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What is Lesson-Drawing?
Richard Rose
Journal of Public Policy / Volume 11 / Issue 01 / January 1991, pp 3 - 30
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X00004918, Published online: 28 November 2008
What is Lesson-Drawing?
R I C H A R D R O S E , Public Policy, University of Strathdyde"
ABSTRACT
Lesson-drawing addresses the question: Under what circumstances and
to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to
another. Searching for fresh knowledge is not normal; the second section
describes the stimulus to search as dissatisfaction with the status quo.
Lessons can be sought by searching across time and/or across space; the
choice depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic communities linking experts together, functional interdependence between
governments, and the authority of intergovernmental institutions. The
process of lesson-drawing starts with scanning programmes in effect
elsewhere, and ends with the prospective evaluation of what would
happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were transferred here
in future. Lesson-drwaing is part of a contested political process; there is
no assurance that a lesson drawn will be both desirable and practical.
The conclusion considers the uncertainty and instability of judgements
about the practicality and desirability of transferring programmes.
The real world in fact is perhaps the most fertile of all sources of good research
questions calling for basic scientific inquiry.
Herbert A. Simon, Nobel laureate lecture
Every country has problems, and each thinks that its problems are
unique to its place and time. Up to a point this is true, since differences
in history and institutions make the budget deficit facing the President of
the United States different from that facing a Soviet leader. Every city
has a unique history and each mayor a unique electoral constituency;
inner city decay in Birmingham, Alabama is a problem to the citizens of
This article is based upon opening sections of the Ransone Lectures on Public Administration,
that I delivered at the University of Alabama in March, 1990 (Rose, forthcoming). An appointment as Guest Professor at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin provided time for the initial reflection on which this work is based. A grant from the Anglo-German Foundation, London, to draw
lessons from the British and German experience of rising unemployment in the 1980s gave
practical experience in doing, as well as preaching about lesson-drawing.
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of action or inaction. As long as a programme's outcome matches aspirations, then there is satisfaction, and it can run by routine. However,
when a gap opens between aspirations and achievements, this creates
dissatisfaction, pressing policymakers to find something that will remove
dissatisfaction.
Running by routine. In an era of big government, public organizations
must normally operate by routine. Otherwise, the everyday services of
government - education, health care, the payment of social security
benefits and the collection of rubbish - could not be delivered. The great
bulk of public officials are not concerned with learning fresh lessons from
elsewhere; they are rule-bound bureaucrats and technicians.
In the economy of administration, busy policymakers have a strong
incentive to ignore what officials under them are doing, for time is
limited, and the political system always generates more demands for
attention than there is time to take notice. As Simon (1978: 13) explains:
In a world where attention is a major scarce resource, information may be an
expensive luxury, for it may turn our attention from what is important to what
is unimportant. We cannot afford to attend to information simply because it is
there.
Policymakers can ignore programmes - as long as routine activities
appear to be producing satisfaction.
The definition of a satisfactory, or at least a 'not unsatisfactory',
programme, is problematic. The aspirations against which achievements are judged are not given; they are political constructions. As
Charles W. Anderson (1978: 191) emphasizes:
A policy problem is a political condition that does not meet some standard.
Problems can be appraised in the light of many different political principles
. . . . Public problems are not just 'out there' waiting to be dealt with. Policymaking is not simply problem-solving. It is also a matter of setting up and
defining problems in the first place.
Becoming dissatisfied. A necessary condition of lesson-drawing is that
policymakers want to learn something that they do not already know.
This occurs when routine is disrupted and policymakers can no longer
operate on the assumption that what was saitsfactory before is still
satisfactory. Capturing the attention of politicians in power is not easy,
for as Karl Deutsch has noted (1963: i n ) , power can be defined as 'the
ability to talk instead of listen, the ability to afford not to learn'.
From a satisficing perspective, promoting a programme as superior to
one already in place is not sufficient to justify change. A gap must be
created between present aspirations and achievements. Ideas-mongers
must generate dissatisfaction by raising aspirations about what it is
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What is Lesson-Drawing?
