Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.

168056) - Digest
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on
July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview
of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They
insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not
pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the Presidents
power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of
Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as
to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion
would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in
the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to
impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance
is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
Rosanna married Ralph in 1998. They have three children. On May 20, 2005, Rosanna filed a verified petition for
issuance of protection order for herself and her children, against his husband Ralph. According to her, there was a time
when Ralph pointed a gun at her and cocked it to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed
against him; there was also an instance when Ralph fed her children with chicken which her youngest child spat out; to
make his children stop crying, he would threaten them with a belt; when she told him to stop coming to the house as she
and her children were afraid of him, he threatened to cut off financial support to them, among others. Acting on the
verified petition, the trial court issued a Temporary Protection Order good for 30 days and required Ralph to comment on
the petition. In his comment questioning the propriety of the temporary protection order, he maintained that Rosanna had
been staying with another man; she surreptitiously moved her children out of their abode despite their written agreement;
and Rosanna is pyschologically, emotionally and mentally unfit to keep the children in her custody.
Without waiting for his Comment to be resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. In order not to
render the petition moot, the CA issued a temporary restraining order for the parties to enjoin them implementing the
temporary protection order. Ralph later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to restrain
the RTC from conducting proceedings therein.
The CA later dismissed his petition for certiorari. It ruled that the petition is still pending with the RTC, hence the factual
matters could be raised thereon. The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to Ralphs contention that RA 9262 is
unconstitutional, since the issue raised in the CA was the alleged grave abuse of disruption by the RTC in issuing the
TPO, the issue could be resolved without ruling on the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262, which is not the very lis
mota of the petition.

Ralph thus filed his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act
9262. According to him, RA 9262, particularly Section 15 thereof which allows the grant of protection orders, is
unconstitutional, since it deprives the respondent of due process before issuance. It is also an invalid delegation of
powers by Congress to the courts.
The Supreme Court:
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued
by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court
may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The
court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the
date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking
full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented, the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing
when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required
not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall
order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice
upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one s defense. To be heard
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
xxx
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of
protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
THIRD
DIVISION, G.R.
No.
170701,
January
22,
2014, RALPH
P.
TUA,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA
HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo
a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged
Section 36(g) of the said law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional
qualification on candidates for Senator?
Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Case No. 21
GR No. 174105
Reghis Romero II et al vs. Jinggoy Estrada et al
Fats!
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order(TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the initations and compulsory
processes issued by the !enate "ommittee on #abor, $mployment and %uman Resources &eelopment in
connection with its inestigation on the inestment of Oerseas 'orers 'elfare dministration(O'') funds
in the !moey *ountain project+
Pursuant to Resolution o+ 5-. and 5/-,Petitioner Reghis Romero 00 as owner of R100 2uilders 0nc+ was
inited by the "ommittee on #abor, $mployment and %uman Resources &eelopment to attend a public
hearing at the !enate on ugust 3-,3446 regarding the inestment of O'' (Oerseas 'orers 'elfare

dministration) funds in the !moey *ountain project+ The inestigation is intended to aid the !enate in the
reiew and possible amendments to the pertinent proisions of R 4/3,The *igrant 'orers ct+
Petitioner Romero in his letter1reply reuested to be e7cused from appearing and testifying before the
"ommittee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine !enate Resolution os+
5-. and 5/-+ The "ommittee denied his reuest+ On the same date, initations were sent to the other si7
petitioners, then members of the 2oard of &irectors of R100 2uilders 0nc+ reuesting them to attend the
!eptember /,3446 "ommittee hearing+ The ne7t day, !enator 8inggoy $strada as "hairman of the "ommittee
issued
subpoena ad testificandum
to petitioner Romero 00 directing him to appear and testify before the
"ommittee relatie to the aforesaid !enate resolutions+ The "ommittee later issued subpoenas to the 2oard of
&irectors of R100 2uilders 0nc+
Iss"e!
'hether or not the subject matter of the !enate inuiry is sub judice
R"ling!
O+ The !upreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
superening issuance of the en banc resolution of 8uly 9, 344 in :R o+ 96/53.+ n issue or a case becomes
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controersy, so that a determination of the issue
would be without practical use and alue+ 0n such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the
petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition+ Thus, there is no
more obstacle1on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is inocable to the continuation of the "ommittee;s
inestigation challenged in this proceeding+
s stated in rnault s+ a<areno,
the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently truerecourse must be had to others who possess it.
The court further held that when the "ommittee issued initations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear
before it in connection with its inestigation of its aforementioned inestments, it did so pursuant to its authority
to conduct inuiries in aid of legislation+ This is clearly proided in rt+ =0, !ec+39 of the 9>. Philippine
"onstitution+ The court has no authority to prohibit a !enate committee from reuiring persons to appear and
testify before it in connection with an inuiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE
AND
SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People s Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
.entry-meta

