Manila Electric Company, Petitioner, Vs - The Court of Appeals, CCM Gas

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CCM GAS

CORPORATION, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, Respondents.
.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila and ordered it to reissue its writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining petitioner from disconnecting its electric supply to private respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation (hereafter CCM Gas) is a customer of petitioner Manila
Electric Company (hereafter MERALCO).On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272,684.81 for electric
consumption for the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984.The amount of the bill is broken down as
follows:
Actual electric energy consumed - P 51,383.98
Purchased Power Adjustment - 213,696.00
Exchange Rate Adjustment - 7,604.83
Total P272,684.81
The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld payment until its question concerning
the purchased power adjustment was answered.
On May 31, 1984, MERALCO gave CCM Gas notice of disconnection if its account was not paid on or
before June 5, 1984.
CCM Gas protested, although it made partial payment of P52,684.81.It demanded to know how the
item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213,696.00 had been arrived at.
As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila, praying that: (a) MERALCO be ordered to pay moral damages and attorneys
fees; (b) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining or restraining MERALCO from
disconnecting CCM Gas electric supply; and (c) a temporary restraining order be issued pending
hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction.
On June 8, 1984, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on July 21, 1984, a writ of
preliminary injunction upon the posting by CCM Gas of a bond in the amount of P1,031,999.69.
CCM Gas having posted the required bond on August 6, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the court on August 13, 1984.
On October 4, 1984, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended answer in which it raised, as
special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case and lack of
valid cause of action of CCM Gas.
On April 30, 1985, the trial court dismissed the case and lifted the injunction it had issued on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the
Board of Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was
arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same
was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive.The trial court said:1
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This claim of the plaintiff is untenable as the P.D.1206, as amended by Sec.3, P.D.1573 vests upon the
BOE supervision, control and jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates to be charged by electric
companies.The purchased power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy after prior notice and
hearing to the public in Case No.80-117.The plaintiffs counsel admitted this law and the decision
authorizing the BOE to regulate and fix power rate and therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action, that the
defendant violated the rights of the plaintiff to be informed of the breakdown and itemization of the
defendants computation of its purchased power adjustment and its refusal, is not supported by any law
or jurisprudence on the matter.The court finds it difficult to continue this case on the basis of the
citations made by the defendant and admitted by the plaintiff.
On May 29, 1985, MERALCO received a copy of the order.Within the reglementary period, it applied
for the payment of damages against the bond.
CCM Gas, which also received its copy of the order on May 29, 1985, filed a motion for an extension
of ten (10) days from June 13, 1985 (the end of the reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion
for reconsideration) within which to file a motion for reconsideration.Its motion was granted and so on
June 24, 1985, CCM Gas filed a motion for reconsideration.MERALCO opposed the motion.
On September 17, 1985, the trial court issued an order, denying CCM Gas motion for reconsideration
as well as MERALCOs claim for damages against the bond.In denying MERALCOs application
against the bond, the trial court said that the injunction bond was intended as a security for damages in
case it was finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.No such finding was
made in this case because the dismissal of the action was for want of jurisdiction.There was no trial;
nor was there a final judgment.
Both parties appealed.On November 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
(a) setting aside the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint;
(b) ordering the trial court to re-issue the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MERALCO from
disconnecting its electric supply to CCM Gas until it furnishes CCM Gas with a statement showing the
basis for computing the purchased power adjustment applicable to CCM Gas;
(c) ordering the trial court to require the parties to reconcile the credits and debits they may have for or
against each other; and
(d) ordering the trial court to hear the case with dispatch.2
CCM Gas contended that the trial court erred in ruling (1) that it had no jurisdiction, (2) that CCM Gas
had no right to inquire into MERALCOs electric billings, and (3) that MERALCO had the absolute
power to disconnect the electric supply to its consumers like CCM Gas.3
