioning of the human mind (and brain). However, from an epistemological point of view, we do not
replace one form of knowledge with another. The conceptual instruments of transactional analysis
are not explained by neuroscience, and neuroscience does not depend on TA instruments. Instead,
every form of knowledge offers its own level of analysis of the phenomena. Although neuroscientists and psychotherapists study the same object, their competencies are different. Considering these
different levels of knowledge, what might be the advantages of comparing transactional analysis and
neuroscience? One is that by integrating the two models, each is enriched. In this sense, the goal is an
exchange that bridges two fields of science (Darden & Maull, 1977). Often an integration among
fields leads to new hypotheses and/or points of view.
This article aims to contribute to such an integration by creating a link between recent models of
human brain functioning and Bernes theory of psychic energy flow. Bernes theory, created to
describe how psychic energy or cathexis moves from one ego state to another, has been cited by
a number of authors over the years but without important revisions (Goulding & Goulding, 1979;
Moiso & Novellino, 1982; Schiff, 1975; Stewart & Joines, 1987). Our goal is to further develop the
theory of cathexis by considering it from a neuroscientific point of view and thus to update the theory
so it is consistent with current research in neuroscience.

Ego States and Bernes Theory of Cathexis

Bernes theory of cathexis states that a certain quantum of energy exists within the boundaries of
each ego state. The behavior of humans and their perceptions of themselves depend on the distribution of such energy among the ego states. Energy can take different forms, with each form influencing the individuals behavior and self-perception.
First, every ego state has a certain amount of energy in potential form. Berne (1961) called this
bound cathexis (p. pp. 40-41). To activate an ego state, the bound cathexis must be transformed into
active cathexis (p. 40). The cathexis can be activated as one of two types, both of which can influence each ego state independently and with differing effects.

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Berne (1961) called the first type free cathexis (p. 41). It involves the activation of bound energy
by a voluntary decision made by the individual. For example, during a neuroscientific experiment, a
subject can decide to use his or her Adult energy voluntarily when required to press a button in
response to a stimulus on a screen. Theoretically, at least, the person could decide to move the
energy to his or her Child (e.g., to enjoy a happy moment) or to his or her Parent (e.g., to enforce
the rules given for completing the experiment).
Berne (1961) defined the second type as unbound cathexis (p. 41). In this case, the liberation
of the bound energy does not occur voluntarily but is activated spontaneously. It may be
prompted by influences from either external stimuli or internal stimuli (e.g., an internal dialogue). For example, an individual who has activated his or her Adult to complete a cognitive task
could also have an automatic activation of the bound cathexis of the Child. In this case, the
cathexis becomes unbound in the direction of the Child, and the person may interrupt the cognitive task because of fatigue, hunger, thirst, or boredom. Alternatively, the same individual
could have an automatic activation of the bound cathexis in the Parent such that the cathexis will
become unbound in the direction of the Parent. For example, the person might interrupt the task to
criticize his or her own performance.
To illustrate the differences between bound, unbound, and free cathexis, Berne (1961) used the
well-known metaphor of the monkey in a tree:
If he remains inactive, his elevated position gives him only potential energy. If he falls off, this
potential energy is transformed into kinetic energy. But because he is a living being, he can jump
off, and then a third component, muscular energy, must be taken into account in order to understand
how he lands where he does. When he is inactive, the physical energy is bound, so to speak, in his
position. When he falls, this energy is unbound, and when he jumps he adds a third component by
free choice. The kinetic and muscular energy together might be called the active energy. Bound
cathexis then corresponds to potential energy, unbound cathexis to kinetic energy, and free cathexis
to muscular energy; and unbound cathexis and free cathexis together may be called active cathexis.
(p. 40)

