SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL v.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO

SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO

G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968 | (Jurisdiction Over the Subject)
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction
over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs.
44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the
Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We
would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006 | (Jurisdiction Over Persons)
FACTS:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted
all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Sometime in September
1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the court.
RULING:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
There is a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of
the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no reqt for him to be in the custody of the
law.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS

G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010 | (Totality Rule)
FACTS:
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the
union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained
the following provision that for teaching employees in college who fail the yearly
evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be
on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due
them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to
achieve the required rating points.
Respondent sought recourse from the CBAs grievance machinery, but to no avail.
Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again failed. The
parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary
Arbitrator (VA).
Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior
case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their
evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with
the CBA in force during the same five-year period. Petitioner argued that said CA
decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the complaint.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA v.

WINSTON JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO
G.R. No. 144118, July 21, 2004 | (Totality Rule)
FACTS:

This case involves a school chemical accident under the supervision of

Engr. Bautista. Its a textbook recommendation for students to use safety goggles in
experimenting chemicals however, in this case, there were none available. In the
course of the experiment because of the mixture of chemicals the test tube where it
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of was contained exploded hitting Winston Cordero in the face. After being confined to
Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of the SLU Hospital he was then transferred by his parents to St. Lukes. As a result of the
accident Winston became blind in regards to his right eye while his left eye may still
records.
Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA see but with great discomfort. Sps Cordero filled a complaint for damages and
negligence against SLU and Engr. Bautista.
reinstated the petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondents petition
despite her failure to appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary period.
RULINGS:
Yes. The CA erred in its ruling.
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be
made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA
shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the
petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; noncompliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for
the petitions dismissal.
Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been
filed. Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full docket
fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such
as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without the appellants fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.

SLU and Engr. Bautista

Jan. 24,
1996
May 30,
1998
June 25,
1998

Dec.17,
1998
Jan. 6,
1999
Feb. 23,
1993

Sept. 1,
1999

Sps Corderos
Filed a complaint

Judgment in favor of Corderos

Notice of Appeal
Opposed the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Corderos for having been filed out of time

Motion for Recon.

to increase award
of damages from
P500,000 to P1m

Trial Court increased award from P500,000 to P1 million

Notice of appeal with the trial court (docket and
other lawful fees had not been paid)
Motion to Admit Docket and Filling Fees (motion
was accompanied by two postal money orders
dated 19 February 1999. To explain the delay,
petitioners counsel stated that he did not know the
amount to be paid or the manner in which to pay it )
Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion to admit
docket and filing fees. Their motion for
reconsideration from the aforesaid resolution was
likewise denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the technical rules in perfecting an appeal may be relaxed in favor of
petitioners.
RULING:
No. As a general rule payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory to the perfection of an appeal.

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to Petitioners argue that they were denied due process and thus were an exception to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the said general rule. There was no violation of due process. An appeal is a statutory
the rules.
right that may only be exercised when there is strict compliance with its
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than requirements.
insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided Petitioners argue that the rules on appeal should be relaxed else there would be a
on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in frustration in the administration of justice. In order for the court to relax its rules there
full when she filed her petition for review.
must be exceptional circumstances to warrant it. In this case there is no such
exceptional circumstance neither does the alleged gross negligence of petitioners
former counsel resulting in the late and improper payment of docket fees constitute
a ground to relax the Courts procedural rules.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of appeal must be filed within the
15-day reglementary period reckoned from receipt of the decision or order appealed

from; the docket and other lawful fees must also be paid within the same period. In
this case, the petitioners were able to take advantage of two opportunities to file a
notice of appeal. The first notice of appeal filed on June 25, 1998 manifested their
desire to appeal the original decision of the trial court dated May 30, 1998. The
second notice of appeal dated January 6, 1999 expressed petitioners intent to
appeal the trial courts order dated December 17, 1998. However, the petitioners
failed to tender payment of the docket fees. The docket fees should have been paid
to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Echague, Isabela, on or before January 20, 1999
however the postal money orders were issued on February 19, 1999. It took almost
one month before the petitioners to tender payment.
Thus since there is no excusable reason to warrant the relaxation of the rules the
appealed case was rightly dismissed.