With respect to the first ground, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear
the case because what CCM Gas was seeking was for MERALCO to show how it arrived at the
purchased power adjustment.This does not involve an exercise of the Board of Energys power to
regulate and fix power rates imposed by electric companies.
With respect to the second contention, the appellate court sustained the right of CCM Gas to inquire
into MERALCOs electric billing.Any customer has a right to know the basis for the charges he is being
made to pay.MERALCO should have no difficulty complying with its duty because it is presumed to
have the figures in computing the purchased power adjustment in accordance with the formula
approved by the BOE, to wit:4
Adjustment A - P0.1433 x B
per KWH = C x D
Where:
A - Billing of National Power Corp.(NPC) to MERALCO during the supply
month
B - Total kilowatt hour of Electric Power purchased by MERALCO from NPC
during the supply month
C - 1 - Franchise tax rates
D - Kilowatt hours sales affected by the purchased power adjustment during the
supply month.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the question whether the trial court erred in dismissing
MERALCOs application for damages had become moot by virtue of its reversal of the trial courts
decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.The appellate court upheld the issuance by the trial
court of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of CCM Gas.
MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court in its
resolution of December 17, 1991.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.MERALCOs petition
presents the following issues: (1) whether the appeal of CCM Gas should not have been dismissed by
the Court of Appeals considering that, as the trial court found, its order dated April 30, 1985 is final and
executory because the motion for reconsideration was filed one day late, and (2) whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over the case.
With respect to the first issue, we hold that the order of April 30, 1985 did not become final because,
although the motion seeking its reconsideration was filed a day after the expiration of the extension, the
last day, June 23, 1985, fell on a Sunday.Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration could be filed the
next day.5
Nonetheless, it is argued that the trial courts finding that its order dismissing the complaint of CCM
Gas had become final and executory was not assigned by CCM Gas as error in its brief before the
Court of Appeals, with the result that such finding is itself now final.The point raised has no merit.A
judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration. 6 The September
17, 1985 order of the trial court, declaring its April 30, 1985 decision final and executory, has no effect
because in fact CCM Gas filed a timely motion for reconsideration.The timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration prevented the decision of the trial court from attaining finality.
It is noteworthy that MERALCOs contention in the Court of Appeals was that the April 30, 1985 order
of the trial court became final on June 13, 1985, i.e., 15 days after CCM Gas received a copy because,
as held in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.Japson,7 the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.8 What MERALCO is now saying is an entirely
different theory.The change in MERALCOs theory is obviously prompted by the fact that the ruling it
cited was not final and was in fact qualified in the Courts resolution of the motion for reconsideration
which made the ruling effective only on June 30, 1986.9 As the trial courts order in this case granting
extension for the filing of a motion for reconsideration was granted before June 30, 1986, it is clear that
it was not interdicted by the Habaluyas rule.
The petitioner contends that the trial court was right in holding itself to be without jurisdiction because
the complaint alleges that CCM Gas did not only demand a breakdown of MERALCOs bill with
respect to the item on purchased power adjustment but questioned as well the imposition of the
purchased power adjustment which is a matter already decided by the Board of Energy in Case No.80117.
This contention is also without merit.It is almost trite to say that what determines the nature of the
action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. 10
In this case the pertinent allegations in the complaint read:11
6.The due date of the aforesaid statement of account was May 29, 1984 but plaintiff had to withhold its
payment of the same because it did not agree with the purchased power adjustment as the same was
arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same
was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive.That this is so is evident from the fact
that the actual energy consumed by plaintiff was only P51,383.98 and yet the purchased power
adjustment was P213,696.00 or an increase of two hundred forty percent (240%) [sic].
...
8.Plaintiff protested this unilateral and arbitrary notice and as a show of its good faith and willingness
to pay the just and fair value of the actual electric energy it consumed, it paid partially the amount of
P52,684.81 but did not pay the purchased power adjustment for the reasons stated above.Moreover,
plaintiff demanded for an itemization or basis of how defendant arrived at the computation of the
purchased power adjustment but to no avail because defendant unjustifiably and unlawfully refused to
issue the said computation, obviously because it could not justify how it arrived at such computation.A