We can show this vision of psychic energy in three distinct forms by superimposing it onto the
ego states (see Figure 1). The figure shows the different forms of energy as vertically passing
through the ego states as well as the permeability of boundaries and the mobility of cathexis. The
larger arrows indicate greater mobility and permeability.
How are self-perception and behavior influenced by the movement of energy? According to
Berne, the ego state that has the most free cathexis at any given moment is perceived as the self.
However, to determine which ego state is controlling an individuals behavior and thus exercising
executive power, the unbound cathexis must be taken into account. Indeed, the executive power lies
in the ego state in which the sum of unbound cathexis and free cathexis is greater. This kind of
description is useful for explaining several phenomena observed in the clinical context, such as the
contamination of one ego state by another (Berne, 1957). For example, a patient with a contaminated
Adult could have free cathexis in the Adult but unbound cathexis in the Child or Parent. In that case,
the executive power might pass from the Adult to the Child or the Parent. Berne (1961, pp. 44-51)
described the contamination of a woman who had a fixed idea that she was being spied on in the
bathroom. This aspect of her personality was Adult ego syntonic. If we view such contamination
from the point of view of the distribution of energy cathexis, the unbound cathexis coming from her
Child invaded her Adult and disabled part of her reality-checking ability. While the distribution of
energy remains as it is, the irrational idea will continue to be Adult ego syntonic. To affect such processes in therapy with patients, therapists can promote a redistribution of cathexis through their
interventions.

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FREE
FREE
FREE

UNBOUND
UNBOUND
UNBOUND

BOUND

BOUND

BOUND

CATHEXIS

Real Self
Executive Power
Figure 1. Energy Across Ego States.

Cathexis Theory and Neural Systems

Do neural systems that correspond to the form of cathexis described by Berne actually exist? Prior to
answering that question, it is helpful to look at the map to see where we are going. The neuroscience
field is large. In this article, we refer to empirical studies based on the use of neuroimaging technologies, above all, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Using fMRI it is possible to
observe blood flow in the brain during experimental conditions (e.g., cognitive tasks or exposure
to specific stimuli). To determine which areas of the brain are specifically activated by experimental
conditions, neuroimaging research has long been based on the assumption of what is called pure

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insertion. That is, the experimental conditions are inserted and added to a baseline activity that characterizes the brain at rest. Thus, to determine which areas of the brain are activated by an experimental condition, functional images acquired in control conditions are subtracted from those acquired in
the experimental condition (Raichle et al., 2001). For example, in working memory studies, functional images acquired during a resting state are subtracted from those acquired during the working
memory task.
Through the model of pure insertion, psychological processes based on free energy have been
investigated by neuroscientists. Free cathexis may correspond to controlled processes that are
carried out voluntarily and are based on endogenous forms of attention (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle,
2004). For example, voluntary emotional regulation tasks activate the dorsal attentional system
(Ochsner & Gross, 2008), which is similar to all tasks that entail voluntary processes (Owen,
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005). The cerebral areas involved in the dorsal attentional system
are the prefrontal cortex (particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), the anterior cingulated
cortex in the dorsal position, and several parietal areas.
Traditionally in neuroscientific research, all processes not corresponding to the voluntary tasks
being studied have been viewed as simply noise, that is, data without significance that acts as the
background to the phenomenon under investigation. Until recently, it was thought that the only alternative to the controlled processes were automatic processes, that is, simple reflexes activated by a
particular environmental stimulus (exogenous forms of attention) (Barrett et al., 2004). Neuroscience was mainly focused on psychological processes linked to free cathexis, whereas psychological processes based on unbound cathexis were largely neglected.
In contrast, clinical psychodynamic theories (such as transactional analysis) have more often also
considered the role of unbound cathexis. With regard to the theory of the flow of cathexis, the concept of unbound cathexis refers to the existence of processes that are not completely conscious. At
the same time, such processes are not simple reflexes activated by exogenous stimuli because they
can drive complex behaviors. As mentioned earlier, unbound cathexis influences the executive
power of the ego states in controlling everyday behavior (Berne, 1961).
For neuroscience, the study of psychological processes linked to unbound cathexis is a great challenge from a methodological point of view. What kind of cognitive task can be used to study spontaneous processes? Does the giving of instructions not contradict spontaneity?
To answer these questions, we refer to the work of researchers who started to criticize the pure
insertion assumption (Fox et al., 2005; Raichle et al., 2001). They observed that in certain circumstances, the resting state is characterized by major activation when compared to how it is during
experimental tasks. More specifically, subtracting activations associated with a baseline condition
from activations associated with an experimental condition revealed negative answers (deactivations) (Raichle et al., 2001). According to these results, it seems that in some cases the brain works
more in the baseline condition. This suggests that other forms of psychic energy move in parallel to
those underlying voluntary processes observed in experimental tasks. For example, habitual use of
suppression is associated with an increase in medial prefrontal cortex activation in a resting state
(Abler, Hofer, & Viviani, 2008).
These intriguing findings produced a reversal in the focus of neuroscientific investigation.
Whereas the resting state had been viewed only as the background for observed processes, now it
became the main object of investigation. This innovative vision has opened a new and fruitful field
of investigation. For example, it has been observed that specific areas of the brain in specific conditions are functionally deactivated. In other words, deactivated areas are not only simply switched
off but are carrying out some functions through their deactivation (Shulman, Astafiev, McAvoy,
dAvossa, & Corbetta, 2007). In a study conducted by our research group, we found that the deactivation of temporal areas allowed participants to avoid emotional memories that interfered with the
execution of a working memory task (Messina, 2013).