GENERAL v. CLARAVAL
G.R. No. 96724,March 22, 1991 | (Manchester Ruling)
FACTS:

of which is only due to Tolerance of the said heirs. Quinagoran's Motion

for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC. Quinagoran then went to the CA
on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders of
the RTC.

Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rizal a sworn On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing
complaint accusing Honesto General and another person of libel, where he allegedly Quinagoran's action and affirming in toto the RTC. CA stated that, it is settled that
suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the total sum of P100 million.
when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
The info. for libel subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting the damages due when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
the offended party. The defense raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Quinagoran's Motion
corresponding to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of merit.
before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor. The trial ISSUE:
Court however, overruled the objection. Thus, Thelmo filed for a writ of certiorari to
annul the aforesaid Orders of the Trial Court alleging that the decision had been Whether or not the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside and that
the complaint of the heirs of Juan de la Cruz before the trial court be dismissed for
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
lack of jurisdiction, because 1) under R.A. No. 7691 the MTC has jurisdiction over
ISSUE:
the case and 2) that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should
Whether or not the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability allege the assessed value of the property involved.
arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be RULING:
deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due
Yes. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of Quinagoran's Motion
course.
to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession
RULING:
or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
No. Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims of damages property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made
must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000, if outside
corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. Republic Act No. 7691 which
requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which was already in effect when
that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the respondents filed their complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994. The Court has
Court."
also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an
This Court's plain intentto make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the
filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly original jurisdiction of the MTC. In Atuel v. Valdez the Court likewise expressly stated
instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, that:
other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or informationhas thus been made
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general
manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions.
jurisdiction. Specifically, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve x xx possession of real property. However, if the
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity
assessed value of the real property involved does not
and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with
Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtbecause the offended party has NOT
actions to recover possession of real propert.
waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon
to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN v. CA and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007 | (Judicial Notice)
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for
FACTS:
by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen, filed on October 27, 1994 the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. Nowhere in
a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan. The mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC
heirs alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents.
sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late The Court of Appeals's Decision dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated
Juan dela Cruz; that in the mid-70s, Quinagoran started occupying a house on the August
28,
2002, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of the heirs; that Regional Trial Courts Orders dated November 11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all
in 1993, they asked Quinagoran to remove the house as they planned to construct a proceedings therein are declared NULL and VOID. The complaint is
commercial building on the property; that Quinagoran refused, claiming ownership dismissed without prejudice.
over the lot; and that they suffered damages for their failure to use the same. The
heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed 400 sq m, more or
less, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated,
HILARIO v. SALVADOR
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, costs of suit and other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005 | (Manchester Ruling)
the case under RA 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MTC to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the FACTS:
346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed
value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be
Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with
more than the said amount.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They
The RTC denied Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11,
alleged that they are the co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador
1999, because present action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint
partakes of the nature of action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with of a parcel of land located in Sawang, Romblon, which property was adjudged as
the Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value of the property. This is so because the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. Sometime in 1989,
in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from the defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the
defendant the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the possession plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-

interest. To reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to ISSUE:
the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail. Petitioners filed an action to recover
1
property before the Regional Trial Court.
2
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the nature of the action. He averred that (1) the complaint failed
to state the assessed value of the land in dispute; (2) the complaint does not
sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subjectmatter of this action; both of which are essential requisites for determining the
jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. The petitioners opposed the motion.
They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court can
take judicial notice of the market value of the property
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
RULING:
No. The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land
is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market
value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real
property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The
fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
The complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed
value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice
of the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or
the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action. In this
case, the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null
and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.
JOVENAL OUANO v. PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION
and HON. JUDGE RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.
G.R. No. 134230, July 17, 2002 | (Manchester Ruling)

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.
Whether or not damages of whatever kind should be included in the
determination of the jurisdictional amount.

RULING:
1

RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Since the action involves ownership and possession of real property, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is determined by the assessed
value, not the market value.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691. Section 33
(paragraph 3) of the said law provides:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Likewise, Section 19 (paragraph 2) of the same law reads:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by
the corresponding tax declaration, is only P2, 910.00. As such, the complaint is well
within the MTCs P20, 000.00 jurisdictional limit. It is elementary that the tax
declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.
2

No. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the main cause of action for recovery of ownership and possession of
real property.

Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation

of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 states:

"2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
FACTS:
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
PGTT INTL INVESTMENT CORP. filed with the RTC, Cebu City a complaint against where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
Jovenal Ouano for Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real Property action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
and Damages. It alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the of the court.
Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. That
PGTT found that Ouano uprooted the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed
them and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTTs demand that he vacate the lots and
restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused, claiming he is the owner and
lawful possessor of the 380 square meters he occupied. Thus, PGTT was deprived
of the use of its property and suffered damages. PGTT then prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant to vacate the premises and restore the lots to their
original condition; pay plaintiff P100, 000.00 as damages per year, beginning
October, 1996 until he shall have vacated the premises and restored the lots to their
original condition; pay P100, 000.00 as attorney's fees; and pay P50, 000.00 as
expenses of litigation.
ARTEMIO INIEGO v. JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, & FOKKER C.
SANTOS
Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over it considering that G. R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006 | (Actions Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)
the assessed value of the lots involved is only P2, 910, as indicated in the latest tax FACTS: On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for
declaration. PGTT contends that the RTC has jurisdiction since the market value of quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a
the lots is P49,760.00.5 Besides, the complaint is not only an action for recovery of traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and
ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that
exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC has exclusive original happened on 11 December 1999, when a freight truck allegedly being driven by
jurisdiction.
Pinion hit private respondents jitney which private respondent was driving at the
The trial court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case because it is of judicial time of the accident.
knowledge that the real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher valuation On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the
than those indicated in the tax declaration.
complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action of the case. According to petitioner, the amount which is the

basis of the jurisdiction of the court should be the actual damages only in the
amount of P 40, 000.00, excluding the moral and exemplary damages, because the
case of quasi-delict only resulted to the actual damages in the exclusion of the latter.
The decision of the court states that the court is of the view that the main cause of
action is not the claim for damages but quasi-delict. Damages are being claimed
only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Article
2176 of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Pinion and under Article 2180 also of
the Civil Code in the case of defendant Iniego. But since fault or negligence (quasidelicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the court has exclusive
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether the action of quasi-delict is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
2.
Whether the basis of the jurisdictional amount should exclude the moral and
exemplary damages.
RULING: It is capable of pecuniary estimation. In a recent case decided by the
Court, which was also cited in the case, the decision is stated as follows:
Respondent Judges observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be determined to be capable
or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject
matter of the action.9 A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. On the
other hand, the "subject matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or
personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is
prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional
Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) & in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by CFI [now RTC]
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for
the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the
defendants alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions represent
the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which
are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal
relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears
to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually
bears the caption "for DAMAGES."
The Court rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict
is capable of pecuniary estimation.
All damages should be included in the basis of the jurisdictional amount for
cases of quasi-delicts are capable of pecuniary estimation and its basis is the
amount of the damages claimed. . The distinction he made between damages
arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to
admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought
by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or
negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his
employer in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed,
without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary
damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in
the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All claims for
damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless
of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule
2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action
as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides
that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery
of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause
of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall
govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the
total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed,
isP490,000.00.

SPOUSES HUGUETE v. SPOUSES EMBUDO

G.R No. 49554, July 1, 2003
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and partition
of the 50-square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in the RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the action is one for
annulment of title and the total assessed value of the subject land was only
P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, pursuant to Sec
33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is
cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
RULING:
No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over
it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought (Caiza
vs
CA).
And in Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to
the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from the
respondents. Their cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the
subject land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the
property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest
therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which
was within the jurisdiction of MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they
were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion
subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.

EULALIA RUSSELL v. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL,

ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO
BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN
G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)
FACTS:
Spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho own a property situated in Liloan,
Cebu and containing an area of 56, 977.40 square meters, more or less. When
Casimero and Cesaria died, the property was inherited by their heirs, herein
Petitioners and Respondents. The property remained undivided until respondents
found a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed
on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, Respondents divided the property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as
heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed
that the document was false and perjurious as the Respondents were not the only
heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between
the heirs Thus, Petitioners filed a complaint against Respondents, denominated
"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void

and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. In response,
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case since the property subject of the controversy has an assessed value of Php
5,000 which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioners opposed
the motion contending that the issue is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Petitioners. Hence, the Petitioners elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court via Petition for Certiorari.

damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main action for
specific performance.