.entry-header
BENGSON
vs.
HRET
and
CRUZ
G.R.
No.
142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,
Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the
Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative
in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No.
63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in
a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
252 SCRA 641 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and
Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him
in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case
himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed.
Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.
Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the

Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but
was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House
of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of twothirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Drilon v De Venecia
Topic: Commission on Apointments
Facts:
In August 2007, both the Senate and the House of Representatives (HOR) elected their
respective representatives to the Commission on Appointments (CA). The contingent of
the Senate for the CA is composed of 1 from KAMPI, 1 UNO, 3 Lakas-CMD, 2 PMP, 1
NPC, 1 LP, and 1 PRP. The contingent of HOR is 6 Lakas-CMD, 2 KAMPI, 3 NPC, and
1 CIBAC Party List.
Because of the non representation of LP, who have 20 elected member at the HOR, to
the contingent, Representative Tanada requested De Venecia (JDV) to consider putting
1 LP member to the contingent and that they are entitled to such cause they have 20
elected members in the HOR. After letters between Tanada and JDV, Drilon filed a case
on behalf of LP requesting the same by Rep. Tanada, which was docketed as G.R. No.
180055 which was later withdrawn due to mootness when Cong Umali from Mindoro
was added to the contingent of HOR to the CA.
Meantime, Senator Jamby Jajajajamby Madrigal claimed that the contingent of Senate
to the CA is not proportional, hence, in violation of the Constitution, for the follow
reasons:
1. PMP has two representatives in the CA although it only has two
members in the Senate and thus [is] entitled only to one (1) seat.
2. KAMPI has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled
to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.
3. PRP has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to
a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.
4. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana Cayetano are
Independents, then Sen. Gordon cannot be a member of the CA as
Independents cannot be represented in the CA even though there will be three
Independents in the CA.
5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP, he still can sit in the CA
representing NP.
She likewise claimed that the composition of the contingent of HOR is not
proportional:
1. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5) members in the Commission on
Appointments although it is entitled only to four (4) representatives and thus
[is] in excess of a member;
2. KAMPI currently has three (3) members in the Commission on
Appointments although it is entitled only to two (2) representatives and thus is
excess of a member;
3. Liberal Party is not represented in the Commission on Appointments

although it is entitled to one (1) nominee; and

4. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the Commission on
Appointments although it only has two members in the House of
Representatives and therefore [is] not entitled to any seat.
In his Comment on Jajajambys petition, respondent Senator Villar
proffered the following arguments

1. Petitioner has no standing to file [the] petition.

2. Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort.
Each House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the
composition of its own contingent to the CA.
3. Petitioner is estopped.
4. Presumption of regularity in the conduct of official functions.
5. The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO
are not available to the Petitioner.
Issue Held Ratio
Won the petitioner has
standing.
NO Senator Madrigal failed to
show that she sustained direct
injury as a result of the act
complained of. Her petition
does not in fact allege that
she or her political party PDPLaban was deprived of a seat
in the CA, or that she or PDPLaban possesses personal
and substantial interest to
confer on her/it locus standi.
WoN petitioner failed to
observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior
resort.
Senator Madrigals primary
recourse rests with the
respective Houses of
Congress and not with this
Court. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction dictates
that prior recourse to the
House is necessary before
she may bring her petition to
court.
It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator
Madrigals letters to the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of Business of the
Session of the Senate to address her concerns. Senator Madrigals filing of the second
petition is thus premature.
Senator Madrigals suggestion that Senators Pilar Juliana Cayetano and Richard
Gordon be considered independent senators such that the latter should not be allowed
to be a member of the CA, and that Senator Alan Peter Cayetano be considered a
member of the NP such that he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his
party to one seat involves a determination of party affiliations, a question of fact which
the Court does not resolve.
DECISION:

 Jajajajambys petition is DISMISSED.