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Investigations of deactivation have led to the discovery of what is called the default system (DS)
(Raichle et al., 2001). This includes the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulated
cortex, the posterior parietal lobe, the lateral and inferior temporal cortex, and the medial temporal
lobes. The default system is anti-correlated to the dorsal attentional system (Fox & Raichle, 2007).
More specifically, it is deactivated during cognitive tasks that involve executive functions or
responses to external stimuli. Moreover, its deactivation positively influences the performance of
an individual who is completing a cognitive task, whereas its insufficient deactivation is associated
with worse performances (Anticevic, Repovs, Shulman, & Barch, 2010). In contrast, the default system is activated in a resting state, when the individuals attention is not required for a specific purpose but it is free to wander (Fox et al., 2005; Raichle et al., 2001). Our hypothesis is that the default
system may be the neural substratum of unbound cathexis.

The Default System and Unbound Cathexis

To further the hypothesis about the parallels between unbound cathexis and the default system, it is
important to recognize what the functions are of the latter. In neuroscience, three main mental processes have been taken into consideration to explain the functions of the default system: semantic
processes (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009), self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2006), and
fluctuating attention (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008).
Semantic processes include memory recovery and representations based on information from past
experiences (there and then). Semantic processes allow the continual recovery of conceptual knowledgemaking sense of the experience, resolving problems that require long elaboration, creating
plans that govern future behaviorin the construction of conceptual models of oneself and relationships. Neuroimaging studies have investigated semantic processes by comparing stimuli with
semantic content (such as words) and stimuli without it (such as strings of letters) (Binder et al.,
2009). The results have shown that the default system is activated when the experimental task
requires semantic processing.
The default system is also activated when individuals carry out tasks that involve the self, such as
exposure to stimuli associated with the self (e.g., personality traits that individuals judge as descriptive of themselves) (Northoff et al., 2006) and during introspection (Fox et al., 2005). More generally, the default system is believed to be involved in self-projection, which is the capacity to project
oneself mentally from the present to the past, the future, or different places (Buckner & Carroll,
2006). Self-projection is an underlying process of many functions of the human brain, including
access to autobiographical memories (self-projections into the past), thoughts relating to the future
(self-projection into the future based on past experiences), and empathy (self-projection into others
perspectives).
The third process associated with the default system is fluctuating attention or passive monitoring. This is a form of unfocused attention that is designed to facilitate understanding of significant
variations of the external environment, corporal state, and emotional states. It works in the background like radar or a sentinel (Shulman et al., 2007). Whereas the dorsal attention system constitutes the neural substratum of voluntary attention, another attentional system, called the ventral
attentional system, appears linked to fluctuating attention. This system partially coincides with the
default system (Corbetta et al., 2008).
Considering the involvement of the default system in semantic processing, self-projection, and
fluctuating attention, several points of convergence between unbound cathexis and the default system can be described. With this aim, it is useful to explore what happens when there is an imbalance
between the activity of voluntary attentional systems (which in our hypothesis is the neural substrate
of free cathexis) and the activity of the default system (which in our hypothesis is the neural substrate
of unbound cathexis).