ISSUE:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

Whether the controversy at hand is one capable of pecuniary estimation.

RULING:
No. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific
performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescession, which is a counterpart
of specific performance.
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the
late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and
entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of
the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COURT

OF APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON
G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)
FACTS:
On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract
of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint
is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does
not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari. On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by private respondent.
RULING:
Yes.It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for
specific performance or rescission of contracts. In Manufacturers Distributors,
Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that actions for specific performance are incapable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private
respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce
their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary
awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As
alleged therein, petitioners failure to pay rentals due for the period from January to
March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of
accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same
complaint likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of the
lease with the closure of and removal all communication equipment in the leased
premises. Under the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the
applicable laws in order to determine whether there was indeed a violation of their
lease agreement that would justify the award of rentals and damages. The prayer,
therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus

Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the

amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court,
therefore, did not err in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

GENESIS INVESTMENT INC., CEBU JAYA REALTY v. HEIRS OF

EBARASABAL
GR No. 181622, November 20, 2013 | (Joinder of Issues)
FACTS:
Roman Ebarasabal, during hi lifetime acquired a parcel of land with an assessed
value of P 2,890. In 2002 the assessed value of the lot was at P 11,9990. Upon his
death, his eight (children became the co-owners of said lot. The children of Roman
are : Ceferino ,Florol,Leona, Pedro, Isidro, Benito, Julian and Gil. After several years
of co- ownership the other Ebarasabal heirs found that the descendants of Gil
Ebarasabal have executed among themselves Extrajudicial Settlement with sale of
parcel of lot to Genesis Investment Inc. for P2, 600,000.00. Genesis was able to
have the title issued under Cebu Jaya Realty.
Other heirs then instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Regional
Trial Court. Genesis filed motion to dismiss on the ground that based on assessed
value of the lot and since case involves title to or possession of real property, the
proper jurisdiction lies with Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the jurisdiction lies with Regional Trial Court or not.

hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is,
whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction.
Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.
Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale
is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand,
exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was
filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April
15, 1994.
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE v. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN
G.R. No. 17391, February 22, 2010
(Money Claims Principally For Damages)
FACTS:

While Kalashian was inside the Police Station Sante uttered words, "How many
rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!" Bert is
Kalashians friend and personal security guard. Kalashian also alleges that Sante
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.
spread rumors that she is involved in a killing incident. Kalashian filed before the
In determining whether an action is one of the subject matter of which is not capable RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against Sante and prayed that Sante
of pecuniary estimation, the court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as
nature of the principal action or remedy sought, where the basis issue is something exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses.
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money is purely
incidental, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such actions where the Sante alleges that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC
subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money and are cognizable by of Baguio who has jurisdiction. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral
damages was not more than P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
RTC.
damages should be excluded in computing the total claim. The trial court ruled that
In this case, it is true that one of the causes of actions pertains to recovery of title or the total claim of respondent amounted toP420,000.00 which was within the
possession to and interest of each parties over said parcel of land, but the principal jurisdiction of the RTC..
relief sought was for the nullification of said Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
entered into by descendant of Gil Ebarasabal with the petitioners. Thus, the ISSUE:
recovery of the undivided shares or interest simply becomes a necessary Whether or not the Regional Trial Court acquire jurisdiction over the case.
consequence if the deed is annulled.
RULING:
RULING:

In joinder of causes of action, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC, provided that The jurisdictional amount of the RTC is above P300,000.00. If the case is in Metro
one of the casues of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venues lies Manila, the jurisdictional amount shall be above P400,000.00.
therein. The case clearly falls within the RTC jurisdiction.
The exclusion of damages in determining the jurisdictional amount applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action,
or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN v.
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE
G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005 | (Joinder of Issues)
In this case, the main cause of action is for damages. The complaint principally
sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
FACTS:
litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by Kalashian. In
On October 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his addition to the moral damages, the exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
mother Martina Gicale. It was raining and one of Pantrancos passenger bus, driven litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to the main action but constitute the
by Alexander Buncan, hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
primary relief prayed for. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed
The total cost of repair was 21, 415.00 but respondent insurance company paid only was P420,000.00, the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
8,000.00. Martina shouldered the balance of 13, 415.00.
Respondents then demanded reimbursement from petitioner and its driver, but they
refused.
Respondents then filed for a sum of money. In their answer, petitioner denied and
averred that MTC had jurisdiction.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed applying the totality rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP v. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,

TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS and ABELARDO DAGORO
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
(General Rule and Exceptions of the Probate Court)
FACTS:

Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 without any known debts or
obligations. During his lifetime he contracted 2 marriages. First to Lucia who died in
RULING:
1924 and having 3 children, namely Jesus (died without issue); Milagros; Jose (who
Yes. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the is survived by his 3 children, Gloria, Joseph and Teresa). Second to Caridad and
same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact they also had 3 children, Eduardo; Sebastian; and Mercedes (survived by her
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise daughter Cecile). Joaquin left 2 parcels of land with improvement in Pasay City.
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
His son Eduardo from his second wife filed petition for settlement of Joaquins
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus intestate estate. The Regional Trial Court issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as

administrator. The court also issued an order of partition which ruled that the bulk of
estate property was acquired during the existence of the 2nd marriage.
Joseph and Teresa (Joses children) filed their motion for reconsideration. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion and declared that the real properties
belonged to conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia and directed partition to
reflect the correct sharing of heirs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve
ownership of real properties.
RULING:
Yes. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership of real
properties. As a general rule, jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with probate of will and or settlement of
estate of deceased persons and does not extend to determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. However, as an exception, as justified
by expediency and convenience, probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
interstate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion or exclusion, from inventory
of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination in a separate action.
If interested parties are all heirs or question is of collation/advancement or parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of the petitioners
are not impaired.

SPS. BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS and JUANITO ULANDAY v.

COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, ELCOCADIO SORIANO
and LIBRADA SORIANO
G.R. No. 99843 June 22, 1993
(Limited Jurisdiction of the RTC as Land Registration Court)

(RTC) also functions as a land registration court, if the parties acquiesced in

submitting that issue for determination in the land registration proceeding and they
were given full opportunity to present their respective sides and their evidence, the
land registration court would have jurisdiction to pass upon that issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the

respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
Spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos filed before the Regional Trial Court of Branch 37, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is further ordered to dismiss Civil Case No.
Lingayen, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and 15958 with costs against plaintiffs therein. Costs against private respondents in this
three-fourths () pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, situated in barangay Baay, Lingayen instance. SO ORDERED
and under Cad-373-D of the Lingayen Cadastre, with the remaining one-fourth
() pro-indiviso portion thereof belonging to Roman Soriano.
FACTS:

The trial court, sitting as a land registration court, issued an order of general default
against the whole world except the Director of Lands and Roman Soriano. In his
opposition, oppositor Soriano alleged that the two lots mentioned in the application
had in fact not yet been divided and therefore, he is a co-owner to the extent of oneseventh (/ 7) pro-indiviso of the combined areas of Lot Nos. 60052 and 8459 and not
only one-fourth () of Lot No. 8459. It was established that the lots in question were
originally owned by Adriano Soriano. Thereafter, Adriano's heirs executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition and subsequently sold to petitioners.
The land registration court in its decision granted the application for registration of
petitioners. This Court also confirms the title of the herein private oppositor over the
one-fourth () pro-indiviso portion. A day after the promulgation of the trial court's
decision granting the application of petitioners in the land registration case,
oppositor filed a complaint against spouses Abalos for the annulment of document
and/or redemption, ownership and damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch 37. The spouses Abalos filed motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of res judicata, pendency of another action, lack of cause of action,
laches, misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the
motion. Petitioners filed petition for certiorari and prohibition before the respondent
court alleging grave abuse of discretion having been committed by the trial court in
not dismissing the complaint.
Respondent court disagreed with the petitioners and dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the lower court, acting as a land registration court, exercises limited jurisdiction.
Therefore, it cannot pass upon questions regarding the validity of contracts affecting
the disputed property. Accordingly, a land registration court having limited jurisdiction
may not resolve an issue involving the validity of the deed of sale which is ordinarily
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction. Concluding, respondent court held that
the trial court committed no error when it refused to adhere to the rule on res
judicata which requires that the resolution of the issue in the prior case should have
been made by a court of competent jurisdiction. The appellate court also
cited Franco v. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank which held that the general rule
that a land registration court has no power to decide matters which are properly
litigable in ordinary civil actions admits of exceptions as when the parties have
acquiesced in submitting said matters for determination in the land registration
proceedings and the parties are afforded full opportunity to present their respective
sides and evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court, sitting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to
determine conflicting claims of ownership over the land sought to be registered.
RULING:
Yes. The court reversed the decision of Respondent court. True, a land registration
court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. But this is not without exception. The
jurisdiction of a land registration court being limited in character, deviations have
been sanctioned under the following circumstances where: (1) the parties agreed or
have acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid issues for determination by the court in
the registration proceedings; (2) the parties were accorded full opportunity in
presenting their respective arguments of the issues litigated and of the evidence in
support thereof; and (3) the court has already considered the evidence on record
and is convinced that the same is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision
upon the issues controverted.
Here, the issue of ownership was fully ventilated before the land registration court
with both of the parties presenting oral and documentary evidence to sustain their
respective claims. It was a full-dress trial on the merits of the applicants' claim over
the parcels of land with the then oppositor, Roman Soriano, having been accorded
every opportunity to refute the same. Indeed, Soriano even offered to sell his shares
in the property to petitioners spouses but the latter found the conditions so onerous
that the transaction failed to materialize.

LETICIA P. LIGON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107751, June 1, 1995 | (Limited Jurisdiction of RTC as Land Registn
Court)
FACTS:
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for specific performance with damages against the
Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP). IDP failed to fulfill this obligation
stipulated in the deed of sale to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract.. Hence INK
prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing the
subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment granting the reliefs
prayed for by INK except the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later. On
22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia
Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. On 15
February 1992 petitioner filed an opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court because the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she
was not made a party to the main case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the petitioner.
RULING:
Yes. The RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner. Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is
now provided that Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and
interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions." The principal action filed by INK before the trial court was for specific
performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well
within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, when INK filed a
motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the
duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a
necessary incident to the main case. The surrender by petitioner will not create any
substantial injustice to her. On the contrary, to grant the petition and compel INK to
file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the
trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This
end should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that
do not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to
insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher objective they seek,
which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights

LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC. v. CA AND CASCADE COMMERCIAL

CORP.
G.R. No. L-88246 June 4, 1993 | (Limited Jurisdiction of tRTC as Land Registn
Court)

FACTS: On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased
a building and lot in Quezon City to private respondent Cascade Commercial
Corporation for a period of 4 years beginning March 1, 1982. On February 19, 1986,
La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for ejectment with preliminary
attachment in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint alleged
non-payment of rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by the
Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action under the general plaintiffs on the defendant. It prayed that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (RTC) should not be resolved in a land for the amount of P73,820.60 to answer for the unpaid rentals. The defendant was
registration proceeding. But since in this jurisdiction the Court of First Instance also asked to vacate the premises and to pay the unpaid rentals in the sum of

P73,820.60 plus the amount of P15,000 monthly starting from March 1986 as the
reasonable value of the use of the premises. On April 4, 1986, Cascade filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Discharge of Attachment. The motions alleged
that, in view of the circumstances surrounding the case, the complaint should be
considered an action for a sum of money and not ejectment. Since the amount
claimed was over P20,000, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
RULING: No, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.
The reason is that the lack of the averment that there was demand to vacate the
premises was never raised by the private respondent in the Metropolitan Trial court
and the Regional Trial Court, and not even in the Court of Appeals. The private
respondent had questioned the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for ejectment but for the

collection of a sum of money. The answer it later filed did not raise the lack of the
said allegation but in fact, recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, actually sought
affirmative relief therefrom. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case may be rejected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is
not without exception. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is
what we said . . . to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction. Nowhere in the Answer of respondents
contain an allegation attacking the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court based on
the issue on demand It is settled that where a party voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may not thereafter be
heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction after all. The party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public
policy.