G.R. No.

208169, October 08, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
EDWARD ADRIANO Y SALES, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the conviction of Edward Adriano y Sales
(Adriano) for the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable
under Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act (CDDA) of 2002, by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a
Decision1 dated 29 October 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05182, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dated 23 August 2011 in "People of the
Philippines v. Edward Adriano y Sales", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16444-D.
The Information
That on or about 25th day of October 2008, in
the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being authorized by
law, sell, deliver, and give away to a poseur
buyer, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of a white
crystalline substance, commonly known as
"shabu" which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of the amount of Two Hundred
Pesos (Php200.00) and in violation of the
above cited law.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged. During the pre-trial conference on 13 July 2009, the
parties stipulated on the following:
1. The identity of the accused as the same person
named in the information;
2. The existence of the specimens and documents
marked as evidence but with a counter-proposal that
the forensic chemist has no personal knowledge as
to the source of the specimen;
3. The qualification of the forensic chemist, P/Sr. Insp.
Yelah Manaog;
4. The existence and due execution of the Physical
Science Report No. D-334-08;
5. The due execution and genuineness of the
FINDINGS on the qualitative examination conducted
on the specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test
for the presence of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug;4
During trial, the prosecution presented Police Officer 1
Teodoro Morales (PO1 Morales), who testified that acting on
a report received from a barangay official and an informant
that Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig
City, Police Chief Inspector Porfirio Calagan formed a team
to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano,

designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking

the buy-bust money consisting of ten PI00.00 bills with the
initials "PC". After briefing, PO1 Morales, together with the
informant and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari
where PO1 Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from
Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money and after
receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, PO1 Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano.
PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano. 5 The
marked money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the
police station for investigation, while the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance, which was marked
with "ESA-251008"6 at the crime scene was brought to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory by PO2
Vergelio Del Rosario, who also prepared the letter-request.7
In the PNP Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory
examination conducted by Police/Senior Inspector Yelah
Manaog confirmed the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.8
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, who
testified that on 22 October 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., he
was at home, putting his nephews and nieces to sleep when
suddenly two (2) armed men barged into the house and
dragged him outside and forcibly took him to the police
station in Taguig City. It was only when they arrived at the
police station when he learned that he was arrested for illegal
sale of shabu.9
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 23 August 2011, the RTC found Adriano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO 1 Morales based
on the presumption that police officers perform their duties in
a regular manner because the defense failed to establish any
ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to at least create
a dent in the prosecution's case. The positive identification of
Adriano as the perpetrator of the crime charged without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of the witness testifying on
the matter, prevails over Adriano's alibi and denial. The
dispositive portion of the decision
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
accused Edward Adriano y Sales is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime, as charged, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP500,000.00).10 x x x x
On appeal, Adriano argued that the shabu allegedly seized
from his possession is inadmissible because of the following
reasons: (1) the warrantless arrest on his person is invalid;
and (2) the arresting officers violated Section 21 of R.A. No.

9165. Adriano asserted that the warrantless arrest was

illegal because there was no reason why the police officers
could not have obtained a judicial warrant before the arrest.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA ruled that the
prosecution established the elements of the crime of illegal
sale of shabu. Even if the prosecution failed to comply with
the requirements provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
such noncompliance did not render the seized items
inadmissible in evidence. Further, the CA rejected the
defense's attempt to debunk PO1 Morales' testimony based
on the defense's failure to substantiate its allegation of illmotive on the part of the arresting officers.
The appeal before us maintained that the lower courts
gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest on the
person of Adriano as illegal and in convicting Adriano
despite the police officers' noncompliance with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165.
We rule in the negative.
Our Ruling
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following two (2) elements must be duly established: (1)
proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.11
In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established the two
(2) elements: (1) to account that the transaction or sale
indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a
clear and direct manner; and (2) the seized illegal drugs and
marked money were presented before the trial court as proof
of the identity of the object of the crime and of the corpus
delicti.12
The argument on the arresting officers' noncompliance with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 deals with the procedure for the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized or
surrendered dangerous drugs. The law
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial

custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;chanrobleslaw
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;chanrobleslaw
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall
be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not
allow the completion of testing within the time
frame, a partial laboratory examination report
shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twentyfour (24) hours;

However, it has been repeatedly noted by the Court, the

Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer some measure of
flexibility through the proviso, "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items". Otherwise stated, non-compliance does not
invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the accused
illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, the Implementing Rules allow the
prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the
seized item, which in this case, has been duly established by
the prosecution. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded

authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or

controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.13 details of the
unbroken chain of custody as found by the
CA:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The first link in the chain of custody is from the
time PO1 Morales took possession of the
plastic sachet of shabu from accused-appellant
and marked the same with the initials "EAS", to
the time the plastic sachet of shabu was
brought to the Police Station. The Certificate of
Inventory for the items seized from accusedappellant was signed by PO1 Morales, PO2
Ronnie Fabroa, and the accused-appellant.
The second link in the chain of custody is from
the time the plastic sachet of shabu was
brought from the Police Station, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. A letter-request was made
for the laboratory examination of the contents of
the plastic sachet of shabu seized from
accused-appellant. The letter-request, and
plastic sachet of shabu, were delivered to the
PNP Crime Laboratory by PO2 Del Rosario. Per
Chemistry Report No. D-334-08 prepared by
Police Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog, the
contents of the plastic sachet tested positive for
shabu.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Thus, despite the arresting officers' failure to strictly observe

the requirements of Section 21 on the custody and
disposition of the seized items, the violation of the CDDA of
2002 was duly proven. The arresting officers duly recorded
the movements and custody of the seized items from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, the defense's
contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a
search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is
misplaced. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three (3)
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;chanrobleslaw
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested

pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may
be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
In the case at bar, Adriano was caught in the act of
committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano
was caught selling illegal shabu through a buy-bust
operation, within the plain view of the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the
violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized but dutybound to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime."15 In People v. Agulay,16 we
discussed buy-bust operation as a form of a valid and
effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. If carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a
buy-bust operation deserves judicial
sanction.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of

regularity in the performance of their official duties. The
presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. However, in the case at bar, the defense failed to
present any proof to substantiate its imputation of ill-motive
on the part of the arresting officers. Contrarily, the
prosecution duly proved the existence of the two elements of
the crime of illegal sale of shabu and established the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items. The presumption
of regularity in favor of the arresting officers prevails.
WHEREFORE, we find no cogent reason to reverse the
finding of the lower court which found Edward Adriano y
Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
sale of shabu. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Court
of Appeal's decision in "People of the Philippines v. Edward
Adriano y Sales", docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05182
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182601

November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL

GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court challenging the decision 1 dated
January 21, 2008 and the resolution 2 dated April 17, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon
City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel
Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners)
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well
as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at
around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between
the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso)
at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City
where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6
(Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident. 4 Acting
on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ
Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02
Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation
personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman
Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who
mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to
Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners
stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners
were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously commence the commission of the crime of

Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed
weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder
by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able
to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the ground that they
had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no
personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the
crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the
police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should
have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the
petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the
CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word
"invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier
carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer
clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the
mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the
arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus,
the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the
order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and
the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that
the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial
of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008; 18
hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE
VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE
LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE
MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND
THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully
arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the
police station only as a response to the arresting officers'
invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which
actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest
took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2)
hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime
scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that
the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC
Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners
should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners
filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is
very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay
the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has
been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than
compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities
surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the
proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the
bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and
the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace
their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the
Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir
Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by
King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor,
England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown
to proclaim certain liberties 26 under the feudal vassals'
threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the
Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational
component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29
of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we
not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder, 31 the United States Supreme
Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit
arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but
only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest,
it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have
acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court
based these rulings on the common law of America and
England that, according to the Court, were not different from
the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified
warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws
then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson 36 that
Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila,
defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a
warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that
in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local
ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as
those of the officers established under the common law of
England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that
the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common
sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest
found support under the then Administrative Code 41 which
directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza, 42 the Court applied Rules
27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken

from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated
in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the
requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in
Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b)
the provision applicable in the present case. This provision
has undergone changes through the years not just in its
phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine
the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully
understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on
American and English common law principle on warrantless
arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In
Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law
for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain,
or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is
reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be
the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to
arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions
of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code
provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code

provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his
antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant
the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply,
however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the
satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and
who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever
summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the
preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal
complaint has been filed against him, provided the following
circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to
believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been
committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to
believe that the person arrested participated in the
commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of
the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials,
including police officers may, within the territory defined in
the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found
in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed,
or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston, 47 which ruled
that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street
at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the
commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony
having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must
justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a
warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in
believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable
ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the
peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned
out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the
1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting
officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually
committed. What was necessary was the presence of
reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established
under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable
suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which,
the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting
officer may be held liable for its breach.48