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According to the literature, this kind of imbalance is observed in psychopathology (WhitfieldGabrieli & Ford, 2012). For example, studies of depressed patients have found a decrease of deactivation in self-related areas of the default system, which seems to reflect an excessive and negative
focus on oneself and on negative autobiographical memories (Grimm et al., 2011; Hamilton et al.,
2011). In a similar way, the activation of the default system is also exaggerated in patients with
posttraumatic stress disorder in association with the presence of intrusive thoughts about the
trauma (Lanius et al., 2010). In anxious patients, forms of emotional avoidance have been associated with a minor deactivation of the medial prefrontal cortex (part of the default system). In
this case, focus on the endogenous sensations may hinder focus of attention on the here and now
of the situation generating anxiety (Zhao et al., 2007). Consistent with investigations into psychopathology, the reelaboration of self-representation due to psychotherapeutic change seems to be
associated with a better balance between the default system and the voluntary attentional system
(Messina et al., 2013).
In summary, the predominance of default system activation in the voluntary attentional system
implies that perceptual aspects (here and now) are dominated by semantic aspects related to there
and then, an excess of negative self-focus, and emotional avoidance.
In transactional analysis, several pathological phenomena characterized by the prevalence of
there and then impacts on the here and now have been described. First, contamination can be viewed
as an activation of unbound cathexis in the Child and/or the Parent that disables the executive power
of the Adult (Berne, 1961). In this case, the activation of forms of unbound energy in the Child and
the Parent interferes negatively with the perception of aspects of reality. In this way, the person does
not assess events based on the here and now but on Child ego states or Parent ego states in the there
and then.
Second, as previously mentioned, semantic functions and self-projection are involved in creating
plans that govern future behavior based on representations of self and other. These plans can be considered adaptive when they are based on realistic semantic representations that also consider hereand-now perceptions (English, 1988). Meanwhile, such plans for the future can be defined as a script
when they are based on archaic semantic representations that have not been reelaborated over time
(Erskine, 1980). These plans activate themselves in an unbound form, influencing the individuals
behavior in a nonadaptive direction without the person being aware of it.
With regard to passive monitoring, the spontaneous reorienting of attention due to a significant
variation in emotional states brings to mind the concept of defense mechanisms (Messina, Benelli,
Sambin, & Viviani, 2011). Indeed, passive monitoring can capture (that is, pick up stimuli without
voluntary attention to them, also in an unconscious way) external or internal stimuli that the individual interprets as harmful, thereby activating defenses to cope with them. According to this idea,
modulations of the default system occur when individuals defensively avoid emotional stimuli
(Benelli et al., 2012). In transactional analysis terms, the unbound cathexis in the Child can be
unconsciously activated by events that were harmful in the there and then and thus escape an Adult
evaluation in the here and now.
However, we must not fall into the error of considering unbound cathexis as something negative.
The same process of incursion of the unbound cathexis may be the foundation of adaptive phenomena such as intuition (Berne, 1977). Intuition, in fact, cannot be regarded as the result of a mere cognitively controlled effort. In addition to the recognition of perceptual elements, intuition requires
introspection, that is, attending to somatic sensations deriving from unbound cathexis. Intuition is
thus facilitated by fluidity between semantic and perceptual elements.
Another example of adaptive processes that require unbound cathexis is empathy. As we mentioned earlier, this capacity is associated with the ability to see ourselves in situations experienced
by others. As with intuition, empathy requires introspection (attention to endogenous sensations)
together with here-and-now perceptions of the other (Kohut, 1982).