xerox copy of the receipt is hereto attached as Annex C.
Although in paragraph 6 of its complaint CCM Gas complains of the unilateral and arbitrary imposition
of the purchased power adjustment as having been made without the benefit of any public hearing, it is
clear that what CCM Gas is questioning is not the power of MERALCO to collect the amount but the
manner in which the amount was arrived at in short, the manner the power was exercised.CCM Gas
predicament concerns its inability to understand why, for its consumption worth P51,383.98, it is being
billed P213,696.00 for purchased power adjustment.Hence, its demand for the details of this item in its
electric bill.Thus, in its memorandum filed in the trial court, CCM Gas said:12
As heretofore stated, previous to the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984, plaintiffs oxygen and
acetylene plant was operating below its normal time of operation.Hence, previous to receiving its
electric bill for this period it already made requests and demands for the breakdown and itemization of
its purchased power adjustment for said periods.This fact was also shown by the plaintiff during the
same hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.Defendant MERALCO gave no heed
and disregarded such requests and without notice again imposed and added that questioned purchased
power adjustment of P213,696.00 to its electric bill for the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984.
Such act of the defendant MERALCO, it is submitted, was oppressive and arbitrary.It is illegal and
done without due process.Here is a situation where normally the electricity consumption of the plaintiff
CCM Gas Corporation should go down and decrease.Yet, it did not and it even increased!
Under that situation, is not the plaintiff CCM Gas Corporation entitled to relief from this Honorable
Court for such oppressive and arbitrary imposition of such questioned purchased power adjustment? Is
not such imposition illegal under the premises?
Furthermore, paragraph 6 merely states the reason why CCM Gas withheld payment of its April 22May 22, 1984 electric bill.Paragraph 8 gives the reason why CCM Gas is asking for damages and an
injunction, namely, to seek redress for the unilateral and arbitrary issuance by MERALCO of a notice
of disconnection when it had failed to give the information demanded.
Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the power
rates to be charged by electric companies, but the regular courts power to adjudicate cases involving
violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.As the Court of Appeals held:13
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To our mind, what CCM Gas demanded from Meralco was only the basis upon which the latter had
computed the purchased power adjustment of P213,696.98.As the trial court observed, CCM Gas did
not question the fact that the law (P.D.1206) vests upon the BOE supervision, control and jurisdiction
to regulate and fix power rates; it did not question the fact that the purchased power adjustment was
decided by the Board of Energy in BOE Case No.80-117; and it did not, before the trial court, question
the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE....
Since the trial court concluded that CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power
adjustment in question, but simply to demand a breakdown and itemization on which Meralco had
based the purchased power adjustment amount of P213, 696.98 which it was trying to collect from
CCM Gas, it is clear that the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter
that in any way pertains to BOEs supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power
rates....The question CCM Gas raised before the trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of the
BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and adjudication.[See La Orden de
PP.Benedictinos v.Stiver and Phil.Trust Co., No.L-4568, 93 Phil.341, 344-345 (1953)].Thus, it is the
trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain a civil action such as the case at
bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein.
The right of CCM Gas to be informed concerning an item in its electric bill is undoubted.Revised Order
No.1, 4, which was issued by the then Public Service Commission provides:
Information and assistance to customers.- Each public service shall, upon request, give its customers or
users, all information and assistance pertaining to his service in order that they may secure proper,
efficient and economical service.
In MERALCO v.Court of Appeals,14 this Court said:
One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the
supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people
living in such areas.Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the
exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the
public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged.Thus, the State may regulate, as it has done through
Section 97 of the Revised Order No.1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which
and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a
delinquent customer.
Whether the right of CCM Gas was violated by MERALCO and, in the affirmative, whether CCM Gas
was right in withholding payment are matters which we do not now decide.These questions must be
resolved on the basis of evidence which the parties may present during trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part, related to counsel for one of the parties.
G.R. No. L-61438 June 24, 1983