In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the

warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which
aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our
Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge
for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was
committed and the person sought to be arrested has
participated in its commission. This principle left so much
discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of
the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6,
Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113
of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964
Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to
the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was
not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a
crime has been committed and whether the person to be
arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the
Rules required that there should be actual commission of an
offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense."
Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination
of whether the person to be arrested has committed the
offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court
restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless
arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of

Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again
underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and renumbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964
Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should not
only have been "committed" but should have been "just
committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for
conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
information indicating that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the
word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless
arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the
following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person
sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to
be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal

knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be

arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the
previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as
to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize
arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements
separately below, starting with the element of probable
cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just
been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or
the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on
the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge,
for purposes of determining whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless
arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not
prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must
be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, 53 the
warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act
of violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v.
United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the
circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be
made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at
the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term
probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting
officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise
reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the
factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are
not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The
probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is
based on information that the arresting officer possesses at
the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired
later.56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is

the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to
the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon
which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic
question to be determined in each case in light of the
particular circumstances and the particular offense
involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely
on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences
therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does
not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to
arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably
trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus,
the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a
witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances,
the arresting officer need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable
cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., 59 the Court held that personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from
probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial
proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for triat. 60 In Buchanan v. Viuda
de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence
of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of
probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based
on the submitted documents of the complainant, the
respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be

arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be
satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage
of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause 63 to
issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances
pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an actual belief or
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining
"probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without
a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for
trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor
and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the
spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance
within their possession. In short, although these officers use
the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the
rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the
arresting officer should base his determination of probable
cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of
more limited facts, evidence or available information that he
must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent
limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless

arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these

instances. The Court held that one should not expect too
much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to
exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes,
he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must
act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the
criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these
two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were
usually taken together in the Court's determination of the
validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis
Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on
December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the
NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification
of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the
commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be
said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the
warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, 69 one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a
member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon
receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field.
Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest
was the information from a third person. It cannot be also
said in this case that there was certainty as regards the
commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the
requirement that an offense has just been committed means
that there must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply
with these requirements because he was arrested only a day
after the commission of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not
present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime.
Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed the offense.
They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1)

day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful
arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days
after the commission of the crime was held invalid because
the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the
"arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot
the victim. The information upon which the police acted
came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in the name
of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute
"personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was
done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the
arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally
gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the
accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only
about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him.
The warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came
immediately after the arresting officers received information
from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal
knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the
information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to
Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.
The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen
who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the
victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the
assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held
that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal
knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating
that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless
arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a
jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the
report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing
his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When
the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different
directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police
concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the
arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the
authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the
place, they met with the complainants who initiated the
report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the

victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby

area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on
the reported statements of the complainants, he was
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed.
Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting
incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a
certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III,
who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the
place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and
when he found him, he informed him of the incident report.
P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the
police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved
in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria
caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle
beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They
also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The
police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita
III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that
the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances.
According to the Black's Law Dictionary, 80 "circumstances
are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the
police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he
could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the
gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element

of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances

should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered
the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited
time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would
have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the
time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to
become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the
element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily
be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the
requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating
these facts of circumstances before the police officer could
effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that
the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:
1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts
and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies
the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of
compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of
the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question
to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with,
namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they
were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the
time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet
and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of
Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in
the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA
because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision. 81
From a review of the records, we conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
upon which they had properly determined probable cause in

effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We

note, however, that the determination of the facts in the
present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on
the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter 82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on
February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was
committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation
at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated
that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on
February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit,
Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at
4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already
inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took
place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of
the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place
two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is
unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty.
Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the
crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that
Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although
they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty.
Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the
Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue
Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The
medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about
8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following
findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion,
T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left
eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right
forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on
area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral
area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending
physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of
contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic
conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the
crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged
mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the
alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso
positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty.
Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers
gathered and which they have personally observed less than
one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of

the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we

deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were
well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police
officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry
bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the
petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however,
instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog,
Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the
police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present
case even admitted to have been involved in the incident
with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of
what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless
arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the
police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the
police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination
of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident
occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the
arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance
to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners'
argument that the police officers did not have personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police
immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed.1wphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed
under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly
the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal
circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot
investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless
arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was
appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest,

the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely
academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93
SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the
petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier
did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple
directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station
would produce a similar effect. In other words, the
application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the
attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of
the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators,
the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by
the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection
with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had
informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the
charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack
the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for
regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been
issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states
that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of
the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from
lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy
disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of
discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is
not required to state all the facts found in the record of the
case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is
best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that
it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion,
the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the

reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the

proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this
case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners'
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21,
2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of
Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the
criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200334

July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentAppellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects
through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to
allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail
themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise
with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent
than real. Often, the compromise is there because law
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to
uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this
scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The
police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts
that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accuseds whereabouts was sent
through a text message. The accusedwho never acted
suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the accused having
been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable
search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and
frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was
not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper
pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should
be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence,
the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of
November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan
(PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer" 2 that one Marvin Buya (also
known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" 3
from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the
suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to
set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from
San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled
to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the

two male passengers who were later identified as Victor

RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9 Cogaed was
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the
contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. 13
Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen,
kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is
a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." 14 "SPO1
Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought
them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still
carrying their respective bags"16 inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and
Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested
Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds
sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick
of suspected marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for
laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the
suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 22
Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects
obtained were indeed marijuana. 23 The marijuana collected
from Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed
4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag
weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams
werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos bags. 27
According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at
Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him" 28
to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. 29
He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. 31
Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying his
things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." 32
Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the
market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached
them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was
inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. 34
SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed
was not privy to their conversation. 35 Thereafter, SPO1
Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to
the police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the
parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended. 37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit

[him] on the head."38 The bags were also opened, but

Cogaed never knew what was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana
when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 40 The
information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the
Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO
DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their
control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen
thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6)
grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of
San Fernando City, La Union. 42 Cogaed and Dayao
pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against
Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and
was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. 44 Trial
against Cogaed ensued. In a decision 45 dated May 21,
2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y
Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to
pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal
considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that
hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just
alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest." 47 Since the
arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be
considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived
his right to object to such irregularity" 49 when "he did not
protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself,
asked him to open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial
courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when
"[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]

voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his
appellants brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING
THE
RESULT
OF
AN
UNLAWFUL
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY
AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether
there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against
the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the
search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was
enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a
discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of
custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by
implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One
of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue
except
upon
probable
cause
to
be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and
diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable."
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that
meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.
This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that
can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of
probable cause must be established by the judge after
asking searching questions and answers. 57 Probable cause
at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of
the place and the things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable
even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court,
searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without
a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the
"uniqueness of circumstances involved including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential
instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures
are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and
(Citations omitted)

emergency

circumstances. 62

III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is
"stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused
with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a
crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person
arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well
as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted
to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the
search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 65 was similar "to a
stop and frisk situation whose object is either to determine

the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the

status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information."66 This court stated that the "stop
and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a
search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and
frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements
of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terrysearches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That
is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent
the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present
in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself
in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe
police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on
facts that they themselves observe whether an individual
is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion
of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 69 the police officers were
initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing
drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying
manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided
the police officers.72 These observations led the police
officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs. 73
These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to
stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who
appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." 77 Upon seeing the
police, the man fled. 78 His flight added to the suspicion. 79
After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
"homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled
that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first." 82
This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with
reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on
their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear
is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney.

There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about

riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police
that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac
himself:
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still
being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the
accused, did you have reason to believe that the accused
were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not
have been identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would
lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The
police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. 85
Anything less than this would be an infringementupon ones
basic right to security of ones person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law
enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 86 one of
the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe
suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a
reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement
further. It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot
be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason" 91 to

serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, 94 Justice Bersamin
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of
more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity."96 The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case,
and there was no approximation for the probable cause
requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched
was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person
searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be
shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with
the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves
the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows
"stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v.
Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio
City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers
prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling

Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they

alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107 The
bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant
that prompted the police to apprehend her. 111 The evidence
obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the
jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v.
Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation
(NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody
possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to
arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking
from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected
Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be
marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand
seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same
circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving
information that the accused was distributing drugs in
"different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One night, the
police received information that thisdrug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the
hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked
at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man alighted from
his car.126 He was carrying a juice box. 127 The police
immediately apprehended him and discovered live
ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he
was holding.128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or
suspicious about Chuas situation when the police
apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstopand-frisk."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to
allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do
not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful
arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested

has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant
of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest
was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not
committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur:
(1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of
the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in
possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence,
he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless
arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional
rights even if we assume that he did not object when the
police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously
stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity
given
under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 132
(Citations omitted) Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive
objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into
his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the
burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is
one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.
In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the
police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of
SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them
what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just
opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open
the bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked
them what were the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen
any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation
from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they
were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1
Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I
observed that he was somewhat frightened.1wphi1 He was
a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping
down and he put down the bag I asked him, "whats that,"
and he answered, "I dont know because Marvin only asked
me to carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional
right, it is not sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself
or herself, or be known as a police officer.1wphi1 The police
officer must also inform the person to be searched that any
inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his
or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this
clearly and in a language known to the person who is about
to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be
anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a
persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision

originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. 136 This rule prohibits

the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones
person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed
were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of
the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence
left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the
fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be
equipped with the resources to be able to perform their
duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise
our societys fundamental values enshrined in our
Constitution.
Otherwise,
we
will
be
seen
as
slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we
seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204589

November 19, 2014

RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision 1 and the
November 20, 2012 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy
Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch
20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation of Section 11,
Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to
fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO
ORDERED.4
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information, 5 dated
March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10745-03. The accusatory portion of the
Information indicting Sanchez reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the
Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the
defense stipulated on the existence and due execution of the
following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory
examination; 2]certification issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4]
transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent
plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.6 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)in its Comment 7 on
the petition is as follows:
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the
information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang," was selling

drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with

CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU
Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B,
Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to,
and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes,
they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out
of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching
up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that
they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of
the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1
Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which
contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy
and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the
police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist
from the NBI, submitted a Certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1
Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite
submitted to this office for laboratory examinations the
following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic
sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic pack, marked
"Mar. 19, 2003." (net wt. = 0.1017 gm)
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned
specimen/s
gave
POSITIVE
RESULTS
for
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY
SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of
filing the case.8
Version of the Defense
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation
against him and presented a different version of the events
that transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to
substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the
witness stand. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he, together with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on
their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they
transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by
four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a
word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He protested and
asked what offense did they commit. The arresting officers
told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He
reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there
but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to
the Imus Police Station where hewas further investigated.
The police officer, however, let DarwinReyes go. On cross-

examination, the accused admitted that it was the first time

that he saw the police officers at the time he was arrested.
He also disclosed that he was previously charged with the
same offense before Branch 90 of this court which was
already dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in
the said case are not the same as those involved in this
case.10
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision 11 finding
that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual
possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had
reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in
possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion
was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying
was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta
(SPO1 Amposta) because there was no showing that he had
been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against
Sanchez. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to
fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO
ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction
before the CA. He faulted the RTC for giving undue weight
on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the
said arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution
evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the
findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and,
thus, upheld the conviction of the accused for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA,
there was probable cause for the police officers to believe
that Sanchez was then and there committing a crime
considering that he was seen leaving the residence of a
notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they
received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It
concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the
subject narcotic from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid
search. The CA then went on to write that non-compliance by
the police officers on the requirements of Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the
conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was
not fatal to the prosecutions causesince its integrity and
evidentiary value had been duly preserved. The falloof the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order
dated October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10745-03
finding accused appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25,
2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November
20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition
for "certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD
THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO, HENCE,A SEARCH WARRANT WAS
NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH
DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD
THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21,
PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER
THE
SEIZED
ITEMS
INADMISSIBLE
IN
EVIDENCE.14
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the
warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the
absence of probable cause on the part of the police officers
to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of
the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item
inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on
his guilt. By way of Comment 15 to the petition, the OSG
prays for the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012
decision of the CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless
search and seizure of the subject narcotic were justified
under the plain view doctrine where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Courts Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from
procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the proper remedy to question the CA judgment,final
order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for
review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. 16 By filing a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez
therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under

Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the

interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition
was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. 17 The
case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence,
there is ample justification to treat this petition for certiorari
as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the
nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought. 18
Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion,"
the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition
for review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds
the same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule,
however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule
that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not
finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative,
denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the
declarants in the course of their testimonies. But an
exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.19 After going over the records of the case
at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and
substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the guilt of
Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated
that this was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest
under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by
the police officers qualifies as a valid search following a
lawful operation by the police officers. The law enforcers
acted on the directive of their superior based on an
information that the owner of the residence where Sanchez
came from was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was
seen leaving the said residence, the law enforcers had
probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was
already a tip that illegal drug-related activities were
perpetrated in the place where he came from and seeing a
match box held on one hand, the police officers action were
justified to inspect the same. The search therefore, is a
sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated drug,
arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3,
1999) is instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue
of an information that a person having been previously
described by the informant, accosted Valdez and upon
inspection of the bag he was carrying, the police officers

found the information given to them to be true as it yielded

marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug and lunch box
inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial
courts ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.1wphi1 A crime
was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow
a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true
that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant
when the search was conducted over the personal effects of
appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police
officer to believe that appellant was then and there
committing a crime. The cited case is akin to the
circumstances in the instant appeal as in this case, Sanchez,
coming from the house of the identified drug dealer,
previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked
tricycle and sped towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The
search that gave way to the seizure of the match box
containing shabu was a reasonable course of event that led
to the valid warrantless arrest since there was sufficient
probable cause for chasing the tricycle he was in.
(Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search
incidental to a lawful arrest withthe stop-and-frisk principle, a
wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it
did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the
confused view that one and the other were indistinct and
identical. That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm
the petitioner's conviction. The Court must clear this
confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the
Terry20 stop- and-frisk search is entirely different from and
should not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful
arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear
in Malacat v. Court of Appeals21:
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext
for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope

of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

A: Our superior gave us the information that there were

tricycle drivers buying drugs from "Intang" or Jacinta
Marciano.

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes

unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment x x x x.

Q: What did you do after that?

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause

is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stopand-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer. 22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delictoarrest nor
the stop- and-frisk principle was applicableto justify the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police
operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual
backdrop of this case shows that the search and seizure on
Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas
testimony on direct examination is revelatory, viz:
Pros. Villarin:
Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall
where were you?
A: Yes, Mam.
Q: Where were you? A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus,
Cavite.
Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite? A: We
were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
Q: Who were with you? A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU
Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
Monzon.
Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?

A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta

Marciano.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of "Intang"
and when the passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d]
them.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver
and the passenger alighted from the tricycle.
Q: What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?
A: I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q: What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a
match box?
A: I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q: Did he allow you?
A: Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
A: The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q: After that what did you find out?
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a
small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance.23
A search as an incident to a lawfularrest is sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires
that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of
a person and his belongings; the process cannot be
reversed.25
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was
no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined
under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking
of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same
rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody
of the person making the arrest. 26 Even casting aside the
petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on
the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was
effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez
before conducting the search on him. It appears from the
above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they

caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger,

Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a
match box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see
the contents of the match box, to which the petitioner
acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez
was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the
shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this
case was that a search was first undertaken and then later
an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by
the search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before
the search, still the warrantless search and seizure must be
struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest was
unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actuallly committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
xxx
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in
flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the
arresting officer.27 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
apprehended has committed it. These elements would be
lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act
could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives
leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding
a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit,
Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal
acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or

strange acts, or at the veryleast appeared suspicious, the

same would not have been considered overt acts in order for
the police officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions
set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied
with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers
chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to
believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug
dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he
boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held to signify
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. 28 The police officers in this
case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did
inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere
in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer
was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house
so as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable
suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her
and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the
house. In other words, there was no overt manifestation on
the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal
activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause
in thiscase was more imagined than real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk"
search in the case at bench. Elucidating on what constitutes
"stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the
Court in People v. Chua29 wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine
reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-andfrisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In
Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 31 a policeman
chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen
and when approached and asked what he was holding in his
hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had
sufficient reason to accost Manalili to determine if he was
actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations,

coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable
reason for the police to stop and frisk the accused after
considering the following circumstances: the drunken
actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that
his companions fled whenthey saw the policemen; and the
fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming
the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these
examples isthe presence of more than one seemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. It was not so in the
case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances
described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a
reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk
search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug
pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not
give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police
officer of any belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or
that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of
the officer. There was even no allegation that Sanchez left
the house of the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any
other suspicious manner. There was no showing either that
he tried toevade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he
attempted to flee when the police officers approached him.
Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not
have engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of
the police officers that a criminal activity had taken place or
was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single
suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the
accused, the Court ruled that the questioned act of the police
officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation.
Cogaed was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a
sack and travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any
unusual or suspicious behavior sufficient to justify the law
enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal
activity. Worse, the assessment of suspicion was made not
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled
to the police officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of
the illegality of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of
marijuana confiscated from the accused was held as
inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu
from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court
disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a

particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain

view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily
apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does notfall
within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally
arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently
discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight.
Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box
being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had
to demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in
order for him to open it and examine its content. The shabu
was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite
search warrant is in violation of the law and the Constitution.
In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless
arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu
purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the accused must be acquitted and exonerated
from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu
allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item
presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes that
there wereseveral lapses in the law enforcers handling of
the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the
standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction.36 The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are
removed.37 Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a
two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and
every link in the chain of custody of the shabu, from the
moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it was
presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The
testimony of SPO 1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he
placed the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he
and the three other police officers brought Sanchez and the
subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their
investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose
where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and
who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in
possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the
police station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20,
2003, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that

a certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the

NBI for laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence
does not establish the identity of the police investigator to
whom SPO 1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized
shabu. The identities of the person who received the
specimen at the NBI laboratory and the person who had the
custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was
chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were
also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious
uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that
the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution
failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in
rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to
doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence
cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the
November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the
immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being
lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the
date of his release, or reason for his continued confinement,
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196005

October 1, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR
PIMENTEL, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the Decision 1 dated 22 October 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming
with modification the Joint Decision 2 dated 3 November
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U10054, and U-10055.
The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista
(Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in
conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and
for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE
LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO
DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN
PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the
BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation
and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with
one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm
JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him multiple fatal
gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter,
accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294. 3 The Information in
Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE
LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO
DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a.
Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the
BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed

firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation

and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with
one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN
BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot
wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.4
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR
PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of
carnapping committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP
Compound, Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their
escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to gain,
conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1)
Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to
Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without the latters knowledge and
consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle.
CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended.5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer
(JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon
Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto
Gancea, Dionisio Badua, Police Senior Inspector Philip
Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes,
SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres,
Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland
Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin
Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban,
SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9
March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1
Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada
(JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching area near
the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned
inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua
the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open
all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa
regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day.
While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the
telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada
ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to answer
the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the

basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head

towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the
shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the
latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor
for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1
Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to
fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1
Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from
JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada
returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2
Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After
seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main
gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and
Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number
CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the
lattersknowledge and consent. They picked up Federico
Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw
jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When they
reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned
turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a
cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and
arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of
JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the death was caused by
shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right
lung. Dr. Parayno also testified that based on the injuries
sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting
was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body
of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the death was caused
by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that
damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldads Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2
Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and ordered him to
clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he
was told to fix a vehicle parked inside the jail compound. He
needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find
the jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in
the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2
Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back
with Badua, JO2 Gamboa handed Badua the key of the jail
compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad
continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle,
Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the other inmates
playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and
Mejia went to retrieve it.

Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa

hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired towards the nipa hut.
Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He
peeped through the windows and saw Mejia pointing a
firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard
the exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He
went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for help
to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the
people pushing it dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he
followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the
main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun
towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he
needed the latter to go with him. Fieldad, along with other
inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a
Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal pointed a long firearm
toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle.
Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they
picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentels Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel
was allowed to go out of his cell. He proceeded to the
basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three
gunshots, but did not immediately mind it because he was
used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he
saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2
Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the jailcompound.
He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange
of fire. Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and
motioned to the latter by pointing his armalite downward
several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him
to remove the stone blocking the tire of the jeep parked near
the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep
because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove
the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were.
Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered
everyone to alight from the jeep, and to board the other
vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornistas Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00
and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning the jail compound.
He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid
gunfires followed by consecutive gunfires coming from the
direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal
and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2
Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards
lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened
main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail
compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and Pimentel board
the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if
he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the
jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the
way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered

Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the

other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it
turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius
Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual
damages and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning
capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico
Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben
Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius
Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual
damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning
capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico
Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben
Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie
Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of CARNAPPING and each is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND
EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO
MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of
Php15,000.00 and moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan
and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and
Pimentel since Chan had died. 7 They assigned the following

errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE
TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING
CONSPIRACY
AND
TREACHERY IN THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF
JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN
BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY
OF THE ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT
THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING
THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS TESTIMONIES.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court
only with respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into
account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalties of
imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case
Nos. U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the penalties of
reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista
acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between
right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of
his acts."10 The Court of Appeals enumerated the following
acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with
Bacolor and hitting the latters head clearly demonstrated his
discernment. He took advantage of the situation where

Fieldad was also grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the

head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would weaken
the latters defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys
from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate
clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus
established discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted
with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.11

In the case of People v. Tabaco, 21 treachery was

appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one of
whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and
order. They were attending an event where many armed
peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In
that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and
had no means of defending themselves against the sudden
attack.

Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of

Appeals decision. In the interim, Cornistafiled a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court
granted in a Resolution 13 dated 15 August 2011. The case
became final and executory as to Cornista on 5 October
2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and
Pimentel only.

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were
not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without
warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of
the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as
he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with
Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock
him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot
JO1 Bacolor.

Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs 15

filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs
in this case.16
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail
guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves
from danger and to maintain peace and order within the
compound."17 This argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might take. 18
In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police
officer was killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also
be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger
to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe
time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar,
the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on
the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on the right breast,
one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with
handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then
shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim
was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range,
thus insuring his death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)

Fieldads Identity was Established

According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him
as a participant in the killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2
Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not
established. However, contrary to his contention, Fieldads
identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was
proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the
testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and
recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?
A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic)
the guards used to take a bath there were persons grappling
possession of the armalite, sir.
Q With whom?
A Charlie and Cornista, sir.
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and
brought the water to the place where (sic) the guards used to
take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with
whom?
A Bacolor, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him, you step down?
A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand
(sic) with accused and who when asked his name he
answered Felmer Fieldad).
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Yes, sir.
COURT

Do you know Charlie?

A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)

A Yes, sir.

It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of

witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination.23 Positive
identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than
the bare denial and explanation by the accused.24

Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?
A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie
Fieldad).
COURT
Warden what is the name?
BJMP WARDEN JACABAN
Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when
asked his name he answered Ryan Cornista).
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista
grappling possession of the armalite of Jail Guard Bacolor?
A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
A Cornista, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back
of his head?
A Bacolor fell down, sir.
xxxx
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?
A He fell down, sir.
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?
A They got his gun, sir.
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
A Charlie, sir.
COURT
What kind of firearm?
A 9 MM, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?

In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads selfserving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult
to disprove.25 True, the conviction of an accused must rest
not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence
has firmly established the guilt of accused beyondreasonable
doubt, conviction is in order.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is
corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A careful
examination of the record reveals that the following evidence
establish Fieldads active participation in the conspiracy to
kill the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with
Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of the latters armalite gun, and JO1
Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him at back
of the head;26
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2
Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and
usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;27
3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who
conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor, testified that
because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim
may have been preceded by a fight between the
victim and the shooter;28
4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad
confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut
before heading out the main gate;29
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with
Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but moments
before the gun shots rang;30
6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the
paraffin casts31 of the hands of Fieldad;32 and
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid
testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldads
hands was positive for the presence of gun powder
nitrates,33 as contained in her report.34 In addition,
Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We
note that Fieldads counsel manifested duringtrial
that the paraffin casting was performed without the
assistance of counsel, contrary to the right of the

accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the

prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test
results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3 March
2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does
not violate the right of the accused against self
incrimination. In People v. Gamboa, 37 we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to
he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it
was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is
afforded to any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense whose confession or admission
may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain
silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated
by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This
constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion
and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be
examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved
positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of
evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. 38
(Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and
established by the acts of the accused themselves when
said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. 40 Once conspiracy is
shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before,
during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and
Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and
design in the commission of the felonies. The positive
testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of
circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion
than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder
the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for
parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court
correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of each
deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of
exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00.41
Exemplary damages are recoverable due to the presence of
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crimes.42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in
connection with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1

Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45,

respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and
P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor,
respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the
formula
Net earning
capacity =

{2/3 x [80 age at the time of

death] x [gross
annual income reasonable
and necessary living
expenses]}43

However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court

computed the net earning capacity using the monthlyincome.
Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive
at the amounts of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and
P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.44 The elements of the crime of carnapping are
that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the
vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof,
or it was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.45
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both
appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep
and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle,
BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not consent to the
taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner,
Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for being hearsay
because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was
missing.
Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal
knowledge that when he arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep
was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he
had to retrieve it from Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was
parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
xxxx
COURT
What is the description of your tamaraw?
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?

A Red, sir.
Q Plate number?
A CDY 255, sir.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
A In my name, sir.
Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep
was in Bactad?
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to
buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
COURT
Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera: 47
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus,
the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants
claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to
facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 49 For
such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. 50 A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a
character asto leave no opportunity to escape or selfdefense in equal combat.52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In

the first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad

voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep
was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board
Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer
vehicles. In addition, according to appellants testimonies,
only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court
ofAppeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who
boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily
overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to.
Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent
danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to
escape individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape,
accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable.53
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstance. 54 The
circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any way
their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the
circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight
from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to
take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a
special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the
special law, and the minimum term not be less than the
minimum prescribed.55 Hence, the penalty imposed by the
trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight
months to sixteen years and two months is in order.

The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of

P15,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal
or moral damages may be adjudicated. 56 Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 57
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury.58
The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order.
However, we delete the award of moral damages since there
was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, or any similar injury.
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder
cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the
amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.59
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated
22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November
2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal
Case No. U-10053 is increased to P30,000.00; 3.
The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case
No. U-10054 is increased to P30,000.00; 4. The
amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity
awarded to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal
Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;
5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning
capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor in
Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to
P2,142,000.00;
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case
No. U-10055 is deleted; and
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170046

December 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., BURT B. FAVORITO,
FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q. QUARTO, AGERICO
C. PALAYPAY, NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO C.
PLANTA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY,
NORMA A. VILLARMINO, RICARDO M. JUAN, JR.,
NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ, MELISSA T.
ESPINA, VIOLETA R. TADEO, JESSICA J. CATIBAYAN,
VIOLETA C. AMAR, RON ALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE
A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N.
DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG, JESUS D.
CAPUZ, RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NO
NETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V.
EDEM, .AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR.,
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions dated January 20, 20051 and October 12,
20052 of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case No. 27969
dismissing the same for lack of probable cause for the crime
of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
charges against respondents. The factual antecedents
follow.
On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Simeon Datumanong,
issuedDepartment Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a
committee for the purpose of investigating alleged anomalies
and illegal disbursements in connection with the repair of
DPWH-owned motor vehicles and equipment. 3 As a result of
the investigation, it was discovered thatduring the period of
March 2001 to December 2001, the emergency repairs
conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved and
paid for by the government, did not actually take place,
resulting in the loss of about One Hundred Thirty-Nine Million
Pesos (P139,000,000.00).4
On August 7, 2002, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal
Audit Service of the DPWH and member of the committee,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint
for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019, as amended, in relation to Sections 20 and 9 of the
General and Special Provisions, respectively, of the General
Appropriations Act, Memorandum of the Secretary on the
Guidelines on Purchases of Spare Parts and Repair of
Vehicles dated July 19, 1997, Department Order No. 33,
Series of1988 of RA 6770, as amended by RA No. 3018,
COA Circular 85-55 A, Seriesof 1985, COA Circular 76-412,
Series of 1976 on splitting of RSE, PO, vouchers and
payrolls, against the several officials/employees of the
DPWH, including respondents herein. 5
On March 1, 2004, the Special Prosecution Officer,

Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office of the Special

Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, filed an
Information6 with respondent Sandiganbayan accusing
Maximo A. Borje, Jr., Burt B. Favorito, Florendo B. Arias,
Erdito Q. Quarto, Agerico C. Palaypay, Napoleon S. Anas,
Danilo C. Planta, Luisito S. Dela Rosa, Rogelio L. Beray,
Norma A. Villarmino, Ricardo M. Juan, Jr., Nelson Umali,
Maria Luisa T. Cruz, Melissa T.Espina, Violeta R. Tadeo,
Jessica J. Catibayan, Violeta C. Amar, Ronaldo G.
Simbahan, Felipe A. San Jose, Rolando C. Castillo,
Conchita N. Dela Cruz, Janette A. Bugayong, Jesus D.
Capuz, Rodellia D. Uy, Romeo C. Fullido,Nonette H. Fullido,
Victoria M. Go, Carmelito V. Edem, Augusto C. Capuz,
Vicente Santos, Jr., of the crime of Plunder defined and
penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended, committed as
follows:
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y
AQUINO, a public officer, being then the Chief of the
Motorpool Section of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, Port Area, Manila, by himself and in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused BURT
FAVORITO y BARBA, FLORENDO ARIAS y BUAG,
ERDITO QUARTO y QUIAOT, AGERICO PALAYPAY y
CORTES, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, DANILO
PLANTA y CALUYA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO
BERAY y LAGANGA, NORMA VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI,
RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA
CRUZ y TALAO, MELISSA ESPINA y TANGPUZ, VIOLETA
TADEO y RAGASA,JESSICA CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL,
VIOLETA AMAR y CASTILLO, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN,
FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, and
JOHN DOESand JANE DOES, who are his officemates
being likewise officials and employees of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), two of whom are high
ranking public officers, namely: BURT FAVORITO y BARBA,
Director III, Administrative and Manpower Management
Services [Salary Grade 27] and FLORENDO ARIAS y
BUAG, Assistant Director, Bureau of Equipment [Salary
Grade 27], and in further connivance/conspiracy with his
other coaccused private individuals engaged inthe business
of motor vehicle and spare parts supply, namely:
CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A. BUGAYONG,
JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELLIA UY y DEL ROSARIO,
ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NONETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA
GO y MANIEGO, CARMELITO EDEM y VARGAS,
AUGUSTO CAPUZ y CO, VICENTE SANTOS, JR., as well
as other JOHN DOESand JANE DOES, with evident bad
faith and intent to defraud and cause damage to the
government, and taking undue advantage of his official
position, authority, connection or influence as such public
officer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally,
amass, accumulate and acquire, by himself, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY-TWO MILLION THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
FIFTY-FIVE AND 38/100 PESOS (P82,321,855.38), more or
less, thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense and to

the damage of the Filipino People and the Republic of the

Philippines inthe aforestated amount, through a series and/or
combination of overt orcriminal acts or similar schemes or
means, consisting of misappropriations, conversions,
misuses, diversions and/or malversation of public funds
and/or raids on the public treasury, by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to, or
simultaneously with, the fraud, by falsifying public, officials
and/or commercial documents, such as Job Orders, PreRepair Inspection Reports, Post-Repair Inspection Reports,
Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE),
Certificates of Emergency Purchases/Repair, Waste Material
Reports, Certificate of Acceptance, Certificates of Fair Wear
and Tear, Price Verifications, Requests for Obligation
Allotment and Disbursement Vouchers, and such other
falsified documents, untruthfully narrating therein material
facts on fictitious emergency repairs of various DPWH
vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, which are, in
truth, imaginary or spurious transactions, and by using such
falsified documents of said imaginary or spurious
transactions for said accused to unlawfully cause the undue
releases of public funds and obtain undue payments on
4,406 transactions, more or less, for said fictitious
emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or ghost
purchases of spare parts, thereby misappropriating,
converting, misusing, diverting and/or malversing the
proceeds thereof for MAXIMO BORJE, JR. y AQUINOs
personal use and benefit.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings
essentially assailing the Ombudsmans finding of probable
cause. On March 19, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order7 giving respondents a period within which to submit
their memoranda of authority. In its Omnibus
Comment/Opposition8 of even date, petitioner questioned
the authority of the Sandiganbayan to act on
respondentsmotions, arguing that the same had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents
and, hence, it had no authority to hear and decide their
motions. Petitioner also alleged that it successfully
established probable cause justifying the issuance by the
respondent court of a warrant of arrest.
On January 20, 2005, respondent Sandiganbayan issued
the assailed Resolution9 upholding its authority to act on
respondents motions for their filing of the same may be
considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court and dismissing the case for lack of probable cause for
the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate charges against the accused-respondents.
Itruled that as the records reveal, not all elements of the
crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed illgotten wealth of at least P50 million. It further denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution 10
dated October 12, 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition invoking the following grounds:
I.

THE
EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION
OF
DETERMINING
THE
EXISTENCE
OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN
INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE
PROSECUTION.
II.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT
BOUND
BY
THE
FINDINGS
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES
IN
ITS
DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF A
CRIMINAL CASE.
Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an executive,
not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that respondent
Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding
and determination of probable cause in their preliminary
investigation. Moreover, petitioner faulted the respondent
court for taking into consideration the findings of Atty. Irene
Ofilada of the Investigating Committee that it was not
respondent Borje who encashed the checks but the
respondent-suppliers, by virtue of a blanket authority given
by the former to the latter. It posits that said findings cannot
bind the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of the
existence of probable cause.
Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly
dismissed the case for the evidence clearly shows the
absence of certain elements of the crime. They maintain that
while investigating officers have a wide latitude of discretion
in the determination of probable cause, which deserves
respect from the courts, the acts of the Ombudsman in
disregarding essential pieces of evidence are tantamount to
an abuse of discretion authorizing the dismissal by the court
of the case.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and judicial. On the one hand,
executive determination of probable cause ascertains
whether a criminal case must be filed in court. 11 It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and should be held
for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of
probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. It is one made by a
judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
presented, there is necessity in placing the accused under
custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated.13
Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
are concerned, the determination of probable cause during
the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for
thatmatter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the

Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the

exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists, and
to charge the person believed to have committed the crime
as defined by law.14
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine the presence or absence of
probable cause believing that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating
the filing of the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts.15 This rule is based not only on respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions of the
Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could
be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide
to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.16
The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable
cause which would warrant the filing of an information
against respondents.1avvphi1 For purposes of filing a
criminal information, probable cause has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondents are
probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. 17 A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspect. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 18
Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause was done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this
Court will not interfere with the same.19
In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against
respondents by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records clearly
reveals that accused Borje, Jr. was the payee of 4,406
checks amounting to P82,321,855.38 covering the
reimbursements of the supposed payments for the
anomalousand questionable repairs of the DPWH vehicles.
While there may havebeen evidence presented which may
lead to an inference that the end-receiver of the amounts
covered by the checks is not actually accused Borje, Jr., but
the accused private individuals suppliers, the fact that the
name of accused Borje, Jr. appears on the subject checks

cannot be denied. Indeed, merebelief that respondents

probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable
cause. Whether they are, in fact, guilty of plunder is a
different matter, which can properly be determined at a fullblown trial on the merits of this case. 20 As this Court has
ruled in People v. Castillo:21
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the
Sandiganbayan to make a determinative finding prior tothe
parties presentation of their respective evidence that there
was no bad faith and manifest partiality on the respondents
part and undue injury on the part of the complainant. In Go v.
Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, we held that "it is well
established that the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits." Also, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to
present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of
the accused upon the filing of the information against the
latter. The reason is found in the nature and objective of a
preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not
decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Moreover, the fact that the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman differs from the findings of Atty. Irene D.
Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH, who
conducted the initial investigation, falls short of being
capricious or arbitrary. It has consistently been held that
there is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. 22
The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely
performing his duty as mandated by the Constitution 23 and
by law.24 Filing an Information against respondents in this
case based on sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents
are probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be whimsical or
despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the
Ombudsmans charge was not at all baseless for the link
between the respondents and the anomalous transactions
herein has been satisfactorily established. In the absence,
therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the
Ombudsman were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this
Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated powers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated January 20,
2005 and October 12, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan
inCriminal Case No. 27969 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution
dated January 7, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-020507-H, finding probable cause to indict respondents for the

crime of plunder is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178343

July 14, 2014

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,

vs.
ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the Resolutions
dated June 15, 20062 and April 24, 20073 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91977 which enjoined the
execution of the Order4 dated June 8, 2005 of Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo in OMB-ADM-0-00-0547, pending
appeal.
The Facts
Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc. (Ecobel)
through its Chairman, Josephine Boright (Boright), applied
for a medium term loan financial facility with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) Investment Management
Group (or Finance Group) to finance the construction of its
condominium project in Ermita, Manila (project). 5 The loan
application was denied due to the following grounds: (a) the
collateral was insufficient; (b) Ecobel did not have the needed
track record in property development; and (c) the loan was
sought during the Asian financial crisis.6
Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel, this time, applied for a
surety bond with the GSIS to guarantee the re-payment of
the principal loan obligation to be procured with the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB).7 Ecobels application was
"APPROVED in principle subject to analysis/evaluation of the
project and the offered collaterals."8
In a Memorandum9 dated January 27, 1998,respondent
Alex M. Valencerina (Valencerina),then Vice-President for
Marketing and Support Services of the GSIS General
Insurance Group (GIG), submitted Ecobels Guarantee
Payment Bond application for evaluation and endorsement
of the GSIS Investment Committee (INCOM). In the said
Memorandum, Valencerina made it appear that Ecobels
application was fully secured by reinsurance and real estate
collaterals,10 and that its approval was urgent considering
Ecobels limited time to avail of the loan from the funder. 11
Such memorandum was coursed through GIG Senior VicePresident, Amalio A. Mallari (Mallari), who scribbled thereon
his own endorsement, stating "Strongly reco. based on
infoand collaterals herein stated."12
On March 10, 1998, the INCOM approved Ecobels
application13 and GSIS Surety Bond G(16) GIF Bond
02913214 dated March 11,1998 (subject bond) was
correspondingly issued indicating the following parties:
Ecobel, represented by its Chairman, Boright, asprincipal
(obligor), PVB as obligee, and Mallari, in representation of
the GSIS General Insurance Fund, the purpose of which was
to guarantee the repayment of the principal and interest on

the loan granted to the principal through the obligee to be

used for the construction of the project. 15 Later, however, or
on November19, 1998, GSIS President and General
Manager Federico Pascual issued a memorandum
suspending the processing and issuance of guaranty
payment bonds.16 Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a
cancellation notice to Ecobel for Mallaris signature, but was
told that the subject bond could no longer be cancelled
because it was already a "done deal." 17 Thus, upon the
request ofMallari, Valencerina signed a Certification dated
January 14, 1999, stating that the subject bond: (a) was
genuine and authentic; (b) constituted a valid and binding
obligation on the part of GSIS; and (c) may eventually be
transferred to Bear, Stearns International, Ltd. (BSIL), Aon
Financial Products, Inc. or any of their assignees, subject to
the prior written orfascsimile notification to the GSIS by the
current obligee, PVB, and that confirmation or approval from
GSIS is not required.18 Said certification further stated that
GSIS had no counterclaim, defense or right of set-off with
respect to the subject bond, provided that drawing
conditions (covered in a separate certification) 19 have been
satisfied.20
Notwithstanding the issuance of the subject bond on March
11, 1998, Ecobel paid its yearly premium only on February 9,
1999 through a postdated check dated February 26, 1999,
and thereon submitted the certificates of title for the
collaterals required therefor. However, the certificate of title
of the major collateral (situated in Lipa City, Batangas), i.e.,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66289, was eventually found
to be spurious.21
Consequently, Valencerina, in the letters 22 dated February
12 and 24, 1999 informed Boright that the subject bond was
"invalid and unenforceable" and that Ecobels check
payment was disregarded by the GSIS. Despite the bond
cancellation notices, Ecobel was still able to secure a
US$10,000,000.00 loan from BSIL using the subject
bond.23 Thereafter, it offered to pay the bond premiums to
the GSIS London Representative Office, which was
accepted by Vice-President for International Operations of
the GIG, Fernando U. Campaa 24 (Campaa), who was
neither furnished copies nor informed of the cancellation of
the subject bond.25
Ecobel defaulted in the payment of its loan, prompting BSIL
to serve upon it a notice of default and its intention to recover
the repayment amount under the terms of their loan
agreement and the subject bond. The GSIS was similarly
advised.26
In a Certification dated March 20, 2000, PVB Executive
President and Chief Operating Officer Florencio Z.Sioson
declared that PVB did not accept the proposal for it to be
named obligee under the subject bond and that there was no
contractbetween Ecobel and PVB.27
In view of the foregoing events, the GSIS conducted an
investigation on the circumstances surrounding the

processing and issuance of the subject bond 28 and

forwarded its report to the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB),
which then conducted its own fact-finding investigation. 29
On May 31, 2000, the FFIB issued a Fact Finding Report, 30
recommending the filing of appropriate criminal and
administrative charges against the concerned GSIS
officials31
including
Valencerina.
Accordingly,
an
administrative case was filed against the said officials for
Gross Neglect of Duty, and Inefficiency and Incompetence in
the Performance of Official Duties before the OMB, docketed
as OMBADM-0-00-0547.
The OMB Proceedings
In a Decision32 dated January 27, 2005, the OMB
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau-B (PIAB-B) found Valencerina, among others, guilty
of gross neglect of duty, and inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, and ordered his
dismissal from service with the accessory penalties provided
for under Sections 57 and 58 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.33
In an Order34 dated June 8, 2005 (June 8, 2005 Order),
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo modified the PIAB-B
decision, among others, finding Valencerina guilty, instead,
of grave misconduct, but imposing the same penalties.
Valencerina moved for reconsideration but was, however,
denied in an Order35 dated September 1, 2005.Dissatisfied,
he filed before the CA a petition for review 36 under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court (Rules), with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against the execution of the June 8,
2005 Order.
The CA Proceedings
On November 22, 2005, 37 the CA issued a 60-day TRO
which expired on January 21, 2006.38
Subsequently, in an Order39 dated April 25, 2006,
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez directed GSIS
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia to
execute the June 8, 2005 Order. Thus, in a Memorandum 40
dated June 8, 2006, the GSIS informed Valencerina that he
is "deemed dismissed from the service asof the close of
office hours" that day.
Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 41 with the CA,
which, finding the necessity to preserve the status
quobetween the parties,42 granted the same in a
Resolution43 dated June 15, 2006 (June 15, 2006
Resolution). Consequently, the corresponding writ of
preliminary injunction44 was issued on June 20, 2006, and
in a Memorandum45 dated June 21, 2006, the GSIS
directed Valencerina to return to work.
At odds with the return directive, the OMB filed a motion for

Reconsideration46 of the June 15, 2006 Resolution which

was denied in a Resolution 47 dated April 24, 2007. The CA
pointed out that "[u]nder Rule 43 of the [Rules], an appeal
shall not stay the judgment to be reviewed unless the [CA]
shall direct otherwise,"48 and that it has resolved to stay the
assailed judgment and orders during the pendency of the
case.
Unperturbed, the OMB filed the instant petition for certiorari.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules ofProcedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman49 (Section 7, Rule III), as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003,
provides that the offices decision imposing the penalty of
removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of
course and shall not bestopped by an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the
respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalentto one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension orremoval and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be
strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Based on the afore-quoted provision, itis clear that the
OMBs June 8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty ofremoval
on
Valencerina
was
immediately
executory,
notwithstandingthe pendency of his appeal. The general rule
on appeals from quasi-judicial bodies stated under Section
12, Rule 43 of the Rules which provides that "[t]he appeal
shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution

sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall

direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just"
would not apply in this case for the following reasons:
First, Section 3,50 Rule V of the OMB Rules of Procedure
provides that the Rules may apply suppletorily or by analogy
only when the procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the said rules.
Here, and as earlier conveyed, Section 7,Rule III
categorically provides that an appeal shall not stop the
offices decision imposing the penalty of removal, among
others, from being executory. Second, it is a fundamental
legal principle that when two rules apply to a particular case,
that which was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other. Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7,
Rule III is a special rule applicable to administrative
complaints cognizable by the OMB, 51 while Section 12,
Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals from quasi-judicial
bodies52 in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between
the two rules, Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the
application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in appeals
from a decision of the OMB in an administrative case. As
held in the case of OMB v. Samaniego:53
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA
in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision
of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to
the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory
is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules
of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to
a particular case, that which was specially designed for the
said case must prevail over the other.54
Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to promulgate
its own rules of procedure.55 This is fleshed out in Sections
18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, 56 otherwise
known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which empower
the OMB to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the
effective exercise or performance of itspowers, functions,
and duties" and to accordingly amend or modify its rules
asthe interest of justice may require. As such, the CA cannot
stay the execution of decisions rendered by the said office
when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically and
specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMBs rulemaking authority be unduly encroached and the
constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be
disregarded.57
Fourth, the previous ruling in Lapid v. CA 58 (as quoted in
Lopez v. CA59 and OMB v. Laja60) wherein the Court,
relying on the old OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e.,
Administrative Order No. 7 dated April 10, 1990, had opined
that "the fact that the [Ombudsman Act] gives parties the
right to appeal from [the OMBs] decisions shouldgenerally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal," 61
cannot be successfully invoked by Valencerina in this case
for the reason that the said pronouncement had already

been superseded by the more recent ruling in Buencamino v.

CA62 (Buencamino). In Buencamino, the Court applied the
current OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e., Administrative Order
No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, which were already in
effect at the time the CA assailed Resolutions dated June 15,
2006 and April 24,2007 were issued, and,hence, governing.
The pertinent portions of theBuencaminoruling are
hereunder quoted for ready reference:
In interpreting the above provision, this Court held in
Laja,citing Lopez that "only orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
imposing the penalties of public censure, reprimand or
suspension of not more than one month or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary shall be final and
unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than
public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases,
the order, directive or decision becomes final and
executoryonly after the lapse of the period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected, orafter the denial ofthe appeal from the
said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution
shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the
Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these
decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of
these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory."
However, as aptly stated by the Office of the Ombudsman in
its comment, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07 has been amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Wh ere the
respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and
conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course.1wphi1 The
Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall
be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary

action against said officer.

Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative
Order No. 17, the amendatory rule, shall not stop the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being
executory, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application
for injunctive relief.63 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied, with those in the original omitted) Lastly, it must be
emphasized that the OMB Rules of Procedure are only
procedural. Hence, Valencerina had no vested right that
would be violated with the execution of the OMBs removal
order pending appeal. In fact, the rules themselves obviate
any substantial prejudice to the employee as he would
merely be considered under preventive suspension, and
entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in
the event he wins his appeal. As aptly pronounced in In the
Matter to Declare inContempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, in the latters capacity as Sec. of DPWH:64
[T]he Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is
violated as he is considered preventively suspended while
his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on
appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
be said to have any vested right in an office.65
Based on the foregoing reasons, the CAs Resolutions
granting Valencerinas prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction staying the execution of the Ombudsmans June
8,2005 Order are therefore patently erroneous and, thus,
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As jurisprudence
dictates, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court
or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence,66 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated June 15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91977 are hereby REVERSED
andSET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
June 20,2006 issued in the said case is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207950

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY",
Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the
required moral certainty that the accused has committed the
offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must prove "the offender's intent to take personal property
before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide
[was] actually carried out" 1 !n order to convict for the crime
of robbery with homicide. The accused may nevertheless be
convicted of the separate crime of homicide once the
prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the
accused's culpability for the victim's death.
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason
Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide:
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of
force, violence and intimidation upon the person of ELMER
DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill,
stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the
saidoccasion or by reason thereof, accused took, robbed
and carried away the following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
Two (2) pcs. Necklace
One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and
undetermined amount of money, all belonging to said
ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in the said
undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
Contrary to law.2
Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on
December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to trial. The
prosecution presented Angelo Peamante (Peamante),
P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve
Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen),
and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the
defense presented Chavez as its sole witness. 3
The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.
On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around
2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood City. 4

When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon

Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black,
long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something
while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at
1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters
across Peamantes house.5
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of
Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that he
was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was
wearing.6
Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so
he simply walked away. However, he dropped something
that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it. 7
He walked away after, and Peamante was not able to
determine what Chavez was holding. 8 Peamante then
entered his house and went to bed.9
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office
(SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. She was joined by
PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo
(sketcher), and a fingerprint technician. 10 They conducted
an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with
SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide
Section.11
The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in
disarray, and they found Barbies dead body inside. 12 They
took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces
of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found
clutched in Barbies left hand. 13 They documented the
evidence then turned them over to the Western Police
District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct
an autopsy on the body.14
At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up
and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He
then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving
Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.15
At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the
body and found that the time of death was approximately 12
hours prior to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on
Barbies body 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the
body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised
wound was caused by a sharp object. 17 Four (4) of the stab
wounds were considered fatal.18
The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila
Police Station to give a statement. Peamante described to
SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he
saw leaving Barbies parlor.19
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered
on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the police
station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old. 21 His mother told
the police that she wanted to help her son who might be
involved in Barbies death.22
SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in

executing a written statement without the assistance of a

lawyer. However, Chavezs mother still gave her statement,
subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco. 23 She
also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie and a
baseball cap owned by Chavez.24

inadmissibility as evidence since his mother was not

presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity
for cross-examination.40 He added that affidavits are
generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears
before the court and testifies on it.41

The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3

Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw leaving
Barbies house/parlor that early morning of October 28,
2006.25 Peamante immediately pointed to and identified
Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement. 26
There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.

Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies

wounds were caused by two sharp bladed instruments, thus,
it was possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also
possible that the assailants committed the crime after
Chavez had left Barbies house.43 Given that many possible
explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the
innocence of Chavez should be favored.44

On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on

October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages withBarbie on
whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding. 27
According to Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a
relationship with Barbies boyfriend, Maki. 28 When Barbie
did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to
Barbies house at around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006. 29
Barbie allowed him to enter the house, and he went home
after.30
On August 19, 2011, the trial court 31 found Chavez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds
accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicideand hereby sentences him to suffer the
penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer
Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as death indemnity and
another P75,000 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.32
On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals 33 affirmed the
trial courts decision.34 Chavez then filed a notice of appeal
pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, elevating the case with
this court.35
This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit
supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both parties filed
manifestationsthat they would merely adopt their briefs
before the Court of Appeals.36
In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence,
considering that the trial court "overlooked and misapplied
some facts of substance that could have altered its
verdict."37 He argued that since the prosecution relied on
purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a
moral certainty of guilt on the part of Chavez. 38 In this case,
even if Peamante saw him leaving Barbies house,
Peamante did not specify whether Chavez was acting
suspiciously at that time.39
As regards his mothers statement,Chavez argued its

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct

evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution
isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez. 45
The circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court
laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other
conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing and robbing
Barbie.46
On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers
statement was inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee
explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even
refer to, any of the statements made by Chavezs mother. 47
Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen
testified on the possibility that there weretwo assailants, Dr.
Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only
one.48 The sole issue now before us iswhether Chavez is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find
Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.
I
Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of
robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robberywith the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed. . . .49
Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent, especially since the prosecutions evidence is
purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral
certainty of guilt.50
The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.51
The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid
down by the prosecution led to no other conclusion than the
commission by Chavez of the crime charged:
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing
that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to
death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following
circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events
that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that
accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed
the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been duly established, as
the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the
victim at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October
2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim to get
inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second,
the victims two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia
with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola)
without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as
partof the missing personal belongings of the victim, were
handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the
accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05 November 2006 when
the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his
mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at
about 2:45 oclock in the morning, witness Angelo
Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person
holding and/or carrying something and about toget out of the
door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but
the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later
positively identified the said person at the police station as
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY, the
accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused
decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with the
victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salens testimony that the
body of the victim was dead for more or less twelve (12)
hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28
October 2006 is not a co-incidence.
The prosecution has equally established, based on the same
circumstantial evidence, that the accused had indeed killed
the victim.52
Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of
evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions
derived from the findings, are generally given great respect
and conclusive effect by this court, more so when these
factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53
Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative
and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders
intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless
of the time when the homicide is actually carried out." 54 In

cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that

homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with
homicide.55
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as
quoted previously, do not satisfactorily establish an original
criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned
by Chavezs mother in her statement as follows:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa
kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay
ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular
phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha
pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na
panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sabahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos
ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay
Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa
pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa
kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin
[sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang. 56 (Emphasis
supplied)
However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no
evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never
presented as a witness during trial to testify on her
statement.57
An original criminal design to take personal property is also
inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds
in various parts of Barbies body.58
The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been
used by this court in its determination of the nature and
circumstances of the crime committed.
This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim.
In a case where the victim sustained a total of 36 stab
wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this
number of stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a strong
indication that appellants made sure of the success of their
effort to kill the victim without risk to themselves."59
This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the
wounds sustained by the victim as indicative ofthe accuseds
intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or
others.60
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
homicide is committed in order "(a) to facilitate the robbery or
the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by
the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to

the commission of the crime." 61 21 stab wounds would be

overkill for these purposes. The sheer number of stab
wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an
original criminal intent of merely taking Barbies personal
property.

This court has considered motive as one of the factors in

determining the presence of an intent to kill, 67 and a
confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the
victimsdeath has been considered as circumstantial
evidence for homicide.68

In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant

liable for the separate crimes of homicide and theft for failure
of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was
committed for the purpose of robbing the victim:

Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie

strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.The
prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds
found indifferent parts of Barbies body and that a kitchen
knife was found in a manhole near Chavezs house at No.
536, 5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila.69

But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution
palpably failed to substantiate its allegations of the presence
of criminal design to commit robbery, independent ofthe
intent to commit homicide. There is no evidence showing
that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on
accused-appellants primary criminal intent. Did he intend to
kill the victim in order to steal the cash and the necklace? Or
did he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters
personal property being merely an afterthought? Where the
homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed
for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery
was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for robo con
homicidio.63
II
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the separate crime
of homicide.
First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the
crime that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and
he had a boyfriend named Maki. Nevertheless, Chavez
described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]ere like
brothers."64 He testified during cross-examination that he
was a frequent visitor at Barbies parlor that he cannot recall
how many times he had been there. 65 This speaks of a
close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.
Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the
morning of October 28, 2006 to settle his misunderstanding
with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with
Barbies boyfriend:
MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie,
for almost three (3) years and the two (2) treated each other
like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of
having a relationship with Maki Aover, Barbies boyfriend
for six (6) months, which resulted in a misunderstanding
between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with
Barbie so thru a text message he sent on the evening of 27
October 2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie did
not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00
oclock in the morning. Barbie let him in and they tried to talk
about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was
not fixed so he decided to gohome. Later on, he learned that
Barbie was already dead.66

The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the

statement of Chavezs mother. This provides, among others,
her sons confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the
knife used in a manhole near their house:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa
kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay
ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular
phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha
pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na
panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa bahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos
ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay
Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa
pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa
kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin
[sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang. 70 (Emphasis
supplied)
Even if this statement was not taken into account for being
hearsay, further investigation conducted still led tothe
unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a
manhole near Chavezs house.71
Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual
findings giving credence to 1) Peamantes positive
identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbies house
that early morning of October 28, 2006 72 and 2) the medicolegals testimony establishing Barbies time of death as 12
hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time
of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day,
October 28, 2006.73
All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide.
III
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise,
thatthing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of

ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when a person

has possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably
presumed as the author of the theft.75
Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the
police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied by the
defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these
cellular phones.77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a
cellular phone has become a necessary accessory, no
person would part with the same for a long period of time,
especially in this case as it involves an expensive cellular
phone unit, as testified by Barbies kababayan, witness
Raymond Seno[f]a."78
However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship
having been established, there is still a possibilitythat these
cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised
when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-examination that
the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their
SIM cards were removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr.
witness?

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate

of Barbie, testified that he could not remember the model of
the Motorola fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but
that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more or less. 82 This
amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on
how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.
These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the
allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties
of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily
surrender her own son and confess that her son committed a
heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he
voluntarily went to the police station on November 5, 2006
for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied him. SPO3
Casimiro testified that the reason she surrendered Chavez
was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and "perhaps
the accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting
nearer to him."85 Nevertheless, during cross-examination,
SPO3 Casimiro testified:

A: No, sir.

Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that
when the mother brought her son, according to you she tried
to help her son, is that correct?

Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.

A: That is the word I remember, sir.

Court: When you received the items,there were no markings

also?

Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she

meant by that?

Witness: No, Your Honor.

A: Yes, sir.

Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim
cards and the batteries?

Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be

cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?

A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.

A: Maybe, sir.86

Q; No sim card and batteries?

Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones

and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that said
cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was
wounded in the incident and that the fatal weapon was put in
a manhole infront[sic] of their residence." 87 The records are
silent on whether Chavez objected to his mothers
statements. The records also do not show why the police
proceeded to get his mothers testimony as opposed to
getting Chavezs testimony on his voluntary surrender.

A; Yes, Your Honor.

Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place
markings when these were turned over to the Public
Prosecutor, no markings?
A: No markings, Your Honor.79
The other missing items were no longer found, and no
evidence was presented to conclude that these weretaken
by Chavez. The statement of Chavezs mother mentioned
that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces ["At ang
isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie
ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City" 80 ], but,
as earlier discussed, this statement is mere hearsay.
In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the
value of the stolen items.81 The lower court made no factual
findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the
information one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola
cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace,
and one bracelet.

At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was

informed by the investigating officer at the police station of
the consequences in executing a written statement
withoutthe assistance of a lawyer.88 She proceeded to give
her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons
confession of the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3
Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:
Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette
Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you mentioned?
A: She was with some neighbors.
Atty. Villanueva

Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?

A: None, sir.
Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the
consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit?
A: We somehow informed her of what will be the
consequences of that statement, sir.
Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?
A: Yes, sir.90
The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the
accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional rights and
nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to
remain silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also
dated November 7, 2006, or two days after Chavez,
accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the
police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the
commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which
require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used
against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an
attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel
present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford
an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he
so desires.92
The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but
were modified to include the statement thatany waiver of the
right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence
of counsel."93
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial
investigation, which begins "when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun tofocus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."94
It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is
"taken into custody by the police," such as during an arrest.
These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from
the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are
to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently
compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to
resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task
of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning
of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis
supplied)

Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of

custodial investigation to "include the practice ofissuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation
of law."97
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda
rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting
exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an
investigating officer ina police station. As an additional
pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his
mother who accompanied him to the police station.
This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence
sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is
guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued
the order dated November 14, 2006 in that "as prayed for,
the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately
commit accused, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to
the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending
trial of this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court." 98
The order of commitment dated September 28, 2011 was
issued after his trial court conviction in the decision dated
August 19, 2011.
Chavez has been under preventive detention since
November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the
trial.1wphi1 This period may be credited in the service of
his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from
term of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the
service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted
previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of
their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall
do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive

imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be
released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of
the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is
under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be
the actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court
may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused:
Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro,
he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.99
V
Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from
the scene of the crime were not properly handled, and no
results coming from the forensic examinations were
presented to the court. There was no examination of the
fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the
manhole near the house of Chavez. 100 There were no
results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands
found with the knife and those in the clutches of the victim.
Neither was there a comparison made between these
strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no report regarding
any finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered,
and no matching with the blood of the victim or Chavezs.
The results of this case would have been rendered with more
confidence at the trial court level had all these been done. In
many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable
or would have been belied had object evidence been
properly handled and presented.
We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life
whether it be the victims or the accuseds is valuable.
The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high
esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these should have
been attended with greaterprofessionalism and more
dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality
of every conviction depends on the evidence gathered,
analyzed, and presented before the courts. The publics
confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the
quality of the convictions we promulgate against the
accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice
system should realize this and take this to heart.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor alias
"Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt
of the separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch
as the commission of the crime was not attended by any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant
Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four

(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be
deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.