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Conclusions
This article has described several points of convergence between Bernes energy theory and neuroscientific models. Specifically, the distinction between free cathexis and unbound cathexis proposed
by Berne is consistent with neuroscientists description of two neural systems whose activity is anticorrelated: (1) the voluntary attentional system, which may be related to free cathexis because of its
activation during tasks requiring voluntary intention, and (2) the default system, which may correspond to unbound cathexis because of its involvement in semantic processing, self-projection, and
fluctuating attention tasks, regardless of voluntary intention.
Such consistency between clinical and neuroscientific points of view contributes to clarifying a
few relevant functions of human emotional dynamics. Especially considering the recent description
of the default system and its functions, neuroscientific research suggests a few characteristics associated with unbound cathexis:
1. Unbound cathexis depends on the experience of there and then and thus on the meaning individuals attribute to their present experience depending on their past experiences (Child and
Parent) more than on perceptual aspects in the here and now (Adult) (Trautmann & Erskine,
1981).
2. Such semantic aspects are relevant for self-related representations (including scripts, see
English, 1988).
3. Unbound energy may cause psychological problems, such as in contamination, when thereand-then unhealthy experience prevails on here-and-now perception (Berne, 1957).
4. Unbound energy is also relevant in healthy functioning such as empathy or intuition, which
requires contact with the internal representation of emotionally relevant past experiences
(Child) together with here-and-now perception.
What can we gain from linking transactional analysis with neuroscience? As we have
described, transactional analysis gains a new perspective on the concept of unbound cathexis.
The neuroscientific description of the default system reflects the functioning of the unbound
cathexis theorized by Berne. According to neuroscientific evidence about default system functions, we hypothesize that clinical phenomena based on unbound energy may be based on default
system activity. Our idea is that unbound cathexis represents a common element across transactional analysis concepts such as ego states, script, rackets, and games. In this sense, the description of the default system contributes to emphasizing and focusing attention on Bernes energy
theory. Transactional analysis concepts can be seen as a way of revealing different patterns of
energy cathexis.
There is another theoretical step forward that this linking supports. In the clinical field, particularly in transactional analysis, we can describe observed phenomena using different theoretical concepts. For example, a TA therapist can interpret a phenomenon using the concept of script or games
or ego states and so on. Probably all of them could provide a good perspective on the situation.
Moreover, all these concepts could be integrated to provide new, congruent points of view. By integrating more than one concept, the therapist can obtain a more complete vision and most likely produce better results. For example, when working with a patient who presents with anxiety, the
symptom could be considered as a manifestation of script and the injunction Dont Be Healthy.
At the same time, it could be analyzed in terms of games that are played to confirm the persons
script, or the Child ego state manifestations during anxiety episodes could be observed. The connection between neuroscience and transactional analysis emphasizes such observations, and the usefulness of integrating TA concepts with neuroscience could be because they have a common origin:
They all describe unbound cathexis.

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Viewing the theory of energy cathexis as the common basis of several TA conceptual instruments
may facilitate the integration and connection of TA with other models. For example, how can we
link psychoanalytic defense mechanisms with the ideas of games and rackets (described as the
demobilization or fixation of energy)? From this point of view, defenses can be seen as forms of
emotion regulation based on the activation of unbound cathexis. Both are based on the prevalence
of there-and-then experience affecting here-and-now perception.
What can neuroscientists gain from this integration? Recently, neuroscience has moved from a
focus on localization to a description of the brain (and the mind) as based on the complex dynamics
of activation and deactivation of brain networks. And this trend has been facilitated by the goal of
explaining complex problems such as those encountered in the clinical field. Moreover, the discovery of the default system has provided a new direction for neuroscientific models, which are now
going beyond considering processes based on voluntary attention toward an interest in other processes that are carried out without the individuals intention. In understanding these new areas in
neuroscience, clinical knowledge could be an important frame of reference because of its long tradition of investigating emotional aspects of humans as observed in clinical settings.
From our work, integrating transactional analysis and neuroscience appears enriching for both.
In this sense, the characterization of transactional analysis as an open discipline that promotes
integration with other fields emerges as an important area to pursue as we seek to develop TA within
the context of current scientific scenarios.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biographies
Irene Messina, PhD, is a postdoc at Padua University and is completing her transactional analysis
training at the Centro Psicologia Dinamica in Padua, Italy. She works as a researcher in the field of
integration of clinical psychology and neuroscience. She can be reached at LIRIPAC, via Belzoni
80, Padua, Italy; email: irene-messina@hotmail.com.
Marco Sambin, Certified Transactional Analyst (psychotherapy), is a full professor of theoretical
models in clinical psychology at Padua University and the director of the Centro Psicologia Dinamica at Padua University, Padua, Italy. He can be reached at CPD-Centro Psicologia Dinamica
Integrata, via Camillo Manfroni 6, Padua, Italy; email: marco.sambin@unipd.it.

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