ERDULFO C. BOISER doing business under the name and style PREMIERE AUTOMATIC
TELEPHONE NETWORK, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., CONRADO HERNANDEZ, ROMAN JUEZAN and WILSON
MORRELL, Respondents.
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GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining
order, to set aside the July 26, 1982 resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals which enjoined the
enforcement of a March 2, 1979 restraining order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The resolution
of the Court of Appeals, in effect, allows the disconnection of telephone communications between
Tagbilaran, Bohol and Mandaue, Cebu thus cutting telephone communications with the rest of the
country and the world, for the duration of the restraining order.
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The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the
province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere
Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and
overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The
arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas
calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other
hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide
relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in
the operation of facilities under the agreement.
On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to
terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system
in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "
Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting
from any disruption of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and
overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil
Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for
injunction and damages.
On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a temporary restraining order against
respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties.
On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the private
respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner and the
private respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and agreed to consider jointly in
said trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order including the propriety
of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was already in the process of winding up its
evidence in Civil Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu when on July 20, 1982, or
nearly three (3) years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order, the
private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the petitioner for
certiorari. CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP.
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The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining
order which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the Mandaue-Tagbilaran
telephone connections. The ground alleged in the petition was:
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING

ORDER, DATED MARCH 2, 1979, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECTMATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED
PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR
COURTS. THE REGULAR COURTS.
As earlier mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its July 26, 1982 resolution which reads:
Without necessarily giving the course to the petition, respondents are directed to file their
Comments (not a motion to dismiss), sufficient in form and substance to constitute an
answer, within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
Meanwhile, the respondents are restrained from enforcing the Order of March 2, 1979, until
further orders from Us.
The hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ. of preliminary injunction is hereby
set on August 10, 1982, ...
Subsequently, the hearing was re-set by the respondent Court of Appeals for September 6, 1982. The
petitioner countered by filing this petition.
The petitioner states that the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, should dismiss CAG.R. No. 14554-SP on the following grounds:
That the respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction or has committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of CA-G.R.
No. 14554-SP; and
That the petition CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP, before respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) is premature and has no legal and factual basis.
The jurisdictional issue raised by Premiere in this petition is tied up to the jurisdictional issue raised by
PLDT on its petition filed with the Court of Appeals.
According to PLDT, the principal issue in dispute is the propriety or validity of the "Circuit
Authorization Order" it issued to its own employees co- respondents Ramon Juezan and Wilson
Morrell regarding the use of its own relay station by petitioner Boiser. PLDT emphasizes, and this is
the main thrust of its case both here and below, that the order which cut off the Tagbilaran-Mandaue
phone connections is an internal transaction and business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely
technical matter pertaining basically to the operation of the communications network of a public utility
corporation. According to PLDT, the CFI of Cebu has arrogated upon itself the authority of supervising
or overseeing the operations of PLDT at its Cebu relay station.
Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with
jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the
interconnection of communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance.
Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the petition before this Court that the CFI of Cebu
acted within its jurisdiction and there being no grave abuse of discretion, the challenge to its
interlocutory order should not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals.
In seeking the dissolution or lifting of the March 2, 1979 CFI restraining order, PLDT stated that the
disconnection it effected was authorized by:
(1) The interconnecting agreement between PLDT and Premiere Automatic Telephone
Network, and
(2) The decision of the Board of Communications dated July 29,1977 in BOC Case No. 7653.
Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides:
Violation of any of the conditions or terms of this Agreement or of the Interconnecting and
traffic Agreement attached hereto shall constitute sufficient cause for the cancellation of
this Agreement and the severance of connection on May (30) days advance notice given in
writing by either party unless such violation creates manifest hazard to life, property or to
facilities of transmission and reception in which event severance may be made without
notice.
Section 2 of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement mentioned in the above Paragraph 13, in turn,
provides:
Sec. 2. If either company defaults in the payment of any amounts hereunder or violates any
other provision of this Agreement, and if such default or violation continues for thirty (30)
days after written notice thereof, the other company may terminate this Agreement
forthwith by written notice.
It may be noted that the above provision mentions a default or violation continuing for thirty days after
written notice and the termination of the agreement by another written notice.
There is nothing in the provision about the period when such written notice should be given by the
party wishing to terminate. Such period can be found in paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting Agreement
quoted earlier. Therefore, even granting that there was default on the part of the petitioner, the 30-day
requisite notice should have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was followed calls for the
presentation of evidence before the proper tribunal.
The second authority for disconnection cited by the private respondents is the decision in BOC Case
No. 76-53. The decision deals with members of PAPTELCO, of which petitioner is one who have
outstanding accounts with PLDT. The BOC decision refers to outstanding accounts of PAPTELCO
members representing PLDT's unremitted shares for domestic long distance and overseas calls. 'me
pertinent provision of the decision is Sec. 3(f) which states that:
In addition to the penalty clause imposed under the preceding paragraph, if any
PAPTELCO member neglects or fails to comply with obligations under this Agreement, its
service may be disconnected by PLDT after sixty (60) days written notice to said
PAPTELCO member, unless its delinquency shall have been fully paid or made current.
It appears clear from the aforecited provision that 60 days prior notice must be given before
disconnection may be effected.
There is, therefore, more than ample basis for the Cebu CFI, now Cebu Regional Trial Court, to assume
jurisdiction and to continue trying Civil Case No. 17867.
The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for
compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral
damages in addition to attorney's fees.
PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of
Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the
Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award
moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to
dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice
provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be
clarified in the civil case for breach of contract.
Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a
purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect
rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.
We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471):

We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service
Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a creature
of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are
expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute'. Filipino Bus Co. vs.
Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.) The functions of the Public Service Commission are
limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly
or by necessary implication conferred upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna, Tayabas Bus
Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046, August 31, 1966, 17
SCRA 111.) As successor in of the Public Service Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for
in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. ...
The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission. The
NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary
implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board of
Communications, "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio
allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for
them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the
courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 769). It cannot be conferred by the will of the
parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon, 62 SCRA 388). The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425.)
The petitioner alleges in its second ground for this petition that the case before the Court of Appeals is
premature and has no legal or factual basis.
The private respondents explain that they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals because the Cebu
CFI had taken an unreasonably long time to resolve the motion to lift its restraining order. PLDT argues
that further delays would be prejudicial and, therefore, the restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals is proper.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu issued its restraining order on March 2, 1979. The motion to lift the
order was filed five months later on August 2, 1979. The motion was properly filed with the trial court,
but the lack of urgency in its filing and the failure of the private respondents to immediately and
vigorously press for the lifting of the restraining order militate against a finding of grave abuse
sufficient to justify a writ of certiorari. The petitioners point out that from the filing of the motion to lift
restraining order on August 2, 1979 up to the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals on July 20, 1982, almost three years lapsed and in all that time, there was no request, motion,
nor hint for the trial court to resolve the pending motion to lift the restraining order.
As stated in Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals (97 SCRA 297, 305):
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all
available remedies must be exhausted. (Plaza v. Mencias, No. I,18253, October 31, 1962, 6
SCRA 563.) Likewise, in a host of case (Aquino v. Estenzo, L-20791, May 19, 1965, citing
Herrera v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 345; Uy Chu v. Imperial, 44 Phil. 27; Amante v. Sison, 60 Phil.
949; Manzanares v. Court of First Instance, 61 Phil. 850; Vicencio v. Sison, 62 Phil. 300,
306; Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez, 81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v. Ibaez, 83 Phil. 104;
Nicolas v. Castillo, 97 Phil. 336; Collector of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 100 Phil. 822;
Ricafort v. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa
Samahang Manggagawa sa San Miguel Brewery v. Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960;
Santos v. Cardeola L-18412, July 31, 1962; Sy It v. Tiangco, L-18376, Feb. 27,1962; Plaza
v. Mencias, L-18253, Oct. 31, 1962), We ruled that before a petition for certiorari in a
higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and
its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be
denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to
decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court
without first giving such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due
deliberation.
Quite the contrary, the private respondents submitted to a trial on the merits and formally agreed that,
in addition to the merits, the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order and the propriety of
the writ of preliminary injunction would be considered and resolved in the trial of the case. The private
respondents agreed that evidence submitted during trial would include evidence on the pending motion.
In fact, the petitioner was already in the process of winding up its evidence before the Court of First
Instance when the private respondents filed their petition with the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents' handling of their case dispels any suspicion of unreasonable delay on the part of
the Court of First Instance to resolve such motion.
The private respondents aver that there are special circumstances which warrant immediate and direct
action of an appellate court. The alleged circumstances include the failure of respondent PLDT to make
full use of its own relay station and the alleged refusal of the petitioner to pay for its use thereby
grievously affecting the expansion and modernization program of the respondent PLDT.
Special circumstances may indeed warrant immediate intervention of a higher court even while the
lower court is deliberating on the action to take on a pending matter. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 768; De Gala-Sison v. Maddela, 67 SCRA 478). The private respondents, however, have failed
to make a showing of such special or exceptional circumstances. We fail to see how closing one relay
station serving the province of Bohol would hasten PLDT's program of national expansion. There are
various other legal remedies, administrative and judicial, available to handle the alleged non-payment
by Premiere of PLDT's share in long distance and overseas calls. The case before the Court of Appeals
is not the proper remedy for enforcing collections from Premiere under the circumstances of this case.
And more important, matters dependent on the presentation of evidence are best handled at the trial
court level.
The private respondents overlook the fact that telephone and telecommunications services are affected
by a high degree of public interest. It is not Premiere alone which win suffer from the appellate
injunction but the people of Bohol. And as far as we can gather from the records, the consumers have
been paying for the services given them. They are not at fault in this controversy between Premiere and
PLDT.
In Republic Telephone Co. V. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (25 SCRA 80), we sustained the
"legalization" of unauthorized services maintained by PLDT for fifteen (15) years instead of ordering
the discontinuance of the telephone system found operating illegally. The reason - public interest would
thus be better served.
In Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (26 SCRA 620) we restated the rule that the
Republic, acting for and in behalf of the Government Telephone System, and the PLDT cannot be
coerced to enter into an interconnecting contract, where the two could not agree on terms. We ruled,
however, that while the Republic may not compel PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic
may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require PLDT to permit
interconnection with the Government Telephone System, as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to payment of just compensation. The justification was, again, the general interest or
public interest.
In Cababa v. Remigio (8 SCRA 50), we sustained the acts of the Public Service Commission under the
principle that while an already established public utility operator must be protected in his investments,
the first consideration is still the protection of public interests and convenience. The question which
ultimately determines issues raised by or against public utilities is what action is for the best interests of
the public?
In the petition now before us, we do not grapple with such issues as legalization of illegal services or
compelling unwilling parties to enter into interconnection of services. We simply rule that pending final
determination of the case before the trial court, the appellate court should refrain from acting on the
petition now before it and from issuing orders that would punish the people of Bohol because Premiere
and PLDT cannot see eye to eye.
The basic policies for the telephone industry embodied in Presidential Decree No. 217 are premised on
the principle that telephone service is a crucial element in the conduct of business activity, efficient
telephone services contribute directly to national development, and telephone services must be made
available at reasonable cost to as many subscribers as possible. Both law and policy considerations can
for the issuance of the prayer for writs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The questioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and our restraining order issued on August 25, 1982
is made PERMANENT. The Intermediate Appellate Court is directed to dismiss the petition in CAG.R. No. 14554.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he
be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec
9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to
dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec.
Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the
Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, Petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, Respondents.
Godofredo
Reyes
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado
Pedro
Ynsua
in
No appearance for other respondents.
for
his
for
respondent
Electoral
own
petitioner.
Commission.
behalf.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO
PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra

quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de
la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6
of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o
antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging ( a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; ( b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and ( c) that the protest
in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to
the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring
the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly
after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
( a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
( b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
( c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted
to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral
Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of
its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
( d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed;
( e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII
of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental
question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
( a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last
day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied
powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry
out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in
adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to
dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a
an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
( b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
( c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created
by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an
"inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
( a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December
9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9,
1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred
upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
( b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission
on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
( c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by
said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within
the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of
prohibition;
( d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to
limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
( e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,

endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,

corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be
article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court;
( g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader
aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment
of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive
in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments
of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard
to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin
and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a
half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2
and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920)
and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional
courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and
authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
chanrobl es
virtual law library
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and
the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and
significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5)
laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive
and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of
three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the
minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which
case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one
each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from
the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art.
121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of
the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific
and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee
modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the
Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and
all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
xxx
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the
first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the
member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to
be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral
Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall
confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the
House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because
he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected?
What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm
their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims - in this
case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there
is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission
unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman
from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared
elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in
question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by
certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly.
The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the
assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there
is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman
from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from
the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the
election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections
are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase
"and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance,
refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest
the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is,
even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided
by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has
power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion

apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros
que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon
en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran
solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment
of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a
la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a
dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa
forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de
la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto
los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by
the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes
of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of
membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each
session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was
to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with
their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the
house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in
substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and

elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute
the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the
members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the
year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons,
as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested.
Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham
election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system,
that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from
whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to
adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher
importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the
house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March,
1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of
controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in
the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice,
but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every
contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of
judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention,
and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they
should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill
which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of
which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house
of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the
remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and
has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord
North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson,
who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that
the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of
parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of
the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court
made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary
Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices
Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo.
5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election
contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried
in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides
that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by
the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland
of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10)
vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court.
For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919
(art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral
Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As
the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a
member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United
States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] - Relentless Partisanship of
Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view
the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission
was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March
4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative.
Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature.
But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution ( Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede
the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within
which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject
at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the
framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated,
but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse
than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part
of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the
Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of
abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must
be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to
it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve
specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of
discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing
the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection
of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise
jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of
equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six
members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated
only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming nonprotested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time
for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly - on the hypothesis that
it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases - had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of
any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As
a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return
of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in
cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England,
the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required
to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or
for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as
circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order
or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed.,
sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in
the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time.
This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members
not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero
vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record - First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs.
Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record - First Period, pp. 1121, 1122;
Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record - First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must
be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus
no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to
have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members.
And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the
medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
( a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory
of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
( b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
( c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
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( d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
( e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific

powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.
( f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
( g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
( h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
( i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
( k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
( l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
( m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO

AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.
FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to
take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who
is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that
the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so
as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before
the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the
first time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in
patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters
connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal
effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge
and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity
as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, Respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT OFFICE. Practice of law in
the Philippines includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto
or
the
enforcement
of
their
rights
in
patent
cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. A member of the bar, because of his legal
knowledge and training should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination
or
other
qualification.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director are
judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are under the law taken
to the Supreme Court.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyers Association that one of the petitioner
Philippine Lawyers Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the
Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction
and
is
in
violation
of
the
law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given
by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasijudicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle
cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent cases before the Patent Office which, as stated
in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than
the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance
with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to
the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also
prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed by Respondent. . . . ."
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Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who may practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic
Act
No.
165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests
or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And
we
have
given
it
careful
thought
and
consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.) , p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) , 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service
Assoc.
(R.
I.)
179
A.
139,
144).
(Emphasis
supplied)
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions of the
Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only
this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and
legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not
be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says
that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was
patented or described in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one
year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides
that the right to the patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or
assigns, and Section 12 says that an application for a patent may be filed only by the inventor, his heirs,
legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent.
Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for
such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation
of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32
provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years
from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant of a license under a particular
patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a
commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentees refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license, purchase, lease or use of
the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a
new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the application of
laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience
for
which
a
member
of
the
bar
has
been
prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent
Law,
Republic
Act
No.
165,
Section
61,
provides
that:
jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph
". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the Director."
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In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head
of
the
Patent
Office.
". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).." . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it
is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions
of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S.
460).
(Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to
hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed
surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of
the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and that the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
"Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered
to
practice
before
the
Patent
Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
x
"(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall
apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner
and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable
service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three
years
in
the
examining
corps
of
the
Patent
Office."
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Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are
of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable
them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and
assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his
office any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to
defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by
advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended
or excluded by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions
and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine." (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section
78,
Republic
Act
No.
165,
for
purposes
of
comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business
in
the
Patent
Office."
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The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take
the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent
on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of
said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more
or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs,
may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with
them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the
Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced
that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right
to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to
compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the
very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional
right
against
self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could
call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against selfincrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party
proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal

by
respondent
Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the

complainants
violates
the
Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a

medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The
Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled
to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee
protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain
silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right
of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine
will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that
the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished
according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded
the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous
crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens.
G.R. No. L-25018
May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,

respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON,
intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately

invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2
Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the
opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real
protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as
doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the
individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v.
Kapunan,5where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft
Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in
this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled
to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
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Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of
Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case7 for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present
as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the
Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled
hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the
Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could
result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he
was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from
compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond,
he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
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On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against
the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitionerappellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available
only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the
matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once
he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the
complainants in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be
allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was
duly filed by them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is
limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power
to compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitionerappellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act
and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the
outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle
announced by us in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an
order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been
filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act,9the complainant requested the investigating committee
that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's
refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of
respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal
case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to
an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of
whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and
his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not
dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an
American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas:
"We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price
for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could
possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and
intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another
American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably
apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be
so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as
a presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice
Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand - with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other
rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the
truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most
heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on
which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical
or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy.
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15
So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it
could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness
of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes,
Dizon,
Makalintal,
Zaldivar,
Teehankee
and
Barredo,
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Sanchez
JJ.,
and
Capistrano,
JJ.,
took
no
concur.
part.

Manila Electric Company, Petitioner, Vs - The Court of Appeals, CCM Gas

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Manila Electric Company, Petitioner, Vs - The Court of Appeals, CCM Gas

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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, CCM GAS

G.R. No. L-61438 June 24, 1983

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

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RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING

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We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471):

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G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

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Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra

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Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

( e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,

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There was no appearance for the other respondents.

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