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Faced with a rising tide of dissatisfaction with a programme, policymakers think first of action. Policymakers do not have time or capacity
to search everywhere; they follow the line of least resistance. The basic
decision rule is: In response to signals of dissatisfaction, start searching near at
hand. In a time-space continuum, the definition of proximity is subjective. Proximity depends upon cognition; what is already known and
people and organizations already known will be appreciated before what
is unfamiliar (cf. Cyert and March, 1963: 12iff).
Varying the scope for search. Confronted with a problem, the first place for
an organization to look is to its own standard operating procedures. If a
programme is deemed inadequate, then the first remedy to try is: more
of the same. If there is dissatisfaction with primary schools or health
care, simply spend more money on teachers or on building new
hospitals; do not question the programmes on which money is spent. An
organization's own past is the second place to search. An agency has an
institutional memory based upon past experience. If a problem is cyclical, such as inflation or unemployment, then it can invoke countercyclical programmes that have been effective before.
However, when there is structural change in the policy environment,
then what worked before is no longer likely to be effective in dispelling
dissatisfaction. When a problem is unprecedented, such as the outbreak
of AIDS, an organization's past cannot offer a solution. At best, it can
only offer analogies drawn from previous epidemics, but analogies are
neither logical nor empirical assurance of effective lessons (cf. Neustadt
and Fineberg, 1983; Day and Klein, 1989). Policymakers must then
search further afield.
At this juncture policymakers have two alternatives. Speculating
about how a novel programme would work in future is one. Speculating
about the future does not require reference to any form of experience.
However, advice that is purely speculative may be treated sceptically,
because it is not grounded on experience but unbounded.
Searching across space is the other major alternative. The scope of
search is a function of the institution seeking help and the problem at
hand. Local government officials are likely to look to nearby local
authorities on the assumption that they have most in common with
neighbours, but American big city mayors must look to cities in other
states. American state officials are likely to turn to neighbouring states
or those considered in the vanguard in dealing with a particular issue. A
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with a claim to policy-relevant knowledge based upon common professional beliefs and standards of judgement, and common policy concerns (Haas, 1990). An epistemic community may base its claims to
authority upon knowledge of hard sciences such as aeronautical
engineering, upon a social science such as economics or social policy, or
upon common education for professional practice, as is the case of
lawyers.
An epistemic community can operate at many levels, state, national
and international. Locally or regionally, a community of education specialists draws together head teachers in the schools, local administrators,
department of education officials, a variety of academics in teacher
training and educational evaluation, and a few free-floating experts.
Leading members of a state or regional community will be active in the
national education policy network; a few may be active at international
levels. The locus of meetings may shift, but the subject matter remains
constant: the concerns of educational policymakers. This stream of information can be drawn upon as lessons for action, as and when dissatisfaction arises at home.
Even though many members of an epistemic community may be
employed by government, their authority does not depend upon votes or
official position, but upon claims to expert knowledge. They operate in a
shadowy world between transnational and transgovernmental contact
(Nye and Keohane, 1971: 38ofF). In the first instance, experts relate to
each other as individuals sharing common professional interests; the
basis of the relationship is nongovernmental, a characteristic of transnational interactions. But experts who hold public office can use their
knowledge to formulate public policies. Even when participating in professional meetings, their capacity to make commitments that lead to
action remains bound by their bureaucratic positions.
Members of an epistemic community may share concepts and
methods, but often they do not agree about public policies. Because
policy advice combines technical knowledge with political judgements
about what is and is not desirable, experts in the same profession often
disagree; economists provide frequent examples of this phenomenon.
Many government organizations employ a multiplicity of experts, and
this can result in disagreements between different epistemic communities. For example, environmentalists concentrate upon characteristics of
nature that are regarded as priceless, whereas economists are prepared
to calculate the costs and benefits of everything, and make trade offs
between environmental pollution and economic growth (see Kelman,
1981).
For policymakers, there is a positive advantage in the existence of
divergent opinions within an epistemic community. As long as there is a
What is Lesson-Drawing?
17
diversity of political outlooks this ensures that there will always be some
experts sharing values consistent with the elected government of the day.
Elected officials searching for lessons prefer to turn to those whose
overall political values are consistent with their own. Although epistemic
communities can be a source of new ideas necessary for lesson-drawing,
they lack the political authority to impose binding decisions.
Functional interdependence. When two or more countries share a problem,
then each must look to the other in order to achieve an effective outcome.
Collective problems can be shared in two contrasting ways. Several
countries can act jointly to deal with a problem. One nation can
externalize the costs of its own activities upon another. Even if policymakers do not have equal influence in the determination of outcomes,
when a collective problem arises they cannot afford to ignore actions by
other countries that influence a problem that is not confined within a
single country.
Environmental policy provides many illustrations of functional interdependence due to the permeability of national boundaries. Although in
the literal sense every country has always had environmental conditions,
it was only in the 1960s and 1970s that the environment emerged on the
political agenda of national policymakers. The emergence of the
environment on the agenda of national politics in many countries reflected the rapid transnational transmission of expert ideas and information.
The pollution of the Mediterranean by the discharge of industrial,
municipal and agricultural wastes from 18 European, Middle Eastern
and North African countries is a classsic example of a collective goods
problem. All nations contribute to the pollution of the Mediterranean
and all suffer its effects. Any action taken by one nation would be
insufficient to prevent its shores and coastal waters from being awash
with pollution from other countries. The problem has been met by the
creation of a special-purpose functional institution, the Mediterranean
Action Plan, authorized by a 1976 Convention establishing an
administrative headquarters to coordinate and advise on the implementation of pollution control programmes in each signatory country to the
benefit of all (Haas, forthcoming).
When there are asymmetries of power, and one country externalizies
its problems onto another, the dissatisfied country knows where to
search, but the outcome is problematic, for the country exporting the
problem is not within its jurisdiction. This situation arises in the case of
Canada's acid rain problem, which is caused more by prevailing
southerly winds exporting airborne American pollutants such as sulfur
dioxide to Canada. In consequence, Canada has been involved in
importing and exporting anti-pollution programmes to the United
States. (Hoberg, 1991).
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What is Lesson-Drawing?
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that member-states must obey, nor does it disburse large sums of money
to encourage new programmes in member states. It is a clearing house
for statistical information that national policymakers (and their critics)
can use to compare their performance with that of other countries.
The European Community is an example of an intergovernmental
institution that does have some binding authority over its members,
and some financial resources. The 12 member states are bound to
accept directives of the Community on a host of issues concerning trade,
industry, employment, agriculture, monetary policy and associated
policy areas. Much of the activity of the Commission in Brussels is
concentrated upon compiling reports about the diverse ways in which
national governments respond to problems, and the extent to which
differences in programmes are consistent with economic integration.
Given that these reports may subsequently serve as the basis for Community directives, national officials have an immediate incentive to pay
close attention to cross-national similarities and differences in
programmes.
The European Community is pledged to the creation in 1992 of a
Single European Market with a harmonious set of economic and social
programmes (cf. Kahler, 1988: 378ff; Majone, 1991). Even though this is
unlikely to create uniform programmes among the diverse members of
the Community, the Single European Market will create competition
between programmes. If programmes in industry, employment, transportation, or other fields appear more effective, then a national government must ask: Could that programme work in our country?
IV. Drawing a Lesson
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What is Lesson-Drawing?
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TABLE
Richard Rose
I
1. Copying. Adoption more or less intact of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction.
2. Emulation. Adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances, of a programme already in
effect in another jurisdiction.
3. Hybridization. Combine elements of programmes from two different places.
4. Synthesis. Combine familiar elements from programmes in effect in three or more different places.
5. Inspiration. Programmes elsewhere used as intellectual stimulus for developing a novel programme without an analogue elsewhere.
What is Lesson-Drawing?
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Richard Rose
Goode, 1984). Although the particulars of a tax may vary from one
country to the next, the effects of choosing one alternative rather than
another are to a substantial degree predictable. For example, ValueAdded Taxes are in effect in 46 countries scattered across every continent. Although there are many variables in the specifies of a ValueAdded Tax, from this experience lessons can be drawn, and the consequences of introducing VAT evaluated by comparison with existing
revenue resources (Tait, 1988).
Prospective evaluation can give forewarning of failure when conditions necessary to make a programme work in country X are not met in
country Y. For example, there is widespread dissatisfaction in Britain
with the low level of vocational education and training for youths in the
labour market, because this leads to a shortage of skilled adult workers.
After reviewing a variety of different alternatives, the Thatcher
Administration adopted as its model the German dual system
(Berufsbildungssystem) which combines training at work by specially qualified and experienced adults with off-site vocational training at further
education colleges. The British government's attempts to implement this
system will take most of the 1990s. However, with the German model as
a template for a prospective evaluation, it can be demonstrated that the
British effort will largely fail, because of the lack of the specially qualified
workers (Meisters) who play a central role in the success of the German
system (Rose and Wignanek, 1990). A constructive conclusion of this
prospective evaluation would be that if Britain wanted to emulate the
German system, it should increase the supply of trainers before increasing the demand for training.
Lesson-drawing is not a mechanical set of deterministic procedures
leading to unalterable conclusions. Obstacles to transferring programmes would be permanent only if the present differences in space could
not be bridged in time. By thinking in terms of both time and space we
can undertake a prospective evaluation that not only identifies the blockages that exist today, but also highlights steps that can be taken to make
a programme effective in one country succeed elsewhere tomorrow.
V. Is Lesson-Drawing Practical or Desirable?
What is Lesson-Drawing?
25
then it is no longer practical or desirable to maintain established programmes, and a search commences for measures that are both practical
and desirable.
Distinguishing practicality from desirability. To describe a programme as
'feasible' is ambiguous, confusing two distinct types ofjudgements. Prospective evaluation is about technical feasibility, whereas elected politicians think in terms of political feasibility. Is there a majority in the
governing party and the legislature for this programme? If not, how
would it have to be altered in order to make it politically feasible? If the
results are as promised, would this gain or lose support with
constituents?
Technical feasibility is taken for granted in abstract theories of social
science that assume perfect fungibility; programmes that operate logically in a theoretical model are expected to be applicable anywhere and
everywhere. The logic is that of an engineering science, which starts with
a model of how an automobile engine works, and designs parts that can
be exchanged between a Ford automobile, whether it is made in Detroit,
Cologne or Barcelona. Even if a few adaptations are necessary, e.g. to
accommodate right-hand drive in Britain, the basic principle remains;
everything can transfer. Prescriptions drawn from abstract models face
difficulties in the first real country to which they are applied.
At the other extreme, theories grounded in history, institutions and
culture assume total blockage, that it is technically impossible to transfer
a programme from one country to another, one city to another, or even
to apply past experience to the present. Every problem is regarded as
having a unique configuration of characteristics specific to a particular
time and place. From this perspective, the important feature of the
income tax in the United States, Britain or Germany is not the generic
attributes of taxation stressed in economics texts, but the fact that one
tax is American, the other is British, and the third is German. Conclusions drawn from over-determined historical studies of a single country
are difficult to apply as lessons in a second country.
When the programme is the unit of analysis, then holistic statements
about total fungibility and total blockage have no specific meaning, for
they ignore specific characteristics of particular programmes and policy
environments. From a programme perspective, it is usually impractical
and undesirable to think in terms of drawing lessons from one policy
area to another, e.g. to run schools like the armed forces. A corollary is
that within a given policy area there are substantial cross-national
similarities in the means and ends of programmes. Because defence and
education programmes differ within a nation, then educationists are
more likely to look abroad for lessons than to look to their own armed
forces for lessons in educating youths.
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Richard Rose
Japan provides an instructive example of the extent to which lessondrawing is practical at the level at which it counts, specific programmes.
After Japan was opened to foreigners in the mid-nineteenth century no
country could have appeared more different. Yet between 1869 and 1882
the Japanese government sponsored the introduction of five programmes
emulating those in France, starting with the Army; four from Britain,
starting with the Navy; three from the United States, starting with a
primary school system, and one each from Germany and Belgium
(Westney, 1987: 13). In no sense did this mean that Japan in the 1870s
was like these Western nations. But it did not need to be similar in all
respects to introduce a programme. All that was required was the
minimum number of elements essential for a programme. For example,
Japan could emulate the British Post Office, which relied heavily upon
railways, by substituting runners to carry letters. As Japan's resources
expanded, it was then possible to make programmes more similar to the
original Western model, or even to switch from one Western model to
another, as Japan did in reorganizing its army on German lines in 1878,
a decade after initially founding an Army on French lines.
Logically, there are four possible ways to combine technical
appraisals of the feasibility of transfer and normative evaluations of
political desirability (Figure 1). Two reinforcing combinations permit
straightforward interpretations. A programme that is deemed desirable
by politicians and capable of transfer by experts is likely to be adopted
and produce satisfaction. A programme that politicians regard as
undesirable and experts describe as likely to be ineffectual if transferred
is doubly rejected.
The most interesting confrontation between political desire and technical expertise occurs when politicians are attracted by the siren call of a
programme that has produced desirable results in another setting, but
prospective evaluation indicates would fail if transferred. The attractiveness of a Japanese programme associated with its economic miracle may
be as compelling to Western policymakers as the call of the female sirens
was to sailors in Greek mythology. However, the siren call of mythology
lured the sailors onto rocks; the siren call of Japanese success may
attract policymakers to a programme that is likely to fail, because the
preconditions for effectiveness in Japan are not met elsewhere. If politicians heed the warning, the problem can be looked at again, with experts
trying to increase the probability of success. Just as late-nineteenth
century Japanese had to adapt Western programmes to meet the conditions of their country then, so late twentieth-century Westerners can be
required to adapt Japanese programmes as a condition of possible
emulation.
A programme will be dismissed an an unwanted technical solution,
What is Lesson-Drawing?
27
Low
(Outcome)
Positive
Satisfactory
transfer
Unwanted
technical solution
Negative
Siren call
Doubly
rejected
lar lesson necessarily reflects the values and knowledge of the moment.
Since there is uncertainty about values and knowledge, decisions about
whether a programme can be, should be or will be adopted are always
subject to change.
At any given point in time, politicians will collectively differ about
what is desirable, for politics is about the advocacy of conflicting goals.
In the course of advocating competing claims about which party can
best achieve popular goals, politicians often disagree about means as
well. Washington is an extreme example of heterogeneity of goals and
means, for Congress, bureaucrats, interest groups and the White House
operate in an institutional framework designed to encourage debate
rather than concentrate authority. The resulting confusion has been
described as a 'garbage can model' of decisionmaking (Cohen et al.,
1972) in which there is a high degree of uncertainty about programmes
and preferences.
Experts can cause uncertainty by disagreeing about whether a programme is likely to be effective. A study of the adoption of international
public health measures to prevent the spread of contagious diseases such
as cholera found that the major obstacle to action was not a difference of
opinion about policy goals, but technical disputes about the causes of
contagious diseases. Richard N. Cooper (1989: 257), himself a macroeconomist, explains:
All scientific parties to the debate were aware of the evidence, but the evidence
was ambiguous and could be used to support conflicting theories. Epidemiology
in the nineteenth century was much like economics in the twentieth century: a
subject of intense public interest and concern, in which theories abounded but
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