NOTES:
If there is a complaint in the election of a member or members, it shall be addressed to
the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House.
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
08
OCT
.date
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. , this simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.

POBRE VS MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

FACTS:
JBC through public invitation publish the soon vacant position of Chief of Justice, hence Santiago
was one of the applicant but unfortunately informed by the JBC that only incumbent associate
justice would qualify the position. During her privilege speech on the Congress to wit; x x x I am
not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.xxx
ANTERO J. POBRE in his sworn letter/complaint invites the attention of the court and asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
Issue: Does the disbarment proceeding and other disciplinary actions should be taken against the
senator?
Ruling:
NO, because the delivery of speech was conducted while the Congress is in session and
therefore she is covered with the state immunity provided in our Constitution Art. VI Sec.11 of the
Constitution. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the

complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
SCB PHILIPPINES VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AND CURRENCIES EN BANC
Posted by kaye lee on 4:05 PM
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate
to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The
respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there
were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in
the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of
Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is
an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except
only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives
cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating
amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the
evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the
courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the AsiaEurope Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a
new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and
services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our
commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and
Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives
on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on
the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country

being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue
concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic,
as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on
transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al
vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and
prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et
al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of
the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11
September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic.
Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on
petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA
may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding
that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to
deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that
treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an
area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are
aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against
any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against
the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would
strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the

Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information,
in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the
Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has

adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before
it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified
grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject
to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The
impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet
the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts

Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla

Case No. 36 / ConstiLaw Batch 4
Nature of the Case:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the TRC of
Quezon City.
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996, this
provided for the modernization and computerization of the voters registration list, and
appropriated funds therefor. Pursuant to the said RA, COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution approving the Voters Registration and Identification Project (VRIS) which
envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 elections. COMELEC
issued invitations for bid and it was awarded to PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation,
which received the highest total weighted score and declared winning bidder. (BID
was 6.58 B Pesos). HOWEVER, RA 8760 provided that the budget appropriated by
Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only 1B and actual available
funds under Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA
requested the execution of the contract, but to no avail. PHOTOKINA filed a petition
with the RTC and was granted, it directed the Commissioners to resume negotiations
to formalize the execution of the contract for the VRIS project. COMELEC filed a
complaint against respondent judge.
Issue:
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract
with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for
the project?
Held:
PHOTOKINA cannot compel COMELEC. Petition is GRANTED, RESOLUTION
issued by Judge Padilla are SET ASIDE.
Ratio:

Enshrined in the 1987 Constitution is the mandate that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In the
execution of government contracts the precise import of this constitutional restriction is
to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations
made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the constitutional injuction are the provisions (section 46 and 47,
chapter of EO 292 or Administrative Code of 1987) which pertinent provisions read:
Section 47. xxxno contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any
government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting
official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the
obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for
expenditure on account thereof xxx
Quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of
appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent
is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract.
Court held in
Metropolitan
case that the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the
offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the
bidder HOWEVER, such statement would be inconsequential in a government where
the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to
allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the government
in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract
was attempted to be made.
Clearly the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS
project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with
PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law
for the project.
The contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio. Proposed
contract is without force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been
entered into.
Relevance to ConstiLaw: NO MONEY PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN
PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY Law
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa (digest)
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO. 209251) NOVEMBER
19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative s
district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an item or
appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved
in project identification.


The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act ( GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The
SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard projects but also covered soft projects such as those
which would fall under education, health and livelihood.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any kind
of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first time when the
Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public
Works Fund, among others.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of
funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were
required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as
the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).

The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and

administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.

In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.

Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to
sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy

There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization
are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.

The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal
existence of the PDAF.

The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation
of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on
the systems constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable


The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon.

The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.

As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.

As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case
was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress.

On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas
of fund release and realignment.

Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power
thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.

The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and hence no
controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated.

The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.

Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation
and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.

Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.

Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature.
They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has

been violated


The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines
(a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.
(c) Checks and balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
Presidents power of item veto.

It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is
because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself or
its members.

The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.

The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government, because it renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.

The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.

Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy


The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.

The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.

For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law , it is
enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose.

Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.

It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.

It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.

The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.

This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.

The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same.

The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility.