Hegel: Elements of The Philosophy of Right

G. \V. F.
HEGEL
Elements of the
Philosophy ofRight
EDITED BY
ALLEN W. WOOD
Prqfessor ofPlzilosoplzy. Cornell Utziversity
TRANSLATED BY
H. B. NISBET
Prrfessor ofModern Latzgpages,
Utziversity ofCambridge
atzd
Fellow ofSidtzey Sussex College
Bogazici University Library
39001101983883
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First published 1991
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British Library Cataloguing in Publicatio11 data

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 177o-1 831
Elements of the philosophy of right- (Cambridge texts in
the hiSiory of political thought).
1. State. Theories
1. Tille D. Wood, Allen W. m. Nisbet, H. B. (Hugh
Barr) 194o- JV. [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts.
English]
320.101
Library of Co11grtss Cataloguing in P11blication data

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 177D-1831
[Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. English]
Elements of the philosophy of right/G.W.F. Hegel; edited by Allen W. Wood;
translated by H. B. Nisbet.
p. em. - (Cambridge texts in the history of political thought)
Translation of: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts.
ISBN o 521 34438 7 (hardback)- ISBN o 521 34888 9 (paperback)
1. Law-Philosophy. 2. Natural law. J. State, The.
4 Political science. 5 Ethics.
1. Wood, Allen W. D. Nisbet, Hugh Barr. m. Title. JV. Series.
K230.H43G7813 1991
340'.1-dczo 9o-21617 CIP
ISBN o 521 34438 7 hardback
ISBN o 521 34888 9 paperback
Contents
Editor's imrodru:tion
Cllro,ology
TrmiSiator's prefoce
Key to abbreviatimiS
Elements of the Philosophy of Right

Editorial Plotts
Glossary
Select bibliograplly
brdex of subjects
brdex of Plames
page vii
xxxiii
XXXV
xlv
Editor's introduction
Hegel was born on z 7 August I 770 in Stuttgart, in the south German
state of Wiirttemberg, son of a middle-class civil servant. His professional career, pursued entirely outside his home state, did not
begin until he was over thirty, and was interrupted between I8o6 and
I 8 I 6. His eventual rise to prominence was meteoric: Hegel was
offered a professorship at the University of Heidelberg in I8I6,
followed by an appointment two years later to the prestigious chair in
philosophy at the University of Berlin which had had Fichte as its only
previous occupant. Hegel occupied this position until his death from
cholera on I4 November I8JI. The influence of his philosophy
began to decline even before his death, but its impact on Prussian
academic life was perpetuated through the activity of some of his
students, especially Johannes Schulze, who was Privy Councillor in
charge of education from I8z3 until the I84os. 1
Hegel's first lectures on right, ethics and the state were delivered in
I 8 I 7, during his first autumn at Heidelberg. As his text he used the
paragraphs on 'objective spirit' from his newly published Et~cyclopaedia
of tile Pllilosopllical Sciet~t:es (I8I6) (EH 40o-452).2 His second
series of lectures came a year later in Berlin. He soon formed the
intention of expanding his treatme~t of this part of the system in a
longer text, which probably existed in draft well before his third series
oflectures on right and the state were delivered in I8Ig-I8zo.
A fateful tum of political events in Prussia forced him to delay
publication of this new work. Since the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon
in I8o6-I8o7, a reform movement within the government had been
taking the country away from absolutism and toward constitutionalism.
VII
Editor's l11troductimr
After the defeat of Napoleon in IBis, this made Prussia an object of
suspicion and alarm throughout the relatively less progressive continental states, especially Austria and Russia. In the summer of I Big,
the cause of reform was decisively defeated by its opponents within
the feudal nobility (see Preface, note 18). In September there was a
conference of German states in Carlsbad. It imposed censorship on
all academic publications and set forth guidelines for the removal of
'demagogues' from the universities. This resulted in the dismissal of
several prominent academics, including Hegel's old personal enemy
J. F. Fries, but also in the arrest of some of Hegel's own students and
assistants (see Preface, notes 6, 8, II, I2, IS, 18). In the light of the
new situation, Hegel revised his textbook on right, composing a new
preface in June, I82o. Published early in I82I, it was to be his last
major work.
Images of Hegel's political thought

From the beginning the Plrilosoplry ofRiglrt was an object of controversy. The earliest reviews, even those written by men Hegel had
counted among his friends, were almost uniformly negative.3 Hegel's
attack on Fries in the Preface was interpreted as showing unqualified
approval of the academic repression. His declaration: 'What is
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational' was read as bestowing
an unqualified blessing on the political status quo (see Preface, note
22). Many could see nothing in Hegel's book except an attempt to
ingratiate himself with the authorities. As Fries himself put it:
'Hegel's metaphysical mushroom has grown not in the gardens of
science but on the dunghill of servility .'4
The earliest attacks on the Plrilosoplry of Riglrt viewed it solely in
relation to the immediate political situation. Later critics in the liberal
tradition followed their interpretation, but gave to the image of Hegel
as conservative sycophant a broader philosophical significance.5
Right-Hegelian interpretations of Hegel's political thought under
Friedrich Wilhelm IV and German nationalist and statist interpretations during the Bismarck period tended only to confirm the idea that
Hegel's political thought consorts well with the spirit of absolutism
and the Prussian Maclltstaat. 6 In the first half of our century the same
image of Hegel naturally led critics to see him as a forerunner of
German imperialism and National Socialism. 7 Together with the
viii
Editur's buroduction
thought that the roots of Marxism lie in Hegel's philosophy, this
secured for Hegel a prominent if unenviable place in the popular
demonology of totalitarianism:'
There were always those, however, who insisted that Hegel was
fundamentally a theorist of the modem constitutional state,
emphasizing in the state most of the same features which win the
approval of Hegel's liberal critics. This was always the position of the
Hegelian 'centre', including Hegel's own students and most direct
nineteenth-century followers. 9 This more sympathetic tradition in
Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of
this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus
among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as
philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of
modem totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as
accounts of Hegel's attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader
philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state. 10
Hegel and the Prussian state

Hegel's political thought needs to be understood in relation to the
institutions and issues of its own time. Yet this is something even
Hegel's contemporaries themselves were often unable to do. The
difficulty and obscurity of Hegel's writings posed problems for them,
just as they have for subsequent readers. The Preface of the Pllilosoplly of Rigllt, \vith its immediate relation to events of the day, provided the earliest critics \vith an easy and obvious way of grasping,
labelling, and categorizing its contents. From Hegel's attacks on Fries
and his evident attempt to placate the censors, they inferred that he
was an opponent of the Prussian reform movement, siding with the
reaction's repressive policies toward intellectual life generally and the
universities in particular. In the light of these conclusions,
judged (or prejudged) the political theory presented in the rest of the
book. Had the critics studied the actual contents of the Pllilos{}/Jly of
Rigllt more closely, however, they could not have reconciled them
with the idea that Hegel's defence of the state is an apology either for
the conservative position or for the Prussian state as it existed in I 8zo.
In IBIS, under the reform administration of Chancellor
Hardenberg, King Friedrich Wilhelm Ill solemnly promised to give his
people a written constitution. The political victory of the conservatives
ix
Editor's lntroductio11
in the summer of I8I9 ensured that the promise would never be kept,
and it was a firm tenet of the conservative position that it never should
be kept, that it never should have been given in the first place. Yet
earlier in the year both Hardenberg and the progressive Interior
Minister Wilhelm von Humboldt drew up constitutional plans, providing for representative institutions, in the shape of a bicameral
estates assembly. These plans are strikingly similar to the Estates as
described by Hegel in PR 298-3 I4 (see 300, note I; 303, note
I; 3I2, note I).
The Prussian officer corps and the higher levels of the civil service
were open only to the hereditary nobility. Reformers under the
administration of Chancellor Karl Freiherr vom Stein (I8o8-I8Io)
had attempted without success to open them to the bourgeoisie. In
Hegel's rational state, all citizens are eligible for military command
and the civil service (PR 27I, note 2; 277, note I; 29I and note
I). Hegel advocates public criminal trials and trial by jury, neither of
which existed in Prussia during his lifetime (PR 228 and note I).
Hegel's rational state does strongly resemble Prussia, not as it ever
was, but Prussia as it was to have become under the reform
administrations of Stein and Hardenberg, if only they had been victorious. Where Hegel's state does resemble the Prussia of I 820, it
provides for the liberalizing reforms which had been achieved
between I8o8 and I8I9 (PR 206 and note I; 2I9 and note 2;
288 and note I; 289 and note I).
Hegel was no radical, and certainly no subversive. In relation to the
Prussian state of I 820 he represented the tendency toward moderate,
liberalizing reform, in the spirit of Stein, Harden berg, Humboldt and
Altenstein (who had arranged for his appointment to his chair in
Berlin). Hegel did not have to be ashamed of publishing his views
(until the middle of I8I9, most of them were even the official position
of the monarch and his chief ministers). But they were diametrically
opposed to the views of Prussian conservatives on some of the largest
and most sensitive political issues of the day.
If Hegel was not a conservative, does that mean that he was a
'liberal'? It does mean that Hegel was a proponent (usually a cautious
and moderate one) of many social and political policies and
tendencies that we now recognize as part of the liberal tradition. But
the term 'liberalism' normally connotes not only these policies, but
also a deeper philosophical rationale for them, or rather a plurality of
X
Editor's bztroductio11
rationales which to some degree share a common spirit and social
vision. The vision is individualistic, conceiving society as nothing but
the outcome of the actions and interactions of human individuals
pursuing their individual ends. The spirit is one which tends to be
suspicious of grand theories of human destiny or the good, preferring
instead to protect individual rights and freedoms, and living by the
faith that human progress is most likely if individuals are left to find
their own way toward whatever they happen to conceive of as the
good. In line with what has just been said, it is also a moralistic spirit,
for which individual conscience, responsibility and decency are
paramount values. The power of this vision and this spirit in modem
society can perhaps best be measured by the fact that 'liberalism' in
this sense is the common basis ofboth 'liberalism' and 'conservatism'
as those terms are now used in everyday political parlance, and by the
fact that liberalism's principles sound to most of us like platitudes,
which no decent person could think of denying.
Hegel does not see liberalism in this sense as a foe, since he sees its
standpoint as expressing something distinctive and valuable about the
modem world. But he does regard its standpoint as limited, and for
this reason potentially destructive of the very values it most wants to
promote. He regards this standpoint as salvageable only when placed
in the context of a larger llision, which measures the subjective goals
of individuals by a larger objective and collective good, and assigns to
moral values a determinate, limited place in the total scheme of
things. In this sense, Hegel is a critic of liberalism, even its deepest
and most troubling modem critic. This is what gives the greatest
continuing interest to Hegel's ethical thought and social theory.
Freedom
______ ____
is founded on an
ethical theol)' which identi...The Philosophy
.
. (}[Right
--.-------------......_
..-------.........---~
.fies the human good with the self-actualization of the human spirit.
.flegel's nameronJ'ie e~nce of illls spmtiS"Pte~it 4). Bt
Hegel does not mean by 'freedom' what most people mean by it. Most
people, according to Hegel, think that freedom consis.tsJn p!mi}l_ilitif:l
-~~ ~~!!l~~ act!Jp, l!!mlili one in which I
am ~e~ne~~y~h mm:!f,_arutnot a.!.JI.Jl.jzy_.an~
external (PR 23). Even in dte case offree action, Hegel thinks that
~~st -people iden~fy it with .~r..bitr~~- (Wi/lkiir), with doing
xi
Editor's /11troductio11
whatever we please (PR 15,R) or with venting our particularity and
idiosyncrasy (PR 15A). Hegel regards this view as ~w and
immature; he insists that we_~~!!}ywh~u
)a!Jty~.Jll!~~or 'objecti_vel(,_ according to the 'concept'
of the will (P R :z ). - -.-~ ...--- --~ ------~------------.,-------
3
Free action is action in which we deal with nothing that is external
to our own objective nature. That does not mean that freedom consists in withdrawing from what is other than ourselves. On the contrary, Hegel insists that 'absence of dependence on an other is won
not outside the other but in it, it attains actuality not by fleeing the
other but by overcoming it' (EG 38:zA). Thus Hegel describes
freedom as 'being with oneself in an other', that is, actively relating to
something other than oneself in sue~ a way that this other becomes
integrated into one's projects, completing and fulfilling them so that it
counts as belonging to one's own action rather than standing over
against it. This means that freedom is possible only to the extent that
we act rationally, and in circumstances where the objects of our action
are in harmony with our reason. The most spiritual of such objects is
the social order in which we live: just as Hegel's treatment of
_individual !.!!!._man psychology falls under the heading of 'subjective
spirit', so his treatment of the rational society, in the Philosophy of
Right, constitutes the sphere of_'_gjljcctive spirit' (EG 385). Freedom
is actual, therefore, only in a rational society whose institutions can be
felt and known as rational by individuals who are 'with themselves' in
those institutions.
Hegel's name for a rational system of social institutions is 'ethical
life' (Siu/ic/zkeit) (PR 144-145). Corresponding to 'objective' ethical life (the system of rational institutions) is a 'subjective' ethical life,
an individual character which disposes the individual to do what the
institutions require (P R 146-148). The ethical disposition is
Hegel's answer to the Kantian separation of duty from inclination,
and more generally to the moralistic psychology which supposes that
unless we are moved by impartial reason to follow moral principles
adopted from a universalistic standpoint, we will inevitably adopt the
utterly selfish policy of maximizing our own interests. On the contrary, Hegel is convinced that the most potent, as well as the most
admirable, human dispositions follow neither of these two patterns. A
rational society is one where the demands of social life do not
frustrate the needs of individuals, where duty fulfils individuality
xii
Editor's Introduction
rather than suppressing it. In such a society rational individuals can
-promote their self-interest to a satisfactory degree without having to
maximize it, and they need not make great sacrifices in order to give
priority to right and duty or to show concern for the good of others.
Because our social life is in harmony \vith our individuality, the duties
of ethical life do not limit our freedom but actualize it. \Vhen we
become conscious of this, we come to be 'with ourselves' in our
ethical duties. Such duties, Hegel insists, do not restrict us, but
liberate us (PR 149).
We might put the point by sa}'ing that for Hegel I am free when I
'identify' myself \vith the institutions of my community, feeling myself
to be a part of them, and feeling them to be a part of me. But Hegel
would deny that such feelings constitute freedom unless they are a
'certainty based on tmtll' (P R 268). That is, the institutions of the
community must tnliJ harmonize the state's universal or collective
interest with the true, objective good of individuals; and individuals
must be conscious of this harmony. Of course there is no freedom at all
in a society whose members 'identify' themselves with it only because
they are victims of illusion, deception, or ideology.11
Personhood and subjectivity

Liberals are usually proud of the fact that they mean by freedom what
most people mean by it, not what Hegel means. They usually think
freedom is the absence of obstacles to doing..,!!_s we like, whether our
choices are good or bad, rational or arbitrary. Confronted with
Hegel's doctrines, they often think that his praise of freedom is a
dangerous deception; they fear that he wants to restrict freedom as
they mean it in the name of freedom as he means it. Such fears are
largely unfounded. Hegel's ethical theory is not based on freedom in
the ordinary sense, but it does not follow from this that Hegel's theory
is hostile or even indifferent to freedom in the ordinary sense. On the
contrary, Hegel thinks that in the modem world, people cannot be
free in his sense unless social institutions pro.,.ide considerable scope
and protection for arbitra freedom.
.
This is because Hegel thinks that, in the modem world, we are
conscious of ourselves in new ways, and that we cannot be 'with
'Ciurselves~al institutions unless they provide for the actualization of our self-image in these respects. First, we think of ourselves as
xiii
persons, indeterminate choosers, capable of abstracting from all our
desires and qualities (PR 5), and demanding an external sphere for
the exercise of our arbitrary freedom (PR 41). This sphere begins
with the person's external body and extends to all the person's property (PR 45-47). The category of'abstract right' applies to such a
sphere of arbitrary freedom. It is called 'abstract right' because in
protecting the rights of persons we must abstract from the particular
use they make of these rights, even from its bearing on the person's
own interests (P R 3 7 ). Abstract right is a variety of freedom in the
Hegelian sense because it involves 'being with oneself' in the external
objects which one owns. The rationality of the modem state requires
that the abstract right of persons be safeguarded; this is the prim~
~ (PR 209,R).
----Modern individuals not only regard themselves as arbitrarily free
choosers, but they also see themselves as giving meaning to their lives
through the particular choices they make. So regarded, individuals
are subjects (PR 105-106). Subjects derive what Hegel calls 'selfsatisfaction' from their role in determining for themselves what will
count as their own particular good or happiness (PR 121-123).
Their sense of self-worth is bound up with the fact that they are aware
of leading il reflective life, shaped through their own deeds. Subjectivity is also"'the sp~f morality, in which individuals measure their
choices by universal standards and reflect on their actions from the
standpoint of conscience.
Hegel gives the name 'subjective freedom' to the variety of 'being
with oneself in an other' in which the 'other' is the individual's own
actions and choices. Modern individuals cannot be free in the
Hegelian sense unless social institutions provide for subjective
freedom in several ways. Modem ethical life must provide for
individual self-satisfaction by enabling people to shape and actualize
their own determinate individualities (PR 187). Thus the state must
respect my right as an individual self to direct my own life, and
provide for this right in the form of its institutions (PR 185R,
2o6R). It must also honour moral conscience (PR 137R) and hold
~~e for my acti~ll!~n so far as they are the exp~10i!_
of my subjectivity (PR 115-120)Tstate which fails to do these
Uiings!S tOillat.extent a state in which individuals cannot be free or
\vith themselves'.
For modem individuals, Hegelian freedom cannot exist unless
xiv
Editor's bztroductimz
there is room for freedom in the ordinary sense. Hegel wants to
replace the ordinary concept of freedom with his concept not because
he is opposed to freedom in the ordinary sense, but because he thinks
that starting with his concept of freedom enables us to see why
freedom in the ordinary sense is objectively a good thing for people to
have. In that way, Hegel's view is not at odds with those who value
freedom in the sense of the unhindered ability to do as we please. On
the contrary, Hegel's ethical theory shows how their position can be
justified.
At the same time, Hegel's view also proposes to tell us something
about when freedom in the ordinary sense is objectively valuable, and
when it is not. Like John Stuart Mill, Hegel thinks the ability to do as
we please is good not in itself but because it is required for the
achievement of other vital human goods. The chance to do as we
please is valuable when it is necessary for or conducive to freedom in
the Hegelian sense; otherwise, it may be worthless or even harmful.
Hegel's view implies that freedom in the ordinary sense should be
protected when it belongs to the rightful sphere of some person or
when it is conducive to a subject's self-satisfaction or to the actualization of that subject's individuality. It also implies that in a case where
doing as we please is not conducive to these goods, there is no reason
to value such freedom at all.
Hegel does not believe that we can decide in the abstract and
irrespective of a structured social context when freedom in the ordinary sense falls within our right and serves to actualize our individuality. He does name certain things which are central to our
personality, and hence belong without exception to our inalienable
and imprescriptible rights: the right to our own body and free status
(PR 57); the right to hold private property (PR 45-49); and the
right over one's own ethical life, religion, and conscience (P R 66 ).
But he does not agree with Kant that we should try to construct our
social institutions so that they maximize the amount of personal
freedom which everyone can enjoy according to a universal lawP
Instead, Hegel thinks that the precise content of our right as persons
and subjects depends on a system of rational institutions, apart from
which we cannot even be-Sure what 'maximal personal freedom' might
mean, much less determine how it might be achieved.
It is the function of positive law, for example, to make right determinate. Our rights as persons havevalidityonlywhen they are expressed
XV
Editor's bztroduction
in law. Conversely, however, Hegel holds that posltlve laws are
obligatory only to the extent that they agree in content with what is in
itself right (PR 20CJ-2IJ). Although personal rights are not determinate except within a system oflaw, Hegel does think that some laws
(e.g. those establishing slavery or forbidding persons to hold private
property) are plainly unjust in the context of any system of law. In
such cases, he agrees with the natural law tradition that those laws do
not obligate us.
Hegel's liberal critics are in the habit of saying that he does not
believe in founding a social order on the conception of individual
rights. The element of truth in this assertion is that Hegel thinks
personal right, apart from a developed system of ethical life, is an
~ty abstraction; he believes that a social order founded (as in
liberal political theory) on such abstractions will be unable even to
protect individual rights, much less to actualize the whole of concrete
freedom. In fact, Hegel thinks that the greatest enemy of personal and
subjective freedom is a _'~hanistic' conception o.L~ state, which
views the state solely as an instrument for the enforcement of abstract
rights; for this sets the state up as an abstraction in opposition to
individuals. In Fichte's theory, for example, Hegel sees the state as a
police power whose only function is to supervise and regulate the
actions of individuals through coercive force (N R 5 19/124). T.he og!y_
~.!....ID!arantee of freedom is a wel1-co~fe, which
integrates the rights of persons and subjects into an organic system of
customs and institutions providing individuals with concretely fulfilling lives.
Hegel is not an enemy of what liberals value in the name of
freedom, but his agenda regarding freedom is not the liberal one. He
believes there are limits to the state's legitimate power to interfere in
the conduct of individuals, but he insists that these limits cannot be
drawn precisely (PR 234). This does not bother him because he
does not share the hberals' fear that the state will inevitably trespass
into the rightful territory of individual freedom unles5 we guard the
boundaries jealously. On the contrary, Hegel maintains that the
'enormous strength' of the modem state lies in the fact that the state's
'substantive unity' rests on the principles of 'subjectivity' and 'personal particularity' (P R 260). An inevitable tendency to violate these
principles could belong only to a state which is inherently selfdestructive, o~o destrov the .sou~:_ce_of its own ~'!eJ.
From Hegel's point of view, a more serious threat to freedom in
modem society is what he calls the 'principle of atomicity', the
tendency in modem life for individuals to be only abstract persons
and subjects, who fail to actualize their personality and subjectivity in
a fulfilling social context. If people insist too stubbornly on their rights
or withdraw too far into their subjecthit:y, Hegel believes that they
become alienated triiiiitliecom:mon social life, without which nothing
they do has any significance for them. This is a threat to people's
freedom because it means that they cannot be 'with themselves' in
their social life; it renders them powerless to make their lives their
own. Where this is so, people's options, however vast and unhindered
they may be, are all alike hollow and meaningless to them; wider
choices only confront them with an emptiness more vast and
appalling.
Hegel's primary aim in the Plzilosoplzy of Riglzt is to show how
personal right and subjective freedom can receive real content
through the institutions of the modem state. In other words, it is to
show us how the modem state is after all the actuality of concrete
freedom (P R 258). This state as Hegel describes it differs little
from the state which liberal theories try to justify, but Hegel's state is
not the same as theirs because his justification is different. Hegel's
state is about different things, serves different human needs, sets
itself different ends.
Civil society
Human beings have not always known themselves as persons and
subjects. These conceptions, according to Hegel, are historically
quite recent, and are still geographically restricted. They are products
of European culture, deriving from the tradition of Greek ethical life
and Christian spirituality. But they,i::lid not become actual even in
European culture as long as there was slavery or serfdom, or property
and economic relationships were bound by feudal fetters and encumbrances, or states were subject to ecclesiaStical authorities or treated
as the private property of an individual or a family. Personality and
subjectivity were not actual in the democratic Greek polis, or the
medieval Church, or the feudal state of the early modem era. They
have become actual only in the modem state which arose out of the
Lutheran Reformation and the French Revolution.
xvii
The modem state contains one specific institution which separates
it decisively from earlier and less developed social orders: Hegel's
name for it is 'civil society'. Prior to Hegel, the term 'civil society'
(biirgerlid1e Gesellschaft, and its cognates in Latin, French, and other
languages) was generally interchangeable with the term 'state'. 'Civil'
society was the realm of citizens (Burger, cives, citoyens), in contrast to
'natural' society or the family.U Hegel, however, distinguishes civil
society from both the family, the private socic!Y- based on love (PR
158), and from the state, i.e. the public-community based explicitly
on reason and aiming at collective or universal ends. Civil society is
the realm in which individuals exist as persons and subjects, as
owners and disposers of private property, and as choosers of their own
life-activity in the light of their contingent and subjective needs and
interests. In civil society, people's ends are in the first instance purely
private, particular and contingent (PR 185), not communal ends
shared with others through feeling (as in the family) or through
reason (as in the state).
In other words, civil society is the realm of the market economy.
Hegel holds that individuals are given their due as free persons, and
achieve actuality as subjects, only when they depend on themselves
for their own livelihood and welfare (PR 182). He is a strong
partisan of the view that the collectivized or state-run econom is a
pre::!!!odern institutio~, incompatible with the modem principle of
iiidividual freedom.At the same time, civil society is not simply identical with the
market economy. As a member of civil society, the individual has a
determinate social identity signified by the term Biirger, not in the
sense of the French word citoyen but in the sense of the French word
bourgeois (PR upR). A bourgeois for Hegel is much more than a selfinterested, calculating llomo economims. Hegel's study of the science of
political economy (in the writings of people such as Adam Smith, Say
and Ricardo) convinces him that people's collective market behaviour
possesses a kind of colle~ty, which is none the less real
for being unintended (PR t8gR). This 'inner necessity' forms the
unconscious basis of genuine social relationships between people, and
gives rise to a 'principle of universality' within civil society, harmonizing with the principle of free individuality (PR 182-184). Civil
society is not merely the natural result of people's free and selfinterested behaviour (a conception Hegel had earlier satirized under
xviii
Editor's lntroductio11
the tide 'the spiritual animal kingdom' (PhG ~ 397)). It is a genuine
fonn of society, a 'universal family' which makes collective demands
on its members and has collective responsibilities toward them (PR
239).
As members of this society, individuals have the duty to support
themselves through labour which benefits the whole, while civil
society as a whole owes each individual the opportunity to labour in a
way which provides a secure, respected and self-fulfilling mode of life
(PR 238). This means that civil society is charged with the education of individuals for membership in it (PR 239), and also collectively responsible for preventing them from falling into poverty,
whether through their own improvidence (P R 240) or through the
contingencies of the market system. The poor in civil society are
victims not of some natural misfortune, but of a social wrong (PR
241).
Though the market economy has a tendency toward rationality,
Hegel sees that it is the scene of systematic conflicts of interest
between producers and consumers, and also of occasional imbalances
which adversely affect everyone; the activities of civil society must be
consciously supervised if it is to remain just and stable (PR 235236). Thus he regards state-run economy and complete freedom of
trade and commerce as extremes; the health of civil society requires a
middle course (PR 236R). The responsibility for overseeing and
regulating civil society's economic activities belongs to what Hegel
calls the state's 'police' function (see PR 231, note 1).
Estates and corporations

Individual freedom in civil society involves much more than simply
being left alone to find our way through life in a market system. If we
are to be 'with ourselves' as members of civil society, we must also
achieve a determinate social identity, a specific trade or profession
(Gewerbe), conferring upon us a determinate social estate, standing or
status (Stant!) (PR 207). Through membership in an estate, our
economic activity ceases to be mere individual self-seeking. It
becomes a determinate kind of contribution to the welfare of civil
society as a whole, recognized for what it is bY. others.
In the case of the urban trades and professions, Hegel thinks this
calls for the organization of civil society into 'corporations' xix
Editor's I tztroductiotz
professional associations or guilds, recognized by the state. A corporation prmides its members with a collective responsibility and aim
within civil society: to look after the special business of their profession, to train new people to work in it, and to set standards for the
work it does. Corporations also look after their own interests, providing assistance to members who are out of work, without undermining
their dignity as tends to happen when they depend on either private
charity or public assistance (PR 253R). In Hegel's staie, as in the
constitutional proposals of Humboldt and Hardenberg, corporations
are also the chief vehicles for popular political representation (see P R
303, note 1). Probably the only reform of the Stein or Hardenberg
administrations about which Hegel had serious reservations was the
abolition of guild monopolies, which were terminated in the interests
of free trade (see PR 255, note 2).
Above all, corporation membership provides indhiduals 'vith a
sense of concrete social identity. Civil society provides for subjective
freedom by offering individuals a wide variety of different lifestyles
between which to choose. But Hegel does not S)mpathize with Mill's
notion that society should encourage individuals to engage in all sorts
of eccentric experiments 'vith their lives, in the hope that by trial and
error they may occasionally find something worth imitating.u He
thinks their choices must be between recognized ways of life,
systematically integrated into the organic S}'Stem of modem ethical
life; the various ways of life should be known to provide dignity and
fulfilment to those who lead them. Corporation membership helps
individuals to achieve a recognized estate or status (Stand) of this
kind. Without this, indhiduals will be isolated from others, alienated
from chil society, and lacking in any determinate standards for success in life. They will gauge their self-worth in civil society not by
ethical standards, but only by the selfish pursuit of wealth, which can
never satisfy them because it has no determinate measure (P R 253).
In Hegel's state, however, corporation membership is open mainly
to the male urban middle class. Hegel argues that civil servants do not
need corporations since the place of corporations for them is taken by
the organization of the government service; he also thinks that the
unreflective ethical disposition of the rural population is unsuited to
the corporate spirit (PR 250). But he also recognizes that wagelabourers are not eligible for corporation membership (PR 252R).
Editor's 11ltroductio1l
Hegel is disturbed by civil society's systematic tendency toward
extremes of wealth and poverty. He notes that the economic processes
of civil society themselves produce a class which is systematically
excluded from civil society's wealth, its spiritual benefits, and consequently even from its ethical life (PR 243-244). Hegel's treatment
of this topic is characteristically hard-headed, perceptive and unsentimental. His main concern is with the social causes of poverty and
with its consequences for the ethical health of civil society. He sees
the fundamental cause of poverty as the process of 'universalization'
applied both to people's needs (through the standardization and
mass-marketing of commodities) and to their labour (through massproduction). The greatest profits come as a result of employing cheap
mass-labour, so that the wealthy have an interest in the existence of a
poor class, whose bargaining power is weak in relation to capital (P R
243). 'When there is great poverty, the capitalist finds many people
who work for small wages, which increases his earnings; and this has
the further consequence that smaller capitalists fall into poverty'
(VPR IV, 610). For Hegel, poverty in civil society is not an accident,
or a misfortune or the result of human error or vice; rather, 'the
complications of civil society itself produce poverty' (VPR17 138),
which (along with personal right and subjective freedom) is a special
characteristic of modem civil society. 'The emergence of poverty is in
general a consequence of civil society; from which on the whole
poverty arises necessarily' (VPR19 193).
Hegel refuses to blame either the wealthy or the poor, as individuals, for the fact of poverty. But he does regard poverty as a cause of
moral degradation, turning those subject to it into a 'rabble' (PObel).
Since Hegel thinks every member of civil society has a right to earn an
adequate living as a member of a recognized estate, he regards the
poor as victims of wrong at society's hands. The basis of the 'rabble
mentality' (Piibellza.ftigkeit) is the outrage of the poor (against the rich,
civil society, and the state) at the wrong they suffer (P R 241). Under
the conditions of life to which the poor are subject, however, the
effect of this justified outrage is to produce a disposition which is
fundamentally at odds with the ethical principles of civil society.
Because they have no chance of the dignity and self-sufficiency
afforded by recognized labour in civil society, the rabble lose both a
sense of self-respect and a sense of right and wrong as applied to their
XXI
Editor's bztroducti011
own actions. They cease to recognize the rights of others, and the
only right they are interested in is their own imagined right to live at
civil society's expense without working at all.
Thus the rabble mentality becomes a criminal mentality. Hegel
suggests that a similar attitude may also develop among the wealthy.
The rich find that they can buy anything, that they do not need to
work, that no one's personality or subjectivity is immune to the power
of their wealth. The rich and the poor equally come to regard the
ethical principles of civil society with scorn (see P R 244, note I).
'Hence wealth can lead to the same mockery and shamelessness as we
find among the rabble. The disposition of the master over the slave is
the same as that of the slave' (VPRig Ig6).
For Hegel's student and colleague Eduard Gans (to whom Hegel
left the task of lecturing on the Philosoplzy ofRight in Berlin during the
last half of the I 82os), the philosophical proposition that the modem
state is rational entails the conclusion that the problem of poverty
must be soluble, that it must be possible to prevent the formation of a
rabble. 'Hence the police must be able to bring it about that there is
no rabble. [The rabble] is a fact, not a right. We must be able to go to
the basis of this fact and abolish it.' 15 Hegel's own reflections on the
problem of poverty are less aprioristic, and less optimistic. Poverty
provides plenty of occasion for exercise of morally good intentions,
but Hegel thinks that private charity is no solution to the problem of
poverty, and often even makes it worse (see PR 242, note I). The
state, in its action on civil society (which Hegel calls the state's 'police
power') is the agency responsible for preventing poverty; but Hegel
considers the various means at its disposal for doing so, and argues
that none of them can solve the underlying social problems (PR
245). Hegel holds that poverty and the rabble mentality are systematic products of civil society, but he does not pretend that civil society
has any remedy for the ills it creates.
The political state

As the distinctively modem social institution, civil society is decisive
for the form of the other institutions of modem ethical life. Because
modem individuals are persons \vith rights of property, there is no
longer a place for the extended family as an economic organization. In
modem society, 'family' can refer only to the patriarchal bourgeois
nuclear family; the feudal family, the 'clan' or wider kinship group(Starnm)- celebrated by some of Hegel's Romantic contemporaries as
the model for all social relations- no longer has any legitimacy (PRj
I72, I77).
The family's sole remaining function is to enable individuals to find

a haven from the harsh interaction of independent persons in civil
society, by participating in bonds of substantial unity on the level of
immediate feeling. For this reason, Hegel argues that property within
the family should be held in common, administrated by the husband
and father. He alone, under normal circumstances, exercises the
rights of personality in the sphere of civil society (P R I 7o-I 7 I);
the wife and mother is naturally confined to the sphere of the family, .
as the guardian of its principle (PR I66). She and the children
]exercise their personal rights in their own name only at those points
where the family reaches its limit and dissolution: when a marriage
ends in divorce (PR I76), when the children leave the family to
found new families of their own (PR I77), or when the father dies
(PR I78).
Civil society in Hegel's theory also determines the political form of
the modem state. Hegel argues that the form most suited to the
modem state is constitutional monarchy (PR 273). Only there does
a political syste~liiS explicit and rational come to be personified
in an individual, who thus gives the state the form of subjective
freedom (PR 279). The offices of the state must no longer be (as in
the feudal state, and in the Prussia of Hegel's time) the property or
the personal prerogatives of individuals or families; the civil service
must be a body of qualified professionals, open to all members of
society irrespective of birth (PR 29I).
In a society which emphasizes the dignity of free subjectivity,
individuals are naturally interested in the conduct of the state's
affairs, and they want a voice in determining its policies. Consequently, the modem state must have representative institutions (PR
30I). Hegel argues that deputies to the Estates (Stiinde) should be
chosen not by popular election from geographical districts but (as
their name implies) they should represent determinate groups (corporations) within civil society. Otherwise, individuals, who are connected to the political process only through the casting of one vote in
an immense multitude, will be alienated from the state by the very
process whose function is to connect them to it (P R 3 I I R).
xxiii
In a Hegelian constitutional monarchy, the hereditary prince or
sovereign represents the 'moment of ultimate decision' (PR 275).
But Hegel intends this only in a 'formal' or 'subjective' sense; 'objectively', he says, the sovereign is bound by his ministers, so that in a
well-constituted state the individual qualities of the sovereign will be
of no consequence (PR 279A, 28oA). Hegel plainly intends real
political power to be in the hands neither of the prince nor of the
people, but of an educated class of professional civil servants.
For Hegel, as for Mill, the function of representative institutions is
not to govern, but to advise those who govern, and to determine who it
is that governs. 16 Hegel expects deputies to the Estates to be ordinary
citizens, not professional politicians. One evident reason for this is
that he wants the Estates to be close to the people, and to represent its
true sentiments; another reason (unstated, but quite evident) is that
he does not want the Estates to be politically strong enough to challenge the power of the professionals who actually govern. But he does
not intend the Estates to be powerless either. In his lectures, Hegel
describes a multi-party system in the Estates, and he insists that the
government's ministry must always represent the 'majority party';
when it ceases to do so, he says, it must resign and a new ministry,
representing the majority in the Estates, must take its place (see PR
301, note 2). This idea takes the Hegelian constitutional monarchy
most of the way toward presently existing parliamentary systems with
a nominal hereditary monarch (as in Britain, Holland, Belgium, or
Sweden).
The state and the individual

To be absolutely and substantively free, individuals must be 'with
themselves' in their social life. One aspect of this is the satisfaction of
their subjectivity, in that ample scope is allowed for arbitrary choice
and the satisfaction of individual welfare. As rational and thinking
beings, however, we relate ourselves universally to the whole of the
social world. Our freedom is not fully actual until we are with ourselves in ends which are universal in scope. We cannot be free (in
Hegel's sense) unless we successfully pursue ends larger than our
own private good, indeed larger than anyone's private good.
Through corporations, individuals in civil society acquire ethical
ends which go beyond their self-interest. These ends, Hegel says,
xxiv
pass over in rum into the absolutely universal end: the state (P R
256). Hegel distinguishes 'the political state proper' from the state
in a broader sense, the community as a whole with all its institutions
(PR 267). He regards the state in the latter sense as the individual's
final end.
Hegel asserts that the individual's highest freedom consists in
membership in the state (PR 258). Accordingly, the highest consciousness of freedom is the consciousness of this membership, in
what he calls the 'political disJ>osition' or 'patriotism'. Hegel denies,
however, that true patriotism consists in the willingness to do heroic
deeds and make extraordinary sacrifices for the sake of one's country.
Instead, he says patriotism is nothing more than a habit of leading
one's normal life and doing one's ethical duty, while taking the state
as one's 'substantial basis and end' (PR 268).
Hegel locates the absolutely universal end in the state because it
alone is a self-sufficient individuality, not part of any larger whole. To
those who would relate their actions to some still larger entity
('humanity at large', a 'cosmopolitan world society' or 'all sentient
creation') Hegel points out that such entities are t ~e~, but only
abstractions. We do not actua ize our freedom by entertaining the
~nings of moralists, but only by relating ourselves to something real which truly actualizes the power of reason in the world. The
state, Hegel says, is 'the absolute power on eartlz' (PR 331).
For the same reason, the state is also the fundamental vehicle of
world history. Human history for Hegel is a progressive succession of
spiritual principles, which actualize themselves successively in the
political constitution and spiritual culture of nation states (P R 3 44).
Thus human actions gain universal, cosmopolitan significance not
through their relation to abstract moral principles, but only in so far as
they are the actions of someone culturally and historically situated,
and give existence to the ethical life of a determinate people at a given
stage of its history. If I want to see my actions in their universal
historical significance, I must regard myself as the child of my age and
people, and my deeds as the expression of the principle embodied in
my state and my time.
The state, for Hegel, is an 'absolute end'; indi\'iduals should place
it above their own private interests. '[The state has] the highest right
in relation to individuals, whose /zig/rest d11ty is to be members of the
state' (PR 258). But the state is an absolute end only because it is
rational; Hegel describes 'rationality' as the 'unity and interpenetration of universality and individuality' (PR 258R). In other words,
what makes the state an end in itself is the way in which it systematically harmonizes the personal right, subjective freedom and happiness
of its individual members. The state is an 'infinite' end distinct from
and higher than its members' rights and happiness only because it
systematically unifies these finite ends.
This is why patriotism, for Hegel, is not a disposition to do extraordinary deeds on the state's bc;half, but only the 'certainty, based on
truth' that in pursuing all my other ends (in my personal, family or
professional life) I thereby always relate myself at the same time to the
state as my universal and ultimate end. That consciousness is what
makes the state 'the actuality of concrete freedom' (PR 260).
(Patriotism is] the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end
of an other (in this case, the state), and in the latter's relation to
me as an individual. As a result, this other immediately ceases to
be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free.
(PR 268)
This makes it a gross distortion to associate Hegel's view \vith the
image of individuals having to sacrifice themselves to the ends of the
state. Such sacrifices may be required in some circumstances, but it is
precisely the almonr~ality of such circumstances which makes the state
an end in itself.
The principal such circumstance for Hegel is war. It is mainly here,
Hegel thinks, that the universal interest of the state can for once be
clearly distinguished from the lesser interests ofindividuals. Although
war is an abnormal condition in the life of nations, Hegel thinks that
occasional wars are inevitable, even that they are necessary to
preserve the ethical health of peoples (P R 324R).
We badly misunderstand Hegel's view if we think it implies that
wars are a good thing, or that we should not try our best to avoid
them. Even during war, Hegel says, war always has the character of
something that ought to cease (P R 338). It may help us to understand Hegel's view of war if we realize that what he believes about war
is closely analogous to what we all believe about human mortality
generally. We know we cannot live forever, and we realize that if we
all could, then this would eventually have disastrous consequences for
Editur's bztroductimz
the human race as a whole. Hegel's views about war no more imply
that wars are a good thing, which we should not try our best to avoid,
than our views about human mortality imply that our own death is a
good thing, which we should not try our best to avoid.
Hegel's legacy
Hegel is an important philosopher; his penetrating analysis of the
human predicament in modem society is perhaps unsurpassed among
social observers of the past two centuries. At the same time, his
thought is subtle and complex; his writings are difficult, even infuriating - laden with impenetrable and pretentious jargon from which
his meaning can be separated only with skilled and careful surgery,
even then usually not without risk of mortal injury.
The inevitable result is that Hegel is cited much more frequently
than he is read, and discussed far oftener than he is understood.
Some of those who discourse on Hegel with the greatest sophistication know him only through warped, inaccurate or bowdlerized
second-hand accounts (for instance, accounts of the Hegelian dialectic as 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis'). 17 The 'Hegelian' ideas which
capture the popular imagination are often not present in Hegel at all,
or have only the most tenuous and dubious connection with what
Hegel actually thought or wrote. Before it gains currency, a fact about
Hegelian doctrine has often been so distorted by oversimplification
and misunderstanding that the truth from which it started is almost
impossible to recognize.
This is the case with the traditional images of Hegel as reactionary,
absolutist, totalitarian. Taken literally, of course, these images have
been long discredited. Yet in our liberal culture they nevertheless
possess a kind of symbolic truth, because they represent this culture's
self-doubts projected with righteous venom into its iconography of
the enemy. Hegel is especially unappealing to that dogmatic kind of
liberal who judges past social and political thinkers by the degree to
which they articulate the views which (it has been decided beforehand) all people of good will must share. The value of Hegel's social
thought will be better appreciated by those who are willing to question
received views, and take a deeper look at the philosophical problems
posed by modem social !ife.
Hegel leaves the liberal's state pretty much intact, but his social
Editor's !t~troductio1l
theory is mercilessly critical of the ahistorical, individualistic and
moralistic rationale which liberalism provides for it In its place,
Hegel gives us an alternative interpretation of modem social life, of
modem economic and political institutions, of modem humanity's
conception of the human good, of the meaning of its fundamental and
insatiable drive for freedom.
This means that although Hegel's theory was put forward as a
rational defmce of the modem state, his true legacy belongs rather to
the critics of modem society. The basic tendency of Hegel's social
thought is to undermine modem society's liberal self-interpretation;
to the extent that its institutions have been shaped by this interpretation, its tendency is even to criticize those institutions themselves. He
presents a communitarian rather than an individualistic rationale for
modem economic and political institutions and of the freedom they
seek to actualize. This provides the basis for an indictment of any
society which tries to call itself 'free' even though it fails to offer its
members any rationally credible sense of collective purpose, leaves
them cynically discontented with and alienated from its political
institutions, deprives them of a socially structured sense of self-identity, and condemns many of them to lives of poverty, frustration and
alienation. It leads us to question the value of the formalisms representative democracy, the market economy, the protection of
individual liberties - with which liberals wish to identify 'freedom',
and to emphasize instead the social contents and consequences which
liberals would usually prefer to leave 'open' by excluding them from
the domain of collective concern and control.
Once we realize this, we can understand why it is that Hegel's most
bitter twentieth-century foes have been those who want to save the
liberal state from its radical opponents on the right or the left. We can
also see through the ironic deception they perpetrate when they avail
themselves of the distorted nineteenth-century image of Hegel as
quietist and conservative apologist. What they fear in Hegel's thought
is not quietism, but the very opposite - subversion of the liberal status
quo.
Clearly, Hegel's social thought is now outdated in important
respects. As Hegel writes about them, the family, civil society, and the
state are clearly institutions of the early nineteenth century. Hegel
insists on the one hand that all human individuals are persons and
xxviii
subjects who must be treated universally as such; on the other hand,
he defends a state which excludes women from public life entirely,
and large segments of the population from all political participation.
With hindsight, it is easy for us to perceive an irreconcilable antagonism between these two positions. We are just as unlikely to be persuaded by Hegel's defence of hereditary monarchy, or his version of a
representative legislature. Even more fundamentally, the nation state
itself was probably never able to play the lofty role in human life which
Hegel assigned it.
Yet at a deeper level, Hegel's philosophy may not be dated at all. It
is not clear that we have in any way surpassed Hegel's conception of
modem human beings, their history, their needs and aspirations, and
the general social conditions required for their self-actualization.
Without denying the right of persons and subjects, Hegel asserts
against liberal orthodoxy the vital necessity for modem humanity of
concrete social situatedness and integration. He reminds us that
without this, the formal freedom to make arbitrary choices and
express our subjectivity leads in the direction of alienation rather than
self-actualization. He stresses the point that we cannot be free unless
our social life is self-transparent. We must be able to gain rational
insight into it, and live consciously in the light of this self-awareness.
Hegel remains an important social thinker largely because these
ideas, products of the age of German idealism, are still central to our
aspirations as reflective social beings. Hegel is also current because
these same aspirations are still radically unfulfilled. This can add only
urgency to Hegel's idea that the value of those freedoms liberals most
prize, though real and important, is nevertheless only conditional,
since it casts serious doubt on the extent to which the conditions are
really satisfied. Hegel meant the Philosophy of Right to afford its
readers a joyous reconciliation with the social world around them. But
for us the actual effects of studying Hegel's book may be very different from what its author intended.
Some information used in the editorial notes was given to me by
Terence Irwin, Allen Rosen, and Rega Wood. Professor H. B. Nisbet
provided detailed, informative advice on the introduction and
editorial notes. Professor Raymond Geuss provided advice on the
content and structure of the introduction. In preparing the notes, I
~Votes
to pages vii-viii
was also aided by the informative editorial apparatus in Hermann

Klenner's excellent edition of Gnmdli11im der Philosophie des Rechts
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag derDDR, I98I).
Ithaca, June
Allen W. Wood
990
Notes to editor's introduction

See John Edward Toews, Hege/ia11ism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, I98o), p. I IJi cf. C. Varrentrapp,JohaTmes Sclmlze
1md das IIOhere preujJische UT11errichJsweser1 ;,, sei11er Zeit (Leipzig, I889).
2 See pp. xlv-xlix for key to abbreviations of the titles of Hegel's
writings.
3 See Manfred Riedel (ed.), MaJerialim z11 Hegels Rechtsphilosophie
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, I975), 1, pp. 53-208.
4 J. F. Fries, Letter of 6 January I82I, in Gunther Nicolin, Hegel iTI
Berichter1 seiTJer Zeitger1osser1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, I970), p. 221.
5 In his highly influential book HegeluTid sei11e Zeit (I857), RudolfHaym
not only depicted Hegel's philosophy as 'the scientific domicile of the
spirit of Prussian reaction', but also concluded that Hegelian speculative idealism, rightly understood, leads to 'the absolute formula of
political conservatism':
As far as I can see, in comparison with the famous saying
about the rationality of the actual in the sense of Hegel's
Preface, everything Hobbes and Filmer, Haller or Stahl have
taught is relatively liberal doctrine. The theory of God's grace
and the theory of absolute obedience are innocent and harmless in comparison with that frightful dogma proT/olmciTig the
existiTJg as e.xistiTJg to be holy.
(Rudolf Haym, Hegelund sei11e Zeit (Berlin: Rudolf Gaertner,
I857). pp. 367-368)
6 For instance, in: J. E. Erdmann, Philosophische VorleSimgm iiber der1
Staat (I85 I); C. Rossler, SJstem der StaaJslehre (I857); A. Lasson,
Systm1 der Rechtsphilosophie (I882). For a recent account of their
views, see Henning Ottmann, b1dividuum llTid GerlleiTJSchaft bei Hegel,
Band I: Hegel im Spiegel der ImerpretatioTieTI (Berlin: de Gruyter, I 977),
pp. I24-I52.
7 See Ottmann's account of Hegel interpretation under the Third
Reich: Individmu11 wzd Gemeinschaft, pp. I52-I82. It is noteworthy,
however, that !fegcl was seldom cited in Nazi lite.nl.DJ~If, and
mention of him there was almost uniformly negative. Alfred
Rosenberg, the 'official philosopher' of National Socialism, was well
I
XXX
.Votes to pages viii-ix
aware
Hegel's admiration for the French Revolution, and
denounced the Hegelian Volksstaat as a conception,{~t;> our blo~
(Rosenberg, 17re Mytil oftile Twentietil Centii1J', tr. V. Bira {Torrance,
CA: Noontide, I982), p. 328). Hegel has usually been associated with
twentieth-century fascism by those who hate both Hegel and fascism,
and most ofl:en by those whose real target is not so much fascism as
Marxism.
8 See John Dewey, Gemra11 Pililosopily and Politics {I9IS); Karl Popper,
17re Operr Society a11d Its E11ernies, Volume II; 17le Higil Tide o[Propilec:J':
Hegel, Man mrd tile A.ften11atil {I945). For a broader account of this
tradition, see Ottmann, brdividumn rmd Gerneirucila.ft, pp. I92-223.
9 These included Eduard Gans, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl
Rosenkranz, and the Education Minister Johannes Schulze. See John
Edward Toews, Hegelianism, especially pp. 7I-I54, 203-242.
IO In the early twentieth century, this position was represented by
scholars such as Franz Rosenzweig and Hans Heimsoth {Franz
Rosenzweig, Hegel rmd derStaat {I92o); Hans HeimsOth, Politik rmd
Moral irr Hegels Gesdtidusplrilosopllie {I935) ). After the Second World
War, the 'centrist-reformist' image of Hegel's political philosophy was
powerfully defended by three influential scholars: Joachim Ritter,
Eric \Veil, and T. M. Knox. See Knox, 'Hegel and Prussianism'
(I935) {reprinted in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Hegel's Political PllilostJp/ry {New York: Atherton, I97o)), and also the editorial material in
Knox's I942 translation of 17re Plrilosoplry o[Rig/11 (Oxford University
Press, I967); Eric Wei~ Hegel et l'itat (I95o); and Joachim Ritter,
Hegel and tire Frerrclr Revol11timr (I957), tr. R. D. Winfield {Cambridge,
M A: MIT Press, I 982 ). A list of prominent Hegel scholars since the
I950S who share the basic view of Knox, \Veil, and Ritter would have
to include virtually every responsible scholar of Hegel's thought in the
past two generations. See especially: Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's 17reory of
tile Modmr State (Cambridge University Press, I972); Jacques
d'Hondt, Hegel irr His Time {I973); translated by John Burbidge
{Lewiston, NY: Broad\iew, I988). Once again, for a reliable account
of the tradition which views Hegel as part of the 'mainstream of
Western political theory' see Ottmann, brdividurun rmd Gesel/sdlll.ft,
pp. 224-378. A debate between proponents the new consensus and
the older tradition of liberal criticism can be found in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Hegel's Political Pltilosop/rJ. The recent publication of
transcriptions of Hegel's lectures between I 8 I 7 and I 83 I has further
confirmed such interpretations. See the editors' introductions to
these texts by Karl-Heinz Ilting {VPR I, 25-I26, VPRI7 I7-34) and
Dieter Henrich {VPRI9 9-39).
.Votes to pages :riii-:r:rvii

I I There are some who deny there is any such thing as a community's
'common interest' and some who think there are_ no objectiye
~~.\lhir!!J!!L~, that individual interests are nothing but what
individuals happen to enjoy, want or prefer. If such people are right,
of course, then there cannot be any such thing as (Hegelian) freedom;
freedom itself will be only an illusion.
r2 Kant, A3r6/B373; TP 289-290173; RL 230l35. (For key to abbreviations see pp. xlix-1.)
I3 See Manfred Riedel, Between Traditio11 a11d Reuollllio11, tr. Walter
Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, r984), Chapter 6,
pp. I32-I37
I4 See Mill, Ott Libert], ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett,
r978), pp. 6r-65, roB.
I 5 Eduard Gans, Natll"echt tmd Universalrechtsgeschidlle, ed. Manfred
Riedel (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, r98r), p. 92.
r6 Mill, 011 Represmtative Govemmem, ed. Currin Shields (Indianapolis:
Hobbs-Merrill, r958), pp. 74-76, 8r-82.
I 7 This particular triadic piece of jargon was actually used by both
Fichte and Schelling (each for his own purposes), but to my knowledge it was never used, not even once, by Hegel. We owe this way of
presenting the Hegelian dialectic to Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus, a
bowdlerizer of German idealist philosophy (see G. E. Mueller, 'The
Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"', Joumal of the
History of Ideas I9 (r958), pp. 4I I-4I4. To use this jargon in
expounding Hegel is almost always an unwitting confession that the
expositor has little or no first-hand knowledge of Hegel.
xxxii
Chronology
I770
1788
I793
I797
I8oi
I8o2
I 8os
I8o6
I 8o7
I8o8
I812
I8 I 6
Born 27 August, Stuttgart, Wiirttemberg.

Enters the Tiibingen theological seminary.
Leaves Tiibingen, becomes private tutor to a family in
Bern, Switzerland.
Takes a new tutoring position in Frankfurt a.M.
After the death of his father, uses his legacy to finance
an academic career at Jena, where his friend Schelling
helps him to secure an unsalaried position as Privatdozent 17re Differerzce Betweetl Fichte's arul Schelling's
System ofPhilosophy, Hegel's first publication.
Faith and Knowledge; On the Wa.JS of Treating Natural
Right Scierztifica/ ly.
Promoted to Professor Extraordinarius.
Fathers an illegitimate child by his married landlady,
Dorothea Burkhardt.
The Pher~ommology ofSpirit. Napoleon's defeat of Prussian forces at Jena disrupts the university, and Hegel is
forced to seek employment elsewhere, becoming editor
of a newspaper in Bamberg.
Becomes Rector of a gymnasium (secondary school) in
Nuremberg.
Marries Marie von Tiicher. Scier~ce ofLogic, Volume 1.
Scierue ofLogic, Volume 11. Hegel is offered a professorship in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg.
Encydopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, first edition in
one volume, to be used as a text in Hegel's Heidelberg
lectures.
Clzrmrology
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1824
1827
1830
183 1
Lectures f<r the first time on the system of ideas later

presented in the Pllilosoplzy ofRiglzt during the academic
year 1817-I8I8.
Invited to succeed Fichte (d. 1814) at the prestigious
chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin. At
Berlin, lectures for a second time (I8I8-I8Ig) on the
Plzilosoplzy ofRiglzt, which by now probably exists complete in draft.
Political upheavals and the institution of academic censorship lead to withdrawal and revision of the Plzilosoplzy
of Riglzt. Lectures on these topics for a third time
I8Ig-I820.
Completes the Plzilosoplzy ofRiglzt.
Publication of the Plzilosoplzy of Rig/11 in January. Lectures on its subject a fourth time 1821-1822.
Lectures on the philosophy of right a fifth time
1822-1823.
Lectures on the philosophy of right a sixth time
1824-1825.
Eru:yclopaedia of tlze Plzilosoplzical Scierzces revised and
expanded to three volumes.
Third edition of ,cyclopaedia of tlze Plzilosoplzical
Scierzces.
Begins lecturing a seventh time on the philosophy of
right. After a month, is stricken with cholera and dies 14
November.
XXXIV
Translator's preface
This translation is based on the text of the first edition of the Rechtsphilosophie (182o), as reproduced in Volume vn of Hegel's Werke,
edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel and published
by the Suhrkamp Verlag (Frankfurt am Main, 1970). I have compared
the text throughout with the variorum edition of the work in Volume 11
of Karl-Heinz Dting's edition of Hegel's Vorlesrmgen iiber Reclltsphilosophie r8r8-r8jr (referred to as VP R II, see key to abbreviations, p. xlviii), whose readings I have at times adopted in preference
to those of the Suhrkamp edition; in all such cases, and on those
occasions when I have encountered errors in the Suhrkamp text, I
have supplied explanatory footnotes.
To the main numbered paragraphs of his text, Hegel frequendy
adds elucidatory comments, often of considerable length, which he
describes as Anmerkrmgen- a term which I have translated (both in
the singular and in the plural) as 'Remarks'. These Remarks are
indented throughout the translated text, as they are in the German
original, to distinguish them from the main text of the numbered
paragraphs to which they are appended. Many of these paragraphs are
further augmented by 'Additions' (Zusiitu} consisting of additional
material from lectures on the Reclztsphilosophie delivered by Hegel
after the first edition of the work had appeared. These Additions are
not indented, but printed in smaller type and prefixed in each case by
the word 'Addition' in order to distinguish them from Hegel's basic
text and Remarks. The Additions were not in fact compiled by Hegel,
but by his pupil Eduard Gans, who incorporated them in his own
edition of the Rechtsphilosop/lie, first published in 1833 and reissued in
XXXV
I 84o; they have also been included in more recent editions such as
those of Bolland (I902) and Lasson (I9I I), as well as that of the
Suhrkamp Verlag (I970). Gans derived the Additions not from
manuscripts of Hegel himself, but from the lecture notes oftwo other
pupils, namely H. G. Hotho, who attended Hegel's lectures of I822I82J, and K. G. von Griesheim, who attended the lectures of I824I825. They are included in this translation rather because of their
long traditional association with Hegel's text than because of any
claim they might have to scrupulous philological accuracy. They
should, in fact, be treated with caution, not so much because they are
based on the notes of students (which actually seem to be conscientious and reasonably accurate in this case), but because Gans's
extracts are highly selective, combining material from two distinct
lecture series and consisting largely of paraphrase rather than verbatim quotation. The complete original texts of Hotho's and
Griesheim's notes have been available since I974 in Volumes 111 and
IV respectively of Ilting's edition of the Vorlesungen iiber Reclrtsplrilosoplrie (VPR), :in which Ilting helpfully encloses in curly brackets
those sections drawn upon by Gans for the Additions. To facilitate
comparison between Gans's versions and the original lecture notes as
published by Ilting, I have identified the source of each Addition by
prefixing to it the letter H (Hotho; see VPR 111), G (Griesheim; see
VPR IV), or both. I have checked Gans's Additions against their
sources throughout, and while I have made no attempt to indicate the
content of those large sections of Hotho's and Griesheim's notes
which Gans has simply ignored, or to record the numerous modifications of phrasing and terminology which he has himself introduced, I
have drawn attention in foomotes to those occasions on which he
appears to have misread or seriously misrepresented the text of
Hotho's and/or Griesheim's notes, or added comments of his own for
which there is no precedent in the sources.
Gans also had at his disposal Hegel's own manuscript annotations
to I-I So of the first edition of the Reclllspllilosoplzie. These annotations, which are reproduced in Hoffmeister's (I955) and Ilting's
editions of the work and in that of the Suhrkamp Verlag, are not
included here, because they consist for the most part not of continuous prose but of highly condensed jottings whose value for an
understanding of the text :is limited; besides, they are frequently
Tratzslator's preface
cryptic, oo that any translation c:i them would have to rely heavily on
conjecture.
In those sections of the text for which he was himself responsible,
Hegel uses two distinct means in order to indicate paragraph divisions, and I have retained this distinction in my translation. Major
divisions - of which there are relatively few - are indicated by the
conventional device of starting a new line and indenting the beginning
of the new paragraph. Less important divisions are marked only by a
dash before the beginning of the next sentence (or group of
sentences).
I have also attempted to reproduce, in the English translation,
Hegel's frequent use of italics for emphasis. These italics are an
important pointer not only to those terms or ideas on which Hegel
wished to lay particular stress, but even at times to his meaning (see,
for example, the first sentence of 167, in which the italics make it
clear that the words in parenthesis refer only to the noun 'inwardness', and not to the noun 'truth' as well). Hegel's use of italics for
titles of books is likewise retained, although I have not followed his
(by no means consistent) practice, in which he was influenced by
printing conventions of his day, ofitalicizing personal names and both
real and hypothetical quotations; in keeping with modem usage,
names are set in normal type and quotations are identified as such by
quotation-marks alone. Only on very rare occasions (for example, on
two occurrences of the word 'this' in the Addition to 70) have I
introduced italics of my own to indicate necessary emphasis in
English.
A word must now be said concerning the principles underlying this
translation, and about the ways in which it differs from the wellknown version by T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1942).
The Rechtsphi/osophie is characterized by a high level of abstraction
and density of expression, and makes frequent use of technical terms
and phrases of uniquely Hegelian significance. I could not therefore
hope to attain that degree of readability and naturalness of English
expression at which I aimed in my translation of Hegel's Lectures on
the Philosophy of World History (bztroduction) (Cambridge, 1975), for
the latter work is for the most part considerably less abstract and
technical in character than the Rechtsphi/osophie. But I have attempted,
as in the previous translation, to achieve a high degree of literalness,
xxxvii
especially in conveying the conceptual basis of Hegel's thought; on
the present occasion, however, I have been more conscious of the
need to maintain consistency in translating technical terms and words
which Hegel uses particularly frequendy, or which have a particular
significance within his thought To cite two examples, I translate
terms such as an rmd for sich ('in and for itself) literally throughout,
and render Hegel's much-used term Bestimmung as 'detennination'
wherever possible, supplying the original in brackets in cases where
sense and usage call for alternative renderings. I considered it less
essential, on the other hand, to try to reproduce Hegel's sentence
structure exactly where this would have made fa- unduly cumbersome
or unidiomatic English.
The term Recht, which occurs in the title of Hegel's work and on
numerous occasions throughout the text, also calls for comment. Its
range of meaning, which is closely akin to that of the Latin term ius, is
much wider than that of the English word 'right', for it encompasses
not only the rights of specific individuals and groups of people, but
also the entire realm of law and justice, both as philosophical concepts
(cf. Naturrecht, English 'natural law') and actual institutions (cf. rihnisclzes Recht, English 'Roman law'). For the sake of consistency, I have
translated it as 'right' whenever possible, and on those (relatively
infrequent) occasions when I have had to translate the word Recht- as
distinct from its compounds - as 'law' or 'justice', I have added the
original in square brackets.
T. M. Knox's translation has been of considerable assistance to
me. On many occasions, I found myself indebted to his solutions to
daunting problems which confront the reader and translator of
Hegel's text Where Knox's renderings seemed incapable of significant improvement- as was not infrequently the case - I made no
attempt to look for alternatives simply for the sake of being different.
On the other hand, Knox's language is often excessively formal by
today's standards, and even at times archaic (which is scarcely surprising after almost half a century); in such cases, I have tried to adopt
a less stilted idiom.
The main difference between my translation and Knox's, however,
is that his general strategy is almost the reverse of my own as described at the top of this page. Knox declares in his preface (pp. xi-xii)
that he has aimed at a literal translation. This literalness is more
conspicuous, however, in his attempts to reproduce Hegel's sen-
tence-structure and turns of phrase, even at the expense eX English
idiom, than in his treabnent of Hegel's network of concepts. He tends
to paraphrase technical expressions (for example, by rendering an tmd
for sich as 'absolute(ly)'), and to translate the same conceptual term in
numerous different ways according to context (for example, by
employing over twenty-five different translations for the term Bestimmung- admittedly an extreme and problematic case); and in particularly abstract passages, he tends to abandon even his customary
adherence to Hegel's sentence-structure in favour of free paraphrase
(comparison of our respective renderings of 183, for example, or of
the first sentence of 173 should make the latter difference
apparent). In view of these differences of approach, Knox's renderings have on many occasions struck me as too loose or imprecise, and
I have duly endeavoured to improve on them. But I must again
acknowledge with gratitude that Knox's general understanding of
Hegel's German is of a high order, with the result that the number of
outright errors I have been able to identify in his translation (around
seventy-five) is remarkably small for a work as long and complex as
the Rechtsplzilosoplzie.
Some of Knox's solutions to problems posed by Hegel's technical
terminology are now so well established in English-speaking Hegel
scholarship that I have simply taken them over, as I did in my previous
translation. These include his translations of real and wirle/iclz as 'real'
and 'actual', and of moraJisclz and sittliclz as 'moral' and 'ethical'. (The
latter translation, incidentally, is sanctioned by a manuscript gloss of
Hegel's on the expression etlzische Pjliclztenlelzre ('ethical theory of
duties') in 148: the gloss reads 'Etlzisclz- statt moralisch- sittlich' (i.e.
'not moral, but ethical or sittliclz')- see VPR 11, 557.)
The pairs of words just cited are, however, only two instances of a
phenomenon which occurs with bewildering frequency in Hegel's
writings and which confronts the translator with formidable difficulties - namely his tendency to employ pairs, or even triads, of terms
which were virtually synonymous in the German of his day and to
invest them at times - but by no means invariably - with nuances of
difference or even with contrasting meanings; some of these differences of meaning will indeed be apparent only to those who are
familiar with the connotations of the terms in question in other parts
of Hegel's philosophical system. Examples of such couplings (in addition to the two already mentioned) include Dasein and Existenz, Ding
xxxix
and Soche, Objekt and Gegenstand, Bezielmng and Relation {also
Verlziiltnis), Grenze and Sc/zrmzke, Gefiihl and Empfindzmg, and Nation
and Volk. It is sometimes possible to find equivalent {if at times
somewhat arbitrarily chosen) pairs of words in English, such as
'reference' and 'relation' for Bezielnmg and Verlliiltnis, or 'boundary'
and 'limit' for Grenze and Sc/zrauke. But on many occasions, the only
natural translation f<r both German words will be the same English
word, as with 'existence' for both Dasein {very awkwardly rendered by
some earlier translators as 'determinate being') and E:ristmz, 'thing'
for Ding and Soclze, and 'object' for Objekt and Gegmstmzd. My solution in such cases has usually been to employ the same English word
f<r both, adding the German originals in square brackets; the wider
associations and range of meaning of such terms, as used by Hegel,
can then be followed up in the glossary at the end of the volume.
When both of the words in such a coupling occur with great
frequency, I have supplied the originals of both {as with Dasein and
Existmz, Ding and Soche). But where one of the two is used with
greater frequency, or adheres consistently to a shared meaning from
which its partner at times deviates, I have supplied the original only of
the less frequent or more variable term, as with the adjectives besonder
{frequently used) and partikular {less frequently used) for 'particular',
and the nouns Objekt {consistent meaning) and Gegenstaud {more
variable meaning) for 'object'. This arrangement has the advantage of
reducing the number of German interpolations needed in the text. To
the same end, I have normally supplied such words, where they are
required, only on their first occurrence within each of Hegel's numbered paragraphs {including any subsequent Remarks or Addition),
except where the interval between successive occurrences is so long
as to justifY a repetition; later occurrences of the relevant English
term within the same paragraph and its appendages can normally be
assumed to translate the German term already supplied on the
previous occasion. When the near-synonym of the German term in
question also occurs within a given paragraph and its appendages, I
have continued to supply the German originals of both in all instances
where the two might otherwise be confi1sed. In a few cases where I
have been unable to detect any semantic difference between such
terms - as with the pairings Gnmdsatz and Prinzip {'principle') or
Jurist and Rec/ztsgelehrter {'jurist'), for example, and on some occasions
with Berechtigung and Rechtfertigu"g {'justification') - I have used the
xl
Tra11slator's preface
same English word for both without supplying the original of either.
But in all cases where significant distinctions might otherwise be
missed, or where conceptually significant German terms are
translated in an unconventional or anomalous manner, I have added
the original in brackets. The obvious disadvantage of interrupting the
English text with parentheses of this kind is, to my mind, outweighed
by the greater precision and insight into Hegel's usage which this
procedure makes possible.
All of the German terms so far mentioned are to be found, with
their English translations, in the glossary. In this glossary, those
English renderings which, in the text, are normally accompanied by
the German original are identified by an asterisk, and crossreferences to their synonyms, near synonyms, and apparent synonyms
are also supplied. The glossary makes no claim to comprehensiveness; it includes only key terms, and in particular those which present
difficulties of translation. Its chief purpose, apart from listing the
standard translations employed, is to elucidate, by means of crossreferences to related terms and by including most secondary as well as
primary English renderings of the German words listed, those clusters of concepts which are of vital importance to an understanding of
Hegel's thought. It is, of course, impossible to apply a list of standard
English equivalents mechanically in translating a work as complex as
the Rechlsplzilosoplzie, or to use the glossary in reverse as a key to the
German originals of every English term listed in it. Two examples
may illustrate the difficulties involved. First, two or more completely
different German words, which are in no way synonyms, may have to
be translated by the same English term which happens to have two or
more distinct meanings. Thus, the words Subjekt, Gegenstand (in
certain contexts), and Untertan, may all be translated as 'subject', as
applied respectively to mind as distinct from its object, to the topic of
a treatise or discourse, and to one who owes allegiance to a sovereign
or state. But in the absence of full dictionary-style definitions of each
distinct usage - and such definitions are beyond the scope of a
glossary of translations - only the context within the work itself can
make the different senses intelligible. And secondly, in cases where
literal translation is impossible - as with many of Hegel's adjectival
nouns, whose English translation requires a noun to be added to the
adjective in question (for example, in the second sentence of 170,
where ein Gemeinsames is translated 'a common purpose', or in the
xli
third sentence of I 18, where ganz anderes is translated as 'things
quite different')- words may be generated ('purpose' and 'things' in
the examples just cited) fm- which no precise equivalent is present in
the original. In those (relatively few) instances of this kind where
confusion or serious ambiguity seemed likely to result, I have supplied
the original German in brackets. It must, however, be emphasized
that, in any systematic study of Hegel's linguistic usage, there is no
substitute for consulting the original text.
Another class of terms which present the translator with difficulties
are those which Hegel on some occasions invests with a sense
peculiar to his own system, but on other occasions continues to use in
one or more of the senses which they possess in everyday usage. The
most familiar of these is perhaps the verb aufheben, which I have
normally translated as 'to supersede' when it is used in its technical
sense (which itself encompasses the meanings 'to remove (or cancel)',
'to raise', and 'to preserve'); when translating it in other ways (for
example, as 'to overcome'), I have added the original in brackets.
Similarly, Vorslellrmg often denotes that mode of 'representational
thought' or 'representational thinking' which, for Hegel, deals not in
concepts but in images raised to the form of universality; but on other
occasions, it signifies no more than a 'notion' or 'idea' in the everyday
senses of these words. The range of this particular term - like the
term Beslimmung- is exceptionally wide and variable in Hegel's writings, and I have supplied the original in brackets on those occasions
where translations other than 'representational thought' or 'representational thinking' are required. Hegel's use of the term Idee, however,
is more consistent. He uses it almost invariably in its technical sense,
to denote the full development (or 'truth') of the Begriff or concept.
To indicate this special significance, I have translated it throughout
with a capital, as 'Idea'.
Certain other terms cause difficulties because the institutions to
which they refer do not have precise counterparts in present-day
society, or because the German term in question has no precise
equivalent in English. Thus, Hegel's Polizei has a much wider sense
than the English 'police', since it refers to an authority whose
responsibility extends beyond the upholding oflaw and order to such
matters as price control, public works, and welfare provisions; for this
reason, Knox and others have translated it as 'public authority'. To
this I would object that Hegel's Polizei is just as alien to modem
xlii
Tra1ZS/ator's preface
German-speakers as the translation 'police' is to modem Englishspeakers, because the word Polizei in modem German has much the
same range of meaning as 'police' has in modem English. I have
accordingly used the translation 'police' throughout The term Stiinde
poses two distinct problems, first because the institutions to which it
refers have changed in character since Hegel's day, and secondly
because it has not just one but two (albeit closely related) meanings.
The Stiinde were, in the first place, the Estates (or Etals) of feudal and
absolutist society, whose representatives might constitute a formal
assembly or parliament. The identity of these Estates was grounded in
supposedly natural divisions within society (such as nobility, clergy,
and commoners), and the term could accordingly be used in a wider
sense (as the singular Stand regularly was) to denote other naturally
distinct social groups such as the practitioners of different trades or
professions. In the former, predominantly political sense, I have
translated Stiinde as 'Estates' (with a capital). And in the latter, wider
sense, I have translated it as 'estates' (with a small letter), in order to
distinguish it from Hegel's term Klllsse, which I have in tum
translated as 'class' and which corresponds more closely to the
modem concept of class as a socio-economic category. The term
Wissenscha.ft, in Hegel's day as in the present, has no precise
equivalent in English, the nearest approximation being the term
'science', which I have accordingly used to translate it. Wissenscha.ft in
German denotes any branch of knowledge or scholarly activity which
is pursued and cultivated in a systematic manner, and in Hegel's case,
it is associated in particular with philosophy as he himself understood
it. The English term 'science', on the other hand, at least since the
first half of the nineteenth century, has carried a more circumscribed
meaning, being associated first and foremost with the explanation of
natural phenomena.
Even the commonest of German verbs, the verb sein ('to be'), can
cause considerable problems, chiefly because Hegel often uses it in
an absolute sense (i.e. without a predicate). Such usage (as in 'To be,
or not to be') is rare in English, so that literal translation is not always
possible. Where sei11 in the absolute sense is coupled with an sich ('in
itselP),fiir sich ('for itselP), etc., I have translated it as 'to have being'
(for example, 'to have being in and for itselr for Hegel's an tozdfiir
sich sein). Where it means 'to exist', I have at times rendered it as 'to
be present' in order to avoid confusion with 'to exist' as a translation
xliii
Tra11Siator's preface
of Hegel's existieren, although 'to exist' is sometimes feasible where no
confusion with existieren is possible.
A word must be said in conclusion on the issue of gender-specific
language. By present-day standards, Hegel's views on women, like
those of many of his contemporaries, are highly discriminatory and
even offensive (see, for example, I 66 of the Reclztsphilosophie).
Accordingly, he regularly uses masculine pronouns, adjectival forms,
etc. either to include the feminine, or to exclude it altogether because
he considers the female sex irrelevant to whatever political or social
institution he is discussing. In the interests of accuracy, I have
wherever possible translated such forms literally. I have, however, in
most cases translated the word Mensch as 'human being', although in a
minority of contexts where this would have sounded unduly awkward
or necessitated a misleading use of the plural, I have translated it as
'man' or 'mankind' (see, for example, IS and the Addition to IJ9).
Square brackets are used throughout to indicate material interpolated by the editor or translator. Such material includes both original German terins where these are supplied, and words or phrases
which I have added for ease of reading or comprehension, but which
have no equivalents in the original. Works frequendy cited in the
fooblotes are referred to by short tide or abbreviation, followed
(where applicable) by volume-number in Roman numerals and pagenumber: e.g. VPR 111, 100; Werke, vn, 200.
Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Allen Wood for
his scrutiny of my translation and for many helpful suggestions, and to
Mrs Ema Smith for fitting into an already busy schedule the timeconsuming task of typing the manuscript.
Cambridge, June
H. B. Nisbet
I 990
xliv
Key to abbreviations
In the editorial notes, writings of Hegel, Kant, Fichte, and Fries will
be cited according to the following system of abbreviations. All
translations occurring in the notes are by the editor, but standard
English translations (where they exist) will normally be cited, with
English pagination following German pagination, separated by a slash
(/).
Writings of Hegel
Werke
Hegel:
Werke: Theorie Werkmugabe. Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970. Cited by volume and page
number.
Hegels Briefe, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister and

Friedheim Nicolin. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1981. Cited by volume and page number.
Hegel: 17ze Lellers, translated by Clark Butler and
Christiane Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984. Cited by page number.
Dijferet~ des Fidzte'sc/~e~z
zmd Sc/zeOing'sclren S)Stetlls der

PhilqSPphie (1801), Werke n.
The.Di./feretzce Betllleetl Ficlzte's and Seize/ling's System of
Philosophy, translated by H. S. Harris and Walter
Cerf. Albany: SUNY Press, 1977.
DV
Die Veifasstmg DeuJschlands, Werke 1.

'The German Constitution', translated by T. M. Knox,
xlv
in Z. Pelczynski (ed.) Hegel's Political Writings, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, I 964.
EH
Er~z.yklopiidie
EL
Enz.yklopiidie der plrilosophischen Wissensdra.fterr 1 (I8I7,

rev. I827, I8Jo), Werke VIII.
Hegel's Logic, translated by William Wallace. Oxford
University Press, I975 Cited by paragraph() num-
der philosoplrischcn Wissenschafterr (I8I7

Heidelberg version). Hege/s siimtliche Werke, IV.
Auflage der Jubiliiumsausgabe, edited by Hermann
Glockner. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag,
I968. Volume VI. Cited by paragraph ()number.
ber. Additions are indicated by an 'A'.
EN
EriZyklopiidie der philosoplrischen Wissenscha.ften II (I 8 I 7,

rev. I827, I8Jo), Werke IX.
Hegel's Philosophy ofNatrtre, edited by M.J. Petry. New
York: Humanities Press, I970. Cited by paragraph()
number.
EG
Enz.yklopiidie Jer philosophischen Wissenschaften 111

(I8I7, rev. I827, I8Jo), Werke x.
Hegel's Philosophy ofMind, translated by William Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, I97I.
Cited by paragraph () number. Additions are indicated by an 'A'.
GW
Glauben und Wisserr (I8o2), Werke II.

Faith a11d Knowledge, translated by Walter Cerf and H.
S. Harris. Albany: SUNY Press, I977
JR
Jenaer Rea/plrilosophie (I8os-I8o6) (previous title:

Jenenser Rea/philosoplrie II), edited by J. Hoffmeister.
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, I969.
Hegel a11d the Huma11 Spirit, translated by Leo Rauch.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, I98J. Cited by
page number.
JR1
Jenerrser Rea/philosophie
1 (I80J-I804), edited by J.
Hoffineister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, I9JO.
Cited by page number.
xlvi
LW
[Beurteilung der] Verllandlzmgen in der Versammlung der

Landstiinde des Konigreiclls Wiirttemberg im Jallr rBrs
und r8r6, Werke IV.
'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom
of Wiirttemberg, 1815-1816', Hegel's Political Writ-
ings.
NP
Niimberger Propiideutik (18o8-18u), Werke rv.
NR
Uber die TIJisserzscllafilicllerl Bellandlungsarter1 des Naturrecllts (1802), Werke 11.

Natural Law, translated by T. M. Knox. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 197 5 Cited by page
number.
PhG
Pllanomer1ologie des Geistes (1807), Werke 111.

Pllenommology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller.
Oxford University Press, 1977 Cited by paragraph(~)
number.
PR
Pkilosopllie des Recllts (1821), Werke vn.

Hegel's Pllilosophy of Rigllt, the present translation.
Cited by paragraph () number. Remarks are indicated by an 'R', Additions by an 'A'.
RB
Uber die englisclle Re[on11bill (1831), Werke XI.

'The English Reform Bill', Hegel's Political Writings.
SP
Verlliiltnis des Skeptizismus zur Pllilosopllie. Darstellung seiner vmcllieder1en Modijikationen und
Vergleicllung des neuester1 mit dern alter1, Werke 11.
'Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition
of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the
Latest Form with the Ancient One', in George di
Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Be111Jeer1 Kant and Hegel.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1985, pp. 311-362.
SS
System der Sittlicllkeit (1802), edited by G. Lasson.

Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967.
System of Ethical Lifo and First Pmlosophy of Spirit,

translated by H. S. Harris. Albany, 1979 Cited by
page number.
xlvii
TJ
17zeologisclze Jugerzdschrifierz (179 3- I Boo), Werke 1.
TE
Hegel: 17zree Essays, I'J9J-I'J95, translated by Peter

Fuss and John Dobbins. University of Notre Dame
Press, I 984.
ETW
Early 11zeological Writi11gs, translated by T. M. Knox.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, I 97 I.
VA
Vor/esu11gerz iiber die Asthetik, 3 vols. Werke XIII-XV.

17ze Philosophy of Fine Art, translated by F. B. P.
Osmaston. New York: Hacker, I975 4 vols. Cited by
volume and page number.
VG
Die Vennmfi i11 der Geschichte, edited by J. Hoffmeister.

Hamburg, I955
Lectures (Jrl the Philosophy of World History: lntroducti011,

translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge, I975 Cited
by page number.
VGP
Vorlesungetz iiber die Gesclziclzte der Plzilosophie I-III,

Werke XV111-XX.
Lectures mz the History of Philosophy, translated by
Elizabeth Haldane. New York: Humanities Press,
I968. Cited by volume and page number.
VPG
Vorlestmgerz iiber die Plzilosophie der Gesclzichte, Werke

XII.
11ze Plzilosoplzy ofHistory, translated by J. Sibree. New

York: Dover, I956. Cited by page number.
VPR
Vorlesungerz iiber Reclllsphilosophie, edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, I 97 4 Including
notes and transcriptions from Hegel's lectures of
t8I8-I8I9 (transcription by C. G. Homeyer), t82It822, I822-1823 {transcription by H. G. Hotho),
1824-1825 {transcription by K. G. von Griesheim),
1831 {transcription by D. F. StrauB). Cited by volume
and page number.
VPR17
Die Philosophie des Recllls: Die Mitschrifierz Watmerzmarm (Heidelberg 18q-r8J8) u"d Homeyer (Berli11
xlvili
Key to abbreviatiotzs
r8I8-r819), edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: KlettCotta Verlag, I983. Cited by page number.
VPRI9
VR
Pllilosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesrmg von r8r()lr82o,

anonymous transcription or transcriptions edited by
Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, I983.
Vorlesungen iiber die Philosoplzie der Religion, Werke
XVI-XVII.
Lectures 011 the Pllilosophy of Religion, 3 volumes,

translated by E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., I895 Cited
by volume and page number.
WL
Wissenschaft der Logik (I8I2, I8I6), Werke v-v1. Cited

by volume and page number.
Hegel's Science of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller.
London: George Allen & Unwin, I 969. Cited by page
number.
In writings cited by paragraph(), a comma used before 'R' or 'A'

means 'and'. Thus: 'PR 33,A' means 'PR 33 and the addition to
33'; 'PR 27o,R,A' means: 'PR 270 and the Remarks to 270
and the Addition to 270'.
Writings of Kant
GS
Ka~~ts
AlB
Kritik der reintm Vernunft, edited by Raymund

Schmidt. Hamburg: Meiner, I956.
Immanuel Kant's Critique ofPure Reason, translated by
Norman Kemp Smith. New York: StMartin's, I963.
Cited by first (A) and second (B) edition pagination,
separated by a slash (e.g. A84/'Bu6).
EF
Zum ewigen Fneden, GS vm.

'Perpetual Peace', translated by H. B. Nisbet, in Hans
Reiss (ed.) Kant's Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I970. Cited by page number.
Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Ausgabe der

koniglich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, I 9 I o- . Cited by volume and page number.
xlix
Key to abbreviatimzs
G
Gnmdlegzmg der Metaphysik der Sillen, GS IV.

Foundaliorzs of the Metaphysics ofMorals, translated by
Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
I 959 Cited by page number.
KpV
Kritik der praktisclzen Venzunfi, GS v.

Critique ofPractical Reason, translated by Lewis White
Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, I956. Cited by
page number.
Religion imzerha/b der Grenzen der bloften Vemunfi, GS

VI.
Religion Withitzthe Limits ofReasmzAiotze, translated by

Theodore M Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New
York: Harper & Row, I96o. Cited by page number.
RL
MetaplzysikderSitten: Rechtslehre, GS VI.

Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John
Ladd. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Cited by page
number, but occasionally by section () number,
especially passages not translated into English.
TL
Metaplzysik der Sillm: Tugendlehre, GS VI.

17ze Doctritze of Virtue, translated by Mary J. Gregor.
New York: Harper & Row, I 964. Cited by page number.
TP
Uber dm Gtmzeitzspmch: Das mag i11 der 17zeorie riclztig

sei1z, taugt aber tziclzt fur die Praxis, G S VIn.
'On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True In
Theory, But It Does Not Apply In Practice',
translated by H. B. Nisbet, in Hans Reiss (ed.) Ka11t's
Political Writitzgs. Cited by page number.
VE
Eine Vorlesmzg Katlls iiber Ethik, edited by P. Menzer

(Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, I 924).
Lectures 011 Ethics, translated by L. Infield. New York:

Harper, I 96 3 Cited by original German and English
page number.
Wri rings of Fichte

FW
Fichtes Werke, edited by I. H. Fichte. Berlin: W. de

Gruyter & Co., I 97 I. Cited by volume and page number.
FR
Beitrag zur BericlztigU1lg der Urteile des Publikums iiber

die franziisisclze Revolution Vtn Allempt to Currect the
Public's Judgments Concerning the French Revolution)
(1793), FW VI.
GNR
Gnmdlagen des Naturrechts (I796), FW 111.

Science ofRights, translated by A. E. Kroeger. London:
Trubner & Co., I889.
SL
System der Siuenle/zre (I798), FW rv.

17ze Science of Etlzics, translated by A. E. Kroeger.
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.,
I897
Wissensc/zaftslehre (I794), including the two introductions (I797), FW 1.

17ze Science of Knowledge, translated by Peter Heath
and John Lachs. Cambridge University Press, I983.
Writings of Fries
AKV
Anthropologische Krilik der Vmzunft Vtnthropologica/

Critique of Reason). Heidelberg: Winter, I838. Cited
by volume and page number, sometimes also by section () number.
NKV
First edition (I8o7) of AKV, entitled Neue Kritik der

Vernunft (New Critique ofReason). Cited by volume and
page number, sometimes also by section () number.
DBS
Von deutschem Bund und deutscher Staatsverfassung; allgemeine staatsrechtliche Ansichten (171e Gm11an Federation and Gen11an Constitution). Heidelberg: Mohr &
Winter, I8I6. Cited by part and page number; dedication cited by page number only.
li
FOB
'Feierrede an die teutschen Burschen' ('Address to

the German Fraternities') Opposilionsblatl oder
Weimarische Zeillmg 30 October 1817.
GDJ
Ober die Geflihrdzmg des Wolzlslandes mzd Clzaraclers der

Deulsclzen durclz die Juden (Tize Danger Posed by the Jews
lo German We/I-Bei11g and Clzaracler). Heidelberg:
Mohr & Winter, 1816. Cited by page number.
HPP
Handbuclz der pmklisclzm Plzilosoplzie. Heidelberg:

Mohr & Winter, 1818.
JE
Julius zmd Evagoras: oder, Sclzonlzeil der See/e. Ein

plzi/osoplzisc/zer Roman. (1813); 2nd expanded edn.,
Heidelberg: Christian Friedrich Winter, 1822.
Dialogues 011 Moralily and Religion, translated by David
Walford. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1982. Cited
by page number.
Iii
G. W. F. Hegel
Elements of the
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
Or
Natural Law and Political Science in
Outline
Table of Contents
Preface
page9
[The Occasion of the Present Work]
[The Speculative Method]
[The Province of Ethics]
[Recent Superficial Treatments of Ethics and
the State]
[The Relation of Philosophy to the State]
Introduction
[ I-2: The Speculative Method]
[ 3: Philosophy and Jurisprudence]
[ 4-Io: Freedom]
[ II-2I: Development of the Free Will]
[ 22-28: The Absolutely Free Will]
[ 29-32: The System of Right]
[ 33] Subdivisions
Part One: Abstract Right

[ 34-40: The Person]
Section
I:
Property
[ 4I-53: Persons and Things]
A. [ 54-58] Taking Possession
B. [ 59-64] Use of the Thing
C. [ 65-70] The Alienation of Property
[ 7 I] Transition from Property to Contract
Section
2:
Contract
[ 72-75: The Contractual Relation]
[ 76-79: Moments of the Contract]
[So: Kinds of Contracts]
[ 8I: Transition to Wrong]
Section 3: Wrong
[ 82-83: The Concept ofWrong]
A. [ 84-86] Unintentional Wrong
B. [ 87-Sg] Deception
C. Coercion and Crime
3
9
IO
II
IS
I9
25
25
28
35
45
53
58
62
6s
67
13
73
84
88
95
I02
I04
I04
Io6
I IO
IIJ
I I5
IIS
I I7
u8
I I9
Philosophy ofRight
[ 90--93: Coercion]
[ 94-: Crime]
[ 97-99: The Cancellation ofCrime]
[ IC>CriOI: Justice]
[ I02-I03: Punishment and Revenge]
[ I04) Transition from Right to Morality
Part Two: ;Morality

[ I05-I07: Subjectivity]
[ Io8-I I2: Subjectivity and Objectivity]
[ I I3-I I4: Action]
119
I2I
I23
126
I30
I3I
I33
I35
I37
I40
Section I: Purpose and Responsibility

[ II 5-u6: Responsibility and Liability]
[ 117-118: Purpose and the Right of
Knowledge]
Section 2: Intention and Welfare

[ II()-120: The Right oflntention]
[ I2I-125: Self-Satisfaction and Welfare]
[ I26-128: Right and Welfare]
I47
I47
I49
I53
Section 3: The Good and the Conscience

[ I2()-I3I: The Good]
[ I32: The Right oflnsight into the Good]
[ I33-I35: Moral Duty]
[ I36-I38: True Conscience]
[ I39-I4o: Evil]
[ I4I] Transition from Morality to Ethical
Life
I57
I57
I58
I6I
I63
I67
Part Three: Ethical Lifo
I43
43
44
I85
I87
[ I42-I43: The Ethical as the Idea of

Freedom]
[ I44-I45=
[ I46-I47:
[ I48-I49:
[ I5cri5I:
( I52-I55:
[ I56-I57:
Ethical Objectivity]
Ethical Subjectivity]
Ethical Duty]
Virtue]
Ethical Right)
Ethical Spirit]
4
I89
I89
I90
I9I
I93
I95
I97
Table ofCmztmts
;;-.
.<
1==-
Section I: The Family

[ I58: Love]
[ I 6o: Moments of the Family]
A. Marriage
[ I 6I-I63: The Marriage Relation]
[ I64: The Marriage Ceremony]
[ I65-I66: Difference of the Sexes]
[ I67: Monogamy]
[ I 68: The Incest Prohibition]
[ I 69: Family Property]
B. The Family's Resources
[ I7o-I7I: Property in Common]
[ 172: The Kinship Group]
C. The Upbringing of Children and the Dissolution of the Family
[ I73: Parental Love]
[ I74-175: UpbringingofChildren]
[ 176: Divorce]
[ I 77: The Emancipation of Children]
[ 178-I8o: Rights of Inheritance]
[ I 8 I] Transition from the Family to Civil
Society
I99
I99
200
200
200
204
206
207
207
208
209
209
209
Section 2: Civil Society

[ I 82-I 84: A Society of Persons]
[ I85-I87: The Development ofParticularity]
[ I88: Moments of Civil Society]
A. The System of Needs
[ I89: Subjective Needs]
a. [ I90-I95l The Nature ofNeeds
and their Satisfaction
b. [ I96-I98] The Nature ofWork
c. [ I 99-208] Resources [and
Estates]
B. The Administration of Justice
[ 209-2 Io: The Recognition of Personal
Right]
a. [ 2I I-2I4] Right as Law
220
220
2IO
2IO
2II
2I3
2I4
2I4
2I9
222
226
227
227
228
23I
233
240
240
24I
Pllilosoplly ofRight
b. [ 215-218] The Existence of the
Law
c. The Court of Law
[ 219-221: The Need for Public
Justice]
[ 222-228: The Legal Process]
[ 229: Transition to the Police and
the Corporation]
C. The Police and the Corporation
[ 230: Particular Welfare as a Right]
a. The Police
[ 231-234: The Need for a
Universal Authority]
[ 235-240: Civil Society's Need
for Economic Regulation]
[ 241-245: Poverty in Civil
Society]
[ 246-248: Civil Society's
Tendency to Colonial Expansion]
[ 249: Transition to the Corporation]
b. [ 25o-255] The Corporation
[ 256: Transition from Civil
Society to the State]
Section 3: The State
[ 257-258: The State as Ethical Idea and
Objective Freedom]
[ 259: Moments of the State]
A. Constitutional Law
[ 26o-262: The State's Relation to
Individuals]
[ 263-266: The State's Relation to Institutions]
[ 267-270: The Subjective and Objective
Sides of the State: Patriotism, The Constitution, Religion]
[ 271: The Constitution as an Organism]
I. The Internal Constitution
6
246
251
251
253
259
259
259
260
260
261
265
267
269
270
273
275
275
281
282
282
286
288
304
305
Table ofContnzts
[ 272-274: Moments c1 the Rational
Constitution]
a. The Power of the Sovereign
[ 275: Three Moments of the
Sovereign Power]
[i. Universality]
[ 276-278: I. Unity of the
Sovereign]
[ 279: 2. The Sovereign as

Individual Person and Subject]
[ 28o-28I: 3 The Sovereign as
Natural Individual]
[ 282: The Right to Pardon]
[ii. 283-284: Particularity: The
Sovereign's Right to Appoint
Officials]
[iii. 285-286: Individuality: The
Stability of the Sovereign
Power]
b. The Executive Power
[ 287-290: The Structure of the
Civil Service]
[ 29I-292: Qualifications for
Public Service]
[ 293-297: The Duties of Civil
Servants]
c. The Legislative Power
[ 298-299: The Function of
Legislation]
[ 300: The Role of the Monarch
and Executive in Legislation]
[ 30I-304: The Estates Assembly]
[ 305-307: The l,Jpper House]
[ 308: The Lower House]
[ 309-3Io: The Task of
Deputies]
[ 3 I I: The Election of Deputies]
[ 3I2-3I3: The BicameralSystem]
7
305
3I 3
3I3
3I4
3I4
3I6
32I
325
326
327
328
328
332
332
336
336
339
339
345
346
348
350
35I
Philosophy ofRight
[ 314-3 I 5: The Function of the
Estates Assembly
[ 3I~3I8: Public Opinion]
[ 3 I9: Freedom of Public Communication]
[ 320: Transition to External
Sovereignty)
II. External Sovereignty
[ 32I-324: The State as an Individual]
[ 325-328: The Military Estate and
War]
[ 329: The Sovereign's Authority over
Foreign Mfairs]
B. International Law
[ 33o-331: The Status of International
Law]
[ 332-333: Treaties Between States]
[ 334-339: The Relations Between States
in Time of War]
[ 340: Transition from the State to World
History]
r-C. World History
[ 341-344: World History as the History of
Spirit)
[ 345: The Viewpoint of World History Is
Above Moral or Ethical Judgements)
[ 346-35I: The Stages of World History as
National Principles]
[ 352-354: The Four Realms of World
History]
I. 355: The Oriental Realm
2. 356: The Greek Realm
3 357: The Roman Realm
4 358--360: The Germanic Realm
35I
353
355
358
359
359
363
365
366
366
368
369
371
372
372
373
374
376
377
378
379
379
Preface
The immediate occasion for me to publish this outline is the need to
provide my audience with an introduction to the lectures on the
Philosophy ofRight which I deliver in the course of my official duties. 1
This textbook is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic,
exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of
philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to
accompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences (Heidelberg, 1817).2
The fact that this outline was due to appear in print and thus to
come before a wider public gave me the opportunity to amplify in it
some of those Remarks whose primary purpose was to comment
briefly on ideas [Vorstelltmgen] akin to or divergent from my own, on
further consequences of my argument, and on other such matters as
would be properly elucidated in the lectures themselves. I have amplified them here so as to clarify on occasion the more abstract contents
of the text and to take fuller account of related ideas [Vorstellmzgen]
which are current at the present time. As a result, some of these
Remarks have become more extensive than the aim and style of a
compendium would normally lead one to ex'Pect. A genuine compendium, however, has as its subject-matter what is considered to be
the entire compass of a science; and what distinguishes it - apart,
perhaps, from a minor addition here or there- is above all the way in
which it arranges and orders .the essential elements [Momente] of a
content which has long been familiar and accepted, just as the form in
which it is presented has its rules and conventions which have long
been agreed. But a philosophical outline is not expected to conform to
9
Plzilosoplzy ofRight
this pattern, if only because it is imagined that what philosophy puts
forward is as ephemeral a product as Penelope's weaving, which is
begun afresh every day. 3
It is certainly true that the primary difference between the present
outline and an ordinary compendium is the method which constitutes
its guiding principle. But I am here presupposing that the philosophical manner of progressing from one topic to another and of conducting a scientific proof- this entire speculative mode of cognition - is
essentially different from other modes of cognition. 4 The realization
that such a difference is a necessary one is the only thing which can
save philosophy from the shameful decljne into which it has fallen in
our times. It has indeed been recognized that the forms and rules of
the older logic - of definition, classification, and inference - which
include the rules of the understanding's cogmnon [Verstandeserkenntnis], are inadequate for speculative science. Or rather,
their inadequacy has not so much been recognized as merely felt, and
then the rules in question have been cast aside, as if they were simply
fetters, to make way for the arbitrary pronouncements of the heart, of
fantasy, and of contingent intuition; and since, in spite of this, reflection and relations of thought inevitably also come into play, the
despised method of commonplace deduction and ratiocination is
unconsciously adopted. - Since I have fully developed the nature of
speculative knowledge in my Science ofLogic,S I have only occasionally
added an explanatory comment on procedure and method in the
present outline. Given that the subject-matter is concrete and
inherently of so varied a nature, I have of course omitted to
demonstrate and bring out the logical progression in each and every
detail. But on the one hand, it might have been considered superfluous to do so in view of the fact that I have presupposed a familiarity
with sci!lntific method; and on the other, it will readily be noticed that
the work as a whole, like the construction [Ausbildung] of its parts, is
based Ofl the logical spirit. It is also chiefly from this point of view that
I would wish this treatise to be understood and judged. For what it
deals with is science, and in science, the content is essentially inseparable from the fomz.
It is true that we may hear it said by those who seem to adopt the
most thorough approach that form is a purely external quality, indifferent to the matter [Saclze] itself: which is alone of consequence;
furthermore, the task of the writer, especially the philosophical writer,
10
Preface
may be said to consist in the discovery of tmths, the statement of
tmths, and the dissemination of tmths and correct concepts. 6 But if we
consider how this task is actually performed, we see on the one hand
how the same old brew is reheated again and again and served up to
all and sundry - a task that may not be without its merits in educating
and arousing the emotions, though it might sooner be regarded as the
superfluous product of over-zealous activity- 'for they have Moses
and the prophets; let them hear them'. 7 Above all, we have ample
opportunity to wonder at the tone and pretentiousness that can be
detected in such writers, as if all that the world had hitherto lacked
was these zealous disseminators of truths, and as if their reheated
brew contained new and unheard-of truths which ought, as they
always claim, to be taken particularly to heart, above all 'at the present
time'. But on the other hand, we can see how whatever truths of this
kind are handed out by one party are displaced and swept away by
truths of precisely the same kind dispensed by other parties. And if,
amidst this jumble of truths, there is something that is neither old nor
new but enduring, how can it be extracted from these formlessly
fluctuating reflections -how can it be distinguished and verified other
than by scientific means?
The tmth concerning right, ethics, a11d the state is at any rate as old as
its expositi011 a11d promulgati011 in public laws arzd i11 public morality a11d
religio11. What more does this truth require, inasmuch as the thinking
mind [Geist] is not content to possess it in this proximate manner?
What it needs is to be comprehended as well, so that the content which
is already rational in itself may also gain a rational form and thereby
appear justified to free thinking. For such thinking does not stop at
what is give7l, whether the latter is supported by the external positive
authority of the state or of mutual agreement among human beings, or
by the authority of inner feeling and the heart and by the testimony of
the spirit which immediately concurs with this, but starts out from
itself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermost
being with the truth.
The simple reaction [Verha/ten] of ingenuous emotion is to adhere
with trusting conviction to the publicly recognized truth and to base
one's conduct and fixed position in life on this firm foundation. But
this simple reaction may well encounter the supposed difficulty of
how to distinguish and discover, among the i11jimte variety ofopi71io71s,
what is universally acknowledged and valid in them; and this perplexI I
Philosophy ofRight
ity may easily be taken for a just and genuine concern with the matter
[Sac/11'] itself. But in fact, those who pride themselves on this perplexity are in the position of not being able to see the wood for the trees,
and the only perplexity and difficulty that is present is the one they
have themselves created; indeed, this perplexity and difficulty is
rather a proof that they want something other than what is universally
acknowledged and valid, something other than the substance of the
right and the ethical. For if they were genuinely concerned with the
latter and not with the vanil] and particularity of opinions and being,
they would adhere to the substantial right, namely to the commandments of ethics and ofthe state, and regulate their lives accordingly.A further difficulty arises, however, from the fact that human beings
think and look for their freedom and the basis of ethics in (the realm
of] thought. But however exalted, however divine this right may be, it
is nevertheless transformed into wrong if the only criterion of thought
and the only way in which thought can know itself to be free is the
extent to which it diverges from what is universally acknowledged and
valid and manages to invent something particular for itself.
The notion [Vorstellung] that freedom of thought, and of spirit in
general, can be demonstrated only by divergence from, and even
hostility towards, what is publicly acknowledged might seem to be
most firmly rooted nowadays in relation [BezieiDmg] to the slate; for this
very reason, it might seem to be the essential task of a philosophy of
the state to invent and propound yet another theory, and specifically a
new and particular theory. If we examine this notion [Vorstellung] and
the activity that is associated with it, we might well imagine that no
state or constitution had ever previously existed or were in existence
today, but that we had now (and this 'now' is of indefinite duration) to
start right from the beginning, and that the ethical world had been
waiting only for such intellectual constructions, discoveries, and
proofs as are now available. As far as nature is concerned, it is readily
admitted that philosophy must recognize it as it is, that the philosopher's stone lies hidden somewhere, but withitz tzalure itself, that
nature is rational witlzin itself, and that it is this actual reason present
within it which knowledge must investigate and grasp conceptuallynot the shapes and contingencies which are visible on the surface, but
nature's eternal harmony, conceived, however, as the law and essence
immantml within it. 111e ethical world, on the other hand, the state, or
reason as it actualizes itself in the element of self-consciousness, is
12
Preface
not supposed to be happy in the knowledge that it is reason itself
which has in fact gained power and authority [Gewalt] within this element, and which asserts itself there and remains inherent within it.*
Additio11 (H). There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of
right: the laws of nature are simply there and are valid as they stand: they
suffer no diminution, although they may be infringed in individual cases.
To know what the law of nature is, we must familiarize ourselves with
nature, for these laws are correct and it is only our notions [Vorstellrmgtm]
concerning them which may be false. The measure of these laws is
external to us, and our cognition adds nothing to them and does not
advance them: it is only our cognition of them which can expand. Knowledge [Ke~mt11is] of right is in one respect similar to this and in another
respect different. We get to know the laws of right in just the same way,
simply as they are; the citizen knows them more or less in this way, and
the positive jurist also stops short at what is given. But the difference is
that, with the laws of right, the spirit of reflection comes into play and
their very diversity draws attention to the fact that they are not absolute.
The laws of right are something laid dow11,h something derived from human
beings. It necessarily follows that our inner voice may either come into
collision with them or concur with them. The human being does not stop
short at the existent [dem Daseie~ulm], but claims to have within himself
the measure of what is right; he may be subjected to the necessity and
power of external authority, but never in the same way as to natural
necessity, for his inner self always tells him how things ought to be, and he
finds within himself the confirmation or repudiation of what is accepted
as valid. In nature, the highest truth is that a law exists at all; in laws of
right, however, the thing [Saclle] is not valid because it exists; on the
contrary, everyone demands that it should match his own criterion. Thus
a conflict may arise between what is and what ought to be, between the
right which has being in and for itself, which remains unaltered, and the
arbitrary determination of what is supposed to be accepted as right. A
disjunction and conflict of this kind is found only in the sphere [Bodell] of
the spirit, and since the prerogative of the spirit thus seems to lead to
discord and unhappiness, we often tum away from the arbitrariness oflife
to the contemplation of nature and are inclined to take the latter as a
model. But these very discrepancies [Gegensatze] between that right which
has being in and for itself and what arbitrariness proclaims as right make
it imperative for us to learn to recognize precisely what right is. In right,
"Translator's note: Grist der Bnracluung; Hotho's notes, on which Gans based this Addition, simply read Geist ('spirit'): see VP R 111, 93
bTranslator's nott: 'Die Rechtsgeserze sind Gestt::us': Hegel plays on the similarity of the
word Gt:Jet:: (law) and Gtut::us (something laid down or posited).
13
Plzilosoplzy ofRiglzt
The spiritual universe is supposed rather to be at the mercy of
contingency and arbitrariness, to be god-[orsaker1, so that, according to
this atheism of the ethical world, tnulz lies outside it, and at the same
time, since reason is nevertheless also supposed to be present in it,
truth is nothing but a problem. But, we are told, this very circumstance justifies, indeed obliges, every thinker to take his own initiative,
though not in seard1 ofthe philosopher's stone, for this search is made
superfluous by the philosophizing of our times and everyone,
whatever his condition, can be assured that he has this stone in his
grasp. Now it does admittedly happen that those who live within the
actuality of the state and are able to satisfY their knowledge and
volition within it - and there are many of them, more in fact than
think or know it, for basically this includes everyone- or at least those
who consciously find satisfaction within the state, laugh at such ini.tiatives and assurances and regard them as an empty game, now more
amusing, now more serious, now pleasing, now dangerous. This restless activity of vain reflection, along with the reception and response it
the human being must encounter his own reason; he must therefore
consider the rationality of right, and this is the business of our science, in
contrast with positive jurisprudence, which is often concerned only with
contradictions. Besides, the present-day world has a more urgent need of
such an investigation, foc in olden times there was still respect and
veneration for the existing [bestelzerulen) law, whereas the culture [Bildllng)
of the present age has taken a new direction, and thought has adopted a
leading role in the formation of values. Theories are put forward in
opposition to what already exists [dem Daseienden), theories which seek to
appear correct and necessary in and foc themselves. From now on, there
is a more special need to recognize and comprehend the thoughts of right
Since thought has set itself up as the essential form, we must attempt to
grasp right, too, in terms of thought If thought is to take precedence over
right, this would seem to throw open the door to contingent opinions; but
genuine thought is not an opinion about something [die Sad1e), but the
concept of the thing [Sache) itself. The concept of the thing does not
come to us by nature. Everyone has fingers and can take a brush and
paint, but that does not make him a painter. It is precisely the same with
thinking. The thought of right is not, for example, what ever}'body knows
at first hand; on the contrary, correct thinking is knowing (das Komm)
and recognizing the thing, and our cognition should therefore be
scientific.
Preface
encounters, might be regarded as a separate issue [Sad1e ], developing
independently in its own distinct way, were it not that pllilosophy in
general has incurred all kinds of contempt and discredit as a result of
such behaviour. The worst kind of contempt it has met with is, as
already mentioned, that everyone, whatever his condition, is convinced that he knows all about philosophy in general and can pass
judgement upon it. No other art or science is treated with this
ultimate degree of contempt, namely the assumption that one can take
possession of it outright.
In fact, what we have seen the philosophy of recent times proclaiming with the ubnost pretension in relation to the state has no doubt
entitled anyone who wishes to have a say in such matters to the belief
that he could just as well do the same thing on his own account, and
thereby prove to himself that he was in possession of philosophy. In
any case, this self-styled philosophy has expressly stated that trutll
itselfcannot be bwum [erkannt], but that truth consists in what '11Jt!lls up
frum eacll individual's lleart, emotion, and entllusiasm in relation to ethical subjects, particularly in relation to the state, government, and
constitution. What has not been said in this connection to Oatter the
young in particular?" And the young have certainly taken note of it.
The saying 'for he giveth to his own in sleep' has been applied to
science, so that all sleepers have counted themselves among the
clwsen; but the concepts they have acquired in their sleep have of
course borne the marks of their origin.51- A leader of this superficial
brigade of so-called philosophers, Herr Fries,t had the temerity, at a
solemn public occasion which has since become notorious/' to put
forward the following idea [Vontellung] in an address on the subject of
the state and constitution: 'In a people among whom a genuine
communal spirit prevails, all business relating to public affairs would
gain its life frum beiO'Ill, from tire people itselfi living societies, steadfastly
united by tile sacred bo"d offriendsllip, would dedicate themselves to
every single project of popular education and popular service'; and so
on. - The chief tendency of this superficial philosophy is to base
science not on the development of thought and the concept, but on
immediate perception and contingent imagination; and likewise, to
reduce the complex inner articulation of the ethical, i.e. the state, the
architectonics of its rationality - which, through determinate distinct Hqtl"s nolt: I have testified elsewhere to the superficiality of his science: see my Scimct
ofLogic (Niimberg, t8IZ), Introduction, p. xvn."'
15
Plzi/osoplzy ofRiglzt
tions between the various spheres of public life and the rights [Berechtigullgen] they are based on, and through the strict proportions in
which every pillar, arch, and buttress is held together, produces the
strength of the whole from the harmony of its parts - to reduce this
refined [gebildeten] structure to a mush of 'heart, friendship, and
enthusiasm'P According to this notion [Vorstellung], the ethical
world, like the universe of Epicurus, should be given over to the
subjective contingency of opinions and arbitrariness; but of course
this is not the caseP By the simple household remedy of attributing to
fee/i,zg what reason and its understandilig have laboured to produce
over several thousand years, all the trouble involved in rational insight
and cognition, guided by the thinking concept, can of course be
avoided. Goethe's Mephistopheles- a good authority- says much the
same thing in lines which I have also quoted elsewhere:
Do but despise reason and science,
The highest of all human gifts Then you have surrendered to the devil
And must surely perish. H
The next step is for this view to assume the guise of piety as well; for
what lengths has such behaviour not gone to in order to lend itself
authority! By means of godliness and the Bible, however, it has
presumed to gain the supreme justification for despising the ethical
order and the objectivity of the laws. For it is surely also piety which
envelops in the simpler intuition of feeling that truth which, in the
world itself, is diversified into an organic realm. But if it is the right
kind of piety, it abandons the form of this [emotional] region as soon
as it emerges from [the condition of] inwardness into the daylight of
the Idea's full development [Entfolhmg] and manifest abundance, and
it brings with it, from its inner worship of God, a reverence for the
laws and for a truth which has being in and for itself and is exalted
above the subjective form of feeling.
The particular form of bad conscience which betrays itself in the
vainglorious eloquence of this superficial philosophy may be
remarked on here; for in the first place, it is precisely where it is at its_
most spiritless that it has most to say about spirit, where its talk is driest
and most lifeless that it is freest with the words 'life' and 'enliven', and
where it shows the utmost selfishness of empty arrogance that it most
often refers to the 'people'. But the distinctive mark which it carries
16
Preface
m its brow is its hatred eX law. That right and ethics, and the actual
world of right and the ethical, are grasped by means of thoughts and
give themselves the form of rationality - namely universality and
determinacy- by means of thoughts, is what constitutes the law; and it
is this which is justifiably regarded as the main enemy by that feeling
which reserves the right to do as it pleases, by that conscience which
identifies right with subjective conviction. The form of right as a duty
and a law is felt by it to be a dead, cold letter and a shackle; for it does
not recognize itself in the law and thereby recognize its own freedom
in it, because the law is the reason of the thing [Sac/ze] and reason
does not allow feeling to warm itself in the glow of its own particularity [Partikularitiit]. The law is therefore, as I have remarked
elsewhere in the course of this textbook/5 the chief shibboleth by
which the false brethren and friends of the so-called 'people' give
themselves away.
Since this arbitrary sophistry has usurped the name of philosophy
and persuaded a wide public that such activities are philosophy, it has
almost become dishonourable to continue to speak philosophically
about the nature of the state; and right-minded [reclrtliche] men cannot be blamed if they grow impatient as soon as they hear talk of a
philosophical science of the state. There is even less cause for surprise that governments have at last directed their attention to such
philosophizing, for philosophy with us is not in any case practised as a
private art, as it was with the Greeks, for example, but has a public
existence [Existenz], impinging upon the public, especially- or solely
- in the service of the state. Governments have had enough confidence in those of their scholars who have devoted themselves to this
subject to leave the development [Ausbildutrg] and import of philosophy entirely to them- granted that here and there, they may have
done so not so much out of confidence in science as out of indifference towards it, retaining teaching posts in philosophy only for
reasons of tradition Gust as in France, to the best of my knowledge,
chairs of metaphysics at least have been allowed to lapse). But their
confidence has frequendy been ill repaid, or alternatively, if they are
thought to be motivated by indifference, the resultant decay of
thorough knowledge [Erkenrrttris] should be regarded as the penalty
for this indifference. It may initially appear that this superficial philosophy is eminendy compatible at least with outward peace and order,
in that it never manages to touch the substance of things [Sachen], or
17
Philosophy ofRight
even to suspect its existence; it would thus have no cause to fear
police intervention, at least initially, if it were not that the state also
contained the need for a deeper education and insight, and demanded
that this need be satisfied by science. But superficial philosophy leads
automatically, as far as the ethical [world] and right and duty in
general are concerned, to those principles which constitute superficiality in this sphere, namely the principles of the Sophists as we find
them so clearly described by Plato. 16 These principles identify what is
right with subjective ends and opinions, with subjective feeling and particular [partikuliire] conviction, and they lead to the destruction of inner
ethics and the upright conscience, of love and right among private
persons, as well as the destruction of public order and the laws of the
state. The significance which such phenomena [Ersclzeimmgen] must
acquire for governments can scarcely be reduced, for example, by the
claim that the very confidence shown by the state and the authority of
an official position are enough to warrant the demand that the state
should accept and give free rein to what corrupts the substantial
source of all deeds, namely universal principles, and should even
allow itself to be defied, as if such defiance were entirely proper. 'If
God gives someone an office, he also gives him sense [Verstand]',' 7 is
an old chestnut which will scarcely be taken seriously by anyone
nowadays.
In the importance which circumstances have again led governments
to attach to the way in which philosophers conduct their business,
there is no mistaking the fact that the study of philosophy now seems
in many other respects to require an element [Mommt] of protection
and encouragement. For in so many publications in the field of
the positive sciences, as well as in works of religious edification and
other indeterminate literature, the reader encounters not only that
contempt for philosophy which I have already referred to, in that
the very people who reveal that their intellectual development
[Geda11kenbildmzg] is extremely retarded and that philosophy is completely alien to them also treat it as something they have finished and
done with; beyond this, we also find that such writers expressly
impugn philosophy and declare its content, the conceptual cognition of
God and of physical and spiritual nature, the cognition of tmtlz, to be a
foolish, indeed sinful presumption, and that reason, and again reaso7l,
and in endless repetition reason is arraigned, belittled, and condemned. Or at the very least, they let us see how, for a large propor-
Preface
tion of those engaged in supposedly scientific study, the claims of the
concept constitute an embarrassment from which they are nevertheless unable to escape. If, I say, one is confronted with such
phenomena [Er.scheinrmgm], one might almost begin to suspect that
tradition is from this poi71t of viw no longer worthy of respect nor
sufficient to guarantee tolerance and a continued public existence
[Existe~1z] to the study of philosophy.f8 - The declamations and
presumptuous outbursts against philosophy which are so common in
our time afford the peculiar spectacle on the one hand of being in the
right, by virtue of that superficiality to which philosophical science has
been degraded, and on the other of themselves being rooted in the
very element against which they so ungratefully tum. For by declaring
the cognition of truth to be a futile endeavour, this self-styled
philosophizing has reduced all thoughts and all topics to the same level,
just as the depotism of the Roman emperors remuved all distinctions
between patricians and slaves, virtue and vice, honour and dishonour,
and knowledge [Kmntnis] and ignorance.20 As a result, the concepts
of truth and the laws of ethics are reduced to mere opinions and
subjective convictions, and the most criminal principles- since they,
too, are conviaioriS- are accorded the same status as those laws; and in
the same way, all objects, however barren and particular [partikular],
and all materials, however arid, are accorded the same status as what
constitutes the interest of all thinking people and the bonds of the
ethical world.
It should therefore be considered a stroke ofgood fortune for science
- although in fact, as I have already mentioned/1 it is a necessary
consequer1ce of the thing [Sache] itself- that this philosophizing, which
could well have continued to spin itself into its own web of scholastic
wisdom, has come into closer contact with actuality, in which the
principles of rights and duties are a serious matter, and which lives in
f H~tl's
nDit: I was reminded of such views on reading a leiter of johannes von Miiller
(Wtrit [Tiibingen, t81o-1g), Part VIII, p. 56), where hesaysofthecondir:ionofRomtin
1803 when the city was under French rule: 'Asked how the public educar:ional insr:itur:ions were faring, a professor replied: "On les tolere comme les bordels." "' 19 One can
sr:ill even hear people reconunendit1g so-called 'rar:ionaltheory' [Vnnunftlehrt), i.e. logic,
perhaps in the belief that no one in any case bothers about it any longer as a lky and
unfruitful science, orthat, if this does happen now and again, those who study it will 6nd
only vacuous formulae, neither bene6cial nor detrimental, so that the recommendar:ion
cannot possibly do any harm. even if it does no good either.
~r1111sl111or's
nolt: 'They are tolerated, like the brothels.'
Philosophy ofRight
the light ofits consciousness of these principles, and that a public split
has consequently resulted between the two. It is this very relation of
philosophy 10 actuality which is the subject of misunderstandings, and I
accordingly come back to my earlier observation that, since philosophy is exploration ofthe rational, it is foc that very reason the conzprehemion oftlze presetll and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond
which exists God knows where - or rather, of which we can very well
say that we know where it exists, namely in the errors of a one-sided
and empty ratiocination. In the course of the following treatise, I have
remarked that even Plato's Republic, a proverbial example of an empty
ideal, is essentially the embodiment of nothing other than the nature
of Greek ethics; and Plato, aware that the ethics of his time were
being penetrated by a deeper principle which, within this context,
could appear immediately only as an as yet unsatisfied longing and
hence only as a destructive force, was obliged, in order to counteract
it, to seek the help of that very longing itself. But the help he required
had to come from above, and he could seek it at first only in a
particular external form of Greek ethics. By this means, he imagined
he could overcome the destructive force, and he thereby inflicted the
gravest damage on the deeper drive behind it, namely free infinite
personality. But he proved his greatness of spirit by the fact that the
very principle on which the distinctive character of his Idea turns is
the pivot on which the impending world revolution turned.
What is rational is actual;
and what is actual is rational.22
This conviction is shared by every ingenuous consciousness as well as
by philosophy, and the latter takes it as its point of departure in
considering both the spiritual and the natural universe. If reflection,
~
.f.e_~liJig,..or.-.whatever form till:~~ciousness may~sum~
regards the prese7ll as vain and looks beyond ~upenor
knowledge, it finds itself in a vain position; and since it has actuality
only in the present, it is itself mere vanity. Conversely, if the Idea is
seen as 'only an idea', a representation [Volltellung] in the realm of
opinion, philosophy affords the opposite insight that nothing is actual
except the Idea. For what matters is to recognize in the semblance of
the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and the
eternal which is present. For since the rational, which is synonymous
with the Idea, becomes actual by entering into external existence
20
Preface
[Eristenz], it emerges in an infinite wealth of forms, appearances, and
shapes and surrounds its core with a brightly coloured covering in
which consciousness at first resides, but which only the concept can
penetrate in order to find the inner pulse, and detect its continued
beat even within the external shapes. But the infinitely varied circumstances which take shape within this externality as the essence
manifests itself within it, this infinite material and its organization, are
not the subject-matter of philosophy. To deal with them would be to
interfere in things [Di11ge] with which philosophy has no concern, and
it can save itself the trouble of giving good advice on the subject. Plato
could well have refrained from recommending nurses never to stand
still with children but to keep rocking them in their arms; and Fichte
likewise need not have perfected his passport reg11/ations to the point of
'constructing', as the expression ran, the requirement that the passports of suspect persons should carry not only their personal description but also their painted likeness.2J In deliberations of this kind, no
trace of philosophy remains, and it can the more readily abstain from
such ultra-wisdom because it is precisely in relation to this infinite
multitude of subjects that it should appear at its most liberal. In this
way, philosophical science will also show itself furthest removed from
the hatred which the vanity of superior wisdom displays towards a
multitude of circumstances and institutions- a hatred in which pettiness takes the greatest of pleasure, because this is the only way in
which it can attain self-esteem [Se/bstgefiihlj.
This treatise, therefore, in so far as it deals with political science,
shall be nothing other than an attempt to comprehend a11d portray the
state as a11 i11hermtly rational mtity. As a philosophical composition, it
must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to construct
a state as it mtght to be; such instruction as it may contain cannot be
aimed at instructing the state on how it ought to be, but rather at
showing how the state, as the ethical universe, should be recognized.
o 3ti]brum.
'Ibou 'PobQ, [boil xai.

Hie Rhodus, hicsaltus.24
To comprehend what is is the task of philosophy, for what is is reason.

As far as the individual is concemed,_each individual is in any case a
child" of his time; thus philo~n!:!Y> too, is its 0~ time cmnpr_ehmded
. ~hm~i~asToolish to imagine that ~ophy ~n
transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap
21
his own time or leap over Rhodes.15 If his theory does indeed
transcend his own time, if it builds itself a world as it ougllt to be, then
it certainly has an existence, but only within his opinions -a pliant
medium in which the imaginiliioii"cani:onstruct anything it pleases.
With little alteration, the saying just quoted would read:
Here is the rose, dance llere.16

What lies between reason as self-conscious spirit and reason as
present actuality, what separates the former from the latter and
prevents it from finding satisfaction in it, is the fetter of some abstraction or other which has not been liberated into (the form of] the
concept. To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the presenrl;
and thereby to delight in the present - this rational insight is the
reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have
received the inner call to comprellend, to preserve their subjective
freedom in the realm of the substantial, and at the same time to stand
with their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has being in and for itself.
Thic; is also what constitutes the more concrete sense of what was
described above in more abstract terms as the unity ofform a11d co11tent.
For fomz in its most concrete significance is reason as conceptual
cognition, and content is reason as the substantial essence of both
ethical and natural actuality; the conscious identity of the two is the
philosophical Idea. - It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy
which does honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to
acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesimzung] anything which has not
been justified by thought - and this obstinacy is the characteristic
property of the modem age, as well as being the distinctive principle
of Protestantism. What Luther inaugurated as faith in feeling and in
the testimony of the spirit is the same thing that the spirit, at a more
mature stage ofits development, endeavours to grasp in the co11cept so
as to free itself in the present and thus find itself therein. It has
become a famous saying that 'a half-philosophy leads away from God'
- and it is the same half-measure which defines cognition as an
appro:dmation to the truth- 'whereas true philosophy leads to God';18
the same applies to philosophy and the state. Reason is not content
with an approximation which, as something 'neither cold nor hot', it
'spews out of its mouth';19 and it is as little content with that cold
despair which confesses that, in this temporal world, things are bad or
22
Preface
at best indifferent, but that nothing better can be expected here, so
that for this reason alone we should live at peace with actuality. The
peace which cognition establishes with the actual world has more
warmth in it than this.
A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the
world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to
perform this function. As the tlzouglzt of the world, it appears only at a
time when actuality has gone through its formative process and
attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily
also apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has
reached maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and
reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in
the shape of an intellectual realm. 30 When philosophy paints its grey
in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated,
but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of
Minerva begins its ilight only with the onset of dusk. 31
- But ~e to conclude this foreword; as a foieW"ord, its function
was in any case merely to make external and subjective comments on
the point of view of the work to which it is prefaced. If a content is to
be discussed philosophically, it will bear only scientific and objective
treabnent; in the same way, the author will regard any criticism
expressed in a form other than that of scientific discussion of the
matter [Saclze] itself merely as a subjective postscript and random
assertion, and will treat it with indifference.
Berlin,
25
June
1820
23
Introduction
The subject-matter of the philosophical science ofrig/11 is the Idea ofrig/11
-the concept of right and its actualization.'
----Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what
are commonly described as mere concepts. On the contrary, it
shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and
that it is the crmcept alone (not what is so often called by that
name, but which is merely an abstract determination of the
~ing) which has ac/lla 1ty, and in such a way that it
~gives actuality to itself. Everything other than(tliiitacrualitc
.:wli1Cn1sVOsite"d hrtbe--concept 1tsei1J is transitory existence
[Dasein], external contingency, opinion, appearance without
essence, untruth, deception, etc. The shape which the concept
assumes in its actualization, and which is essential for cognition of the concept itself, is different from its fonn of being
purely as coricept, and is the other essential moment of the
Idea.
Addition (H). The concept and its existence [bistt'ILZ] are two aspects [of
the same thing], separate and united, like soul and body. The body is the
same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one
another. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa.
Thus____!!te e~~ce_lDasei11] of the concept is its body, just as the latter
~ducegjt The buds have the tree withintflemand
its entire strength, although they are not yet the tree itself. The
tree corresponds entirely to the simple image of the bud. If the body does
ooeys
contain
25
not correspond to the soul, it is a wretched thing indeed. The ~f
existence [Dasei11) and the concept, ofbodv and soul, is the Idc;a. It is not
justanannony, ~~-Nothing lives which is
not in some way Idea.1J!~.J1.ea of_tjW~ and in order to be
truly apprehended, it must be recognizable in its concept and in the
concept's existence [Dasei11l
The science of right is a part ofphilosoplzy. It has therefore to develop

the Idea, which is the reason within an object [Gegnzstmzd], out of the
concept; or what ~es to the same thing, ft must observe the proper
immanent development of the thing [Sac/ze] itself. As a part [ofphilo"5oi>liY1fthas a determinate starti11gpoi11t, which is the result and truth
of what preceded it, and what preceded it is the so-called proof of that
result. Hence the concept of right, so far as its comi11g i1110 bei11g is
concerned, falls outside the science of right; its deduction is presupposed here and is to be taken as give11. 1
Addition (G). Philosophy forms a circle.1 It has an initial or immediate

point - for it must begin somewhere - a point which is not demonstrated
and is not a result. But the starting point of philosophy is immediately
relative, for it must appear at another end-point as a result. Philosophy is
a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, but is rounded off within itself:
According to the formal, non-philosophical method of the
sciences, the first thing which is sought and required, at least
for the sake of external scientific form, is the $!fi.J!l/m11. The
positive science of right cannot be much concerned with this,
however, since its chief aim is to state_!!!b~~gbt and legal
.: [Rechterzs], i.e. what the particular legal determinations are.
} This is the reason for the warning: 'omnis definitio in iure
~t'
civili periculosa. aJ And in fact, the more incoherent and internally contradictory the determinations of a [system of] right
are, the less possible it will be to make definitions within it; for
11
'I
~should contain.u_~!y5,r~~~~u~
;yresent~_tex~-~~~-e_:would immediately make the c~~

\'ti5fyelement - in this case, what is unjust [das U11rechtlic/ze] 1'-
--
"Trt111slmor's note: 'In civil law all definitions are hazardous.'
26
buroduction
''isible in all its nakedness. Thus, in Roman law [das romische

Recllt], for example, no definition of a lluma11 beitzg would be
possible, for the siavecouTd not be subsumed under it;
indeed, the status [Stand] of the slave does violence to that
concept The definitions of 'property' and 'proprietor' would
seem equally hazardous in many situations. - But the deduction of the definition may perhaps be reached by means of
etymology, or chiefly by abstraction from particular cases, so
' that it is ultimately basea on the teelin~;;(iiorste/
lung] of human beings. The correctness of the definition i;]
then made to depend on its agreement with prevailing ideasj If
[Vorstellrmgen]. This method leaves out of account what is
alone essential to science -with regard to content, the necessity
ofthe tiling [Sac/11!] in and for itself (in this case, of right), and
with regard to form, the nature of the concept. In philosophical cognition, on the other hand, the chief concern is the
l~~ and the route by which it has become a
. resuTt [is]1ts proof and deduction. Thus, given that its cmztent is
necessary for itself, the second step is to look around for what
corresponds to it in our ideas [Vorstellrmgen] and language.
But this concept as it is for itself in its tnulz may not only be
different from our represematimz [Vorstellrnzg] of it: the two
must also differ in their form and shape. If, however, the
representation is not also false in its content, the concept may
well be shown to be contained in it and present in essence
within it; that is, the representation may be raised to the form
of the concept. But-it is-50~- being the -meas~~
.crikrlon CJthe concept which is necessary and true for itself
that it must rather derive its truth from the concept, and
recognize and correct itself with the help of the latter.- But if,
on the other hand, the former manner rf cognition with its
formal definitions, inferences, proofs, and the like has now
virtually disappeared, the other mode which has replaced it is
a bad substitute: thilt is;-ldeas in general, and hence also the
Idea of right and its further determinations, are taken up and
asserted in immediate fashion as facts ofconsciOUS711!ss, and our
natural or f~t~~ified-feellng5,0~;-oz,m heart and entllusiasm,
ar~-iliaae ilie source of rlght.4 If this is the most convenient
method of all, it is also the least philosophical - not to mention
I-2
Philosophy ofRight
here other aspects of this view, which has immediate
relevance [Beziehro1g] to action and not just to cognition.
Whereas the first - admittedly formal - method does at least
require thefonn of the concept in its definitions and the.foml
of necessary cognition in its proofs, the mode of immediate
consciousness and feeling makes the subjectivity, contingency, and arbitrariness of knowledge into its principle.- A
familiarity with the nature of scientific procedure in philosophy, as expounded in philosophical logic, is here
presupposed.
~--~----
Right is in general positive (a)'I:J!rough its_.fo.!.'i!.. of having~ within

a [particular] sta~this le~ority is the principle which
underlies knowledge [Kmntnis] of right, i.e. the positive scie11ce of right.
(b) In terms of cm1ie111, this right acquires a positive element (a)
through the particul;u:n:~~~'al&har~'Ci:.~0eople, its stage of historical development, and the whole context of relations governed by
r~atural necessity; 1 (~)through the necessity whereby a system of legal
right must contain the applicalion_ of the universal concept to the
particular and extenrally given characteristics of objects [Gegenstiinde]
and instances- an application which is no longer [a matter of] speculative thought and the development of the concept, but [of] subsumption by the understanding; (y) through the final determinations
required for making
de_cjsions
in actuality.
_,.., .... - .
----~--
If the feelings of the heart, [personal] inclinations, and

arbitrariness are set up in opposition to positive right and
laws, philosophy at least cannot recognize such authorities.
That force and tyranny may be an element in positive right is
contingent to the latter, and has nothing to do with its nature.
Later in this work ( 211-214), it will be shown at what
'-poin_!.!i_g:~t._must become~ti_-.:e. The determinationS which
will be discussed in that context are mentioned here only in
order to indicate the limits [Grenze] of philosophical right and
at the same time to rule out any possible idea [Vontellur1g], let
alone expectation, that its systematic development should give
rise to a positive code of laws such as is required by an actual
--
28
bztroductimz
2-3
state. - Natural law or philosophical right is different from f(

positive right, but it would be a grave misunderstanding to ! 1
distort this difference into an opposition or antagonism; on
the contrary, their relation is like that between Institutes and
Pandects.1 - With regard to the historical element in positive
right (first referred to in 3 above), Montesquieu stated the
[!ue historical view, ~~e_hica~ ~e~int,
tlla~neral and its particularoeternunanons
..
-..........,---.--.-- ... -----~----.~~
should
not be considered
in the abstract, but
.. _ in isolation
... ... ,..and
______
rather as ~ d~endent moment within 07le totality, in th~-:
text
all the other eterminations
which constitute the
. --of
.....
......
__,_ ........ ~----~
~~er of a na..t.i!!!!_anil_i_g~~tl&~~t~~ ~~Y.. _g_~jl}
their genuine~~fi.~D~. l!!}.c;! hence also their justification.3
..:.. T~""i:onsider the emerge~~e and d~~~Topment of detennina.:: l
tions of right as tlzey appear in time ~~lzistoriCIJI task.j
This task, like that of recognizing the logical consistency of
such determinations by comparing them with previously existing legal relations, is meritorious and praiseworthy within its
own sphere, and ,bea~relation to the DhilJW!Rhical
......__
approach- unless, that is to say, development from historical
- --------
__ ____
------------ - __
_,
,,_,.
---~
*'
~- develo_p~~jt'from_ th~~~~~na
the significance of historical e_1q1lanatig.1.1.. a~~~ jy~fication is

~e~~!l~ to ilic!i]!!i~G.iati?~~~c~~~r
iisel/~ T~tinction, which is very important and should oe
'fifiiily borne in mind, is at the same time a very obvious one; a
determination of right may be shown to be entirely grou,Jed i7l
and co7lsistentwitlz the prevailing circumstances and existing legal
institutions, yet it may be contrary to right [rmreclztliclz] and
irrational in and for itself: like numerous determinations of
JRoman civil law [Pri;;;;edzt] which followed quite consistently
from such institutions as Roman paternal authority and
Roman matrimony. But even if the determinations of right are
rightful arurrarlonal, it is one thing to demonstrate that this is
so - and this cannot truly be done except by means of the
concept - and another to depict their historical emergence
and the circumstances, eventualities, needs, and incidents
which led to their introduction. This kind of demonstration
and (pragmatic) cognition in terms of proximate or remote
historical causes is often called 'explanation', or even more
commonly 'comprehension', in the belief [Mei11ung] that this
kind of historical demonstration is all - or rather, the one
essential thing - that needs to be done in order to comprelzmd
the law or a legal institution, whereas in fact the truly essential
issue, the concept of the thing [Sac/ze], has not even been
mentioned. - Similarly, we often hear talk of Roman or Germanic 'concepts of right', or of such 'c071Cepts of right' as are
defined in this or that legal code, although these codes contain
no reference to concepts, but only to general detenni11atim1S of
right, propositions of the understanding, principles, laws, and
the like. - By disregarding the difference in question, it
becomes possible to shift the point of view and to tum the
request for a true justification into a justification by circumstances, a logical deduction from premises which may in
themselves lftir sich] be as valueless as the conclusions derived
from them, etc.; in short, the relative is put in place of the
absolute, and the external aopearance in place of the nature of
the thing [Sache] itself. When a historical justification confuses an origill in external factors with an ori n in the concept, it u~~ves the opposite of what it intends.
Ifh
can be shown that the origin of an institution was entire!
---~--:....::-:.:-::--.c:::..::..~~.;;:....~~;..:..:.;.:y:-"'---.:ov-;;.;..;c:..,..-"'.
expedient and necessary under e specific circumstances of
~req\llrements of the IStorical vi
oint are
......---.......____....~~
~~~~~up~9~am?~~
._;_~g~,~~.J$~i~rc;h:~
for ~_0-~mstances are no Ion~~ J

}nstitution ~~re~~~ex:i!t].
Thus If, for example, the monasteries are justified by an appeal
to their services in cultivating and populating areas of wilderness and in preserving scholarship through instruction, copying of manuscripts, etc., and these services are regarded as the
reason [Gnmd] and purpose [Bestinmzu11g] of their continued
existence, what in fact follows from these past services is that,
since the circumstances have now changed completely, the
monasteries have, at least in this respect, become ~E~~.!JS
and inappropriate. - Since it has now been shown that the
historical significance of origins, along with their historical
demonstration and exposition, belongs to a different sphere
from th~l?sophical view of the ~me origins and of the
30
bztroducti011
concept of the thing, the two approaches can to that extent
-~i~differei.lt"to one another. But since they do not

always maintain such peaceful relations, even in scientific
matters, I shall quote something relating to their mutual contact which appears in Herr [Gustav] Hugo's Textbook of the
History of Roman Law [Lelzrbuclz der Geschic/zte des riimisclzen

Rec/zts, 1790], and which will also further elucidate their supposed mode of opposition.5 Herr HugoJ;OiiitS out in the
passage in question (fifth edition [1818], 53) 'that Cicero
praises the Twelve Tables, while looking askance at the philosophers',6 whereas 'the philosopher Favorinus treats them just
as many a great philosopher has subsequently treated positive
right'. In the same context, Herr Hugo replies once and for all
to such treatment with the explanation that 'Favorinus understood the Twelve Tables just as little as the philosophers have
understood positive right'. -As to the correction of the philosopher Favorinus by the jurist Sextus Caecilius in [Aulus]
Gellius' Noctes A tticae, XX, 1, it is primarily a statement of the
true and lasting principle which must underlie the justification
of anything whose impact is merely positive.7 'Non ignoras',
says Caecilius very aptly to Favorinus, 'legum opportunitates et
medelas pro temporum moribus et pro rerum publicarum
generibus, ac pro utilitatum praesentium rationibus, proque
vitiorum, quibus medendum est, fervoribus, mutari ac f/ecti,
neque uno statu consistere, quin, ut facies coeli et marls, ita
rerum atque fortunae tempestatibus varientur. Quid salubrius
visum est rogatione ilia Stolonis . . . quid utilius plebiscito
Voconio ... quid tam necessarium existimatum est ... quam
lex Licinia ... ? Omnia tamen haec obliterata et operta sunt
civitatis opulentia ... a~~ositiv~~
their significance and appropriateness are circumstantial and
__,..--
-----------
-------------
"Translator's note: 'You know very well that the advantages and remedies afforded by the
laws change and vary in accordance with the customs of the age and types of constitution, with considerations of present advantage and of deficiencies to be remedied, and
that they do not persist in a constant state. On the conuar), they are changed by the
storms of chance and circumstance, just as storms change the face of the' sea and sky.
What could be more salutary than the legal proposal ofStolo8 ... , what more useful than
the popular decree ofVoconius, ... , and what has been deemed as necessary ... as the
Licinian law ... ? :\nd yet they have all been obliterated and obscured by the opulence of
the present state10 .. .'
31
Philosophy ofRight
commonly 'comprehension', in the belief [Meinung] that this
kind of historical demonstration is all - or rather, the one
essential thing - that needs to be done in order to comprehend
the law or a legal institution, whereas in fact the truly essential
issue, the concept of the thing [Sache], has not even been
mentioned. -Similarly, we often hear talk of Roman or Germanic 'concepts of rig/a', or of such 'concepts of right' as are
defined in this or that legal code, although these codes contain
no reference to concepts, but only to general determinations of
right, propositions of the understanding, principles, laws, and
the like. - By disregarding the difference in question, it
becomes possible to shift the point of view and to tum the
request for a true justification into a justification by circumstances, a logical deduction from premises which may in
themselves [{iir sich] be as valueless as the conclusions derived
from them, etc.; in short, the relative is put in place of the
absolute, and the external a~ce in place of the nature of
the thing [Sache] itself. When a historical justification confuses an origill in external factors with an ori in the conceP-t it ~~~tyachleves the opposite of what it intends.
IDt
can be shown that the origin of an institution was entire(
--~--~~~~~~~~~~
~xpedient ana necessary under
e specific circumstances of
tile tfme;-tllereq~tiie~
fuifiiied:-~~amou~tifi
,~~~!!>::Br~i~-C::.!Y~
~~~~-the o~ginal ircums~~~R!~~ _
!_nstitution has thereby los~ts meal_!i.Q!5~l;i~].

Thus if, for example, the monasteries are justified by an appeal
_ to their services in cultivating and populating areas of wilderness and in preserving scholarship through instruction, copying of manuscripts, etc., and these services are regarded as the
reason [Gnmd] and purpose [Bestimmung] of their continued
existence, what in fact follows from these past services is that,
since the circumstances have now changed completely, the
monasteries have, at least in this respect, become ~l?e~s
and inappropriate. - Since it has now been shown that the
historical significance of origins, along with their historical
demonstration and exposition, belongs to a different sphere
view of
the same origins and of the
from the philosQE!tical
.
___..,_
~--
_____ ___ ---JO
11ltroductio1l
concept .......of
___the thing, the two approaches can to that extent
remain indifferent to one another. But since they do not
always maintain such peaceful relations, even in scientific
matters, I shall quote something relating to their mutual contact which appears in Herr [Gustav] Hugo's Textbook of tile
History of Roman Law [Lehrbucll der Geschicllte des romisclzen
Recllls, 1790], and which will also further elucidate their supposed mode of opposition.5 Herr Hugo~ out in the
passage in question (fifth edition [1818], 53) 'that Cicero
praises the Twelve Tables, while looking askance at the philosophers',6 whereas 'the philosopher Favorinus treats them just
as many a great philosopher has subsequendy treated positive
right'. In the same context, Herr Hugo replies once and for all
to such treatment with the explanation that 'Favorinus understood the Twelve Tables just as little as the philosophers have
understood positive right'. -As to the correction of the philosopher Favorinus by the jurist Sextus Caecilius in [Aulus]
Gellius' Noctes Atticae, xx, I, it is primarily a statement of the
true and lasting principle which must underlie the justification
of anything whose impact is merely positive.7 'Non ignoras',
says Caecilius very apdy to Favorinus, 'legum opportunitates et
medelas pro temponmz moribus et pro rerum publicarum
generibus, ac pro utilitatum praesentizmz rationibus, proque
vitionmz, quibus medendum est, fervoribus, muta1i ac ftecti,
neque uno statu consistere, quin, ut facies coeli et maris, ita
rerum atque fortunae tempestatibus varientur. Quid salubrius
visum est rogatione ilia Stolonis . . . quid utilius plebiscita
Voconio ... quid tam necessarium existimatum est ... quam
lex Licinia ... ? Omnia /amen haec obliterata et operta sunt
civitatis opulentia ...'").'.!!.~.~-~~
~~ca~~- and appropriateness are circumstantial and
-~_.--
~--
Translmor's nou: 'You know very well that the advantages and remedies afforded by the
laws change and vary in accordance with the customs of the age and t)pes of constitution, with considerations of present advantage and of deficiencies to be remedied, and
that they do not persist in a constant state. On the contrary, they are changed by the
storms of chance and circumstance, just as storms change the face of the sea and sky.
What could be more salutary than the legal proposal ofStolo 8 ... , what more useful than
the popular decree ofVoconius, 9 , and what has been deemed as necessary ... as the
Licinian law ... ? And yet they have all been obliterated and obscured by the opulence of
the present state 10 .. '
31
Philosophy ofRight
.their ~~'!~_!!1-~~~ntire.!J_his~_; they a~_!y
of a transient nature. 'flie wisdom of ;;natlegisiiltors-and
., _...--..,--------~-~--~
governments have done for the circumstances of their time
and laid down for the conditions under which they lived is a
distinct issue [eit~e Sac/1e /iir sich] which should be assessed by
'lifstory,Whose recognition of it will be all the more profound if
such an assessment is supported by philosophical insights. I
shall, however, cite an example of Caecilius' further attempts
to justify the Twelve Tables against Favorinus, because in so
doing, he employs the eternally deceptive method of the
understanding and its mode of ratiocination, namely by sup_
-~oo~[~tui]fora bad~ze~g
that thelatter hasther~ustified. He mentions the
~~w which, after,~_.P_~Jjed interval had elapsed,
gave the creditor the right to kill the de'!>tor or to sell him into
slavery, or even, if there were several creditors,~_! p_f!f!]if
l~nd SQ di_Ekf_~}!i.P.L bJ!I~i!_etl_th'!~t, if anyone had cut offtoo
much or too little, he should inCJn- no cmzseque11tlegal disadvantage
(a clause which would have benefited Shakespeare's Shylock
in 11ze Merchant of Venice and which he would most gratefully
have accepted). 11 In support of this law, Caecilius puts
forward the goot_l reason that it provided an additional guarantee of good faith and~that, given the abominable nature of the
law, it wasnever intended that it should be enforced.'l In his
thoughtlessness, he not only fails to reflect that this latter
provision [Bestinmzung] frustrates the former intention, namely
that the law should guarantee good faith, but also overlooks
the fact that he hinlSeltClieSanexample immediately afterwards of how the law on false witness was rendered ineffectual by its excessive severit). - But it is not clear what Herr
Hugo means wlienllesays that Favorinus did not understand
the law; any schoolboy is capable of understanding it, and
Shylock would have understood better than anyone else the
clause in question, which would have been of so much advantage to him; by 'understandint, Herr Hugo must have meant
only that degree [Bildzmg] of understanding which is satisfied
Translator's tiDtt: The text in the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's Wtrkt VII reads &chtsanttil ('legal share'). This is clearly an error for &chtsnacilttil, the correct reading as in
llting's edition (VPR II, IOZ).
32
Introduction
if a good reason can be found fer such a law.- Incidentally, a
further misunderstanding of which Caecilius convicts
Favorinus in the same context is one to which a philosopher
may readily confess without blushing- namely his failure to
realize that iumentum, which the law specified, 'as distinct
from arcera', as the only mode of transport to be provided to
bring a sick man as witness to the court, should be understood
to signify not only a horse but also a coach or wagon. 13 Caecilius was able to derive from this legal determination a further proof of the excellence and precision of the old laws, for
in determining how a sick witness was to be summoned to
testify in court, they even went so far as to distinguish not just
between a horse and a wagon, but even between different
kinds of wagon - between a covered and upholstered wagon,
as Caecilius explains, and a less comfortable one. We would
thus be left with a choice between the severity of the original
law and the triviality of such determinations; but to describe
such things, let alone learned ellpositions of them, as 'trivial',
would be among the greatest possible affronts to scholarship
of this and other kinds.
But in the textbook cited above, Herr Hugo also has occasion to speak of rationality in connection with Roman law, and
I was particularly struck by the following points. In his treatment of the period from the origin oftire state to the Twelve Tables
( 38 and 39), he says that 'people (in Rome) had many
needs and were obliged to work, requiring the assistance of
draught animals and beasts of burden such as riJe ounelves
possess, that the territory of Rome consisted of alternate hills
and valleys, that the city stood on a hill, etc. - allusions which
'-were perhaps meant to fuffil the intentions of Montesquieu,
but which will scarcely be found to have captured the latter's_
spi~t. He the~ points out ( 40) ,'th~t the po~ition with regard,! to nght was still very far from satlsfymg the lughest demands o([
reason'. (This is quite correct; Roman family law
[Familienrecht], slavery, etc. do not satisfy even the most
modest demands of reason.) But in dealing with later periods,
Herr Hugo forgets to tell us in which of them, if any, Roman
law satisfied tire /zig/zest demands of reason. In 289, however,
Herr Hugo says of the classical jurists in the period of the
33
highest development [Ausbildung] ofRoman law as a science 'that it
has long since been noticed that the classical jurists had a
philosophical education'; but 'few people are aware' (although
the many editions of Herr Hugo's textbook have ensured that
more people are now aware) 'that no category of writers is so
eminently deserving as these same Roman jurists to be likened
to the mathematicians in respect of logical deduction from
first principles or to the new founder of metaphysics in respect
of the strikingly distinctive way in which they develop their
concepts - the latter being confirmed by the remarkable fact
that there are nowhere so many trichotomies as in the classical
jurists and in Kant'.- That logical consistency which Leibniz
praises is certainly an essential characteristic of the science of
right, as of mathematics and every other science of the understanding; but this logical consistency of the understanding has
nothing to do with the satisfaction of the demands of reason
and with philosophical science. 14 Apart from this, however,
. \the very illconsistency of the Roman jurists and praetors should
1 be regarded as one of their greatest virtues, for it enabled
them to dissociate thems~l"~ and abominable
~titu.~.?-~s;ilibough they were at th_e same time compelled to
~t...verbal distinctions on the sly" (as when they called
bollontm-'"Poss~ what nevertheless amounted to an
inheritance)15 and even silly excuses (and silliness is equally
an inconsistency) in order to preserve the letter of the Twelve
Tables, for example by the fiction or pretence' that a daughter
was a son' (see U. G.] Heineccius, Antiquitatum Romallanon
.. . fiber I [Frankfurt, I 771 ], tit. u, 24)/6 - But it is ludicrous
to see the classical jurists lumped together with Kant because
of a few trichotomous divisions - particularly those cited in
Note 5 to Herr Hugo's remarks- and to see this kind of thing
called 'development of concepts'.
__ _.~~,/~-.. J-r./ ,r.r ~-
"TranslaJor's nou: Hegel uses here the Latin adverb collidt.

bTranslator's nott: Hegel uses the Latin and Greek terms jit:tio and {mbY.{!ta~.
'TranslaJor's no/t: Hegel uses the Latin termsfilia and filius.
34
lntroductimz
The basis [Boden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its
precise location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so
that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmung] and
the system of ri_ght is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of
spirTt'Produced from within itself as a second nature.
Additio11 (H,G). The freedom of the will can best be explained by

reference to physical nature. For freedom is just as much a basic
determination of the will as weight is a basic determination of bodies. If
matter is described as heavy, one might think that this predicate is merely
contingent; but this is not so, for nothing in matter is weightless: on the
contrary, inatter is weight itself. Heaviness constitutes the body and is the
body. It is just the same with freedom and the will, for that which is free is
the will. Will without freedom is an emp word, just as freedom is actual
only as ~or as subject. But as fa- the connection between the will and
thought, the following remarks are necessary. Spirit is thought in general,
and the human being is distinguished from the animal by thought But it
must not be imagined [sich vorstellen] that a human being thinks on the
one hand and wills on the other, and that he has thought in one pocket
and volition in the other, for this would be an empty representation
[Vorstellrmg]. ~ distinctio~~_!Wee..E.-thou_g_~~--is simply ~t
tx:tween th~~cal attitud~s. But they are not two separate
~n the contrary the will is a articular way of thinking- thinking
translating itselfinto existence [ asein], thinliliig as e drive to give itself
existence. This distinction between thought and will can be expressed as
follows. When I think of an object [Gegenstand], I make it into a thought
and ~~~;.!_!!lake it into som~~h_!'l
~~e. For it is only when I think that am
with mys~lf [bei mir], and !t i~ comprehendigg it that~_san
penetrate an ob"ect; it then riOlonger stands OP. osed to me and I have
- eprived it ofjb_p.t qualitY Q[jts own which i~ itself in ~EE_~ition to
'me. }U'st as Adam says to Eve: 'You are flesh of my flesh anobone of my
booe' ,1 so does spirit say: 'This is spirit of my spirit, and its alien character
has disappeared.' r>cy_re~entation [VontellzmgJ is a gcneralizatioJl,
and this is inherent in thought. .~leneralize som@ling means to think
it. Tis thought and l~the universat~en I say 'I'~Qf
_account~IY...e._m:!!cularity__~ch as~ c~now
redge[Kt'tmmisse], and age. 'I' is t~IIY e'.!!P_ty;_~t_!!L!!!~r~t ~~le~!y~~this s~~~The colourful canvas of the world is
before me; I stand opposed to it and in this ltheoretical] attitude I overcome
35
Philosophy ofRight
[m!f11t'be] its opposition and make its content my own. 'I' is at home
in the world when it knows it, and even more so when it has comprehended it So much for the theoretical attitude. The practical attitude, on
the other hand, begins with thought, with the 'I' itself, and seems at first
to be opposed [to the world] because it immediately sets up a separation.
In so far as I am practical or active, i.e~ !~~~ine
myself, and to determine m~elf means recisel to R sit a difference. But
~~I posit are nevertheless also mine, the determinations apply to me, and the ends to which I am impelled belong to me. Now
even if I let go of these determinations and differences, i.e. ifl posit them
in the so-called external world, they still remain mine: they are what I
have done or made, and they bear the imprint of my mind [Geist]. This,
then, is the distinction between theoretical and practical attitudes; the
relationship between them must now be described. The theoretical is
essentially contained within the practical; the idea [VD;;t~e
~~b~e cannot have a will without
intelligence. On the contrary,. the will contains the theoretical within
Jtsl:!f. The will determines itselt';~;:;(ftli~d:etennination is primarily ~
iiiward nature, for what I will I represent to myself as my object [Gegmstarui). 1be animal acts by instinct, it is ~~d ~y something inward and
is therefore also practical; but it has no will, because it does not represent
to itself what it desires. It is equally impossible to adopt a theoretical
attitude or to think without a will, for in thinking we are necessarily active.
The content of what is thought certainly takes on the form of being; but
this being is something mediated, something posited by our activity.
These distinct attitudes are therefore inseparable: they are one and the
same thing, and both moments can be found in every activity, of thinking
and willing alike.
With regard to the freedom of the will, we may recollect the
older method of cognition. It simply presupposed the represmtation [Vorstellu11g] of the will and attempted to set up a definition of the will by extracting it from this representation; then,
in the manner of the older empirical psychology, the so-called
proofof the will's freedom was derived from the various feelings and phenomena [Empfi71dtmgm tmd Erscheimmgm] of
ordinary consciousness, such as remorse, guilt, and the like,
which could allegedly be explai11ed only in terms of a free will.
But it is more convenient simply to adhere to the notion that
freedom is giver~ as a fact of consciousness in which we must
simply believe.1 The deduction that the will is free and of rohat
the will and freedom areas already remarked in 2 above-
+-s
I tllroducti011
is possible only within the context of the whole [of philosophy]. The basic features of this premise-arelbat spirit is
initially intelligence and that the detenninations through which
it proceeds in its development,Jromfte/i'!! to representational
thitzkin[JV~tel/en] tfi{/zough;_are the way by which it prod'uCeSitselraslM'r==-w ch, as practical spirit in general, is the
proximate truth of intelligence. I have given an account of
these matters in my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
(Heidelberg, 1817), 363-399, and hope to deal with them
in greater detail on a future occasion.J It is all the more
necessary for me to contribute in this way to what I hope will
be a more thorough cognition of the nature of spirit, because,
as I pointed out in the Encyclopaedia (Remarks to 367), it is
hard to imagine that any philosophical science can be in so l !{bad and neglected a condition as that doctrine ofspirit which is 1
usually called 'psychology'. 4 - And as for those elements
[Momente] of the concept of the will which are mentioned in
this and the following paragraphs of the Introduction and
which result from the premise referred to above, it is possible
to form an idea [Vmltel/en] of them by consulting the selfconsciousness of any individual. In the first place, anyone can
discover in himself an~~at
~soever, and likewise to determine himself, to posit any content
fu"liliil~:;nn likewise have examples of the further determinations [of the will] within his selfconsciousness.
5
The will contains (a) the element o{.jjffilm!ilei7iii1~ or of the 'I' 's
. pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content,
wheili.er present munedtately through nature, through needs, desires,
and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved;
~~ the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or zmi.vmali!J!.JJu!
pure~l.
'~
Those who regard thinking as a particular and distinctfaczJty,

divorced from the will as an equally distinct[tUU/ty, and who in
addition even consider that thinking is prejud~ to the will"''__,-
37
especially the good will - show from the very outset that they
are totally ignorant of the nature of the will (a remark which
we shall often have occasion to make on this same subject). 1 ' Only one aspect of the will is defined here- namely this absolute
possib7ilij0' abstmcting from every detemunanon in which I
~---------~~-~
find myself or which I have posited in myself. the flight from
~veryconteiltas~~in
trus ~presentational thought [die Vontellung] considers this as ect in itself tir siclz] as freedom and holds fast
to it;\thl; is negatroe eedom r the freedom of the under-
s~lfhisiSihe-tre~of!l ofthe:_vmdhi~
!he status o~~fit remains pure!)'

it becomes in the~ouffialm
the Hiiidu fanatheOrenCal,
'----~~~---.......
~
-~~m_of ~e cont~m~l~~o~ut if it tum~ ~o ac!_U~t
~m!h~--~Q1;9.Jm~nati
cism of destruc~n, dem~~ishingtheWhOie exis~~l
~funin!!-_!!Ilgan- indiviaUals regarcrea--as-suspe~
_given orde.r~ating any organization which attempg

to rise up anew. 3 Oiliy-i~ymg something does this
~tive wt1I hav~ feeling of its ownexf~t
may well believe that it wills some positive condition, for
instance the condjtion of universal equality or of univcrs~
---- ---- - ------....---..... ....... ___..~ouslife,b_y_tJtdoe~~~~~':~
--
~is con~ti~n.J.'9!_~s ~! -~~~e gi~~!.~~~- to some~~

a particulanzation both of institutions anifOf indi"Yiduals; but
itl5:-P.tclscir" thr~~-=-tfie aiiiiilillatian-af"jlarticularicy~f
---
,object:We-=dc.ll!nnination -tii.attlle se1r-ConsClousness- of this
~~g;tive freed~-;is-e5: Th~S:-wilaievel--ru~h-~~d~m
-Gelieves [meint] that it wills can in itself [/iir siclz] be no more

than an abstract representation [Vontellung], and its actualization can only be the fury of destruction.
Addition (H,G). It is inherent in this element of the will that I am able to

free myself from everything, to renounce all ends, and to abStract fran
everything.4 The human being alone is able to abandon an things, even

his own life: he can commit suicide. The animal cannot do this; it always
remains only negative, in a determination which is alien to it and to which
it merely grows accustomed. The human being is pure thinking of himself, and only in thinking is he this power to give himself universality, that
1
vis, to extinguish all particularity, all determinacy. This negative freedom
s-6
bllroductimz
or ,freedom of the understanding is one-sided, but this one-sidedness

alwa;-Comains within ItSelf an essential determination and should there-..fore not be dis~; ~..t~~t of the ~der~~~~~_!!; : ,_.
~-~etennination as unique and elevates it to supreme stat_!!S ...i "
This form o~liistory. The Hindus, for
example, place the highest value on mere persistence in the knowledge of
one's simple identity with oneself, on remaining within this empty space
of one's inwardness like colourless light in pure intuition, and on
renouncing every activity of life, every end, and every representation
[Vontellung]. In this way, the human being becomes Brahman. There is no
longer any distinction between the finite human being and Brahman;
instead, every difference [D@'rt71Z] has disappeared in this universality.
This form [of freedom] appears more concretely in the active fanaticism
of both political and religious Iife. An example of this was the Reign of
Terror in the French Revolution, during which all differences of talents
and al]thority were supposed to be cancelled out [mygehoben]. This was a
time of trembling and quaking and of intolerance towards everxth9;
particular. For fanaticism wills only what is abstract, not what is artiCUlated, so that whenever differences emerge, it finds them incompatible
with its oWniiiaete"-nacyan"dcanceiSi:fiem(/ieofileQI!l.J~he
people, unng the Frenc
vo ution, destroyed once more the institutions they had themselves created, because all institutions are incompat-J
ible with the abstract self-consciousness of equality.
)!
----
6
(~)
In the same way, '/' is the transition from undifferentiated

di erenttalion, JetemzinaJion, and e Sl mg 0 a
in.~eterminacy tO
det~rminacy as a content and object. - Th1s content may further be

gtv-;n~ concept of spirit. Through this
positing of itself as something detemzinate, '/' ste s int
"s nee
[Dasein] in general - the absolute moment
the nitude or par~ ,4cu/ariZillion of the 'I'.
'of
This second moment of detemzination is just as much negativity

and cancellation ~~~flzeben] as the first-~~ is the cancella.tion of the first abstract ne tivity. -just as the particular is in
general contained within the universal, so in consequence is
, .this second moment already contained within the first-and is
merely a positing of what the first alrea~Y-~- itz its!}[ The first
-------- . ---- .----....-......~'""".,--- .. ,.......
moment - that is, the first as it is for itselfis not true infinity
_..-......,____________
39
Philosophy ofRight
or the concrete universality of the concept, but only something
detenninate and one-sided. For since it is abstraction from all
determinacy, it is itself not without determinacy; and the fact
that it is abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy,
deficiency, and finitude.- The differentiation and determination of the two moments ~e~ountl ifll:lie
~~~~pt
that m l'IChte- to cOnfine oarseltes to hiS presentation-'/',

as the unbounded (in the first proposition of his 17zeory of
Knowledge [WismiSclzafts/ehre]), is taken purely and simply as
something positive (and thus as the universality and identity of
the understanding). Consequently,. this abstract 'I' for itselfis
~osed to__k!lze tru.!J!; and limit~
general, whether as a given external limit or as an activity of
the 'I' itselfis therefore something addedto it (in the second
proposition).' - The further step which speculative philosophy had to take was to apprehend the negativity which is
immanent within the universal or the identical, as in the'/'- a
step the need for which is not perceived by those who fail to
apprehend the dualism of infinity and finitude, even in that
immanent and abstract form in which Fichte understood it.
Addition (H,G). This second moment appears ;t5 the opposing one. It is to
be apprehended in its universal mode: it belongs to freedom, but does not
constitute the whole of freedom. The 'I' here emer es from undifferentiated indeterminacy to become di erentiated, to posit some g etermi~aslts'C~Ii)CCt [GegertstandJ.~o not me~ly will- I will
_Jomething. A will which, as described in the previous paragraph, willS only
th~~universal; ~ls not/zing and is therefore not a will at all. The
-particular [thing] which th~ISiSalliiiiiii~-~i~der
,to be a wur,~~eit-nlefact that the wiii wills
iiiiiielhl(,iis ilie limit or negation. T.EJ.lS-.particularization is what as a rule
is called ~ought usually~regards the lrrst m~
~--......-.
...namely
the indeterrrunate, as the a so ute an tgher moment, an conversclyrcgards die limited as a mere negation of this indeterminacy. But
this indeterminacy is itself merely a negation with regard to the determinate, to finitude: 'I' is this solitude and absolute negation. The indeterminate will is to this extent jut as one-stded astnaTWhich exists in mere
determinacy.
----------
I 1ztroduaion
6-7
-----------------------(y) The will is the unity of both these moments- Jarticularity reflected
into itself and ereb restored t tmiversalit _. It is individtiality

[Einzelheit), the self-detemzinatimz of the '1', in that it posits itself as the
negative of itself, that is, as detemzinate and limited, and at the same
timeremaills with itself [bei sich ), that is, in its idemily with itself and
universality; and in this detennination, it joins together with itself
alone. - 'I' detennines itself in so far as it is the self-reference of
negativity. As this reference to itself, it is likewise indifferent to this
detenninacy; it knows the latter as its own and as ideal,~
possibility by which it is not restricted but in which it finds itself merely
'6ec~ it posits itself in it. - This is the freedom of the will, which
constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its gravity, just as
gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body.
Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal, as the
~-~-~~nnillaie, and as
particular, with a detenninate object [Gegenstand), content,
and end. But these two moments are only abstractions; what is
concrete and true (and everything true is concrete} ~
universality which has the particular as its opposite, but this
~~tion into itself, has been
reconciled [ausgeg/ichen] with the universal. This unity is
individuality, butnot in itS immediacy as a smg e urut- as in
~mmon idea [Vorstellung) ofindividuality- b~in
accorda~e wiili tlie concept of mdlvt~m;yclopaedia
of the PliliiiSoPlilrolS~n other words, this
jndividuality is in fact none other than the _EOncryt i~f. The
first two moments- that the will can abstract from everything
and that it is also detennined (by itself or by something else)are easy to accept and grasp, oecausetliey~
[fiir siclz ), moments of the understanding and devoid of truth.
But it is the third moment, the true and speculative (and
everything true, in so far as it is comprehended, can be
thought of only speculatively), which the understanding
!~~ses to enter into, because the conceptiSj)r~~ what the
understanding always aescnbes as incomprehensible. The
-titSKorprovmg and explammg ui"more detaifiliiSiii""nennost
insight of speculation - that is, infinity as self-referring
----..../~~~-~~
41
Plzi/osoplzy ofRight
negativity, this ultimate source of all acti\'ity, life, and con.sciousness -: J>_elongs_ ~Q)ggi.c_?~Qurely ~peculatlve philosophy.
-The only thing which remains to be noted here is that, when
we say that the will is universal and that the will determines
itself, we speak as if the will were already assumed to be a
.. subjec!.J)r..m/J.il!!!!.!EJt. But the will is not comp!ete and universal
until it is determined, and until this determination is superseded and idealized; it does not become will until it is this
self-mediating activity and this return into itself.
'!~'hat is properly called the will contains both the preceding
moments. 'I' as such is primarily pure activity, the universal which is with
itself [bei siclz ]; but this universal determines itself, and to that extent is no
longer with itself but posits itself as an other and ceases to be the universal. Then the third moment IS lliat 'r is with itse~s
(i(}ier; as it detemiihes itself, it neverthelessstill remai~-;ithitself and
does not cease to hold fast to the universal. This, then, is the concrete
concept of freedom, whereas the two previous moments have been found
to be thoroughly abstract and one-sided. But we already possess this
freedom in the form of feeling [Empji,du11g], for example in friendship
and lov~.1 Here:WC arenotone-sidedly within ourselves~;;
-~urselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves
in this limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being
should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his self-awareness
only by regarding the other as other. ThUS: freedom lies neither in
maefenninacyilodii.aetenrunacy, out is both at once. The will which
limits itself exclusively to a this is the will of the stubborn person who
considers himself unfree unless he has this will But the will is not tied to
something limited; on the contrary, it must proceed further, for the nature
of the will is not this one-sidedness and restriction. ..freedQ!Il is to ~ill
something determinate, yet to be with oneself [bei sich] in this determinacy
arufto reiurnon~re to the universal.
Additi011 (H).
8
The further determination of particularization (see 6 above) constitutes the difference between the forms of the will: (a) in so far as
determinacy is the fomzal lfonllellef;;ppositio"n between the subjective
on the one hand and the objective as external immediate existence
I ntrodrution
7-9
[Existen.z] on the other, this is the formal (fomzale]" will as self-consciousness, which.finds an external world outside itself. As individu-
~ [Einzelheit] re~~~~~~n~;_y i~~~-~~!f!-_it ~s ..
of tr~bjective end into nfgectziirty ilirough die mediation Of

adi~~atnexteffiiillm"eans.-rrCihesPfrtta;i"t ISiilaruilOrTtSdr,
"whereby lis aetemunacy--iSiiDsolutely true and its own (see
Encyclopaedia, 363),' the relation of consciousness constitutes no
more than the aspect of the will's appeara,zce. This aspect will not be
separately [fiir sich] considered any further here.
Addition (H). The consideration of the will's determinacy is the task of the
understanding and is not primarily.,3l~e. The will is determined by
no means only in the sense of content, but also in the sense of form. Its
determinacy with regard to form is its end and the accomplishment of its
end. At first this end is only subjective and internal to me, but it should also
become objective and throw off the deficiency of mere subjectivity. One
may ask here why it has this deficiency. If that which is deficient does not
at the same time stand above its deficiency, then its deficiency does not
exist for it. For us an animal is deficient, btit not for itself. In so far as an
end is still only ours, it is for us a deficiency, foc to us, freedom and will
are the unity of the subjective and the objective. Hence the end must be
posited objectively, and it thereby attains not a new one-sided determination but only its realization.
TransltUor's note: The distinction between the adjective [om1al and the preceding forme//
appears to carry no particular significance. On subsequent occasions in the Reclusp/lilosophit (frr example, 12.3 and Hegel's Remarks to 13, 15, 115, 135, 139, 2.61,
etc.), Hegel uses only forrnt/1.
g
(b) In so far as the will's determinations are its ow" - that is, its
, intemally reflected particularization in general - , 3 e its content.
'fl:Use~e will, is its end m accordance with
the form specified under (a) above - either its inner or subjective end
as represented in the act of willing, or its end as actualized and
accomplished through the mediation of its activity as it translates the
subjective into objectivity.
43
10
This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is primarily
immediate. Thus, the:_~~~-~ it is in general
the will in its co11ce t. Only when the will has itsel~t
egenstandj is it for itself what it is in itself./
Finitude, according to this determination, consists in the fact
that what something is in itself or in accordance with its concept is different in its existence [Existenz) or appearance from
what it is for itself, thus, for example, ~t
mutual externality of nat_ re is space, but for itself it is time.
f;o points should be noted in this connection: first that,
because the true is simply the Idea, we do not yet possess an
object or detennination in its truth if we grasp it only as it is in
itselfor in its concept; and secondly, that something as concept
or in itself likewise exists, and this existence [Existenz) is a
shape proper to the object (as with space in the above example). The separation which is present in the finite world
between being-in-itself and being-for-itself at the same time
constitutes the finite world's mere existence [Dasein) or
appearance (immediate examples of this will arise in connection with the natural will and then with fonnal right, etc.). The
understanding stops at mere beiug-in-itselfand therefore calls
freedom in accordance . with this being-in-itself a foculty
[Venniigm), since it is indeed in this case~~
[Miiglichkeit). But the understanding regaras this detennination as absolute and perennial, and takes the relationship
[Beziehrmg) of freedom to what it wills, or in general to its
reality, merely as its application to a given material, an application which does not belong to the essence of freedom itself.
In this way, the understanding has to do with the abstract
alone, not with the Idea and truth of freedom/
----
Addition (G). The will which is a will only in accordance with its concept is
free in itselfbut at the same time unfree, for it would be truly free only as
a truly detenninate content; in the latter case, it is free for itself, has
freedom as its object, and is freedom. Whatever is still only in accordance
with its concept, whatever is merely in itself, is only immediate, only
natural. We are also familiar with thic; in representational thought [i11 der
44
buroductimz
,-------------
Vorste/lung]. \[he child is;, itselfa human bein
,.-.------ .... -- . ------:

;~t has reason only in itsr/f,)
it is only the p~~ea~ and freedoiJl, a!!.!_is -thei-etorerrfe__Q_~_

__J!!_.a,ccordance with tts concep!: ~~~!!:~!_e_~ts as yet onlv in~ (
!!_Ot ~human being who is rational in himself must ;
w~the process of self-production both by going out of himself }I
and by educating himself inwardly, in order that he may also become
-...
rational for lzimself.
---~~
n
The will which is free as yet only in itselfis the immediate or natural /
will. The determinations of the difference which is posited within the
will by the self-determining concept appear within the immediate will
as an immediately present content: these are the drives, desires, and
inclinations by which the will finds its~If naturallv deterrnjn~.d. This
content, along with the determinations developed within it, does
indeed originate in the will's rationality and-it ts thus rationafifl}iSclfi)
but expressed in so immediate a form, it does not yet have the form of
ratfonality.' For me, this content is admittedly entirely mine; but this
fo~that content are still different, so that the will is a finite will
witlzin itself.
Empirical psychology relates and describes these drives and
inclinations and the needs derived from them as it encounters
them, or believes it encounters them, in experience, and
attempts to classify this given material in the usual way. We
shall discuss below what the objective element of these drives
is, what shape this element assumes in its truth (without the
form of irrationality which it possesses as drive), and also what
shape it assumes in its existence [E.tistenz].
Addition (H). The animal, too, has drives, desires, and inclinations, but it
has no will and must obey its drive if nothing external prevents it But the
human being, as wholly indeterminate, stands above his drives and can
determine and posit them as his OWIL !he drive is part of nature, but to
posit it in this 'I' depends upon my will, which therefore cannot appeal to
theliict that the drive is grounded in nature.
45
Io-11
-:{
12
The system of this content as it is already present in its immediacy in
the will exists only as a multitude of varied drives, each of which is
mine in general along-with-others, ana at ffie same time something
universal and indeterminate which has all kinds of objects [Gegenstande] and can be satisfied in all kinds of ways. Inasmuch as the will,
in this double indeterminacy, gives itself the form of individuality
[Ei,zellzeit] (see 7), it is a resolving will, and only i so far as it makes
any resolutions at all is it an actual will.
~ To resolve on something [etwas besclzliejien] is to cancel
"t--;j
[01if/zeben) that indeterminacy in which each and every content

is initially no more than a possibility. But our language also
contains the alternative expression siclz etlt$clzliej1en ['to
decide']/ which indicates that the indeterminacy of the will
itself, as something neutral yet infinitely uitful, the origi al
seed of all existence [Dasein ], contains its determi ations and
ends within itself, and merely brings them forth from within.
"Tramkltor's nou: Literally, 'to close something'.
bTratrs/alor's not~: Literally, 'to unclose oneselr.
By resolving, the will posits itself as the will of a specific individual

and~~)Yhi_ch ~~~~~-f~g else_ But apart
from this ji11itude as consciousness (see 8), ~ediate will,
because of the difference between its form and its content (see I I),
is purely fonnal; its only appropriate function is that of abstract resolution, and its content is not yet the content and product ofits freedom.
In so far as intelligence is a tlzinking power, its object [Gegetzstand] and content remain universal and the intelligence itself
behaves as a universal activity. In the will, the universal also
~ch is mine', as individuality

[Ei11zellzeit); and i the immediate, i.e. formal will, it signifies
abstract individuality which is not yet filled with its free
universality. It is therefore in the will that the proper [eigetze]
finitude of intelligence begins, and it is only by raisi g itself
Introduction
once more to the level of thought and by conferring immanent

universality upon its ends that the will cancels [aujhebt] the
difference of form and content and ~Wielf objecti.!_e,
infinite will. Thus those who believe that the human being is
infinite in the realm of the will in general, but that he - or
reason itselfis limited in the realm of thought, have little
understanding of the nature of thinking and willing.' In so far
as thinking and willing are still distinct, it is rather the converse which is true, and thinking reason, as will, is [reason]
deciding [sic/z entschlieflen] on its ownfinitude.
Addition (H). A will which resolves on nothing is not an actual will; the
characterless man can never resolve on anything. The reason [Gnmd] for
such indecision may also lie in an over-refined sensibility which knows
that, in determining something, it enters the r~ of finitude, imposing a
limit on itself and relinquishing i~t does not wish to renounce
11i'et0tantYWJiiC1rifffiteiias. Such arusposition [Gemiit] is dead, even ifits
aspiration is to be beautiful/ 'Whoever aspires to great things', says
Goethe, 'must be able to limit himsetr.J Only by making resolutions can
the human being enter actuality,.however.painful tlleProcess iiiay6e; for
mema wotmt-r;ah:er nmemerge!Toiil that -inwar(f"fifo<iling in whiCh" it
reserves a universal possibility for itself. J!J!!p~si~ isj!f>t]'_et_act1J~ty.
The will which is sure of itself does nat thererOre
itSelfiiiWTiatft
determines.
lose
"Tr/JIIS/atar's nott: As T. M. Knox (Knox, p. ZJO, note) sunnises, the tin- of the original
must surely read tinn. Gans, who compiled the 'Additions', has simply taken this error
over from Hotho's transcription of Hegel's lectures (cf. VPR m, 131).
14
The finite will, purely with regard to its form, is the self-reflecting
jtr~' which is with itself [bei sic/z selbst) (see ~such,itsk,~
tibtroe its content, i.e. its various drives, and also above the further
individual ways in which these are actualized and satisfied. At the
same time, since it is only formally infinite, it is tied to this content as
to the determinations of its nature and of its external actuality (see
6 and I I); but since it is indeterminate, it is not restricted to this or
that content in particular. To this extent, this content is only a possible one for the reflection of the '/' into itself; it may or may not be
mine; and 'I' is the possibility of determining myself to this or to
47
12-14
something else, of choosing between these determinations which the 'I'
must in this respect regard as external.'
The freedom of the will, according to this determination, is arbitrariness, in which the fdlowing two factors are contained: free reflection,
~h a.Qstracts f!:~m __!:'!~ and dependence on an inwardly or
~~~~on~nt and material. Since this content, which is
necessary in itse/f"'ii.S ~the same time determined as a
possible content in opposition to free reflection, it follows that
arbitrariness is co11tingou:y in the s~ape of will.
The commonest idea [Vm-stellung] we have of freedom is that
of arbitrariness - the mean position of reflection between the
will as determined solely by natural drives and the will which
is free in and for itself. When we hear it said that freedom in
general consists in ~ able to do as o11Uieases, such an idea
[Vontellung] can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of
intellectual culture [Bildrmg des Geda11kens]; for it shows not
the least awareness of what constitutes the will which is free in
and for itself, or right, or ethics, etc. Reflection, the (om1al
~~~unity_ of se~ is the will's
abstract certamty orTtSfreeaom, but 1t Js not yet the tnllh of
this freedom, because it does not yet.h!!_'f_e itself as its con!_ent
~ ~_Q__ that the subjective side is still something other
~ve[tltegege,ISt;;m!liCTiC];-tn.eCOirtent o!tlii.s selfdetermination therefore also~~ins p~~
Instead of being the will in its truth,-. arbitrariness
is rather the
____,-...;-:-------------..,
-~-!!!!Bf!i~n. -In the controversy which arose chiefly at
the time of Wolfi's metaphysics as to whether the will is
actually free or whether our knowledge of its freedom is
merely a delusion, it was arbitrariness which people had in
mind 1 To the certainty of this abstract self-determination,
. detenni,i.wujgh!l~lt, which, as something
-;;;;;;,;;;;.ed, is not contained in that certainty and therefore
comes to itjrom outside- although 'outside' here denotes drive
or rel'resentation [Vontellung), or ;mtpiyltelact that meCOii-~eSsiSfilled in such a way that its content is not derived
_
Introduction
.from its own self-detennining activity as such. Accordingly,
siilce-onff tbeToriDal element Of'free self-determination is
immanent within arbitrariness, whereas the other element is
something given to it, arbitrariness may indeed be called a
delusion if it is supposed to be equivalent to freedom. In all
1\_TI:~ as in that of Kant and subsequently in
Fries's utterly superficial revision of it, freedom is nothing
other than this formal self-activity.2
Addition (H). Since I have the possibility of determining myself in this or

that direction -that is, since I am able to choose- I possess an arbitrary
will, and this is what isUs"iiillyca(lealreeaoiD.Tfie cliOice which I have
lieSJ.Ii.tECUniversality of the will, whereby I can make this or that [thing]
mine. This [thing] which is mine is a particular content and is therefore
incompatible with me; thus it is separate from me and is only potentially
mine, just as I am only the potentiality of uniting with it The choice
therefore lies in the indeterminacy of the
and the determinacy of the
content. Because of this content, the will is consequently not fref,
aftliough it has in
itself the aspect of infinity
in a fonnal sense. None of
-:""""....._
.
these contents is in keeping with it, and it does not truly have itself in any
of them. It is inherent in arbitrariness that the content is not determined
as. mine by the nature of my will, but by contir~gency, thus I am also
dependent on this coinent, and this is the contradiction which underlies-.
gb,itrariness. The common man thinks that he is free when he is allowed
to act arbitrarily, but this very arbitrariness implies that he is not free.
When I will what is rational, I act not as a particular [partikr1lares]
individual, but in accordance with the concepts c1 ethics in general: in an
ethical act, I vindicate not myself but the thing [die Sl.e]. But a person
who does so~perverse gives the greatest prominence to his particularity [Partikrdaritiit]. The rational is the high road which everyone
follows and where no one stands out from the rest When great artists
complete a work, we can say that it llad to be so; that is, the artist's
particularity has completely disappeared and no mamzerism is apparent in
it. Phidias has no mannerisms; the shape itself lives and stands out. But
!he B!'orer the artist .is, the more we see of himself, of his particularity and
-arbitrariness.3 If we stop our enquiry at arbitrariness, at the human
being's ability to will this or that, this does indeed constitute his freedom;
but if we bear fumly in mind that the content of what he wills is a gi...en
one, it follows that he is determined by it and is in this very respect no
longer free.
49
Whatever the will has decided to choose (see I 4), it can likewise
relinquish (see s). But with this possibility of proceeding in tum
beyond any other content which it may substitute for the previous
one, and so on ad infinitum, it does not escape from finitude, because
every such content is different from the form [of the will] and therefore finite; and the opposite of determinacy- namely indeterminacy,
indecision, or abstraction - is only the other, equally one-sided
moment.
That contradiction which is the arbitrary will (see Is) makes its
appearance as a dialectic of drives and inclinations which conOict with
each other in such a way that the satisfaction of one demands that the
satisfaction of the other be subordinated or sacrificed, and so on; and
since a drive is merely the simple direction ofits own determinacy and
therefore has no yardstick within itself, this determination that it
should be subordinated or sacrificed is the contingent decision of
arbitrariness - whether the latter is guided by calculations of the
understanding as to which drive will afford the greater satisfaction, or
by any other consideration one cares to name.
Addition (H). Drives or inclinations are primarily a content of the will, and
only reflection stands above them; but these drives [Triebe] themselves
become impelling [treibend), presS upon each ot]ler, and conflict with each
other, andan of them wish to b_e 5atis.fied. If, then, I put all the others
aside and corruillt myself to only one_ of them, I find myself in a destructive
lmiitatiori, fa by my very act I have relinquished my univcrglity, which is
a !i)'Stem of alf drivc;s~ But'it is of just as little help merely to subordinate
certain drives [to others]- the course of actio!) to which the understanding usually resqrts - because no yardstick by_ which they might be
arranged in order is available h!;re; the demand for such an order therefore usually ends in tedious platitudes/ .
With regard to the judgenre1ll of drives the appearance of the dialectic

is such that, as immanent and hence also positive, the determinations of
so
lntroductiun
16-19
the immediate will are good; thus man is said to be by nature good. But
in so far as they are detenninatiom of nature, opposed to freedom and
to the concept of the spirit in general and therefore negative, they must
be eradicated; thus man is said to ~e by nature evil. In this situation, the
decision in favour of one assertion or the other likewise depends on
subjective arbitrariness. 1
Addition (H). The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is superior
to the other according to which he is good. Interpreted philosophically,
this doctrine should be understood as_ follows. As spirit, man is a free
being [Wesen] who is in a position not to let himself be determined by
natural drives. When he exists in an immediate and uncivilized
[ungebildetm] condition, he is therefore in a situation in which he ought
not to be, and from which he must liberate himself. This is the meaning
of ~e doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity would not be
the religion of freedom.
Underlying the demand for the purification oftlze drives is the general
idea [Vo,.ste/lung) that they should be freed from the form of their
immediate natural determinacy and from the subjectivity and contingency of their corztent, and restored to their substantial essence.
The truth behind this indeterminate demand is that the drives should
become the rational system of the will's determination; to grasp them
thus in terms of the concept is the content of the science of right.
The content of this science can be expounded, with reference
to all its individual moments sufh as right, property, morality,
family, the state, etc., in the following form: man lzas by nature
a drive towards right, and also a drive towards property and
morality, and also a drive towards sexual love, a drive towards
sociability, etc. 1 If one prefers to accord the dignity of a
philosophical shape to this form of empirical psychology, then
this, in the light of what has passed in recent times for philosophy {as was earlier noted) and continues to pass for it, can
be achieved at low cost simply by declaring that man finds
within himself, as a fact oflzis consciousness, that he wills right,
property, the state, etc. This same content, which appears
here in the shape of drives, will recur later in another form,
namely that of duties.Z
Philosophy ofRight
'When reflection applies itself to the drives, representing them,

estimatitq(tlienl,a~IHpafing-~ another and then with
the means they employ, their consequences etc., and with a sum total
of satisfaction- i.e. with llappiness1 - it confers formal universality upon
this material and purifies it, in this external manner;Orits crudity and
barbariry.;T~-cUlifvation of__ the ~niver~ty o~ tho~ght is ~
11,bsolute value of education (cf. r87).:r-~-----------------~
Addition (H). In happiness, thought already has some power over the
natural force of the drives, for it is not content with the instantaneous, but
requires a whole of happiness. This is connected with education to the
extent that education likewise implements a universal. But two moments
are present in the ideal of happiness: the first is a universal which is
superior to all particularities; but secondly, since the content of this
universal is in tum merely universal pleasure, the individual and particular, i.e. a finite quantity, reappears at this point, and we are compelled to
return to the drive. Since the content of happiness lies in the subjectivity
and feeling [Empfirulrmg) of everyone, this universal end is itself particular
[partikrdar], so that no true unity of content and fonn is yet present within
it
The truth, however, of this formal universality, which is indeterminate for itself and encounters its determinacy in the material already
mentioned, is"i!Eftelefflf~lilj;)_!!y will, or freetf!!!!.. When
the will has universality, or itself as infinite form, as its content, object
[Gegenstand), and end, it is free not only irz itself but also for itself- it is
the Idea in its truth.,-----.~---.......____.
The self-consciousness of the will, as
desir~
and drive, is
sensuous, "TUst a;ti;"(ea~ilii~ i~''ge~~;;td";;otes
...----.--
-~-~and hence that condition in which~~s-
'- ~e~tself. T~~~j_llhas two el~tsthe

will which lias being irz and for itself has as its object the will
itself as such, and hence itself in its pure universality. This
universality is such that the immediacy of the natural and the
partiaJarity [Partikularitiit) with which the natural is likewise
~ )l~uo~~~!. an~-~:~~univ~sality;
52
lntroduaion
invested when it is produced by reflection are superseded
within it. But this process whereby the particular is suEerseded and raised to the universal is what is called the acti'11ity
of thought. The self-consciousness which purifies and raises
-its object, content, and end to this universality does so as
thought asserting itself in the will. Here is the point at which it
becomes clear that it is only as thinking intelligence that the will
is truly itself and free. The slave does not know his essence,
his infinity and freedom; he does not know himself as an
essence - he does not know himself as such! for he does not
think himself. This self-consciousness which comprehends
ttself as essenc~t"h;"o..igiithought and thereby dives~elf of
ilie connngent and the untrue cons~ thePri~clPl;~.
right, of morality, and-of all _ethics. Those who speak
philosophically of right, morality, and ethics and at the same
time seek to exclude thought, appealing instead to feeling,
heart, emotion, and inspiration, bear witness to the profound
contempt into which thought and science have fallen; for in
their case, science itself, having sunk into despair and total
lassitude, even adopts barbarism and thoughtlessness as its
principle and does everything it can to rob mankind of all
truth, worth, and dignity.
-
---h~_,..--.----..__..--..~--.
Additimz (H). Truth in philosophy means tha~the concept corresponds to_

:T~~ A body, for example, is reality, and the soul is the concept. But
soul and body ought to match one another; a dead body therefore stJ11 has
an existence [Existerzz], but no longer a true one, fur it is~ conce_p~~!
~~ [Dasei,]: that is why the dead bod~decom~oses. Tne will in its
truth is such that what it wills, i.e. its content, is identical with the will
itself, so that freedom is willed by freedom.
Tf!~~hich has-~~~ in and for itself is tndy infinite,~se its
~~~~~el~nd therefore not something which it sees

as other or as a iimitation; on the contrary, i~~_!...~imo
~i{ljlS..object. Furthermore, it is not just a possibility, predisposition, or capacity (Jx?terztia),
but the_infipite
.
...... '--- ..in
....--......actuality (i1zjinitum actu),
because the concept's existence [Dasein] or objective [gegerzstandliclze]
externality is inwardness itself.
53
2o-22
Plzilosoplzy of/Uglzt
If one therefore speaks only of the free will as such, without
specifying that it is the will which is free in and for itsel[, one is
speaking only of the predispositimz towards freedom or of the
natural and finite will (see II), and therefore not- whatever
one may say and believe - of the free will. - When the understanding regards the infinite merely as something negative
and hence as beyond its splzere, it believes that it is doing the
infinite all the more honour by pushing it ever further away
and distancing it as something alien. In the free will, the truly
infinite has actuality and presence - the will itself is the idea
which is present within itself.'
Addition (H). Infinity has rightly been represented by ~ image of the

circle, because a straight line runs an indefinit~
'iie'g;;nv~~~nfimty, does not return into
itseif:Tll~~-~flslio()ll5flrpossnnliif;}q
predi~on; on thecontrary, ru-rxterruu~ts
---
~elf.
- - - - - ------------------~-
Only in this freedom is the will completely witlz itself [bei siclz],l
because it has reference to nothing but itself, so that every relationship of dependence on something otlzer than itself is thereby eliminated.
-It is tnte, or rather it is tnttlz itself, because its determination consists
in being in its existence [Dasein) - i.e. as something opposed to itselfwhat it is in its concept; that is, the pure concept has the intuition of
itself as its end and reality.
It [the will] is rmiversal, because all limitation and particular individuality [Eitzzellzeit] are superseded within it. For these lie solei! in the
, difference~n the~ncept and its object [Gegenstmui] or content,
~sed in another torm,lntli"eaifl'erence~
subjective being-for-itself and its being-in-itself, or between its
exclusive and resolving individuality [on the one hand] and its universality itself [on the other].
The various determinations of universality are given in logic
(see Encyclopaedia of tlze Plzilosoplzical Sciences, II8-Iz6). 1
54
Introduction
The first thing which the expression 'universality' suggests to
representational thought [dem Vorste/len] is an abstract and
external universality; but in the case of that universality which
has being in and for itself, as defined here, we should think
neither of the universality of reflection - i.e. cmnmunality or
totality - nor of that abstract universality which stands outside
and in opposition to the individual - i.e. the abstract identity
of the understanding (see Remarks to 6). The universality in
question is concrete within itself and consequently has being
for itself, and it is the substance of the self-consciousness, its
immanent generic character [Gattung] or immanent idea; it is
the concept of the free will as the universal which extends beyond
its object, which permeates its detennination and is identical
with itself in this determination. - The universal which has ~
. bein in and for itself is in eneral W'i'latiS""Caikd the rational j
and it can be understood only in this speculative way.
22-26
*'
25
The subjeaive, as far as the will in general is concerned, denotes the
[Einzellleit] (see 7) as
~istina
m
its
conce
t
which
as
bein
i"
itsel.
The subjectivity of
._...........___
the will tlierefore denotes (a)J!)I!J...ftla!!, the absolute unity of the selfconsciousness with itself, in which the self-consciousness, as~,
is totally inward and abstractly dependent upon itself- i.e. the pure
'ifr~lnty Of itself, as distinct from truth; (~) ~
--~~tingent cont~t of _!!latever .!:_n~
will may pursue; (y) one-sided form in general (see 8), in so far as
-thatwJi1Cilis willed, whatever its content, is sti11 only a content
belonging to the self-consciousness, an unaccomplished end.
~~ ~elf:SQ~cious aspect, ~viduality
26
(a) The will, in so far as it has itself as its determination and is thus in
conformity with its con~t and truly itself, is the totally ob "eaiv t;
(~) but the objective will, inasmuch as it lacks the i;; nite form of self- 1
consciousness, is th~ will~merse in its ob"ect or condition, j
whatever the content of the latter may ~e,-_~.!h.~~~...hild, 1
the ethical will/ or the will of the slave, ilie superstitious will, etc.; ;
~~
-....___7
-. . -.. -'1. ..........
~~~
55
. J.... ...,..~._,..-../""",.-
't:
Plzilosoplzy of/Uglzt
(y) finally, objectivity is the one-sided form opposed to the subjective
determination of the will, and is thus the immediacy of existence
[Daseitz] as external existence [&istetzz];~the ~
objective to itself in this sense until its end'i"'a'refulfilled .
.
------------~~
These logical determinations of subjectivity and objectivity

have been listed here in order that we may expressly note in
relation to them - since they will often be employed in what
follows - that, like other distinctions and antithetical
determinations of reflection, they pass over into their
opposites on account of their finitude and hence of their
dialectical nature. Other such antithetical determinations,
however, ,retain a fixed significance for representational
thought [Vorstellrmg] and for the understanding, because their
identity is still only of an inward ind. In the will, on the other
hand, such antitheses- which are supposed to be abstract, yet
at the same time determinations of the will which can be
nown only as tire concrete - lead by themselves to their own
identity and to a confusion of their meanings, a confusion into
which the understanding quite unwittingly falls. - Thus the
will, as freedom with inward being, is subjectivity itself; subjectivity is accordingly the will's concept and hence its objectivity;
but its subjectivity, as opposed to objectivity, is finitude; yet in
this very opposition, the will is not with itself but involved with
the object, and its finitude consists just as much in the fact
that it is not subjective, etc. - Thus, the significance to be
attached in what follows to the subjective or objective aspects
of the will should in each case be apparent from the context,
which defines their position with reference to the totality.
Addition (H). It is usually believed that the subjective and objective are
firmly opposed to one another. But this is not the case; they in fact pass
over into one another, f<r they are not abstract determinations li e positive and negative, but already have a more concrete significance. If we
first consider the term 'subjective',~-~~y denote an end peculiar to a
spc;cific subject. In this sense, a very bad work of art which does not fulfil
its purpose [Sac/re] is purely subjective. But the same term may also be
applied to the content of the will, and it is then roughly synonymous with
~: a sul?i~!;tive cQru~ is one whirh_h_e.IQngs only to the subject.
~... 1.) -..---~
~.---.-<,.------:~~
Thus bad acnons, fur example, are merely su~ve. - But in adoition,
~describe a-~--~~-~~o/::_~h!_~-h~nlyitself
s6
bztroductimz
as its object [G~t7zstmul] and which possesses the power to abstract from
~any fiirtlier content. Thus, subjectivity may have a wholly particular
[partikulare) significance, or it may mean something eminently justified,
since everything which I am to recognize also has the task of becoming
mine and gaining its validity in me. Such is the infinite greed of subjectivity, which collects and consumes everythingmthiri tfifs s1mp\esource
of me.t>w'f'T~-aersttiOdiiliWiesSviriedW"aYs.
Weiiii}rwiderstand by it everything which we make our object [uns
gegt7zstiindlich ), whether such objects are actual existences [Eristt'7LZe71) or
are mere thoughts which we set up in opposition to ourselves. But we also
comprehend [under objectivity] the immediacy of existence [Dasein] in
which the end is to be realized: even if the end is itself wholly particular
(panikular) and subjective, we nevertheless call it objective as soon as it
makes its appearance. But the objective will is also that in which truth is
present. Thus the will of God, the ethical will, is objective. Finally, we
may also aescfibe as objective the will which is completely immersed in !ts
object [Objekt1 such as the wtll of the child, which is founded on trust and
liC'I(Ssubjective freedom, and the will of the slave, which does not yet
know itself as free and is consequently a will with no will of its O\'{JL In this}
sense,eve~~~h
has notyet completed its infinite return into itself is obiective.
\.~-~~~
The absolute determination or, if one prefers, the absolute drive, of

the free spirit (see zx) is to make its freedom into its object [Gegen-~
stand] - to make it objective
both in the sense that it becomes the
rational system of the spirit itself, and in the sense that this system
becomes immediate actuality (see z6). This enables the spirit to be
for itself, as Idea, what the will is in itself. The abstract concept of the
Idea of the will is in general tile free will wilicil wills tile free wi/1. 1
~he activity of the

consists in cancelling (azljZulzeben) the con_tradiction between subjectiYiJ:y_;md objectivity and in trans anng its
_ends from thei~])j~c.tive detenl!!nation into an objective one, wh,!!e
at the same time remaining 'IIJitil itselfin ~_h.is objectivity.,Apart from
the formal mode of consciousness (see 8) lit which objectivity is
present only as immediate actuality, this activity is the essential deue/opmt7zt of the substantial content of the Idea (see 2 If, a development
------
57
,,
11'
in which the concept determines the idea, which is itself at first
c.---~-- -=--=-~-abstract, to (produce] the totality of its system. This totality, as the
substantial element, is independent of the opposition between a
merely subjective end and its realization, and is the same in both of
these forms.
!}!i!! is any existence [Daseirz]
in general which is t~~f)he

free will.' Right is therefore in general freedom, as Idea.
,--
In the Kantian definition [Bestimmur~g] of right (see the

introduction to Kant's Theory ofRight [Metap/zysische Arzforzgsgrii7Ule der Reclllslelzre, 1797 ]), which is also more widely
accepted, the essential element [Momerzt] is 'the limitatiorz of
my freedom or arbitrary will in such a way that it may coexist
with the arbitrary will of everyone else in accordance with a
universallaw'.1 On the one hand, this definition contains only
a.-negative determination
- that of limiution; and on the other
--- ..
hand, the positive [element] -the universal law or so-called
'law of reason', the consonance of the arbitrary will of one
individual with that of the other - amounts simply to the
familiar (principle of] formal identity and the law of contradiction. The definition of right in question embodies the view,
especially prevalent since Rousseau, according to which the
substantial basis and primary factor is supposed to be not the
will as rational will which has being in and for itself or the
spirit as trne spirit, but ~ and spirit as the particular
individual, as the will of the s-ingi~-pers~~ [desE~Trlilis
distinctive arbitrariness. 3 Once this principle is accepted, the
rational can of course appear only as a limitation on the
freedom in question, and not as an immanent rationality, but
only as an external and formal u01~---:-This view isdevoid
"ci'any speCulatlveth~d is refuted by the philosophical
concept, and has at the same time produced phenomena [Erscheirzurzger~] in people's minds and in the actual world whose
terrifying nature is matched only by the shallowness of the
thoughts on which they are based/
---~'-.-
ss
Introduction
Right is something utterly sOred, for the simple reason that it is the
existence [Dasein] of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom.
- But the formalism of right - and also of duty1 - arises out of the
different stages in the development of the concept of freedom. In
opposition to the more formal, i.e. more abstrt and hence more
limited kind of right, that sphere and stage of the spirit in which the
spirit has determined and actualized within itself the further moments
contained in its Idea possesses a higher right, f<r it is the more cmu:rete
sphere, richer within itself and more truly universal.
Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its I'
distinctive right, because it is the existence of freedom in one
Of its own determinations. When we speak of the opposition
between morality or ethics and rigllt, the right in question is
merely the initial and formal right of abstract personality.
Morality, ethics, and the interest of the state- each of these is
a distinct variety of right, because each of them gives determinate shape and existence to freedom. They can come into
collision only in so far as they are all in equal measure rights; if
the moral point of view of the spirit were not also a right - i.e.
freedom in one of its forms -it could not possibly come into
collision with the right of personality or with any other right,
because every right embodies the concept of freedom, the
highest deternunation of spirit, in relation to which everything
else is without substance. But a collision also contains this
further moment: it imposes a limitation whereby one right is
subordinated to another; only the right of the world spirit is
absolute in an unlimited sense.
The method whereby the concept, in science, develops out of itself

and is merely an immanent progression and production of its own
determinations is likewise assumed to be familiar from logic. Its progress does not depend on the assertion that various circumstances are
preserll or on the subsequent application of the universal to such
material of eAtraneous origin.
59
The.~~-the ~t, ~92_~ot onltdissolv~s
the particularizations oft&e'universal but also produces them,
i~fdfaiedic.Tco"DSe"~~f
-aiatectic \vhich takes an object [Gegerrstand], proposition, etc.
given to feeling or to the immediate consciousness in general,
and dissolves it, confuses it, develops it this way and that, and
is solely concerned with deducing its opposite - a negative
mode which frequently appears even in Plato.' Such dialectic
may regard as its final result the opposite of a given idea
[Vorstellung], or, as in the uncompromising manner of ancient
scepticism, its contradiction, or, in a lame fashion, an approximation to the truth which is a modem half-me~ure.Z
~e concept conststs not mere y m producing and apprehending the determination as an opposite and
limiting factor, but in producing and apprehending the positive
.~~~~ult which it ~s; and..!!_ is this al~~e w!!_ich
makes it a developmerrt and immanentpro- ession. This
. ~tic, then, "is not an extern acuvity of subj~hought,
but the very soul of the content which puts forth its branches
and fruit organically. This development of the Idea as the
activity of its own rationality is something which thought,
since it is subjective, merely observes, without for its part
adding anything extra to it. To consider something rationally
means not to bring reason to bear on the object from outside
in order to work upon it, for the object is itself rational for
itself; it is the spirit in its freedom, the highest apex of selfconscious reason, which here gives itself actuality and
engenders itself as an existing world; and the sole business of
science is to make conscious this work which is accomplished
by the reason of the thing [Saclre] itself.
"---
The
The detemnnatiorrs in the development of the concept are on the one

hand themselves concepts, but on the other hand, since the concept is
essentially Idea, they have the form of existence [Dasein], and the
..----------~---- --~series of concepts which results is therefOre at the same time a series
~-~; this is how science should regard them.
6o
Introduction
31-32
In the more speculative sense, the mode of exister/Ce of a concept and its detem1i71acy are one and the same thing. But it
should be noted that the moments, whose result is a furtherdetermined form (of the concept), precede it as determinations of the concept in the scientific development of the Idea,
but do not come before it as shapes in its temporal development. Thus the Idea, in its determination as the family,
presupposes those determinations of the concept from which,
in a later section of this work, it [i.e. the Idea) will be shown to
result. But the other side of this development is that these
inner presuppositions should also be present for themselves as
shapes, such as the right of property, contract, morality, etc.,
and it is only at a more advanced stage of culture [Bildm1g) that
the moments of development attain this distinctive shape of
existence.
Addition (H). The Idea must continually determine itself further within
itself, for it is initially no more than an abstract concept But this initial
abstract concept is never abandoned. On the contrary, iLme~!J_.b.e_~o~s
continually richer in itself, so that the last determination is also the
'ridleSt.Th~ons which previously existed only in themselves thereby attain their free self-sufficiency, but in such a way that the
_concept remains the soul which holds everythin~the':._~E~ __which
arrives at 1ts own differentiation only through an immanent_rocess.lfrie
cannot therefore say that the concept arrives at anything new; on the
contrary, the last determination coincides in unity with the first. Thus,
even if the concept appears to have become fragmented in its existence,
this is merely a semblance, as is subsequently confirmed when all its
details finally return in the concept of the universal. In the empirical
sciences, it is customary to analyse what is found in representational
thought (Vontel/u,g), and when the individual instance has been reduced
to the common quality, this common quality is then called the concept.
This is not how we proceed, for we merely wish to observe how the
concept determines itself, and we force ourselves not to add anything of
our own thoughts and opinions. What we obtain in this way, however, is a
series of thoughts and another series of existent shapes, in which it may
happen that the temporal sequence of their actual appearance is to some
extent different from the conceptual sequence. Thus, we cannot say, for
example, that property existed before the family, although property is
nevertheless dealt witli first. One might accordingly ask at this point why
do not begin with the highest instance, that is, with the concretely true.
The answer will be that we wish to see the truth precisely in the form of a
we
result, and it is essential for this purpose that we should first comprehend
the abstract concept itself. What is actual, the shape which the concept
assumes, is therefore from our point of view only the subsequent and
further stage, even if it should itself come first in actuality. The course we
follow is that whereby the abstract forms reveal themselves not as existing
for themselves, but as untrue.
SUBDIVISIONS
33
In accordance with the stages in the development of the Idea of the
will which is free in and for itself, the will is

A. immediate; its con.fSP-t is ~efore abstr~y,
nd its existence [Dasein) is an immediate external thing [Sache];-
~_.9!~
B. ~ .....reflected
from its external existence i11to itself, determined as sub...-------~-~~
jective iudividua/ity [Einzelheit] in opposition to the universal - the
"'u~~som.---e""""thin,_,.~g~l,.-n-te..... _a....,'---"-e_g,_o_o....,.,.---an~d partly as
something external, an existent world, with these two aspects of the
Idea mediated only through each other; the Idea in its division or
particular existence [Existenz], the right of the subjective will in relation to the right of the world and to the right of the Idea -which,
however, has being only i11 itself, - the sphere of morality; l
C. the unity and truth of these two abstract moments - the thought
Idea of the good realized in the internally reflected will and in the
external world; - so that freedom, as the substance, exists no less as
actuality and necessity than as subjective will;- the Idea in its universal existence [Existenz] in, and for itself; (the sphere of) ethical life.
But the ethical substance is likewise
(a) natural spirit; - the fomily,
(b) in its division and appearance; - civil society,
(c) the state as freedom, which is equally universal and objective in
the free self-sufficiency of the particular will; this actual and
organic spirit (a) of a people (~) actualizes and reveals itself
through the relationship between the particular national spirits (y)
62
Introduction
32-33
and in world history as the universal world spirit whose right is
supreme.
That a thing [Sac/re] or content which is posited only in
accordance with its concept or as it is in itself, has the shape of
inmrediacy or of being, is presupposed from speculative logic;
the concept which exists for itself in the Jonn of the concept is
something different, and is no longer immediate. - The
principle which determines the above subdivisions is likewise
presupposed. 1 The subdivisions may also be regarded as a
historical preview of the parts [of the book), for the various
stages must generate themselves from the nature of the content itself as moments in the development of the Idea.
Philosophical subdivisions are certainly not an external classification - i.e. an outward classification of a given material
based on one or more extraneous principles of organization but the immanent differentiation of the concept itself. Morality and ethics, which are usually regarded as roughly
synonymous, are taken here in essentially distinct senses. 2 Yet
even representational thought [Vorstellung) seems to distinguish them; Kantian usage prefers the expression morality,
as indeed the practical principles of Kant's philosophy are
confined throughout to this concept, even rendering the point
of view of ethics impossible and in fact expressly infringing and
destroying it. But even if morality and ethics were etymologically synonymous, this would not prevent them, since they are
now different words, from being used for different concepts.
Addition (H). When we speak here of right, we mean not merely civil right,
which is what is usually understood by this term, but also morality, ethics,
and world history. These likewise belong here, because the concept
brings thoughts together in their true relationship. If it is not to remain
abstract, the free will must first give itself an existence [Dasein], and the
primary sensuous constituents of this existence are things [Sacllen ), i.e.
external objects [Dinge). This first mode of freedom is the one which we
should know as property, the sphere of formal and abstract right; property
in its mediated shape as contract, and right in its infringement as crinre and
punislmlt'llt, are no less a part of this sphere. The freedom which we have
here is what we call the person, that is, the subject which is free, and
indeed free for itself, and which gives itself an existence [Dasein) in the
realm of things [Saclren ]. But this mere immediacy of existence is not in
keeping with freedom, and the negation of this determination is the
sphere of morality. I am then free no longer merely in this immediate
thing [Sadze], but also in a superseded immediacy- that is, I am free in
myself, in the subjective realm. In this sphere, everything depends on my
insight, my intention, and the end I pursue, because externality is now
regarded as indifferent. But the good, which is here the universal end,
should not simply "remain with me; on the contrary, it should be realized.
For the subjective will demands that what is internal to it- that is, its end
-should attain an external existence [Dasein], and hence that the good
should be accomplished in external existence [Existmz]. Morality and the
earlier moment of formal right are both abstractions whose truth is
attained only in etlzicol lifo. .:rhus, ethical life is the uni of the will in its
, concept and th!_will .!!.L.~~individual [des Ehzzel11e11], that lS, of rhe
~-iiiftial existence [D~(f'methi:rrg natura( in the
~f love and feeling [Er11pjitrdzmg] - the family; here, the individual
[das bzdiuidzmm] has overcome [mifgelzobetr] his personal aloofness and
finds himself and his consciousness within a whole. But at the next stage,
we witness the disappearance of ethical life in its proper sense and of
substantial unity: the family becomes fragmented and its members behave
towards each other as self-sufficient individuals, for they are held
together only by the bond of mutual need. This stage of civil society has
often been equated with the state. But the state emerges only at the third
stage, that of ethical life and spirit, at which the momentous unification of
self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality takes place. The
right of the state is thereforesuperior to the other stages: it is freedom in
its most concrete shape, which is subordinate only to the supreme
absolute truth of the world spirit.
PART ONE
Abstract Right
The will which is free in and for itself, as it is in its abstract concept, is
in the determinate condition of immediacy. Accordingly, in contrast
with reality, it is its own negative actuality, whose reference to itself is
purely abstract - the inherently individual [i" siclz einze/ner] will of a
subject. In accordance with the moment of particularity of the will, it
has in addition a content consisting of detenninate e_!!$ls, and as
exclusive individuality [Einze/lzeit], it simultaneously encounters this
content as an external world immediately confronting it.
Addition (H). When I say that the will which is free in and for itself, as it is
in its abstract concept, is i~ondition ofim~cy, this
should be understood as follows. The completed Idea of the will is that
condition in which the concept has fully realized itself and in which its
existence [Daseirz] is nothing but the concept's own development. Initially,
however,_ the ~Zt is abstract- that is, although all its determinations
it, they are no more than contained in it: they have
are contained wt
being only in themselves and have not yet developed into a totality in their
own i1glitlrrsaytfiat I am free, 'I' is still this being-within-itself
[lrlsidzseirz] without any opposition. In morality, on the other hand, there is
already an opposition; lor m this sphere, I am present as an individual
will, whereas the good iS die universal, even though it is wi~hin me. Thus,
~~-edlsffi'(cffactors of individuality and universality within itself, and is corisequently' determinate._ But such a distinction
is notpresent itlitially, for there is no progression or mediation at thefu.st
stage of abstracttrnity, where the will has the form of immediacy, of
being. The essential insight to be gained here, then, is that this initial
indeterminacy is itsei.U determinacy. For indete~e
'beffig no diStillction a'S yet between the will and its content; but
indeterminacy itself, when opposed to the determinate, takes on the
determination of being something determinate; it is abstract identity
which here constitutes its determinacy; the will thereby becomes an
individual will- the person.
The universality of this will which is free for it~.lf..is formal univer~..L i.e. th~~elf-consc.imJs (but otherwise oontentless) and
szmp/e reference to itselfin its individuality [Einze/lzeit]; 1 to this extent,
the subject is a person. It is inherent in personality that, as this person, I
5
1
am completely detennined in all respects (in my inner arbitrary will,
drive, and desire, as well as in relation to my immediate external
existence [Daseitz]), and that I am finite, yet totally pure selfreference, and thus know myself in my finitude as itifitzite, uuiversal,
and free.
Personality begins only at that oint where the sub"ect has not
merelfaconsc.~~sn~itselfi.!!_~neral as concrete and in
~~~~ ~.YA~te_!!!!!P..ed,_.b.IJ.t.A.9ru!~~J!~-Pf itself as a c_Q!Il:.
pleteiY abstract 'I' in which all concrete limi.~ti~nd validicy_

the ~onality, therefore,
-i:h~~e is knowledge of the self as an object [GegenstamJ], but as
. ai-"e -~~g~ted~;t"~ti~In
~~nTtYandllencepurely
Jd~tical wit~tlley have notyet arrivedat
~--~~~JV.pd k_no~e4g~~divit!ya~
~eoples
do not yet have a personality. The spirit which

has being in and for itself differs in this respect from spirit in
---=---..r-t~araJ1!=e, for in the same determination in which the
latter is onlyself-cmlSf:iousuess- consciousness ofitself, but only
in accordancewit:ll"theriaturat-;~if
"TiS as yet external
oppositions (see Plzetlmllenology of Spirit, Bamberg and
Wiirzburg, 1807, pp. IOifT. and E11qclopaedia of tile
Plzilosoplzical Sciences, 344)2 - the former has itself, as abstract
and free 'I', as its object and end and is consequently a persmz.
and.
Addilioll (H). The will which has being f<r itself, or the abstract will, is the
person. The highest achievement of a human being is to be a person; yet
in spite of this, the simple abstraction 'person' has something contemptuous about it, even as an expression.3 The person is essentially
different from the subject, for the sub~t is only the possihi1itv o(.personality, since any living thing
is as;:I'bfect. A person is therefore
""asubject which is aware of this subjectivity, for as a person, I am com-
whatever
~~~~!L!!-~Yse!f::~:J:e!.~~~~~~ali'X~[~re
bell)g-for-itself. As t/z;s person, I know myself as free m myself, and I can

absrra~i:-lron:i- everything, since nothing confronts me but pure personality. And yet as this person I am something wholly determinate: I am
of such an age, of such a height, in this room, and whatever other
particular things [Partikularitiitc11) I happen to be. Personality is thus at
the same time the sublime and the wholly ordinary; it contains this unity
of the infinite and the utterly finite, of the deterininate boundary and the
completely unbounded. The supreme achievement of the person is to
68
Abstract Right
support this contradiction, which nothing in the natural realm contains or
could endure.
1. Personality contains in general the capacity for right and constitutes the conceP-t and the {itself abstract) ~asis of abstract and
!ten~e fonnal right. The commandment of right is therefore: be a
person and respea otlzm as persons.'
2. The particularity of the will is indeed a moment within the entire

consciousness of the will (see 34), but itls-;otfet contained in the
abstract personality as such. Thus, although It IS present - as desire,
neecr,-anves, contingent preference, etc. - it is still different from
personality, from the determination of freedom. - In formal right,
therefore, it is not a question of particular interests, of my advantage
or welfare, and just as little of the particular ground by which my will
is determined, i.e. of my insight and intention. 1
Addition (H). Since particularity, in the person, is not yet present as

freedom, everything which depends on particularity is here a matter of
indifference. If someone is interested only in his formal right, this may be
pure stubbornness, such as is often encountered in emotionaUy limited
people [einem beschriinkten Herzen tmd Gemiite); for uncultured people ~
insist most strongly on their rights, whereas those of nobler mind seek to '
discover what other aspects there are to the matter [Sac/ze] in question..
J'hus abstract right is initially a mere possibility, and in~ respect is
formal in character as compared with the whole extent of the relationship.
Consequently, a determination of right givc:S.mea-warrant, but it is not
absolutely necessary that I should pursue my rights, because this is only
one aspect of the whole relationship. For possibility is being, which also
has the significance of not being.
With reference to concrete action and to moral and ethical relations,

abstract right is only a possibility as compared with the rest of their
content, and the determination of right is therefore only a pennission
or watTant.l Forme same reason [Grund) of its abstracmess, the
--------7
necessity of this right is limited to the negatiy_e - not to violate personality and what ensues from personality. Hence there ~~'
prohibitions of right, and the positive form of ~of right
iS,- iii"""ltSUitimate content, based on prohibition.1
3 The resolving and immediate individuality [Einzellzeit] of the person

relates itself to a nature which it encounters before it. Hence the
personality of the will stands in opposition to nature as subjective. But
since personality within itselfis infinite and universal, the limitatiollQf
~is in contradiction with it and is mdl and void.
-pe;:~nality is that which acts to overcome [auftulzeben] this limitation
and to give itself reality- or, what amounts to the same thing, to posit
that existence [Dasei7l] as its own.
Right is primarily that immediate existence [Dasei7l] which freedom

gives itself in an immediate way,
(a) as possession, which is property; freedom is here the freedom of the
-~bstract will~a/, or, by the same token, the freedom of.!E..J
~~~relates onlv ta....hi!n..elf. '~--...'"
(b) A person, in disting:Qi~ from himself, relates himself
to a"oth~~P.!'1fl!J:. and indeed it is only as owners of property that
the two have existence [Dasein] for each other.' Their identity i7l
themselves acquires exist~!!fe [Existenz] through the transference
of the property of the one to the other by common will and with
due respect of the rights of both - that is,J~y_~t.
(c) The will which, as in (a), is differentiated within itself in its selfreference rather than distinguished from another person as in (b),
is, as a particular will, different from and opposed to itself as the
will wlziclz has being i7l a7ld for itself. This constitutes wrong and
-"'----~
----~---~~-----~
cnme.
The division of right into the right of persons and things
[Saclze7l] and the right of actio7ls (Aktionen], like the many other
divisions of this kind, aims primarily to impose an extemal
order upon the mass of disorganized material before us. The
..
------------------------70
Abstract Right
chief characteristic of this division is the confused way in
which it jumbles together rights which presuppose substantial
relations, such as family and state, with those which refer only
to abstract personality. Kant's division of rights, which has
since round favour with others, into the right oft/zings, the right
of persons, and personal right of a real [dingliclz] kintP is an
example of this confusion. To enlarge upon the lop-sidedness
and conceptual poverty of the division into the right ofpersons
and the right oft/zings, which is fundamental to Roman law (the
right of actions concerns the administration of justice and has
no place in this classification), would take us too far. Here, it
is clear at least that ~q:s~ alone con~ !. ~ht !O things,
and consequently that personal right is m essence a right of
things- 'thing' [Sac/ze] being understood in its general sense as
everything external to my freedom, including even my body
~~TiiisngmOf~~~as
such. But as for what is called the right ofpersons in Roman law,
~t
re ards a human being as a person onl~
status (see Heineccius, Elemetlta iuris civilis [I 728], 7s);

h-;nce in Roman Ia w even personality itself, as opposed to
slavery, is merely an estate [Sta!!4) or condition [Z,lstarulj.l
Apart fr~heright concerning slaves (among whom children
may virtually be included) and the condition of riglztlessness
(azpitis diminutio)/ the content of the so-called right of persons in Roman law is concerned with fami{y relationships. 5 In
Kant, moreover, family relationships belong to personal rights
ofa real ki11d. 6 The right of persons in Roman law is therefore
not the right of the person as such, but no more than the right
of the partimlar person; it will later be shown that the substantial basis of family relationships is rather the surrender of
personality. It must, then, inevitably seem,~ to discuss
the righ~ of the person iri his partimlar det~ before the
uruverSarngnt orpersOllafuY~ForK3rlt, personal rights are
those rights which arise out of a contract whereby I give
something or perfonn a service- in Roman law, the ius ad rem
which arises out of an obligatio.' Admittedly, only a person is
obliged to implement the prOvisions of a contract, just as it is
only a person who acquires the right to have them implemented. But such a right cannot therefore be called a personal
71
right; rights of every kind can belong only to a person, and
seen objectively, a right based on contract is not a right over a
person, but only over something external to the person or
something which the person can dispose of, i.e. always a thing.
SECTION I
Property
The person must give himself an external sphere offreedom in order to

have being as Idea.' The person~ll which has
being in and for itsefr,iilthislirSta.n""d as yet wholly abstract
determination. Consequently, this sphere distinct from the will, which
may constitute the sphere of its freedom, is likewise determined as
immediately diffirerlt and separable from it.
Addition (H). The rational aspect of property is to be found not in the

satisfaction of needs but in the s~~~
~~~ality. Not until he has property doeS the person exist as reason. Even if
this first reality cf my freedom is in an external thing [Sac/te] and is thus a
poor ldnd of reality, the abstract personality in its very immediacy can
have no other existenre(15;iseir~] than in the determination of immediacy.
__,__ ---------
What is immediately different from the free spirit is, for the latter and
in itself, the external in general -a thing [Sache], something unfree,
impersonal, and without rights.
o:..-~
_,...._- ---
The word 'tlziPij [Sathe], like the word.~Qbj~C!~~, has two

opposite meanings.' On the one hand, when we say 'that's the
thirzj, or 'the tiling; not the person; is what matters', it signifies
what is Stlbstantial. On the other hand, when contrasted with
the person (as distinct from the particular subject), the thing is
the opposite of the stlbstar~tial: it is that which, by definition
73
Philosophy ofRight
[seiner Bestirmmmg nachJ, is purely external.- What is external
for the free spirit (which must b~crearry distinguished from
mere consciousness) is external in and for itself; and for this
reason, the definition [BegriffibestirmmmgJ of the concept of
nature is that it is the external in itself.
----~--~
Addition (H). Since a thing [SaclzeJ. has no subjec~ty~t

nl to the s~lt""Space and rime are external in this
way. As an o ject of the senses, I am myself external, spatial, and
temporal. In so far as I have sensuous intuitions, I have them of something which is external to itself. An animal can intuit, but the soul of the
animal does not have the soul, or itself, as its object [GegetlstarldJ, but
something external.
IAs theJJ~!.~~t and hence also [ast essentially individual, a

person has .~~e [Exister1z] partly ~ithin himself and
partly as something to whi~h he rela,tes as to an external world. - It is
only these things [Sacllerz] in their immediate quality, not those
determinations they are capable of taking on through the mediation of
the will, which are at issue here in connection with personality, which
is itself still in its initial immediacy.
Intellectual [geistigeJ accomplishments, sciences, arts, even
religious observances (such as sermons, masses, prayers, and
blessings at consecrations), inventions, and the like, become
objects [GegenstiindeJ of contract; in the way in which they are
bought and sold, etc., they are treated as equivalent to
acknowledged things. It may be asked whether the artist,
scholar, etc. is i'n legal possession of his art, science, ability to
preach a sermon, hold a mass, etc. - that is, whether such
objects are things. We hesitate to call such accomplishments,
knowledge. [Koz~llnisseJ, abilities, etc. things; for on the one
hand, such possessions are the object ~fro~mercial negotiations and agreements, yet on the other, they are of an inward
and spiritual nature. Consequently, the understanding may
find it difficult to define their legal status, for it thinks only in
:1 terms of the alternative that something is either a thing or not a
\I thing Oust as it must be either infinite or finite).' Knowledge,
74
Abstract Right
sciences, talents, etc. are of course attributes of the free spirit,
and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is
equally capable, through expressing them, of giving them an
external existence [Dasein] and disposing of them (see below),
-;;-that ~under th~futition fl!esti,;;;;;ung) of tlzings.
"fb'ii"s, theyare -notPri~rilyimii;,ediate in character,-but
become so only through the mediation of the spirit, which
reduces its inner attributes to immediacy and externality. - In
ac~rdimCeWiththe~lijUst-[tinreClit/iClien]'"'an.aunethical
determination of Roman law, children were, from the father's
--------------------~
point of view, tlzings. The father
was consequently in legal
_possesSton of fiiSChil~. although he also stood in the ethical relation oflove to them (which must, of course, have been
greatly weakened by the wrong referred to above). Thus,
there was in this case a union - albeit a totally unjust one- of
the two detenninations of being a thing and not being a thing.
-_Abstract Egb!...i:! co~ed only_ wi!b the~
an~ also with the particular, which belongs to the
e-XIs~d5Piiere-Oilie~;;~;rr~:-But it
-~~eparticuiaroii&Tnso far as it is ~parable
and immediately differentfrOmilieperson - wtetr.er this

'sepatiition---cOnstifiitB""icr-essen:nardetei1iiination, or whether
it receives it only by means of the subjective will. Thus, intellectual accomplishments, sciences, etc. are relevant here only
in their character as legalJ!Qssessions; that possession of body
and spirit which iSacquired through education, study, habitu--~ - ation, etc. and which
constitutes an inner property of the spirit
will not be dealt with here. But ~~9f!uch intellec- ~
-----
----
~!_l pro~~.i!!to....<\~~~% tl! -~~!~ 1~ ran~ mtbi.JL!h? 7

-~~~-~~~g~--?D~~~~~a ,?~~.!J>LQp~~ will be }
discussed only when we come to
right~~
44
the disposal of proQe!1f.

~- ... /---~--~----
I.
,...__ , . /
[Sac~e].
--
A person has the

place his will in any thing
The thing
thereby becomes mitu and acquires my will as its substantial end
"[since it has no such end ~itiiTn itielt),i;detennination, and its soul
:::.the absoTlii~righi ofappropri;Jion whicliliuman oeings have over all
things [Sachen].
75
~f
Philosophy ofRight
That so-called philosophy which ascribes reality - in the
sense of self-sufficiency and genuine being-far-and-in-itself
-to immediate individual things [Di11gen ], to the non-personal
realm, as well as that philosophy which assures us that spirit
cannot recognize truth or know what the tlli11g-i11-itse/fis/ is
immediately refuted by the attitude of the free will towards
these things [Dinge]. If so-called external tili'l&f have a
semblance of self-sufficiency for consciousness, for intuition
and representational thought, the free will, in contrast, is the
idealism and truth of such actuality.
Addition (H): ~gs !f>!~~)_~b~~~ t~~.

because the liuman oemg is free will ana, as such, exists in and for
himself, whereas that which confronts him does not have this quality.
Hence everyone has the right to make his will a thing [Sacile] or to make
the thing his will, or, in other words, to supersede the thing and transform
it int~~wn; fo_r th~thing, as ext~maJI~~n~f, a~ot
-~te ~fer~e
-~~~~~loJ~f. A living creature
(the animal) is also external in this way and is to that exten~
[Sacile]. The will alone is infinite, absolute in relation to everything else,
is merely relative. Thus to appropriate
whereas~tiler, for its part,
.
\something means basically only to manifest the supremacy of my will in
relation to the thing [Sacile] and to demonstrate that the latter does _!!QJ
.!!_ave being_in and for itself and ~end i~lf. This manifestation
occurs through my conferring upon the thing an end other than that
which it immediately possessed; I give the living creature, as my property,
a soul other than that which it previously had; I give it my soul The free
will is consequently that idealism which does not consider t'hiRgs [Di,1ge],
as they are, to be in and for themselves, whereas realism declares them to
be absolute, even if they are found only in the form of finitude. Even the
animal has gone beyond this realist philosophy, for it consumes things
[Dinge] and thereby proves that they are not absolutely self-sufficient.1
fui
-~
have even external power over something constitutesj~ion,

just as the. particular circumstance that I make something my own out
of natural need, drive, and ~i-~_!~$._~_c_u!~_int~f
,_P._O~EI\But the circumstance that I, as free will,- a~~~
[gegenstii,ldlicil] to myself in what I possess and only become an actual
1To
......__..--:.r--
Abstract Riglzt
will by this means constitutes the genuine and rightful element in
possession, the determination of pmperty.1
In relation to needs - if these are taken as primary - the
possession of property appears as a means; but the true position is that, from the point of view of freedom, property, as the
first existence [Dasein] of freedom, is an essential end for itself.
--z
Since my will, as personal and hence as the will of an individual (des

Ei,zelrmr], ~ecomes objectie in property, the latter takes on the
character of private property; and common property, which may by its
nature be own-ed~arate individuals, takes on the determination ;
of an inherently (an sich]~hich it is in itself ;
(fiir ~e) for the arbitrary will whether-or not fi:dain \
my shareinlr--------~~------- "'
. . - ---=-----
The utilization of elmrePitary objects is, by its nature, incapable

of being particularized in the form of private possession. The agrarian laws of Rome embody a conflict between community and priva~e ownership ofland; the latter, as the more
rational moment, had to retain its supremacy, albeit at the
expense of other rlghts. 1 - Er11ailed family property contains a
moment which is opposed to th~i!!~~rsonality and
hence of private piopertyTButtnose determinations which
concern private property may have to be subordinated to
higher spheres of right, such as a community or the state, as is
the case withprivatepr~~mes ~perty of
a so-called corporate person (moralische Peno"] or property in
mortmain. Nevertheless, sucli exceptions cannot be grounded
in contingency, private arbitrariness, or private utility, but only
in the rational organism of the state. - The Idea of Plato's
republic contains as a universal principle a wrong against the
person, ~9asm_~!~ .!_~~_p_c:r~.!!kfQ!lili!_d~ OW!!.-~,~erty.3 The idea [Vorstellrmg] of a pious or friendly or even
compulsory brotherhood of men with commu,al property and a
ban on the principle of private property may easily suggest
itself to that disposition which misjudges the nature of the
77
r;- _
freedom of spirit and right and does not comprehend it in its
determinate moments. As for the moral or religious dimension, when Epicurus' friends planned to establish such an
association with communal property, he prevented them from
doing so for the simple reason [Gnmd) that their plan displayed distrust, and that those who distrust one another are
not friends (Diogenes Laertius, I.x.6).
Addition (H). In property, my will is personal, but the person is a specific

entity [ei11 Dieses]; thus, property becomes the personal aspect of this
specific will. Since I give my will existence [Dasein] through property,
property must also have the determination of being this specific entity, of
being mine. This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private
property. Even if exceptions may be made by the state, it is nevertheless the

state alone which can make them; but frequently, especially in our own
times, private property has been restored by the state. Thus, for example,
many states have rightly dissolved [arifkel10ben] the monasteries, because a
community does not ultimately have the same right to property as a
person does.
As a person, I am myself an immediate itldividual [Eit1Zt'l11er]; in its

further determination, this means in the first place that I am alive in
this organic body, which is my undivided external existence [Dasein],
tmiversal in content, the real potentiality of all further-determined
'eXIstence. But as a person, I at the same time possess my life a11d body,
like other things [Sacllen ], only in so far as I so will it.
'f\,..._,.---'- .... .. -. -~-
The fact that, from the point of view that I exist not as the
concept which has being for itself but as the immediate concept, that I am alive and have an organic body, depends on the
concept of life and on the concept of the spirit as soul moments which are taken over from the philosophy of nature
(Encyclopaedia of tile Pllilosopllical Scier1ces, 259ff.; cf.
161, 164, and 298) and from anthropology (ibid., 3 18)/
I have these limbs and my life only itlsofaras /so will it; the
animal cannot mutilate or destroy itself, but the human being
can.
Addition (G). Animals are indeed in possession of themselves: their soul is
Abstract Riglzt
in possession of their body. But they have no right to their life, because
they do not will it.
- - - - - - - - ---------- --~------
.r-~~
In so far as the body is immediate existence [Dasein] it is not commensurate with the spirit; before it can be the s irit's willing organ and
soul-inspire~ if~~ust first be taken possession of bf1I(e
'1jjiilr(s"ee 57 . - Butforotlrers, I am essentially a free entity within/i.:=J.
my body while I am in immediate possession of it.
It is only because I am alive as a free entity within my body
that this living existence [Dasein] may not be misused as a
beast of burden. In so far as I am alive, my soul (the concept
and, on a higher level, the free entity) and my body are not
separated; my body is the existence [Dasein] of freedom, and I
feel through it. It is therefore only a sophistical understanding, devoid of any Idea, which can make a distinction whereby
the tl~-in-itself[Ding an siclr], the soul, is neither touched
nor affected if the body is abused and the existence [Existenz] of
the person is subjected to the power of another/,-----..--.-I can with--~~'!.J~_JllD.~~ce [Eristenz] :md make it
external to me - I can keep particular feelings ou~ff
'and be free even ifl am in chains. But this is my will;for otlrers,
I am in my body. L'd!EJ!.!!.fgr the otlrer onlJ in so far as I am
free in my existence [Dasein]: this is an identical proposition
.(seemy SCience ofLogic, Vol. 1 [first edition, 1812], pp. 49ff.). 2
Violence done to my body by others is violence done to me. _,
Because I feel, contact with or violence to my body touches (
me immediately as actual a_~d present. This constitutes the (
difference between personal injury and infringement of my )
external property; for in the latter, my will does not have this
~------------_.J
immediate presence and actuality.
In relation to external things, _!he rational aspect i.s..Jh.@tLP-ossess

J~_roi!e!!J; ~~- p~rti'kz!.~~c_t,__b.Q."!!~Y~.! includ_S.Y..hi~-~tiv~nds,
needs, arbitrariness, talents, external circumstances, etc. (see 45). It
------------- -.,---- -- -- ----79
,1
is on these that mere possession as such depends, but this particular
aspect, in this sphere of abstract personality, is not yet posited as
identicar;.ith1ieedom. ~Wi..4.t and lWW-;;;;;h I possess is ther~
purely contingent as far as right is concerned.
------------- . - --- ....
If we may speak here of more tlran one person where no such

distinction has yet been made, we may say that, in terms of
personality, these persons are equal. But this is an empty and
tautological proposition; for the person, as an abstraction, is
precisely that which has not yet been particularized and
posited in a determinate distinction. - qualio is the abs~
-~~~tity of the understanding~~t Qting whi1! occurs
to rellectiVe"th~ence to mediocrity of spirit in
general, when It comes across the relation [Bezielrung] of unity
to a difference. Equality, in this case, can only be the equality
of abstract persons as such, which thus exdu!'es everytltig& to
do. with possessions, this basis of inijii{imy~r- The demand is
- sometimes made for ~Uiifiy in tJledrSiribution ofland or even
of other available resources. The understanding which makes
this demand is all the more vacuous and superficial in that this
particularity encompasses not only the external contingency of
nature, but also the whole extent of spiritual nature in its
infinite particularity and differentiation and in its organically
developed reason. - One cannot speak of an injustice ofnature
in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, for
:s> ~~~~__!!!~~~just nor uJ!i!'-~

That all human beings should have their livelihood (Auskommerz] to meet their needs is, on the one hand, a moral 11Jisll;
and when it is expressed in this indeterminate manner, it is
indeed well intentioned, but like everything that is merely well
intentioned, it has no objective being. On the other hand, a
livelihood is something other than possession and belongs to
another sphere, that of civil society.
Addition (H). The equality which one might wish to introduce, for example, with reference to the distribution of goods would in any case be
destt_py~ain within a short time, because all resources are dependent
on /(fjlj~enc~ But if something is impracticable, it ought not to be put into
practiceefther. For while human beings a!.e cerrainly:--equai:-they are
equal orily as persons,-tlmrfs, in relation to the source of their posses-
.--....----------------------------~--
8o
Abstract Riglzt
4<)-51
sions. Accordingly, everyone oughtto havepropeft!/ If we therefore wish

to speak- of"equahty, It is this equality which we Should consider. But this
equality is distinct from the determination of particularity, from the question of how much l_possess. In this context, it is false to maintain that
justice requires everyone's propertyto be equatffor 1t requ1res orily that
everyone should have propenx. Particularity, in fact, is the very condition
to which inequality is appropriate and in which equality would be contra.!!
to right. It is perfectly correct that human beings often covet the goods of
others; but this is precisely what is contrary to right, for right is that which
remains indifferent to particularity. p--~-
so
That a thing [Saclle] belongs to the person who happens to be tllefint to
take possession of it1 is an immediately self-evident and superfluous
determination, because a second party cannot take possession of what
is already the property of someone else.
Addition (H). The above detenninations have chiefly concerned the proposition that the personality must have existence [Dasein] in property. That
the first person who takes possession of something is also its owner is,
then, a consequence of what has been said The first is not the rightful
owner because he is the first, but because he is a free wil~ for it is only the
fact that another comes after him which makes him the first.
My inner idea [Vontel/ung] and will that something should be mine is

not enough to constitute property, which is the existence [Dasein] of
personality; on the contrary, this requires that I should take possession
of it. The existence which my willing thereby attains includes its ability
to be recognized by others. - That a thing of which I can take
possession ~hould be ownerless is (see so) a self-evident negative
condition; orrather, it refers to the~c~ relation to others.
Addition (H,G). The concept of property requires that a person should

place his will in a thing [Soclle], and the next stage is precisely the
realization of this concept. My inner act of will which says that something
is mine must also become recognizable by others. Ifl make a thing mine, I
give it this preaicate which must appear in it in an external form, and must
not simply remain in my inner will. It often happens that children
emphasize their prior volition when they oppose the appropriation of
81
~~
'
something by others; but for adults, this volition is not sufficient, for the
form of subjectivity must be removed and must work its way out to
ObJeCtiVlly.
_.-
52
Taking possession of a thing [Sac/ze] makes its matter my property,
since matter in itself [fiir sich] does not own itself.
Matter offers resistance to me (and it consists solely in offering resistance to me). ~~r
t~Jf t~!!!_e~ in my quality as abstract SJ>irit, nam I as
~nsuous spirit. (Sensuous representation [Vontellen] wrong y
regards the sensuous being of the spirit as concrete and its
rational being as abstract) But in relation [Beziehung] to the
will and to property, this being-for-itself of matter has no
truth. Taking possession of something, as an external activity
whereby the universal right to appropriate natural objects
[Naturdinge] is actuali~e_d, falls under the conditions o_[@y.lii-
-~~~~mJ,iQ_~,--aE__~~whereby
we a~~e_p_liysical ownership of things. Given the ~e

differences b~~ere are infinitely varied
senses in which one can take control and poSSC(s5ion of them,
and doing so is subject to equally varied kinds of limitation
and contingency. In any case, the generic and elemental
aspects of something are not as such~ [Gegenstand] of
.\\ P.EJ~~.tilifl_[Einzellzeit]; in order to beCO'iile suchan
; \ object and be taken possession of, they must first be individu. \.....r-:-------------~~
alfzed (e.g. as a breath or air or a arink of water). With regard
10llie impossibility of taking possession of an external genus
as such, or of the elemental, the ultimate consideration is not
the external physical impossibility of doing so, but the fact that
the person, as will, determines himself as an individual
[Einzellzeit] and, as a person, is at the same_~.i.~ate
individuality; hence he is also related, as a person, to the
externalworld as to individual things [Einzellzeiten] (see my
Remarks to 13; also 43).- The control and external possession [of things] thus becomes, in infinite ways, more or less
indeterminate and incomplete. Matter, however, is never
without an essential form, and it is only by virtue of this form
Abstract Right
51-53
that it is something. The more I appropriate this form, the

more I come into aaual possession of the thing [Sad1e]. The
consumption of foodstuffs is a penetration and alteration of
their qualitative nature by virtue of which they were what they
were before they were consumed. The training (Ausbildung] of
my organic body in various skills, like the education of my
spirit, is likewise a more or less complete penetration and
taking possession thereof; the spirit is what I can appropriate
most completely. But this actuality of taking possession is different from property as such, which is completed by the free
will. In face of the free will, the thing does not retain any
distinct property for itself, .even if possession, as an external
relationship, still .. retains an external aspect. The empty
abstraction .Pf a matter without attributes which, in the case of
property, is supposed to remain external to me and the property of the thing itself, is something which thought must get
thebetter of.
Addition (G). Fichte has raised the question of whether the matter also
belongs to me ifl give it form.' From what he says, it follows that, if I have
made a cup out of gold, anyone else is at liberty to take the gold provided
that he does not thereby damage my handiwork. However separable the
two may be in terms of representation [Vontel/u,g], this distinction is in
fact an empty piece of hair-splitting; for if I take possession of a field and
cultivate it, not only the furrow is my property, but the rest as wei~ the
earth which belongs to it. For I wish to take possession of this matter as a
whole: it therefore does not remain ownerless or its own property. For
even if the matter remains external to the form which I have given to the
object (Gtgenstaud], the form itself is a sign that the thing is to be mine;
the thing thereore does not remain external to my will or outside what I
have willed. Thus, there is nothing there which could be taken possession
of by someone else.
53
The-mor.e precise determinations of property are to be found in the
rwlll's relationship~e t:liiig"t[Sache]. This relationship is (a) in an
~kmgpossessl~n, in so far as the will has its existence
[Dasein] in the thing as somethi:D~t"~s~J (~~}n so far as the thing is
negative in relation to the will, e will has its existence in it as in
something to be negated - ~ (y) the reflection-7Jthe-~~ll from the
83
Philosophy ofRight
thing back into itself - alienation; - positive, negative, and infinite
Judgements of the will upon the thing/
A. Taking Possession
Taking possession consists partly in the immediate physical seizure of

something, partly in giving it form, and partly in merely designating its
ownership.
-
Addition (G). These modes of taking poSsession contain the progression

fran the determination of individuality [Einzellreit] to that of universality.
Physical'"Scii"u~cur only in the..case of (:iii"iiiar\iifiililthin~ [Sac/re],
whereas the designation of ownership means ta1ililg possession in terms of
representational thought (Vontellung]. In the latter case, I hlive a
of the-rlting and consider that the thing in its totality is
mine, and not merely the part of which I can take possession physically.
;epreSeirtaifun
55
(a} From the point of view of these~~. physical seizure is the mqg
complete mode of taking possession, because I am immediately
present m this possession anamy will is thus also discernible in it. But
this mode in general is merely subjective, temporary, and extremely
limited in ~e, as well as by die qaGtabie natifre of tile objects
~iinde].- The scope of this mode can be somewhat extended
-~ other means'='e.g. J)ytlleconneCfiOifwlUCfiTCan esti6"iiS~n
something and things [Sac/ren] which otherwise belong to me, or by a
connection which may come about by chance.
Mechanical forces, weapons, and instruments extend the
_range of my power. Connections between my property and
sanieihing which abuts upon it may make it more easily possible for me th!Ul f<r another owner, or even exclusively so for
me, to take possession of something or to make use of it; or
the addition to my proper may be regarded as a non-selfsufficient accident of tile tiling to which it has been added/
Such connections may include the fact that my land is beside
Abstract Riglzt
53-56
the sea or a river, that my fixed property borders on land

suitable for hunting, pasture, or other uses, that stone or other
mineral resources underlie my fields, that there may be
treasure in or under the land which I own, and so on; or the
connections may arise only in the course of time and as a
result of chance, as with some so-called natural accessions,
such as alluvial deposits and the like or items washed ashore.
(The procreation of animals [foetzua] is indeed also an accession to my resources; but as it is an organic relationship, no
external thing is added to another thing which I already possess, so that this instance is quite different in kind from other
accessions.Y All of these are external associations whose bond
of union is neither the concept nor a living force [Lebendigkeit].
It is therefore the task of the understanding to adduce and
weigh the reasons for and against them, and of positive
legislation to reach a decision according to whether the relations [Beziehungen] between the things in question are more or
less essential or inessential.
Additio11 (G). Taking possession is always incomplete in character.JJakc.

possession of no more than~ touch with !!!!. body, but it follows
miiii~temal objects [Dinge] extend further than I can grasp.
Thus, when I have a specific thing in my possession, something else will
be connected with it. I take possession of things with my hand, but its
reach can be extended. The hand is a great organ which no animal
possesses, and what I grasp with it can itself become a means of reaching
out further. When I possess something, the understanding at once concludes that it is noi"jiisfwhaTJpossessiiliiiled'fately that is mine, but also
jy~~ connected with it Here, positive right must pronounce judgement, for nothing further can be deduced from the concept
s6
(~) When I give form to something, its determinate character as mine
receives an independently (fiir siclr] existing [bestelze~ule] externality and
ceases to be limited to my presence in tlzis time and space and to my
present knowledge and volition.
To give form to something is the mode of taking possession

most in keeping with the Idea, inasmuch as it combines the
su1ijective----;m(fth-e--oo~. Other~se, it varies infinitely
Bs
according to the qualitative nature of the objects [Gegenstiinde]
and the variety of subjective ends. - We must also include
here the giving of form to the organic. The effects which I
have on the latter do not remain merely external, but are
assimilated by it, as in the tilling of the soil, the cultivation of
plants, and the domestication, feeding, and conservation of
animals; further examples are the measures we employ in
order to utilize raw materials or the forces of nature, or the
influence which we cause one substance [Stt?UJ to exert upon
another, and so on.
Addition (H). In empirical contexts, this giving of form may assume the
most varied shapes. The field which I cultivate is thereby given fonn. As
far as the inorganic realm is concerned, I do not always give it form
directly. If, fer example, I build a windmill, I have not given form to the
air, but I have constructed a form in order to utilize the air, which cannot
be takenaway froriiltr~~formed it [i.e. the
airl Even the fact that I conserve game may be regarded as a way of
imparting form, for it is a mode of conduct calculated to preserve the
object in question. The training of animals is, ~f course, a more direct way
of giving them_ form, and I play a greater role in this process.
_,..---,
"\(Y
~ ~''
The human being, in his immediate existence [Existenz] in himself, is a

natural entity, external to his concel?t; it is only through the development [Ausbildung] of his own body and spirit, essentially by means of lzis
self-consciousness co relmrdir~g itself as free, that he takes possession of
elf and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others.
Or to put It the other way round, this taking possession of oneself
consists also in translating into llCtuality what one is in terms of one's
concept (as possibility, capacity [Vernzogen], or predisposition). By this
~~what one is in concept is posited for the first time as one's
~
~
own, and __~!_O as an oli)ect
[Gege11Stand] distinct,..,.-from simp!!:~
""Coiiiciousness:)md1ttiiere!ijoecomes capabieortakingon the form of
tlze tlzing [Saclze] (cf. Remarks to 43).
-----
The alleged justification of slavery (with aU its more specific

explanations in terms of physical force, capture in time of war,
the saving and preservation of life, sustenance, education
[Er.oielzung], acts of benevolence, the slave's own
86
s6-s7
Abstract Riglzt
acquiescence, etc.), as well as the justification of the
master~
status as simple lordship in general, and all historical views on

the right of slavery and lordship, depend on regarding the
human being simply as a natural being [NatUTWesen] whose
~ristmzTTotwhich diraihitrary will is also a part) is
nQ!in confoDDicy..with.bis..c..cept. Conversely, the claim that
~lavery is absolutely contrary to right is firmly tied to the
,J'"c~LQUb~~~ )e~ !ometh~s_:l!j ~<
and is one-stded masmuch as 1t regards the human bemg as "by

nature free, or (and this amounts to the same thing) takes the
!;concept as such in its immediacy, not the Idea, as the truth.;
'This antinomy,r _,.,..-....._____.,.like all antinomies, is based on formal thinking, which fixes upon and asserts tbe two moments of an Idea
iilseparation from each other, so thatbothare lacking in truth
and do not contonn to ille~Idea. 1 The free spirit consists
/
precisely in not having its being ~~~~r in itse/[
(see 21), but in overcoming [aujheben] this formal phase oC
its being and hence also its immediate natural existence, and (
in giving itself an existence which is purely its own and free. )
That side of the antinomy which asserts the concept of
freedom thus has the advantage that it contains the absolute
starting point - though only the starting point - on the way to
truth, whereas the 9ther Side~ which goes no further than
{\ concepdess existenceU does not contain the point of view of
:z-;-ra~nafi.!t_a~d- right at all. The point of view of the free will,
TJ 'With~ich rlgntand the science of right begin, is already
beyond that false [tmwahren] point of view whereby the human
being exists as a natural being and as a concept which ha!_.
""bebig(iliiymliie~refore capable of enslave~t.
Tiifs earlier and false appearance1 [Er.scheinung] is associated
with the spirit which has not yet gone beyond the point of view
of its consciousness; the dialectic of the concept and of the as
yet only immediate consciousness of freedom gives rise at this
stage to the stntggle for recognition and the relationship of lordship and seroitude (see Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. I 15ff. and
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 325ff.)_3 But that
the objective spirit, the content of right, should no longer be
~pprehended merely lnlts subjective concept, and consequendy that the ineligioilityorthehUmanbeing in and for
><
--...------.----..~
7 vfr
Philosophy ofRight
himself for slavery should no longer be apprehended merely
as something which ought to be [als ei7l blojles Sol/en), is an
insight which comes only when we recognize that the Idea of
freedom is truly present only as the state.
Addition (H). If we hold firmly to the view that the human being in and for
himselfis free, we thereby condemn slavery. But if someone is l!- slave, his
own will is responsible, just as ih~nsibility lies with the will of a
people if that people is subjugated. Thus the wrong of slavery is the fault
not only of those who enSlave-or subjugate people, but of the slaves and
the subjugated themselves. ~a~ ~curs in the transitional phase
~~n~~n~lltettulf~s
ina world where a wron is still right. Here, the wrong is Valid, so that the
-:---
.....
,_~LOc~
~:S\~
possessio~ich
(y) That mode of taking

is not actual in itself but
merely represents my will occurs when I mark a thing [Sadiel Wiih a sign
to indicate that I have placed my will in it. This mode of taking
possession is highly indeterminate in its objective [gegenstiindlichen]
scope and significance.
Additio'z (H). Taking possession by designation is the most c

lete
mode of all, for the effect of the sign is more or less i~lielt all siclz) in the
other ways of taking possession, too. If I seize aining or give fonn to it,
the ultimate significance is likewise a sign, a sign given to others in order
to exclude them and to show that I have placed my will in the thin~
the concept of the sign is that the thing does not count as what it is, but as
~~to si~cOCk~itizenship
within a state, although t e colour has no connection with e nation and

represents not itself but the nation. It is precisely through the ability to
make a sign and by so doing to acquire things [Dinge] that human beings
display their mastery over the latter.
B. Use of the Thing [Sache]

59
Through my taking possession of it, the thing [Sache] acquires the
predicate of being mine, and the will has a_p~it~:!elatio!ls_!tip [Bezie-
88
Abstract Right
57-60
hung] to it. Within this identity, the thing is equally posited as so_!lle- ___.,......___,.....- - .... - --------------.~ --~--- ---~-~- ----~
~
t:l!irii[!J.~g~J_''--~rnL~~~!~~n~ is a particular will,
!!_eed, preference, etc. B..!::!t m_y_!le(!d,_~ ~ p~ulari~~~-~t is
the positive factor which finds satisfaction, and the thing, as negative -in itself,~~~- Use is the realization of ;
rr
my need through the alteration, destruction, or consumption of the :::> '.
thing, whose selfless nature is thereby revealed and which thus fulfil~..:;' ..
its destiny [Beslimmung].
That use is the real aspect and actuality of property is what
representational thought [Vor.slelltmg] has in mind when it
regard~ disused ro erty as dead and ownerless, and justifies
its unlawful appropriation of it on the grounds that the owner
did not use it. - But the will of the owner, in accordance with
which thing is his, is the primary substantial basis of property, and_ the further determination of use is merely the
[outward] appearance and particular mode of this universal
basis to which it is subordinate.
Addition (H,G). While I take complete possession of a thing in a universal

way by designating it as mine, its use embodies an even more universal
relation, because the _thing is not then recognized in its particularity, but is
._I!.(!~ted
by me. The thing is reduced to a means of satisfying my need.

When Iaila the thing come together, one of the two must lose its
[distinct] quality in order that we may become identic~. But I am alive, a
willing and truly afiUTiiiitive agent; the thing, on the other hand, is a
natural entity.u It must accordingly perish, and I survive, which is in
general the prerogative and rationale [Venmrlji) of the organic.
"Translator~
nou: ist das Natiirlicll~ in Griesheim's notes, from which Gans derived !his
senlence,lhe phrase reads istdas Negatiw ('is !he negative'): see VPR IV, 214.
6o
The use [Bermtzung] of a thing [Sache] by immediate seizure is in itself
an individual act of taking possession. But in so far as the use is based
on a continuing need and entails the repeated use of a self-renewing
product- perhaps even limiting itself with a view to safeguarding that
renewal - these and other circumstances tum that immediate and
individual seizure into a sign to _in.dicate....a__unh!et:sal act of taking../
. posseS$iQ.n, and hence that -~ -t;ke possession of the elemental or
-----
Philosophy ofRight
organic basis of such products or of any other conditions to which they
are subject.
61
Since the substance of the thing [Sacile] for itself, which is my property, is its externality, i.e. its non-substantiality- for in relat!on to me,
it is not an end in itself (see 42) - and since this"'"realized externality
is the use or employrirent to which I subject it, it follows that tile 11Ji1ole
use or employment of it is tile tiling in its entirety. Thus, if I have the
whole use of the thing, I am its owner; and beyond the whole extent of
its use, nothing remains of the thing which could be the property of
someone else.
Addition (G). The relation of use to property is the same as that of

substance to accident, inner to outer, or force to its manifestation._...,.._
A force
exists onl in so far as it manifests itself: the field is a field only in so far as
1t produces a crop.1 Thus, he who has the use of a field is the owner of the
whole, and it is an empty abstraction to recognize any further property in
the object [Gegenstand] itself.2
Only my entitlement to a partial or temporary use of something or to

partial or temporary possession of it (a possession in the shape of the
partial or temporary possibility of using it) is therefore to be distinguisiled from the oumersilip of the thing [Sacile] itself. If the whole
extent of the use of a thing were mine, but the abstract ownership
were supposed to be someone else's, the thing as mine would be
wholly penetrated by my will (see the previous paragraph and 52),
while it would at the same time contain something impenetrable by
me, i.e. the will, in fact the empty will, of someone else. As positive
will, I would thus be at the same time objective and not objective to
myselfin the thing- a relation of absolute contradiction.- Ownership
........
is therefore essentially fi"ee and con1plete ownership. 1
________________________________
The distinction between the right to the 11Jilole extent oftile use
of a thing and abstract o11Jnersilip is a product of the empty
understanding, for which the Idea - here as the unity of
ownership, or even of the personal will in general and its
6o-62
Abstract Right
reality - is not the truth, but for which these two moments in
their separation from one another count as something true.
This distinction, therefore, as an actual relation, is one of an
empty proprietorship which might be called a madness of
personality (if the term 'madness' were used not just of a
direct contradiction within a person between his merely subjective idea [Vontellu,1g) and his actuality), because the term
'mine', as applied to a si,1gle object, would have to mean both
my exclusive individual will and another exclusive individual
will, with no mediation between them. 2 - In the Institutes,
Book n, Chapter 4, we are told: 'Ususfructus est ius aliaus
rebus utendifruendi salva rerum substantia.' And it is further
stated: 'ne tamen in universum i'1utiles essent proprietates
semper abscendente usufructu, placuit, certis modis extingui
usumfructum et ad proprietatem reverti.' 'The law has
dedded' - as if an initial preference or decision were needed to
make sense of that empty distinction by a determination of
this kind! A property which suffered 'the pennanem cessation
of usufruct' would not only be 'useless' but no longer a 'property' at all.- This is not the place to discuss other distinctions
within property itself, such as those between res ma,ldpi and
'Jec mandpi, dominium Q!nritarium and Bonitarium, and the
like, since they are unconnected with any conceptual
determination of property and are merely historical niceties
associated with this [department of] right 3 But on the one
hand, the distinction discussed above is contained in the relations of dominium directum and dominium utile, in the
emphyteutic contract and the further relations encountered in
estates held in fief with their hereditary rents and other taxes,
payments, feudal tributes, etc. in all their various determinations, where such burdens cannot be redeemed/ On the other
hand, this distinction is not present hlsOTar as domi,1ium utile
is associated with burdens as a result of which dominium
directum becomes at the same time a dominium utile. If such
4
"Translator"s 1101~: 'Usufruct is 1he righ11o use and enjoy lhe fruils of anoth~r~ propeny
provided !hal iiS substanu is conserved ... Bul in order 1ha1 properties should nol
become uselm lhrough lhe Jlmiim~ent cessation of usufrua, lhe law has d~cid~d 1ha1,
under cenain circumslances, lhe righl of usufruCI should be annulled and lhe use should
reven 10 1he proprielor.'
"
relations contained nothing other than the above distinction in
its strict abstraction, they would in fact imply not two lords
(domim ), but an oTlmer on the one hand and a lord over nothing
on the other. But on account of the burdens [on the property],
what we have are two owne,; in a mutual relationship. Nevertheless, their relationship is not one of commorz ownership,
although the transition from it to common ownership is very
easy to make. This transition has already begun when, under
dominium directum, the yield of the property is calculated and
treated as its essential aspect, so that the incalculable aspect of
proprietorship, which has perhaps been thought to lend it
nobility, is subordinated to its useji1l [utile] aspect, which in this
case is the rational element.
It must be nearly one and a half millennia since the freedom
ofpmorzality began to flourish under Christianity and became
a universal principle for part - if only a small part - of the
human race.s But it is only since yesterday, so to speak, that
the freedom ofproperty has been recognized here and there as a
principle - an example from world history of the length of
time which the spirit requires in order to progress in its selfconsciousness, and a caution against the impatience of
opinion.
/~!!:(
',_~
A thing [Sathe] in use is an individual thing, determined in quan~

~dqual~an_~ut-~ as
gu~'~i~rmined, is at the same ti~parable with other
~~e same utili~J1l_!?t!l~.J.!.t~ific -~~~r~t
~~~~~-!!r~~-thus_likewis~~~n its
wiJ:!0Ltl.!_e.!__!!eeds.
Consequently, the~
thing is also comparticularity
-~
-----~--parable with things which serve other needs. This tmiv~e
~~ie-~--d~~~e~ particul~
[Pi,ti"kulariii!Jin
~~litTfis at the..........--.
same tiffieaostracted from
~------__ .----~-------this s~c_i_~_~_ty, is the thing's value, in which its true substantiality
is deienni,e_d and b~~~~s~yf_Iq_nif1Q~~~~sS.h5
the fi1ll owneiofthe thing, I am the owner-both of its value and of its
-------.__ __
... _____
- use.
_,...,....--------~-~-,...._---
~-------
-----~-----'-
Abstract Right
The property of the feudal tenant is distinguished by the fact~
that the tenant is the owner only of the thing's use, not of its
value.
Addition (H). The qualitative disappears here in the form of the quantitative. For if I speak of'need', this is a term which can encompass the most
diverse things [Di1zge], and it is their common quality which makes them
commensurable. 1 Thus, the progression of thought here is from the
specific quality of the thing [Sac/It'] to a stage at which this determinate
quality is indifferent, i.e. that of quantity. A similar situation arises in
mathematics. If, for example, I define a circle, an ellipse, or a parabola, it
can be seen that they are specifically different. Nevertheless, the distinction between these different cunes is defined purely quantitatively, that
is, in such a way that the only relevant factor is a quantitative distinction
which relates to their coefficients alone, to their purely empirical dimenthe quantitative determina n which
sions. In the case 2f...Jlrope
emerges ~the qualitanve is
ue. Here e
itative su "es the
-:q::=u::::an~tu~m:-?,o;;r::,:.,.:e:=;q;,..:~n~ni.:ty;,:.::aoo:::;..-Iis,:-:=a;s;su;c~,~bo~th~=-:r~e:se=:rv=e~d~and=:~s=u~pe~.
~cepe of value, the thing [Sac/It'] itself is regarded
merely as a sign, andJt~unts not as itself but as what i~h. A bill of
exchange, for example, does not represent its quality as paper, but is
merely a sign representing another universal, namely value. The value of
a thing can vary greatly in relation [.Bciehung] to need; but if one wishes to
express not the specific nature of its value but its value in the abstra!;t, this
is expressed as 11l01leJ. Money can represent anything [al/e Di11ge), but
since it doesnot (lijilct the need itself but is only a sign in place of it, it is
itself governed in tum by the specific value which it merely expresses in
the abstract It is indeed possible to be the owner of a thing [Sac/It']
without at the same time being the owner of its value. A family which
cannot sell or mortgage its estate is not the proprietor of its value. But
since this form of property is out of keeping with the concept of property,
such limitations [of ownership] (feudal tenancies and entails) are now for
the most part disappearing.
~.
Without tho bi<cti"
P"'''~~~O~<
will, which lono con.Ututo
their significance and value, the form given to property and the sign
which denotes it are t1!_e~~ere externals. This presence,
however, which is use, employment, or some other expression of the
will, is located in time, in respect of which thl\._ oliective factor is. the
.continua1lce of this expression. Without this, the thing [Sac/ze) becomes
----------
-----....-----
~--- ~-
93
-----
--
ownerless, because the actuality of will and possession has abandoned
itCOn5equently, I can gain or lose property by prescription. 1
Prescription, therefore, has not been introduced into right
merely because of an external consideration at variance with
right in its strict sense - that is, in order to terminate the
disputes and confusions with which old claims would threaten
the security of property, etc: On the contrary, prescription is
based on the determination of the reality of property, of the
will's need to express itself in order to possess something. Public memorials are national property, or more precisely -like
works of art in general without regard to their use [Be1zutzung]
- it is their indwelling soul of remembrance and honour which
gives them their validity as living and self-sufficient ends; but
if this soul abandons them, they are then in this respect
, i3Wilerl~o-n is concerned and become contingent private possessions, as, for example, the Greek and
Egyptian works of art in Turkey. -The right o(prr;;;;t;p;op;;iy
'Whf~ his productions is subject to
prescription for similar reasons; they become ownerless in the
sense that, like public monuments (but in an opposite way),
they become universal property and, according to the particu~
lar use that is made of the thing in question, .EQntiD!trn!
_private possessions. - Mere land, consecrated as a place of
~--~~
burial or even dedicated in its own right [{tir siclz] to perpetual
disuse, embodies an empty arid absent arbitrary will. An injury
lVerletZU7zg] to this will is not an injury to anything actual, and
it cannot therefore be guaranteed that it will be respected.
----
Additimz (H). Prescription is based on the assumption that! have c~d

dOOi as mine. _For if something is to remain mine, continuiQ:
of my will is required, and this is dj~~ ~ e use [Gebrauclz] or
~tnetfiing in ~- - The oss of value which public
m<mlorialS may suffer was often demonstrated at the time of the Reformation in the case of endowed Masses. The spirit of the old faith, that is, of
the endowed Masses, had departed, and they could consequently 6e).
taken possession of as property.2
.j1
.tQ regard the
94
Abstract Right
C. The Alienationa ofProperty

6s
It is possible for me to alienate my property,~s nYQC only in sclli!!:.
~~ m~Thus, I may abandon (dere/inquiere) as
ownerless anYfliing belonging to me or make it over to the will of
someone else as his possession- but only.iilSoTarasthe thing [Sache]
is external ==::;;
in nature. 1
c
Addition (H). While prescription is an alienation of property without a

.direct declaration on the part of the will, true alienation is a declaration by
the will that I no longer wish to regard the thing as mine. The whole issue
-can also be viewed in such a way that alienation is regarded as a true mode
of taking possession. The first moment in property is to take possession of
something immediately; use is a further means of acquiring property; and
the third moment is the unity of the first two, namely taking possession of
something by alienating it
66
Those goods, or rather substantial determinations, which constitute
my own distinct personality and the universal essence of my selfconsciousness are therefore it~alienable, and my right to them is i!!lP_r!scriptible. They include my personality in general, my unive!sal
~.---~--~-~- ~-~-,----.---- ..-- ---"" .......
freedom of will, ethical llfc, and religion.
....
--........---------
The idea that what spirit is in accordance with its concept or

in itself should also have existence [Dasein) and being-foritself (and hence that it should be a person, be capable of
owning property, and have an ethical life and religion)- this
Idea is itself the concept of spirit (As causa sui, i.e. as a free
Translator's nou: Hegel's tenn Emiiuftnung and its synonym Vtriiftnung ('disposal' or
'alienation') are impossible to translate satisfactorily, as are the related forms veriiufttm
and sich tnliifttm ('to dispose d' or 'to alienate'), wriiujkrbar ('disposable' or 'alienable')
and IIIIWI'iiufttrlidr ('inalienable'. For the basic and original meaning of mliiufttm is 'to
cxtemalize', and Hegel, throughout the fdlowing section
65-71), repeatedly exploits
this meaning by associating the terms in question with etymologicaUy related words such
as iiajkrlidr ('external') and Arif/mmg ('expression' or 'utterance'). It is, of course,
impossible to reproduce the resulting network of et}mological associations in translation.
Since the context is one oflegal transactions, I have wherever possible used the English
legal expression 'alienation' and its derivatives.
95
~.
cause, spmt 1s that 'cuius natura non potest conC1p1 ms1

existens'"- Spinoza, Etlzics, 1, 1 ). 1 In this very concept of spirit
as that which is what it is only through itselfand as infinite return
!_nto~fu>~~~~liesthe
, .ro;sibility of an opposition, in that what the spirit is only in

/ itself may differ from what it is for itself(see 57), or cooversely, what it is only for itselfas with evil in the case of the
\ will - may differ from what it is ;, itself. Herein lies the
possibility of tlze alienation of_ persrmality and its substantial
being, whetlierth~Jace in an unconscious or
an explicit manner.- Exam~nation o~~ty
include slavert'~~!l~on from owning prop~ns~~_!tf~~-!lf.~~C:~P-.S~ The alienation
ofintelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is
encountered ~~n, when power and authority are
granted to others to determine and prescribe what actions I
should perform (as when someone enters into an express
agreement to commit robbery, murder, etc. or incurs the
possibility of committing crimes) or hQ!t'_! sho~ld inte~ret~
'-d_!.~~t~.s _o.f_~.!l_t]~~ie_Q~~._t~~~~c.- The right to such
inalienable things is imprescriptible, for the act whereby I take
possession of my personality and substantial essence and
make myself a responsible being with moral and religious
values and capable of holding rights removes these
determinations from that very externality which alone made
them capable of becoming the possessions of someone else.
When their externality is superseded in this way, the
determination of time and all other reasons [Grunde] which
can be derived from my previous consent or acceptance lose
their validity. This return on my part into myself, whereby I
make myself existent as Idea, as a person with rights and
morality, supersedes the previous relationship and the wrong
which I and the other party have done to my concept and
reason [Vemrmft] in treating the infinite existence [E.tistenz] of
the self-consciousness as something external, and in allowing
it to be so treated. - This return into myself reveals the
contradiction inherent in handing over to others my capacity
"Transkzlor's 110/t: 'whose nature cannot be conceived other than as existing'.
g6
Abstraa Right
for rights, my ethical life and religiosity; for I did not myself
possess these things, and as soon as I do possess them, they
exist essentially only as mine, and not as something external.
Addition (H). It is in the nature of the case [Sache] that the slave has an
absolute right to free himself, and that, if someone has agreed to devote
his ethical life to robbery and murder, this is null and void in and for
itself, and anyone is entitled to revoke such a contract The same applies
if I put my religiosity~fa priest who is my confessor, for a
human being must decide such inward matters entirely within himself.Areligiosil)' which is il! part controlled by someone else is not a genuine
re!ig!_~~SOOIYOiieiila-oug1ittOa'Wellwi.tlllilme; are'i:iiiillcarion of being-in-and-for-itself is something which ought to belong

to me.
I can alienate individual products of my particular physical and mental

(geistigen) skills and active capabilities to someone else and allow him
to use them for a limited period, because, provided they are su_bje.CUQ.
this limitation, they acquire an external relationship to my totality and
--zmivif.sality. By alienating the whole of my time, as made concrete
-through work, and the totality of my production, I would be making
the substantial quality of the latter, i.e. my universal activity and actuality or my personality itself, into someone else's property.
It is the same relation as that discussed above ( 6r) between

the substance of the thing [Sache] and its use [Benutzung); just
as use is distinct from substance only in so far as it is limited,
so too does the use [Gebrauch] of my powers differ from the
powers themselves - and hence also from me - only in so far
as it is quantitatively limited; a power is the totality of its
manifestations, just as substance is the totality of its accidents
and the universal the totality of its particularizations.
Addition (H). The distinction discussed here is that between a slave and a
modem servant or hired labourer. The Athenian slave perhaps had easier
tasks and more intellectual [geistigere] work to perform than our servants
"TranskJtor's IID/t. I have chosen the reading 'an einen andem' ('to someone else'), as in
Ilting's main text (VPR n, 278), in preference to 'von einem anderen' ('of someone
else1, as in the lirst edition and the Suhrkamp edition (Wtrkt vu, 144).
97
normally do, but he was nevertheless a slave, because the entire scope of
his activity had been alienated to his master.
68
The distinctive quality of intellectual [geistignt] production may, by
virtue of the way in which it is expressed, be immediately transformed
into the external quality of a thing [Sac/te], which may then in tum be
produced by others. In acquiring it, the new owner may thus
appropriate the thoughts which it communicates or the technical
invention which it embodies, and it is this possibility which at times
(as with literary works) constitutes the sole purpos~ [Bertimmung] of
such things and their value as acquisitions; in addition, the new owner
at the same time comes into possession of the universal ways and means
of so expressing himself and of producing a multiplicity of such
things.
In the case of works of art, the form which tangibly represents
the thought in an external medium is, as an object [.Ding], so
distinctive a product of the individual artist that any copy of it
is essentially the product of the intellectual [geistigen] and
technical skill of the copyist. In the case of a literary work, the
form which makes it an external thing [Sac/te], as with the
invention of a technical device, is ofa medtanical kind. For with
a literary work, the thought is represented not in concrete
depiction but only by a series of discrete and abstract signs,
and with a technical device, the thought has a completely
mechanical content; and the ways and means of producing
such things [Sachen], qua things, belong to the category of
ordinary skills. - Between the extremes of the work of art and
the product of manual craftsmanship there are also transitional stages which share the character of one or other
extreme to a greater or lesser extent.
"Transltltor's nou. Hegel uses the adjective tigm1iim/id1 ('distinctive', 'peculiar'), exploiting its close relationship with the noun Eigentwn ('property', 'ownership') as on several
other occasions in his discussion of property ( 41-71). It is not possible to preserve
this fonnal association in English, since the only words which would adequately reflect it
(the adjectives 'proper' and 'own') are rarely suitable as translations of tigtntiimlidl.
Abstract Riglzt
......__,
6g
Since the person who acquires such a product possesses its entire use
and value if he owns a single copy of it, he is the complete and free
owner of it as an individual item. But the author of the book or the
inventor of the technical device remains the; owner of the universal
ways and means of reproducing such products and things [Stu'hm],
ro-;:-ne lia~rrunedia~hese universarwaYsand means
as such but may reserve them for himself as his distinctive mode of
expression.
The substance of an author's or inventor's right does not
primarily consist in his arbitrarily imposing the condition, on
alienating a single copy of his work, that the power which the
other person thereby acquires to manufacture such products
on his own account as things should not become the other's
property, but should remain that of the inventor. The first
question is whether such a separation between the ownership
of the thing and the power which this confers to produce such
things in tum is an admissible part of the concept, or whether
it does not cancel [ardlzebt] full and free ownership (see 62)so that it depends solely on the arbitrary will of the intellectual
[geistigen] originator whether he retains the power to
reproduce the things in question, or alienates this power as
something of value, or places no value on it for his own part
and relinquishes it along with the individual thing. For this
power has the peculiar character of being that aspect of a
thing which makes it not merely a possession but a resource
(see below, 17off.), !D that the latter quality lies in the
particular kind of external use to which the thing is put, and is
distinct and separable from the use to which the thing was
immediately destined. (The use in question is not what is
known as an accessio natura/is like the procreation of animals
[(oetura].) 1 Since, then, this distinction arises within that
which is by nature divisible (that is, within external use), to
retain one part of the use while alienating the other part is not
to reserve a proprietorship without utility [r~ti/e]. - The purely
negative, but most basic, means of furthering the sciences and
arts is to protect those who work in them against tlre.ft and to
99
provide them with security for their property, just as the
earliest and most important means of furthering commerce
and industry was to protect them against highway robbery. Besides, the destiny [Bestimmung) of a product of the intellect
[Geistesprodukt) is to be apprehended by other individuals and
appropriated by their representational thinking, memory,
thought, etc. Hence the mode of expression whereby these
individuals in tum make what they have learned (for learning
means not just memorizing or learning words by heart - the
thoughts of others can be apprehended only by thinking, and
this rethinking is also a kind ofleaming) into an alienable thing
will always tend to have some distinctive fomz, so that they can
regard the resources which flow from it as their property, and
may assert their right to reproduce it. The propagation of the
sciences in general, and the specific business of teaching in
particular, in accordance with its determination and the duty
associated with it (most specifically in the case of the positive
sciences, Church doctrine, jurisprudence, etc.), consist in the
repetition of established thoughts, all of which have already
been expressed and acquired from external sources; the same
is true of writings designed for teaching purposes and for the
propagation and dissemination of the sciences. As for the
extent to which the existing store of knowledge, and in particular the thoughts of other people who retain external
ownership of their intellectual products, become, by virtue of
the new fomz which they acquire through repeated expression,
a special intellectual [geistiges) property of the individual who
reproduces them and thereby give him (or fail to give him) the
right to make them his external property in tum- the extent to
which this is so cannot be precisely determined, nor therefore
defined in terms of right and the law. The same is true of the
extent to which such repetition in a written publication constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism ought therefore to be a matter
[Sache) of honour, and honour should deter people from committing it.- Thus laws against breach ofropyright do attain their
end of protecting the property rights of authors and publishers
to the (albeit very limited) extent specified.2 The ease with
which one can deliberately alter the form of something or
invent an insignificant modification to a major science or to a
100
Abstract Right
comprehensive theory which someone else has created, or
even the impossibility of sticking to the words of the original
author when expounding what one has learned - not to mention the particular ends which necessitate such repetition- in
itself [fiir sich) introduces that endless multiplicity of alterations which give the property of others the more or less
superficial imprint of being one~ own. For example, the hundreds upon hundreds of compendia, excerpts, anthologies,
etc., aritlunetic books, geometries, devotional writings, etc.,
show how every new idea [Einfal~ which appears in critical .
journals, poetry almanacs, encyclopaedias, etc. can also be
immediately reported under the same or a different title, yet
put forward as the writer's own property. This can easily have
the effect that the profit which the author or inventive
entrepreneur expected from his work or new idea is eliminated, reduced for both parties, or ruined for everyone. - But
as for the effect ofhonour in preventing plagiarism, it is remarkable that the expression 'plagiarism', or indeed 'literary theft',
is no longer to be heard these days. This may be because
honour has had its effect in suppressing plagiarism, or
because plagiarism has ceased to be dishonourable and the
revulsion against it has disappeared, or because an insignificant new idea and a change in outward form are rated so
highly as originality and as the product of independent
thought that it never occurs to anyone to suspect plagiarism.
"Translmor's nou. The Suhrkamp edition (WD"k~ VII, 149) here reads alltin ('alone'),
which is undoubtedly an error. The correct reading is al/m ('for everyone'), as in VPR 11,
288 and other editions.
The comprehensive totality of external activity, i.e. life, is not something

external to personality, which is itself this pe'rsonality and immediate.
The disposal [Entiiufterung) or sacrifice of life is, on the contrary, the
opposite of the existence [Dasein] of tins personality. I have therefore
.no right whatsoev~ to~i~, and only an ethical Idea as
~~~1chl7il s u11mediately individual personality in itself has
been submerged, and which is the actual power behind the latter, has
101
69-70
such a right. Thus, just as life as such is immediate, so also is death at
the same time its immediate negativity;,death must consequently come
from outside, either as a natural event [~f
. [vonfremder Hantij.
the Idea, by the hand of an outstder
--
Addition (H). It is certainly the case that the individual [eirJZe/rre] person is
a subordinate entity who must dedicate himself to the ethical whole.
Consequently, if the state demands his life, the individual [Individuum]
must surrender it. But may a human being take his own life? One may
regard suicide in the first instance as an act of bravery, albeit an inferior
bravery of tailors and maidservants. On the other hand, it can also be seen
as a misfortune, since it is the product of inner _der:~~~nt. But the
main question is: have I a right to commit suicide? The answer will be
that, as tlzis individual, I am not master of my life, for the comprehensive
totality of activity, i.e,__lifeJ!.!!Qt~~~~ity, which
is itself immediately t/iif.Thus: it is a contradiction to speak of a p_ew..OCS.
right over his life, fer this wouldmean that a person had a right over
-~no such right, for he does not stand above himself and
cannot pass judgement on himself. When Hercules burned himself to
death or Brutus fell on his sword, this was a hero's behaviour in relation
to his own personality; but if it is a question of a simple right to kill
oneself, such a right may be denied even to heroes. 1
TRANSITION FROM PROPERTY TO CONTRACT
Existence [das Dasein], as determinate being, is essentially being for

another (see above, Remarks to 48). Property, in view of its
existence as an external thing [Saclze], exists for other external things
and within the context of their necessitY arui coii'Ungency. Hut as the
existence of the will, its existence for another can only be for tire will of
another person. This relation [Bezielzrmg] of will to will is the true
distinctive ground in which freedom has its existence. This mediation
whereby I no longer own property merely by means of a thing and my
subjective will, but also by means of another will, and hence within
the context of a common will, constitutes the sphere o(;;ntraa.
---
~'
---
Reason makes it just as necessary that human beings should

enter into contractual relationships- giving, exchanging, trad102
Abstract Right
7~71
ing, etc. - as that they should possess property (see Remarks

to 45). As far as their own consciousness is concerned, it is
need in general- benevolence, utility, etc. -which leads them
to make contracts; but implicitly (an siclz], they are led by
reason, that is, by the Idea of the real existence of free personality ('real' in the sense of 'present only within the will').
COntract presupposes that the contracting parties recog11jze
each other as persons and owners of property; ana since tt is a
' relanonshlp of ObJective spirit, the moment of recognition is
~ contained and presuppose(fWi.ihin it (cf. 35 and
Remarks to 57). 1
Addition (H). In a contract,] have ~~e..Qf a commg.u.~l: for

it is the interest of reason iliatthe subjegiv will should become more
-unive~L@raise }_I:Se f to this actua JZation. Thus, my Wl
tams Its
determination as this~cT,Oiitm community with another
will. The universal will, on the other hand, appears here as yet only in the
form and shape of community.
103
SECTION 2
Contract
That [kind of] property of which the as_p_ect of existence [Dasein] or

atema!!!J. is no longer merely a thing [Sii&,;Jbut contains the moment
~will (and hence the will of another person) comes~
tli;ough contract. This is the process in which the following contradiction is .represented and mediated: I am and remain an owner of
property, having being for myseff and excluding the will of another,
only in so far as, in identifying my will with that of another, I cease to
be an owner of property.
It is not only possible for me to ..dh"!POse of an item of property as an

external thing [Sac/re] (see 65)- I am also cowrpelledby the concept to
dispose of it as property in order that my will, as existent, may become
objective [gegenstandlich] to me. But according to this moment, my
will, as externalized: is at the same time arrother will. Hence this
moment, in which this necessity of the concept is real, is the urrity of
different wills, which therefore relinquish their difference and distinctiveness. Yet it is also implicit (at this stage) in this identity of
different wills that each of them is and remains a will distinctive for
itself and not identical with the other.
'Translator's nou. The tenn Hegel uses is ~1tauj/ert ('disposed or or 'alienated'). Here,
its original meaning or 'externalized' seems more appropriate (cf. translator's note to
p. 95 above).
104
rights of the sovereign and the state been regarded as objects
of contract and based on a contract, as the result merely of a
conmzo11 will and proceeding from the arbitrary will of those
who have combined to fonn a state. ~ver different these
twopoints ofVlew may
one respect, they c!o have this in
common: they have transferred the determinations of private
property to a sphere of a totally different and higher nature.
(See below, 'Ethical Life' and 'The State'.)
bern
Addition (H). In recent times, it has become very popular to regard the
state as a contract of all with all. Everyone, we are told, makes a contract
with the sovereign, and he in tum with the subjects. This view is the result
of superficial thinking, 'Xhich envisages only a single unity of different
wills. But in a contract, th~;e--aretWo~~e
perSons and wish to rem3iii'Owners of pro~;ty;tlte contract accordingly
originates in the arbitrary will of the person -an origin which marriage
iifsOfiaSfri~~n the case of the state, this is
different fromJhe outset,~ arbitrary will of individuals [b1dividuen]
is not in a.{)osin'60101ireak awa' m the state, because the m lVI ual is
~eacfy "t_y nature a citizen of it. It is the ratiO~s~
~ ~ ----- ......
human beings to live within a state, and even if no state is yet present,
reason requires that one be established. The state itself must give permission for individuals [Eillzelr~e) to enter or leave it, so that this does not
depend on the arbitrary will of the individuals concerned; consequently,
the state is I_lOt based on contract, which pr~SI!PJ!Oses an arbitrary will. It
is false to say that the arbitrary will of everyone is capable of founding a
state: on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary for each individual to live
within the state. The great advance made by the state in modem times is
that it remains an end in and for itself, and that each individual may no
longer base his relationship [Beziellung) to it on his own private stipulation, as was the case in the Middle Ages.
-----
A contract is fon11al in so far as the two act_!_Q[ consent whereby_~

common will comes into bein~e;!:~tive
m-;~-;Jiena---_____ .-.--...
non of a thi_!!!USache] and the
positive
moment
acceptance- are
...,.....-----.. __________
__,...,..,..,.. ofits._.___,.
- perfonned s~yoftlle two contracting parties:_ this is a co!Itract of
gjJi, - But a contract may be called real in so far as etlC/i of the two
contracting wills is the totality of these mediating moments, and
._,.
___ _._ ___
--~--~~--~
------~-----
____
"-----~----------
xo6
_____
__,..,........_~--
Abstract Right
75-77
thereby both becomes and remains an owner of property in concluding it: this is a contract of exc/umge.
Addition (H). A contract requires two acts of consent in relation to two

things: for I seek both to acquire property and to relinquish it The
contract is real when each party performs the entire action, both
-relinquishing and- acquinng property and remauung an owner of property
while relinquishing it; and it is formal when only one party acquires
property or relinquishes it. ------.
----7
Since each party, in a real contract, retains the same property with
which he enters the contract and which he simultaneously
relinquishes, that property which remains identical as having being in
itself within the contract is distinct from the external things [Sachen]
which. change owners in the course of the transaction. The former is
the value, in respect of which the objects of the contract [Vertragigegenstiinde) are equal to each other, whatever qualitative external differences there may be between the things exchanged; it is their
univmal aspect (see 63).
The determination that /aesio enon11is"1 cancels [mljhebe] the
contractual obligation consequently has its source in the concept
of contract, and specifically in that moment whereby the contracting party, by alienating his property, remains an owner ofproperty
and, more precisely, remains quantitatively the same as he was
before. But the damage is not just excessive {as it is considered to
be if it exceeds one half of the value) but infinite, if a contract or
stipulation of any kind has been entered into to alienate inalimable goods {see 66).- Furthermore, a stijllllatimr differs from a
contract first through its content, since it refers to a single part
or moment of the whole contract, and secondly, since it is the
fomza/ settlement of the contract (of which more will be said
later).3 In respect of its content, the stipulation contains only
the formal determination of the contract, the consent of one
party to deliver something and the consent of the other to
accept it; it has therefore lJeenctaSSed among so-called
-,'iiirratmlf contracts. The distinction between unilateral and
"Trans/aJar's
11D1t: 'excessive damage'.
107
bilateral contracts," and other classifications of contracts in
Roman law, are in part superficial groupings based on a single
and often external aspect such as the kind of formalities they
are associated with; and in part they confuse (among other
things) determinations which concern the nature of contract
itself with others which concern only the administration of
justice (actiones) and the legal [rechtlichen] consequences of
positive law, and which often derive from wholly external
circumstances and contravene the concept of right.
The distinction between property and possession~ ~e sub~tial and

e~~mal asp~cts [of ownership] (see 45), becomes, in contract, the
distinction between the common will as agreement and its actualization
throug~_p5~~greemeilt\vruc~een reached, considered by itself [frir siclr] without reference to its performance, is an
idea of representational thought [ein Vtrgestelltes ], to which a particu'Jii;et;stt,ci(.6asdti]...-~~Sftlie'refore be given in accordance with the
distinctive manner in which representational thoughts [Vorstellungen]
/rave their existence in signs (see Encyclopaedia of tire Philosophical
Sciences, 379f.).l This is achieved by expressing the stipulation
through formal gestures and other symbolic actions, and particularly by
a specific declaration in language, the most appropriate medium [Element] of intellectual representation [der geistigen Vorstellung].
According to this definition [Bestimmung], a stipulation is
indeed the form through which the content of a contract, i.e.
what is concluded in it, has its existence as something as yet
only represented. But this representation is merely a form, and
it does not mean that the content is still subjective in character, as something to be wished for or willed in such and such a
way. On the contrary, the content is the decision which the
will finally reaches on such matters.
Additimr (H). Just as, in the theory [Le/rre] of propeny, we had the distinction between property and possession, between the substantial and the
merely external, so do we have in contract the difference [Differenz]
between the common will as agreement and the particular will as performance: ItlieSiii lire natureoTCOiirrac:tdlatooni thecommon Wilii"nd
--------
108
Abstract Right
77-79
the particular will should be expressed, fa- a contract is a relationship

between one will and another. The agreement, which manifesq; i!Selfby
means of a sign, and the performalice-are
keit~ePa"rate a~o~g
.ro.ffi'Zea rgebililett'll] peoples, whereas they may coincide among the
uncivilized. In the forests of Ceylon there is a nation of traders who lay
out their property and peacefully wait until others come and put theirs
down beside it; in this case, there is no difference between the mute
declaration of will and its perEOrmance.
----~-. -- ----..__
____...____ ---~
therefore
--
79
The stipulation contains the aspect of will, and hence the substantial
ele~~ht in a contract. In contrast to this, the possession which
remains in force so long as the contract is unfulfilled is in itself [/iir
sicll] merely the external aspect, which has its determination in the will
alone. Through the stipulation, I have relinquished an item of property and my arbitrary will over it, and it has already bemme tile property
of tire otller party. In terms of right, I am thus immediately bound by
the stipulation to perfomr what has been agreed.
The difference between a mere promise and a contract lies in
the fact that, in a promise, whatever I intend to give, do, or
perform is expressed as so"l_Y.Jing in tire {itture, and~
remains a subjective determination of my will, which I can
therefiire subsequendy alter. The stipulation in a contract, on
the other hand, is itself already the existe~~ee [Dasein] ofE!Xwill's decision, in the sense that I have thereby alienated the
thing [Saclle] I own, that it has tzow ceased to be my property,
and t~t I alieady- re-c{iglilzei~ ;;;tile property of the other
party. The Roman distinction between pactum and co11tractus is
a bad one/ - Fichte once maintained that my obligation to
observe a contract commences only when the other party begins
to perform [his side of the agreement], for until he does so, I
do not know whether his original utterance was seriously
meant; the obligation before the performance could therefore
only be of a moral nature, rather than based on right.2 But the
utterance of a stipulation is not just an utterance in general;
on the contrary, it embodies the common JlJi/1 which has cQme
into being, and which has superseded the arbitrariness of
[individual] disposition and its liability to change. It is not
109
therefore a question of whether the other party's attitude may
have differed inwardly, or subsequently become different, but
of whether he has any right to such different attitudes. Even if
the other party begins to perform [his side of the agreement], I
likewise retain the arbitrary will which enables me to do
wrong. The nullity of Fichte's view is at once apparent from
the fact that it would base contractual rights on the false
infinite/ on an infinite regress, on the infinite divisibility of
time, matter, action, etc. The existmcewhich the wi//has in the
formality of gesture or in language which is determinate for
itself is already the complete existence of the will, as intellectual [intellektuellen) will, and the performance [of the agreement] is merely its selfless consequence. -The fact that there
are also, in positive right, so-called real contracts as distinct
from so-called consemual contracts - in the sense that the
former are considered as fully valid only after the consent has
been followed by the actual performance (res, traditio rer)- is
of no consequence here. 4 For on the one hand, the former are
particular cases where it is only this transfer [of goods] which
enables me to perform my side [of the agreement], and where
my obligation to perform it refers to the thing in question only
in so far as it has come into my hands, as with loans, contracts
of lease, and deposits (and as may be the case with other
contracts, too) - a circumstance which concerns not the
nature of the relationship between stipulation and performance, but the manner of performance itself. And on the other
hand, the arbitrary will is always at liberty to stipulate in a
contract that the obligation of the one party to perform [his
side of the agreement] should not lie in the contract itself as
such, but should depend on the other party performing his
side first.
So
The classification of contracts and a judicious analysis, in the light of
this classification, of their various kinds, should not be based on
external circumstances but on distinctions inherent in the nature of
contract itself. -These distinctions are those between formal contract
and real contract, between ownership and possessiOn and use, and
,___..
.______
--------------- -
__
110
Abstract Right
79-8o
----
between .nlue and the P,ecific thing [Sac/ze]. They accordingly give
-rise to the following kinds of contract
(the classification given here
coincides on the whole with that of Kant's Metaphysical Elements ofthe
Theory of Right [Metaplzysisclze Anfangsgriinde der Rechlslehre], pp.
I 2off., 1 and one might have expected that the old humdrum classification of contracts as real and consensual, named and unnamed, etc.
would long since have been abandoned in favour of a rational
classification):
A. Contract ofgift, comprising
I. Gift of a thing; so-called gift in the proper sense.
2. Loan of a thing, i.e. the giving away of part ofit or of the limited
t7ifoyn~ use of it; the lender here remains the owner of the
thing (mutuum and commodatum without payment of interest).1
The thing in this case is either a specific thing, or it may, even if
it is a specific thing, nevertheless be regarded as universal, or it
counts (like money) as a thing universal in itself (fiir sidz).
3 Gift of a service of any kind, e.g. the mere safe-keeping of an
item of property (depositum). 3 Testamentary disposition, i.e. the
gift of a thing with the particular condition that the other party
should not become the owner until the time ofthe donor's death
(at which time the latter in any case ceases to be the owner),
has no place in the concept of contract, but presupposes civil
society and a positive legislation.
B. Contract of exchange
Exchange as such:
(a) of a thing of any kind, i.e. of a specific thing for another of
the same kind.
(~) purchase or sale (t7ntio, venditio); 4 exchange of a specific thing
for one designated [bestimmt) as universal and which counts
only as value, without the other specific determination of
utility - i.e. for money.
2. Letting or hiring (locatio, conductio); alienation of the tt7nporary
use of a property in exchange for rent, viz.
(a) of a specific thing, letting in the proper sense, or
(~) of a universal thing, so that the lender remains only the
owner of this universal, orin other words of the value-loan
(mutuum, or commodatum, if a rent is payable).5 The further
empirical characteristics of the thing (whether it be a stick,
I.
I I I
implement, house, etc., res fungibilis or non fungibilis) 6 give
rise to other particular determinations (as in A.2. above,
loan as gift), but these are of no importance.
3- Wages crmtract (locatio operae); 7 alienation of my output [Produzierem) or services (i.e. in so far as these are alienable) for a
limited time or with some other limiting condition (see 67).
Akin to this are mamlates and other contracts whose performance
depends on character and trust or on superior talents, and where
an incommensurability arises between the performance and its
external value (which in this case is not described as wages, but as
an lzonorari11m).
C. Completi011 of a cmltract (cautio) by giving a pledge

In those contracts whereby I alienate the use [Benutztmg) of a
thing, I am no longer in possession of it but am still its owner (as
when I rent something out). Furthermore, in contracts of
exchange, sale, and gift, I may have become the owner of something without yet being in posses_sion of it, and the same disjunction arises with regard to any performance which does not follow
step by step. Now the effect of the pledge 8 is that in the one case I
remain, and in the other case I come into, actual possession of tlze
value as that which is still, or has already become, my property,
without being in possession of the specific thing which I am handing over or which I am to receive. The pledge is a specific thing,
but it is my property only to the extent of the value of the property
which I have handed over into someone else's possession or which
is due to me. But as far as its specific character and any excess
value it may have are concerned, it remains the property of the
person giving the pledge. Consequently, giving a pledge is not
itself a contract but only a stipulation (see 77), i.e. the moment
which completes a contract with regard to the possession of a
property. -Mortgage and surety are particular forms of pledge.
Additi011 (H). In the case of contract, we made the following distinction:
while I become the owner of an item of property through the agreement
(stipulation), I do not yet have possession of it but gain possession Q!!ly
through the J!elformance. Now if I already have full a.VJiei:ShlpO the
--~---TNJk: Hegel's manuscript
"Trans/atur's
note adds the gloss 'i.e. r:I no imponance for the
universal determinations'.
II2
8o-8I
Abstract Right
thing, the purpose of the pledge is that I should at the same time gain
possession of the value of the property, and that the performance should
thereby be guaranteed within the agreement itself. Surety is a particular
kind of pledge whereby someone tenders his promise or his credit as a
guarantee of my performance. Here, a person assumes the role which, in
the case of a pledge, is fulfilled by a mere thing.
81
In any relationship of immediate persons to one another, their wills
are not only identical in themselves and, in a contract, posited by them
as common, but also particular. $ince they are inmtediate persons, it is
_p~ conting!C!!,!_ wh~ther th~~i~ar_!ills are in ~nformity!ith
the will wllicll lias being in itself. and which has its existence [Existen.z]
sorel:ftliro'iigliuieroriiier.lfilie-.;_ni~r-~ritSeif" is different
from the universal, its attitude and volition are chari~y
~~ contingency, and it enters mt9-9pposit!_on t~
which is right in itself, this is wrong.
}
The transition to wrong is made by the logical higher necessity that the moments of the concel!.t - here, that of right in
itself or the Will as universal, and that of right in its existence,
which is simply the particulariJy of will - should be ~sit~s
jiff~r tf!!!t!_selves; this belongs to the abstract reality of the
concept. - But tills particularity of the will for itself is
arbitrariness and contingency, and in contract, I have
relinquished these only as arbitrariness in relation to an
individual thing [Saclle], not as the arbitrariness and contingency of the will itself.
77 *
7
Addition (H). In contract, we had the relationship of two wills as a common will. This identical will, however, is only relatively universal - a
posited univerSal will- and is thereby still in opposition to the particular
will. The contract or agreement nevertheless contains the right to require
its performance; but this again is a matter [Sache] for the particular will,
which may, as such, act in contravention of that right which has being in
itself. Thus, there_ap~l!~!_this point the negation which was already
preserifiifiln earlier stage in the wiU which has being in itself, and this
-negati0n"1s -quite sifiiply ~~~i -fiie overall progression is that the will is
purged tt its immediacy so that, from the common will, that particularity
IIJ
is evoked which then appears in opposition to it. In a contract, the
consenting parties will retain their particular wills; thus, contract has not
yet progressed beyond the stage of arbitrariness, and it therefore remains
susceptible to wrong.
SECTION
Wrong [Das Unrecht]

82
In contract, ri ht in itselfis present as something positet!, and its inner
universality is present as a common actor in the arbitrariness and
particular wills of those concerned. This appeartmee of right, in which
right itself and its essential existence [Dasein1 the particular will,
coincide immediately - i.e. in a contingent manner - goes on, in the
case of wrong, to become ~ ~ce- an opposition between right in
itself and the particular will as that in which right becomes a particular
riglzt. But the truth of this semblance is that it is null and void, and
that right re-establisties itself by negating tfiis negation of itself.!
_"I:-hr~~_? this process of mediation whe~~by right re~ to itself
from its negation, it determines itself as actual and valid, whereas it
was at first olily inltSelfancfSOiileiliing itmnediate. ~-~-
---
Addition (H). Right in itself, the universal will, is essentially determined by

the particularWill;-aiUI thus stands in relation [Bt:Zielzung) to something
inessential This is the relationship [Verlliilt11is) of the essence to its
appearance. Even if the appearance is in conformity with the essence, it is
not in conformity with it from another point of view, for appearance is the
stage of contingency, or essence in relation [Be:zie/umg) to the inessential.
But in the case of wrong, appearance goes on to become a semblance. A
semblance is existence inappropriate to the essence, the empty detachment and positedness of the essence, so that in both [semblance and
essence), their distinctness is [mere) difference. Semblance is therefore
the untruth which disappears because it seeks to exist for itself, and in this
disappearance, essence has shown itself as essence, that is, as the power
over semblance. The essence has negated its own negation, and is thereby
115
confirmed. Wrong is a semblance of this kind, and through its disappearance, right acquires the determination of something fixed and valid.
What we have just referred to as essence is right in itself, in contrast to
which the particular will is superseded [sich aujhebt] as untrue. Whereas
right previously had only an immediate being, it now becomes actual as it
returns out of its negation; f<r actuality is that which is effective and
sustains itself in its otherness, whereas the immediate still remains liable
to negation.
"Tra11slator's nou: Hegel defines the term Wirldichkrit {'actuality') by
relationship with the verb lllirknr ('to be effective').
e:~.'Pioiting
its
Right, as something particular and therefore complex in contrast to

the universality and simplicity of its being i11 itself, acquires the form of
a sembla11ce. It is this semblance either i11 itselfor immediately, or it is
posited by the subject as sembla11Ce, or it is posited by 'ilii subject as
completely null and void- that is, it becomes tmimenti011al or civil wrong,
deception, or crime.
Addition (H). Wrong is thus the semblance of essence which posits itself
as self-sufficient. If the semhlan~e_j_s_P-resenum!Y il1itself and not alsg for
itself- that is, if the wrong is in my opinion right- the wrong is unintentional. Here, the semblance exists from the point of view of right,~
from my point of view. The second [kind ot] wrong is deception. In this
case, the wrong is "iiii'ta semblance from the point of view of right in itself;
instead, what happens is that I create a semblance in order to deceive
another person. When I deceive someone, right is for me a semblance. In
the first case, wrong was a semblance from the point ofView of right. In
the second case, right is only a semblance from my point of view, i.e. from
the point of view of wrong. Finally, the third [kind ot] wrong is crime.
This is \\!O!Ig both in itself and for me. But in this case, I will the wrong
- an if
not employeventlie semblance of right. The other person against
whom the crime is committed is not expected to regard the wrong, which
has being in and for itself, as right. The difference between crime and
deception is that in the latter~~i.!WD of right is still present~the
form of the action, and this is correspondingly absent in the case of crime.
- --- - - --------
ao
II6
Abstract Right
8z-86
A. Unintentional Wrong
Taking possession (see 54) and contract, for themselves and in their
particular varieties, are in the first place different expressions and
consequences of my will in general; but since the will is inherently [in
sich] universal, they are also legal claims [Rec/ztsgrii1ule] in respect of
their recognition by others. By virtue of their multiplicity and mutual
externality, they may be entertained by different persons with
reference to one and the same thing [Saclle], and each of these persons, on the strength of his particular claim, may regard the thing as
his property. This gives rise to collisiotts of rights.
Bs
Such a collision, in which a legal claim is made to a thing [Sache], and
which constitutes the sphere of civil actions, involves the recognition of
right as the universal and deciding factor, so that the thing may belong
to the person who has a right to it. The action concerns merely the
subsllmption of the thing under the property of the one or the other
party - a completely negative judgement whereby, in the predicate
'mine', only the particular is negated.
- 86
For the parties involved, the recognition of right is bound up with
their particular opposing interests and points of view. In opposition to
this semblance/ yet at the same time within the semblance itself (see
Bs), right in itselfemerges as something represented [vm;gestel/t] and
required. But it appears at first only as an obligation, because the will is
not yet present as a will which has freed itself from the immediacy of
interest in such a way that, as a particular will, it has the universal will
as its end. Nor is it here determined as a recognized actuality of such
a kind that, when confronted with it, the parties would have to
renounce their particular points of view and interests.
Addition (H). What is right in itself has a determinate ground, and the
wrong which I hold to be right I also defend on some ground or other. It is
II7
Plzilosophy ofRight
in the nature of the finite and particular that it leaves room for contingencies; collisions must therefore occur, for we are here at the level of
the finite.)_'~first kind of wrong negates onlt_t~rticular wiii,J'lhile
universal right lsrcspectcd; it is consequently e least serious of all
--~ ---....------'
wrongs. Ifl say that a rose is not red, I nevertheless recognize that it has a
colour. rtileretOre"Oo nOti:lenytilegemJs,"out o;r-y the i)articular col~
J.e. re . g t 1s a so reco~zcd m trus case. Ea~s wfiatis
'riglrt,"~ e~edt;) receive only what is right; their wrong
consists [beste/11] solely in considering that what they will is right
B. Deception
Right in itself. as distinct from right as particular and existent, is

indeed, as a req11irement, determined as the essential; but as such, it is
at the same time only a requirement and in this respect merely subjective, hence inessential and a mere semblance. When the universal is
thus reduced by tlte particular will to a mere semblance. and, in the
.caseOfc~;,-is reduced in t~ first place to a purely external
communicy_~f -~' this c~tutes -d~cepiion.----------------~~------Addition (H). The pa~~ will i~--~~~2!._this second level of
wrong, but uruversal riglit JS i10tlil deception, the particular will is not
infringed, because the deceived person is g!ven the__illusion that he ~
receiving his right fitlis, theright~hi~h"is required is posited as something subjective, a mere sem~lance, and this constitutc;s deception.
.
88
In a contract, I acquire an item of property on account of the particular nature of the thing [Sac/ze] in question, and at the same time in the
light of the inner universality which it possesses, partly through its
vallle and partly through having been someone else's property. The
arbitrary will of the other party m~ delude me with a false semblance
as regards what I acquire, so that the contract may be perfectly in
order as a free mutual agreement to exchange this specific_thipg in its
i1mnediate individuality [Eimelheit], although the aspect of what is_
universal in itselfis lacking. (On the irififute Judgement in its positive
.........-----.
~.
___ ------
----~---
II8
Abstract Right
8Hj1
expression or as an identical proposition, see Er1cyclopaedia of tile
Pililosopilical Sciences, 121.) 1
8g
That the objective or universal element, as opposed to this acceptance
of the thing [Sacile] merely as tilis tiling and to the mere opinions and
arbitrariness of the will, should be recognizable as valr~e and have
validity as right, and that the subjective arbitrary will in its opposition
to right should be superseded, is again in the first instance only a
requirement.
Addition (H). No penalty attaches to civil and unintentional wrong, for in

such cases I have willed nothing contrary to right In the case of deception, however, penalties are introduced, because it is now a matter of
infringements of right.
C. Coercion and Crime

go
When I own property, my will is embodied in an extemaltilir1g [Sacile].
This means that my will, to the extent that it is reflected in the
external thing, is also caught up in it and subjected to necessity. In
this situation, it may either experience force in general, or it may be
forced to sacrifice or do something as a condition' of retaining some
possession or' positive bemg, thereby s~ffering coercion.
'
Additiotl (H). Wrong in the proper sense is crime, where neither right in
itself nor [right] as it appears to me is respected - that is, where both
sides, objective and subjective, are infringed. -
'2
91
As a living being, the human ~ing can certainly. be dom~nated
[beZHIImgen] - i.e. his. physical side and other external attributes may
be brought under the pc)wer of others. But "the free will' in and for
itself cannot be coeried [gezw~genf (see s), except in so far as it [ails
~:aw itsiij'JiOm'tile extemal dimension in \vhich it is caught up, or
119
from its idea [Vorstellung] of the latter (see 7). Only he who wills to
be coerced can be coerced into anything. 1
The will is Idea or actually free only in so far as it has existence

[Dasein], and the existence in which it has embodied itselfis the being
of freedom. Consequently, force or coercion immediately destroys
itself in its concept, since it is the expression of a will which cancels
-[lilifhebt] the expression or existence of a will. Force or coercion, taken
in the abstract, is therefore contrary to right.
---
Became coercion destroys itselfin its concep!, it has its real expression
~lfll1lg] inthe fact that coerdmt is cancelled [atqgehoben] by coerdon;
it is therefore not onlyconditionally right ~a
second coercion which cancels an initial coercion.
The violation of a contract through failure to perform what it
stipulates or to fulfil rightful duties towards the family or state,
whether by action or by default, is an initial coerci~ or at
least force, in so far as I withhold or withdraw from another
person a property which belongs to him or a service which is
due to him. - Pedagogical coercion, or coercion directed
against savagery and barbarism [Wildheit tmd Rohlteit], admittedly looks like a primary coercion rather than one which
comes after a primary coercion which has already occurred.
But the merely natural will is in itself a force directed against
_the Idea of freedom as that which has being in itself, which
must be protected against this uncivilized [ungebildeten] will
and given recognition within it. Either an ethical existence
[Daseirz] has already been posited in the family or state, in
which case the natural condition referred to above is an act of
violence against it, or there is nothing other than a state of
nature, a state govemed entirely by force, in which case the
Idea sets up a right of heroes' against it.
Addition (H). Within the state, heroes are no longer possible: they occur
only in the absence of civilization. The end they pursue is rightfu~
120
Abstract Right
91--95
necessary, and political, and they put it into effect as a cause [Sache] of
their own. The heroes who founded states and introduced marriage and
agriculture admittedly did not do this as their recognized right, and these
actions still appear as [a product of] their particular will. But as the higher
right of the Idea against the state of nature, this coercion employed by
heroes is a rightful coercion, f<r goodness alone can have little effect
when confronted with the force of nature.
"Tnmslator's note: Instead of stallllirll ('political'), the equivalent adjective in Hotho's
notes (VP R 111, 2.95), on which Gans based this Addition, is silllir/1 ('ethical').
Abstract right is a coercive rigilt, because a wrong committed against it

is a force directed against the existence [Dasein] of my freedom in an
extenwl thing [Saclle]. Consequently, the protection of this existence
against such a. force will itself appear as an external action and as a
force which !!Upersedes the original one.
To define abstract right- or right in the strict sense - from
the start as a right which justifies the use of coercion' is to
interpret [m~assen] it in the light of a consequence which
arises only indirectly by way of wrong.
Addition (H). Special attention must be paid here to the distinction

between right and morality. In the moral sphere - that is, when I am
reflected into myself- there is also a duality, for the good is my end and
the Idea by which I should determine myself. The existence of the good is
my decision, and I actualize it within myself; but this existence is wholly
inward, so that coercion cannot be applied to it. Thus, the laws of the
state cannot claim to extend to a person's disposition, for in the moral
sphere, I exist [only] for myself, and force is meaningless in this context.
95
The initial use of coercion, as force employed by a free agent in such
a way as_to infringe the existence [Dasein] of freedom in its ~
sense - i.e. to infringe right as right - is crime. This constitutes a
1_!!~tively ;;;JI,ite judgementJ.~ its ~omplete sense (see my [Science oj]
Logic, Vol. n, p. 99)1 whereby not only the particular- i.e. the subsumption of a thing [Saclze] under my will (see 85) -is negated, but
121
also the universal and infinite element in the predicate 'mine' -i.e. my
capacity for rights. This does not involve the mediation of my opinion
\as 1t does in iltception; see 88), but runs counter to it. This is the
.sphere of penallaf1J1 "/
Right, whose infringement is crime, has admittedly appeared
up till now only in those shapes which we have considered;
hence crime likewise, for the moment, has only the more
specific meaning associated with these determinations. But
the substantial element within these forms is the universal,
which remains the same in its further development and in the
further shapes it assumes; thus its infringement, i.e. crime,
also remains the same, in conformity with its concept. Hence
the determination which will be considered in the following
paragraph also applies to the particular and further
determined content [of crime], e.g. in perjury, treason, counterfeiting, forgery, etc.
g6
It is only the existent will which can be infringed. But in its existence
[Dasein1 the will enters the sphere of quantitative extension and
qualitative determinations, and therefore varies accordingly. Thus, it
likewise makes a difference to the objective side of crime whether the
will's existence and determinacy in general is infringed throughout its
entire extent, ana hence r~infiitity whic_!t_ corresponds to its
concept {as in murder, slavery:
coercion, etc.) or only in one
part, and if so, in which of its qu_alitative determination_s.
religiOus
The Stoic view that there is only one virtue and one vice,' the
laws ofDraco2 which punish every crime with death, and the
barbarous code of formal honour which regards every
infringement as an offence against the infinite personality, all
have this in common: .they ~-E~!~n the abstract
thought of the free will
personality, and do not consider
thelaffCi'm-ffieconcrete'aiidd~minate existence which it
must have as Idea.- The distinction between robbery and tlzeft
is a qualitative one/ for in the case of robbery, [my] 'I' is also
infringed as present consciousness and hence as tlzis subjeaive
infinity, and force is used against my person.- Various quali-
ana
122
Abstract Riglzt
95-97
tative determinations [of crime], such as danger to public

security, have their basis in more precisely determined circumstances, but they are often apprehended only indirectly in the
light of other consequences rather than in terms of the concept of the thing [Sac/ze]. Thus, the crime which is more
dangerous in itself (fiir sic/1], in its immediate character, is a
more serious infringement in its extent or quality. - The
subjective, moral quality [of a crime] relates to the higher
distinction regarding the extent to which an event or deed is in
any sense an action, and concerns the latter's subjective
nature itself (which will be discussed later).
Addition (H). Thought cannot specify how each crime should be

punished; positive determinations are necessary for this purpose. With
the progress of education, however, attitudes toward crime become more
,_lenient,. and punishments today are not nearly so harsh as they were a
hundred years age.~ It is not the crimes or punishments themselves which
change, but the relation between the two.
When an infringement of right as right occurs, it does have a positive

external existence [Existenz], but this existence within itselfis nWJ and
~ The manifestation of its nullity is that the nullification of the
infringement likewise comes into existence; this is the actuality of
right, as its necessity which mediates itself with itself through the
cancellation (Aujlze/mng] of its infringement.
Addition (H). Through a crime, something is altered, and the thing [Sac/ze]
exists in this alteration; but this existence is the opposite of the thing itself,
and is to that extent within itself[in siclz] null and void. The nullity is [the
presumption] that right as right has been cancelled [auJKelzobe.z]. For right,
as an absolute, cannot be cancelled, so that the expression of crime is
within itself null and void, and this nullity is the essence of the effect of
crime. But whatever is null and void must manifest itself as such- that is,
it must itself appear as vulnerable. The criminal act is not an initial
positive occurrence followed by the punishment as its negation,~
itself negative, so that the _punishment is roge)y the negation of the /.
negafimi:l\cffiarnglrt!fi_hus the cancellation fAuPzebz;gjOtm~ ~
-ment, a.na it is in this very circumstance that it demonstrates its validity a.nCiproves itself as a necessary and mediated existence [Dasein].
123
Philosoplzy ofRiglzt
g8
An infringement which affects only external existence [Dasein] or
possessions is an evil [Ubelj or damage done to some kind ofproperty or
resources; the cancellation (Arljrrebung] of the infringement, where the
latter has caused damage, is civil satisfaction in the form of compensation
(in so far as any compensation is possible).
/
With regard to this satisfaction, the
universaL~haracter
of the
,~~.~~must in any ca~ace~ts~c

qualitative character where the damage amounts to destruction and is a~_e!J.rr~able . .}
:.W
't~~
But an injury [Verlet.zung] suffered by the will which has J>eing i11 itself
.. --~.,-"
----~
(and hence also by the will of the injuring party as well as by the
injured and everyone else) has no pos}tive existence [E.tisterr.z] in this will
as such, no more than it has in 'the. ~~re p~ [of the injury]. For
itself, this will which has being in itself (i.e. right or law in itself) is
rather something which has no external existence and is to that extent
invulnerable. In the same way, the injury is a purely negative thing for
the particular will of the injured party and of others. The positive
existence oftire inj11ry consists solely in the particular JPi/1 oftire criminal.
Thus, an injury to the latter as an existent will is the cancellatio~
(Auftreben] ~U-~~ crime, wllic/r wollld otlreT'11Jise be regarded as valid, and 1
the ~.Q.~ of right.
-
The theory of punishment is one of the topics which have

come off worst in the positive jurisprudence [Reclrts'I1Jissensdraft] of recent times; for in this theory, the understanding is
inadequate, and the essential factor is the concept. - If the
fur_!!tc:_r
crime and i~ellati~.!!_fd!'./!ebung], which
.~~te~inc:_'!_ as puni~,!lt, are regarded-Oiilyasevils [Ubel{in
general, one may well consider it unreasonable to will an evil
merely because anotlrer evil is already present (see Klein's Ele-
3-
nrents ofPenal Law [Gnmdsiit.ze des peinliclren Recllts], 9f.). 1

This superficial character of an evil is the primary assumption
in the various theories of punishment as __E!e~n, as a
deterrent, a threat, a corrective, etc.; and conversely, what is
---------
124
Abstract Riglzt
supposed to result from it is just as superficially defined
[bestimrnt] as a good. But it is neither a question merely of an
evil nor of this or that good; on the contrary, it is definitely
[bestimrnt] a matter of rDTong and ofjustice. As a result of these
superficial points of view, however, the objective consideration of justice, which is the primary and substantial point of
view in relation to crime, is set aside; it automatically follows
that the essential consideration is now the moral point of view,
i.e. the subjective aspect of crime, intermixed with trivial
psychological ideas [Vorstellungen] of stimuli and the strength
of sensuous motives [Triebfedern] as opposed to reason, of
psychological coercion and of psychological influences on
representational thought [die Vorstellrmg] (as if such influences
were not themselves reduced by freedom to something purely
contingent). The various considerations which are relevant to
punishment as a phenomenon [Enclreinrmg] and to its relation
[Bezielzung] to the particular consciousness, and which concern its effect on representational thought (as a deterrent,
corrective, etc.), are of essential significance in their proper
context, though primarily only in connection with the modality
of punishment. Bu~-~~f~!Y~~n
and for itself ismst. In the present discussion, we are solely
_r--~;:::...t-../'"
concerned with the need to cancel [arifzulreben] crime-~
a source of evil, but as an infringement of right as right- and
."als(iwfih--~klndor@Sience-whkh crime possesses, which
must also be cancelled. This existence is the true evil which
must be removed, and-tlie essential'polnt is [to discover]
Wherc:2!_ tt~s. So long as the COiiCej)ts relating totiilSha~t
been definitely [bestimmt] recognized, confusion must prevail
in our views on punishment.
Addition (H). Feuerbach's theorY bases punishment on threat and maintains that, if anyone commits a crime in spite of the threat, the punishment must follow because the criminal knew about it in advance. But to
what extent is the threat compatible with right? The threat presupposes
that human beings are not free, and seeks to c~ce tlieiiltliiOUgllihe
..re!ireseiififfioiqVr.iiiteJ/ti!ifof an ew:-Butrightarut justice must have
rJ!iir"SeafiiiT~~~oma~~ -~~- wW., a~dnm-ill-that lack of freedom at which
"the threat is directed. To jusrify punishment in this way is like raising
one's stick at a dog; it means treating a human being like a dog instead of
------
125
Plzilosoplzy o[Riglzt
respecting his honour and freedom. But a threat, which may ultimately
-provoke someone into demonstrating his freedom in defiance of it, sets
justice aside completely. Psychological coercion can refer only to qualitatIve and quantitative differences within crime, not to the nature of gime
itself, and any legal codes which may have originated in this doctrine
COiisequently have no proper foundation.
IOO
The injury [Verletzung] which is inflicted on the criminal is not only
just in itse/f(and since it is just, it is at the same time his will as it is in
~stence [Dasein] of his freedom, llis right); it is also a rigllt
for tile criminllllzimse/J, that is, a right posited in his existent will, in his
action. For it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that it
is universal in character, and that, by performing it, he has set up a
_____
.,.....,___~
J~YY.. which~~~'i~~---~5.!:[ in~

~b_!~h ~e may therefore be n~QW~~~
It is well known that Beccaria1 questioned the right of the

state to impose capital punishment, on the grounds that it
could not be presumed that the social contract included the
consent of individuals [/ndividuen] to allow themselves to be
killed, and that we ought rather to assume the contrary. But
~he stat~o means a contract (see 75), and its sub~
~nee does not consist unconditionally in the proteaion
and safeguarding of the lives and property of individuals as
such. The state is rather that higher instance which may even\'>}
itself lay claim to the lives and property of individuals and j
require their sacrifice. - Furthermore~c:_: _gg.i!J!Lof the crirni- I
nal involves not only the concept of crime, its rationality in and
_:ror-;helf~hieh--th~si:are-m~Si-enforc~ witll or without the
consent of individuals [der Einzehren], but also the formal
rationality of the individual's [des Einzelnen] volition. In so far
as the punishment which this entails is seen as embodying tire
criminal's own rigllt, _t_~~ criminal is honoured as a rational
b~. -~-~C!!lie~~i!i"OnOilr~
of his punishment are not derived from his own act; and he is
---..----...~---------~............._~
afso demed it if he is regarded simply as a harmful animal
which must be a:.c:.nd.;.~<l..hl!~less, or punished with a view to
deterring or reforming him. - Besides, so far as the mode of
:~
126
Abstract Right
existence [Existenz] of justice is concerned, the fonn which it

has within the state, namely that of prmislzment, is not its only
fonn, and the state is not a necessary condition of justice in
itself.
Addition (H,G). Beccaria is quite right to demand that human beings

should give their consent to being punished, but the criminal gives this
consent by his very act. Both the nature of crime and the criminal's own
will require that the infringement for which he is responsible should be
cancelled [aa.Jkelzoben]. Nevertheless, Beccaria's efforts to have capital
punishment abolished [ariflreben Zll lassen] have had advantageous effects.
Even if neither Joseph II nor the French have ever managed to secure its
complete abolition,1 people have begun to appreciate which crimes
deserve the death penalty and which do not. The death penalty has
consequently become less frequent, as indeed this ultimate fonn of
punishment deserves to be. 3
IOI
The
cancellation [Au~eben] of crime is retribution in so far as the
...... --------.....-----... -~-/~ ..._,_"--~"""'-'~...,----..-...--"'~.!3tter, by its conce- t, is
infrin ement oran infringement, and in so
far as crime, by its existence [Dasein], has a determinate qualitative
and quantitative magnitude, so that its negation, as existent, also has a
determinate magnitude. But this identity [of crime and retribution],
which is based on the c~ not an equality in the s ecific
-~ortliei'iffi1iiiement, but in its character in itse - i.e. in
an
(, f\
'~___,-
~--
It is usual in science for a determination - in this case, that of

punishment - to be defined in tenns of the universal represe~z
tations [Vorstellurzg] of conscious psychological experience. In
the present case, this experience would indicate that the
universal feeling of peoples and individuals towards crime is,
and always has been, that it deserves to be punished, and that
~lzat tlze criminal lzas d~t~;sliotild also happ_ento him. It is incomprenensible how those sciences which derive their determinations from universal representations [Vor:stellung] should on
other occasions accept propositions which contradict such socalled universal facts of consciousness. - But the determination of equality has brought a major difficulty into the idea
[Vorstellrnzg] of retribution, although the justice (in tenns of
127
9C)-IOI
their qualitative and quantitative character) of whatever
punishments are determined is in any case a matter which
arises later than the substance of the thing [Sacl1e] itself. Even
if, for this later determination of punishments, we had to look
around for principles other than those which apply to the
universal aspect of punishment, this universal aspect remains
what it is. Yet the concept itself must always contain the basic
principle, even for the particular instance. This determination
of the concept, however, is precisely that necessary connection [which dictates] that crime, as the will which is null and
void in itself, accordingly contains within itself its own nullification, and this appears in the form of punishment, It is this
\\ fnner_ identit) which,___fur Jh~ u9derstanding..t.. is reqected _i!t
- 1.t ~.xfum'Sr~[bas~irt] a:s-'eqmiiilj.-tile q"Ualfta~and

' quantitative ~cliaracter oTcrimeanal.ts cancellation [seitzes
A~P1ebens]
thus falls into the sphere of externality, in which no

absolute determination is in any case possible (cf. 49). In tile
realm offinite tmngs, the absolute determination remains only a
requirement, on which the understanding must impose
increasing restrictions- and this is of the utmost importancebut which continues ad infinitum and admits in perpetuity of
only an approximaJe fulfilment. - If we not only overlook this
nature of the finite realm but also proceed no further than
abstract and specific etpllliity, an insuperable difficulty arises
when we come to determine punishments (especially if
psychology also invokes the strength of sensuous motives
[Triebfodern] and, as a corollary, either the correspondingly
greater strengtll of the evil will or- if we prefer- the correspondit~gly lesser strengtll and freedom of the will in general). Furthermore, it is very easy to portray the retributive aspect of
punishment as an absurdity (theft as retribution for theft,
robbery for robbery, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, 1
so that one can even imagine the miscreant as one-eyed or
toothless); -~~--~c:_~ncept has nothing..!.?~
~ ji .abs.1J!dity, for which the introduction of that [idea of] specific
' equality is alone to blame. Value, as the inner etpllliity of things
[Sacllell] which, in their existence [E~arespecifically
quite different, is a determination which has already arise-n in
connection with contracts (see [ 77] above) and with civil
---------------;
128
Abstract Right
101
suits against crimes (see g8)," and which raises our

representation [Vorstellung] of a thing above its immediate
character to the universal. In the case of crime, whose basic
detennination is the infinite aspect of the deed, that aspect
which is only externally specific disappears all the more
readily, and equality remains merely the basic measure of the
criminal's essential deserts, but not of the specific external
shape which the retribution should take. It is only in terms of
this specific shape that theft and robbery [on the one hand]
and fines and imprisonment etc. [on the other] are completely
unequal, whereas in terms of their value, i.e. their universal
character as injuries (Verletzrmgen], they are comparable. It is
then, as already remarked, a matter [Sache] for the understanding to seek an approximate equivalence in this common
value. If we do not grasp either the connection, as it is in itself,
between crime and its nullification, or the thought of value
and the comparability of crime and punishment in terms of
value, we may reach the point (see Klein's Elements of Penal
Law, g) 2 of regarding a proper punishment as a purely arbitrary association of an evil [eines Ubels] with an illidt action.
Addition (H). Retribution is the inner connecti
and the identity of two

detenninations;,.hlch are different in appearance and so have a different external existence [Existenz] in relation to one another. When the
criminal meets with retribution, this has the appearance of an alien
destiny [Bestimmung) which does not belong to him; yet as we have seen,
the punishment is merely a manifestation of the crime, i.e. it is one half
which is necessarily presupposed by the other. What is at first sight
objectionable about retribution is that it looks like something inunoral,
like revenge, and maL th~be interpreted_as _a personal matter. Yet it is
not the personal elemeiit,bu~~ut retribution. 'Vengeance is mine' is the word of GOd in the Bible? and it the word
retribution should evoke the idea [Vorstellung] of a particular caprice of the
subjective will, it must be replied that it signifies merely the shape of the
crime turned round against itself. The Eumenides4 sleep, but crime
awakens them; thus the deed brings its own retribution with it. But
although retribution cannot aim to achieve specific equality, this is not the
case with murder, which necessarily incurs the death penalty. For since
life is the entire compass of existence [Daseir1], the punishment [for
---
"Translalor's now The reference in aD editions r:i Hegel's text is to 95, which appears
to be an error. I follow T. M. Knox in substituting 98 as more appropriate.
129
murder] cannot consist [bestel11m) in a val11e -.since none is equivalent to
life - but only in the taking of another life.
102
In this sphere of the immediacy of right, t~e cancellation Vftifheben] of
crime is primarily revenge, and its contmt is just so far as it constitutes
remoution. But in itsfonll, it is ~asubiective will which can
place its ;,z5nity in any infringement (of right] which occurs, and
WhOse justice is therefore alto ether contin m!!Just as it exists for tlze
otJzer_pa'!)'~~~rticzlla~iJ!:..I.~~. as the positive action
Ofajiiiiiicular will, be~ a new in..f!iEg_enumt; because of this con~ becomes part of an infinite progression and is inherited
indefinitely from generation to generation.
Where the crimes are prosecuted and punished not as crimina
-----~
.p11blica but a$...qfming_priJ;fga (as with theft and robbery
among
tlle)ews and Romans, and even today with certain offences in
England, etc.) ~hment still has at least an ele~ent of
~~about it. 1 Private revenge is diSnllctlrom the revenge
of heroes, knightly adventurers, etc., which belongs to the
period when states first arose.
Additimz (H). In a social condition in which there are nei~her magi~

nor laws, punishment always takes the form of revenge; this remains
inadequate inasmuch as it is the action of a subjective will, and thus out of
keeping with the content. It is true that the members of a tribunal are also
persons, but their will is the universal will of the law, and they do not seek
to include in the punishment anything but what is naturally present in the
matter [Sac/ze] in hand. On the other hand, the injured party does not
perceive wrong in its quantitative and qualitative li~tion [Begrnzzt~ng],
~~~ply as :~on~~uaTification, ~.!!!y_go too_!:~~~
retaliation, WlU'C!llvill in turn lead to rurtller wrong. Among unCivilized
[tmgebildeieiiJ peoples, revenge is undying, as wtilltheArabs, where it can
be suppressed only by superior force or by the impossibility of putting it
into effect. There is still a residue of revenge in several legal codes in use
today, as in those cases wliere it is left to individuals to decide whether
they \vish to bring an offence [Verletzzmg] to court or not.
IJO
Abstract Riglzt
To require that this contradiction, which in the present case is to be

found in the manner in which wrong is cancelled [der Art tmd Weise des
Aujhebens ], should be resolved in the same way as contradictions in
other kinds of wrong (see 86 and 89), is to require a justice freed
from subjective interest and subjective shape and from the contingency of power - that is, a p11nitive rather than an avenging jtlStice.)
Primarily, this constitutes a requirement for a will which, as a particular and sllbjective will, also wills the universal as such. But this concept
of morality is not just a requirement; it has emerged in the course of
this movement itself.
TRANSITION FROM RIGHT TO MORALITY
Thus, crime and avenging justice represent the shape of the will's
development when it has proceeded to the distinction between the
universal will which has being itz itself, and the individt~al [einzelnen]
; will which has bein or itsel in opposition to the universal. They also
' show ow the will whicli has being in itself, by superseding this opposition, ~tunie_!!_into itself and thereby itself become acttlai and for
itself. Having proved itselfin oppo7iii0llto-t:he~~
,17_!0%_ o~ljifor-it~?Ji right accordingly is and is recognized ~s actual_.!ry
virtue ofTts necessity. -!his shape [of the will's development] is also
-~~tfme further advance
In the inner
determination of the
will by_ its concept. In accordance with its concept, the will's selfactualization is the process whereby it supersedes its being::!!I:-it~-:!_f
and the form.ofimmediacy ifi~ which is
-its shape in the realm of abstract right (see 21). Consequently, it
first posits itself in the opposition be~ee~tlieu:iiiversal will which has
being in itselfand the individual will which has being for itself, then, by
superseding this opposition - the neg!_tion of the negation - it
determines its~lf.~_i-'ts_en__.st_en_-;-_e
[Dasein], so thin it is not only a
free will in itself, but also for itself, as self-related [siclz atif siclz bezielumde] negativity. Thus, it now has itS pmonality- and in abstract right
the will is no more than personality - as its object [Gegenstand]; the
._ ....... J ___ ......
--.~___............~...._
131
101-104
Philosophy ofRight
infinite subjectivity of freedom, which now has being for itself, constitutes the principle of the moral point of viellJ.
-------
If we look again more closely at the moments through which

the concept of freedom develops from the will's initially
abstract determinacy to its self-related determinacy and hence
to the self-detennination of s11bjectivity, we see that they are as
follow~operty, the will's determinacy is abstract possession
[das abstro/ete Meinzge] and is therefore fcicateCT"lii an e~al
thing [Sac/1e]; in contract, it is possession mediated by will and
. __
merely held ;, COIIIIIIon; in wrong, the will of the sphere of
right in its abstract being-in-itself or immediacy is posited as
~ mtzt~~!D.:..._the individual will, which is itself cmztingent. In
.tilemoral pointO'fvi.ew, it [i.e. the will's abstract determinacy]
has been overcome to the extent that this contingency itself, as
reflected into itself and identical witlz itself, is the infinite and
inwardly present contingency of the will, i.e. its s11bjeaivity.
_..--~-------~
.....-.___.;~~
Addition (H). It is [a necessary] part of the truth that the concept should
exist, and that this existence should be in conformity with the concept.Jg.
right, the will has its exist~ in~~1, bUt the next stage is
'rcitJie'WllrTci1iiVet:JUSexistence in itself, in something internal. It must
have being for itself, as subjectiVity, and be confronted with itself. This
.relation to ltself!Sthatiif a7/innaiw11, but"iiCan attain this only bY superseding its immediacy. The immediacy which is superseded in crime thus
leads, through punishment - that is, through the nullity of this nullity - to
affinnation, i.e. to morality. 1
~
132
PART
Two
Morality
IOS-106
105
'l
The moral point of view is the point of view of the will in so far as the
latter is infinite not only in itself but also for itself (see 104). ~
reflection of the will into itself and its identity for itself, as opposed to
its being-in-itself and immediacy and the determinacies which
develop within the latter, determine the person as a st~biect.
-----=----
106
~inc~~jectivity no~!..~!!~!ill!~~~cy of_th~oncept and
is distinct from the concept as such (i.e. from the will which has being
in itself), and more precisely since the will of the subject, as the
individual [des Einzelr~en] who has being for himself, at the same time
exists (i.e. still has immediacy in it), it follows that subjectivity constitutes the existence [Dasein] of the concept. - A higher ground has
thereby been determined for freedom; the Idea's aspect of existence.}
[E.ristenz ], its real moment, is now the subjectivity of the will. Only in
~
the will as subjective will can freedom, or the will which has being in
itself. be actual.
The second sphere, i.e. morality, thus represents in its

entirety the real aspect of the concept of freedom. The process within this sphere is such that the will which at first has
being only for itself, and which is immediately identical only in
itselfwi~ the ~ill which has being in itse/f(i.e. with the univer~~..'~!!,1) is superseded; and leaving behind it this difference in
which it has immersed itself in itself, it is posited fa- itself as
identical with the will which has being in itself. This movement
~Isaccordingly'the cultivation of the ground on which freedom
is now established, i.e. subjectivity. The latter, which is at first
abstract - i.e. distinct from the coricept - becomes identical
;iih the concept, so that the Idea there~nsitstrtie'
realiZation. Thus, ~subjective will determines itself as corresponditigly objective, and hence as truly concrete.
~~~~-
Addition (H). ~ith rig~in th~~~!~ made no difference what my

princi.e!_e a intention was. This question rf the self-determination and
'm:Oti.ve (Tnebjider] of th~vill and of its purpose now arises in connection
----
with morality. Human beings expect to be judgedin accordance with their

~--~--,..-.--
135
...............
~.......__._,_,.
self-determination, and are in this respect free, whatever external
'determinants may be at work. It is impossible to break in_!o this inner
conviction of human beings; it is inviolable, and themoral will is therefore
inaccessible. The worth of a human being is measured by his inward
actions, and hence the point of view of morality is that of freedom which
._has being for itself.'~~-~--~
The will's self-detemzination is at the same time a moment of its

concept, and subjectivity is not just the aspect ofits existence [Dasein],
biiiTtsown determination (see 104). The will which is determined
as subjective and free for itself, though initially only concept, itself has
existence in order to become Idea. The moral point of view therefore
takes the shape ofthd ri~ftlze s,b.ftive ~In accordance with this
right, the will can recogmzesomethlilg orYsomcthing only in so far as
that thing is its own, and in so far as the will is present to itself in it as
subjectivity:
As far as this aspect is concerned, the process of the moral

point of view referred to above (see Remarks to 1o6) takes
the following shape: it is the devel~_pment of t~e rig_lzt ~f the
subjective will - or of its mode of existence - whereby this
--;ubjective ;jll further determines what it recognizes as its
own in its object [Gegenstand] so that this becomes the will's
true concept- i.e. becomes objective in the sense of the will's
own universality.
Addition (H). This entire determination of the subjectivity of the will is
again.Jl whole which, as subjectivity, must also have objectivity,~~ in
the subject can freedom be realized, for the subject is the true material for
iliQ'i~.~JJ!is existence -of the will which we have cal!ed~c
tivity is different fror!i)lievii1Jw!Ucl:l1lilsliemg in anif1'0rit.Selt For in
oraer tObeeome the latter, the Will must free itself from this second onesidedness of mere subjectivity. In morality, it is the distinctive interest of
the human being which comes into question, and the high value of this
interest consists precisely in the fact that the human being knows himself
as absolute and determines himself. The uncivilized [rmgebiltkte] human
being lets everything be dictated to him by brute force and by natural
conditions; children have no moral will and allow themselves to be
determined by their parents; but the cultivated [gebildete] and inwardly
Morality
I06-Io8
developing human being wills that he sl!_ould himselfbe present in everything he does.,
-- ---- ------ --...... .........----~-
108
The subjective will, as immediate for itself and distinct from that
which has being in itself (see Remarks to 106), is therefore abstract,
circumscribed [beschrar~kt], and formal. But not only is subjectivity
[itself] formal; as the infinite self-determination of the will, it also
constitutes the [om1al aspeCt of the will [in general]. When it makeS'ihis
first appearance in the individual [eirJZe/r~m] will, it has not yet been
posited as identical with the concept of the will, so that the moral
point of view is consequently the point of view of relatiorJShip, ~
Jion.. or requirement. - And since the difference [.Differmz] of subjectivity likewise corrtains the determination whereby it is opposed to
objectivity as external existence [Dasein], we also encounter here the
point of view of corucioumess (see 8) - in general, the point of view of
the difference, finitude, and appearmJCe of the will.
The moral is not primarily defined [bestimmt] simply as the
opposite ofimmoral, just as right is not in an immediate sense
the opposite of wrong. On the contrary, the universal point of
view of the moral and the immoral alike is based on the
subjectivity of the will.
Additim1 (H). In morality, self-determination should be thought of as

sheer restless activity which cannot yet arrive at something tllat is. Only in
-th;;e~es the will become identical with the concept of the

will and have the latter alone as its content. In the moral sphere, the will
still relates to that which has being in itself; it is thus the point of view of
7./l.Ifere~lce, and tfie process associated with it is that whereby the su6fective
~lUeves identity with its concept The obligation which is therefore
still present in morality is fulfilled only in the ethical realm. In addition,
this 'other' to which the subjective will stands in relation is twofold: first.
it is the substantial element of the concept, and secondly, it is that which
exists externally. Even if the good were posited in the subjective will, this
would not yet amount to its implementation.
IJ7
109
In accordance with its universal determination, this formal aspect [of

the will] contains in the first place the opposition between subjectivity
and objectivity and the activity associated with this opposition (see
8). More precisely, its moments are as follows: eristence (Dareinl agd
,t};!!!:!!!ftlJlq are i~~ru>t (cf. I04),_~n~~-th_e_wil_._l_as
subjective is itself this ~2-~~t. The two sides [i.e. subjectivity and
-ObjectiViijfmust be distinguished- each as independent [fiir sicll] -and
posited as identical. In the self-determining will, ~.!.~t:rmina~(Q.)
initially P~!~n tile will by the ~~-~-:_a~ its y~
~Jtself, ~~ve~~ !!!:i~ is the /inLneg!!tiQJl,
and the fonnallimitation [GretlZe] of ibis negation is that it is merely
s2_~thing po~fti~e. As infinite reflection into itself this
)~~~~r~~ill~_if, and the Will is (~) the aspiration
[Wollen] to overcome [auftulzeben] this restriction [Sdzranke] - i.e. the
activity of translating this content from subjectivity into objectivity in
general, into an immediate existence. 1 (y) The simple identity of the will
'with itself in this opposition is the content or end which remains
constant in the two opposites and iDdifferen~ards these differences of form.
110
But this identity of content receives its more precise and distinctive
determination within the moral point of view, in which freedom, this
identity of the will with itself, is present/or the will (see 105).
_.,.,.-_,-._.-~
(a) The content is determined for me as mine in such a way that, in its
identity, it contains my subjectivity for me not only as my inner end, but
also in so far as this end has achieved external objectivity.
Addition (H). The content of the subjective or moral will contains a

determination of its own: even if it has attained the form of objectivity, it
should nevertheless still contain my subjectivity, and my act should be
recognized only in so far as it was inwardly determined by me as my
purpose m:l intention. Only what was already present in my subjective
will do I recognize as mine in that will's expression, and I expect to reencounter my !!ltbjective consciousness in it.
Morality
II I
(b) Although the content does include something particular- regardless of where this may have come from - it nevertheless embodies, as
the~~c:.g.tof the will reflected into itsel in its detenninacy, and hence
of the self-identical and universal will, (a) e inner determination of
being ~rmfty~which has being in itself, or of
possessing the of!i_ectjyiJ.y__gf_ tlze concept; but (~) because the subjective
will, in so far as it has being for itself, is at the same time still formal
(see roB), this is only a requirement, and it still includes the possibility of [the content] not being in conformity with the concept.
112
(c) While I preserve my subjectivity in implementing my ends (see
r ro), in the course of thus objectifying them I at tlze same time
supersede this subjectivity in its immediacy, and hence in its character
as my individual subjectivity. But the external subjectivity which is
thus identical with me is the will of others (see 73). -The basis of
the will's existetiCe [Existetzz] is now subjectivity (see ro6), and the will
of others is the existence [Existet~z] which I give to my end, and which
is for me at the same time an other. - The implementation of my end
therefore has this identity of my will and the will of others within it- it
has a positive reference to the will of others.
The objectivity of the end, once it is implemented, therefore
encompasses three meanings - or rather it contains as a unity
the following three moments: it is (a) extemal immediate
existence [Dasei11] (see ro9), (j3) in conformity with the cmzcept (see 1 r2), and (y) zmivmal subjectivity. The subjectivity
which is preserved in this objectivity is such that (a) the ob~
tive end is my end, so that I am preserved inlt-as tlzis
rndlvldual~ro); moments (~) and (y) of subjectivity
coincide with moments $) and (y) of objectivity (see above).That these determinations, which from the point of view of
morality are distinct from one another, are thus united only as
a co71tradiction constitutes more precisely the finitude of this
sphere, or its character as appearance (see roB); and the
development of this point of view is the development of these
r39
109-112
contradictions and their resolutions (although such resolutions, within this sphere, can only be relative).
Addition (H). In connection with formal right, we noted that it contained

~
and that an action strictly in keeping with right consequently had a purely negative determination in respect of the will of
others. In morality, on the other hand, the determination of my will with
reference to the will of others is ositive -that is, the will which has being
m itself is mwardly present in w at the subjective will realizes. This
entails the production or alteration of something existent, which in tum
has reference to the will of others. The concept of morality is the will's
inner attitude [Verlzalter1) towards itself. But not just one will is present
here. On the contrary, its objectivization also contains the determination
whereby the individual will within it is superseded; and in consequence,
since the determination of one-sidedness disappears, two wills with a
positive reference to one another are now posited. In the context of right,
any intentions which the will of others may have with reference to my will,
which gives itself existence [Dasei") in property, are irrelevant. In the
moral sphere,~~!!!.. the )fare of others is also invol ~y
at this point that this positive reference can come into play.
'~--------------~--------------~
T~e expr~~~~~mo..!~on.
Action
contains- tl'ie following determinations: (a:) it must be known by me in

its externali~; (13) its essential relation [Bezielmng) to the
concept is ~n~QW.igatio_n; and (y) it has an essential relation [Bezielmng) to _tli~-~~thers.
Only with the expression of the moral will do we come to
action. The existroce [Dasein) which the will gives to itself in
formal right is located in an immediate tlzi1JJLlSaclze) and is
~
_,... _ _,...,..,.....~
its'einmmediate. Initially, it does not in itself (fUr siclz) have
'S.nyil:p/icit-rcterence to the concept, Jrhich is not yet QWosed
to or distinguished from the sub~e-Will, nor does it have a
~o the will of others; in its basic determination, a commandment of right is merely a f!...roltibition (see
38). Contract and wrong do admittedly begin
have a
reference to the will of others - but the agreer11rot which is
concluded in the former is based on arbitrariness; and its
essrotial reference to the will of the other1s-, ~-~of right, a
-------------
to
Morality
negative one, inasmuch as I retain my property (in terms ofits

Viilue) andallow the other party to retain his. On the other
hand, that aspect of crime which has its source in the subjective
will, and the manner of its existence [Existenz] in that will, only
now come into consideration. - The content of a legal jgericlztlic/ze] action (actio), which is determined by rules, is not imputable to me; it tluis contains
some of Ui.e moments of
moral action proper, and these are only externally present.
That aspect of action which makes it moral in the proper
sense is therefore distinct from its legal l"gericlztlic/ze] side.
oruy
The right of the moral will contains three aspects:

(a) The abstract or formal right of action, according to which the
content of my action, as accomplished in irnmedillle existence
[Dasein], is entirely mine, so that the action is the purpose of the
subjective will.
(b) The particular aspect of the action is its irmer content, (a) i.e. the
manner in which its universal character is determined/or me- this
constitutes the value of the action and the reason why I consider it
valid, i.e. its iPitention; (~) its content, as the particular [besonderer]
end of my particular [partikularen] and subjective existence, is
11Jelfare.
(c) This content, though inward in character, is at the same time
raised to its universality and thus to that objectivity which has being
in and for itself; as such, it is the absolute end of the will, i.e. the
good, and its opposite, in the sphere of reflection, is sub "ective
-lllU~v;e"~~an~~~.~e~fth~~~o~f~evz~'~or~o~~e~c,=v=,s=~T.~=rCi=e~.----~--~---mora~ it must in the first place correspond to my purpose, for it is the right of the moral will to recognize;1n
its eiisteiice,OnlyWiiat was inwardly present as purpose. Purpose cone~ only the formal condition that the external will should also be
present within me as an int~l element. In the second moment, on the
other hand, the question arises of the intention behind the action- that is,
of the relative value of the action in. relation [Bezielzu,g] to me. And lastly,
the third moment iS not just th~ relative value of the action, but its
univ~sal value, the !JOd. 1be ~t division in [moral) action is that
between what is purposed and what is accomplished in the realm of
Additimz (H). For an action to be
Ifi
112-114
Philosophy ofRight
existence; the second is between what is present externally as universal
will and the particular inner determination which I give to it; and lastly,
the third factor is that the intention should also be the universal content
[of the action].~~ is the intention, raised to the concept of the will.
~
142
SECTION I
Purpose and Responsibility

IIS
The finiwde of the subjective will in the immediacy of action consists
immediatel in the fact that the action of the will presupposes an
::_extern ob"e [Gegenstand] with various attendant circumstances.
The deed osi
n alteration to this given e ence [Dasein], and the
will is entirely responsible for it in so far as the abstract predicate 'mine'
attaches to the existence so altered.
--.-
An event, or a situation which has arisen, is a concrete external

actuality which accordingly has an indetenninable number of
attendant circumstances. Every individual moment which is
shown to have been a condition, gro1md, or cause of some such
circumstance and has thereby contributed its share to it may be
regarded as being wholly, or at least partly, responsible for it. In
the case of a complex event (such as the French Revolution),
the formal understanding can therefore choose which of a
countless number of circumstances it wishes to make responsible for the event.
~dditimz (H). I can be made responsible for whatever was contained in my

purpose, and this is the chief consideration as far as crime is concerned.
But responsibility involves only the wholly external judgement as to
whether I have done something or not; and the fact that I am responsible
for something does not mean that the thing [Sac/ze] can be imputed to me.
143
rr6
It is admittedly not of my doing if damage is caused to others by things
[Dinge] of which I am the owner and which, as external objects, exist
and function within a varied context (as may even be the case with
myself as a mechanical body or living entity). But the damage is more
or less my fault, because the things which caused it are after all mine,
although they are in tum only more or less subject to my control,
supervision, etc., according to their own distinct nature.
I 17
The autonomously acting will, in the ends which it pursues in relation
to the existence [Dasein] it has before it, has an idea [Vorstellrmg] oftlze
circumstarzces wlziclz tlzat existence involves. But since, on account of this
presupposition, the will is finite, the objective phenomenon fgegenstiindliclze Ersclzeirzurzg] is contingent for it, and may contain something other
than what was present in the will's idea [Vorstellrmg] of it. It is,
however, the right of the will to recognize as its action, and to accept
responsibility for, only those aspects of its deed which it knew to be
presupposed within its end, and which were present in its purpose. -I
can be made accountable for a deed only if my will was responsible for it
- tlze right of knowlmge.

Additio11 (H). The will has before it an existence upon which it acts; but to
be able to do this, it must have an idea (Vorstellrmg] of that existence. I am
truly responsible OrifYJriSOfarasTliacfiffiowledge-oftlieexistence before
me. Since the will has a presuppositi-on oltli1s-15nd, 1t 1s finite- or ~,
siiice it is finite, it has a presupposition of this kind In so far as my
thinking and volition are rational, my point ci view is not that ci finitude,
because the object [GegenstmuJ] upon which I act is not something other in
relation to me. But limitation and restriction are always inherent in
finitude. I am confronted with an other which is only contingent and only
externally necessary, and which may either coincide with or be at variance
with me. But I am only what has reference to my freedom, and m~
-~-~~~a deed only in so ~ !_have ~t:l:Jedipus,
who unwittinglykli'lelrFilSfiitller, Cannotbeaccused of parricide, although
the legal codes of antiquity attached less importance to the subjective
.~t, t~!_~_.9nsibili~ [Zurec/,zung], than is the case t~J;cy:~y
sanctuaries were established in antiquity, to receive and protect fugitives
from vengeance/
144
Morality
116-118
II8
Furthermore, action has multiple consequences in so far as it is
translated into external existence [Dasein]; fer the latter, by virtue of
its context in external necessity, develops in all directions. These
consequences, as the [outward] shape whose soul is the end to which
the action is directed, belong to the action as an integral part ofit. But
the action, as the end translated into the external world, is at the same
time exposed to external forces which attach to it things quite different from what it is "for itself, and impel it on into remote and alien
consequences. The will thus has the right to accept responsibility only
for the first set of consequences, since they alone were part of its
purpose.
The distinction between amtingent and necessary consequences
is indeterminate inasmuch as inner necessity comes into
existence in the finite realm as extemal necessity, as a relationship between individual things [Dingerz] which, as self-sufficient entities, come together in mutual indifference and in
an external manner. The maxim [Gnmdsatz) which enjoins us
to disregard the consequences of our actions, and the other
which enjoins us to judge actions by their consequences and
make the latter the yardstick of what is right and good, are in
equal measure [products of the] abstract understanding. In so
far as the consequences are the proper and immanmt shape of
the action, they manifest on! y its nature and are nothing other
than the action itself; for this reason, the action cannot
repudiate or disregard them.' But conversely, the consequences also include external interventions and contingent
additions which have nothing to do with the nature of the
action itself. - The development in the realm of existence of
the contradiction which is contained in the necessity ofthe finite
is simply the transformation of necessity into contingency and
vice versa. From this point of view, to act therefore means to
submit oneselfto this law. -It follows from this that the criminal
stands to benefit if his action has less adverse consequences,
just as the good action must accept that it may have no consequences or relatively few; and it also follows that, once the
consequences of a crime have developed more fully, the crime
145
itself is made responsible for them. - The heroic self-consciousness (as in ancient tragedies like that of Oedipus) has
not yet progressed from its unalloyed simplicity to reflect on
the distinction between deed and action, between the external
event and the purpose and knowledge of the circumstances, or
to analyse the consequences minutely, but accepts responsibility for the deed in its entirety. 2
Addition (H). The fact that I recognize only what I had an idea [Vor.stellungf' of constitutes the transition to intention. For I can be made responsible only for what I knew of the circumstances. But necessary
consequences attach themselves to every action - even if what I initiate is
purely individual and immediate - and they are to that extent the universal element contained within it It is true that I cannot foresee those
consequences which might be prevented, but I must be familiar with the
universal nature of the individual deed.J What is at issue here is not the
individual aspect but the whole, which concerns not the. determinate
character of the particular action but its universal nature. The transition
from purpose to intention consists, then, in the fact that I ought to be
-a~fy of my mdividuil acnon, l:iui: also rl
universal which is
~-cia~~ manner, the universal is what I
have willed, i.e. my itttnztion.
-----
me
.----------- ....,..--._--.... .
,
---
"Tr1111Sitllor's nott: In Ho1ho's notes (VPR 111, 36z), on which Ibis Addition is based, the
equivalent word is in fact VonDt: ('purpose'), which would yield !he ttanslation 'only
what was my purpose'.
SECTION 2
Intention and Welfare

119
The external existence [Dasein] of an action is a varied set of connections which may be regarded as infinitely divided into individual units
[Einzellzeiten ], and the action itself can be thought of as having touched
only one ofthese units in the first instance. But the truth of the individual
[des Einzelnm] is the universal, and the determinate character of the
action for itself is not an isolated content confined to one external
unit, but a u11iversal content containing within itself all its various
connections. The purpose, as emanating from a thinking agent, contains not just the individuafUirit;"" but essentially that universal aspea
already referred to - the interztion.
[The word for] inte7ztion contains in its etymology [the idea of]
ahstraaion,a either as the form of universality or as the selection
o~cular aspect of the concrete thing [Sache ]. To attempt
to justify something in terms of its intention is to isolate an
individual aspect completely and to maintain that it is the
subjective essence of the action. -To judge an action as an
--;xternal deed without first determining whether it is right or
wrong is to apply a universal predicate to it, classifying it as
arson, murder, or the like. - By its determination, external
actuality consists of individual units, which shows that external
conneaions are inherent in its nature. Actuality is touched in
"Trans/a/or's nott: Absicht ('intention') is derived from the verb absehm {'to look away'),
and Hegel associates it with the idea of abstraction as a 'looking away' from whatever is
to be abstracted from.
147
the first instance only at one individual point (just as in arson,
the flame is applied directly only to a small portion of the
wood - this yields only a proposition, not a judgement), but
the universal nature of this point implies its expansion. In
living organisms, the individual [component] exists immediately not as a part, bu~ as an organ i!!_which the universal a;;
.such has its present _:xistence. ,Pience iii murder, it is not a
~sh as~inamdtlal~which is injured, but the
.life itself within it. On the one hand, subjective reflection,
ignorant of the logical nature of the individual and the universal,~ in the minute analysis of individual units and
consequences; and on the other hand, it is in the nature of the
finite deed itself to contain such separable contingencies. The notion of dolus indireaus., was invented for the reason
[Gnmd] just considered.
Additiort (H). It is certainly the case that a greater or lesser number of

circumstances may intervene in the course of an action. In a case of arson,
for example, the fire may not take hold, or conversely, it may spread
further than the culprit intended. Nevertheless, no distinction should be
made here between good and ill fortune, for in their actions, human
beings are necessarily involved in externality. An old proverb rightly says,
'The stone belongs to the devil when it leaves the hand that threw it'1 By
acting, I expose myself to misfortune, which accordingly has a right over
me and is an existence of my own volition.
"Tr1111siDtor's rwtt: 'indirect wrong'.
120
The rigltt of illtention is that the universal quality of the action shall
have being not only in itself, but shall be /mown by the agent and thus
have been present all along in his subjective will; and conversely, what
we may call the right of the objeaivity of the action is the right of the
action to assert itself as known and willed by the subject as a tmnking
agent.
The right to such insight implies that the responsibility of
children, imbeciles, lunatics, etc. for their actions is either
totally absent or diminished. - But just as actions, in their
Morality
external existence [Dasein], include contingent consequences,

so also does subjective existence contain an indeterminacy as
far as the power and strength of self-consciousness and
presence of mind are concerned. This indetenninacy,
however, can be taken into account only in connection with
imbecility, lunacy, etc., and with childhood, because only such
pronounced conditions as these can annul [aufoeben] the
character of thought and free will and allow us to deny the
agent the dignity [Ehre] of being a thinking individual and a
will.
121
The universal quality of an action is the varied content of the action in
general, reduced to the simplefonn of universality. But the subject, as
reflected into itself and hence as a particular entity in relation to the
particularity of the objective realm, has its own particular content in
its end, and this is the soul and detenninant of the action. The fact
that this moment of the particularity of the agent is contained and
implemented in the action constitutes subjective freedom in its more
concrete determination, i.e. the right of the subject to find its satisfaction
in the action. 1
Addition (H). I for myself, reflected into myself, am still a particular entity
in relation to the externality of my action. My end constitutes the
detennining content of the action. Murder and arson, for example, as
universals, do not constitute my positive content as a subject. If someone
has perpetrated crimes of this kind, we ask why he committed them. The
murder was not committed foc the sake of murder; on the contrary, some
particular positive end was also present. If we were to say, however, that
the murder was committed for the pleasure of killing, then this pleasure
would itself be ~itive content of the sub~t as such, and the deed
would then be the satisfaction of the subject's volition. Thus the motive
JBeweggnmilf"ot a deed IS more prec1sely what we Cili the moral element,
and this, in the present context, has two meanings- the universal which is
inherent in the purpose, and the particular aspect of the intention. In
recent times especially, it has become customary to enquire about the
motives of actions, although the question used simply to be 'Is this man
honest [rechtschaffen)? Does he do his duty?' Now, we seek to look into
people's hearts, and thereby presuppose a gulf between the objective
realm of actions and the inner, subjective realm of motives. The
149
119-121
determination of the subject must certainly be considered: it wills something whose ground lies within the subject itself; it wills the fulfilment of
its desire and the gratification of its passion. But the good and the right
are also a content- not just a natural content, but a content posited by my
rationality; and to make my freedom the content of my will i; a pure
determination of my freedom itself. The higher moral viewpoint therefore
consists in finding satisfaction in one's action, not in stopping short at the
gulf between the self-consciousness of the human being and the objectivity of the deed - although the latter attitude does predominate in
certain periods of world history and of the lives of individuals.
!22
This particular aspect gives the action its subjective value and inlerest
for me. In contrast with this end - i.e. tlze intention from tlze point ofview
of its content - the immediate character of the action in its further
content is reduced to a means. In so far as such an end is a 6nite one,
it may in tum be reduced to a means to some further intention, and so
on in an infinite progression.
123
For the content of these ends, all that presents itself here is (a) formal
activity itself, inasmuch as the subject actively commits itself to
whatever it is to regard and promote as its end - for human beings
wish to act in support of whatever interests them, or should interest
them, as their own. $) But the as yet abstract and formal freedom of
subjectivity has a more determinate content only in its natural subjective existence [Dasein] - its needs, inclinations, passions, opinions,
fancies, etc. The satisfaction of this content is we/fore or happiness,
both in its particular determinations and in its universal aspect - the
ends of finitude in general.
This is the point of view of relations/zip (see to8), where th~
subject is determined in its differentiation and so counts as
something particular, and where the content of the natural will
makes its appearance (see I 1). But the will here is not as it is
in its immediacy; instead, this content, belonging as it does to
the will reflected into itself, is raised to a universal end, namely
that of we/fore or lzappiness (see Encyclopaedia oftlze Plzilosophical
Morality
Sciences, 395ff.).1 This is the point of view of thought which

does not yet comprehend the will in its freedom, but rejleas on
its content as something natural and given- as, for example,
in'tiled~siiH:roesus and so-ron.~/
Addition (H). In so far as the determinations of happiness are present and
given, they are not ttue determinations of freedom, which is not lrUly
present for itself until it has adopted the good as an end in itself. We may
ask at this point whether the human being has a right to set himself ends
which are not based on freedom, but solely on the fact that the subject is a
living being. The fact that he is a living being is not contingent, however,
but in accordance with reason, and to that extent he has a right to make
his needs his end. There is nothing degrading about being alive, and we
do not have the alternative of existing in a higher spirituality. It is only by
raising what is present and given to a self-creating process that the higher
sphere of the good is attained (although this distinction does not imply
that the two aspects are incompanble).
Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual himself (including his

recognition in the shape of honour and fame) is also to be found in the
implementation of ends wlziclz are valid in and for tlzemselves, it is an
empty assertion of the abstract understanding to require that only an
end of this kind shall appear willed and attained, and likewise to take
the view that, in volition, objective and subjective ends are mutually
exclusive. Indeed, such attitudes become even worse if they lead to
the assertion that, because subjective satisfaction is present (as it
always is when a task is completed), it constitutes the agent's essential
intention to which the objective end was merely a means. - What the
subject is, is tile series of its actions. If these are a series of worthless
productions, then the subjectivity ofvolition is likewise worthless; and
conversely, if the series of the individual's ~eeds are of a substantial
nature, then so also is his inner will 1
The right of the subject's particularity to find satisfaction, or to put it differently - the right of subjeaive freedom, is the
pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and
the modcrn-age. This right, in its infinity, is ex}>ressed in
Chrisnamty, andl.t has become the umversal and actual
principle of a new form of the world. Its more specific shapes
121-124
Philosophy ofRight
include love, the romantic, the eternal salvation of the
-~as an end, etc.; then there are morality and conscience, followed by the other forms, some of which will come
into prominence below as the principle of civil society and as
moments of the political constitution, while others appear
within history at large, particularly in the history of art, the
sciences, and philosophy. - Now this principle of particularity
is admittedly a moment within an antithesis, and in the first
instance at least, it is just as much identical with the universal
as distinct from it. But abstract reflection fixes this moment in
~diff~~~!ruf"~J;~~
,_prod~~!.!-!!ew of morality as a perenni~e
~iiist one's -own~timf, as ~tile injunction: 'Do With

repugnance what duty commandsY This same [use of the]
understanding produces that psychological view of history
which contrives to belittle and debase all great deeds and
individuals by transforming into the main intention and effective spring [Triebfoder] of actions those inclinations and passions which were simultaneously satisfied by substantial
activity, along with fame and honour and other consequences
- indeed that whole particular aspect which it had declared in
advance to be inherently inferior. The same attitude assures
us that, sin~e great actions and the activity associated with a
series of these have accomplished great things in the world
and have consequently brought power, honour, and fame to
the itzdividual agent, it is not the greabless itself which belongs
to the individual, but only those particular and external consequences which accrued to him from it; and since this particular aspect is a consequence [of the individual's action1 it is
also supposed .for this reason to have been the end, and indeed
even the sole end in view.- Such reflection as this fixes upon
the subjective side of great individuals- f<r its own basis is
likewise subjective - and averlooks the substantial element in
this edifice of vanity which it has itselfconstructed. This is the
view of 'those psychological valets de cllambre for whom there
are no heroes, not because the latter are not heroes, but
because the former are only valets de cllambre' (see
Pllet~omeno/ogy of Spirit, p. 616).J
Morality
Additimz (H). 'In magnis voluisse sat est'" rightly signifies that we ought to
will something great But we must also be able to implement it, or else our
willing is futile [lichtig). The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves which
have never been green.
"Translator~ 1101~: 'In great things, it is sufficient to have willed. ' 1
125
Subjectivity, with its partic,lar content of welfare, is reflected into itself
and infinite, and consequently also has reference to the universal, to
the will which has being in itself. This [universal] moment, initially
posited within this particularity itself, includes the wel(are ofothers- or
in its complete, but wholly empty determination, the welfare of all.
The welfare of many other particular beings in general is thus also an
essential end and right of subjectivity. But since the universal which
has beitzg in and for itself, ao; distinct from such particular [kinds of]
content, has not so far .been determined beyond the stage of right,
these ends of particularity, different as they are from the universal,
may be in conformity with it - but alternatively, they may not.
126
My particularity, however, like that of others, is only a right at all in so
far as I am free. It cannot therefore assert itselfin contradiction to this
substantial basis on which it rests; and an intention to promote my
welfare and that of others- and in the latter case in particular it is
called a moral intention - cannot justify an action which is wro11g.
One of the most conspicuous among the corrupt maxims of
our time is that we ought to interest ourselves in the so-called
moral intention be~ind wrong actions, and to imagine
[vorzustellen] inferior [sddechte] subjects with allegedly good
hearts, i.e. hearts which will their own welfare and perhaps
even the welfare of others. This maxim derives in part from
the pre-Kantian period of sensibility [guten HeTZe11s) 1 and constitutes, for example, the quintessence of familiar and affecting dramatic presentations:" But this doctrine has also been
revived in a more extreme shape, and inner enthusiasm and
153
the emotions, i.e. the fomz of particularity as such, have been
made the criterion of what is right, rational, and excellent. As
a result, crimes and their guiding principles, even if these
should be the most banal and empty fancies and foolish
opinions, are presented as right, rational, and excellent on the
grounds that they are based on the emotio7J!.. and on er1tlmsiasm
(for further details, see Remarks to 140 below).- In addition, we must bear in mind the point of view from which right
and welfare are being examined here -namely as formal right
and the particular welfare of the individual [des Einzelnen].
The so-called crnmnon weal or welfare of the state, i.e. the right
of the actual and concrete spirit, is an altogether different
sphere, in which formal right is just as much a subordinate
moment as particular welfare and the happiness of thJ;.
individual. We have already noted above [see 29] that one of11
the commonest errors of abstraction is -~st _2n private \
rights and IJrivate welfare as valid in and for themselves in
~--------_apposition
_,.,. . . ___ _,.,..,..,....._____________
to the universality of the state.7
.___,
Additimz (H). The famous answer 'je n'en vois pas Ia necessite"' which was
given to the libeller who excused himself by saying 'i1 faut done que je
vive16 is relevant here.J For life, when confronted with the higher realm of
freedom, is not necessary at all. When St Crispin stole leather to make
shoes for the poor, his action was both moral and wrong, and hence
invalid. 4
"TransliJJar's riOlt: 'I do not see the need for it.'
rrans/tJJar's rrott: 'But I have to live.'
127
The particularity of the interests of the natural will, taken together as a
simple totality, is personal existence [Dasein] as lifo. bz extreme danger
and in collision with the rightful property of someone else, this life
may claim (not in equity, but as a right) a right of necessity,' for the
alternatives are an infinite injury [Verletztmg] to existence with total
loss of rights, and an injury only to an individual and limited existence
of freedom, whereby right as such and the capacity for rights of the
injured party, who has been injured only in this specific property,
continue to be recognized.
154
i\1ora/ity
From the right of necessity arises the benefit of competence,
whereby a debtor is permitted to retain his tools, agricultural
implements, clothes, and in general as much of his resources
- i.e. of the property of his creditors- as is deemed necessary
to support him, even in his accustomed station in society.
Addition (H). Life, as the totality of ends,~ a right in .QPQQ.Sition to

abstract right If, for example, it can be preserved by stealing a loaf, this
certaiiJy constitutes an infringement of someone's property, but it would
be wrong to regard such an action as common theft If someone whose life
is in danger were not allowed to take measures to save himself, he would
be destined to forfeit all his rights; and since he would be deprived of life,
his entire freedom would be negated. There are certainly many prerequisites for the preservation of life, and if we look to the future, we must
concern ourselves with such details. But the only thing that is necessary is
to live rww; the future is not absolute, and it remains exposed to contingency. Consequently, only the necessity [Not] of the immediate present
can justifY a wrong action, because its omission would in tum involve
committing a wrong - indeed the ultimate wrong, namely the total negation of the existence of freedom. The berlejiciw11 compete11Jia? is of
relevance here, because links of kinship and other close relationships
entail the right to demand that no one should be sacrificed completely for
the sake of right
128
Such necessity [Not] reveals the finitude and hence the contingency of
both right and welfare- of the abstract existence [Dasei11] of freedom
as distinct from the existence [Existerzz] of the particular person, and
of the sphere of the particular will as distinct from the universality of
right. Their one-sided and ideal character is thereby posited, just as it
was already determined for them in their concept. Right has already
(see Io6) determined its existerue [Dasei11] as the particular will; and
subjectivity, in its comprehensive particularity, is itself the existence
[Dasein] of freedom (see I 27), just as it is in itself, as the infinite
self-reference of the will, the universal aspect of freedom. The two
moments in right and subjectivity, thus integrated so as to attain their
truth and identity - though initially still in a relaJive relation [Bezielumg] to one another - are the good (as the folfilled universal,
determined in and for itself) and the conscierzce (as infinite and
ISS
126-128
Philosophy ofRight
inwardly knowing [wissende]" subjectivity which determines its content
within itself).
"Translator's nou: Here, and throughout the fdlowing section (Section 3), Hegel exploits
the etymological relationship between GaDissm ('conscience'), Wissm ('knowledge'), and
GaDifthnt ('certainty') to suggest an affinity between their meanings. It is, unfortunately,
impossible to retain these associations in English translation.
SECTION
The Good and the Conscience

129
The good is the Idea, as _the u~ty of the concept of the will and the
_[!grticular.J'ii]l, in which abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of
knowing, and the contingency of external existence [Dasein], as selfsufficient for themselves, are superseded; but they are at the same time
essentially contained and preserved within it. - [The good is] realized
freethlm, the absolute and ultimate end of the 11JOtld.
Addition (H). Eve!Y stage is in fact the Idea, but the earlier stages contain
it only in more abstract form. For example, even the 'I' as personality is
already the Idea, but in its most abstract shape. The good is therefore the
Idm as ji1rtlll!t determir~ed, the-unity of tlie concept of the will and the
particular will. It does not belong to abstract right, but has a complete
content whose import encompasses both right and welfare.
Within this idea, welfare has no validity for itself as the existence
[Dasei11] of the individual and particular will, but only as universal
welfare and essentially as universal in itself, i.e. in accordance with
freedom; welfare is not a good without right. Similarly, right is not the
good without welfare (fiat iustitia should not have pereat mundut' 1 as its
consequence). Thus, since the good must necessarily be actualized
through the particular will, and since it is at the same time the latter's
"Translator's rrote: The Latin sa}ing which Hegel splits into two parts means roughly:
'Let justice be done, even if the world should perish.'
I
57
substance, it has an absolute right as distinct from the abstract right of
property and the particular ends of welfare. In so far as either of the
latter moments is distinguished from the good, it has validity only in
so far as it is in conformity with it and subordinate to it.
For the subjective will, the good is likewise absolutely essential, and the
subjective will has worth and dignity only in so far as its insight and
intention are in conformity with the good. In so far as the good is still
at this point this abstract Idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet
posited as assimilated to it and in conformity with it. It thus stands in a
relalirmship to the good, a relationship whereby the good ought to be its
substantial character, whereby it ought to make the good its end and
fulfil it- just as it is only in the subjective will that the good for its part
has the means of entering into actuality.
Additio11 (H). The good is the truth of the particular will, but the will is
only what it commits itself to; it is not by nature good, but can become
what it is only by its own efforts. On the other hand, the good itself,
without the subjective will, is only an abstraction, devoid of~
'WhiCh it ~a---roacru.evCOrilythl'OiJgJl'the subjective will. The
development of the good accordingly has three stages: (I) the good must
be a particular will for me - since I am a will myself- and I must know it;
(2) the nature of the good must be stated, and the particular determinations of the good must be developed; (3) and lastly, the good must be
determined for itself and particularized as infinite subjectivity which has
being for itself. This inward determination is conscience.
132
The right ofthe subjective willis that whatever it is to recognize as valid
should be perceived by it as good, and iliatit shOuld be hefd responSlble
-~- as its-~~ translated into external objectivity- as right
or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, according to its cognizance
[Ke:mlllis] of the value which that action has in this objectivity.
The good is in general the ~-~e__of~ in its substa11tiality and tmiversa/ity- the will in its truth; the good therefore
exists without exception only i11 thought and through thought.
Consequently, the assertion that human beings cannot know
.W.orality
13o-132
---------------------[erkemzen] the truth, but have to do only with appearances, or

that thought is harmful to the good will, and other similar
notions [Vorste/lungen], deprive the spirit both of intellectual
and of all ethical worth and dignity.- The right to recognize
nothing that I do not perceive as rational is the highest right of
the subject, but by virtue of its subjective determination, it is
at the same time fonnal; on the other hand, the right of the
rational- as the objective - over the subject remains firmly
established. - Because of its formal determination, insight is
equally capable of being true and of being mere opinion and
error. From the point of view of what is still the sphere of
morality, the individual's attainment of this right of insight
depends upon his particular subjective education. I may
require of myself and regard it as an inner subjective right that
my insight into an obligation should be based on good reasons
and that I should be convinced by it, and in addition, that I
should recognize it in terms of its concept and nature. But
whatever I may require in order to satisfy my conviction that
an action is good, permissible, or impermissible - and hence
that the agent is in this respect responsible for it - in no way
detracts from the right ofobjectivity.- This right of insight into
the good is distinct from the right of insight with regard to
action as such (see 117). As far as the latter is concerned, the
right of objectivity takes the following shape: since action is an
alteration which must exist in an actual world and thus seeks
recognition in it, it must in general conform to what is
recogrzized as valid in that world. Whoever wills an action in the
actual world has, in so doing, submitted himself to its laws and
recognized the right of objectivity.- Similarly, in the state, as
the objectivity of the concept of reason, legal responsibility [die
gericlztliclze Zureclnnmg] must not stop at what the individual
considers to be in conformity with his reason or otherwise, or
at his subjective insight into rightness or wrongness, good or
evil, or at what he may require in order to satisfy his conviction. In this objective field, the right of insight applies to
insight into legality or illegality, i.e. into what is recognized as
right, and is confined to its primary meaning, namely
cognizance [Kenntnis] in the sense of fanziliarity with what is
legal and to that extent obligatory. Through the public nature
159
of the laws and the universality of customs, the state takes
away from the right of insight its formal aspect and that contingency which this right still has for the subject within the
prevailing viewpoint [of morality]. The right of the subject to
know [kennen] action in its determination of good or evil, legal
or illegal, has the effect, in the case of children, imbeciles, and
lunatics, of diminishing or annulling [aufzulleben] their
responsibility in this respect, too; but it is impossible to
impose a definite limit [bl!stimmte Grenze] on these conditions
and the level of responsibility associated with them. But to
make momentary blindness, the excitement of passion, intoxication, or in general what is described as the strength of
sensuous motives [Triebfodem] (but excluding anything which
gives grounds for a right of necessity - see I 27)a into
grounds for attributing responsibility or determining the
[nature of the] crime itself and its culpability, and to consider
such circumstances as taking away the criminal's guilt
[Sclluld], is once again (cf. IOO and Remarks to I zo't to
deny the criminal the right and dignity [E/zre] of a human
being; for the nature of a human being consists precisely in
the fact that he is essentially universal in character, not an
abstraction of the moment and a single fragment of knowledge. -Just as what the arsonist sets on fire is not the_isolated
area of'w~iJ.d .ll~inf.l!.~~~e to which he applies the flame, but
-the universal within it- i.e. the entire house- so, too, is the
arsorrlSt hi~~lf. a;~-~ubject, not just the individual aspect of
this moment or this isolated passion for revenge. Ifhe were so,
he would be an animal which should be hit on the head
because of its dangerousness and proneness to unpredictable
fits of rage. -It is said that the criminal, at the moment of his
action, must have a clear representation [sic/z ... miisse vorgestellt
llabe11 fofit:S-wrongfuliiess and cUTpability before he can be
made responsible for it as a crime. This requirement, which
appears to uphold his right of moral subjectivity, in fact denies
his inherent nature as an intelligent being; for this nature, in
"Translator's nott: The reference in most editions of Hegel's text is to no, which
appears to be an error.! follow Dtings edition in substituting
127
as more appropriate.
rransllllor's rwtt: I follow llting in substituting 120 for 119, which is given in most
earlier editions, including the first.
I6o
,Wora/ity
132-134
its active presence, is not confined to the shape it assumes in

Wolff's psychology - namely that of clear representations [Vorstellungen] - and only in cases of madness is it so deranged as
to be divorced from the knowledge and performance of
individual things [Dinge]. 1 - The sphere in which the above
circumstances come into consideration as grounds for relaxing the punishment is not the sphere of right, but the sphere
of clemency.
133
The relation of the good to the particular subject is that the good is
the essentitil character of the subject's will, which thus has an unqualified obligation in this connection. Because particularity is distinct from
the good and falls within the subjective will, the good is initially
determined only as universtil abstract essentiality- i.e. as dutt. In view of
this determination, duty should be done for tlte sake of duty. 1
Addition (H). The essential element of the will for me is duty. Now if I
know nothing apart from the fact that the good is my duty, I do not go
beyond duty in the abstract. I should do my duty for its own sake, and it is
in the true sense my own objectivity that I bring to fulfilment in doing so.
In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and free. The merit and
exalted viewpoint of KJUlt's moral philosophy are that it has emphasized
this significance of duty.
Since action for itself requires a particular content and a determinate

end, whereas duty in the abstract contains nothing of the kind, the
question arises: what is duty? For this definition [Bestimmung], all that
is available so far is this: to do right, and to promote welfare, one's own
welfare and welfare in its universal determination, the welfare of
others (see 1 19).
Addition (H). This is the very question which was put to Jesus when
someone wished to know what to do in order to gain etemallife. 1 For the
Jmiversal aspect of good, or good in the abstract, cannot be fulfilled as an
abstraction; it must first acquire th~-~Irther determination of particularity.
161
Philosophy ofRight
135
These detenninations, however, are not contained in the determination of duty itself. But since both of them are conditional and limited,
they give rise to the transition to the higher sphere of the unconditional, the sphere of duty. Hence all that is left for duty itself, in so far
as it is the essential <I" universal element in the moral self-consciousness as it is related within itself to itself alone, is abstract universality,
whose determination is idemity without content or the abstractly positive, i.e. the indeterminate.
However essential it may be to emphasize the pure and
unconditional self-detennination of the will as the root of duty
- for knowledge [Erkenntnis] of the will first gained a finn
foundation and point of departure in the philosophy of Kant,
through the thought of its infinite autonomy (see I 33) - to
cling on to a merely moral point of view without making the
transition to the concept of ethics reduces this gain to an empty
fonnalism, and moral science to an empty rhetoric of duty for
duty's sake. From this point of view, no immanent theory of
duties is possible. One may indeed bring in material from
outside and thereby arrive at particular duties, but it is impossible to make the transition to the determination of particular
duties from the above determination of duty as absence of
contradiction, as fonna/ correspondence with itself, which is no
different from the specification of abstract indeterminacy; and
even if such a particular content f<l" action is taken into consideration, there is no criterion within that principle for deciding whether or not this content is a duty. On the contrary, it is
possible to justify any wrong or immoral mode of action by
this means. - Kant's further fonn - the capacity of an action
to be envisaged as a unive7'sa/ maxim - does yield a more
concrete representation [Vorste/lung] of the situation in question, but it does not in itself (jiir sich] contain any principle
apart from fonnal identity and that absence of contradiction
already referred to.- The fact that "o property is present is in
itself (jiir sic/1] no more contradictory than is the non-existence
of this or that individual people, family, etc., or the complete
absence of human lift. But if it is already established and
1W.orality
presupposed that property and human life should exist and be
respected, then it is a contradiction to commit theft or
murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction with something, that is, with a content which is already fundamentally
present as an established principle. Only to a principle of this
kind does an action stand in a relation [Bezielmng] of agreement or contradiction. But if a duty is to be willed merely as a
duty and not because ofits content, it is afonnal identity which
necessarily excludes every content and determination.
The further antinomies and shapes assumed by this perennial obligation, among which the merely moral point of view of
relations/zip simply drifts to and fro without being able to
resolve them and get beyond obligation, are developed in my
Plzenon1enology of Spirit, pp. ssoff.; cf. Encyclopaedia of tlze
Plzilosoplzical Sciences, 42off. 1
Additim1 (H). Whereas we earlier emphasized that the point of view of

Kant's philosophy is sublime inasmuch as it asserts the conformity of duty
and reason, it must be pointed out here that this point of view is defective
in that it lacks all articulation For the proposition 'Consider whether your
maxim can be asserted as a universal principle'2 would be all very well if
we already had determinate principles concerning how to act. In other
words, if we demand of a principle that it should also be able to serve as
the determinant of a universal legislation, this presupposes that it already
has a content; and if this content were present, it would be easy to apply
the principle. But in this case, the principle itself is not yet available, and
the criterion that there should be no contradiction is non-productive- for
where there is nothing, there can be no contradiction either.
Because of the abstract character of the good, the other moment of

the Idea, i.e. particularitj in general, falls within subjectivity. Subjectivity, in its universality reflected into itself, is the absolute inward
certainty of itself; it is that which posits particularity, and it is the
detennining and decisive factor 7 tile co11science. 1
Addition (H). One may speak of duty in a most sublime manner, and such
talk glorifies the human being and fills his heart with pride. But if it leads
to nothing determinate, it ultimately grows tedious, for the spirit requires
that particularity to which it is entitled. Conscience, m the other hand, is
that deepest inner solitude within oneself in which all externals and all
limitation have disappeared - it is a total withdrawal into the self. As
conscience, the human being iS~olongei1iooiiaD"ytlleenilsofJ)articu
larity, so that conscience represents an exalted point of view, a point of
view of the modem world, which has for the first time attained this
consciousness, this descent into the self. Earlier and more sensuous ages
have before them something external and given, whether this be religion
or right; but [my] conscience lmows itself as thought, and that this
thought of mine is my sole source of obligation.
True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself,
it therefore has fixed principles, and these have for it the character of
determinacy and duties which are objective for themselves. In contrast to its content - i.e. truth- conscience is merely the fpm1al asl!!f
of the activity of the will, which,asthiswill, has no distinctive content
~own. But the objective system of these principles and duties and
the union of subjective knowledge with this system are present only
when the point of view of ethics has been reached. Here, within the
formal point of view of morality, conscience lacks this objective content, and is thus for itself the infinite formal certainty of itself, which
for this very reas~;rsatthe same tiiiie the c~rta~subject.
Conscie~JCe expresses the absolute entitlement of subjective
self-consciousness to know in itself and from itself what right
and duty are, and to recognize only what it thus knows as the
good; it also consists in the assertion that what it thus knows
and wills is tmly right and duty. As this unity of subjective
knowledge and that which has being in and for itself, conscience is a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate. But
whether the conscience of a specific individual is in conformity
with this Idea of conscience, and whether what it considen or
declares to be good is also actually good, can be recognized only
from the cmllmt of this supposed good. What constitutes right
and duty, as the rationality in and for itself of the will's
determinations, is essentially neither the particular property of
an individual, nor is itsfonn that offeeling [Empfindung] or any
other individual - i.e. sensuous - kind of knowledge, but
essentially that of universal determinations of thought, i.e. the
Morality
form of laws and principles. The conscience is therefore subject to judgement as to its truth or falsity, and its appeal solely
to itselfis directly opposed to what it seeks to be -that is, the
rule for a rational and universal mode of action which is valid
in and for itself. Consequently, the state cannot recognize the
conscience in its distinctive form, i.e. as subjective /mow/edge,
any more than science can grant any validity to subjective
opinion, assertion, and the appeal to subjective opinion. What is
not distinct within the true conscience is nevertheless distinguishable, and it is the detennining subjectivity of knowledge and volition which can separate itself from the true
content, posit itself for itself, and reduce the content to afonn
and semblance. The ambiguity associated with conscience
therefore consists in the fact that conscience is assumed in
advance to signify the identity of subjective knowledge and
volition with the true good, and is thus declared and acknowledged to be sacrosanct, while it also claims, as the purely
subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself; the
authority [Berechtigung] which belongs only to that identity
itself by virtue of its rational content which is valid in and for
itself. The point of view of morality, which is distinguished in
this treatise from that of ethics, includes only the formal
conscience; the true conscience has been mentioned only in
order to indicate its different character, and to prevent the
possible misunderstanding to the effect that we are here discussing the true conscience rather than the formal conscience, which is in fact our exclusive concern. The true
conscience is contained in the ethical disposition, which will
be considered only in the following section. The religious
conscience, however, lies completely outside this sphere.'
Addition (H). When we speak of conscience, it may easily be thought that,

because its form is that of abstract inwardness, it is already in and for
itself the true conscience. But the true conscience is that which
determines itself to will what is in and for itself the good and a duty. Here,
however, we are dealing only with good in the abstract, and conscience
still lacks this objective content and is as yet only the infinite certainty of
itself.
:
'
...:.;:.\ J,-
;, 1381--
~~~ination
This subjectivity, as abstract

and pure certainty of
itself alone, evafX!!_aJes into itself all detenninaJe aspects of right, duty,
~ exis!~U?._asein], inas~~b. J!!.itJ~ th~.P~h
detennines solely_[~~~ itself what is good in relation to a given
content, and at the same time the power to which the good, which is at
first only an Idea [V07Xestellt] and an obligation, owes its actuality.
The self-consciousness which has managed to attain this
absolute reflection into itself knows itselfin this reflection as a
consciousness which cannot and should not be compromised
by any present and given determination. In the shapes which it
more commonly assumes in history (as in the case of Socrates,
the Stoics, etc.), the tendency to look inwards into the self and
to know and determine from within the self what is right and
good appears in epochs when what is recognized as right and
good in actuality and custom is unable to satisfy the better
will. When the existing world offreedom has become unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer finds itself in the
duties recognized in this world and must seek to recover in
ideal inwardness alone that harmony which it has lost in actu...._____
~ Once self-consciousness has grasped and acquired its
formal right in this way, everything depends on the kind of
content which it gives to itself.'
Additim1 (H). If we look more closely at this process of evaporation and

observe how all determinations are absorbed into this simple concept and
must again issue forth from it, we can see that the process depends
primarily on the fact that everything which we recognize as right or duty
can. be shown by thought to be null and void, limited, and in no way
absolute. Conversely, just as subjectivity evaporates every content into
itself~l!.!!!!Y~lso in~m develop it out of itself. J2v~rything which arises in
.~al re.a..lm is produce~ of1he sp!!:!!_. On the other
hand, this point of view is defective inasmucli as it is merely abstract.
When I am aware of my freedom as the substance within me, I am inactive
and do nothing. But if I proceed to act and look for principles, I reach out
for determinations, and there is then a requirement that these should be
deduced from the concept of the free will. Thus, while it is right to
evaporate right <r duty into subjectivity, it is on the other hand wrong if
this abstract foundation is not in tum developed. Only in ages when the
166
Morality
138-139
actual world is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettled existence [Existmz] may

the individual be permitted to flee from actuality and retreat into his inner
!ife. Socrates made his appearance at the time when Athenian democracy
had fallen into ruin. He evaporated the existing world and retreated into
himself in search of the right and the good. Even in our times it happens
that reverence fc:r the existing order is in varying degrees absent, and
people seek to equate accepted values with their own wil~ with what they
have recognized.
Where all previously valid determinations have vanished and the will
is in a state of pure inwardness, the self-consciousness is capable of
making into its principle either tlze universal in and for itself, or the
arbitrariness of its own particularity, giving the latter precedence over
the universal and realizing it through its actions - i.e._jt is capable of
being eviU
Conscience, as formal subjectivity, consists simply in the
possibility of turning at any moment to evil; for both morality
and evil have their common root in that self-certain!}' which
has being for ttself and knows and resolves for itself.
The origin of evil in general lies in the mystery - i.e. the
speculative aspect - of freedom, in the necessity with which it
emerges from the natural phase of the will and adopts a
character of inwardness in relation to it. It is this natural phase
of the wm which comes into existence [Existenz] as self-contradiction, as incompatible with itself in this opposition, and
thus it is this partiaJarity of the will itself which further
aetermines itself as evil. For particularityeXists oiily as
~rlalirt. - in the present case as the opposition between the
will's natural phase and its inwardness. Within this opposition, the will's inwardness is only a relative and formal beingfor-itself which can derive its content only from the
determinations of the natural will, from desire, drive, inclination, etc. Now it is said of these desires, drives, etc. that they
may be either good or evil. But when the will lets its content be
determined by these desires etc. in the determination of contingency which they have as natural [forces], and hence also by
the form which it [i.e. the will] has at this point, the form of
Philosophy ofRight
particularity, it thereby becomes opposed to rmiversality as
inner objectivity, i.e. to the good, which, along with the will's
internal self-reflection and the cognitive [erkemumdet1) consciousness, makes its appearance as the opposite extreme to
immediate objectivity, to the merely natural._ln this case, the
inwardness of the will is evil. The human being is therefore
evil both in llimselfor b] nature and at the same time through
his reflection into himself, so that neither nature as such (apart
from the naturalness of the will which remains tied to its
particular content) nor reflection turned in upm1 itself, i.e. in
cognition in general (unless it remains attached to that
opposition already referred to) is in itself [fiir sich] evil Absolutely united with this aspect of the r~ecessity ofevil is also
the fact that this evil is determined as that which of necessity
ought not to be, i.e. the fact that it ought to be cancelled
[auJkehober1]. It is not that the point of view of division referred
to abo~e ought never to appear at all -on the contrary, it is
this which constitutes the distinction between the unreasoning
animal and the human being. But the will must not stop short
at this point and cling on to particularity instead of the universal as the essential; the point of view of division should be
overcome as null and void. In connection with this necessity of
evil, [we should also note that] it is subjectivity, as the infinity of
this reflection, which is faced with and present within this
opposition; if it stops short at this juncture - i.e. if it is evil- it
is consequently presentfor itself, retains its separate individuality, and is itself this arbitrary will. It is accordingly the
individual subject as such which bears the entire respmiSibility
for its own evil."

Addition (H). The abstract certainty which knows itself as the basis of
everything has within it the possibility of willing the universal of the
concept, but also that of making a particular content into its principle and
realizing this content. It follows that the abstraction of self-certainty is
always a part of evil, which is the second of these alternatives, and that
only the human being is good - but only in so far as he can am be evil.
Good and evil are inseparable, and their inseparability derives fiom the
"Tr111Uialor~ nolt:
I follow llting (VPR n, -4) in reading stints Biism ('its own ail')
rather than tits Bosm ('e\il (in generalf) as in the Suhrkamp edition of the text.
168
Mora/it)'
fact that the concept becomes its own object [Gege11Siallii] and, as object,
immediately embodies the determination of difference. The evil will wills
something opposed to the universality of the will, whereas the good acts in
accordance with its true concept. The difficulty about the question of how
the will can also be evil usually arises because we think of the will as
having only a positive relationship to itself, and envisage it as something
determinate which exists for itself, i.e. as the good. But the question of the
origin of evil signifies more precisely this: 'How does the negative come
into the positive?' If we presuppose that, at the creation of the world, God
is the absolutely positive, it is impossible to recognize the negative within
this positive, no matter which way we tum; for to assume that evil was
permitted by God is to assume on his part a passive relationship which is
unsatisfactory and meaningless. In the representational thought [Vontelltmg] of religious myth, the origin of evil is not comprehended; that is,
there is no recognition of the one in the other, but only a representation
[Vontellro1g) of succession and coexistence whereby the negative comes to
the positive from outside. But this cannot satisfy thought, which demands
a reason [Gnmd) and a necessity and seeks to apprehend the negative as
itself rooted in the positive. The solution [of this problem], from the point
of view of the concept, is contained in the concept itself, fa- the conceptor in more concrete terms, the Idea - has the essential characteristic of
differentiating itself and positing itself negatively. If we merely stick to the
positive, i.e. to the wholly good which is supposedly good in its origin, we
have an empty determination of the understanding which clings to such
one-sided abstractions and, by the mere act of asking the question, makes
it into a difficult one. But from the point of view of the concept, positivity
is apprehended as activity and self-differentiation. Thus, evil as well as
good has its origin in the will, and the will in its concept is both good and
evil. The natural will is in itself the contradiction of self-differentiation, of
being [both] for itself and inward To say then that evil contains the more
precise determination that the human being is evil in so far as his will is
natural would run counter to the common idea [Vomellzmg] that it is
precisely the natural will which is innocent and good. But the natural will
is opposed to tile conlent of freedom, and the child and uneducated man
whose wills are natural are for that reason accountable for their actions
only to a lesser degree. Thus, when we speak of human beings, we do not
mean children but self-conscious individuals, and when we speak of the
good, we mean knowledge of the good. Now it is true that the natural is in
itself ingenuous, neither good nor evil; but in relation to the will as
freedom and as knowledge of freedom, the natural contains the
determination of the unfree, and is therefore evil. In so far as man wills
the natural, it is no longer merely the natural but the negation of the good
169
as the concept of the will. - But if it were now to be argued that, since evil
is inherent in the concept and necessary, man would not be responsible if
he committed it, it must be replied that the decision is man's own act, the
product of his freedom and responsibility. Religious myth tells us that
man is like God in his knowledge [Erkermwis) of good and evil, and this
likeness is indeed present in that the necessity here is not a natural
necessity - on the contrary, the decision is in fact the cancellation
[Auflzebung) of this duality of good and evil Since I am confronted with
both good and evil, I am able to choose between them; I can choose either
of them and accept one or the other into my subjectivity. It is thus in the
nature of evil that man may will it, but need not necessarily do so.
The self-consciousness knows how to discover a positive aspect in its

~
own end (see 135); for this end, as part of the purpose of an actual
concrete action, necessarily has a positive aspect. By virtue of this
positive aspect, [which it regards] as a dUly and admirable intmtion, the
self-consciousness is able to assert that its action is good both for
others and for itself. But because of its self-reflection and consequent
awareness ot die universal character of the will, it is also in a position
to compare with this universal character the essentially negative content of its action, which is simultaneously present"within it. To as~
that this action is good for others is hypocrisy, and to assertth;Uit is
~~~;J~c-~[Tst<)g~
..extr~"eatwhich subjectivity declares itself absolute.

---------~-~--"-----...:.__ _"7
- .. ____.......____
This last and most abstruse form of evil, whereby evil is

perverted into good and good into evil and the consciousness,
knowing that it has the power to accomplish this reversal,
consequently knows itself as absolute, is the greatest extreme
of subjectivity from the point of view of morality. It is the form
to which evil has advanced in our time- thanks to philosophy,
i.e. to a shallowness of thought which has twisted a profound
concept into this shape and has presumed to call itself philosophy, just as it has presumed to call evil good. In these
present Remarks, I shall briefly indicate the principal shapes
which this subjectivity commonly assumes.
(a) Hypocrisy contains the following moments: (a) knowledge
of the true universal, whether in the form merely of a
Morality
feeling of right and duty or of a more advanced knowledge
[Kenntnis] and cognition of these; (~) a willing of the
particular which is at odds with this universal; and (y) a
knowing comparison of these two moments so that the
particular volition is detennined, for the willing consciousness itself, as evil. These detenninations signify actingwith a bad conscience, but not yet hypocrisy as such.- It
was at one time a question of great importance whether an
action was evil on{y in so for as it was done witlz a bad
conscience, i.e. with a developed consciousness of the
moments indicated above. - Pascal (Lellres prwinciales, 4)
describes very well what follows from answering this
question in the affinnative: 'll seront tous damnes ces
demi-pecheurs, qui ont quelque amour pour Ia vertu.
Mais pour ces francs pecheurs, pecheurs endurcis,
pecheurs sans melange, pleins et acheves, l'enfer ne les
tient pas: ils ont trompe le diable a force de s'y abandonner.'"f - The subjective right of self-consciousness to
know an action in its detennination as either good or evil
in and for itself must not be thought of as colliding with
the absolute right of the objectivity of this detennination in
such a way that the two are represented as separable, and
Trans/a/or's 11ott: 'They ,,;n all be damned, these half -sinners who retain some love of
virtue. But as for those open sinners, hardened sinners, undiluted, complete, and
consummate sinners, hell cannot hold them: they have deceived the devil by their
complete surrender.' 1
f Htgtl's nott: In the same context, Pascal also quotes Christ's intercession on the Cross
for his enemies: 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.z- a superfluous
request if the fact that they did not know what they were doing removed the quality of
evil from their action so that it did not require forgiveness. He likewise cites the
opinion of Aristotle (NimmacheDtl Ethia 111.2 lu1ob27)), who distinguishes between
acting oint ElOOx; and acting O.yvowv;bJ in the former case of ignorance, the person
concerned acts imVJiuntarily (this ignorance relates to attmal ciramstatKts; see 117
above), and he cannot be held responsible for his action.~ But of the latter instance,
Aristotle says: 'All wicked men fail to recognize what they should do and refrain from
doing, and it is this very defect (t'ql.ag"tia) which makes people unjust and in general
evil. Ignorance of the choice between good and evil does not mean that an action is
involuntary (i.e. that the agent cannot be held responsible for it), but only that it is bad.'5
Aristotle, of course, had a deeper insight into the connection between cognition and
volition than has become usual in that superficial philosophy which teaches that motion
and tnthusiasm, not cognition, are the true principles of ethical action. 6
Tratlslator's nott: oint ELbw<; (\vithout perception') is translated by both David Ross and
Terence Irwin as 'in ignorance'; ayvo6Jv ('from ignorance') is translated by Ross as 'by
reason of ignorance' and by Irwin as 'caused by ignorance'.
171
IJ)-140
indifferent and contingent towards one another; it was the
latter relationship in particular which was regarded as
fundamental in the old debates about efficacious grace. 7 In
its formal aspect, evil is the individual's most distinctive
property, because it is precisely his subjectivity positing
itself entirely for itself, and is therefore entirely his
responsibility (see 139 and the appended Remarks); and
on the objective side, man is by Ins concept spirit and
rationality in general, and has the determination of selfknowing universality wholly within himself. It is therefore
to deny him the honour due to his concept if his good side
- and hence also the determination of his evil action as
evil- is divorced from him and he is not made responsible
f<r his evil action either. How determinate the consciousness of these moments in their respective differences is,
what degree of clarity or obscurity it has attained as developed cog~lition, and to what extent the conscience associated with an evil action is more or less evil in fomz - all
these are less important questions of a more empirical
character.
(b) To act in an evil manner and with an evil conscience does
not amount to hypocrisy.8 Hypocrisy includes in addition
.~d~!!__~Ss, whereby evil
is in the first place represented for others as good and the
evildoer pretends in all external respects to be good, conscientious, pious, etc. -which in this case is merely a trick
to deceive others. But secondly, the evil person may find in
the good he does at other times, or in his piety, or in good
reasons of any kind, a means of justifying for llimse/fthe evil
he does, in that he can use these reasons to distort it into
something he considers good. This possibility exists
within subjectivity, for, as abstract negativity, it knows that
all determinations are subordinate to it and emanate from
it.
(c) We must in the first place include in this distortion that
attitude [Gestalt] known as probabilism. 9 It adopts the
principle that an action is permissible and can be done in
good conscience if the consciousness can discover any
good reason [Gnmd] for it - even if this is merely the
Morality
autlzority of a single theologian, and even if other theologians are known to diverge very considerably from the
former's judgement. Even in this notion [Vorste/lung],
there is still present the correct consciousness that a
reason and authority of this kind affords only a probability,
although this is regarded as sufficient to satisfy the conscience. It is at the same time conceded that a good reason
is merely of such a kind that other reasons of at least equal
merit may exist alongside it. A further trace of objectivity
can be discerned in this attitude in so far as it assumes
that a reason should be the detennining factor. But since
the decision between good and evil is made to depend
upon many good reasons, including those authorities
already referred to - despite the fact that these reasons
are so numerous and discordant- it is also apparent that it
is not this objectivity of the thing [Sac/ze], but subjectivity,
which is the decisive factor. As a result, (personal] preference and the arbitrary will are made the arbiters of good
and evil, and both ethics and religiosity are undermined.
But the fact that it is the agent's own subjectivity which
makes the decision is not yet acknowledged as the [governing] principle - on the contrary (as already mentioned), it is claimed that a reason is the decisive factor.
To this extent, probabilism is still a form of hypocrisy.
(d) The stage immediately above this is [the view] that the
good will consists in willing tlze good; this willing of good in
tlze abstract is supposed to be sufficient, indeed the sole
prerequisite, for the goodness of the action itself. Since
the action, as detenninate volition, has a content, whereas
good in tlze abstract determines nothing, it remains the task
of particular subjectivity to give this abstraction its
determination and fulfilment Just as, in the case of probabilism, anyone who is not himself a learned Reverend Pere
relies on the autliOnty of such a theologian in order to
subsume a determinate content under the universal
determination of the good, so in this case is every subject
immediately accorded the honour [Wiin/e] of providing
the abstract good with a content, or - and this amounts to
the same thing - of subsuming a content under a univer1 73
Philosophy ofRiglzt
sal. This content is only one of the various aspects of a
concrete action, some of which may even justify its description as criminal and bad. But that subjective
determination which I give to the good is the good which I
know in the action, i.e. my good intention (see I 14).
There thus arises a conflict of determinations, for one of
them suggests that an action is good, whereas others suggest that it is criminal.10 It thus seems that the question
also arises, in the case of an actual action, whether the
intention is actUJl!ly good. But it may not only be generally
the case that the good is the actual intention; it must in
fact always be so if we adopt the point of view that the
abstract good is the determining ground of the subject.
An injury done by a well-intentioned action whose
determination is in other respects criminal and evil is, of
course, also good, and all would seem to depend on which
aspect of the action is the most essenJial. But this objective
question is not applicable here- or rather, it is the subjectivity of consciousness itself whose decision alone constitutes the objective element. Essential and good are in any
case synonymous; the former is just as much an abstraction as the latter; good is what is essential ,~th regard to
the will, and what should be essential in 'this respect is
precisely that an action is determined as good for me. But
this abstract good, being completely lacking in content,
can be wholly reduced simply to meaning anything positive
at all- anything, that is, which has any kind of validity and
which, in its immediate determination, may even count as
an essential end (such as doing good to the poor, or caring
for myself, my life, my family, etc.). The immediate
consequence of this for itself is that any content one
pleases can be subsumed under the good Furthermore,
just as the good is an abstraction, so consequently is the
bad likewise devoid of content, receiving its determination
from my subjectivity; and this is also the source of the
moral end of hating and eradicating the bad as an indeterminate quality. - Theft, cowardice, murder, etc., as
actions - i.e. as products in general of a subjective will have the immediate determination of being the satisfaction
174
Morality
of such a will, and hence of being something positive; and
in order to make the action into a good one, it is merely a
question of knowing this positive aspect as my intention in
performing the action, and this aspect is then the essential
factor in determining the action as good, because I know
it as the good in my intention. Theft in order to benefit
the poor, theft or desertion in battle for the sake of one's
duty to care for one's life or one's (perhaps even
impoverished) family, murder for hatred and revenge i.e. in order to satisfy a self-awareness of one's own rights
or of right in general, and one's sense of someone else's
wickedness, of wrong done by him to oneself or to others,
to the world or the people in general, by eliminating this
wicked individual who is wickedness personified, and
thereby contributing at least something towards the end of
eradicating the bad - all of these deeds, by virtue of the
positive aspect of their content, are in this way transformed into well-intentioned and consequently good
actions.// Even the lo11Jest degree of understanding is
enough to discover, like those learned theologians, a positive aspect in every action and hence a good reason and
intention underlying it. Thus it has been said that there is
in fact no such thing as an evil man, for no one wills evil
for the sake of evil- i.e. the purely negative as such- but
always something positive, and hence, according to the
point of view in question, always something good. In this
abstract good, the distinction between good and evil, as
well as all actual duties, has vanished; consequently,
merely to will the good and to have a good intention in
one's action is more like evil than good, in that the good is
willed only in this abstract form so that its determination is
left to the arbitrary will of the subject.
To this context there also belongs the notorious proposition that the end justifies the means. 12 - Taken on its own,
this expression is at first sight trivial and vacuous. It may
be replied in equally indeterminate fashion that a just end
doubtless justifies the means, whereas an unjust end does
not. (To say] that the means is right if the end is right is a
tautological statement inasmuch as the means is precisely
175
that which is nothing in itself [/iir sich] but exists for the
sake of something else and has its determination and
value in the latter as its end -that is, if it is tru(y a means. But the meaning of the above proposition lies not just in
its formal significance; it can also be understood in the
more determinate sense that it is permissible, and perhaps
even one's duty, to use as a means to a good end something which in itself is not a means at all, to violate something which is in itself sacrosanct, and thus to make a
crime the means to a good end. In [those who follow] this
proposition, there is on the one hand an indeterminate
consciousness of the dialectic of the aforementioned positive element in isolated determinations of right or ethics,
or of equally indeterminate general propositions such as
'Thou shalt not kill' or 'Care for your own welfare and
that of your family'. Courts of law and soldiers have not
only the right but also the duty to kill human beings; but
in this case, there are precise definitions as to what kind of
people and what circumstances make this permissible and
obligatory. In the same way, my welfare and that of my
family must also b~ subordinated to higher ends and
thereby reduced to a: means. But what we describe as a
crime is not a general proposition of this kind, left indeterminate and still subject to a dialectic; on the contrary, it
is already delimited in a determinate and objective
manner. Now what is set up in opposition to this
determination - namely that sacred end which is supposed to exonerate the crime - is nothing other than a
subjective opinion of what is good or better. It is the same
thing as happens when volition stops short at the abstract
good,.so that every determinate characteristic of good and
evil or right and wrong which has being and validity in and
for itself is cancelled [mifgehoben], and this determination
is assigned instead to the feeling, imagination [Vrmtellen],
and caprice of the individual.
(e) Subjective opinion is at last expressly acknowledged as the
criterion of right and duty when it is alleged that the
ethical nature of an action is determined by the conviction
which holds something to be right. 1J The good which is
lv1.orality
willed does not yet have a content; and the principle of
conviction contains the further specification that the subsumption of an action under the determination of the
good is the responsibility of the subject. Under these
circumstances, any semblance of ethical objectivity has
completely disappeared. Such doctrines are intimately
connected with that self-styled philosophy, already
frequently referred to, which denies that trotlz - and the
truth of the spirit as will, its rationality in so far as it
actualizes itself, is to be found in the precepts of ethics can be recognized. Since such philosophizing maintains
that the knowledge [Erkenntnis] of truth is an empty vanity
which transcends the sphere of cognition [Erkennen], and
that the latter is a mere semblance, it must immediately
make this very semblance its principle as far as action is
concerned, and thereby equate the ethical with the distinctive outlook of the individual and his particular crmviction.
The degradation into which philosophy has thus sunk
seems at first glance, in the eyes of the world, an utterly
indifferent happening which has affected only the idle talk
of academics; but such a view necessarily becomes part of
our view of ethics, which is an essential component of
philosophy, and only then do the implications of these
views become apparent in and for [the realm of] actuality.
-The dissemination of the view that subjective conviction
is the sole determinant of the ethical nature of an action
has had the effect that references to /zypocrisy, which used
to be frequent, are nowadays uncommon; for to describe
evil as hypocrisy implies that certain actions are i11 and for
tlzemselves misdemeanours, vices, and crimes, and that the
perpetrator is necessarily aware of them as such in so far
as he knows and acknowledges the principles and outward
acts of piety and integrity [Reclztliclzkeit] even within the
pretence in whose interest he misuses them. Or in relation to evil in general, it used to be assumed that it is a
duty to recognize the good and to know how to distinguish
it from evil. But it was at all events an absolute requirement that human beings should not commit vicious and
criminal acts, and that they should be held responsible for
177
q.o
such acts in so far as they are human beings rather than
animals. But if a good heart, good intentions, and subjective conviction are said to be the factors which give actions
their value, there is no longer any hypocrisy or evil at all;
for a person is able to transform whatever he does into
something good by the reflection of good intentions and
motives [Bwegungsgriinde], and the element [Moment] of
his cmrviction renders it good.f Thus, there is no longer
such a thing as crime or vice in and for itself, and instead
of those free and open, hardened and undiluted sinners
referred to above we have a consciousness of complete
justification by intention and conviction. My good intention in my action and my conviction ofits goodness make it
good. In so far as. we speak of judging and pronouncing a
verdict on an action, this principle requires that the agent
should be judged only in terms of his intention and conviction, or of his faith - not in the sense in which Christ
requires faith in objective truth (so that the judgement
passed on a person of bad faith, i.e. on one whose conviction is bad in its content, must also be negative, in keeping
with this evil content), but in the sense ofloyalty to one's
conviction (in so far as a person, in his action, remains true
to his conviction), i.e. in the sense of formal, subjective
loyalty, which is alone in keeping with duty. - Since this
principle of conviction is at the same time subjectively
determined, the thought of the possibility of error must
also thrust itself upon us, and this in tum presupposes a
law which has being in and for itself. But the law [itself]
does not act; only an actual human being acts. And, according to the above principle, the sole criterion of the worth
of human actions is the extent to which the individual
fHtt;tl~ noll: 'That he feels completely amvim:td, I do not doubt in the least. But how
many people proceed from such felt conviction to commit the gravest misdeeds! Thus, if
anything may be excused on such grounds, no ratioTUJI judgmrtnt of good and roil or of
honourable and conttmptiblt dtt:isions is any longer possible; dtlusion then has equal rights
with reason, or rather, reason no longer has any rights or valid authority (Ansthm]
whatsoever; its voice is an absurdity; ht who ha.s no doubts is tht possessor of truth!
I tremble at the consequences of such toleration, which would be exclusively to the
advantage of unreason.' (F. H. Jacobi to Count Holmer, Eutin, 5 August 18oo, commenting on Count Stolberg's change of religion, in Brmnus (Berlin, August t8oa)). 14
Morality
concerned has incorporated the law into his own conviaion.
But if, by this token, it is not actions which are to be
judged by the law in question- i.e. to be measured by it in
any way - i! is impossible to tell what that law is for or
what purpose it is to serve. Such a law is reduced to a
purely external letter, indeed to an empty word, for it is
only my conviction which makes it a la111 and a binding duty
for me. - Such a law may have the authority of God and
the state behind it, and the authority of the thousands of
years for which it was the bond by which human beings
and all their deeds and destinies were held together and
sustained - authorities which encompass countless
individual conviaions. If I then set against all this the authority of my individual conviction - and as my subjective
conviction its validity is merely [that of] authority- this
may at first appear a monstrous presumption. But this
appearance is refuted by the very principle which takes
subjective conviction as its criterion. - If, however, the
higher illogicality of reason and conscience - which shallow science and miserable sophistry can never entirely
banish - admits the possibility of error, the very fact that
crime and evil in general are classed as error reduces the
fault to a minimum. For to err is human,'5 and who has not
been mistaken about this or that circumstance, about
whether there was cabbage or sauerkraut with yesterday's
lunch, and about countless matters of greater and lesser
importance? Yet the distinction between the important
and the unimportant disappears if subjectivity of conviction and adherence to such conviction are the sole
criterion. It is in the nature of the case that the higher
illogicality already referred to should admit the possibility
of error; but when it goes on to say that a bad conviction is
merely an error, it in fact simply becomes another kind of
ilogicality, namely that of dishonesty. For in the first
instance, conviction is supposed to be the basis of ethics
and of man's supreme worth, and is thereby declared to
be a supreme and sacred value; and in the second case, all
that we are concerned with is error, and my conviction is
insignificant and contingent, in fact a purely external
179
circumstance which I may encounter i11 one way or a11other.
And my conviction is indeed an extremely insignificant
thing ifl cannot recognize the truth; foc then it is a matter
of indifference how I think, and all that remains foc me to
think about is that empty good as an abstraction of the
understanding. - It may also be remarked that, as far as
the mode of action of other people in relation to my own
action is concerned, it follows from this principle of justification on grounds of conviction that, if their faith and
conviction make them regard my actions as crimes, they
are quite right to do so- a consequence whereby I am not
only denied all credit in advance, but am on the contrary
simply reduced from a position of freedom and honour to
a situation of unfreedom and dishonour. In the justice to
which I am here subjected- and which in itselfis also my
own justice - I merely experience someone else's subjective conviction and, when it is implemented, I consider
myself acted upon merely by an external force.
(f) Finally, the supreme form in which this subjectivity is
completely comprehended and expressed is that to which
the term 'irony', borrowed from Plato, has been applied/ 6
Only the name is taken from Plato, however, for Plato
used it of a method which Socrates employed in personal
dialogue to defend the Idea of truth and justice against the
complacency of the uneducated consciousness and that of
the Sophists; but it was only this consciousness which he
treated ironically, not the Idea itself. Irony concerns only a
manner of speaking in relation to people; without this personal direction, the essential movement of thought is
dialectic, and Plato was so far from treating the dialectic
in itself[fiirsiclz], let alone irony, as the ultimate factor and
as the Idea itself that, on the contrary, he ended the to and
fro of thought, and particularly of subjective opinion, by
submerging it in the substantiality of the ldea.f The only
fHtgt/'s 1101t: My late colleague Professor Solger11 did admittedly take over the expression 'irony' which Friedrich von Schlegel introduced during an earlier period of his
litera1y career and whose meaning he extended to include that subjectivity which knows
itself as supreme. But Solger's better judgement rejected this definition [Bestimmung1
and his philosophical insight seized upon and retained only one aspect of it, namely the
180
Morality
possible culmination - and this must now be discussed of that subjectivity which regards itself as the ultimate
instance is reached when it knows itself as that power of
resolution and decision on [matters of] truth, right, and
dialectical element proper, the activating pulse of speculative reflection. But I do not find
his conclusions entirely clear, nor can I agree with the concepts which he develops in his
last, substantial work, his detailed Criliqu~ ofAugwt Wilhtlm von Schl~gt!s uaum on
Dram/JlicArl and Liur/Jlur~ (Wimu Jahrbuch, Vol VII, pp. CJO!T.~ 'True irony', says Solger
on that occasion (p. 92), 'starts from the point of view that, as long as human beings live
in this present world, it is only in this world that they can fulfil their destiny, even in the
highest sense of that word. Any means whereby we believe we can transndfiniu mtls is a
vain and nnpy fancy ... Even the highest of things is present to our action only in a
limit~d and finiu shap~. This, if understood correctly, is a Platonic view, very truly
expressed in opposition to that empty striving for the (abstract) infinite which Solger had
previously referred to. But to say that the highest of things is present in a limited and
finiu shape, like the realm of ethics - and the ethical realm is essentially actuality and
action- is very different from saying that it is a.finit~end; the shape and form of finitude
do not deprive the content, i.e. the ethical realm, of any of its substantiality or of the
infinity which is inherent within it. Solger continues: 'And for this very reason, it [the
highest of things] is as insignijiaJnt in us as the lowest of things, and ~ussarif.y perishes
111ith us and our insignificant inte/111. For it is truly present in God alone, and when it
perishes in us, it is transfigured as something divine, in which we would have no share if
there were not an immediate presence of this divinity which becomes manifest even as
our actuality disappears; but the state of mind to which this presence becomes immediately evident in human events themselves is tragic irony.' The arbitrary name 'irony'
would not in itself require comment, but there is an unclarity in the statement that it is
th~ highest ofthings which puiJhes with our insignificance, and that the divine is revealed
only when our actuality disappears, as when we are told on page 91: 'We see heroes lose
faith in the noblest and finest aspects of their dispositions and feelings, not only in
relation to what these lead to, but also in relation to their souru and thdrvalur; indeed, we
are elevated by the do111n[all ofth~ best itself.' The tragic downfall of figures of the highest
ethical worth can interest us, elevate us, and reconcile us to its occurrence only in so far
as such figures appear in mutual opposition, with equally justified but distinct ethical
powers which have unfortunately come into collision. (The just downfall of complete and
self -important rogues and criminals - as, for instance, the hero of the modem tragedy
Guilt [Di~Schulaf 8 - cenainly has an interest for criminal law, but not for true art, with
which we are here concerned.) As a result of this opposition to an ethical principle, they
incur guilt, from which the right and wrong of both parties emerges, and with it the true
ethical Idea which, purified and triumphing over this 011~-sUkdness, is thereby reconciled
in us. Accordingly, it is not the highest thing in us which perishes, and we are dt!ooUdnot
by thul1J111n[all ofthtbest but, on the contrary, by the triumph of the true. This is the true
and purely ethical interest of ancient tragedy, as I have explained more fully in my
Phmommologyo[Spirit (pp. 404ff.; cf. pp. 683ff:).l 9 (In romantic tragedy, this determination undergoes a fiuther modification.) But the ethical Idea, 111ithou1 st~eh unfortunau
collisions and the downfall of the individuals caught up in this misfortune, is actual and
presmt in the ethical world; and that this highest of things should not aj)Mar insignifiamt
in its actuality is what the real ethical existence [Eristmz], the state, takes as its end and
puts into effect, and what the ethical self-consciousness possesses, intuits, and knows,
and thinking cognition comprehends, in tht stalt.
r8r
140
duty which is already implicitly [an sich] present within the
preceding forms. Thus, it does indeed consist in knowledge of the objective side of ethics, but without that selfforgetfulness and self-renunciation which seriously
immerses itself in this objectivity and makes it the basis of
its action. Although it has a relation [Bezielzung] to this
objectivity, it at the same time distances itself from it and
knows itself as that which wills and resolves in a particular
way but may equally well will and resolve otherwise. - 'You
in fact honestly accept a law as existing in and for itselr [it
says to others]; 'I do so, too, but I go further than you, foc
I am also beyond thls law and can do this or that as I
please. It is not the thing [Sac/ze] which is excellent, it is I
who am excellent and master of both law and thing; I
merely play with them as with my own caprice, and in this
ironic consciousness in which I let the highest of things
perish, I merely enjoy myse/j.- In this shape, subjectivity is
not only empty of all ethical content [die Eitelkeit alles sittliclzen /nhalts] in the way of rights, duties, and laws, and is
accordingly evil (evil, in fact, of an inherently wholly
universal kind); in addition, its form is that of subjective
emptiness [Eitelkeit], in that it knows itself as this emptiness of all content and, in this knowledge, knows itselfas
the absolute. - The extent to which this absolute selfsatisfaction does not simply remain a solitary worship of
the self, but may even form a communi~y whose bond and
substance consist, for example, in mutual assurances of
conscientiousness, good intentions, and enjoyment of this
reciprocal purity, but above all in basking in the glory of
this self-knowledge and self-expression and of cherishing
and cultivating such pursuits; and the extent to which
what has been called the 'beautiful soul' (i.e. that nobler
kind of subjectivity which fades away inasmuch as it is
empty of all objectivity and thus has no actuality of its
own), and certain other phenomena [Gestaltrmger1] are
related to the stage [of subjectivity] which we are here
considering - these are questions which I have discussed
in the Phetlomet~ology of Spirit (pp. 6osfT.). The whole of
Section (c) of that work, 'The Conscience', should be
Morality
compared with what is said here, especially in relation to
the transition to a higher stage in general (although the
latter is defined differently in the Phcnomenology).20
Additio11 (H). Representational thought [Vomellrorg] can go further and

transform the evil will into a semblance of goodness. Even if it cannot
alter the nature of evil, it can nevertheless make it appear to be good. For
every action has a positive aspect, and since the determination of good as
opposed to evil can likewise be reduced to the positive, I can maintain that
my action is good with reference to my intention. Thus, evil is connected
with good not only within the consciousness, but also in its positive aspect.
If the self-consciousness passes its action off as good only for the benefit
of other people, it takes the form of hypocrisy; but ifit is able to assert that
the deed is good in its own estimation, too, we have reached that even
higher level of subjectivity which knows itself as absolute. For subjectivity
of this kind, good and evil in and fa- themselves have disappeared, and it
can pass off as good or evil whatever its wishes and its ability dictate. This
is the point of view of absolute sophistry which sets itself up as a legislator
and refers the distinction between good and evil to its own arbitrary will.
As for hypocrisy, this includes above all those religious hypocrites (or
Tartuffes) who comply with all ceremonial requirements and may even be
pious in themselves [fiir sicll], while at the same time doing whatever they
please. Nowadays, there is no longer much talk of hypocrites, partly
because this accusation appears too harsh, and partly because hypocrisy in
its immediate shape has more or less disappeared. This barefaced lie and
cloak of goodness has now become too transparent not to be seen
through, and the distinction between doing good on the one hand and evil
on the other is no longer present to the same extent since increasing
education has made such antithetical determinations seem less clear-cut.
Instead, hypocrisy has now assumed the subtler guise [Gestalt] of probabilism, which consists in the attempt to represent a transgression as something good from the point of view of one's own conscience. This can only
occur where morality and goodness are determined by an authority, so
that there are as many reasons as there are authorities for maintaining that
evil is good. Casuistic theologians, especially Jesuits, have worked on
these cases of conscience and endlessly multiplied them.
As these cases are refined to the highest pitch of subtlety, numerous

.collisions arise, and the antithesis of good and evil becomes so blurred
that, in individual instances, the opposite poles prove interchangeable. All
that is asked for is probability, that is, an approximation to goodness which
can be substantiated by some reason or by some authority. Thus, this
point of view has the peculiar determination of possessing only an abstract
content; the concrete content is presented as inessential - or rather, it is
Plzi!oSlJplzy ofRight
allowed to depend on mere opinion. In this way, someone may have
committed a crime while willing the good. If, for example, an evil man is
murdered, the assertion that the murderer wished to resist evil and to
diminish it can be passed off as the positive aspect [of the deed]. The next
step beyond probabilism is that it is no longer someone else's authority or
assertion that counts, but the subject itself, i.e. its OIPII conviction, which
can alone make something good The inadequacy of this is that everything
is made to refer solely to conviction, and that there is no longer any right
which has being in and for itself, a right for which this conviction would
merely be the form. It is not, of course, a matter of indifference whether I
do something from habit or custom or because I am thoroughly persuaded of its truth. But objective truth is also different from my conviction,
for the latter makes no distinction whatsoever between good and evil;
conviction always remains conviction, and the bad can only be that of
which I am not convinced. While this point of view is that of a supreme
instance which obliterates good and evil, it at the same time acknowledges
that it is subject to error, and to this extent, it is brought down from its
exalted position and again becomes contingent and appears to deserve no
respect. Now this form is irUflJ, the consciousness that such a principle of
conviction is of little value and that, within this supreme criterion, only
arbitrariness prevails. This point of view was in fact a product of Fichte's
philosophy, which maintains that the is absolute, i.e. that it is absolute
certainty, the universal selfhood [/cllheit] whose further develdpment
leads to objectivity.21 It cannot in fact be said ofFichte that he rrlade the
arbitrary will of the subject into a principle in the practical sphere, but this
[principle of the] particular, in the sense of Friedrich von Schlegel's
'particular selfhood', was itselflater elevated to divine status in relation to
the good and the beautiful. This implies that objective goodness is merely
something constructed by my conviction, sustained by me alone, and that
I, as lord and master, can make it come and go [as I please]. As soon as I
relate myself to something objective, it ceases to exist for me, and so I am
poised above an immense void, conjuring up shapes and destroying them.
This supremely subjective point of view can arise only in a highly
cultivated age in which faith has lost its seriousness, which now exists
essentially only in the vanity of aU things.
.W.arality
TRANSITION FROM MORALITY TO ETHICAL LIFE
141
For the good as the substantial universal of freedom, but still as

something abstraa, determinations of some kind are therefore
required, as is a determining principle (although this principle is identical with the good itself). For the conscimce likewise, as the purely
abstract principle of determination, it is required that its determinations should be universal and objective. Both of them [i.e. the good
and the conscience], if raised in this way to independent totalities [/iir
sic/1 zur Totalitiil], become the indeterminate which ouglzt to be
determined. - But the integration of these two relative totalities into
absolute identity has already been accomplished i'1 itself, since this
very subjectivity of pure se/f-certaimy, melting away for itself in its
emptiness, is identical with the abstract u'1iversality of the good; the
identity - which is accordingly concrete - of the good and the subjective will, the truth of them both, is etlzicallifo.
A conceptual transition of this kind can be understood more
fully with the help of logic. Here, it need only be said that the
nature of the limited and the finite -which in this case are the
abstract good which merely ouglztto be, and an equally abstract
subjectivity which merely ouglztto be good- is for them to have
their opposite present witlzi'1 tlzem, the good its actuality, and
subjectivity (the moment of the actuality of the ethical) the
good; but since they are one-sided, they are not yet posited as
what they are i'1 themselves. They become posited in their
negativity, for as they or1e-sidedly constitute themselves as
independent totalities, both refusing to accept what is present
in itself within them - the good lacking subjectivity and
determination, and the determinant, i.e. subjectivity, lacking
what has being in itself - they cancel themselves out [sic/1
azif/1ebm] and are thereby reduced to moments, to moments of
the concept which becomes manifest as their unity and has
attained reality through this very positing of its moments, so
that it now exists as Idea; this is the concept which has developed its determinations to reality and which is simultaneously
present in their identity as their essence wlziclz lzas being in
I4Q-I4I
itself. - That existence [Dasein] of freedom which was
immediately present as riglzt is determined in the reflection of
self -consciousness as the good; the third stage, present here h.
its transition as the truth of this good and of subjectivity, is
therefore also the truth of subjectivity and of right. - The
etlzica/ is a subjective disposition, but of that right which has
being in itself. That this Idea is the tn1tl1 of the concept of
freedom cannot be assumed or derived from feeling or from
any other source, but, in philosophy, can only be pruved. Its
deduction consists solely in the fact that right and the moral
self-consciousness can be seen in themselves to return to this
Idea as their own resrJt.- Those who think they can dispense
with proofs and deductions in philosophy show that they are
still far from forming the least idea of what philosophy is; they
may well speak on other matters, but those who wish to speak
without the concept have no right to participate in philosophical discourse.
Addition (H). Both principles which we have so far considered, the

abstract good and the conscience, lack their opposite: the abstract good
evaporates into a complete powerlessness which I can endow with any
content whatsoever, and subjectivity of spirit becomes no less
impoverished in that it lacks any objective significance. A longing may
therefore arise fa- an objective condition, a condition in which the human
being gladly debases himself to servitude and total subjection simply in
order to escape the tonnent of vacuity and negativity. If many Protestants
have recendy gone over to the Catholic Church,' they have done so
because they found that their inner life was impoverished, and they
reached out for a fixed point, a support, and an authority, even if what
they gained was not exacdy the stability of thought. The unity of the
subjective with the objective good which has being in and for itself is
ethical life, and the reconciliation which takes place in it is in accord with
the concept. For whereas morality is the fonn of the will in general in its
subjective aspect, ethical life is not just the subjective fonn and selfdetermination of the will: it also has its own concept, namely freedom, as
its content. The sphere of right and that of morality cannot exist
independendy [/Ur siclz]; they must have the ethical as their support and
foundation. For right lacks the moment of subjectivity, which in tum
belongs solely to morality, so that neither of the two moments has any
independent actuality. Only the infinite, the Idea, is actual. Right exists
only as a branch of a whole, or as a climbing plant attached to a tree which
has fum roots in and for itself.
x86
PART THREE
Ethical Life
142
Ethical life is the Idea of freedom as the living good which has its
knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality
through self-conscious action. Similarly, it is in ethical being that selfconsciousness has its motivating end1 and a foundation which has
being in and for itself. Ethical life is accordingly the concept offreedom
which has become the existing [vorha11denm] world and the 11alure of
self-consciousness.
Since this unity of the concept of the will with its existence [Dasein ],
i.e. with the particular will, is knowledge, consciousness of the difference between these moments of the Idea is present, but in such a
way that each of these moments has become for itself the totality of
the Idea and has the latter as its foundation and content.
(a) The objective sphere of ethics, which takes the place of the
abstract good, is substance made concrete by subjectivity as itifinite

fonn. It therefore posits dislit~aimu within itself which are thus
determined by the concept. These distinctions give the ethical a fixed
content which is necessary for itself, and whose existence [Bestehen] is
exalted above subjective opinions and preferences: they are laws a11d
imtitutions which have being in and for themselves.
Addition (H). In ethical life as a whole, both objective and subjective
moments are present, but these are merely its forms. Its substance is the
good, that is, the fulfilment of the objective [united] with subjectivity. If
we consider ethical life from the objective point of view, we may say that
ethical man is unconscious of elf. In this sense, Antigone proclaims
t no one kriows where the laws come from: they are eternal 1 That is,
their determination has being in and for itself and issues from the nature
of the thing [Sache]. But this substantial element is also endowed with
consciousness, although the status of the latter is always only that of a
moment
189
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these determinations
of the Idea constitutes its rationality. In this way, the ethical sphere is
freedom, or the will which has being in and for itself as objectivity, as
a circle of necessity whose moments are the etllical powers which
govern the lives of individuals. In these individuals- who are accidental to them - these powers have their representation [Vm:ttellung],
phenomenal shape [ersc/zei1letllie Gestalt], and actuality.
Addition (H). Since the determinations of ethics constitute the concept of

freedom, they are the substantiality or universal essence of individuals,
who are related to them merely as accidents. Whether the individual
exists or not is a matter of indifference to objective ethical life,. which
alone has permanence and is the power by which the lives of individuals
are governed. Ethical life has therefore been represented to nations as
eternal justice, or as gods who have being in and for themselves, and in
relation to whom the vain pursuits of individuals are merely a play of the
waves.
"Trans/alar's nou: Ein an111ogmtles Spit/, literaRy 'an upward-surging play'. The word
an1110gmtles., perhaps a reminiscence of Goethe's poem 'Grenzen der Menschheit'
('Limitations of Mankind')/ which likens man, in contrast to the gods, to an evanescent
phenomenon borne upwards by, then sinking beneath, the waves, is not found in
Hotho's transcription of Hegel's lectures, from which Gans compiled this Addition (see
VPR m, 485). It was therefore presumably added by Gans himself.
(~) In this actual self-consciousness [which it now possesses], the substance knows itself and is thus an object [Objekt] of knowledge. In
relation to the subject, the ethical substance and its laws and powers
are on the one hand an object [Gegetzstand], inasmuch as tlley are, in
the supreme sense of self-sufficiency. They are thus an absolute
authority and power, infinitely more firmly based than the being of
nature.
The sun, moon, mountains, rivers, and all natural objects

[Naturobjekte] around us are. They have, in relation to consciousness, the authority not only of being in the first place, but
also of having a particular nature which the consciousness
acknowledges, and by which it is guided in its behaviour
rgo
Ethical Life
145-148
towards them, its dealings with them, and its use of them. The
authority of ethical laws is infinitely higher, because natural
things [Naturdinge] display rationality only in a completely
external and fragmented manner and conceal it under the guise
[Gestalt] of contingency.
On the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject. On the
contrary, the subject bears spiritual witness to them as to its own essence,
in which it has its self-awareness [Selbstgefiilzlj and lives as in its element which is not distinct from itself - a relationship which is
immediate and closer to identity than even [a relationship of]faitlz or
tmst. 1
Faith and trust arise with the emergence of reflection, and

they presuppose representations and distinctions [Vorstel/ung
und Untersclziedj. For example, to believe in pagan religion and
to be a pagan are two different things. That relationship - or
rather, that relationless identity - in which the ethical is the
actual living principle [Lebendigkeit] of self-consciousness,
may indeed tum into a relationship of faith and conviction or a
relationship mediated by fiutlzer reflection, into insight
grounded on reasons, which may also begin with certain particular ends, interests, and considerations, with hope or fear,
or with historical presuppositions. But adequate cognition of
this identity belongs to conceptual thought [dem denkenden
Begri.ffi).
All these substantial determinations are duties which are binding on

the will of the individual; for the individual, as subjective and
inherently undetermined - or determined in a particular way - is
distinct from them and consequently stands in a relations/zip to tlzem as to
his own substantial being.
The ethical tlzeory of duties [Pjliclztenlelzre]l - i.e. in its objective
sense, not as supposedly comprehended in the empty
principle of moral subjectivity, which in fact determines
nothing (see 134) - therefore consists in that systematic
development of the circle of ethical necessity which follows
here in Part 111ree of the work.2 The difference between its
presentation here and the form of a theory ofduJies lies solely in
the fact that the following account merely shows that ethical
determinations are necessary relations, and does not proceed
to add in every case 'this determination is therefore a duty for
human beings'. - A theory of duties, unless it forms part of
philosophical science, will take its material from existing relations and show its connection with one's own ideas [Vontellungen] and with commonly encountered principles and
thoughts, ends, drives, feelings [Empfindungen], etc.; and as
reasons in favour of each duty, it may also adduce the further
consequences which this duty may have with reference to
other ethical relations and to welfare and opinion. But an
immanent and consistent theory of duties can be nothing
other than the development of those relations which are necessitated by the Idea of freedom, and are therefore aaual in their
entirety, within the state.
A binding duty can appear as a limitation only in relation to indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom, and to the drives of the natural
will or of the moral will which arbitrarily determines its own indeterminate good. The individual, however, finds his liberation in duty. On
the one hand, he is liberated from his dependence on mere natural
drives, and from the burden he labours under as a particular subject
in his moral reflections on obligation and desire; and on the other
hand, he is liberated from that indeterminate subjectivity which does
not attain existence [Dasein] or the objective determinacy of acpon,
but remains within itself and has no actuality. In duty, the individual
liberates himself so as to attain substantial freedom.
Addition (H). Duty places limits only on the arbitrary will of subjectivity
and clashes only \vith that abstract good to which subjectivity clings.
When people say that they want to be free, this means primarily only that
they want to be free in an abstract sense, and every determination and
division [Giiedenmg] within the state is regarded as a limitation of that
freedom/ To this extent, duty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of
Etlzical Life
freedom in the abstract, that is, of unfreedom: it is the attainment of
essential being, the acquisition of affirmative freedom.
The ethical, in so far as it is reflected in the naturally determined

character of the individual as such, is virtue; and in so far as virtue
represents nothing more than the simple adequacy of the individual to
the duties of the circumstances [Verlliiltnisse] to which he belongs, it is
rectitude.
In an ethical community, it is easy to say whlll someone must
do and what the duties are which he has to fulfil in order to be
virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly
stated, and known to him within his situation. Rectitude is the
universal quality which may be required of him, partly by right
and partly by ethics. But from the point of view of morality,
rectitude can easily appear as something of a lower order,
beyond which one must impose further demands on oneself
and others. For the craving to be something special [Besonderes]
is not satisfied with the universal, with what has being in and
for itself; only in the exceptional does it attain consciousness of
its distinctiveness. - The different aspects of rectitude may
equally well be called virtues, because they are likewise
properties of the individual - although not exclusive to him in
comparison with other individuals. But talk of virtue in general
can easily verge on empty declamation, because it refers only
to something abstract and indeterminate; and such talk, with
its reasons and descriptions [Darstellzmgen], is directed at the
individual as arbitrary will and subjective caprice. Within a
given ethical order whose relations are fully developed and
actualized, virtue in the proper sense has its place and actuality
only in extraordinary circumstances, or where the above relations come into collision. But such collisions must be genuine
ones, for moral reflection can invent collisions for itself
wherever it likes and so give itself a consciousness that something special [Besonderenz] is involved and that sacrifices have
been made. 1 This is why the form of virtue as such appears
more frequently in uncivilized societies and communities, for
193
in such cases, the ethical and its actualization depend more on
individual discretion and on the distinctive natural genius of
individuals. In this way, the ancients ascribed vinue to
Hercules in particular. 2 And since, in the states of antiquity,
ethical life had not yet evolved into this free system of selfsufficient development and objectivity, this deficiency had to
be made good by the distinctive genius of individuals. - If the
theory [Le/m] of virtues is not just a theory of duties and thus
includes the particular aspects of character which are
determined by nature, it will therefore be a r~atural history of
spirit.
Since virtues are the ethical in its particular application,
and since, in this subjective respect, they are indeterminate,
the quantitative principle of more or less will play a part in
their determination.; Discussion of them will therefore
involve those defects or vices which are opposed to them, as in
Aristotle, who judiciously defined each particular virtue as a
mean between an excess and a deficiency. - The same content
which assumes the form of duties and then of virtues also takes
the form of drives (see Remarks to I g). Their basic content is
the same, but in drives, this content still belongs to the
immediate will and to natural sensation and has not developed
far enough to attain the determination of the ethical. Drives
therefore have in common with the content of duties and
virtues only their abstract object [Gegenstar~d], and since this is
indeterminate in itself, it cannot serve to distinguish them as
good or evil. Alternatively, if we abstract their positive aspect
from them, they are good, and conversely, if we abstract their
negative aspect, they are evil (see I 8).
Additi011 (H,G). If this or that particular action of a person is ethical, this

does not exactly make him virtuous; it does so only if this mode of conduct
is a constant feature of his character. Virtue consists rather in ethical
virtuosity, and if we speak less about virtue nowadays than before, the
reason [Gnmd] is that the ethical is no longer so much the form of a
particular individual. The French, above all, are the people who speak
most of virtue, because with them, the individual is characterized more by
his distinctive qualities and by a natural mode of behaviour. The Germans, on the other hand, are more thoughtful, and in their case, the same
content acquires the form of universality.
I94
Etlzical Life
ISo-IS2
But if it is simply identical with the actuality of individuals, the ethical

[das Sittliclze], as their general mode of behaviour, appears as custom
[Sitle]; and the lzabit of the ethical appears as a second nature' which
takes the place of the original and purely natural will and is the allpervading soul, significance, and actuality of individual existence
[Daseitz]. It is spirit living and present as a world, and only thus does
the substance of spirit begin to exist as spirit.
Addition (H,G). just as nature has its laws, and as animals, trees, and the
sun obey their law, so is custom the law appropriate to the spirit of
freedom. Custom is what right an!f morality have not yet reached, namely
spirit For in right, particularity is not yet that of the concept, but only of
the natural will. Similarly, from the point of view of morality, self-consciousness is not yet spiritual consciousness. At this stage, it is merely a
question of the value of the subject in itself- that is, the subject which
determines itself in accordance with good as opposed to evil still has the
form of arbitrary will. Here, on the other hand, at the level of ethics, the
will is present as the will of spirit and has a substantial content which is in
conformity with itself. Education [Piidagogik] is the art of making human
beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how
they can be reborn, and how their original nature can be transformed into
a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes /zabitr~al to
them. In habit, the opposition between the natural and the subjective will
disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken; to this extent,
habit is part of ethics, just as it is part of philosophical thought, since the
latter requires that the mind [der Geist] should be trained to resist arbitrary fancies and that these should be destroyed and overcome to clear the
way for rational thought Human beings even die as a result of habit- that
is, if they have become totally habituated to life and mentally rKeistig) and
physically blunted, and the opposition between subjective consciousness
and mental activity has disappeared. For they are active only in so far as
they have not yet attained something and wish to assert themselves and
show what they can do in pursuit of it. Once this is accomplished, their
activity and vitality disappear, and the loss of interest which ensues is
mental or physical death.
In this way, etlzica/ subslatlliality has attained its riglzt, and the latter has
attained validity. That is, the self-will of the individual [des Einzelnen],
195
Philosophy ofRight
and his own conscience in its attempt to exist for itself and in opposition to the ethical substantiality, have disappeared; for the ethical
character knows that the end which moves it1 is the universal which,
though itself unmoved, has developed through its determinations into
actual rationality, and it recognizes that its own dignity and the whole
continued existence [Bestehen] of its particular ends are based upon
and actualized within this universal. Subjectivity is itself the absolute
form and existent actuality of substance, and the difference between
the subject on the one hand and substance as its object [Gegenstand],
end, and power on the other is the same as their difference in form,
both of which differences have disappeared with equal immediacy.
Subjectivity, which is the ground in which the concept of
freedom has its existence [Existenz] (see 106), and which, at
the level of morality, is still distinct from this its own concept,
is, in the ethical realm, that [mode of] existence of the concept
which is adequate to it.
The right of individuals to their subjective deten11inatio" to freedom is

fulfilled in so far as they belong to ethical actuality; for their certainty
of their own freedom has its ITUlh in such objectiv~ty, and it is in the
ethical realm that they actually possess their own essence and their
inner universality (see 147).
When a father asked him for advice about the best way of
educating his son in ethical matters, a Pythagorean replied:
'Make him the citizen ofa state with good /fJlDs.' (This saying has
also been attributed to others.)1
Addition (H). Those pedagogical experiments in removing people from

the ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the count:Iy (cf.
Rousseau's Emile) have been futile, because one cannot successfully isolate people from the laws of the world.2 Even if young people have to be
educated in solitude, no one should imagine that the breath of the
spiritual world will not eventually find its way into this solitude and that
the power of the world spirit is too weak for it to gain control of such
remote regions. The individual attains his right only by becoming the
citizen of a good state.
Etlzicol Lifo
ISZ-157
The right of individuals to their particularity is likewise contained in

ethical substantiality, for particularity is the mode of outward
appearance in which the ethical exists.
ISS
Hence duty and rigl1t coincide in this identity of the universal and the
particular will, and in the ethical realm, a human being has rights in so
far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights. In abstract
right, I have the right and someone else has the corresponding duty;
and in morality, it is merely an obligation that the right of my own
knowledge and volition, and of my welfare, should be united with my
duties and exist objectively.
Addition (H). The slave can have no duties; only the free human being has
these. If all rights were on one side and all duties on the other, the whole
would disintegrate, for their identity is the only basis we have to hold on to
here.
The ethical substance, as containing self-consciousness which has

being for itself and is united with its concept, is the actual spirit of a
family and a people.
Addition (H). The ethical is not abstract like the good, but is intensely
actual. The spirit has actuality, and the individuals are its accidents.
Thus, there are always only two possible viewpoints in the ethical realm:
either one starts from substantiality, or one proceeds atomistically and
moves upward from the basis of individuality [Einz.ellleit]. This latter
viewpoint excludes spirit, because it leads only to an aggregation, whereas
spirit is not something individual [11id1ts Einzelrlt!S] but the unity of the
individual and the universal.
157
The concept of this Idea has being only as spirit, as self-knowledge
and actuality, because it is the objectivization of itself, the movement
through the form of its moments. It is therefore
197
A. immediate or 11atural ethical spirit - the fomi(y.
This substantiality passes over into loss of unity, division, and the
point of view of relativity, and is thus
B. civil society, i.e. an association of members as self-sufficient individuals [Einzelrter] in what is therefore afomllll universality, occasioned
by their needs and by the legal constitution as a means of security for
persons and property, and by an external order for their particular
and common interests.
This external state
C. withdraws and comes to a focus in the end and actuality of the
substantial universal and of the public life which is dedicated to
this - i.e. in the constitution of the state.
SECTION I
The Family
The family, as the immediate s11bstantiality of spirit, has as its
determination the spirit's feeling [Empfindung] of its own unity, which
is luve. Thus, the disposition [appropriate to the family) is to have selfconsciousness of one's individuality within this unity as essentiality
which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as an
independent person [eine Person for sich] but as a member.
Addition (H,G). Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with

another, so that I am not isolated on my own rfiir midz], but gain my selfconsciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence
[meir~es FUrsichseirzs] and through knowing myself as the unity of myself
with another and of the other with me. But love is a feeling [Empfindrmg],
that is, ethical life in its natural form. In the state, it is no longer present.
There, one is conscious of unity as law; there, the content must be
rational, and I must know it. The first moment in love is that I do not wish
to be an independent person in my own right (fiir mich] and that, ifl were,
I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find
myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [daft it:h in
ilr gelte], who in tum gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most
immense contradiction; the understanding cannot re5olve it, because
there is nothing more intractable than this punctiliousness of the selfconsciousness which is negated and which I ought nevertheless to possess
as affirmative. Love is both the production and the resolution of this
contradiction. As its resolution, it is ethical unity.
1 99
159
The right which belongs to the individual [dem Einzelnen] by virtue of
the family unit and which consists primarily in his life within this unit
takes on legal fumz [die Form Reclztens], as the abstract moment of
detemzinate individlllllity [Ei1zzelheit], only when the family begins to
dissolve. In this situation, those who ought to be members [of the
family] become, in their disposition and actuality, like self-sufficient
persons, and they now receive separately and in a purely external
manner - [in the shape of] financial resources, food, costs of education [Erzielnmg], etc. - what was formerly their due as a determinate
moment within the family.
Additiun (G). The right of the family properly consists in the fact that its
substantiality should have existence [Dasei11]. It is thus a right against
externality and against defection from the family unit On the other hand,
love is itself a feeling [Empfindzmg], subjective in character, and unity
cannot assert itself against it. Thus, if unity is required, it can be required
only with reference to those things [Diage] which are by nature external
and not conditioned by feeling.
160
The family attains completion in these three respects:
(a) in the shape of its immediate concept, as marriage;
(b) in external existence [Dasein], as the property and assets ri the
family and their administration;
(c) in the bringing up of children and the dissolution of the family.
A. iW.aniage
161
Marriage, as the immediate ethical relationship, contains fint the
moment of natural vitality; and since it is a substantial relationship,
this involves life in its totality, namely as the actuality of the species
[Gatllmg] and its process (see Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
"Translalor~
nole: In this context or marriage and the ramily, the word Galllmg (genus,
species) carries with it strong overtones or the closely related word /kgmlllng (mating,
copulation). Hegel, who habitually exploits such et}-mological relationships, is doubtless
aware or this affinity.
zoo
Ethical Life
IS9-I62
Sciences, I 67ff. and 288ff.). 1 But secor1d/y, in self-consciousness, the

u11im1 of the natural sexes, which was merely i1l11Jard (or had being only
in itse/j) and whose existence [E.tistolz] was for this very reason merely
external, is transformed into a spiritual union, into self-conscious love.
Additio11 (G). Marriage is essentially an ethical relationship. Formerly,
especially under most systems of natural law, it was considered only in its
physical aspect or natural character. It was accordingly regarded only as a
sexual relationship, and its other determinations remained completely
inaccessible.2 But it i~ equally crude to interpret marriage merely as a civil
contract, a notion (Vmtel/ung] which is still to be found even in KantJ On
this interpretation, marriage gives contractual form to the arbitrary relations between individuals, and is thus debased to a contract entitling the
parties concerned to use one another. A third and equally unacceptable
notion is that which simply equates marriage with love; for love, as a
feeling [Empfirulrmg], is open in all respects to contingency, and this is a
shape which the ethical may not assume.4 Marriage should therefore be
defined more precisely as rightfully ethical [reclulich sittliche] love, so that
the transient, capricious, and purely subjective aspects of love are
excluded from it.
162
The subjective origin of marriage may lie to a greater extent in the
particular inclination of the two persons who enter this relationship, or

in the foresight and initiative of parents, etc. But its objective origin is
the free consent of the persons concerned, and in particular their
consent to constitute a sir1gle persor1 and to give up their natural and
individual personalities within this union. In this respect, their union
is a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation.
To enter the state of marriage is an objective determination,
and hence an ethical duty. The external origin of a given
marriage is by nature contingent, and depends in particular on
the level of development [Bildzmg] of reflective thought
[Rqlerio11]. At one extreme, the initial step is taken by wellintentioned parents, and when the persons destined to be
united in love get to know each other as destined partners, a
mutual inclination results. At the other extreme, it is the
mutual inclination of the two persons, as these infinitely parti201
cularized individuals, which arises first - The former
extreme, or any way at all in which the decision to marry
comes first and is followed by the inclination so that the two
come together in the actual marital union, can itself be
regarded as the more ethical course.- In the latter extreme, it
is i1ljinitely pmticular distincmess [Eigentiimlichkeit] which
asserts its claims; this is associated with the subjective
principle of the modem world (see Remarks to 1 24 above).
- But in those modem dramas and other artistic presentations
in which love between the sexes is the basic interest, we
encounter a pervasive element of frostiness which is brought
into the heat of the passion such works portray by the total
ronti11gency associated with it. For the whole interest is
represented as resting solely upon these particular individuals.
This may well be ofinfinite importance for them, but it is of no
such importance in itselP
Addition (H). Among those peoples who hold the female sex in little
respect, the parents arrange marriages arbitrarily, without consulting the
individuals concerned; the latter accept this arrangement, since the particularity of feeling [Empfi,uitmg] makes no claims for itself as yet. The
girl's only concern is to find a husband, and the man's to find a wife.
Under other circumstances, considerations of wealth [des Vennogms],
connections, or political ends may determine the outcome. This may have
very harsh effects, inasmuch as marriage is made a means to other ends.
In modem times, on the other hand, the subjective origin [of marriage],
the stale ofbeit~git~ luve, is regarded as the only important factor. Here, it is
imagined that each must wait until his hour has struck, and that one can
give one's love only to a specific individual.
The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the consciousness of this

union as a substantial end, and hence in love, trust, and the sharing of
the whole ofindividual existence [Existmz]. When this disposition and
actuality are present, the natural drive is reduced to the modality of a
moment of nature which is destined to be extinguished in its very
satisfaction, while the spiritual bond asserts its rights as the substantial
factor and thereby stands out as indissoluble i11 itselfand exalted above
the contingency of the passions and of particular transient caprice.
202
Ethical Life
It was noted above ( 75) that marriage is not a contractual
relationship as far as its essential basis is concerned. For the
precise nature of marriage is to begin from the point of view of
contract- i.e. that of individual personality as a self-sufficient
unit- in order to supersede it [ilm auftulzeben]. That identification of personalities whereby the family is a single person and its
members are its accidents (although substance is essentially
the relationship of accidents to itself- see Encyclopaedia oftlze
Plzilosoplzical Sciences, 95) 1 is the ethical spirit. Taken by
itself (/lir siclz] - i.e. stripped of the many external features it
possesses by virtue ofits existence [Dasein] in tlzese individuals
and in those interests of (the realm of] appearance which are
determined in time and in various different ways- and viewed
in a shape appropriate to representational thought, this spirit
has been venerated as the Penates etc.; and in general it is in
this spirit that the religious character of marriage and the
family, i.e. piety, is em bodied. 2 It is a further abstraction if the
divine and substantial is separated from its existence [Dasein]
in such a way that feeling [Empfindrmg] and the consciousness
of spiritual unity are categorized [/itiert] as what is falsely
called Platonic love. This separation is associated with the
monastic attitude which defines the moment of natural life
[Lebendigkeit] as utterly negative and, by this very separation,
endows it with infinite importance in itself [/iir sic/z ].
corzcubir~age inasmuch as the latter
is chiefly concerned with the satisfaction of the natural drive, whereas this
drive is made subordinate within marriage. This is why, within marriage,
one may speak unblushingly of natural functions which, in extra-marital
relationships, would produce a feeling of shame. But this is also why
marriage should be regarded as indissoluble in itself, for the end of
marriage is the ethical end, which is so exalted that everything else
appears powerless against it and subject to its authority. Marriage should
not be disrupted by passion, for the latter is subordinate to it. But it is
indissoluble only ir1 itself, fer as Christ says, divorce is permitted only
'because of the hardness of their hearts'. 3 Since marriage contains the
moment of feeling [Empfindu7lg], it is not absolute but unstable, and it has
within it the possibility of dissolution. But all legislations must make such
dissolution as difficult as possible and uphold the right of ethics against
caprice.
Addiliorz (H,G). Marriage differs from
203
Just as the stipulation of a contract in itself (fiir sich] contains the

genuine transfer of property (see 79), so also do the solemn declaration of consent to the ethical bond of marriage and its recognition and
confirmation by the family and community constitute the formal conclusion and actuality of marriage. (That the church plays a part in this
connection is a further determination which cannot be discussed
here.) It is accordingly only after this ceremony has first taken place, as
the completion of the substantial [aspect of marriage] by means of the
sign - i.e. by means of language as the most spiritual existence
[Dasein] of the spiritual (see 78) - that this bond has been ethically
constituted. The sensuous moment which pertains to natural life
[Lebendigkeit] is thereby put in its ethical context [Verlliiltnis] as an
accidental consequence belonging to the external existence of the
ethical bond, which may even consist exclusively in mutual love and
support.
If, in order to establish or assess the legal determinations [of
marriage], it is asked what the chief end of marriage is, this
chief end will be understood to mean whatever individual
aspect of its actuality is to be regarded as more essential than
the others. But no one aspect on its own [/Ur sich] constitutes
the whole extent of its content which has being in and for
itself - that is, of its ethical character - and one or other
aspect of its existence [Existenz] may be absent, without
prejudice to the essence of marriage. - If the conclusion of
marriage as such - i.e. the ceremony whereby the essence of
this bond is expressed and confirmed as an ethical quality
exalted above the contingency of feeling [Empfindung] and particular inclination - is seen as an external fonna/ity and a socalled purely civil precept, nothing remains of this act except
perhaps the purpose [Zweck] of edification and of attesting the
civil relationship [of the marriage partners]. Or indeed, it is
the merely positive, arbitrary enactment of a civil or
ecclesiastical precept, which is not only indifferent to the
nature of marriage, but also- in so far as the emotions are
inclined by this precept to attach a value to the formal conclusion [of marriage] and to regard it as a condition which must
204
Ethical Life
be fulfilled before the partners can commit themselves totally
to each other - brings disunity into" the disposition of love
and, as an alien factor, runs counter to the inwardness of this
union. Although such an opinion claims to impart the highest
conception of the freedom, inwardness, and perfection of
love, it in fact denies the ethical character oflove, that higher
suppression and subordination of mere natural drive which is
already naturally present in sllame and which the more determinate spiritual consciousness raises to cllastity and pwity
[Zucllt]. More particularly, the view just referred to casts aside
the ethical determination [of marriage]. This consists in the
fact that the consciousness emerges from its naturalness and
subjectivity to concentrate on the thought of the substantial.
Instead of further reserving to itself the contingency and
arbitrariness of sensuous inclination, it removes the marriage
bond from this arbitrariness and, pledging itself to the
Penates, makes it over to the substantial; it thereby reduces
the sensuous moment to a merely conditional one - conditioned, that is, by the true and ethical character of the relationship, and by the recognition of the marriage bond as an
ethical one. -It is impertinence and its ally, the understanding, which cannot grasp the speculative nature of the substantial relationship; but both the uncorrupted ethical emotions
[Gemiit] and the legislations of Christian peoples are in keeping with this speculative nature.
Addition (G). Friedrich von Schlegel in his Lt~eintk and a follower ofhis in
the anonymous Letters (Lubeck and Leipzig, 1800) have argued that the
marriage ceremony is superfluous and a formality which could be dispensed with, on the grounds that love is the substantial element and that its
value may even be diminished by this celebration. 1 These writers
represent the physical surrender as necessary in order to prove the
freedom and intensity of love - an argument with which seducers are not
unfamiliar. On the relations between man and woman, it should be noted
that a girl loses her honour in [the act of] physical surrender, which is not
so much the case with a man, who has another field of ethical activity
apart from the family. A girl's vocation [Bestirnmung] consists essentially
only in the marital relationship; what is therefore required is that love
"TrtiiiSiallll''s nole: Instead of vmmeinige, which I have translated 'brings disunity into',
Hoffmeister's edition has vmmrtinige, which means 'contaminates' or 'defiles'.
205
Plrilosoplzy ofRight
should assume the shape of marriage, and that the different moments
which are present in love should attain their truly rational relation to each
other.
The 7lllluraJ determinacy of the two sexes acquires an irzte//eauaJ and

ethical significance by virtue of its rationality. This significance is
determined by the difference into which the ethical substantiality, as
the concept in itself, divides itself up in order that its vitality may
thereby achieve a concrete unity.
The 011e [sex] is therefore spirituality which divides itself up into

personal self-sufficiency with being for itself and the knowledge and
volition of free u11iversality, i.e. into the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the objective and ultimate end.
And the other is spirituality which maintains itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the substantial in the form of concrete iruiividuaJity [Eirzulheit] andfeeli11g [Empfi,drmg]. In its external relations, the
former is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. Man
therefore has his actual substantial life in the state, in learning [Wisserrscllllji], etc., and otherwise in work and struggle \vith the external
world and \vith himself, so that it is only through his division that he
fights his way to self-sufficient unity \\ith himself. In the family, he
has a peaceful intuition of this unity, and an emotive [empjindend] and
subjective ethical life. Woman, however, has her substantial vocation
[Bestimmung] in the family, and her ethical disposition consists in this
[family] piety.
In one of the most sublime presentations of piety- the Ami-
go,e of Sophocles - this quality is therefore declared to be

primarily the law of woman, and it is presented as the law of
emotive [empjinderui] and subjective substantiality, of inwardness which has not yet been fully actualized, as the law of the
ancient gods and of the chthonic realm [des U11terirdische,] as
an eternal law of which no one knows whence it came, and in
opposition to the public law, the law of the state - an opposition of the highest order in ethics and therefore in tragedy,
206
Ethical Life
and one which is individualized in femininity and masculinity
in the same play; cf. PlzeT1omenology of Spirit, pp. 383ff. and
417ff.'
Addition (H,G). Women may wen be educated, but they are not made for
the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which
require a universal element.2 Women may have insights [Eirlfii/le], taste,
and delicacy, but they do not possess the ideal. The difference between
man and woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is
closer in character to man, the plant to woman, for the latter is a more
peaceful [process of) unfolding whose principle is the more indeterminate
unity of feeling [Empfindtmg]. When women are in charge of government,
the state is in danger, for their actions are based not on the demands
of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion. The education
of women takes place imperceptibly, as if through the atmosphere of
representational thought, more through living than through the acquisition of knowledge [Kenntnissen], whereas man attains his position only
through the attainment of thought and numerous technical exertions.
Marriage is essentially monogamy, because it is personality or immediate exclusive individuality [EiTIZellzeit] which enters into and surrenders itself to this relationship, whose truth and inwardness (tlze
subjective fonn of substantiality) consequently arise only out of the
mutual and undivided surrender of this personality/ The latter attains
its right of being conscious of itself in the other only in so far as the
other is present in this identity as a person, i.e. as atomic individuality.
Marriage, and essentially monogamy, is one of the absolute
principles on which the ethical life of a community is based;
the institution of marriage is therefore included as one of the
moments in the foundation of states by gods or heroes.
Furthermore, since marriage arises out of the free surrender by both

sexes of their personalities, which are infinitely unique (etgen] to
themselves, it must not be concluded within the naturally identical
circle of people who are acquainted and familiar with each other in
every detail- a circle in which the individuals do not have a distinct
207
personality of their own in relation to one another- but must take
place [between people] from separate families and personalities of
different origin. Marriage between blood relations is therefore at
variance with the concept of marriage as an ethical act of freedom
rather than an association based on immediate natural existence
[Natiirlichkeit) and its drives, and hence it is also at variance with
genuine natural feeling [Empfindrmg).
If marriage itself is regarded as an arbitrary contract and as

grounded not in naturalltuD but merely in the natural sexual
drive, and if external reasons for monogamy have been
derived even from the physical relation between numbers of
men and women, and obscure feelings have been cited as the
only reason for prohibiting marriage between blood relations,
such arguments are based on the common notion [Vor.stellung]
a state nature and of the naturalness of right, and on the
absence of the concept of rationality and freedom.
Addition (H). In the first place, marriage between blood relations runs
counter even to the feeling [Gefii/11] of shame, but this revulsion is justified by the concept of the thing [Sache ). In other words, what is already
united cannot then be united only by means of marriage. As far as the
purely natural relationship is concerned, it is well known that reproduction within a family of animals produces more feeble offspring, for what is
to be united must first be separate; the power of procreation, like that of
the spirit, increases with the magnitude of oppositions out of which it
reconstitutes itself. Familiarity, acquaintance, and the habit of shared
activity should not be present before marriage: they should be discovered
only within it, and the value of this discovery is all the greater the richer it
is and the more components it has.
The family, as a person, has its external reality in property; and only in
the latter, in the shape of resources, does its substantial personality
have its existence [Dasein].
zo8
Etlzical Life
168-172
B. The Family's Resources
Not only does the family have property; as a univmal and enduring
person, it also incurs the need for possessions which are determined
as pennanent and secure, i.e. it needs resources. Abstract property contains the arbitrary moment of the particular need of the single
individual [des blofl Einzelnen]; this is here transformed, along with the
selfishness of desire, into care and acquisition for a communal purpose,
i.e. into an etlzical quality.
The introduction of permanent property appears, in conjunction with the institution of marriage, in the legends of the
founding of states, or at least of civilized (gesiltet] social life.
But the precise nature of these resources and the true method
of consolidating them become apparent within the sphere of
civil society.
The family as a legal [reclztliche] person in relation to others must be

represented by the husband as its head. In addition, he is primarily
responsible for external acquisition and f<r caring for the family's
needs, as well as for the control and administration of the family's
resources. These are common property, so that no member of the
family has particular property, although each has a right to what is
held in common. This right and the control of the resources by the
head of the family may, however, come into collision, because the
ethical disposition of the family is still immediate (see 1 58) and
exposed to particularization and contingency.
When marriage takes place, a new fomi~y is constituted, and this is

self-sufficient for itself in relation to the kinslzip groups or houses from
which it originated; its links with the latter are based on the natural
blood relationship, but the new family is based on ethical love. The
property of an individual is therefore also essentially connected with
209
his marital relationship, and only more distantly connected with his
kinship group or house.
Marriage settlements which place a restriction on the common

ownership by the partners of their goods, and measures which
ensure that the wife will continue to receive legal support,
etc., are significant inasmuch as they provide for the dissolution of the marriage in the event of natural death, divorce,
etc., and attempt to guarantee that, in such an eventuality, the
share of the various members of the family in the common
property will be preserved.
Addition (H). Many legal codes relate to the family in the wider sense and
regard it as the essential bond, whereas the other bond which unites each
specific family appears less important in comparison. Thus, in older
Roman law, the wife in the less binding variety of marriage had a closer
relationship to her own kinsfolk than to her children and husband, 1 and in
the era of feudal law, the maintenance of the splendor familiae made it
necessary to count only the male members of the family as belonging to it
and to regard the family in its entirety as the most important factor,
whereas the newly constituted family disappeared from view. Nevertheless, every new family is more essential than the wider context of blood
relationships, and marriage partners and children form the proper
nucleus in opposition to what can also be described in a certain sense as
the family. The financial circumstances [Venn6ge7zsverhiiltnis] of individuals must therefore have a more essential connection with their marriage
than with the wider circle of their blood relations.
C. The Upbringing of Children and the Dissolution of the

Family
The unity of marriage, which in substance is merely inwardness and

disposition but in existence [als existiere1ul] is divided between the two
subjects, itself becomes in the children an existence [eine Existenz]
which has being for itself, and an object [Gegenstand] which they [i.e. the
parents) love as their love and their substantial existence [Dasein]. From the point of view of nature, the presupposition of persons
existing immediately- as parents - here becomes the result, a process
210
Ethical Life
which runs on into the infinite progression of generations which
produce and presuppose one another. This is the mode in which the
simple spirit of the Penates reveals its existence [E.tistenz] as a species
[Gattrmg]a in the finite realm of nature.
Addition (H). The relation of love between man and wife is not yet an
objective one; for even if this feeling [Empfindrurg) is their substantial
unity, this unity does not yet possess objectivity [Gege~rstiindliclrkeit]. The
parents attain this unity only in their children, in whom they see the whole
of their union before them. In the child, the mother loves her husband
and he his wife; in it, they see their love before them. Whereas their unity
is present in their [shared] resources only as in an external thing [Sadie], it
is present in their children in a spiritual form in which the parents are
loved and which they love.
"Translator's note: Compare note to 161 above.
Children have a right to be brouglrt 11p and supported at the expense of

the family. The right of the parents to their children's services, as
services, is based on and limited to the common concern of caring for
the family in general. In the same way, the right of the parents over
the tlt'bitrary will of the children is determined by the end of bringing
them up and subjecting them to discipline. The end to which punishments are directed is not justice as such; it is rather of a subjective and
moral nature, seeking to have a deterrent effect on a freedom which is
still entrarnmelled in nature and to raise the universal into the children's consciousness and will.
Additio11 (H). Human beings do not arrive by instinct at what they are
destined to become; on the contrary, they must attain this by their own
efforts. This is the basis of the child's right to its upbringing. The same
applies to peoples under paternal governments: they are fed out of central
depots and are not regarded as self-sufficient adults. The services which
may be required of children should therefore contribute solely to the end
of their upbringing; they must not claim to be justified in their own right
[/iir sich], fer the most unethical of all relationships is that in which
children are slaves.' One of the chief moments in a child's upbringing is
discipline, the purpose of which is to break the child's self-will in order to
eradicate the merely sensuous and natural One should not imagine that
kindness alone is sufficient for this purpose; for it is precisely the immediZII
ate will which acts according to immediate fancies and desires rather than
reasons and representations [1'0rstelllmgm]. If one presents children with
reasons, it is left to them to decide whether to accept these or not, and
thus everything is made to depend on their caprice.2 The fact that the
parents constitute the universal and essential element entails the need for
obedience on the part of the children. Unless the feeling of subordination, which creates a longing to grow up, is nurtured in the children, they
become forward and impertinent.3
175
Children are free in themselves, and their life is merely the immediate
existence [Dasein] of this freedom;' they therefore do not belong as
things [Sac/zn1] either to others or to their parents. As far as their
relationship with the family is concerned, their upbringing has the
positive determination that, in them, the ethical is given the form of
immediate feeling [Empfindung] which is still without opposition, so
thattheirearlyemotionallife may be lived in this [context], as the basis
of ethical life, in love, trust, and obedience. But in the same connection, their upbringing also has the negative determination of raising
the children out of the natural immediacy in which they originally
exist to self-sufficiency and freedom of personality, thereby enabling
them to leave the natural unit of the family.
The position of Roman children as slaves is one of the institutions which most tarnishes the Roman legal code, and this
offence against the most vulnerable and innermost life of
ethics is one of the most important moments which enable us
to understand the world-historical character of the Romans
and their tendency towards legal formalism. - The need for
an upbringing is present in children as their own feeling of
dissatisfaction within themselves at the way they are -as the
drive to belong to the adult world whose superiority they
sense, or as the desire to grow up. The method of education
through play sees childishness itself as already inherently
valuable, presents it in this light to the children, and debases
serious things - and the method itself- to a childish form for
which the children themselves have little respect. 2 By
representing children, in the immature state which they feel
they are in, as in fact mature, by endeavouring to make them
212
Ethical Lifo
satisfied with the way they are, this method distorts and
obscures the true need of the children themselves for something better; it creates in them on the one hand an indifference towards, and imperviousness to, the substantial
relations of the spiritual world, and on the other a contempt
for people inasmuch as they have presented themselves to
them in a childish and contemptible light, and finally a vanity
and self-importance which revels in its own excellence.
Addititm (H,G). As a child, the human being must have lived with his
parents in a circle oflove and trust, and the rational must appear in him as
his own most personal [eigerzste] subjectivity. In the period of infancy, the
mother's role in the child's upbringing is of primary importance, for [the
principles of] ethics must be implanted in the child in the form of feeling
[Empfir~drmg]. It should be noted that, on the whole, children love their
parents less than their parents love them, for the children are increasingly
independent and gain in strength, thereby leaving their parents behind
them, whereas the parents possess in their children the objective and
concrete form [die objektive GegeriStihuilichkeit] of their union
Marriage is still only the immediate [form of the] ethical Idea and thus
has its objective actuality in the inwardness of subjective disposition
and feeling [Emp.findung]. This accounts for the basic contingency of
its existence [E.risterzz].Just as there can be no compulsion to marry,
so also can there be no merely legal [rechtliches] or positive bond which
could keep the partners together once their dispositions and actions
have become antagonistic and hostile. A third ethical authority is,
however, required in order to uphold the right of marriage- i.e. of
ethical substantiality- against the mere opinion that a hostile disposition is present, and against the contingency of merely transient
moods, etc., to distinguish these from total estrangement, and to
make sure that the partners are totally estranged before divorce is
granted.
Addition (H). Since marriage is based only on subjective and contingent
feeling, it may be dissolved. The state, on the other hand, is not subject to
partition, for it is based on law. Marriage certainly ought to be indissoluble, but this indissolubility remains no more than an ob/igatitm. Since,
however, marriage is an ethical institution, it cannot be dissolved by the
ZIJ
arbitrary will but only by an ethical authority, whether this be the Church
or a court of law. If a total estrangement has occurred - e.g. through
adultery - then even the religious authority must permit divorce.
The ethical dissolution of the family consists in the fact that the
children are brought up to become free personalities and, when they
have come of age, are recognized as legal [redJtliche] persons and as
capable both of holding free property of their own and of founding
their own families- the sons as heads of families and the daughters as
wives. In this family they now have their substantial determination,
and in relation to it, their original family recedes in importance as
merely their original basis and point of departure, while the abstract
category [das Abstraktum] of the kinship group has even fewer rights.
I78
The natural dissolution of the family through the death of the parents,
particularly of the husband, results in inheritance of the family's
resources. Inheritance is essentially a taking possession by the
individual as his own property of what i" themselves are common
resources- an acquisition which, in the case of more distant relationships and with the increasing self-sufficiency of persons and families
as a result of the dispersal of civil society, becomes more indeterminate as the disposition of unity declines and as every marriage leads to
the renunciation of previous family relationships and the establishment of a new and self-sufficient family.
The notion [Einfom that inheritance is based on the fact that,
by a person's death, his resources become o11111erless property
and as such accrue to the first person to take possession of
them, and that, since it is get~erally the relatives of the
deceased, as those who are usual{y closest at hand, who take
possession in this way, this common occurrence is then made
into a rule, for the sake of order, by positive legislation- this
notion disregards the nature of the family relationship.'
214
Etlzical Life
176-18o
179
The disintegration [of the family] leaves the arbitrary will of the
individual free either to expend his entire resources in accordance
with his caprices, opinions, and individual ends [Zwecke der EinzeUieit],
or to regard a circle of friends, acquaintances, etc. so to speak as
taking the place of a family and to make a pronouncement to that
effect in a testament whereby they become his rightful heirs.
The formation [Bildung) of such a circle as would give the will
an ethical justification for disposing of resources in this way especially in so far as the very act of forming this circle has
testamentary implications - involves so much contingency,
arbitrariness, intent to pursue selfish ends, etc., that the ethical moment is extremely vague; and the recognition that the
arbitrary will is entitled to make bequests is much more likely
to lead to infringements of ethical relations and to base aspirations and equally base attachments, and to provide an opportunity and justification for foolish arbitrariness and for the
insidious practice of attaching to so-called benefactions and
gifts vain and oppressively vexatious conditions which come
into effect after the benefactor's death, in which event his
property in any case ceases to be his.
The principle that the members of the family become self-sufficient

and rightful persons (see I 77) allows something of this arbitrariness
and discrimination to arise within the family circle among the natural
heirs; but it must occur only on a very limited scale if the basic
relationship is not to be damaged.
The simple direct arbitrariness of the deceased cannot be
made the principle of the right to make a will, especially if it is
opposed to the substantial right of the family; for the love and
veneration of the family for its former member are primarily
the only guarantee that his arbitrary will will be respected after
his death. Such arbitrariness in itself contains nothing which
desenres greater respect than the right of the family itself- on
the contrary. Otherwise, the validity of a testamentary disposi215
tion would reside solely in its arbitrary recognition by others.'
But a validity of this kind can be admitted primarily only when
the family relationship of which the disposition fonns an
integral part grows more remote and ineffective. But ineffectiveness in a family relationship, when the latter is actually
present, must be classed as unethical, and to extend the
validity of arbitrary dispositions at the expense of family relationships is implicitly to weaken the latter's ethical standing. To make this arbitrariness the main principle of inheritance
within the family was, however, part of that harsh and unethical aspect of Roman law referred to above, whereby a son
could even be sold by his father and, if he was given his
freedom by others, again came under his father's authority
[Gewalt] and did not actually become free until he had been
given his freedom for the third time. 2 According to these laws,
the son never attained his majority de iure, nor did he become
a ~egal [rechtliche] person, and the spoils of war (peculium
azstrense) were the only property which he could own;J and if
he escaped from his father's authority by being sold and
liberated on three occasions in the manner described above,
he could not inherit along with those who remained in
servitude to the family unless he was expressly included in the
will. In the same way, a wife (in so far as she entered marriage
as a matron, and not as one who in manum cmroeniret, in
mancipio esset," as on entering a state of slavery) continued to
belong to the family from which she came, rather than to the
family which, by her marriage, she had in part founded and
which was now actually her own; and she was therefore debarred from inheriting the resources of those who were actually
her fonzily, just as the latter could not inherit from their wife
and mother.4 - We have already noticed (see Remarks to 3
above) how the unethical aspects of these and other such laws
[Rechte] were circumvented in the administration of justice,
e.g. with the help of the expression bonorum possessio instead of
hereditas, and through the fiction of giving a filia the designation filius (the fact that bonorum possessio is in tum distinct
from possessio bonorum belongs to that kind of knowledge
"Translator's nott: 'entered into marriage and was thereby enslaved'.
216
Etlzical Life
[Ke~mtrzissen] which characterizes the expert on legal matters).5 This, as we noted, was the sad necessity to which the
judge had to resort, in the face of bad laws, in order to
smuggle rationality, by artful means, into at least some of their
consequences. This was associated with the terrible instability
of the main institutions [of the state], and with a frantic
activity of legislation designed to counteract the outbreak of
evils [Obel] which resulted from it. - The unethical consequences which thjs right of arbitrariness in testamentary dispositions had among the Romans are familiar enough from
history, and from the accounts of Lucian and other writers. 6 It lies in the nature of marriage itself, as the immediate [form
of] ethical life, that it is a mixture of substantial relationship,
natural contingency, and inner arbitrariness. If, then,
arbitrariness is given precedence over the right of the substantial as a result of the servitude of children and the other
determinations referred to above or associated with these, and
not least because divorce was easy to obtain in Rome- so that
even Cicero (and what fine things he has written about
lzonestum and decorum" in his De Officii/ and everywhere else
in his works!) could divorce his wife as a speculation in order
to pay his debts out of his new wife's dowry- then a legal way
is open to ethical corruption, or rather the laws make such
corruption inevitable.7
That institution of the law of inheritance which, in order to
preserve the fami{y and to enhance its renoum by means of
substitutiorts andfami{y testamentary trusts,8 either favours the
sons by excluding the daughters from inheritance or favours
the eldest son by excluding the remaining children (or allows
any other kind ofinequality to arise) on the one hand infringes
the principle of the freedom of property (see 62), and on the
other depends on an arbitrariness which in and for itself has
no right to recognition- or more precisely, it depends on the
intention to uphold not so much tlzis family, as tlzis kinship
group or house. Not tlzis house or kinship group, however, but
thefami{y as suclz is the Idea which has this right [to recognition], and freedom [to dispose] of resources and equality of
Translator's
~Translator's
1/0ie: 'mora6ty' and 'propriety'.

uou: Of D11ties (title or a work by Cicero).
217
inheritance are much more likely than their opposites to
preserve both the shape [Gestaltrmg] of ethics and the families
themselves. - Institutions like those of Rome totally misapprehend the right of marriage (see 172), for marriage entails
the complete foundation of a distinct and actual family, in
comparison with which what is called the family in a general
sense - i.e. the stirps or gens - becomes only an abstraction
which grows ever more remote and less actual as one generation succeeds the other (see 177 ). Love, the ethical
moment in marriage, is, as love, a feeling [Empfirzdrmg) for
actual individuals in the present, not for an abstraction.- On
this abstraction of the understanding as the world-historical
principle of the Roman Empire, see below ( 356). - The
higher sphere of politics brings with it a right of primogeniture and an inflexible entaiJment of resources - not,
however, in an arbitrary manner, but as a necessary consequence of the Idea of the state; butthis will be dealt with later
(see 306).
Additiorz (H,G). In Rome, the father in earlier times could disinherit his
children, and could even kill them; 9 later, this was no longer permitted.
Attempts were made to create a system out of this incongruity between
the unethical and its ethical adaptations, and it is adherence to this system
which constitutes the difficulty and inadequacy of our own law of
inheritance. Wills may certainly be permitted; but in allowing them to be
made, our point of view must be that this right of arbitrariness arises or
increases with the disintegration of the family and the distance between
its members; and the so-calledfmnib offrinldship which a will brings into
existence can arise only in the absence of the closer family of marriage
and children. Wills in general have a disagreeable and unpleasant aspect,
for in making my will, I identify those foc whom I have an affection. But
affection is arbitrary; it may be gained in various ways under false
pretences or associated with various foolish reasons, and it may lead to a
beneficiary being required to submit to the greatest indignities. In England, where all kinds of eccentricity are endemic,G innumerable foolish
notions are associated with wills.
"TrQIIS/IIIar's nott: The preceding seven words appear to be Gans's interpolation, since
they have no counterpan in the sections of Hotho's and Griesheim's notes (VP R 111,
ss8-s6z and rv, 466-468) on which this Addition is based.
218
Ethical Life
I8o-I8I
TRANSITION FROM THE FAMILY TO CIVIL SOCIETY
The family disintegrates, in a natural manner and essentially through

the principle of personality, into a pl11rality of families whose relation
to one another is in general that of self-sufficient concrete persons
and consequently of an external kind. In other words, the moments
which are bound together in the unity of the family, as the ethical Idea
which is still in its concept, must be released from the concept to
[attain] self-sufficient reality. This is the stage of diffirmce [D@rmz].
To put it first in abstract terms, this gives the determination of
partimlarity which is related to rmiversality, but in such a way that the
latter is its basis - though still only its im1er basis; consequently, this
universality is present only as a formal appeara11ee in the particular [a11[
fonnelle, i11 das Beso11dere 1mr sc/1eiumde Weise). This relation of reflection accordingly represents in the first instance the loss of ethicallife;
or, since the latter, as the essence, necessarily appears (see
E,u:yc/opaedia oft he Philosophical Scimces, 64fT. and 81 ff.), 1 this relation constitutes the world of appearallce of the ethical, i.e. civil society.
The expansion of the family, as its transition to another
principle, is, in [the realm of] existence [Existmz], either a
peaceful expansion whereby it becomes a people or 11atio11,
which thus has a common natural origin, or a coming together
of scattered family communities under the influence of a
dominant power or in a voluntary union prompted by interdependent needs and their reciprocal satisfaction.
Additior1 (H). The point of departure of universality here is the selfsufficiency of the particular, so that ethical life appears to be lost at this
level, for it is in fact the identity of the family which consciousness regards
as the primary, divine, and obligating factor. But a relation now arises
whereby the particular is to be my primary determining principle, and the
ethical detennination is thereby superseded. But I am in fact simply
under a misapprehension, for while I believe that I am adhering to the
particular, the universal and the necessity of the [wider] context nevertheless remain the primary and essential factor. I am thus entirely on the
level of semblance, and while my particularity remains my determining
principle - that is, my end - I am thereby sening the universal which in
fact retains ultimate power over me.
219
SECTION 2
Civil Society
The concrete person who, as a particular person, as a totality of needs

and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness, is his own end, is
one principle of civil society. But this particular person stands essentially in re/alion [Beziehung] to other similar particulars, and their
relation is such that each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through
the others, and thus at the same time through the exclusive medialion
of the form of universality, which is tile second principle.
Addition (H,G). Qvil society is the [stage of] difference [Differenz] which
intervenes between the family and the state, even if its full development
[Arubildung] occurs later than that of the state; for as difference, it presupposes the state, which it must have before it as a self-sufficient entity in
order to subsist [bestellen] itself. Besides, the creation of civil society
belongs to the modem world, which for the first time allows all
determinations of the Idea to attain their rights. If the state is represented
as a unity of different persons, as a unity which is merely a community [of
interests], this applies only to the determination of civil society. Many
modem exponents of constitutional law have been unable to offer any
view of the state but this. In civil society, each individual is his own end,
and all else means nothing to him. But he cannot accomplish the full
extent of his ends without reference to others; these others are therefore
means to the end of the particular [person]. But through its reference to
others, the particular end takes on the form of universality, and gains
satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of others. Since particularity is tied to the condition of universality, the whole [of civil society]
is the sphere [Boden] of mediation in which all individual characteristics
220
Ethical Lift
[Einzelheilen), all aptitudes, and all accidents of birth and fonune are
liberated, and where the waves of all passions surge forth, governed only
by the reason which shines through them. Particularity, limited by universality, is the only standard by which each particular [person] promotes his
welfare.
The selfish end in its actualization, conditioned in this way by universality, establishes a system of all-round interdependence, so that the
subsistence [Subsistenz) and welfare of the individual [des Einzelnen)
and his rightful existence [Da.sein] are interwoven with, and grounded
on, the subsistence, welfare, and rights of all, and have actuality and
security only in this context.- One may regard this system in the first
instance as the external state, the state of necessitj and of the
understanding.
When it is divided in this way, the Idea gives a disti71Ct existence [Da.sein)
to its moments- to particularity it gives the right to develop and express
itselfin all directions, and to universality the right to prove itself both
as the ground and necessary form of particularity, and as the power
behind it and its ultimate end. -It is the system of ethical life, lost in
its extremes, which constitutes the abstract moment of the reality of
the Idea, which is present here only as the relative totality and inner
necessity of this external appearance.
Addition (H). Here, the ethical is lost in its extremes, and the immediate
unity of the family has disintegrated into a plurality. Reality here is
externality, the dissolution of the concept, the self-sufficiency of its
liberated and existent moments. Although particularity and universality
have become separated in civil society, they are nevertheless bound up
with and conditioned by each other. Although each appears to do precisely the opposite of the other and imagines that it can exist only by
keeping the other at a distance, each nevertheless has the other as its
condition. Thus, most people regard the payment of taxes, for example, as
an infringement of their particularity, as a hostile element prejudicial to
their own ends; but however true this may appear, the particularity of their
own ends cannot be satisfied without the universa~4 and a country in
"Translator's nott: The remainder of this sentence has no counterpan in the section of
Hotho's notes (VPR m, 57o-574) on which this Addition is based.
221
Philosophy ofRiglzt
which no taxes were paid could scarcely distinguish itself in strengthening
its particular interests [Besomlerlreit). It might likewise appear that the
universal would do better to absorb the strength of the particular, as
described, for example, in Plato's Republic; but this again is only apparent,
for the two exist solely through and for one another and are transformed
into one another. In furthering my end, I further the universal, and this in
tum furthers my end 1
Particularity in itself [fiir sich ], on the one hand indulging itself in all
directions as it satisfies its needs, contingent arbitrariness, and subjective caprice, destroys itself and its substantial concept in the act of
enjoyment; on the other hand, as infinitely agitated and continually
dependent on external contingency and arbitrariness and at the same
time limited by the power of universality, the satisfaction of both
necessary and contingent needs is itself contingent. In these opposites
and their complexity, civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance
and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common
to both.
The self-sufficient development of particularity (cf. Remarks
to r 24) is the moment which appears in the states of the
ancient world as an influx of ethical corruption and as the
ultimate reason [Gnmd] for their downfall. These states, some
of which were based on the patriarchal and religious principle
and others on the principle of a more spiritual, though simpler, ethical life, but all of which were based on original
natural intuition, could not withstand the division which arose
within the latter as self -consciousness became infinitely
reflected into itself. As this reflection began to emerge, first as
a disposition and then in actuality, they succumbed to it,
because the simple principle on which they were still based
lacked the truly infinite power which resides solely in that
unity which allows the opposition within reason [Vemunfi] to
develop to its fiJI strength, and has overcome it so as to preserve
itself within it and wholly cmllain it within itself. - Plato, in his
Republic, presents the substance of ethical life in its ideal
beauty and truth; but he cannot come to terms with the
principle of self-sufficient particularity, which had suddenly
222
Ethical Lift
184-186
overtaken Greek ethical life in his time, except by setting up

his purely substantial state in opposition to it and completely
excluding it [from this state], from its very beginnings in
private property (see Remarks to 46)1 and the fomi/T to its
subsequent development (Ausbildrmg] as the arbitrary will of
individuals and their choice of social position [des StmuJes ],
etc. 3 This deficiency also explains why the great substarztial
truth of his Republic is imperfectly understood, and why it is
usually regarded as a dream of abstract thought, as what is
indeed often called an ideal. The principle of the self-sufficient
muJ i11herently i7lfirzite perso11ality of the individual [des
Ei11Zt!l7len], the principle of subjective freedom, which arose in
an inward form in the Christimz religion and in an external
form (which was therefore linked with abstract universality) in
the Romarz world, is denied its right in that merely substantial
form of the actual spirit [in Plato's Republic]. This principle is
historically later than the Greek world, and the philosophical
reflection which can fathom these depths is likewise later than
the substantial Idea of Greek philosophy.
Additimz (H). Particularity in itself [/iir sich] is boundless [maftlos] extravagance, and the forms of this extravagance are themselves boundless.
Through their representations [Vorstellrmgerz] and reflections, human
beings expand their desires, which do not form a closed circle like animal
instinct, and extend them to false [schlechte] infinity. But on the other
hand, deprivation and want are likewise boundless, and this confused
situation can be restored to harmony only through the forcible intervention of the state. Although Plato's state sought to exclude particularity,
this is of no help, because such help would contradict the infinite right of
the Idea to allow particularity its freedom. It was primarily in the
Christian religion that the right of subjectivity arose, along with the
infinity of being-for-itself; and in this situation, the totality must also be
endowed with sufficient strength to bring particularity into harmony with
the ethical unity.
But in the very act of developing itself independently [/iir sich] to

totality, the principle of particularity passes over into wziversality, and
only in the latter does it have its truth and its right to positive actuality.
This unity is not that of ethical identity, because at this level of
ZZ3
division (see 184), the two principles are self-sufficient; and for the
same reason, it is present not as freedom, but as the necessity whereby
the particular must rise to the fomz ofuniversality and seek and find its
subsistence in this form.
Individuals, as citizens of this state, are private persons who have their
own interest as their end. Since this end is mediated through the
universal, which thus appears to the individuals as a means, they can
attain their end only in so far as they themselves determine their
knowledge, volition, and action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this continuum [Zusammenlzang). In this
situation, the interest of the Idea, which is not present in the consciousness of these members of civil society as such, is the process
whereby their individuality [Ei1zzellzeit) and naturalness are raised,
both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to formal freedom
and formal universality of knowledge and volition, and subjectivity is
educated in its particularity.
The ideas [Vorstelltmgerz] of the innocence of the state of nature
and of the ethical simplicity of uncultured [zmgebildeter]
peoples imply that education [Bildzmg] will be regarded as
something purely extenzal and associated with corruption.' On
the other hand, if one believes that needs, their satisfaction,
the pleasures and comforts ofindividual fpartikularm] life, etc.
are absolute ends, education will be regarded as merely a means
to these ends. Both of these views show a lack of familiarity
with the nature of spirit and with the end of reason. Spirit
attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing
this limitation and finitude upon itselfin [the shape of] natural
needs and the continuum [Zusammenlza11g] of this external
necessity, and, in tlze very process ofadapting itself to tlzese limitations,O by overcoming them and gaining its objective existence
[Dasein] within them. The end of reason is consequently
'Transkuor's oot~: ~hD1 tl4mit, t14.P .:r sich in si~ hinnnbild~t. In this section, Hegel pla}'s
repeated]}' on ,-arious fonns of the '-erb bildm (to educate, shape, or cultivate) in order to
underline their semantic affinities. He ex-ploits various forms of the verb sdtdrten (to
appear) to similar effect in 181.
224
Ethical Lift
neither the natural ethical simplicity referred to above, nor, as
particularity develops, the pleasures as such which are
attained through education. Its end is rather to work to
eliminate natural simplicity, whether as passive selflessness or
as barbarism of knowledge and volition - i.e. to eliminate the
inmrediacy and individuality [Einzelheit] in which spirit is
immersed, so that this externality may take on the rationality of
which it is capable, namely the fomz of universtJ/ity or of the
understanding. Only in this way is the spirit at honre and with
itself in this externality as such. Its freedom thus has an
existence [Dasein] within the latter; and, in this element
which, in itself, is alien to its determination of freedom, the
spirit becomes for itself, and has to do only with what it has
impressed its seal upon and produced itself. - By this very
means, thefomz ofrmiversality comes into existence [Existenz]
for itself in thought, the only form which is a worthy element
for the existence [Existenz] of the Idea. Education, in its
absolute determination, is therefore liberation and JDOrk
towards a higher liberation; it is the absolute transition to the
infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life, which is no
longer immediate and natural, but spiritual and at the same
time raised to the shape of universality. Within the subject,
this liberation is the hard work of opposing mere subjectivity of
conduct, of opposing the immediacy of desire as well as the
subjective vanity of feeling [Empjindung] and the arbitrariness
of caprice. The fact that it is such hard work accounts for
some of the disfavour which it incurs. But it is through this
work of education that the subjective will attains objeaivity
even within itself~ that objectivity in which alone it is for its
part worthy and capable of being the aa11ality of the Idea. Furthermore, this form of universality to which particularity
has worked its way upwards and cultivated [heraufgebildet]
itself, i.e. the form of the understanding, ensures at the same
time that particularity becomes the genuine bei7lg-for-itself of
individuality [Einzelheit]; and, since it is from particularity that
universality receives both the content which fills it and its
infinite self-determination, particularity is itself present in
ethical life as free subjectivity which has infinite being-for225
itself. This is the level at which it becomes plain that educaJion
is an immanent moment of the absolute, and that it has
infinite value.
Addition (H). By educated people, we may understand in the first place

those who do everything as others do it" and who do not flaunt their
particular characteristics [Partikularitiit], whereas it is precisely these
characteristics which the uneducated display, since their behaviour is not
guided by the universal aspects of its object [Gegenstand]. Similarly, in his
relations with others, the uneducated man can easily cause offence, for he
simply lets himself go and does not reflect on the feelings [Empftndur~gen]
of others. He does not wish to hurt others, but his conduct is not in
harmony with his will. Thus, education irons out particularity to make it
act in accordance with the nature of the thing [Sache]. True originality, by
which the [universaW thing is produced, requires true education, whereas
false originality assumes tasteless forms which occur only to the
uneducated.
"Translator's note: The telo:t, as e~vacted by Gans from Hotho's notes, reads soldtt ... die
alia machm lronnm, 111as andere tun ('those who can do everything that others do').
Hotho's notes in fact read daft sit alles 11uJdttn n>{ie] Andere ('that they do evef}thing as
others do it'; VPR 111, sBz). I have adopted the laner reading as more authentic and as
b
giving a better sense, and have modified it to lit the structure of Gans's sentence.
Translator's note: In Hotho's notes, on which this Addition is based, the term StJht is
here defined as 'the universal in e"ery form' (\'P R 111, 583). I have accordingly added
'universal' in brackets.
r88
Civil society contains the following three moments:
A. The mediation of r~eed and the satisfaction of the individual [des
Eir~zelr~m] through his work and through the work and satisfaction
of the needs of all the others - the system of r~eeds.
B. The actuality of the universal of freedom contained therein, the
protection of property through the adminislraJiotl ofjustice.
C. Provisions against the contingency which remains present in the
above systems, and care for the particular interest as a common
interest, by means of the police and the corporation.
Ethical Life
A. The System of Needs
189
Particularity, in its primary detennination as that which is opposed to
the universal of the will in general (see 6o)/ is subjective need, which
attains its objectivity, i.e. its satisfaction, by means of (a) external
things [Dinge], which are likewise the property and product of the
needs and wills of others and of(~) activity and work, as the mediation
between the two aspects. The end of subjective need is the satisfaction of subjective particularity, but in the relation [Beziehung] between
this and the needs and free arbitrary will of others, universality asserts
itself, and the resultant manifestation [Scheinen] of rationality in the
sphere of finitude is the understanding. This is the chief aspect which
must be considered here, and which itself constitutes the conciliatory
element within this sphere.
Political economy is the science which begins with the above

viewpoints but must go on to explain mass relationships and
mass movements in their qualitative and quantitative
detenninacy and complexity. - This is one of the sciences
which have originated in the modem age as their element
[Boden]. The development of science is ofinterest in showing
how thought extracts from the endless multitude of details with
which it is initially confronted the simple principles of the
thing [Sac/ze], the understanding which works within it and
controls it (see Smith, Say, and Ricardo}. 1 - To recognize, in
the sphere of needs, this manifestation [Schein en] of rationality
which is present in the thing [Sache] and active within it has,
on the one hand, a conciliatory effect; but conversely, this is
also the field in which the understanding, with its subjective
ends and moral opinions, gives vent to its discontent and
moral irritation.
Addition (H,G). There are certain universal needs, such as food, drink,
clothing, etc., and how these are satisfied depends entirely on contingent
circumstances. The soil is more or less fertile in different places, the years
Transl4tor's not~: The first edition, and the Suhrkamp edition, refer to 6o, but llting's
edition refers to 6, which makes much better sense (VPR 11, 640). T. M. Knox's
suggestion of 59 (Knox, p. 126) is less plausible.
227
Plzilos()/Jizy ofRight
are more or less productive, one man is industrious and the other lazy.
But this proliferation of arbitrariness generates universal determinations
from within itself, and this apparently scattered and thoughtless activity is
subject to a necessity which arises of its own accord. To discover the
necessity at work here is the object [Gegenstand] of political economy, a
science which does credit to thought because it finds the laws underlying
a mass of contingent occurrences. It is an interesting spectacle to observe
here how all the interconnections have repercussions on others, how the
particular spheres fall into groups, influence others, and are helped or
hindered by these. This interaction, which is at first sight incredible since
everything seems to depend on the arbitrary will of the individual [tks
Ei,IZI!Inerz ], is particularly worthy c:f note; it bears a resemblance to the
planetary system, which presents only irregular movements to the eye, yet
whose laws can nevertheless be recognized.
a. The Nature of Needs and their Satisfaction
The ways and means by which the aPiimal can satisfY its needs are
limited in scope, and its needs are likewise limited. Though sharing
this dependence, the lzuman beiP~gis at the same time able to transcend
it and to show his universality, first by multiplying his needs and means
[of satisfYing them], and secondly by dividing and differentiating the
concrete need into individual parts and aspects which then become
different needs, particularized and hence more abstract.
In right, the object [Gegerzstand] is the person; at the level of

morality, it is the subject, in the family, the family-member, and
in civil society in general, the citizen (in the sense of bourgeois).
Here, at the level of needs (cf. Remarks to 123), it is that
concretum of representationaltlzouglzt which we calltlze lzuman
being; this is the first, and in fact the only occasion on which
we shall refer to tile lzuman being in this sense.
Addition (H). The animal is a particular entity [ein Partikulares] which has
its instinct and the means of satisfying it, means whoSe bounds cannot be
exceeded There are insects which are tied to a specific plant, and other
animals whose sphere is wider and which can live in different climates;
but there is always a limiting factor in comparison with the sphere which
is open to the human being. The need for food and clothing, the necessity
228
Ethical Lift
of renouncing raw food and of making it fit to eat and~~
p.atural immediacy, means that the human being's life is less comfortable
ihinthatc)fthe-animal- as indeed it ought to be, since man is a spiritual
being. The understanding, which can grasp distinctioQS, brings multiplicity into these needs; and s~ce "taste ana utility become criteria of judgement, the needs themselves are also affected by them. In the end, it is no
longer need but opinion which has to be satisfied, and it is a distinctive
feature of education that it resolves the concrete into its particulars. The
very multiplication of needs has a restraining influence on desire, for if
people make use of many things, the pressure to obtain any one of these
which they might need is less strong, and this is a sign that necessity [die
Not] in general is less powerful.
.
191
In the same way, the means employed by particularized needs, and in

general the ways in which these are satisfied, are divided and multiplied
so that they in tum become relative ends and abstract needs. It is an
infinite process of multiplication which is in equal measure a differetltiation of these determinations and ajudgemmt on the suitability of the
means to their ends - i.e. [a process of] refinemmt.
Addition (H). What the English call 'comfortable"' is something utterly

inexhaustible; its ramifications are infinite, for every comfort in tum
reveals its less comfortable side, and the resulting inventions are endless.
A need is therefore created not so much by those who experience it
directly as by those who seek to profit from its emergence.
"TranslDtor's 11ou: Hotho, on whose notes this Addition is based, cites this word in the
French form confortabl~. and makes no reference to the English (VP R 111, 593).
Needs and means, as existing in reality [a/s ree//es Dasein], become a

being [Sein] for others by whose needs and work their satisfaction is
mutually conditioned. That abstraction which becomes a quality of
both needs and means (see 191) also becomes a determination of
the mutual relations [Beziehung] between individuals. This universality, as the quality of being recognized, is the moment which makes
isolated and abstract needs, means, and modes of satisfaction into
concrete, i.e. social ones.
229
Addition (H). The fact that I have to fit in with other people brings the
fonn of universality into play at this point I acquire my means of satisfaction from others and must accordingly accept their opinions. But at the
same time, I am compelled to produce means whereby others can be
satisfied. Thus, the one plays into the hands of the other and is connected
with it. To this extent, everything particular [al/es PartikzJare] takes on a
social character; in the manner of dress and times of meals, there are
certain conventions which one must accept, fa in such matters, it is not
worth the trouble to seek to display one's own insight, and it is wisest to
act as others do.
This moment thus becomes a particular end-determinant for the

means themselves and their ownership, and also for the way in which
needs are satisfied. In addition, it immediately involves the requirement of equality in this respect with others. On the one hand, the need
for this equality, together with imitation as the process whereby people
make themselves like others, and on the other hand the need of
particularity (which is likewise present here) to assert itself through
some distinctive quality, themselves become an actual source of the
multiplication and expansion of needs.
Within social needs, as a combination of immediate or natural needs

and the spiritual needs of represmtational thought [Vontellzmg], the
spiritual needs, as the universal, predominate. This social moment
accordingly contains the aspect of liberation, because the strict natural
necessity of need is concealed and man's relation is to his own opinion,
which is universal, and to a necessity imposed by himself alone,
instead of simply to an external necessity, to inner contingency, and to
arbitrariness.
The notion [Vontell1111g] that, in relation to his needs, man
lived in freedom in a so-called state of nature in which he had
only so-called natural needs of a simple kind and in which, to
satisfy these, he employed only those means with which a
contingent nature immediately provided him1 - this notion,
even if we disregard the moment ofliberation which is present
ZJO
Ethical Lifo
in work (and which will be discussed below), is mistaken. For
a condition in which natural needs as such were immediately
satisfied would merely be one in which spirituality was
immersed in nature, and hence a condition of savagery and
unfreedom; whereas freedom consists solely in the reflection
of the spiritual into itself, its distinction from the natural, and
its reflection upon the latter.
1 95
This liberation isfomlal, because the particularity of the ends remains
the basic content The tendency of the social condition towards an
indeterminate multiplication and specification of needs, means, and
pleasures- i.e. lux11ry- a tendency which, like the distinction between
natural and educated needs, has no limits [Gre~lZt'll], involves an
equally infinite increase in dependence and want. These are confronted with a material which offers infinite resistance, i.e. with external
means whose particular character is that they are the property of the
free will [of others] and are therefore absolutely unyielding.
Additi011 (H). Diogenes, in his whole character as a Cynic/ is in fact

merely a product of the social life of Athens, and what determined him
was the opinion against which his entire way oflife reacted. His way of life
was therefore not independent, but merely a consequence c:i these social
conditions, and itself an unprepossessing product of luxury. Where, on
the one hand, luxury is at its height, want and depravity are equally great
on the other, and Cynicism is then evoked by the opposite extreme of
refinement
"Translator's nou: The first edition, and the Suhrkamp edition, read ungtbildelml
('uneducated'). I follow Uling's edition (VPR 11, 644), whose reading gelildetem ('educated') makes bener sense.
b. The Nature of Work
The mediation whereby appropriate and particularized means are

acquired and prepared for similarly particularized needs is work. By
the most diverse processes, work specifically applies to these
numerous ends the material which is immediately provided by nature.
231
Philosophy ofRight
This process of formation gives the means their value and appropriateness, so that man, as a consumer, is chiefly concerned with huma71
products, and it is human effort which he consumes.
Additimz (H). There are few immediate materials which do not need to be
processed: even air has to be earned - inasmuch as it has to be heatedand perhaps water is unique in that it can be drunk as it is found. It is by
the sweat and labour of human beings that man obtains the means to
satisfY his needs.
The variety of determinations and objects [Gegenstiiruie] which are

worthy of interest is the basis from which theoretical educatio71
develops. This involves not only a variety of representations [Vorstellurzgen] and items of knowledge [Kemll7zisse71], but also an ability to
form such representations [des Vorstel/ens] and pass from one to the
other in a rapid and versatile manner, to grasp complex and general
relations '[Beziehrmgerz], etc. -it is the education of the understanding
in general, and therefore also includes language. - Practical educatimz
through work consists in the self-perpetuating need and habit ofbei71g
occupied in one way or another, in the limitatimz ofo11e's activity to suit
both the nature of the material in question and, in particular, the
arbitrary will of others, and in a habit, acquired through this discipline, of objective activity and U71iversa/ly applicable skills.
Additi011 (H). The barbarian is lazy and differs from the educated man in
his dull and solitary brooding, for practical education consists precisely in
the need and habit of being occupied. The clumsy man always produces
something other than what he intended, because he is not in control ofhis
own actions. But a worker can be described as skilled if he produces the
thing [Sache] as it ought to be, and if, in his subjective actions, he
encounters no resistance to the end he is pursuing.
The universal and objective aspect of work consists, however, in that

(process of] abstracti011 which confers a specific character on means
and needs and hence also on production, so giving rise to the divisi071
of labour. Through this division, the work of the individual [des
Ei7lzel71er1] becomes simpler, sn that his skill at his abstract work
Etlzical Life
becomes greater, as does the volume of his output. At the same time,
this abstraction of skill and means makes the dependence and reciprocity
of human beings in the satisfaction of their other needs complete and
entirely necessary. Furthermore, the abstraction of production makes
work increasingly mechmzical, so that the human being is eventually
able to step aside and let a machine take his place.'
c. Resources [and Estates]
In this dependence and reciprocity of work and the satisfaction of

needs, subjective selfishness turns into a contributimz towards the satisfaction ofthe needs ofeveryone else. By a dialectical movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning,
producing, and enjoying on his own account [fiir sich], thereby earns
and produces for the enjoyment of others.' This necessity which is
inherent in the interlinked dependence of each on all now appears to
each individual in the form of tmiversal and pennanent resources (see
170) in which, through his education and skill, he has an opportunity to share; he is thereby assured of his livelihood, just as the universal resources are maintained and augmented by the income which he
earns through his work.
200
The possibilit] of sharing in the universal resources - i.e. of holding
partictdar resources- is, however, conditional upon one's own immediate basic assets (i.e. capital) on the one hand, and upon one's skill on
the other; the latter in tum is itself conditioned by the former, but also
by contingent circumstances whose variety gives rise to differences in
the development of natural physical and mental [geistigen] aptitudes
which are already unequal in themselves (fiir sich]. In this sphere of
particularity, these differences manifest themselves in every direction
and at every level, and, in conjunction with other contingent and
arbitrary circumstances, necessarily result in inequalities in the resources
and skills of individuals.
The spirit's objective right ofparticzJarity, which is contained
within the Idea, does not cancel out [11icht miflzebt] the
233
196-200
Philosophy ofRight
inequality of human beings in civil society - an inequality
posited by nature, which is the element of inequality - but in
fact produces it out of the spirit itself and raises it to an
inequality of skills, resources, and even of intellectual and
moral education. To oppose this right with a demand for
equali~y is characteristic of the empty understanding, which
mistakes this abstraction and obligation of its own for the real
and the rational. This sphere of particularity imagines that it is
universal, but in its merely relative identity with the universal,
it retains both natural and arbitrary particularity, and hence
the remnants of the state of nature. In addition, that reason
which is immanent in the system of human needs and their
movement articulates this system into an organic whole composed of different elements (see 201).
The infinitely varied means and their equally infinite and intertwined
movements of reciprocal production and exchange converge, by virtue
of the universality inherent in their content, and become ';Fferentiated
into tmiversal masses. In consequence, the whole complex [Zusammenhang] evolves into particular systems of needs, \vith their corresponding
means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and theoretical and
practical education - into systems to which individuals are separately
assigned, i.e. into different estates.
Additimt (H). The manner in which the universal resources are shared
depends on every particular characteristic of the individuals concerned;
but the universal differences into which civil society is particularized are
necessary in character. While the family is the primary basis of the state,
the estates are the second. The latter are of special importance, because
private persons, despite their selfishness, find it necessary to have
recourse to others. This is accordingly the root which links selfishness
with the universal, i.e. with the state, which must take care to ensure that
this connection is a firm and solid one.
202
The estates are determined, in accordance with the concept, as the
substa11tial or immediate estate, the reflecting or formal estate, and
lastly, the unil;ersal estate.
234
Ethical Lift
(a) The substantial estate has its resources in th~ natural products of
the soil which it cultivates -soil which is capable of being exclusively
private property, and which requires not just indeterminate exploitation, but fonnation of an objective kind. Given the association of
work and acquisition with fixed individual seasons, and the
dependence of the yield on the varying character of natural processes,
the end to which need is directed in this case becomes that of provision
for the future. But because of the conditions to which it is subject, this
provision retains the character of a [mode of] subsistence [Subsistenz]
in which reflection and the will of the individual play a lesser role, and
thus its substantial disposition in general is that of an immediate
ethical life based on the family relationship and on trust.
The proper beginning and original foundation of states has
rightly been equated with the introduction of agriallture and of
marriage. For the fonner principle brings with it the cultivation of the soil, and in consequence exclusively private property (cf. Remarks to 170), and it reduces the nomadic life of
savages, who seek their livelihood in constant movement, to
the tranquillity of civil law [Privatrec/zt] and the secure
satisfaction of needs. This is accompanied by the restriction
[Besclzriinkzmg] of sexual love to marriage, and the marriage
bond is in tume~ended to become a lasting and inherently [in
sic/z] universal union, while need becomes care for tlze fanzi{y
and possession becomes fomi{y property. Security, consolidation, lasting satisfaction of needs, etc. - qualities by which
these institutions primarily recommend themselves - are
nothing but fonns of universality and shapes assumed by
rationality, the absolute and ultimate end, as it asserts itself in
these objects [Gegenstiinden]. -What can be more interesting
in this connection than the ingenious and learned explanations
which my highly esteemed friend, Herr Creuzer, has given of
the agrarian festivals, images, and shrines of the ancients
(especially in the fourth volume of his Mythology and Symbolism)'? In the consciousness of the ancients, the introduction of
agriculture and of the institutions associated \vith it were
divine acts, and they were accordingly treated with religious
235
20o-203
veneration. A further consequence, which also occurs in the
other estates, is that the substantial character of this estate
entails modifications with regard to civil law- especially to the
administration of justice- and likewise with regard to education and instruction and also to religion; these modifications
do not affect the substantial c011tent, but only its fonn and the
development of reflection.
Additio11 (H). In our times, the [agricultural] economy, too, is run in a
reflective manner, like a factory, and it accordingly takes on a character
like that of the second estate and opposed to its own character of naturalness. Nevertheless, this first estate will always retain the patriarchal way of
life and the substantial disposition associated with it The human being
reacts here with immediate feeling [Empjilllilmg] as he accepts what he
receives; he thanks God for it and lives in faith and confidence that this
goodness will continue. What he receives is enough for him; he uses it up,
for it will be replenished. This is a simple disposition which is not
concerned with the acquisition of wealth; it may also be described as that
of the old nobility, which consumed whatever it had In this estate, the
main part is played by nature, and human industry is subt dinate to it In
the second estate, however, it is the understanding itself wuich is essential, and the prodocts of nature can be regarded only as raw materials.
204
(b) The estate oftrade and industry [Stand des Gewerbes] has the task of
giving fonn to natural products, and it relies for its livelihood on its
work, on reflection and the understanding, and essentially on its mediation of the needs and work of others. What it produces and enjoys, it
owes chiefly to itself and to its own activity. - Its business is in turn
subdivided into work performed in a relatively concrete manner in response to individual [ei11zelne] needs and at the request of individUals
[Einzeb~er] (tire estate of craftsmanship); more abstract work of mass
production which supplies individual needs but is more universally in
demand (the estate of manufacturers); and the business of exchanging
separate commodities [Mille/] for one another, chiefly through the
universal means of exchange, namely money, in which the abstract
value of all goods is actualized (the estate ofcommerce).
Ethical Lifo
Addition (H). In the estate of trade and industry, the individual

[Individuum] has to rely on himself, and this feeling of selfhood is
intimately connected with the demand for a condition in which right is
upheld. The sense of freedom and order has therefore arisen mainly in
towns. The first estate, on the other hand, has little need to think for
itself: what it gains is an alien gift, a gift of nature. This feeling of
dependence is fundamental to it, and may easily be coupled with a willingness to accept whatever may befall it at the hands of other people. The
first estate is therefore more inclined to subservience, the second estate to
freedom.
"Transfiltor'snou: hat ... a>mig sdbst::u dmkn1; this seems to be a misreading by Gans of
the equivalent phrase in Hotho's notes (VPR 111, 630), hat lllmig sid1 ~lbst ::u dankm
('owes little to its cmn effons').
(c) The universal estate has the universal i1llerests of society as its business. It must therefore be exempted from work for the direct satisfaction ofits needs, either by having private resources, or by receiving an
indemnity from the state which calls upon its services, so that the
private interest is satisfied through working for the universal.
On the one hand, the estates, as particularity become objective to itself,

are divided in this way into different general categories in accordance
with the concept. But on the other hand, the question of which
particular estate the individual will belong to is influenced by his
natural disposition, birth, and circumstances, although the ultimate
and essential determinant is subjective opinion and the particular arbitrary will, which are accorded their right, their merit, and their honour
in this sphere. Thus, what happens in this sphere through inner
necessity is at the same time mediated by the arbitrary will, and for the
subjective consciousness, it has the shape of being the product of its
own wil1. 1
In this respect, too, in relation to the principle of particularity
and subjective arbitrariness, a difference emerges between the
political life of east and west, and of the ancient and modem
worlds. In the former, the division of the whole into estates
237
203-206
came about riJjectively and of its own accord, because it is
rational in itself, but the principle of subjective particularity
was at the same time denied its rights, as when, for example,
the allocation of individuals to specific estates was left to the
rulers, as in Plato's Republic (Book 111, p. 320, Zweibriicken
edition, Vol. VI (415 a-d]), or to birth alone, as in the Indian
caste-system.Z Thus subjective particularity, excluded from the
organization of the whole and not reconciled within it, consequently shows itself- since it likewise appears as an essential
moment - as a hostile element, as a corruption of the social
order (see Remarks to 185). It either overthrows the latter,
as in the Greek states and in the Roman Republic; or if the
social order survives as a ruling power - or perhaps as a
religious authority- it appears as inner corruption and complete degeneration, as was to some extent the case in Sparta
and as is now entirely the case in India.- But if it is supported
by the objective order, conforming to the latter and at the
same time retaining its rights, subjective particularity becomes
the sole animating principle of civil society and of the
development of intellectual activity, merit, and honour. The
recognition and right according to which all that is rationally
necessary in civil society and in the state should at the same
time come into effect tlzrouglz tlze mediation oftlze arbitrary will
is the more precise definition [Bestimmu11g] of what is
primarily meant by the universal idea [Vorstelltmg] of freedom
(see 121).
The individual attains actuality only by entering into e:riste11ce [Dasein]

in general, and hence into detenninate particularity; he must accordingly limit himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need.
The ethical disposition within this system is therefore that of rectitude
and the lzo11our of one's estate, so that each individual, by a process of
self-determination, makes himself a member of one of the moments
of civil society through his activity, diligence, and skill, and supports
himself in this capacity; and only through this mediation with the
universal does he simultaneously provide for himself and gain recognition in his own eyes [Vorstellrmg] and in the eyes of others. -Morality
Ethical Lift
zo6-zo8
has its proper place in this sphere, where reflection on one's own
actions and the ends of welfare and of particular needs are dominant,
and where contingency in the satisfaction of the latter makes even
contingent and individual help into a duty.
Initially - i.e. especially in youth - the individual balks at the
notion [Vor:stellung] of committing himself to a particular
estate, and regards this as a limitation imposed on his universal detennination and as a purely atema/necessity. This is a
consequence of abstract thinking, which stops short at the
universal and so does not reach actuality; it does not recognize
that the concept, in order to exist, must first of all enter into the
distinction between the concept and its reality, and hence into
detenninacy and particularity (see 7), and that only thus can
abstract thinking attain actuality and ethical objectivity.
Addition (H). When we say that a human being must be somebody [etDitiS ],
we mean that he must belong to a particular estate; for being somebody
means that he has substantial being. A human being with no estate is
merely a private person and does not possess actual universality. On the
other hand, the individual [der Einzelne] in his particularity may see himself as the universal and believe that he would be lowering himself if he
became a member of an estate. This is the false notion [Vor:stelltmg) that, if
something attains an existence [Dasein] which is necessary to it, it is
thereby limiting and surrendering itself.
The principle of this system of needs, as that of the personal [eigene]

particularity of knowledge and volition, contains within itself that
universality which has being in and for itself, i.e. the universality of
freedom, but only abstractly and hence as the right of property. Here,
however, this right is present no longer merely in itself, but in its valid
actuality as the protection of property through the administration of
justice.
239
B. The Administration ofJustice

209
The relativity of the reciprocal relation between needs and work to
satisfy these needs includes in the first place its reflection into itself as
infinite personality in general, i.e. as (abstract) riglzt. But it is this very
sphere of relativity- as that of education -which gives right an existence
[.Daseir~] in which it is universally recognized, knoum, and willed, and in
which, through the mediation of this quality of being known and
willed, it has validity and objective actuality.
It is part of education, of tlzi11king as consciousness of the
individual [des Einzelnen J in the form of universality, that I am
apprehended as a universal person, in which [respect] all are
identical. A lzuman being counts as suclz because lze is a lzuman
being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German,
Italian, etc. This consciousness, which is the aim of tlzouglzt, is
of infinite importance, and it is inadequate only if it adopts a
fixed position - for example, as cosmopolitanism - in opposition
to the concrete life of the state.
Addition (H). On the one hand, it is through the system of particularity

[Partikldaritiit] that right becomes externally necessary as a protection for
particular interests [die BesmuJerlzeit]. Even if its source is the concept,
right comes into existence [Eristenz] only because it is useful in relation to
needs. In order to conceive of right in terms of thought, one must be
educated in how to think, and not remain confined to the merely sensuous
realm; one must adapt the form of universality to the objects [Gegetzstiitzden], and likewise regulate one's will according to a universal
[principle]. Only after human beings have invented numerous needs f(l'
themselves, and the acquisition c:f these needs has become entwined with
their satisfaction, is it possible for laws to be made.
210
The objective actuality of right consists partly in its being present to
the consciousness and being in some way known, and partly in its
possessing the power of actuality, in having validity and hence also in
becoming known as universally valid.
Etlzicol Lift
209-211
a. Right as Law
2II
When what is right in itselfis posited in its objective existence [Dasein]
-i.e. determined by thought for consciousness and kno11m [bekanPit] as
what is right and valid - it becomes law;" and through this detennination, right becomes positive right in general.
To posit something as universal- i.e. to bring it to the consciousness as a universal - is, as everyone knows, to think (cf.
Remarks to I 3 and 2 I above); when the content is reduced
in this way to its simplest form, it is given its final detenninacy.
Only when it becomes law does what is right take on both the
form of its universality and its true determinacy. Thus, the
process of legislation should not be represented merely by
that one ofits moments whereby something is declared to be a
rule of behaviour valid for everyone; more important than this
is the inner and essential moment, namely cognition of tile
content in its determinate universality. Since only animals have
their law as instinct, whereas only human beings have theirs as
custom [Gewolmlleit], customary rights contain the moment of
being tllougllts and of being knoiDn [gewuftt]. The difference
between these and laws consists [beste/u] simply in the fact that
the former are known in a subjective and contingent manner,
so that they are less detenninate for themselves and the
universality of thought is more obscure; and in addition,
cognizance [die Kenntnis] of this or that aspect of right, or of
right in general, is the contingent property of only a few
people. The view that such rights, since they take the form of
customs [Gewollnlleiten], are privileged in having become part
of life is an illusion, for the valid laws of the nation do not
cease to be its customs merely because they have been written
down and collected. (Besides, it is precisely in those areas
which involve the most lifeless material and the most lifeless
thoughts that there is most talk nowadays of life and becoming
"Trans/01ors note: Hegel is once again exploiting the el)mological affinity of words to
suggest a semantic aflinil). In this case, the noun Gtset:: ('law') echoes the verb gtset::l
('posited').
part of lift.) When customary rights are eventually collected
and put together-which must happen at an early stage among
a people which has attained even some degree of education this collection is a legal code; and since it is merely a collection,
it will be characterized by fonnlesmess, indeterminacy, and
incompleteness. The main difference between t is and a legal
code in the proper sense is that in the latter, the principles of
,right in their universality, and hence in their ~e
'-~~~~--;;!
the land (or common law) ofEngland is con tamed, as everyone
knows, in statutes (formal laws) and in so-called unwrillen law;
this unwrtften law, incidentally, is likewise recorded in writing, and knowledge [Ketmtnis] of it can and must be acquired
solely through reading (of the many quarto volumes which it
-~
fills). The enormous confusion w ich prevails in England
both in the administration of justice and in the matter [Sache]
itself has, however, been described by those most familiar
with it.l They note in particular the circumstance that, since
this unwritten law is contained in the verdicts of courts of law
2
and judges, the
......_ judges constantly act as legislators; they are
both dependen on the au ority of their preuecessors -since
the latter merely gave expression to the unwritten law- and
independent of it, because they themselves incorporate the
unwritten law and are accordingly entitled to judge whether
earlier decisions were compatible wit the unwritten law or
not. - A similar confusion which could have arisen in the
administration of justice during the later Roman Empire
because of the differing authorities of all the famous jurists
was averted when an emperor devised the ingenious
expedient, known as the law of citations/ which introduced a
kind of college of long-deceased lawyers with a majority vote
and a president (see Hugo's History of Roman Law [1799
edition], 354). - To deny a civilized nation, or the legal
profession [detnjuristisclletz Standel within it, the ability to draw
up a legal code would be among the greatest insults one could
offer to either; 4 for this does not require that a system oflaws
with a new content should be created, but only that the present
content of the laws should be recognized in its determinate
211-212
Etlzical Lift
universality - i.e. grasped by means of
sequently applied to particular cases.
tllor~gllt
- and sub-
Addition (H,G). The sun and the planets also have their laws, but they are
unaware of them. Barbarians are governed by drives, customs [Sitten),
and feelings, but they have no consciousness of these. When right is
posited and known [gL'lllllflt), all the contingencies of feeling [Empjind11ng)
and opinion and the forms of revenge, compassion, and selfishness fall
away, so that right only then attains its true determinacy and is duly
honoured. Only through the discipline of being apprehended does it
become capable of universality. Collisions arise in the application of the
law, where the understanding of the judge has its place; this is entirely
necessary, for the implementation of the law would otherwise be a completely mechanical process. But to go so far as to eliminate such collisions
altogether by relying heavily on the discretion of the judge is a far worse
solution, because collisions are also inherent in thougrt, in the thinking
consciousness and its dialectic, whereas the mere decision of a judge
would be arbitrary. It is usually argued in defence of customary right that
it has a living quality, but this living quality, i.e. the identity of the
determination with the subject, is not the whole essence of the matter
[Saclze]; right must be known by thought, it must be a system in itself, and
only as such can it have any validity among civilized [gebildeten) nations. If
it has lately been denied that nations have a vocation to legislate, this is
not only offensive but also foolish, for it does not even credit individuals
[derz Ei1zzelnen) with the skill to reduce the infinite mass of existing laws to
a coherent system, despite the fact that the infinite urge of our times is
precisely to systematize, i.e. to raise to the universal. It has likewise been
held that collections of verdicts such as are found in the corpr1s jrail are
much more valuable than a legal code worked out in the most general
way, on the grounds that such verdicts always retain a certain particularity
and association with history which people are reluctant to part with. But
the practice of English law shows clearly enough how pernicious such
collections are.
In this identity of bei11g in itself and bei11g posited, only what is llllD has
binding force as right. Since being posited constitutes the aspect. of
existence [Dasei11) in which the contingency of self-will and of other
particular factors may also intervene, what is law may differ in content
from what is right in itself.
243
Philosoplzy o[Riglzt
In positive right, what is legal [geset.zmiiflig] is therefore the
source of cognition of what is right [Recht], or more precisely,
of what is ltmJfiJ [Reclztens]; the positive science of right is to
that extent a historical science whose principle is that of authority. Whatever else may arise is a matter [Sache] for the
understanding and concerns the external classification, compilation, consequences, and further application etc. [oflaws].
When the understanding becomes involved with the nature of
the thing [Sache] itself, its theories (e.g. of criminal law) show
what mischief it can do with its deductive reasoning [.Riisonnement aus Griirulen]. - On the one hand, positive science has
not only the right, but also the necessary duty to deduce in
every detail from its positive data both the historical developments and the applications and ramifications of the given
determinations of right, and to follow up their consequences;
but on the other hand, if it is then asked whether, after all
these demonstrations, a determination of right is rational,
those who occupy themselves with this science should at least
not be absolutely astonished, even if they regard the question
as beside the point.- On undmtanding[the law], cf. Remarks to
3 above.
While right comes into existence [Dasei71] primarily in the form of

being posited, it also comes into existence in tenns of cm1tent when it
is applied to the material of civil society - to its relationships and
varieties of property and contracts in their endlessly increasing diversity and complexity - and to ethical relationships based on emotion,
love and trust (but only in so far as these contain the aspect of abstract
right- see 1 59). Since morality and moral precepts concern the will
in its most personal [eigensten] subjectivity and particularity, they cannot be the object [Gegenstandj of positive legislation. Further material
[for the positive content of right] is furnished by the rights and duties
which emanate from the administration of justice itself, from the
state, etc.
Addition (G). In the higher relationships of marriage, love, religion, and

the state, only those aspects which are by nature capable of having an
external dimension can become the object of legislation Nevertheless,
Etlzical Lift
the legislation of different peoples varies greatly in this respect. For

example, the Chinese state has a law to the effect that a husband must
love his first wife more than his other wives. If he is convicted of having
done the opposite, he is subjected to corporal punishment In older
legislations, there are likewise numerous rules concerning loyalty and
honesty which are out of keeping with the nature of law, because they
apply entirely to the realm of inwardness. It is only in the case of oaths,
where things [Dinge] are referred to the conscience, that honesty and
loyalty must be taken into account as substantial issues.
But apart from its application to the particular, the fact that right is
posited also makes it applicable to the individual [ein.zelt~m] case. It
thereby enters the sphere of the quantitative, which is not determined
by the concept (i.e. the quantitative in itself fliir sich ], or as the
determination of value when one qualitative item is exchanged for
another). Determination by the concept imposes only a general limit
[Gmz.ze] within which variations are also possible. But such variations
must be eliminated if anything is to be actualized, at which point a
contingent and arbitrary decision is arrived at within the limit referred
to.
It is in this focusing of the universal, not just on the particular
but on an individual case - i.e. in its immediate application that the purely positive aspect of the law chiefly lies. It is
impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a
determination derived from the concept, whether the just
penalty for an offence is corporal punishment of forty lashes
or thirty-nine/ a fine of five dollars [Taler] as distinct from
four dollars and twenty-three groschen or less,Z or imprisonment for a year or for 364 days or less, or for a year and one,
two, or three days. And yet an injustice is done if there is even
one lash too many, or one dollar or groschen, one week or one
day in prison too many or too few.- It is reason itself which
recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance
have their (albeit limited) sphere and right, and it does not
attempt to reduce such contradictions to a just equivalence;
here, the only interest present is that of aaualization, the
interest that some kind of determination and decision should
245
212-214
be reached, no matter how this is done (within given limits
[imzerl1alb ei11er Grenze]). This decision belongs to formal selfcertainty, to abstract subjectivity, which may rely either on its
ability - withi11 the give11 limits - to stop short and settle the
matter simply in order that a settlement may be reached, or on
such grounds for determination as the choice of a row1d number, or of the number forty minus one. - It makes no difference if the law does not specifY this ultimate determination
which actuality requires, but leaves it to the judge to decide
and simply limits (beschriil1kt] him to a maximum and
minimum; for the maximum and minimum will themselves be
round numbers of this kind, and they do not remove [hebt es
11icht mifl the need for the judge to arrive at a finite and purely
positive determination of the kind ref erred to, but assign it to
him as a necessary task.
Addition (H,G). There is essentially one aspect of law and the administration of justice which is subject to contingency, and this derives frOOJ the
fact that the law is a universal determination which has to be applied to
the individual case. If one were to object to this contingency, the objection
would be merely abstract. For example, the magnitude of a punishment
cannot be made to correspond with any conceptual definition [BwrJfibestimmzmg], and whatever is decided will in this respect always be arbitrary. But this contingency is itself necessary; and if one uses it as a
general argument against a code oflaws, for example, on the grounds that
the latter is therefore imperfect, this overlooks the very aspect in which
completeness is impossible to attain, and which must therefore be
accepted as it stands.
b. The Existence [Dasei11] of the Law
215
For the law to have binding force, it is necessary, in view of the right
of self-consciousness (see 13 z and its appended Remarks) that the
laws should be made universally kno11111.
To hang the laws at such a height that no citizen could read
them, as Dionysius the Tyrant did/ is an injustice [Unrecht] of
exactly the same kind as to bury them in an extensive
apparatus of learned books and collections of verdicts based
Etlrical Lift
214--216
on divergent judgements, opinions, practices, etc., all expressed in a foreign language, so that knowledge [Kenntnis] of the
laws currently in force is accessible only to those who have
made them an object of scholarly study. - Those rulers who
have given their peoples a collection of laws - if only a formless collection like thatofjustinian, or better still, a lawoftlzeland
embodied in an orderly and specific legal code1 - were not
only the greatest benefactors of their peoples, who duly
praised and thanked them; what they did was at the same time
a great aa ofjustice.
Additimz (G). The legal profession [JrtristerJStamJ], which has special
knowledge of the laws, often regards this as its monopoly and no concern
of those who are not among its members. Thus, the physicists took
exception to Goethe's theory of coloursl because he did not belong" to
their profession and was a poet into the bargain. But just as one need not
be a shoemaker to know whether one's shoes fit, so is there no need to
belong to a specific profession in order to know about matters of universal

interest. Right is concerned with freedom, the worthiest and most sacred
possession of man, and man must know about it if it is to have binding
force for him.
past tense is Gans's, for Gricshcim's notes read 'docs not belong
to their profession and is even a poet' (VPR IV, 543); Goethe, who died in I8Jz, was still
alive when Gricshcim made his notes from Hegel's lectures.
Tmns/Oior's nott: The
On ~he one hand, simple and universal determinations are required for
the public legal code, but on the other, the nature of theji11ite material
in question leads to endless further determinations. The scope of the
law ought on the one hand to be that of a complete and self-contained
whole, but on the other hand, there is a constant need for new legal
determinations. But since this antinomy is merely a product of the
specializatimz of universal principles which themselves remain
unchanged, the right to a complete legal code remains intact, as does
the right [which requires] that these simple and universal principles
should be capable of comprehension and formulation without
reference to, and in distinction from, their specialization.
One of the main sources of the complexicy oflegislation is that
247
Philosophy ofRight
the rational, i.e. that which is rightful in and for itself, may
gradually infiltrate primitive institutions which contain an
unjust element [ein Unrec/zt] and are therefore of merely
historical significance. This took place with Roman institutions, as already mentioned (see Remarks to t8o), and with
the old feudal law, etc. But it is essential to realize that the
very nature of the finite material entails an infinite progression
when determinations which are universal in themselves and
rational in and for themselves are applied to it.- It is therefore
mistaken to demand that a legal code should be comprehensive in the sense of absolutely complete and incapable of any
further determinations (this demand is a predominantly German affliction) and to refuse to accept, i.e. to actualize, something allegedly imperfect on the grounds that it is incapable of
such completion. Both of these errors are based on a misapprehension of the nature of finite matters such as civil law
[Privatrec/zt], whose so-called perfection is a perennial approximation to perfection, and on a misapprehension of the difference between the universal of reason and the universal of
the understanding, and of the application of the latter to the
material of finitude and individuality [Einzellzeit ], whose extent
is infinite.- 'Le plus grand ennemi du bien c'est le mieux'" is
an expression of true common sense, as opposed to the common sense of empty ratiocination and reflection/
Addition (H,G). Completeness means the comprehensive collection of all

individual items belonging to a given sphere, and no science or area of
knowledge [Kemzt11is] can be complete in this sense. Now if it is said that
philosophy or any other science is incomplete, it is easy to conclude that
one ought to wait for the remaining part to be added, for it may be that the
best is yet to come. But this is not the way in which progress is made,
whether in geometry, in which new determinations continue to emerge
despite the fact that it appears to be a closed subject, or in philosophy,
which is always capable of funher specialization, even if it is concerned
with the universal Idea. The universal law always used to be the Ten
Commandments; and it is manifestly absurd not to promulgate the law
'Thou shalt not kill' en the grounds that a legal code cannot be complete.
"Tmmlalor's nou: 'The greatest enemy of the good is the better.' I foUow the Suhrkamp
edition (Wtrke vn, 369) and VP R (II, 663) in reading 'mirox', as against the first edition's
'mnllmr.
Etlzicol Lifo
Even idle reflection may conclude that every legal code is capable of
improvement, for it is possible to imagine what is most glorious, exalted,
and beautiful as being more glorious, exalted, and beautiful still. But a
large and ancient tree puts out more and more branches without thereby
becoming a new tree; yet it would be foolish to refuse ID plant a tree just
because it might produce new branches.
Just as right in itselfbecomes law in civil society, so too does my

individual [einzelrze] right, whose existence [Dasein] was previously
immeditJJe and abstract, acquire a new significance when its existence is
recognized as part of the existent [aistierenden] universal will and
knowledge. Acquisitions of property and transactions relating to it
must therefore be undertaken and expressed in the fomr which that
existence gives to them. Property is accordingly based on contract and
on those fornralities which make it capable of proof and valid before
the law.
The original, i.e. immediate, modes of acquisition and tides
(see 54ff.) are in fact abandoned in civil society, and occur
only as individual accidents or limited moments. - Both feeling, which remains confined to the subjective, and reflection,
which clings to its abstract essences, reject such formalities,
whereas the dead understanding may for its part hold on to
them in preference to the thing [Sac/re] itself and multiply
them indefinitely. - Besides, the process of development
[Bildzmg] begins with a content whose form is sensuous and
immediate and, by means oflong and arduous work, arrives at
the form of thought appropriate to this content and thereby
gives it simple and adequate expression. It is in the nature of
this process that, at the stage when the development of right is
only just beginning, ceremonies and formalities are extremely
elaborate, and count rather as the thing itself than as its
symbol; this is why, even in Roman law, a multitude of
determinations, and especially turns of phrase, was retained
from earlier ceremonies instead of being replaced by
determinations of thought and adequate means of expressing
them.
216-217
Additim1 (H,G). When right is posited as what it is in itself, it is law. I
possess something or own a property which I took over as ownerless; this
property must now also be recognized and posited as mine. 1bis is why
there are [om1alities in society with reference to property: boundary stones
are erected as symbols for others to recognize, and mortgage books and
property registers are compiled. Most property in civil society is based on
contract, whose fonnalities are fixed and determinate. One may well view
such fonnalities with antipathy and believe that they exist only in order to
bring in money fa the authorities [Obrigkeit]; they may even be regarded
as offensive and as a sign of mistrust, on the grounds that they invalidate
the saying that a man's word is his bond; but the essential aspect of such
fonns is that what is right in itself should also be posited as right. My will
is a rational will; it has validity, and this validity should be recognized by
others. Here is the point at which my subjectivity and that of others must
be put aside, and the will must attain a security, stability, and objectivity
which fonn alone can give it.
Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in

civil society, crime is no longer an injury [Verletzung) merely to a
subjective infinite, but to the universal cause [Sache] whose existence
[Existenz] is inherently [in sich] stable and strong. This gives rise to the
viewpoint that an action may be a danger to society. On the one hand,
this increases the magnitude ofthe crime; but on the other, the power
of society has now become sure of itself, and this reduces the external
importance of the injury and so leads to greater leniency in its
punishment.
The fact that an injury to one member of society is an injury to
all the others does not alter the nature of crime in terms of its
concept, but in terms of its outward existence [8istenz]; for
the injury now affects the attitudes [Vorstellung) and consciousness of civil society, and not just the existence [Dasein)
of the immediately injured party. In heroic ages - see the
tragedies of the ancients - the citizens do not regard the
crimes which members of royal houses commit against each
other as injuries to themselves. - Crime i11 itselfis an infinite
injury, but as an existence [Dasein], it must be measured in
terms of qualitative and quantitative differences (see g6);
and since its existence is essentially determined as a represen-
zso
Ethical Life
tatio11 (V07:stellrmg] and co1tsriormzess oft he validity ofthe laws, its
darzger to dvil socie~y is a determination of its magnitude, or
even o11e of its qualitative determinations. - This quality or
magnitude varies, however, according to the c01zditio" of civil
society, and this is the justification both for attaching the
death penalty to a theft of a few pence or of a turnip, and for
imposing a lenient punishment for a theft of a hundred and
more times these amounts. Although the view that they are a
threat to civil society may appear to aggravate crimes, it has in
fact been chiefly responsible for a reduction in punishments.
A penal code is therefore primarily a product of its time and of
the current condition of civil society.
Additio11 (H). That a crime committed in society should appear greater
and yet be punished more leniently is an apparent contradiction. But
whereas it would be impossible for society to leave a crime unpunished since the crime would then be posited as right - the fact that society is
sure of itself means that crime, in comparison, is always of a purely
individual character, an unstable and isolated phenomenon. The very
stability of society gives crime the status of something merely subjective,
which seems the product not so much of the deliberate will as of natural
impulse. This view makes crime appear in a milder light, so that its
punishment also becomes milder. If society is still inwardly unstable,
punishments must be made to set an example, fer punishment is itself a
counter-example to the example of crime. But in a society which is
internally stable, the positedness of crime is so weak that the cancellation
[Arljlreb11ng] of this positedness must itself assume similar proportions.
Thus, harsh punishments are not unjust in and for themselves, but are
proportionate to the conditions of their time; a criminal code cannot be
valid for every age, and crimes are semblances of existence (Sclteillexistellznz] which can meet with greater or lesser degrees of repudiation.
c. The Court of Law
V.1hen right has come into existence [Dasei11] in the form oflaw, it has
being for itself; as opposed to partiatfar volitimzs aud opi11iom with
regard to right, it is self-sufficient and has to assert itself as rmivmaf.
This cognitio11 and actt~alizatio" of right in the particular case, without
the subjective feeling (Empfi,dzmg] of partiat!ar interest, is the
responsibility of a public authority [Maclzt1 namely the rourt oflaw.
The historical origin of judge and lawcourts may have taken
the form of a patriarchal relationship, of coercion [Gewalt], or
of free choice; but this is irrelevant as far as the concept of the
thing [Sache] is concerned. To regard the introduction of
jurisdiction by sovereign princes and governments as merely a
matter [Sache] of arbitrary grace andfovour, as Herr von Haller
does (in his Restoration of Political Science)/ is an example of
that thoughtlessness which fails to realize that, since legal and
political institutions in general are rational in character, they
are necessary in and for themselves, and that the form in
which they first arose and were introduced has no bearing on
a discussion of their rational basis. - The opposite extreme to
this view is the crude notion that the administration of justice,
as in the days of the right of private warfare [Faustrecht1 is an
improper use of force, a suppression of freedom, and a rule of
despotism.2 The administration of justice should be regarded
both as a duty and as a right on the part of the public authority, and as a right, it is not in the least dependent on whether
individuals choose to entrust it to an authority or not.
220
When the right against crime takes the form of revenge (see 102), it
is merely right in itself, not in a form that is lawful [Rechtens1 i.e. it is
not just [gerecht] in its existence [Existenz]. Instead of the injured party,
the injured universal now makes its appearance, and it has its distinctive actuality in the court of law. It takes over the prosecution and
penalization of crime, and these thereby cease to be the merely subjective and contingent retribution of revenge and are transformed into
the genuine reconciliation of right with itself, i.e. into punishment.
Objectively, this reconciliation applies to the law, which restores and
thereby actualizes itself as valid through the cancellation (Aujheben] of
the crime; and subjectively, it applies to the criminal in that his law,
which is known by him and is valid for him and for his protection, is
enforced upon him in such a way that he himself finds in it the
satisfaction of justice and merely the enactment of what is proper to him
[des Seinigen].
Etlzical Life
219--223
221
A member of civil society has the riglztto stand in a court oflaw and also
the duty to submit to the court's authority and to accept its decision alone
when his own right is in dispute.
Addition (H). Since every individual has the right to stand in court, he
must also know the laws, otherwise this entitlement would be of no use to
him. But the individual also has the duty to submit to the court's authority. Under the feudal system, the powerful often refused to do so,
challenging the court and treating it as an injustice [Unrecht] on the
court's part if they were summoned before it But conditions such as these
contradict the purpose of a court In more recent times, sovereign princes
have had to recognize the authority of the courts in private matters, and in
free states, they usually lose their cases.
222
In the courts, right takes on the determination that it must be capable
ofproof. The process of law puts the parties in a position of having to
substantiate their evidence and their legal arguments [Rechtsgriinde],
and to acquaint the judge and themselves with the matter [Sac/ze] in
question. These steps are tlzemselves rights; their course must therefore
be determined by law, and they also form an essential part of theoretical jurisprudence [Rechtswissenschaft].
Addition (H). It may be infuriating to know that one has a right and then
be denied it on the grounds that it cannot be proved. But the right which I
have must also be a posited right: I must be able to describe it and prove
it, and a right which has being in itself cannot be recognized by society
until it has also been posited.
The fragmentation of these actions into more and more separate

actions with their separate rights has no inherent limit [Gren.ze].
Through this fragmentation, the process of law, which in itself is
already a means, stands out in opposition to its end as something
external to it. - The parties have a right to go through these lengthy
formalities, which are their right. But since these may also be turned
into an evil [Obe~ and even into an instrument of injustice [Unrecht],
253
the parties must be obliged by law to submit themselves to a simple
court (a court ofarbitration or court of the first instance) in an attempt
to settle their differences before they proceed any further. This is
necessary in order to protect them - and right itself, as the substantial
matter [Sac/ze] at issue - against the process of law and its misuse.
Equity involves a departure from formal right in the light of

moral or other considerations, and relates primarily to the
cmrtent of the legal action. The function of a court of equity,
however, will be to reach a decision on the individual case,
without adhering to the formalities of the legal process and in
particular to the objective evidence as the law may interpret it;
it will also reach its decision in the interests of the individual
case in its own right, and not in the interests of making a
universal legal disposition/
The rights of the subjective consciousness include not only that of

making the laws publicly known (see 215), but also the possibility of
knowing [.zu kennen] how the law is actualized in particular cases, i.e. of
knowing the course of the external proceedings, legal arguments
[Rechtsgriinde], and so forth -the publicity ofthe administration ofjustice;
for the course of law is in itself an occurrence of universal validity,
and although the particular content of the case may be of interest only
to the parties themselves, its universal content (i.e. the right within it
and the decision on this right) is of interest to everyone.
The deliberations of the members of the court among themselves on the judgement they are to deliver are expressions of
opinions and views which are still particular and hence not of a
public nature.
Addition (H). Straightforward common sense sees it as right and proper

that the administration of justice should be public.1 A major obstacle to
this has always been the high station of those with powers of jurisdiction,
since they are reluctant to appear before the general public, seeing themselves as guardians of a right to which the laity should not have access.
But a primary characteristic of a right is that the citizens should have
confidence in it, and it is this aspect which requires that justice should be
dispensed in public. The right of publicity is based on the fact that the
254
Etlu"cal Life
end of the court is right, which as a universal should also come before the
universal, and also on the fact that the citizens are thereby convinced that
justice [Recht] is actually being done.
The dispensation of justice, as the application of the law to the

individual case, involves two distinct aspects: first, a knowledge
[Erke1mtnis] of the nature of the case in its immediate individuality
[Einzelheit] - e.g. whether a contract etc. has been made, whether an
offence has been committed and who the culprit is, and in crimir~al
law, whether the substantial, criminal character of the deed was
determined by premeditation (see Remarks to 1 19); and secondly,
the subsumption of the case under the law of the restoration of right,
which, in criminal cases, includes the punishment. The decisions on
these two distinct aspects are also distinct functions.
In the judicial system of Rome, the distinction between these
two functions took the form that the praetor gave his decision
on the assumption that the facts of the matter [Sac/re] were so
and so, and then appointed a special iudex to inquire into these
facts/ -In the English legal system, it is left to the insight or
arbitrary will of the prosecutor to categorize an act in terms of
its specific criminal character (e.g. as murder or
manslaughter), and the court cannot determine otherwise if it
finds his conclusion incorrect. 2
In the first place, the supervision of the whole course of the inquiry,
and of the legal actions between the parties (which are themselves
rights- see 222), and in addition the second aspect of legal judgement (see 225), are the proper task of the professional judge. Since
he is the organ of the law, the case must be prepared for him to enable
it to be subsumed [under the law in question]; that is, it must be
raised out of its apparent empirical character to become a recognized
fact of a universal kind.
255
223-226
Philosophy ofRight
227
The first of these aspects- the knowledge [Erkenntnis] of the case in its
immediaJe individuality [Einze/lzeit], and its categorization- does not in
itself involve any legal dispensation. It is a knowledge to which every
ed11ca1ed person may aspire. The essential factor in categorizing an
action is the subjective moment of the agent's insight and intention
(see Part Two above); besides, proof is concerned not with objects
[Gegenstiinde] o( reason or abstract objects of the understanding, but
only with details, circumstances, and objects of sensuous intuition and
subjective certainty, so that it does not involve any absolutely objective
determination. For these reasons, the ultimate factors in such a decision are subjective corrviction and conscience (animi sententio); 1 and in
the case of the proof, which rests on the statements and affirmations
of others, its ultimate (though subjective) guarantee is the oatil.
In dealing with this subject, it is of great importance to bear in

mind the kind of proofhere in question, and to distinguish it
from other varieties of cognition and proof. To furnish a proof
of a determination of reason like the concept of right - i.e. to
recognize its necessity - requires a different method from that
required to prove a theorem in geometry. Besides, in the latter
case, the figure is determined by the understanding and
already made abstract in accordance with a law. But with an
empirical content such as a fact [Tillsaclze], the material of
cognition is a given sensuous intuition and the subjective
certainty of the senses, along with depositions and affirmations concerning such material; and from these statements,
testimonies, circumstances, and the like, conclusions and
inferences are subsequently drawn. The objective truth which
emerges from such material and from the method appropriate
to it leads, when the attempt is made to determine it objectively for itself, to lza/f-prooft and also, as a perfectly logical
consequence which at the same time contains a formal illogicality, to extraordinary punishments. This objective truth means
something quite different from the truth of a determination of
reason or of a proposition whose content the understanding
has already determined abstractly for itself. To show that the
recognition of this kind of empirical truth about an event lies
Ethical Life
within the proper legal determination of a court, and that this
determination also gives it a proper qualification, and hence
an exclusive right in itself, to perform this task and makes it
necessary for it to do so - this is an important factor in
considering the extent to which judgements on facts [das Faktum], as well as on legal questions, should be assigned to
formal courts oflaw.
Addition (H). There is no reason [Gnmd] to assume that the professional

judge alone should establish the facts of the case [Tatbestar~d], for anyone
with a general (as distinct from purely legal) education is competent in
this matter [Sache]. An assessment of the facts of the case will be based on
empirical circumstances, on testimonies concerning the deed [Handlur~g]
in question and similar intuitive perceptions [Anscllauur~gen], but also on
facts [Tatsacllen] from which conclusions can be drawn concerning the
deed itself and which make it appear probable or improbable. The aim
here is to attain certainty, not truth in the higher sense, which is invariably
eternal in character. This certainty is subjective conviction or conscience,
and the question here is: what form should this certainty assume in a
court of law? The requirement COIJ!.Illonly encountered in German law
[im deulscllen Recllle] that the criminal should confess his guilt has truth on
its side inasmuch as the right of subjective self-consciousness is thereby
satisfied; fa- what the judges pronounce must not differ from what is in
the consciousness, and only when the criminal confesses does the judgement no longer contain anything alien to him. But the difficulty arises
here that the criminal may deny his guilt, with the result that the interest
of justice is prejudiced. If, on the other hand, the subjective conviction of
the judge is to prevai~ an element of harshness is again introduced, fathe person in question is no longer treated as a free individual. The
mediation [between these possibilities] is the requirement that the verdict
of guilt or innocence should emanate from the soul of the criminal- as in
trial by jury.
When judgement is pronounced - in the sense that the case in question is thereby subsumed under the ltmJ - the right of self-consciousness of the [affected] party is preserved in relation to the ltmJ,
inasmuch as the law is known and is consequendy the law of the party
concerned; and it is preserved in relation to the subsumption,
inasmuch as the process oflaw is public. But as far as the decision on
Z57
Philosophy ofRight
the particular subjective and external co1ltenl of the matter [Sache] is
concerned (knowledge [Erken11tnis) of which belongs to the first ofthe
two aspects referred to in 225 above), this right is satisfied by the
cmifidnzce which can be placed in the subjectivity of those who arrive at
the verdict. This confidence is based primarily on their equality with
the party concerned in respect of their particularity - their social
status [Stand] and the like.
The right of self-consciousness, the moment of subjective
freedom, can be regarded as the substantial viewpoint when we
consider the necessity for publicity in the administration of
justice and for so-called trials by jury.' What may be said in
favour of these institutions on the grounds of their utility is
essentially reducible to this right. Other considerations and
reasons concerning their various advantages and disadvantages may generate arguments and counter-arguments; but like
all grounds for reasoning [Rasmmement], these are secondary
and inconclusive, or else derived from other and possibly
higher spheres. It is possible that the administration of justice
in itself could be managed well by purely professional courts,
perhaps better than by other institutions. But even if this
possibility could be increased to probability - or indeed to
necessity - it is of no relevance, for on the opposite side there
is always the right of self-consciousness which retains its claims
and finds that they are not satisfied. - Given the nature of the
entire corpus oflaws, knowledge [Kcmtnis] of right and of the
course of court proceedings, as well as the ability to pursue
one's rights, may become the property of a class [Stand] which
makes itself exclusive even by the terminology it uses,
inasmuch as this terminology is a foreign language for those
whose rights are at stake. In this situation, members of civil
society, who depend for their livelihood on their activity, their
ow11 knowledge [Wissen] and volitio11, remain alienated not only
from their own most personal interests but also from the
substantial and rational basis of these, namely right, and they
are reduced to a condition of tutelage, or even a kind of serfdom, in relation to the class [Stand] in question. Even if they
have the right to be physically present in court, to have a
[ooti11g in it (i11 iudicio stare), this counts for little if they are not
Etlzica/ Lifo
to be present in spirit and with their own knowledge [Wissen],
and the right which they receive will remain an external[ale
for them.
In the administration of justice, civil society, in which the Idea has lost
itselfin particularity and split up into the division between inward and
outward, returns to its concept, to the unity of the universal which has
being in itself with subjective particularity {although the particularity
in question is that of the individual case, and the universal is that of
abstract right). The actualization of this unity in its extension to the
entire range of particularity, first as a relative union, constitutes the
determination of the police; and secondly, as a limited but concrete
totality, it constitutes the corpora1io11.
Addition (H). In civil society, universality is merely necessity. As far as

needs are concerned, right as such is the only fixed point.G But this right,
which is only a limited sphere, relates solely to the protection of what I
possess; welfare is something external to right as such. Nevertheless, this
welfare is an essential determination in the system of needs. Hence the
universal, which in the first instance is merely right, has to be extended
over the entire field of particularity. justice is a major factor in civil
society: good laws will cause the state to flourish, and free ownership is a
fundamental condition of its success. But since I am completely involved
in particularity, I have a right to demand that, within this context, my
particular welfare should also be promoted. Account should be taken of
my welfare, of my particularity, and this is the task of the police and the
corporation.
"TTtlllslalor~s
nou: ist n11r das Rtrht a/s solthes das Ftrtt. In Hotho's notes, the equivalent
phrase reads ist n11r das Rtrlu als sdthts das Erstt (VP R 111, 68g), i.e. 'righ! as such is alone
primary'.
C. The Police and the Corporation
In the system of needs, the livelihood and welfare of each individual

[iedes Einze/nen] are a possibility whose actualization is conditioned by
the individual's own arbitrary will and particular nature, as well as by
259
the objective system of needs. Through the administration of justice,
infringements of property or persona1ity are annulled. But the right

wlziclz is actually present in particularity means not only that contingencies
which interfere with this or that end should be cm~eelled [au.fkelzoben]
and that the undisturbed security of persons and property should be
guaranteed, but also that the livelihood and welfare of individuals
should be secured- i.e. that particular welfare should be treated as a nglzt
and duly actualized.
a The Police 1
In so far as the principle by which this or that end is governed is still

that ofthe particular will, that authority [Macht] of the un.iversa1 which
guarantees security remains, on the one hand, primarily limited to the
sphere of contingencies, and on the other, it remains an external order.
Apart from crimes which the universal authority [Maclzt] must prevent
or bring to justice -i.e. contingency in the shape of arbitrary evil- the
permissible arbitrariness of inherently [fiir siclz] rightful actions and of
the private use of property also has external relations [Beziehungen]
with other individuals [Einzelne], as well as with other public arrangements designed to further a common end. Through this universa1
aspect, private actions become a contingent matter which passes out
of my control [Gewalt] and which can wrong or harm other people or
actua1ly does so.
There is admittedly 011/y a possibility that harm may be done. But the
fact that no harm is done is, as a contingency, likewise no more than
that. This is the aspect of wrong which is inherent in such actions, and
which is consequently the ultimate reason [Gnmd] for pena1 justice as
implemented by the police.
Ethical Life
2Jo-236
The relations [Beziehungen] of external existence [Dasein] fall within

the infinite of the understanding; consequently, no boundary is
present in itselfbetween what is harmful and what is harmless (even
with regard to crime), between what is suspicious and what is not
suspicious, or between what should be prohibited or kept under
surveillance and what should be exempted from prohibitions, surveillance and suspicion, inquiry and accountability. The more precise
determinations will depend on custom, the spirit of the rest of the
constitution, prevailing conditions, current emergencies, etc.
Addition (H). No fixed determinations are possible here, and no absolute

boundaries can be drawn. Everything here is personal; subjective opinion
comes into play, and the spirit of the constitution and current dangers will
determine the more precise circumstances. In times of war, for example,
various things which are otherwise harmless must be regarded as harmful.
Because of these aspects of contingency and arbitrary personality, the
police takes on a certain character of maliciousness. When ret1ection is
highly developed, the police may tend to draw everything it can into its
sphere ofint1uence, for it is possible to discover some potentially harmful
aspect in everything. On such occasions, the police may proceed very
pedantically and disrupt the ordinary life of individuals. But however
troublesome this may be, no objective boundary line can be drawn here. 1
In the indeterminate multiplication and interdependence of daily

needs, the procurement and exchange ofmeam to satisfy these (a process
on whose unimpeded continuance everyone relies) and the need to
make the requisite inquiries and negotiations as short as possible give
rise to aspects of common interest in which the business of one is at
the same time carried out on behalf of all; they also give rise to means
and arrangements which may be of use to the community. These
universal fonctiolls and arrangements of fJilblic utility require oversight
and advance provision on the part of the public authority [Macht].
The differing interests of producers and consumers may come into

collision with each other, and even if, 011 the wlwle, their correct
relationship re-establishes itself automatically, its adjustment also
needs to be consciously regulated by an agency which stands above
both sides. The right to regulate individual matters in this wa)i(e.g. by
deciding the value of the commonest necessities of life) is based on
the fact that, when commodities in completely universal everyday use
are publicly marketed, they are offered not so much to a particular
individual [Individuum] as such, as to the individual in a universal
sense, i.e. to the public; and the task of upholding the public's right
not to be cheated and of inspecting market commodities may, as a
common concern, be entrusted to a public authority [Macht). - But
the main reason why some universal provision and direction are
necessary is that large branches of industry are dependent on external
circumstances and remote combinations whose full implications cannot be grasped by the individuals [Individuen) who are tied to these
spheres by their occupation.
At the opposite extreme to freedom of trade and commerce in
civil society are public arrangements to provide for and
determine the work of everyone. These included, for example, the building of the pyramids in ancient times, and other
enonnous works in Egypt and Asia which were undertaken for
public ends, and in which the work of the individual [des
Einzelnen) was not mediated by his particular arbitrary will and
particular interest. This interest invokes the freedom of trade
and commerce against regulation from above; but the more
blindly it immerses itself in its selfish ends, the more it
requires such regulation to bring it back to the universal, and
to moderate and shorten the duration of those dangerous
convulsions to which its collisions give rise, and which should
return to equilibrium by a process of unconscious necessity.
Addition (H). The aim of oversight and provisions on the part of the police
is to mediate between the individual [bidividrmm] and the universal possibility which is available for the attainment of individual ends. The police
should provide for street-lighting, bridge-building, the pricing of daily
necessities, and public health. Two main views are prevalent on this
subject. One maintains that the police should have oversight over everything,' and the other maintains that the police should have no say in such
matters, since everyone will be guided in his actions by the needs of
others. The individual [der Eir~zebre] must certainly have a right to earn his
living in this way or that; but on the other hand, the public also has a right
262
Ethical Life
to expect that necessary tasks will be performed in the proper manner.
Both viewpoints must be satisfied, and the freedom of trade should not be
such as to prejudice the general good.
Now even if the possibility exists for individuals to share in the

universal resources, and even if this possibility is guaranteed by the
public authority [Macht], it remains- apart from the fact that such a
guarantee must always be incomplete - open to contingencies of a
subjective kind. This is increasingly the case the more it takes such
conditions as skill, health, capital, etc. for granted.
Initially, the family is the substantial whole whose task it is to provide

for this particular aspect of the individual, both by giving him the
means and skills he requires in order to earn his living from the
universal resources, and by supplying his livelihood and maintenance
in the event of his incapacity to look after himself. But civil society
tears the individual [Individuum] away from family ties, alienates the
members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as selfsuffiCient persons. Furthermore, it substitutes its own soil for the
external inorganic nature and paternal soil from which the individual
[der Ei11zelrze] gained his livelihood, and subjects the existence [Bestelml] of the whole family itself to dependence on civil society and to
contingency. Thus, the individual [bldividuum] becomes a sm1 ofcivil
society, which has as many claims upon him as he has rights in relation
to it.
Addition (H). Admittedly, the family must provide food fer its individual
members [EinzeJ,en], but in civil society, the family is subordinate and
merely lays the foundations; its effectiveness is no longer so comprehensive. Civil society, on the other hand, is the immense power which draws
people to itself and requires them to work for it, to owe everything to it,
and to do everything by its means. Thus, if a human being is to be a
member ofcivil society, he has rights and claims in relation to it, just as he
had in relation to his family. Civil society must protect its members and
defend their rights, just as the individual [der Einzehze] owes a duty to the
rights of civil society.
239
In this character as a universal fomi/y, civil society has the duty and
right, in the face of arbitrariness and contingency on the part of the
parents, to supervise and influence the education [Er.liellung] of children in so far as this has a bearing on their capacity to become
members of society, and particularly if this education is to be completed not by the parents themselves, but by others. In so far as
communal arrangements can be made for this purpose, it is likewise
incumbent upon civil society to make them.
Addition (H,G). It is difficult to draw a boundary here between the rights

of parents and those of civil society. As far as education is concerned,
parents usually consider that they have complete freedom and can do
whatever they please. With all public education, the main opposition
usually comes from the parents, and it is they who protest and speak out
about teachers and institutions because their own preference goes against
them. Nevertheless, society has a right to follow its own tested views on
such matters, and to compel parents to send their children to school, to
have them vaccinated, etc. The controversies which have arisen in France
between the demands for freedom of instruction (i.e. for parental choice)
and f<r state supervision are relevant in this context.
Translator's 11ott: This final sentence has no counterpart in the sections of Hotho's and
Griesheim's notes on which this Addition is based (cf. VPR 111, 701f. and rv, 6ozf[).
In the same way, society has the duty and right to act as guardian on
behalf of those who destroy the security of their own and their family's
livelihood by their extravagance, and to implement their end and that
of society in their place.
Addition (G). In Athens, thelawobliged every citizen to give an account of

his means of support; the view nowadays is that this is a purely private
matter. 1 On the one hand, it is true that every individual has an
independent existence [ist jedes bulividtmm fUr sicll ]; but on the other, the
individual is also a member of the system of civil society, and just as every
human being has a right to demand a livelihood from society, so also must
society protect him against himself. It is not just starvation which is at
stake here; the wider viewpoint is the need to prevent a rabble from
emerging. Since civil society is obliged to feed its members, it also has the
right to urge them to provide for their own livelihood.
Ethical Life
Not only arbitrariness, however, but also contingent physical factors

and circumstances based on external conditions (see :zoo) may
reduce individuals to poverty. In this condition, they are left with the
needs of civil society and yet- since society has at the same time taken
from them the natural means of acquisition (see :z I 7), and also
dissolves [mdhebt] the bond of the family in its wider sense as a
kinship group (see I8 I)- they are more or less deprived of all the
advantages of society, such as the ability to acquire skills and education in general, as well as of the administration of justice, health care,
and often even of the consolation of religion. For the poor, the universal authority [Macht] takes over the role of the family with regard not
only to their immediate deficiencies, but also to the disposition of
laziness, viciousness, and the other vices to which their predicament
and sense of wrong give rise.
The subjective aspect of poverty, and in general of every kind of want

to which all individuals are exposed, even in their natural environment, also requires subjective help, both with regard to the particular
circumstances and with regard to emotion and love. This is a situation
in which, notwithstanding all universal arrangements, morality finds
plenty to do. But since this help, both in itself [/iir sic!J] and in its
effects, is dependent on contingency, society endeavours to make it
less necessary by identifYing the universal aspects of want and taking
steps to remedy them.
The contingent character of almsgiving and charitable donations (e.g. for burning lamps before the images of saints, etc.)
is supplemented by public poorhouses, hospitals, streetlighting, etc. Charity still retains enough scope for action, and it is
Inistaken if it seeks to restrict the alleviation of want to the
partimlarity of emotion and the co71/ingency of its own disposition and knowledge [Kemztnis ], and if it feels injured and
offended by universal rulings and precepts of an obligatory
kind. On the contrary, public conditions should be regarded
as all the more perfect the less there is left for the individual to
z6s
do by himself [fiir sich] in the light of his own particular
opinion (as compared with what is arranged in a universal
manner). 1
When the activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with expanding its population and industry. - On the one hand, as
the association [Zusammerzhang] of human beings through their needs
is universalized, and \\ith it the ways in which means of satisfying these
needs are devised and made available, the accumulation of wealth
increases; for the greatest profit is derived from this twofold universality. But on the other hand, the specialization [Vereinzelung] and
limitation of particular work also increase, as do likewise the
depetzderzce and want of the class 1 which is tied to such work; this in
tum leads to an inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms, and
particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil society.
When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain

standard of living - which automatically regulates itself at the level
necessary for a member of the society in question - that feeling of
right, integrity [Reclztliclzkeit], and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one's own activity and work is lost. This leads to the
creation of a rabble, which in tum makes it much easier for disproportionate wealth to be concentrated in a few hands.
Addition (G). The lowest level of subsistence [Subsisterzz1 that of the

rabble, defines itself automatically, but this minimum varies greatly
between different peoples. In England, even the poorest man believes he
has his rights; this differs from what the poor are content with in other
countries. Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is
created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc. It also follows
that those who are dependent on contingency become frivolous and lazy,
like the lazzarm1i of Naples, for example. This in tum gives rise to the evil
that the rabble do not have sufficient honour to gain their livelihood
through their own work, yet claim that they have a right to receive their
livelihood. No one can assert a right against nature, but within the condi-
z66
Ethical Life
tions of society hardship at once assumes the form of a wrong inflicted on
this or that class. The important question ofhowpovertycan be remedied
is one which agitates and torments modern societies especially. 1
If the direct burden [of support) were to fall on the wealthier class, or
if direct means were available in other public institutions (such as
wealthy hospitals, foundations, or monasteries) to maintain the
increasingly impoverished mass at its normal standard of living, the
livelihood of the needy would be ensured without the mediation of
work; this would be contrary to the principle of civil society and the
feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual members.
Alternatively, their livelihood might be mediated by work (i.e. by the
opportunity to work) which would increase the volume of production;
but it is precisely in overproduction and the lack of a proportionate
number of consumers who are themselves productive that the evil
[Vbel] consists [besteht), and this is merely exacerbated by the two
expedients in question. This shows that, despite an excess of wealth,
civil society is rzot wealthy enough - i.e. its own distinct resources are
not sufficient- to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a
rabble.
The example of England permits us to study these phenomena
[Erscheimmgen] on a large scale, especially the results achieved
by poor-rates, boundless donations, and equally limitless
private charity, and above all by the abolition [A~/heben] of the
corporations. There (especially in Scotland), it has emerged
that the most direct means of dealing with poverty, and particularly with the renunciation of shame and honour as the
subjective bases of society and with the laziness and extravagance which give rise to a rabble, is to leave the poor to their
fate and direct them to beg from the public.
This inner dialectic of society drives it - or in the first instance this

specific society- to go beyond its own confines and look for consumers,
and hence the means it requires for subsistence [Subsisterzz], in other
nations [Viilkenr] which lack those means of which it has a surplus or
generally lag behind it in creativity, etc.
whic~
Just as the earth, the firm and solid ground, is a precondition of the
principle of family life, so is the sea the natural element for industry,
whose relations with the external world it enlivens. By exposing the
pursuit of gain to danger, industry simultaneously rises above it; and
for the ties of the soil and the limited circles of civil life with its
pleasures and desires, it substitutes the element of fluidity, danger,
and destruction. Through this supreme medium of communication, it
also creates trading links between distant countries, a legal [reclltlicllen] relationship which gives rise to contracts; and at the same time,
such trade [Verkelzr] is the greatest educational asset [Bildungsmittel]
and the source from which commerce derives its world-historical
significance.
Rivers are not natural boundaries, which they have been taken
to represent in modem times. On the contrary, both they and
the oceans link ltuman beings together. It is also inaccurate on
Horace's part to say:
deus abscidit
Prudens Oceano dissociabili
Terras"
This can be seen not only from the fact that river basins are
inhabited by a single tribe or people, but also, for example,
from the relations which existed in former times between
Greece, Ionia, and Magna Graecia, between Brittany and
Britain, between Denmark and Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Livonia, etc.; it is also particularly clear when we contrast this
with the lesser degree of contact between the inhabitants of
coastal territories and those of the interior. - But in order to
appreciate what an educational asset is present in the link with
the sea, one should compare the relationship to the sea of
those nations in which creativity has flourished with those
which have shunned navigation and which, like the Egyptians
Translator's nott: 'A prudent god seportlled the lands by the dividing ocean'.I
z68
Etlzical Lifo
and Indians, have stagnated internally and sunk into the most
appalling and miserable superstition; one should likewise note
how all great and enterprising nations push their way to the
sea.
This extended link also supplies the means necessary for colonizaJion
- whether sporadic or systematic - to which the fully developed civil
society is driven, and by which it provides part of its population wi~ a
return to the family principle in a new country, and itself with a new
market and sphere of industrial activity.
Addition (G). Civil society is driven to establish colonies. The increase of

population alone has this effect; but a particular factor is the emergence
of a mass of people who cannot gain satisfaction for their needs by their
work when production exceeds the needs of consumers. Sporadic colonization is found particularly in Germany. The colonists move to
America or Russia and retain no links with their home country, to which
they are consequently of no service. The second variety of colonization,
quite different from the first, is systematic. It is initiated by the state,
which is aware of the proper way of carrying it out and regulates it
accordingly. This mode of colonization was frequently employed by the
ancients, especially the Greeks. Hard work was not the concern [Sathe] of
the Greek citizen, whose activity was directed rather towards public
affairs [iijfenJ/icl~erl Dingen). Accordingly, whenever the population grew to
a point at which it could become difficult to provide for it, the young
people were sent off to a new region, which was either specifically chosen
or left to be discovered by chance. In more recent times, colonies have not
been granted the same rights as the inhabitants of the mother country,
and this situation has resulted in wars and eventual independence, as the
history of the English and Spanish colonies shows. The liberation of
colonies itself proves to be of the greatest advantage to the mother state,
just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage to the
master. 1
What the police provides for in the first instance is the actualization
and preservation of the universal which is contained within the particularity of civil society, [and it does so] as an extemal order and
269
arrangement for the protection and security of the masses of particular
ends and interests which have their subsistence [Bestehen] in this
universal; as the higher guiding authority, it also provides for those
interests which extend beyond the society in question (see 246). In
accordance with the Idea, particularity itself makes this universal,
which is present in its immanent interests, the end and object [Gegenstand] of its will and activity, with the result that tlze etlzical returns to
civil society as an immanent principle; this constitutes the determination of the corporation.
b. The Corporation
250
The agricultural estate, in view of the substantiality of its natural and
family life, has within itself, in immediate form, the concrete universal
in which it lives. The u11ivmal estate, by definition [in seiner Bestimmung], has the universal for itself as its basis and as the end of its
activity. The intermediate estate, i.e. the estate of trade and industry,
is essentially concerned with the particular, and the corporation is
therefore specially characteristic of it. 1
251
The work performed by civil society is divided into different branches
according to its particular nature. Since the inherent likeness of such
particulars, as the quality common to them all, comes into existence
[Existenz] in the association, the selfislz end which pursues its own
particular interest comprehends [fizftt] and expresses itself at the same
time as a universal end; and the member of civil society, in accordance
with his parthular skill, is a member of a corporation whose universal
end is therefore wholly concrete, and no wider in scope than the end
inherent in the trade which is the corporation's proper business and
interest.
By this definition [Bestimmu7lg], the corporation has the right, under

the supervision of the public authority [Maclzt ], to look after its own
Ethical Life
interests within its enclosed sphere, to admit members in accordance
with their objective qualification of skill and rectitude and in numbers
determined by the universal context, to protect its members against
particular contingencies, and to educate others so as to make them
eligible for membership. In short, it has the right to assume the role of
a second family for its members, a role which must remain more
indeterminate in the case of civil society in general, which is more
remote from individuals and their particular requirements.
The tradesman [Gewerbsmann] is distinct from the day
labourer, as he is from someone who is prepared to perform
an occasional [einzelnen) contingent service. The former, who
is - or wishes to become - a master, is a member of an
association not for occasional contingent gain, but for the
whole range and universality of his particular livelihood. Privileges, in the sense of rights of a branch of civil society
which constitutes a corporation, are distinct from privileges
proper in the etymological sense/ in that the latter are contingent exceptions to the universal law, whereas the former
are no more than legally fixed determinations which lie in the
particular nature of an essential branch of society itself.
2 53
In the corporation, the family not only has its finn basis in that its
livelihood is guamnteed- i.e. it has secure resources (see I 70) - on
condition of its [possessing a certain] capability, but the two [i.e.
livelihood and capability] are also recognized, so that the member of a
corporation has no need to demonstrate his competence and his
regular income and means of support- i.e. the fact that he is somebody
-by any further external evidence. In this way, it is also recognized that
he belongs to a whole which is itself a member of society in general,
and that he has an interest in, and endeavours to promote, the less
selfish end of this whole. Thus, he has his honour in his estate.
As a guarantor of resources, the institution of the corporation

corresponds to the introduction of agriculture and private
property in another sphere (see Remarks to 203). - When
complaints are made about that luxury and love of extravagance of the professional fgewerbetreibenden] classes which is
271
associated with the creation of a rabble (see 244), we must
not overlook, in addition to the other causes [of this
phenomenon] (e.g. the increasingly mechanical nature of
work), its etlzica/ basis as implied in what has been said above.
If the individual [der Einzelne] is not a member of a legally
recognized [bereclztigten] corporation (and it is only through
legal recognition that a community becomes a corporation),
he is without the lzonour of belmzging to an estate, his isolation
reduces him to the selfish aspect of his trade, and his livelihood and satisfaction lack stability. He will accordingly try to
gain recogniti011 through the external manifestations of success
in his trade, and these are without limit (mzbegrenzt], because it
is impossible for him to live in a way appropriate to his estate if
his estate does not exist; for a community can exist in civil
society only if it is legally constituted and recognized. Hence
no way of life of a more general kind appropriate to such an
estate can be devised. - Within the corporation, the help
which poverty receives loses its contingent and unjustly [mit
Unrecht] humiliating character, and wealth, in fulfilling the
duty it owes to its association, loses the ability to provoke
arrogance in its possessor and envy in others; rectitude also
receives the true recognition and honour which are due to it
In the corporation, the so-called natural riglzt to practise one's skill

and thereby earn what there is to earn is limited only to the extent
that, in this context, the skill is rationally determined. That is, it is
freed from personal opinion and contingency, from its danger to
oneself and others, and is recognized, guaranteed, and at the same
time raised to a conscious activity for a common end.
The fomi{y is the first ethical root of the state; the corporatimz is the
second, and it is based in civil society. The former contains the
moments of subjective particularity and objective universality in substantial unity; but in the latter, these moments, which in civil society
are at first divided into the i11ternal{y reflected particularity of need and
Ethical Life
satisfaction and abstract legal [rechtlic/zen] universality, are inwardly
united in such a way that particular welfare is present as a right and is
actualized within this union.
The sanctity of marriage and the honour attaching to the
corporation are the two moments round which the disorganization of civil society revolves.
Addition (H). When the corporations were abolished [au}.gelzoben] in recent

times, it was with the intention that the individual (der Einzelne] should
look after himself. But even if we accept this, the corporation does not
affect the individual's obliga~on to earn his living. In our modem states,
the citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the state;
but it is necessary to provide ethical man with a universal activity in
addition to his private end. This universal (activity], which the modem
state does not always offer him, can be found in the corporation. We saw
earlier that, in providing for himself, the individual [das Individuum] in
civil society is also acting for others. But this unconscious necessity is not
enough; only in the corporation does it become a knowing and thinking
[part of] ethical life. The corporation, of course, must come under the
higher supervision of the state, for it would otherwise become ossified and
set in its ways, and decline into a miserable guild system2 But the
corporation in and for itself is not an enclosed guild; it is rather a means
of giving the isolated trade an ethical status, and of admitting it to a circle
in which it gains strength and honour.
zs6
The end of the corporation, which is limited and finite, has its truth in
the end which is universal in and for itself and in the absolute actuality
of this end. So likewise do the separation and relative identity which
were present in the external organization of the police. The sphere of
civil society thus passes over into the state.
The town is the seat of civil trade and industry, of selfabsorbed and divisive [vereirzzelnden] reflection, of individuals
who mediate their own self-preservation in relation to other
legal [reclllliclzen] persons. The country is the seat of an ethical
life based on nature and the family. Town and country- these
constitute in general the two ideal moments from which the
state emerges as their true ground. - This development of
immediate ethical life through the division of civil society and
273
on to the state, which is shown to be their true ground, is the
scientific proofof the concept of the state, a proof which only a
development of this kind can furnish. - Since the state
appears as the result of the development of the scientific concept in that it turns out to be the true ground [of this development], the mediation and semblance already referred to are
likewise superseded by immediacy. In actuality, therefore, the
state in general is in fact the primary factor; only within the
state does the family first develop into civil society, and it is
the idea of the state itself which divides into these two
moments. In the development of civil society, the ethical substance takes on its infinite form, which contains within itself
the following two moments: (x) infinite differentiation to the
point at which the inward being [Jnsic/zsein] of self-consciousness attains being-for-itself and (z) the form of universality
which is present in education, the form of thought whereby the
spirit is objec~ve and actual to itself as an organic totality in
laws and institutions, i.e. in its own will as thought.
274
SECTION
The State
2 57
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea - the ethical spirit as
substantial will, maniftst and clear to itself, which thinks and knows
itself and implements what it knows in so far as it knows it. It has its
immediate existence [Existenz] in custom and its mediate existence in
the self-consciousness of the individual [des Einzelnen1 in the individual's knowledge and activity, just as self-consciousness, by virtue of its
disposition, has its substa11tial freedom in the state as its essence, its
end, and the product of its activity.
The Penates are the inner and lower gods, and the spirit of the
natio11 (Athene) is the divine which knows and wills itself. Piety
is feeling [Empfindung] and ethical life governed by feeling,
and political virtue is the willing of that thought end which has
being in and for itself.
zs8
The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it
possesses in the particular se/f-crnzsciousness when this has been raised
to its universality; as such, it is the rational in and for itself. This
substantial unity is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it,
freedom enters into its highest right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals [die Einzelnen], whose
highest du~y is to be members of the state.
Z75
If the state is confused with civil society and its determination
is equated with the security and protection of property and
personal freedom, tlze interest of individuals [der Einzel11en] as
suclz becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it
also follows from this that membership of the state is an
optional matter. - But the relationship of the state to the
individual [bzdividuum] is of quite a different kind. Since the
state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of
the state that the individual [Individuum] himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. Union as such is itself the true
content and end, and the destiny [Bestimmung] of individuals
[lndividuen] is to lead a universal life; their further particular
satisfaction, activity, and mode of conduct have this substantial and universally valid basis as their point of departure and
result. - Considered in the abstract, rationality consists in
general in the unity and interpenetration of universality and
individuality [Einzellzeit]. Here, in a concrete sense and in
tenns of its content, it consists in the unity of objective
freedom (i.e. of the universal substantial will) and subjective
freedom (as the freedom of individual [it~dividuellen] knowledge and of the will in its pursuit of particular ends). And in
terms of its form, it therefore consists in self-determining
action in accordance with laws and principles based on tlzouglzt
and hence universal. - This Idea is the being of spirit as
necessary and eternal in and for itself. - As far as the Idea of
the state itself is concerned, it makes no difference what is or
was the lzistorical origin of the state in general (or rather of any
particular state with its rights and determinations)- whether it
first arose out of patriarchal conditions, out of fear or trust,
out of corporations etc., or how the basis ofits rights has been
understood and fixed in the consciousness as divine and positive right or contract, habit, etc. In relation to scientific cognition, which is our sole concern here, these are questions of
appearance, and consequently a matter [Saclze] for history. In
so far as the authority of any actual state concerns itself with
the question of reasons, these will be derived from the forms
of right which are valid within that state. - The philosophical
approach deals only with the internal aspect of all this, with
the concept as tlzouglzt [mit dem gedodzten Begri.ffe]. As far as the
Ethical Life
zs8
search for this concept is concerned, it was the achievement of

Rousseau to put forward the will as the principle of the state, a
principle which has thought not only as its form (as with the
social instinct, for example, or divine authority} but also as its
content, and which is in fact thinking itself. But Rousseau
considered the will only in the determinate form of the
individual [einzelnen] will (as Fichte subsequendy also did) and
regarded the universal will not as the will's rationality in and
for itself, but only as the common element arising out of this
individual [einzelrzen] will as a conscious wi/1.1 The union of
individuals [der Einzelrzen] within the state thus becomes a
contract, which is accordingly based on their arbitrary will and
opinions, and on their express consent given at their own
discretion; and the further consequences which follow from
this, and which relate merely to the understanding, destroy
the divine [element] which has being in and for itself and its
absolute authority and majesty. Consequendy, when these
abstractions were invested with power, they afforded the
tremendous spectacle, for the first time we know of in human
history, of the overthrow of all existing and given conditions
within an actual major state and the revision of its constitution
from first principles and purely in terms of thought; the irztention behind this was to give it what was supposed to be a purely
rational basis. On the other hand, since these were only
abstractions divorced from the Idea, they turned the attempt
into the most terrible and drastic event.Z- In opposition to the
principle of the individual will, we should remember the
fundamental concept according to which the objective will is
rational in itself, i.e. in its concept, whether or not it is
recognized by individuals [Einzelnen] and willed by them at
their discretion - and that its opposite, knowledge and volition, the subjectivity of freedomo (which is the sole content of
the principle of the individual will) embodies only one (consequendy one-sided) moment of the Idea of the rational will,
which is rational solely because it has being both in itself and
for itself. - Also at variance with the thought that the state may
"Trans/a/or~
n01e: The word order in the firs! edition is '!he subjecti\ily of freedom,
knowledge and volition'; bu! since !he following relative clause requires Suhjeldiviliil as
its antecedent, other editions have adopted the present word-order.
be apprehended by cognition as something rational for itself is
(the practice of] taking the externality of appearance and the
contingencies of want, need of protection, strength, wealth,
etc. not as moments of historical development, but as the
substance of the state. Here, the principle of cognition is once
again that of separate individuality (die Einze/heit der
lndividuen ], but not so much the thought of this individuality as
the converse of this, namely empirical individuality with all its
contingent qualities of strength and weakness, wealth and
poverty, etc. This notion (Einfo/lj of ignoring the state's
infinity and ra1io11ality in and for itself and of banishing thought
from the apprehension of its inner nature has probably never
appeared in so unadulterated a form as in Herr von Haller's
Restoration ofPolitical Science.J It is unadulterated, because in all
other attempts to grasp the essence of the state, however onesided or superficial their principles may be, this very intention
of comprehending the state brings with it thoughts or universal
determinations. Here, however, Herr von Haller not only
consciously dispenses with the rational content of the state
and with the form of thought, but fulminates with passionate
zeal against them both. This Restoralion doubtless owes part of
what Herr von Haller assures us is the widespread influence
ofits principles to the fact that it has managed, in its presentation, to dispense with a/ I tlwughts, and has thereby managed
to make the whole work as of one piece in its thoughtlessness.
For in this way, it avoids the confusion and discontinuity
which diminish the impact of a presentation in which
references to the substantial are mixed in with the contingent,
and reminders of the universal and rational are intermingled
with the merely empirical and external, with the result that, in
the sphere of the empty and insignificant, we are reminded of
the higher realm of the infinite.- This presentation is equally
consistent in one further respect. For since the sphere of contingency, rather than the substantial, is taken to be the essence
of the state, the content of such a work is consistent precisely
in the utter inconsistency of its thoughtlessness, in that it
heedlessly goes its way and is soon just as much at home with
the opposite of what it had approved a moment earlier.f
t Hegrl's note: In view of the characteristics specified above, the book in question is of an
Ethical Life
Additimz (G). The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom, and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom should
be actual. The state is the spirit which is present in the world and which
conscio11s/y realizes itself therein, whereas in nature, it actualizes itself only
as the other of itself, as dormant spirit Only when it is present in
consciousness, knowing itself as an existent object [Gegt7zstaml], is it the
state. Any discussion of freedom must begin not with individuality
[Eill.ullzeit] or the individual self-consciousness, but only with the essence
of self-consciousness; for whether human beings know it or not, this
essence realizes itself as a self-sufficient power of which single individuals
[die einzelrzerz bzdividllt7z] are only moments. The state consists in the
march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of reason actualizing
itself as will. In considering the Idea of the state, we must not have any
particular states or particular institutions in mind; instead, we should
consider the Idea, this actual God, in its own right [fiir siclz]. Any state,
even if we pronounce it bad in the light of our own principles, and even if
we discover this or that defect in it, invariably has the essential moments
of its existence [Existenz] within itself (provided it is one of the more
advanced states of our time). But since it is easier to discover deficiencies
than to comprehend the affirmative, one may easily fall into the mistake of
overlooking the inner organism of the state in favour of individual
[einzelrze] aspects. The state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and
hence in the sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad
behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest man, the
criminal, the invalid, or the cripple is still a living human being; the
affirmative aspect- life - survives [bestelzt] in spite of such deficiencies,
and it is with this affirmative aspect that we are here concerned.
original kind In itself [/iir sick], the author's indignation could well have something noble
about it, for it was sparked ofT by the false theories referred to above (which originated
largely with Rousseau), and above all by attempts to put these theories into practice. But
in order to escape from these, Herr von Haller has withdrawn to the opposite extreme,
which is totally devoid of thought and therefore cannot claim to have any substance
[GtiiiUI]- that is, the most virulent hatred of all/tlrlls and ltgis/IJiitm, and of all formtJ/ly and
ltgally dtttmri11td rif}tt. Hatred of laiD, of ltga/ly determined rif}tt, is the shibboleth
whereby fanaticism, imbecility, and hypocritical good intentions manifestly and infallibly
reveal themselves for what they are, no matter what disguise they may adopt. - Originality like that of Herr von HaUer is always a remarkable phenomenon [Enc/ltinung],
and I will cite some examples of it for those of my readers who are as yet unfamiliar with
his book. Herr von Haller first puts forward his basic principle (Vol. 1, pp. J.pff.),
namely 'that just as, in the inanimatt world, the larger displaces the smaller, the powerful
the weak, etc., so also among the animals, and likewise among human beings, does the
samt law reappear in nobler (often surely also in ignoble?)" forms [Gt":Staltm ]', and 'that
this is aatrdingly zht tttmal and tmalltrablt trdinanct t{God, that the mort poiDOjiJ rules,
must rule, and always shall rule'. It is evident even from this, as well as from what
'l'rans/IJior's 11ott: The words in parentheses are Hegel's own interjection.

2 79
Plzi/osoplzy ofRiglu
follows, what is meant by po111~r in this context: it is not the power of justice and ethics,
but the contingent power of nature. In support of this, Herr von Haller further cites,
among other reasons (pp. 365f.), the fact that nature, with admirable wisdom, has
ordained that the \lery sense of one's Ollm Sll~riority irresistibly eMobles the character
and favours the development of precisely those virtues which are most necessary to one's
subordinates. He asks, with elaborate formal rhetoric, 'whether it is the strong or the
weak in the realm of the sciences who more often abuse their authority and trust foc base
and selfish ends and to the detriment of credulous people, whether among jurists the
masters of their science are the pettifoggers and cavilling lawyers who deceive the hopes
of credulous clients, who call white black and black white, who misuse the laws as a
vehicle of wrongdoing, who make beggars out of those who need their protection and
who, like hungry Vllltures. tear the innocent lamb to pieces, etc.' Herr von Haller forgets
at this point that he is employing such rhetoric precisely in order to defend the proposition that the ru/~ ofth~ mor~po111nj"11/ is an eternal ordinance of God, the very ordinance
whereby the vulture tears the innocent lamb to pieces, and that those whose knowledge
[Kmntnis] of the law gives them greater power are therefore quite right to plunder the
credulous people who need their protection, since they are the weak. But it would be
expecting too much for two thoughts to be brought together where not a single thought is
present. - It goes without saying that Herr von Haller is an enemy of legal codes. Civil
laws, in his opinion; are on the one hand completely 'unnecessary, in that they follow
s~lf-nlitimtly frum th~ I Ql11 ofnaltiTe'. It would have saved much of the effort that has been
expended on legislation and legal codes since states first began, and that is still expended
on such matters and on the study of jurisprudence [dtsgtsm:lichm Rtrhts), if people had
always been content with the sound principle thal allthis is ~!f-witknt. 'On the other
hand, laws are not in fact made for private persons, but as inslrlletions for lesser
magistrates to acquaint them \Vith the will of the chief justice. Jurisdiction is not in any
case a dll:y on the pan of the state (Vol 1, pp. 297f: and passim), but a charitable aa, a
service provided by those with greater power and purely as an accessory. It is not the
most perfect means of guaranteeing right, but is in fact ins~cur~ and uncl!ftain. It is the
only means with which our modem jurists ha\le left us, for they ha\le robbed us of the
oth~ thr m~arrs, the very ones which /~ad most quickly and rtliably to the goal and which,
apan from the legal system,frimd/y nature has gi\len to human beings in order to sur~
tMir righlfol fmdllm.' And these three means are - what do you think? - '(1) pmona/
odienc~ to, and inculaJJion of, the natural law; (z) mistanc~ to injustice [Unrtdrt); and (J)
flight, when no other help is available.' (How unfriendly the jurists are in comparison
with friendly nature!) 'The naltiTal and di:ui~ law, howe\ler, which all-bountiful nature
has gi\len to e\leryone (Vol 1, p. z9z), is: honour everyone as your equal' (on the author's
own principles, this ought to read: 'honour him who is not your equal, but is more
powerful than yourself'); 'give offence to no one 111ho ghJts no offenc~ to you; demand
nothing but what he DRS to you' (but what does he owe?); 'but more than this: love your
neighbour and serve him where you can.' - The imp/tJIIIalion of this la111 is supposed to
render a legislation and constitution superfluous. It would be interesting to see how Herr
von Haller interprets the fact that, despite the implantation of this law, legislations and
constitutions have made their appearance in the world! In Volume 10, pp. 36zf., the
author comes to the 'so-called national liberties', i.e. the juridical and constitutional laws
of nations. (In this wider sense, e\lery legaUy determined right may be described as a
/ibtrty.) He says of these laws, among other things, 'that their content is usually my
insignifiamt, e\leD if great value may be placed in books on such docununtllty liberties.'
When we see then that the author is here referring to the national liberties of the
German Imperial Estates,4 of the English nation (such as the Magna Charta 5 '111hich is
lial~ rmd, hol11ftJn', and nJtn kss rmtkntood on account a its archaic aprtssions', the Bill of
Righrs6 etc.), of the Hungarian nation, etc., we are amazed to discover that these once so
z8o
Ethical Lift
highly prized possessions are of no significance, and that it is only in books that these
nations place any value on their laws, which have had an efTect on every gannent the
individual wears and every morsel of bread he eats, and whose effects are daily and
hourly present in everything.- If we may also mention the Gm"al Legal CodtofPrusria/
Herr von Haller speaks of it with particular disfavour (Vol. 1, pp. r85ff.) because
unphilosophical errors (though not, at least, the Kantian philosophy, to which Herr von
Haller reacts with particular bitterness) have exerted an incrtdiblt influence on it, and
above all because it refers, among other things, to the rtau, the resources of the state, the
end of the state, the head of state, the dutits of the head of state, servants of the state, etc.
Worst of all, in Herr von Haller's opinion, is 'the right to impose t4r~s on the private
resources of individuals, their trade, their production, or their consumption in order to
pay for tht nmJs oftht rtatt; for this means that both the Hng himself(since the resources
of the state are not the private property of the sovereign, but the resources of the state
itself) and the Prusrian dti::mr havt nothing ofthtir onm, neither their persons nor their
assets, and all subjects are rtrfi in tht t)'tS oftht la11l, because they may not 111it/rdrQ11J from
tht rtroiu oftht rtatt'.

On top of all this incredible crudity, perhaps the most amusing touch is the emotion
[RiihnmgJ with which Herr von Haller describes his inexpressible pleasure at his discoveries (Vol. 1, Preface (pp. xWi-xxivD- 'a joy such as only the friend of truth can feel
when, after honest enquiry, he attains the certainty that ... he has, ro to rptak (yes, 'so to
speak' indeed!), found the utterance of nature, the word of God himlt/f. (On the
concrary, the word of God quite expressly distinguishes its revelations from the
utterances of nature and of natural man.) He tells us 'how he could have fallen on his
knees in sheer wonderment, how a flood of joyful tears poured from his eyes, and living
religiosity arose from that moment within him'. - Herr von Haller's religiosity ought
rather to have bemoaned it as the harshest punishment imposed by God (f~r it is the
harshest judgement human beings can experience) that he had strayed so far from
thought and rationality, from respect for the laws, and from the knowledge [ErkmnlnirJ
of how infinitely imponant and divine it is for the duties of the state and the rights of the
citizens to be determined by I=- that he had strayed so far from all this that absurdity
was able to pass itself off in his eyes as the 11lord of Gad.
"Translator's nott: Haller's text reads
ntuphjlor~irchm
lrrtiim" ('errors of modem
philosophy').
The Idea of the state

(a) has immediate actuality and is the individual state as a self-related
organism- the amstitutio11 or amstitutimza//Q11J [imzeres Staatsrecht ];
(b) passes over into the relalio11ship of the individual state to other
states - i71ternatimzallaw [iiufleres Staatsrecht];
(c) is the universal Idea as a genus [Gattu11g] and as an absolute power
in relation to individual states - the spirit which gives itself its
actuality in the process of world history.
Additimz (G). The state as actual is essentially an individual state, and

beyond that a particular state. Individuality should be distinguished from
281
particularity; it is a moment within the very Idea of the state, whereas
particularity belongs to history. States as such are independent of one
another, and their relationship can consequently only be an external one,
so that there must be a third factor above them to link them together. This
third factor is in fact the spirit which gives itself actuality in world history
and is the absolute judge of states. Admittedly, several states may form a
league and sit in judgement, as it were, on other states, or they may enter
into alliances (like the Holy Alliance, 1 for example), but these are always
purely relative and limited, like [the ideal of] perpetual peace. The one
and only absolute judge which always asserts its authority over the particular is the spirit which has being in and for itself, and which reveals
itself as the universal and as the active genus in world history.
A. Constitutional Law
z6o
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom
requires that personal individuality [Einze/heit] and its particular
interests should reach their full development and gain recog11itio11 oftheir
right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and
also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord
into the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and
willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pur-sue it as their ultimate end. The effect of
this is that the universal does not attain validity or fulfilment without
the interest, knowledge, and volition of the particular, and that
individuals do not live as private persons merely for these particular
interests without at the same time directing their will to a universal
end [in und fUr das Allgemeine wo/len] and acting in conscious awareness of this end. The principle of modern states has enormous
strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to
attain fulfilment in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity,
while at the same time bringing it back to substa11tial unity and so
preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.
Addition (H,G). The Idea of the state in modem times has the distinctive
characteristic that the state is the actualization of freedom not in
accordance with subjective caprice, but in accordance with the concept of
the will, i.e. in accordance with its universality and divinity. Imperfect
282
Ethical Life
states are those in which the Idea of the state is still invisible [eingelliillt]
and where the particular detenninations of this Idea have not yet reached
free self-sufficiency. In the states of classical antiquity, universality was
indeed already present, but particularity [Ptutikulariliil] had not yet been
released and set at liberty and brought back to universality, ie. to the
universal end of the whole. The essence of the modem state is that the
universal should be linked with the complete freedom of particularity
[Besmuierheil] and the well-being of individuals, and hence that the interest of the family and of civil society must become focused on the state; but
the universality of the end cannot make further progress without the
personal [eigene] knowledge and volition of the particular individuals [der
Besonderlzeil], who must retain their rights. Thus, the universal must be
activated, but subjectivity on the other hand must be developed as a living
whole. Only when both moments are present [bestelzen] in full measure
can the state be regarded as articulated and truly organized.
261
In relation to the spheres of civil law [Privatreclzt] and private welfare,
the spheres of the family and civil society, the state is on the one hand
an external necessity and the higher power to whose nature their laws
and interests are subordinate and on which they depend. But on the
other hand, it is their immanent end, and its strength consists in the
unity of its universal and ultimate end with the particular interest of
individuals, in the fact that they have duJies towards the state to the
same extent as they also have rights (see I 55).
As has already been noted (in the Remarks to 3 above), it

was above all Montesquieu who, in his celebrated work
L 'Esprit des Lois, focused on and attempted to expound in

detail both the ~bought that laws, including those of civil law
in particular, are dependent on the specific character of the
state, and the philosophical view that the part should be considered onlywith reference to the whole.' -Duty is primarily
an attitude towards something which, for me, is substantial and
universal in and for itself. Right, on the other hand, is in
general the existence [Dasein] of this substantial element, and is
consequently the latter's particular aspect and that of my own
particular freedom/ Thus, on a formal level, right and duty
appear to belong to different aspects or persons. In the state, as
an ethical entity and as the interpenetration of the substantial
and the particular, my obligation towards the substantial is at
the same time the existence of my particular freedom; that
is, duty and right are u11ited within the state i11 o11e and the same
relatimz [Beziehmzg]. But further, since the distinct moments
also attain their characteristic shape and reality within the state,
so that the distinction between right and duty again arises at
this point, these moments, although identical i11 themselves (i.e.
in a formal sense) are at the same time differe71t in content. In
the realms of civil law and morality, the relation [between
right and duty] lacks aaual necessity, so that only an abstract
equality of content is present; in these abstract spheres, what
is right for one person ought also to be right for another, and
what is one person's duty ought also to be another person's
duty. That absolute identity of duty and right [referred to
above] occurs here only as an equivalent identity of content, in
that the determination of the content is itself wholly universal;
that is, there is a single principle for both duty and right,
namely the personal freedom of human beings. Consequently,
slaves have no duties because they have no rights, and vice
versa (Religious duties do not concern us here.)J - But in the
internal development of the concrete Idea, its moments
become differentiated, and their determinacy becomes at the
same time a different content: in the family, the rights of the
son are not the same in content as the son's duties towards his
father, and the rights of the citizen are not the same i11 content
as the citizen's duties towards the sovereign and government.
- The above concept of the union of duty and right is a factor
[Bestinmzrmg] of the greatest importance, and the inner
strength of states is embodied in it. -The abstract aspect of
duty consists simply in disregarding and excluding particular
interests as an inessential and even unworthy moment. But if
we consider the concrete aspect, i.e. the Idea, we can see that
the moment of particularity is also essential, and that its
satisfaction is therefore entirely necessary; in the process of
fulfilling his duty, the individual must somehow attain his own
interest and satisfaction or settle his own account, and from
his situation within the state, a right must accrue to him
whereby the universal cause [Sache] becomes his own particular
Ethical Life
cause. Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let

alone suppressed; on the contrary, they should be harmonized
with the universal, so that both they themselves and the
universal are preserved. The individual, whose duties give
him the status of a subject [Untertarz), finds that, in fulfilling
his duties as a citizen, he gains protection for his person and
property, consideration for his particular welfare, satisfaction
of his substantial essence, and the consciousness and selfawareness of being a member of a whole. And through his
performance of his duties as services and tasks undertaken on
behalf of the state, the state itself is preserved and secured.
Viewed in the abstract, the sole interest of the universal would
be [to ensure] that the tasks and services which it requires are
performed as duties.
Addition (H). Everything depends on the unity of the universal and the
particular within the state. In the states of antiquity, the subjective end
was entirely identical with the will of the state; in modem times, however,
we expect to have our own views, our own volition, and our own con-
science. The ancients had none of these in the present sense; fa- them,
the ultimate factor was the will of the state. Whereas, under the despotic
regimes of Asia, the individual has no inner life and no justification within
himself, in the modem world human beings expect their inner life to be
respected The association of duty and right has a dual aspect, in that
what the state requires as a duty should also in an immediate sense be the
right of individuals, for it is nothing more than the organization of the
concept of freedom. The determinations of the will of the individual
acquire an objective existence through the state, and it is only through the
state that they attain their truth and actualizatioiL The state is the sole
precondition of the attainment of particular ends and welfare.
The actual Idea is the spirit which divides itself up into the two ideal
spheres of its concept - the family and civil society - as its finite
mode, and thereby emerges from its ideality to become infinite and
actual spirit fer itself. In so doing, it allocates the material of its finite
actuality, i.e. individuals as a mass, to these two spheres, and in such a
way that, in each individual case [am Einze/rzerz], this allocation
z8s
26!-262
appears to be mediaJed by circumstances, by the individual's arbitrary
will and personal [eigene] choice of vocation [Bestimmung] (see 185
and the appended Remarks)/
Addition (H). In Plato's republic, subjective freedom is not yet recognized,

because individuals still have their tasks assigned to them by the authorities [Obrigkeit].Z In many oriental states, this assignment is governed by
birth. But subjective freedom, which must be respected, requires
freedom of choice on the part of individuals.
In these spheres in which its moments, individuality [Einzelheit] and

particularity, have their immediate and reflected reality, spirit is
present as their objective universality which manifests itselfin them [a/s
ihre in sie scheinende objektive A/lgemeinlzeit] as the power of the rational
in necessity (see 184), i.e. as the institutions considered above.'
Addition (H). The state, as spirit, is divided up into the particular

determinations of its concept or mode of being. If we take an example
from nature, the nervous system is, properly speaking, the system of
sensation: it is the abstract moment of being with oneself [bei rich] and of
thereby having one's own identity. But the analysis of sensation reveals
two aspects, and these are divided in such a way that both of them appear
as complete systems: the first is abstract feeling or self-containment, dull
internal movement, reproduction, inner self-nutrition, growth [.Produ::ieren ], and digestion. The second moment is that this being-withoneself stands in opposition to the moment of difference [Differen.z] or
outward movement. This is irritability, the outward movement of sensation, which constitutes a system of its own, and there are lower classes of
animals which have developed this system exclusively as distinct from the
soul-governed unity of inner sensation. If we compare these natural
relations [Nalt~rbezielllmgen] with those of spirit, we must liken the family
to sensibility and civil society to irritability. Then the third factor is the
state, the nervous system itself (frir rich], with its internal organization; but
it is alive only in so far as both moments - in this case, the family and civil
society - are developed within it. The laws which govern them are the
institutions of that rationality which manifests itself within them [des in rie
scllei11etzden Vernii1giigetz). But the ground and ultimate truth of these
institutions is the spirit, which is their universal end and known object
[GegenstamJ]. The family, too, is ethical, but its end is not a known end; in
civil society, however, separation is the determining factor.
286
Ethical Life
z6z-z6s
Individuals as a mass are themselves spiritual natures, and they therefore embody a dual moment, namely the extreme of individuality
[Einzelheit] which knows and wills for itself, and the extreme of urziv.:rsality which knows and wills the substantial. They can therefore attain
their right in both of these respects only in so far as they have actuality
both as private and as substantial persons. In the spheres in question
(i.e. family and civil society], they attain their right in the first respect
directly; and in the second respect, they attain it by discovering their
essential self-consciousness in [social] institutions as that universal
aspect of their particular interests which has being in itself, and by
obtaining through these institutions an occupation and activity directed towards a universal end within a corporation.
265
These institutions together form the constitution - that is, developed
and actualized rationality- in the realm of particularity, and they are
therefore the firm foundation of the state and of the trust and disposition of individuals towards it. They are the pillars on which public
freedom rests, for it is within them that particular freedom is realized
and rational; hence the union of freedom and necessity is present ir1
itself within these institutions.
Addition (G). It has already been noted that the sanctity of marriage and
the institutions in which civil society takes on an ethical appearance
constitute the stability of the whole - that is, the universal is
simultaneously the concern [Sache] of each [individual] as a particular
[entity). What matters most is that the law of reason should merge with
the law of particular freedom, and that my particular end should become
identical with the universal; otherwise, the state must hang in the air. It is
the self-awareness of individuals which constitutes the aCtuality of the
state, and its stability consists in the identity of the two aspects in question. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its
citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their
subjective ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as
such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an insecure
footing.
But the spirit is objective and actual to itself not only as this necessity
and as a realm of appearance, but also as the ideality and inner
dimension of these. Thus, this substantial universality becomes its
own object [Gegenstand] and end, with the result that the necessity in
question similarly becomes its own object and end in the shape of
freedom.
The necessity in ideality is the development of the Idea within itself; as

subjective substantiality, it is the [individual's] political disposition, and
as objective substantiality - in contrast with the former - it is the
organism of the state, the political state proper and its constitution.
Additim1 (G). The unity offreedom which wills and knows itself is present
in the first instance as necessity. Here, the substantial is present as the
subjective existence [ExiSlenz] of individuals; but the other mode of
necessity is the organism, i.e. the spirit is a process within itself which is
internally articulated, and which posits differences within itself through
which it completes its cycle.
The political disposition, i.e. patriotism in general, is certainty based on

tmth (whereas merely subjective certainty does not originate in tmth,
but is only opinion) and a volition which has become lwbitrllll. As
such, it is merely a consequence of the institutions within the state, a
consequence in which rationality is actually present, just as rationality
receives its practical application through action in conformity with the
state's institutions. - This disposition is in general one of tn1st (which
may pass over into more or less educated insight), or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and
in the latter's relation to me as an individual [a/s Einzelnem]. As a
result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my
consciousness of this, I am free.
Patriotism is frequently understood to mean only a willingness
to perform extrtUJrdinary sacrifices and actions. But in essence,
z88
Etlzical L{Je
z66-z68
it is that disposition which, in the normal conditions and

circumstances of life, habitually knows that the community is
the substantial basis and end. It is this same consciousness,
tried and tested in all circumstances of ordinary life, which
underlies the will.i.ngness to make extraordinary efforts. But
just as human beings often prefer to be guided by
magnanimity instead of by right, so also do they readily convince themselves that they possess this extraordinary patriotism in order to exempt themselves from the genuine
disposition, or to excuse their lack of it. - Furthermore, if we
take this disposition to be something which can originate
independently [fiir sicll] and arise out of subjective representations [Vor.stellungen] and thoughts, we are confusing it with
opinion; for in this interpretation, it is deprived of its true
ground, i.e. objective reality.
Addition (H). Uneducated people delight in argument [Rii.sonieren] and

fault-finding, fa- it is easy to find fault, but difficult to recognize the good
and its inner necessity. Education in its early stages always begins with
fault-finding, but when it is complete, it sees the positive element in
everything. In religion, it is equally easy to say that this or that is superstition, but it is infinitely more difficult to comprehend the truth which it
contains. Thus people's apparent political disposition should be distinguished from whatthey genuinely will; fa- inwardly, they in fact will the
thing [Sae/~e], but they fasten on to details and delight in the vanity of
claiming superior insight. They trust that the state" will continue to exist
[bestellen] and that particular interests can be fulfilled within it alone; but
habit blinds us to the basis of our entire existence [E.ristenz]. It does not
occur to someone who walks the streets in safety at night that this might
be otherwise, for this habit of [living in] safety has become second nature,
and we scarcely stop to think that it is solely the effect of particular
institutions. Representational thought often imagines that the state is held
together by force; but what holds it together is simply the basic sense of
order which everyone possesses.
"TransitUor's 110/t: The equivalent term in Hotho's notes (VP R 111, 7l5) is not dtr StQIII
('the state'), as in Gans's version here, but dit Sa&bt ('the thing').
The 'fpoliticaiJ disposition takes its particularly determined content

from the various aspects of the organism of the state. This organism is
the development of the Idea in its differences and their objective
actuality. These different aspects are accordingly the various powers
[within the state) with their corresponding tasks and functions,
through which the universal continually produces itself. It does so in a
necessary way, because these various powers are determined by the
nature ofthe concept; and it preserves. itself in so doing, because it is itself
the presupposition of its own production. This organism is the politi-
cal constitution.
Addition (G). The state is an organism, i.e. the development of the Idea in
its differences. These different aspects are accordingly the various powers
with their corresponding tasks and functions, through which the universal
continually produces itselfin a necessary way and thereby preserves itself,
because it is itself the presupposition of its own production. 1'hi<; organism is the political constitution; it proceeds perpetually from the state, just
as it is the means by which the state preserves itself. If the two diverge and
the different aspects break free, the unity which the constitution produces
is no longer established. The fable of the belly and the other members is
relevant here/ It is in the nature of an organism that all its parts must
perish if they do not achieve identity and if one of them seeks
independence. Predicates, principles, and the like get us nowhere in
assessing the state, which must be apprehended as an organism, just as
predicates are of no help in comprehending the nature of God, whose life
must instead be intuited as it is in itself.2
The fact that the end of the state is both the universal interest as such
and the conservation of particular interests within the universal interest as the substance of these constitutes (1) the abstract actuality or
substantiality of the state. But this substantiality is (z) the necessity of
the state, for it divides itself up into the conceptual differences within
the state's functions; and these differences, by virtue of this substantiality, are likewise actual and fixed detenninations or powers. (3) But
this very substantiality is the spirit which knows and wills itself as
having passed through the fonn of education. The state therefore /mows
Ethical Life
269-270
what it wills, and knows it in its universality as something tlzouglzt.

Consequently, it acts and functions in accordance with known ends
and recognized principles, and with laws which are laws not only in
themselves but also for the consciousness; and it likewise acts in determinate knowledge [Ketmtnis] of existing circumstances and relations
in so far as its actions have relevance to these.
This is the point at which we must touch on tlze stale's relation
to religion/ because it has repeatedly been maintained in
recent times that religion is the foundation of the state, and
has even been presumed that this assertion constitutes the
whole of political science. No assertion is more apt to produce
so much confusion, or indeed to set up confusion itself as the
political constitution and the form which cognition ought to
take. - It may at first seem suspicious that people recommend
and resort to religion above all in times of public distress,
disruption, and oppression, and that they are referred to it for
consolation in the face of wrong and for hope as a compensation for loss. When it is further regarded as a precept of
religion that we ought to treat worldly interests and the course
of actual events with indifference, despite the fact that the
state is the spirit wlziclz is present in tlze 1DOrld, this religious
advice does not seem calculated to promote the interest and
business of the state as an essential and serious end. On the
contrary, it seems to represent the entire political regime as a
matter [Saclze] of indifference and arbitrariness, either
because it is formulated in such a way as to suggest that the
state is dominated by the ends of passion, unjust (unreclztliclzer]
force, and the like, or because such religious advice attempts
to retain exclusive validity and claims authority to determine
and administer [the process of] right. Although it may seem
derisive to dismiss all resentment towards tyranny by declaring that the oppressed find consolation in religion, it should
not be forgotten that religion can take on a form which leads
to the harshest servitude within the fetters of superstition and
to the debasement of human beings to a level below that of the
animals (as among the Egyptians and Indians, who venerate
animals as higher beings).2 This phenomenon [Enclzeinrmg]
may at least draw our attention to the fact that we ought not to
291
Philosophy ofRight
speak of religion in wholly general terms, and that we instead
require a power to rescue us from it in some of the shapes it
assumes and to champion the rights of reason and self-consciousness.- But the essential determinant of the relationship
between religion and the state can be discovered only if we
recall the concept of religion. The content of religion is
absolute truth, and it is therefore associated with a disposition
of the most exalted kind. As intuition, feeling, and representational cognition [vorstel/ende Erkennlnis] whose concern is
with God as the unlimited foundation and cause on which
everything depends, it contains the requirement that everything else should be seen in relation [Bezielumg] to this and
should receive confirmation, justification, and the assurance
of certainty from this source. It is within this relationship that
the state, laws, and duties all receive their highest endorsement as far as the consciousness is concerned, and become
supremely binding upon it; for even the state, laws, and duties
are in their actuality something determinate which passes over
into the higher sphere as that in which its foundation lies (see
Encyclopaedia of tlze Plzilosoplzical Sciences, 453).3 Religion
therefore also contains that point which, in spite of all change,
failure of actual ends and interests, and loss of possessions,
affords a consciousness of immutability and of the highest
freedom and satisfaction.f If, then, religion constitutes the
fmmdation which embodies the ethical realm in general, and,
more specifically, the nature of the state as the divine will, it is
at the same time only a formdation; and this is where the two
(i.e. the state and religion] diverge. The state is the divine will
as present spirit, unfoldir~g as the actual shape and organization
of a world. - Those who refuse to go beyond the form of
religion when confronted by the state behave like those who,
f Htgtfs
nott: Rtligion,like cognition and scimet, has as iiS principle a distinct form which is
different from that of the state. All of these therefore enter into the state, partly as ~ans
to education and the [appropriate) disposition, and panly in so far as they are essentially
tnds in thmutlvtS inasmuch as they have an external existence [Dastin]. In both respects,
the principles of the state are appliaiJit to them. A comprehensively concrete treatise on
the state would also have to consider these spheres, as well as an, purely natural
circumstances, etc., in their relevance (Be::itlmng) to and position within the state. In the
present treatise, however, in which it is the principle of the state which is expounded in
iiS own distinct sphere and in accordance with iiS Idea, the principles of these other areas
and the applicatior1 of the right of the state to them can be mentioned only in passing.
Etlzical Life
in the cognitive realm, claim to be right even if they invariably
stop at the essence instead of proceeding beyond this abstraction to existence [Dasein], or like those who (see Remarks to
140 above) will only the abstract good and leave it to the
arbitrary will to determine wlzat is good. Religion is the relation to the absolute in tlze fomz of feeling, representational
tlzouglzt, and faith, and within its all-embracing centre, everything is merely accidental and transient. If, then, we also
adhere to this form in relation [Bezielzung] to the state and act
as if it were the essentially valid and determining factor in this
[political] context, too, we thereby expose the state, as ail
organism within which lasting [bestelzende] differences, laws,
and institutions have developed, to instability, insecurity, and
disruption. The laws, as the objective and universal element
[within the state], no longer have a lasting and valid
determination, but take on a negative determination in relation to that form [of religion] which veils over everything
determinate and thereby assumes a subjective character. The
consequence for human behaviour is [such advice as] 'To the
righteous, no law is given', 'Be pious, and you may otherwise
do as you please', or 'You may abandon yourselves to your
own arbitrariness and passion, and refer others who thereby
suffer wrong to the solace and hope of religion, or (even
worse) dismiss and condemn them as irreligious'/ If,
however, this negative attitude does not simply remain an
inward disposition and viewpoint, but turns instead to the
actual world and asserts itself within it, it leads to religious
fanaticism which, like political fanaticism, repudiates all political institutions and legal order as restrictive limitations
[Schranken] on the inner emotions and as incommensurate
with the infinity of these, and hence also rejects private property, marriage, the relationships and tasks of civil society, etc.
as unworthy of love and the freedom of feeling. Since,
however, decisions still have to be made in relation to actual
existence [Dasein] and action, the same thing happens as in
the case of that subjectivity of the will in general which knows
itself to be absolute (see 140), namely that the decisions are
made on the basis of subjective representations (V07:stellung],
i.e. of opinion and the caprice oftlze arbitrary will.- The truth,
however - as opposed to this truth which veils itself in the
2 93
subjectivity of feeling and representational thinking - is the
momentous transition of the inner to the outer, that
incorporation [Ei,wildzmg] of reason into reality which the
whole of world history has worked to achieve. Through this
work, educated humanity has actualized and become conscious of rational existence [Dasein], political institutions, and
laws. Those who 'seek the Lord' and assure themselves, in
their uneducated opinion, that they possess everything
immediately instead of undertaking the work of raising their
subjectivity to cognition of the truth and knowledge of objective right and duty, can produce nothing but folly, outrage,
and the destruction of all ethical relations. These are necessary consequences of that religious disposition which insists
exclusively on its form, and so turns against actuality and the
truth which is present in universal form within the laws. But
this disposition need not necessarily proceed to actualize itself
in this way. With its negative point of view, it may well retain
its inward character, conform to [social] institutions and laws,
and simply resign itself to these with sighs, or with contempt
and longing. It is not strength but weakness which, in our
times, has turned religiosity into a polemical kind of piety,
whether this is associated with a genuine need or merely with
unsatisfied vanity. Instead of mastering one's opinions by the
labour of study and subjecting one's volition to discipline so as
to elevate it to free obedience, the easiest course is to
renounce cognition of objective truth, to nurse a sense of
grievance and hence also of self-conceit, and to find in one's
own godliness all that is required in order to see through the
nature of the laws and of political institutions, to pass judge. ment on them, and to lay down what their character should
and must be. And indeed, since these are the findings of a
pious heart, they must be infallible and indisputable; for if we
make religion the basis of our intentions and assertions, these
cannot be faulted on account of either their shallowness or
their injustice [ u,zrecht/ichkeit]!
But if the religion in question is of a genuine kind and does
not have this negative and polemical attitude towards the
state, but acknowledges and endorses it, it will also have a
status [Zustmzd] and expressim1 of its own [(rir sich). The busi-
294
Ethical Life
ness ofits worship consists in actions and in doctrine; for these,
it requires possessiom and property, as well as individuals dedicated to the seroice of the community. A relationship thus
arises between the state and the religious community, and its
determination is a simple one. It is in the nature of the case
[Sache] that the state fulfils a duty by giving the [religious]
community every assistance and protection in the pursuit of its
religious end. Indeed, since religion is that moment which
integrates the state at the deepest level of the disposition [of
its citizens], the state ought even to require all its citizens to
belong to such a community - but to any community they
please, for the state can have no say in the content [of religious
belief] in so far as this relates to the internal dimension of
representational thought. A state which is strong because its
organization is fully developed can adopt a more liberal
attitude in this respect, and may completely overlook
individual matters [Einzelheiten] which might affect it, or even
tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even
their direct duties towards the state (although this naturally
depends on the numbers concerned). It is able to do this by
entrusting the members of such communities to civil society
and its laws, and is content if they fulfil their direct duties
towards it passively, for example by commutation or substitution [of an alternative service].f But in so far as the religious
t Htgd's nou: Of Quakers, Anabaptists, etc., it may be said that they arc active members
only of civil society and that, as private persons, they have purely private relations with
other people: Even in this context, they have been exempted from taking oaths; they fulfil
their direct duties towards the state in a passive manner, and although they reject
outright one of the most important of these, namely the defence of the state against its
enemies, they may even be allowed to fulfil this duty by substituting another service
instead 6 Towards such sects, the state practises tolmltion in the proper sense of the
word; for since they do not recognize their duties towards it, they cannot claim the right
to belong to it. When, on one occasion, there was a strong movement in the American
Congress to abolish negro slave!}, a member from the southern states aptly retoned:
'Leave us our negroes and you can keep your Quakers.' - Only ifthe state is strong in
other respects can it overlook and tolerate such anomalies, relying above all on the power
of custom and the inner rationality of its institutions to reduce and overcome the
discrepancy if the state docs not strictly enforce its rights in this respecL For example,
although it may well have been contrary to formal right ro grant even civil rights ro the
Jm~s, on the grounds that the Ia ncr should be regarded not just as a particular religious
group but also as members of a foreign nation [Volk], the outcry which thisviewpointand
others produced overlooked the fact that the Jews arc primarily lluman lmngr; this is not
just a neutral and abstract quality (see Remarks to 209), for its consequence is that the
295
Philosophy ofRight
community owns property and otherwise performs acts of worship with the help of individuals employed for this purpose, it
emerges from the inner realm into that of worldly affairs and
hence into the province of the state, thereby placing itself
immediately under its laws. It is true that the oath and the
ethical realm in general, including the marriage relationship,
involve that inner penetration and elevation of the disposition
which is confirmed at the profoundest level by religion. [But]
since ethical relations are essentially relations of actual ratio71ality, the rights of this rationality must first be asserted within
them, and the confirmation of the Church is then added to
these rights as their purely inward and more abstract aspect. As for the other ways in which the Church community expresses itself, the inward [dimension] predominates over the
outward to a greater extent in matters of doctrine than in acts of
worship and other related kinds of behaviour, in which it is at
once apparent that the legal [rechtliche] aspect at least is in
itself [(r;r siclz] a matter [Sache] for the state. (Admittedly,
Churches have also contrived to exempt their servants and
property from the authority [Macht] and jurisdiction of the
state, and have even acquired jurisdiction over laymen in
matters such as divorce proceedings, the taking of oaths, etc.,
in which religion plays a part.) - The role of the police with
regard to such actions is, of course, more indeterminate, but
this lies in the nature of their function and applies equally to
other purely civil activities (see 234 above). Whenever
individuals of the same religious persuasion join together to
form a community or corporation, the latter will in general be
subject to the policing and supervision of the state. -Doctrine
itself~ however, has its province within the conscience, and
granting of ci~il rights gives those who receive them a s~lf-111l1Qr~ss as recognized /~gal
[rec/11/ic/r] persons in ci\il society, and it is from this root, in6nite and free from all other
influences, that the desired assimilation in terms of attitude and disposition arises.' [If
they had not been granted civil rights,] the jews would have remained in that isolation
with which they have been reproached, and this would righdy have brought blame
[Sc/a/d) and reproach upon the state which excluded them; for the state would thereby
have failed to recognize its own principle as an objective institution \lith a power of its
own (cf. the end of the Remarks to z68). While the demand for the exclusion of the
jews claimed to be based on the highest right, it has proved in practice to be the height of
folly, whereas the way in which governments have acted has proved wise and
honourable.'
296
Ethical Lift
enjoys the right of the subjective freedom of self-consciousness, that sphere of inwardness which is not, as such, the
province of the state. Nevertheless, the state, too, has its
doctrine, for its institutions and whatever it recognizes as valid
in relation to right, to the constitution, etc. are present essentially in the form of thotlght as law. And since the state is not a
mechanism but the rational life of self-conscious freedom and
the system of the ethical world, the disposition [of its citizens],
and so also thefir] consciousness of this disposition in
principles, is an essential moment in the actual state. But the
doctrine of the Church is in tum not just an internal matter
for the conscience; as doctrine, it is in fact an expressi01z,
indeed the expression of a content which is intimately connected, or even directly concerned, with ethical principles and
with the laws of the state. Thus, state and Church are at this
point either in direct agreemmt or in direct opposition. The
Church may go so far as to present the difference between
their respective provinces as an abrupt opposition, for it may
take the view that, since the Church embodies the absolute
content of religion, the spirittlal in general and hence also the
ethical element are part of its concern, whereas the state is a
mechanical framework serving non-spiritual and external
ends. The Church may look on itself as the kingdom of God,
or at least as the road and forecourt which lead to it, yet regard
the state as the kingdom of the world, i.e. of the transitory and
finite; in other words, it may see itself as an end in itself, but
the state purely as a means. And as far as doctrinal instrudi07z is
concerned, these claims may be coupled with the demand that
the state should not only grant the Church complete freedom
in such matters, but should also treat its teachings, as doctrines, with unconditional respect, regardless of what they
may contain, on the grounds that the Church is alone responsible for determining them. But while the Church bases these
claims on the far-reaching argument [Griinde] that the
spiritual element in general is its property, science and cognition in general are also represented in this province and, like a
Church, develop into a totality with its own distinct principle
which may consider itself as occupying the same position as
the Church, but with even greater justification. Thus, science
may also demand the same independence from the state, and
treat the latter simply as a means which should provide for it
as an end in itself. - Furthermore, it makes no difference to
this relationship [between Church and state] whether the
individuals and heads of congregations who devote themselves to the service of the religious community have gone so
far as to lead an existence [E.tistetlz] separate from the state, so
that only the other members of their community are subject to
its control, or whether they remain in other respects within
the state and regard their ecclesiastical vocation [Bestinnr~ung]
merely as one aspect cf their social status [Stand] which they
keep separate from the state. It should in the first place be
noted that such a relationship is associated with that view
[Vontellung] of the state according to which its sole function
[Bestimmung] is to protect and secure the life, property, and
arbitrary will of everyone, in so far as the latter does not
infringe the life, property, and arbitrary will of others; in this
view, the state is merely an arrangement dictated by necessity
[Not]. In this way, the higher spiritual element of what i true
in and for itself is placed, as subjective religiosity or theoretical science, beyond the [confines of the] state which, as the
laity in and fer itself, should merely show respect [for this
element] and is thus completely deprived of its proper ethical
character. We do indeed know from history that there have in
the past been periods and conditions of barbarism in which all
higher spirituality had its seat in the Church, while the state
was merely a secular regime of violence, arbitrariness, and
passion and the abstract opposition [of Church and state]
referred to above was the main principle of actuality (see
358). 9 But to claim that this situation is the one which truly
corresponds to the Idea is to proceed too blindly and superficially. On the contrary, the development of this Idea has
established the truth [of the proposition] that spirit, as free
and rational, is inherently [an .sich] ethical, that the true Idea is
actual rationality, and that it is this rationality which exists as
the state. It has further emerged just as plainly from this Idea
that the ethicaltmtll which it embodies is present for thinking
consciousness as a cor1tet1t on which the form of universality
has been conferred- i.e. as law- and that the state in general
Etlzical Life
knows its ends, and recognizes and implements them with a

determinate consciousness and in accordance with principles.
Now religion, as already remarked, has the truth as its universal object [Gegnntand], but as a gimr content whose basic
determinations have not been recognized in terms of concepts
and thought. In the same way, the relation of the individual to
this object is an obligation based on authority, and the witrzess
of his own spirit and heart, as that in which the moment of
freedom is contained, is faith and foeling [Empfindrorg]. It is
philosophical insight which recognizes that Church and state
are not opposed to each other as far as their crmterrt is concerned, which is truth and rationality, but merely differ in
form. Thus, when the Church proceeds to put forward doctrines (although there are and have been Churches which
confine themselves to worship, and others in which worship is
the principal concern, and doctrine and a more educated
consciousness are merely secondary), and its doctrines relate
to objective principles, to ethical and rational thoughts, its
expression of these doctrines immediately brings it into the
province of the state. In contrast with the faith and authority of
the Church in relation to ethics, right, laws, and institptions,
and with its subjective conviction, the state possesses knowledge.
Within its principle, the content is no longer essentially confined to the form of feeling and faith, but belongs to determinate thought. When the content which has being in and for
itself appears in the shape of religion as a particular content,
as the doctrines peculiar to the Church as a religious community, they remain outside the domain of the state. (In Protestantism, there is no laity, so that there is likewise no clergy
to act as an exclusive depositary of Church doctrine.) Since
ethical principles and the organization of the state in general
may be drawn into the province of religion and not only may,
but also should, be framed with reference to the latter, this
reference gives the state itself its religious accreditation. On
the other hand, the state retains the right and form of selfconscious, objective rationality, the right to enforce the latter
and to defend it against assertions based on the subjective
variety [Gestalt] of truth, no matter what assurances and authority this truth may carry with it. Since the essential principle
Z99
of the fonn of the state as a universal is thought, it was in fact
from the state that freedom of thought and science first emerged
(whereas it was a Church which burned Giordano Bruno10
and forced Galileo to recant on his knees for expounding the
Copernican theory of the solar system, 11 etc.).f Thus, science,
too, is to be found on the side of the state, for it has the same
element of form as the state, and its end is cognition, by means
of thought, of objective truth and rationality. Thinking cognition may admittedly fall from [the level of] science to [that of]
opinion and deductive reasoning [Riisonieren aus Griinden]
and, turning its attention to ethical subjects and the organization of the state, set itself up in contradiction to their
principles. And it may in so doing make the same pretensions
as the Church makes for its own distinctive sphere, namely by
presenting its opinim1s as reason, and as the right of the subjective self-consciousness to freedom of opinion and convictHtgrl's t!Ok. See Laplace, &positio11 of tht Systtm of tilt World '&position drr Systimt du
monde (Paris, 1796)), Book v, Chapter~ 'When Galileo annot. . ed the discoveries he
had made with the telescope (~he phases ofVenus, etc.), he showed at the same time that
they proved beyond doubt the~ earth itself. But the idea (VonullrrngJ of
this movement was pronounced heretical by an assembly of cardinals, and Galileo, its
most famous advocate-;wa:ssummoned before the court of the Inquisition and compelled
to recant it in order to escape a harsh prison sentence. In a man of intellect (Gdst], one of
the strongest passions is the passion for truth. Galileo, convinced of the earth's movement by his own observations, reflected for a long time over a new work in which he
intended to develop all the proofs in its favour. But in order to avoid that persecution to
which he would otherwise ceruinly have fallen victim, he adopted the stratagem of
presenting these proofs in the form of dialogues between three individuals. It is obvious
enough that the advocate of the Copernican system has the advantage; but since Galileo
did not pronounce a verdict, and since he gave as much weight as possible to the
objections advanced by the adherents of Ptolemy, he was entitled to expect that he would
be left to enjoy unmolested that peace which his advanced years and labours had earned
for him. In his seventieth year, he was again summoned before the tribunal of the
Inquisition; he was put in prison, and there required to recant his opinions for a second
time, under threat of the penalty laid down for relapsed heretics. He was made to sign
the fdJo,,ing formula of abjuration: "I, Galileo, having appeared in person before the
court in my seventieth year, on bended knee and \\ith the holy Gospels before my eyes
and in my hands, abjure, damn, and curse, with sincere heart and true belief, the
absurdity, falsity, and heresy of the doctrine of the earth's movement", etc. What a
spectacle, to see a venerable old man, famed throughout a long life de\'oted solely to the
study of nature, abjuring on his knees and against the testimony of his own conscience
that truth which he had convincingly demonstrated! A judgement of the Inquisition
condemned him to imprisonment in perpetuity. A year later, on the intercession of the
Grand Duke of Florence, he was set at liberty. He died in 1642. His loss was mourned
throughout Europe, which his labours had enlightened and which was incensed at the
judgement passed b} a hated tribunal on so great a man.'
300
Etlzical Lift
tion. The principle of -this subjectivity of knowledge has
already been discussed above (see Remarks to I 40 ). All that
need be mentioned here is that the attitude of the state
towards opinion - in so far as it is merely opinion, a subjective
content which therefore has no true inner force and power,
however grandiose its claims - is on the one hand one of
infinite indifference, like that of the painters who stick to the
three primary colours on their palettes, regardless of the
wisdom oftile sclrools which tells them that there are seven. But
on the other hand, when these opinions based on bad
principles give themselves a universal existence [Dasein]
which undermines actuality, the state must protect objective
truth and the principles of ethical life; and it must do the same
if the formalism of unconditional subjectivity should seek to
make science its basis and starting-point, and to tum the
state's own educational establishments against it by inciting
them to make pretensions akin to those of a Church. And
conversely, when confronted with a Church which claims
unlimited and unconditional authority, the state must on the
whole assert the formal right of self-consciousness to its own
insight and conviction, and in general to thoughts concerning
what should count as objective truth.
The unity ofstate and Cllurcll, a subject [Bestimmung] which
has likewise been much discussed and held up as an ultimate
ideal in recent times, may also be mentioned here.U Although
their essential unity lies in the truth of principles and disposition, it is just as essential that, along with this unity, the
differnlte between their forms of consciousness should attain
particular existence [Existenz]. That unity of Church and state
which has so often been wished for is to be found in oriental
despotism - but in this case, there is no state in the sense of
that self-conscious configuration [Gesta/trmg] of right, of free
ethical life, and of organic development which is alone worthy
of the spirit. - Furthermore, if the state is to attain existence
[Dasein] as the self-knowing ethical actuality of spirit, its form
must become distinct from that of authority and faith. But this
distinction emerges only in so far as the Church for its part
becomes divided within itself. Only then, [when it stands]
above the particular Churches, can the state attain universality
301
of thought as its formal principle and bring it into existence
[Existenz]; but in order to recognize this, one must know not
only what universality is in itself, but also what its existence
[Existenz] is. Consequently, far from it being, or ever having
been, a misfortune for the state if the Church is divided, it is
through this division alone that the state has been able to fulfil
its destiny [Bestimmung] as self-conscious rationality and ethical life. This division is likewise the most fortunate thing
which could have happened to the Church and to thought as
far as their freedom and rationality are concerned.
Addition (H). The state is actual, and its actuality consists in the fact that
the interest of the whole realizes itself through the particular ends. Actu-
ality is always the unity of universality and particularity, the resolu~f
--unrvma1iiYllitQparticUf~~o be self-sufficient,
although it is sustained and supported only by the whole. If this unity is
not present, nothing can be actual, even if it may be assumed to have
existence [Existenz]. A bad state is one which merely exists; a sick body also
exists, but it has no true reality. A hand which has been cut off still looks
like a hand and exists, but it has no actualityP True actuality is necessity:
what is actual is necessary in itself. Necessity consists [besteht] in the
division of the whole into the distinctions within the concept, and in the
fact that this divided whole exhibits a fixed and enduring determinacy
which is not dead and unchanging but continues to produce itself in its
dissolution. An essential part of the fully developed state is consciousness
or thought; the state accordingly knows what it wills and knows this as an
object of thought (ein Gedachtes]. Since, then, the seat of knowledge is
within the state, science also has its seat here and not within the Church.
This notwithstanding, there has been much talk in recent times to the
effect that the state should grow out of religion. The state is [fully]
developed spirit and it displays its moments in the light of consciousness;
and the fact that what lies within the Idea emerges into [the sphere of]
objectivity [Gegenstibzdlichkeit] means that the state appears as a finite
entity and is thereby shown to be a secular realm (Gebiet], whereas religion presents itself as a realm of infinity. The state consequently seems
subordinate, and since the finite cannot exist on its own [fiir sic/1 bestelzen},
it allegedly requires the Church as its basis. As a finite entity, it is said to
lack justification, and only through religion can it be sanctified and belong
to the infinite. But this view of the matter [Sade] is extremely one-sided.
The state is indeed essentially secular and finite, and has particular ends
and particular powers; but its secularity is only one ofits aspects, and only
a spiritless perception can regard it as merely finite. For the state has a
302
Ethical Life
soul which animates it, and this animating soul is subjectivity, which
creates distinctions on the one hand but preserves their unity on the
other. In the realm [Reich] of religion, distinctions and finite elements are
also present. God, it is said, is three in one; there are accordingly three
determinations, and it is only the unity of these which constitutes the
spirit. Consequently, if we apprehend the divine nature in concrete terms,
this can be done only by means of distinctions. Thus, finite elements are
to be found in the divine realm as well as in the secular, and [to contend]
that the secular spirit, i.e. the state, is purely finite is a one-sided view, for
actuality is not irrational. A bad state, of course, is purely secular and
finite, but the rational state is infinite within itself. Secondly, it is argued
that the state should derive its justification from religion. The Idea, within
[the context of] religion, is spirit internalized in emotion, but it is this
same Idea which gives itself secular expression in the state and secures an
existence [Dasein] and actuality for itself in knowledge and volition. Thus,
to say that the state must be founded on religion may mean that it should
be based on and grow out of rationality. But the same proposition can also
be misunderstood to mean that those human beings whose spirit is fettered by an unfree religion are best equipped to obey. The Christian
religion, however, is the religion of freedom -although it may come a bout
that this freedom is perverted into unfreedom under the influence of
superstition. If, then, the above proposition means that individuals must
have religion in order that their fettered spirit can be more effectively
oppressed within the state, its sense is a bad one; but if it is meant that
human beings should have respect for the state as that whole of which
they are the branches, the best way of achieving this is, of course, through
philosophical insight into its essence. But if this insight is lacking, the
religious disposition may lead to the same result. Consequently, the state
may have need of religion and faith. But the state remains essentially
different from religion, for what it requires has the shape of a legal
[rechtlid1en] duty, and it is indifferent to the emotional attitude with which
this duty is performed. The field of religion, on the other hand, is inwardness; and just as the state would prejudice the right of inwardness if it
imposed its requirements in a religious manner, so also does the Church,
if it acts like a state and imposes penalties, degenerate into a tyrannical
religion. A third difference, connected with that just mentioned, is that
the content of religion is and remains latent [eingehiillt], so that emotion,
feeling [Empfimhmg), and representational thought are the ground on
which it rests. On this ground, everything has the form of subjectivity,
whereas the state actualizes itself and gives its determinations a stable
existence [Dasein ]. Thus, if religiosity sought to assert itself in the state in
the manner which it usually adopts on its own ground, it would subvert
303
the organization of the state; foc the differences within the state are far
apart, whereas everything in religion invariably has reference to the
totality. And if this totality sought to take over all the relations [Beziehu,gen] of the state, it would become fanaticism; it would wish to find the
whole in every particular, and could accomplish this only by destroying
the particular, for fanaticism is simply the refusal to admit particular
differences. If we may so put it, the saying 'Laws are not made for the
pious' is no more than an expression of this fanaticism. For when piety
adopts the role of the state, it cannot endure anything determinate, but
simply destroys it. It is also in keeping with this if piety leaves decisions to
the conscience, to inwardness, and is not determined by reasons; for
inwardness does not develop reasons and is not accountable to itself.
Thus, if piety is to count as the actuality of the state, all laws are swept
aside and it is subjective feeling which legislates. This feeling may be pure
arbitrariness, and it is only by its actions that we can tell whether or not
this is so. But in so far as they are actions or precepts, they assume the
shape of laws, and this is in direct contradiction to the subjective feeling
referred to. God, as the object [Gegenstand] of this feeling, might also be
made the determinant; but God is the universal Idea which remains
indeterminate within this feeling, and which is not sufficiently mature to
determine what exists in developed form within the state. The very fact
that everything in the state is stable and secure is a defence against
arbitrariness and positive opinion. Thus, religion as such should not hold
the reins of government.
fhe political constitution is, .first, the organization of the state and the
process of its organic life with reference to itself, in which it differentiates its moments within itself and develops them to established
existence [.zum Bestehm].

Secondly, the state in its individuality is an exclusive unit which
accordingly has relations with others; it thereby turns its differentiation
outwards and, in accordance with this determination, posits its existing
[bestehmdm] differences within itself in their ideality.
Just as irritability in the living organism is itself in one

respect an inward quality which belongs to the organism as such, so also
in the present case is the outward reference directed towards inwardness.
The inward aspect of the state as such is the civil power, and its outward
direction is the military power, although the latter is also a specific aspect
within the state itself. The equilibrium of these two aspects is an import-
Addition (H).
Ethical Life
ant factor in the history" of the state. Sometimes the civil power is completely defunct and based exclusively on the military power, as at the time
of the Roman emperorsb and the praetorians; 1 and at other times - as in
the modem period - the military power is solely a product of the civil
power, as when all citizens are eligible for conscription.2
"TranslaJor's nou: The word Gesinnung ('disposition'), which appears at this point in all of
those editions of the &dusphilosophi~ which include Gans's Additions, should read
Geschidzu ('histocy1 as in Hotho's notes, used by Gans as the basis of this Addition (see
VPR 111, 74l). The error is presumably a misreading by Gans.
Translator's nou: The remainder of this sentence appears to be Gans's own interpolation, as it has no counte!p3n in either Hotho's or Griesheim's notes.
Tlze Internal Constitution'
The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates and

determines its activity within itself in accordance with the nature of the
concept. It does so in such a way that each of the powers in question is in
itself the totality, since each contains the other moments and has them
active within it, and since all of them, as expressions of the differentiation [Unterschiedj of the concept, remain wholly within its ideality and
constitute nothing but a single individual whole.
In recent times, .we have heard an endless amount of empty

talk both about,the constitution and about reason itself. The
most vapid of this has come from those in Germany who have
persuaded themselves that they have a better understanding
than anyone else -especially governments- of what a constitution is, and who believe that all their superficialities are
irrefutably justified because they are allegedly based on religion and piety. It is no wonder that such talk has made
reasonable men [Miinner] sick of the words 'reason',
'enlightenment', 'right', etc., and likewise of the words 'constitution' and 'freedom', and that one is almost ashamed to
enter into any further discussion of political constitutions. 1
But it may at least be hoped that such excesses will lead to a
more widespread conviction that philosophical cognition of
such subjects cannot come from ratiocination or from [the
' Trmzskltor's not~: Literally: 'The Internal Constitution for ltself[/iir sich )' -i.e. the internal
aspects ,,;ll be considered here in their own right.
305
consideration of] ends, grounds, and utilities - let alone from
emotionality, love, and enthusiasm - but only from the concept; and it is also to be hoped that those who believe that the
divine is incomprehensible and that cognition of the truth is a
futile [nichtiges] enterprise will take no further part in the
discussion. At any rate, neither the undigested chatter nor the
edifying sentiments which their emotions and enthusiasm
generate can claim to merit the attention of philosophy.
Among ideas [Vorstel/rmgen] now in currency, that of the
necessary division [Teiltmg] of powers within the state calls for
mention (with reference to z6g). 2 This is a highly important
determination which, if understood in its true sense, could
rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom; but it
is also an idea [Vor.stellrmg] of which those very people who
believe that they speak out of love and enthusiasm know
nothing and wish to know nothing, for it is in this very idea
that the moment of rational determinacy lies. In other words,
the principle of the division of powers contains the essential
moment of difference, of real rationality; but such is the view of
the abstract understanding that, on the one hand, it attributes
to this principle the false determination of the absolute selfsufficiency of each power in relation to the others, and on the
other hand, it one-sidedly interprets [auffassen] the relation of
these powers to one another as negative, as one of mutual
limitation. In this view, the reaction of each power to the
others is one of hostility and fear, as if to an evil [Vbel], and
their determination [Bestimmung] is such that they oppose one
another and produce, by means of this counterpoise, a general
equilibrium rather than a living unity. It is only the selfdetermination of the concept within itself, not any other ends or
utilities, which contains the absolute origin of the different
powers, and it is solely because of this that the organization of
the state is inherently [in sich] rational and the image of eternal
reason. - How the concept and subsequently, in concrete
fashion, the Idea, become determined in themselves and
thereby posit their moments- universality, particularity, and
individuality [Einzelheit] - in abstraction can be learned from
logic (though not, of course, from the logic commonly in
use).3 At any rate, to take the negative as a starting-point and
306
Ethical Life
to make malevolence and distrust of malevolence the primary
factor, and then, on this assumption, to devise ingenious
defences whose efficiency depends merely on corresponding
counter-defences is, as far as thought is concerned, characteristic of the negative understanding and, as far as the disposition is concerned, characteristic of the outlook of the rabble
(see 244 above).- If the powers- e.g. what have been called
the execulive and legislative powers - attain self-sufficiency, the
destruction of the state, as has been witnessed on a grand
scale 4 [in our times], is immediately posited; or if the state is
essentially presened, a unity of one kind or another is
established for the time being by means of a conflict whereby
one power subjugates the others, and it is by this means alone
that the essential [object], the survival [Bestehen] of the state, is
achieved.
Addition (H). One should expect nothing from the state except what is an
expression of rationality. The state is the world which the spirit has
created for itself; it therefore follows a determinate course which has
being in and for itself. How often do we hear talk of the wisdom of God in
nature! But we must not for a moment imagine that the physical world of
nature is of a higher order than the world of the spirit; for the state is as
far above physical life as spirit is above nature. We should therefore
venerate the state as an earthly divinity" and realize that, if it is difficult to
comprehend nature, it is an infinitely more arduous task to understand
the state. It is of the utmost significance that, in recent times, we have
attained specific6 intuitions concerning the state in general and have been
so much occupied with discussing and framing constitutions. But this still
does not resolve the problem; it is also necessary to bring to a rational
matter [Sache] the reason of intuition,' to know what its essence is, and [to
realize] that its most conspicuous aspect is not always the essential. Thus,
while the powers of the state must certainly be distinguished, each must
form a whole in itself and contain the other moments within it. When we
speak of the distinct activities of these powers, we must not fall into the
monumental error of taking this to mean that each power should exist
independently lfrir sic/1] and in abstraction; on the contrary, the powers
should be distinguished only as moments of the concept. On the other
"Translator's nou: als ein lrdisdr-Gotdiclles; Hotho's notes, on which Gans based this
Addition, read simply als ein Giiu/iclu:s Cas something divine'): see VP R 111, 7+4
hTranslator's rwu: Hotho's notes read butimmtc-t ('more specific'): see VPR 111, 7+4
'Translator's rwtt: Hotho's notes read (in translation): 'One must also bring reason to a
rati9nal intuition' (VP R 111, 744).
Philosophy ofRiglu
hand, if these differences do exist [besteher1] independently and in abstraction, it is plain to see that two self-sufficient entities cannot constitute a
unity, but must certainly give rise to a conflict whereby either the whole is
destroyed or unity is restored by force. Thus, during the French Revolution, the legislative power at times engulfed the so-called executive, and at
other times the executive power engulfed the legislative, so that it remains
an absurdity in this context to raise, fCI' example, the moral demand for
harmony. For if we refer the matter [Sache] to the emotions, we admittedly save ourselves all the trouble; but although ethical feeling may be
necessary, it is not qualified to determine the powers of the state on its
own. Thus, the main point to note is that, just as the determinations of the
powers are in themselves the whole, so too do all of them, in their
existence [Exi.stenz], constitute the entire concept. We usually speak of
three powers- the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. The first of
these corresponds to universality and the sec~md to particularity; but the
judiciary is not the third constituent of the concept, because its [i.e. the
judiciary's) individuality [Einzelheit] lies outside the above spheres.
The political state is therefore divided into three substantial

elements:1
(a) the power to determine and establish the universal- the legislative
power;
(b) the subsumption of particular spheres and individual cases under
the universal - the executive power,
(c) subjectivity as the ultimate decision of the will- the power of tire
suvereign, in which the different powers are united in an individual
unity which is thus the apex and beginning of the whole, i.e. of
constitutional monarchy.
The development ~4usbildung] of the state to constitutional
monarchy is the achievement of the modem world, in which
the substantial Idea has attained infinite form. The history of
this immersion of the world spirit in itself or - and this
amounts to the same thing - this free development in which
the Idea releases its moments (and they are only its moments)
from itself as totalities, and in so doing contains them in that
ideal unity of the concept in which real rationality consists
Ethical Life
272-273
[besteht] - the history of this true fonnation [Gestaltung] of

ethical life is the concern [Sadre] of universal world history.
The old classification of constitutions into monarchy,
ariStocracy, and democracy presupposes a still undivided and substantial unity which has not yet attained its inner differentiation
(as an organization developed within itselO and which consequently still lacks depth and concrete rationality.1 From the point
of view of the ancient world, therefore, this classification is the
true and correct one; for in the case of a unity which is still
substantial and has not yet progressed to its absolute development [Enifaltung] within itself, the difference is essentially
external and appears primarily as a difference in the number of
those in whom that substantial unity is supposed to be immanent (see Encyclopaedia of tire Philosophical Sciences, 52)."
These forms, which in this instance belong to different
wholes, are reduced, in constitutional monarchy, to [the status
of] moments. The monarch is one [individual]; several participate in the executive power, and the many at large participate
in the legislative power. But as already mentioned, such
purely quantitative differences are merely superficial and do
not convey the concept of the thing [Sache]. There has been
much talk in recent times of the democratic and aristocratic
elements i11 mo11archy, but this is equally beside the point; for
in so far as the determinations in question do occur in
monarchy, they have lost their democratic and aristocratic
character. - Some representations [Vor.stellungen] of constitutions merely set up the state as an abstraction which governs
and issues commands, and leave it undecided -or regard it as
immaterial- whether this state is headed by one or several or
all.- 'All these forms', says Fichte in his Natural Law (Part 1,
p. 196), 'are right and proper provided that there is an ephoratf!'4 (an institution devised by Fichte as a counterweight to the
supreme power), 'and may promote and preserve universal
right within the state'. - Such a view (like the device of an
ephorate) is a product of that superficial conception of the
state referred to above. If social conditions are quite simple,
these differences are admittedly of little or no significance;
not~: The first edition refers to 82 of the E"'J'Io!Jdia (first edition); I
foUow Knox (p. 367) and VPR 11, 730 in preferring 521 as more plausible.
'Translator's
309
thus Moses, for example, made no provision in his legislation
for institutional changes in the event of the people requiring a
king, but merely added the commandment that the king
should not possess large quantities of horses, wives, and silver
and gold (Deuteronomy 17:16fl:). - Furthermore, it is
certainly possible in one sense to say that the Idea is likewise
indifferent to the three forms in question (including that of
monarchy, at least in its limited meaning as an a/ternaJive to
aristocracy and democracy}; but it is indifferent to them in the
opposite sense [to that ofFichte], because all three are out of
keeping with the Idea in its rational development [Entwicklung] (see 272), and the latter could not attain its right and
actuality in any of them. For this reason, it has become utterly
pointless to ask which of the three is most commendable; such
forms can be discussed only in a historical context. - Nevertheless, in this as in so many other instances, we must
acknowledge Montesquieu's depth of insight in his famous
account of the principles of these forms of government. But
while acknowledging the accuracy of his account, we must not
misunderstand it. It is common knowledge that he specified
virtue as the principle of democracy/ and such a constitution
does indeed depend on the disposition [of the citizens] as the
purely substantial form in which the rationality of the will
which has being in and for itself still exists under this constitution. But Montesquieu 6 adds that England, in the seventeenth century, afforded a fine spectacle of how efforts to
establish a democracy were rendered impotent by a lack of
virtue on the part of the leaders, and further observes that,
when virtue disappears from the republic, ambition takes hold
of those whose hearts [Gemut] are susceptible to it and greed
takes possession of everyone, so that the state falls prey to
universal exploitation and its strength resides solely in the
power of a few individuals and the unruliness of everyone. To
these remarks, it must be replied that, as the condition of
society grows more advanced and the powers of particrJarity
are developed and liberated, it is not enough for the heads of
state to be virtuous; another form of rationalla w is required
apart from that of the [individual] disposition if the whole is to
have the strength to maintain its unity and to grant the forces
310
Ethical Life
of developed particularity their positive as well as negative
rights. In the same way, we must avoid the misunderstanding
of imagining that, since the disposition of virtue is the substantial form in a democratic republic, this disposition thereby
becomes superfluous, or may even be totally absent, in a
monarchy; and still less should we imagine that virtue and the
legally detennined activity of an articulated organization are
mutually opposed and incompatible. -The view that moderation is the principle of aristocracy' entails an incipient
divergence between public power and private interest, which
at the same time affect each other so directly that this constitution is intrinsically liable at any moment to turn immedi:ately into the harshest condition of tyranny or anarchy - as
witness the history of Rome - and so to destroy itself. - The
fact that Montesquieu recognizes honour as the principle of
monard1y8 is enough to indicate that the monarchy he has in
mind is neither the patriarchal or ancient variety nor that
which has developed an objective constitution, but feudal
monarchy as that in which the relationships covered by its
constitutional law [i1meren Staatsrecht] have become firmly
established as rights of private property and privileges of
individuals and corporations. Since the life of the state is
based, under this constitution, on privileged personalities to
whose discretion a large part of what has to be done for the
preservation [Bestehen] of the state is entrusted, the objective
aspect of their services consists not in duties but in representations [Vorstellung] and opinions; consequently, the state is
held together not by duty but merely by honour.
Another question naturally presents itself here: who is to
draw up the constitution? This question seems clear enough,
but closer inspection at once shows that it is nonsensical. For
it presupposes that no constitution as yet exists, so that only an
atomistic aggregate of individuals is present. How such an
aggregate could arrive at a constitution, whether by its own
devices or with outside help, through altruism [Giite], thought,
or force, would have to be left to it to decide, for the concept is
not applicable to an aggregate. - But if the above question
presupposes that a constitution is already present, to draw up a
constitution can only mean to change it, and the very fact that
311
a constitution is presupposed at once implies that this change
could take place only in a constitutional manner. -But it is at
any rate utterly essential that the constitution should not be
regarded as something made, even if it does have an origin in
time. On the contrary, it is quite simply that which has being
in and for itself, and should therefore be regarded as divine
and enduring, and as exalted above the sphere of all manufactured things. 9
Additio11 (H). The principle of the modern world at large is freedom of

subjectivity, according to which all essential aspects present in the
spiritual totality develop and enter into their right. If we begin with this
point of view, we can scarcely raise the idle question of which fonn,
monarchy or democracy, is superior. We can only say that the forms of an
political constitutions are one-sided if they cannot sustain within themselves the principle of free subjectivity and are unable to conform to fully
developed reason.
"Transbztor's note: In Hotho's notes, on which this Addition is based, this word is not a/fer
('aU') but alter ('ancient'), so that Hegel's observation, which then reads 'the fonns of
ancient political constitutions are one-sided and cannot sustain [etc.)', applies only to the
constitutions of antiquity. Gans has removed the sentence from its context in the notes
and given it a more general application.
Since spirit is actual only as that which it knows itself to be, and since
the state, as the spirit of a nation [Volk], is both the law which
pem1eates all relatim1s within it and also the customs and consciousness
of the individuals who belong to it, the constitution of a specific nation
will in general depend on the nature and development [Bildung] of its
self-consciousness; it is in this self-consciousness that its subjective
freedom and hence also the actuality of the constitution lie.
The wish to give a nation a constitution a priori, even if its
content were more or less rational, is an idea [Einfall] which
overlooks the very moment by virtue of which a constitution is
more than a product of thought. Each nation accordingly has
the constitution appropriate and proper to it.
Additi011 (H,G). The constitution of a state must permeate all relations

within it. Napoleon, f<r example, tried to give the Spanish a constitution a
312
Ethical Life
273-275
priori, but the consequences were bad enough. For a constitution is not
simply made: it is the work of centuries, the Idea and consciousness of the
rational (in so far as that consciousness has developed in a nation). No
constitution can therefore be created purely subjectively [to1z Subjekterz].
What Napoleon gave to the Spanish was more rational than what they had
before, and yet they rejected it as something alien, because they were not
yet sufficiently cultivated [gebildet]. 1 The constitution of a nation must
embody the nation's feeling for its rights and [present] condition;
otherwise it will have no meaning or value, even if it is present in an
external sense. Admittedly, the need and longing for a better constitution
may often-be present in individuals [Einzehzm], but for the entire mass [of
people] to be filled with such an idea (Vo,-stell!mg] is quite another matter,
and this does not occur until later. Socrates' principle of morality or
inwardness was a necessary product of his age, but it took time for this to
become [part of] the universal self-consciousness.
a. The Power of the Sovereign
The power of the sovereign itself contains the three moments of the
totality within itself (see 272), namely the 1mivma/ity of the constitution and laws, 1 consultation as the reference of the particular to
the universal, and the moment of ultimate decisio11 as the selfdetermi1latio1l to which evecy1hing else reverts and from which its
actuality originates. This absolute self-determination constitutes the
distinguishing principle of the power of the sovereign as such, and
will accordingly be dealt with first.
Additio11 (H). We begin with the power of the sovereign, i.e. with the
moment of individuality [Ei11zellzeit], for it contains within itself the three
moments of the state as a totality. In other words, the 'I' is simultaneously
the most individual" and the most universal [element]. On the face of it,
nature, too, is individual in character, but reality - i.e. non-ideality or
mutual externality- is not that which has being with itself [das Beisidzseiendel for in reality, the various individual units [Ei11zellzeitm] subsist
side by side. In the spirit, on the other hand, all the various elements are
present only ideally and as a unity. Thus, the state, as spiritual in character, is the exposition of all its moments, but individuality 6 is at the same
"Translator's nou: Hotho's notes read simply 'the individual' (das Eit~::elnr, VPR 10, 756).
~Trans/aJar's nou: Hotho reads 'ideality' (dit ldtalitiir, VPR 111, 757).
313
time its inner soul and animating principle, [and this takes the form of)
sovereignty, which contains all differences within itself.
1. The basic determination of the political state is the substantial

unity or ideality ofits moments. (a) In this unity, the particular powers
and functions of the state are both dissolved and preserved. But they
are preserved only in the sense that they are justified not as
independent entities, but only in such a way and to such an extent as
is determined by the Idea of the whole; their source is the latter's
authority [Macht] and they are its fluid members, just as it is their
simple self.
Addition (G). This ideality of the moments [in the state) is like life in an
organic body: it is present at every point, there is only one life in all of
them, and there is no resistance to it. Separated from it, each point must
die. The same applies to the ideality of aU the individual estates, powers,
and corporations, however much their impulse may be to subsist and have
being for themselves. In this respect, they resemble the stomach of an
organism which also posits itself as independent [fiir sich] but is at the
same time superseded and sacrificed and passes over into the whole. 1
(13) The particular functions and activities of the state belong to it as its
own essential moments, and the individuals who perform and
implement them are associated with them not by virtue of their
immediate personalities, but only by virtue of their universal and
objective qualities. Consequently, the link between these functions
and particular personalities as such is external and contingent in
character. For this reason, the functions and powers of the state
cannot be private property.!
Additio11 (G). The activity of the state is associated with individuals. The
latter, however, are not entitled by nature to perform these tasks, but
[only) by virtue of their objective qualities. Ability, skill, and character are
partiaJilT qualities of an individual, who must be trained and educated for
a particular occupation. For this reason, an office can neither be sold nor
inherited. In France, seats in parliament were formerly sold, as are officers' commissions up to a certain rank in the English army to this day; but
314
Etlzica/ Lifo
this practice was (or still is) connected with the medieval constitutions of
certain states, and these constitutions are now gradually disappearing.
'Translator's nou: The second half of this sentence is an e:memely free paraphrase of
much fuller reflections in Griesheim 's notes on the conflict in England between nobility
and CI'0\\11 (V P R IV, 668).
The above two determinations- i.e. that the particular fimctions and
powers of the state are not self-sufficient and fixed, either on their
own account [/iir siclz] or in the particular will of individuals, but are
ultimately rooted in the unity of the state as their simple self constitute the sovereignty of tlze state.
This is inlenzal sovereignty. The second aspect is external
sovereignty (see below). - In the feudal monarchy of earlier
times, the state certainly had external sovereignty, but internally, neither the monarch himself nor the state was
sovereign. On the one hand (cf. Remarks to 273), the particular functions and powers of the state and civil society were
vested in independent corporations and conununities, so that
the whole was more of an aggregate than an organism; and on
the other hand, they [i.e. these functions and powers] were the
private property of individuals, so that what the latter had to
do in relation to the whole was left to their own opinion and
discretion. -The idealism which constitutes sovereignty is the
same determination as that according to which the so-called
parts of an animal organism are not parts, but members or
organic moments whose isolation and separate existence [Fiirsic/z-Bestelzen] constitute disease (see Encyclopaedia of tlze
Plzilosoplzical Sciences, 293). 1 It is the same principle which
we encountered (see 7) in the abstract concept of the will
(see Remarks to 279) as self-referring negativity, and hence
as universality determining itself to individuality [Einzellzeil], in
which all particularity and determinacy are superseded - i.e.
the absolute and self-determining ground. In order to grasp
this, one must first have understood the whole conception of
the substance and true subjectivity of the concept. - Since
sovereignty is the ideality of every particular authority [Berec/z315
tigung], it is easy to fall into the very common misunderstanding of regarding this ideality as mere power and empty
arbitrariness, and of equating sovereignty with despotism. But
despotism signifies the condition of lawlessness in general, in
which the particular will as such, whether of a monarch or of
the people (ochlocracy), counts as law (or rather replaces law),
whereas sovereignty is to be found specifically under lawful
and constitutional conditions as the moment of ideality of the
particular spheres and functions [within the state]. In other
words, these spheres are not independent or self-sufficient in
their ends and modes of operation, nor are they solely
.immersed in themselves; on the contrary, in these same ends
and modes of operation, they are determined by and
dependent on tile end oftlze whole (to which the indeterminate
expression 'the JIJe/fare of tile state' has in general been
applied). This ideality manifests itself in two different ways. In times of peace, the particular spheres and functions [within
the state] pursue the course of satisfYing themselves and their
ends, and it is in part only as a result of the unconscious
necessity of the thing [Sac/ze] that their selfishness is transformed
into a contribution to mutual preservation, and to the
preservation of the whole (see 183). But it is also in part a
direa influence from above which constantly brings them back
to the end of the whole and limits them accordingly (see 'The
Executive Power', 289), and at the same time urges them to
perfonn direct services for the preservation of the whole. But in a situatim1 ofcrisis [Not] -whether in internal or external
affairs - it is around the simple concept of sovereignty that the
organism and all the particular spheres of which it fonnerly
consisted rally, and it is to this sovereignty that the salvation of
the state is entrusted, while previously legitimate functions
[dieses sonst Berechtigte] are sacrificed; and this is where that
idealism already referred to attains its distinct actuality (see
321 below).
2. Sovereignty, which is initially only the universal thought of this

ideality, can exist only as subjeaivity which is certain of itself: and as
JI6
Ethical Life
the will's abstract- and to that extent ungrounded - self-determinatimz
in which the ultimate decision is vested. This is the individual aspect
of the state as such, and it is in this respect alone that the state itself is
one. But subjectivity attains its truth only as a subjea, and personality
only as a per'Son, and in a constitution which has progressed to real
rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has its distinctive [ausgesonderte] shape which is aaual for itself. This absolutely
decisive moment of the whole, therefore, is not individuality in
general, but one individual, the monarch.
The immanent development of a science, the derivation of its
entire content from the simple concept - and without such a
derivation it certainly does not deserve the name of a
philosophical science - has the following distinctive feature.
One and the same concept - in this case the will - which
begins by being abstract (because it is itself the beginning),
retains its character yet [at the same time] consolidates its
determinations, again through its own exclusive agency, and
thereby acquires a concrete content. Thus, it is the basic
moment of personality, initially abstract in [the sphere of]
immediate right, which has continued to develop through its
various forms of subjectivity until at this point, in [the sphere
of] absolute right, in the state, and in the completely concrete
objectivity of the will, it becomes the personality oftile state, its
certainty ofitself. This last [instance], whose simple self supersedes all particularities, cuts short the weighing of arguments
[Grii11de] and counter-arguments (between which vacillations
in either direction are always possible) and resolves them by its
'I will', thereby initiating all activity and actuality.- But personality (and subjectivity in general), as infinite and self-referring, has its trutlz - and indeed its proximate and immediate
truth - simply and solely as a person, i.e. as a subject which
has being for itself; and that which has being for itself is also
simply one. The personality of the state has actuality only as a
person, as tile monarch.- Personality expresses the concept as
such, whereas the person also embodies the actuality of the
concept, and only when it is determined in this way [i.e. as a
person] is the concept Idea or truth.- A so-called moral person,
[such as] a society, community, or family, however concrete it
317
may be in itself, contains personality only abstractly as one of
its moments. In such a person, personality has not yet reached
the truth of its existence [Existenz]. The state, however, is
precisely this totality in which the moments of the concept
attain actuality in accordance with their distinctive truth. - All
these determinations, both in themselves [/iir sich] and in the
[particular] shapes which they assume, have been discussed
throughout this entire treatise; but they are repeated here
because, although they are readily accepted when they assume
a particular shape, they are no longer recognized and apprehended precisely when they reappear in their true position,
i.e. no longer in isolation, but in their truth as momems of the
Idea. -The concept of the monarch is therefore extremely
difficult for ratiocination - i.e. the reflective approach of the
understanding - to grasp, because such ratiocination stops
short at isolated determinations, and consequently knows only
[individual] reasons [Griirzde], finite viewpoints, and deductimz
from such reasons. It accordingly presents the dignity of the
monarch as derivative, not only in its form but also in its
determination, whereas the very concept of monarchy is that it
is not deduced from something else but erztirely sel[-origirzati11g.
The idea [Vonte/lwzg] that the right of the monarch is based
on divine authority is therefore the closest approximation to
this concept, because it conveys the unconditional aspect of
the right in question. But the misunderstandings associated
with this idea are familiar enough, and the task of philosophical enquiry consists precisely in comprehending this divine
quality.
The term 'popular sovereignty' may be used to indicate that a
people is self-sufficient for all external purposes and constitutes a state of its own, like the people of Great Britain- as
distinct from the peoples of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or
of Venice, Genoa, Ceylon, etc., who are now no longer
sovereign because they have ceased to have sovereign princes
or supreme govenunents of their own. -We may also say that
irllenzal sovereignty lies with the people, but only if we are speaking of the whole [state] in general, in keeping with the above
demonstration (see 277 and 278) that sovereignty belongs
to the state. But the usual sense in which the term 'popular
Ethical Life
sovereignty' has begun to be used in recent times is to denote
the opposite ofthat suvereignty which exists in the monarch. In this
oppositional sense, popular sovereignty is one of those confused thoughts which are based on a garbled notion [Vorstellung] of the people. Without its monarch and that artiaJation of
the whole which is necessarily and immediately associated
with monarchy, the people is a formless mass. The latter is no
longer a state, and none of those determinations which are
encountered only in an inten'IIJ!Iy organized whole (such as
sovereignty, government, courts of law, public authorities
[Obrigkeit], estates, etc.) is applicable to it. It is only when
moments such as these which refer to an organization, to
political life, emerge in a people that it ceases to be that
indeterminate abstraction which the purely general idea
[Vontellung] of the people denotes. -If 'popular sovereignty' is
taken to mean a republican form [of government], or more
specifically democracy (for the term 'republic' covers many
other empirical combinations which are in any case irrelevant
in a philosophical discussion), then all that needs to be said
has already been said above (see Remarks to 273), apart
from which there can be no further discussion of such a
notion [Vontellung] in face ofthe developed Idea. -If a people
is represented neither as a patriarchal tribe [Stamm], nor as
existing in an undeveloped condition in which democratic or
aristocratic forms are possible (see Remarks to 273)- or
indeed in any other arbitrary and inorganic condition - but is
envisaged as an internally developed and truly organic totality,
its sovereignty will consist in the personality of the whole,
which will in turn consist in the reality appropriate to its
concept, i.e. the person of the monarch.
At that stage referred to above at which constitutions were
divided into democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy- i.e. the
point of view of substantial unity which remains within itself
and which has not yet attained its infinite differentiation and
immersion in itself - the moment of the ultimate and selfdetennining decision of the wiII does not emerge for itself in its
own distinct actuality as an immanent organic moment of the
state. Admittedly, even when the state assumes these less
advanced shapes, there must always be an individual at its
head. This individual is either already present as such [/iir
sich], as in monarchies of the type in question, or, as in
aristocracies and more particularly in democracies, he may
rise up from among the statesmen or generals in a contingent
manner and as partia1lar circumstances require; for all actions
and all actuality are initiated and implemented by a leader as
the decisive unit But enclosed in a union of powers which is
still undifferentiated, this subjectivity of decision must either
be contingent in its origin and emergence or occupy an altogether subordinate position. So long as heads of state were
subject to such conditions, it was only in a sphere beyond their
own that a pure and unalloyed decision could be found in the
shape of a fate which determined [events] from without. As a
moment within the Idea, this decision had to come into
existence [Existenz], but its roots lay outside the circle of
human freedom which the state encompasses. - This is the
origin of the need to derive the ultimate decision on major
issues and important concerns [Momente] of the state from
oracles, a daemon (in the case of Socrates), the entrails of
animals, the feeding and flight of birds, etc.; 1 for when human
beings had not yet fathomed the depths of self-consciousness
or emerged from the undifferentiated condition of substantial
unity to attain being for themselves, they were not yet strong
enough to perceive this decision within their own being. -In
the daemon of Socrates (cf. [Remarks to] 138 above), we can
see how the will which in the past had simply projected itself
beyond itself began to tum in upon itself and to recognize itself
from within, which is the beginning of a self-/mowing and
hence genuine freedom. Since this real freedom of the Idea
consists precisely in giving each of the moments of rationality
its own present and se/f-co11Scious actuality, it is through its
agency that the ultimate self-determining certainty which
constitutes the apex of the concept of the will is allotted the
function of a[n individual] consciousness. But this ultimate
self-determination can fall within the sphere of human
freedom only in so far as it occupies this supreme position,
isolated for itself and exalted above everything particular and conditional; for only thus does its actuality accord with its concept.
320
Ethical Life
Addition (G). In the organization of the state (which in this case means
constitutional monarchy), the one thing which we must bear in mind is
the internal necessity of the Idea; all other considerations are irrelevant
The state must be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph
of reason which becomes manifest in actuality. All considerations of mere
utility, externality, and the like must therefore be excluded from a
philosophical treatment [of this subject). Representational thought can
easily comprehend that the state is the self-determining and completely
sovereign will, the ultimate source of decisions. But it is more difficult to
grasp this 'I will' as a person, for this [formula] does not imply that the
monarch may act arbitrarily: on the contrary, he is bound by the concrete
content of the advice he receives, and if the constitution is finnly
established, he often has nothing more to do than to sign his name. But
this name is important: it is the ultimate instance and no11 plus ultra. It
could be said that an organic articulation was already present in the
beautiful democracy of Athens, but we can see at once that the Greeks
based the ultimate decision on completely external phenomena [Erscheinungen] such as oracles, the entrails r1 sacrificial animals, and the
flight of birds, and that they regarded nature as a power which proclaimed
and expressed by these means what was good for human beings. At that
time, self-consciousness had not yet arrived at the abstraction of subjectivity, nor had it yet realized that an 'I will' must be pronounced by man
himself on the issue to be decided. This 'I will' constitutes the great
difference between ancient and modem worlds, so that it must have its
own distinct existence (Etistenz] in the great edifice of the state.
Unfortunately, however, this determination is regarded4 as merely
external and discretionary.
4
TranslaJor's nou: Griesheim's notes, from which this Addition is emacted, read
'frequently regarded' (lliiujig . .. ang~uhm; V P R IV, 676).
z8o
3 Seen in abstraction, this ultimate self of the will of the state is
simple and therefore an imnzediateindividuality [Einzellzeit], so that the
determination of naturalness is inherent in its very concept. The
monarch, therefore, is essentially determined as this individual, in
abstraction from every other content, and this individual is destined
(bestimmt] in an immediate and natural way, i.e. by his natural birth, to
hold the dignity of the monarch.
This transition from the concept of pure self-determination to
321
271)-280
the immediacy of being, and hence to the natural realm, is of a
purely speculative nature, and its cognition accordingly
belongs to logical philosophy. Furthermore, it is, on the
whole, the same transition as that which is already familiar to
us from the nature of the will in general, as the process which
translates a content from subjectivity (as an end in view [als
vorgestellten Zweck]) into existence [Daseitl] (see 8). But the
distinctive form of the Idea and of the transition here in
question is the immediate transfom1ali011 of the pure selfdetermination of the will (i.e. of the simple concept itself) into
this [specific entity), into natural existence, without the mediation of a particular content (such as the end of an action).- In
the so-called ontological proof of the exister1ce of God, it is this
same transformation of the absolute concept into being which
has given the Idea its profundity in the modem age. But this
has recently been declared incmnprehensible, which amounts to
renouncing all cognition of the tmth, for truth is simply the
unity of the concept and existence (see 2 3). 1 Since this unity
is not to be found in the consciousness of the understanding,
which continues to regard these two moments of the truth as
separate, this consciousness may perhaps, in the present [religious] context, concede the possibility of a faith in this unity.
But since the idea [Vor.stellrmg] of the monarch is regarded as
entirely within the scope of ordinary consciousness, the
understanding insists all the more firmly on its separation [of
the two moments] and on the consequences which its astute
reasoning can deduce from this. It accordingly denies that the
moment of ultimate decision in the state is linked in and for
itself (i.e. in the concept of reason) with the immediate and
natural, and concludes from this first, that this link is contingent, and secondly - since it equates rationality with the
absolute distincmess of the two moments - that such a link is
irrational. From this, further devastating consequences ensue
for the Idea of the state.
Additi011 (H). A frequent objection to monarchy is that it makes the affairs

of the state subject to contingency - since the monarch may be illeducated or unworthy of holding the highest office - and that it is absurd
for such a situation to be regarded as rational But this objection is based
on the invalid assumption that the monarch's particular character is of
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Ethical Life
z8o-z8x
vital importance. In a fully organized state, it is only a question of the

highest instance of formal decision, and all that is required in a monarch
is someone to say 'yr:S and to dot the 'i'; for the supreme office should be
such that the particular character of its occupant is of no significance.
Whatever other qualities the monarch has in addition to his role of
ultimate decision belong to [the sphere of] particularity [Partilmlariliil],
which must not be allowed to affect the issue. There may indeed be
circumstances in which this particularity plays an exclusive part, but in
that case the state is either not yet fully developed, or it is poorly constructed In a well-ordered monarchy, the objective aspect is solely the concern
of the law, to which the monarch merely has to add his subjective 'I wi11'.1
28I
The two moments in their undivided unity
i.e. the ultimate
ungrounded self of the will, and its existence [Exislenz] which is
consequendy also ungrounded (and which belongs by definition
[Beslimmung] to nature) -constitute the Idea of something mmlfroed by
arbitrary will, i.e. the majesty of the monarch. In this unity lies the
actual unity of the state, and it is only by \'irtue of its inward and
outward immediacy that this unity is saved from being dragged down
into the sphere of particularity with its arbitrariness, ends, and
attitudes, from the strife of factions round the throne, and from the
enervation and destruction of the power of the state.
The rights of birth and inheritance constitute the basis
[Grund] of legitimacy, i.e. the basis not just of a purely positive
right but also [of a right contained] in the Idea. - If the mode
of succession is clearly defined - i.e. if the throne is inherited
-the formation of factions is prevented when the throne falls
vacant; this circumstance has long been cited, and righdy so,
in support of hereditary succession. Nevertheless, this aspect
is merely a consequence, and if it is made into a ground
[Gnmd], it debases [the monarch's] majesty to the sphere of
ratiocination and, regardless of its character of ungrounded
immediacy and ultimate inward being, grounds it not upon the
Idea of the state which is inmtanent within it, but on something outside il, on some thought of a different character such
as the welfare oftlze slate or oftlze people. From a determination
of this kind, it is indeed possible, by using middle terms
[medias temzinos], to deduce [the need for] hereditary succession; but other middle terms, and hence other consequences, are equally possible, and the consequences which
have been drawn from this welfare of the people (salut du
peuple) are only too familiar. - For these reasons, philosophy
a/one is in a position to consider this majesty [of the monarch]
by means of thought, for every method of enquiry other than
the speculative method of the infinite and self-grounded Idea
annuls [mifllebt] the nature of majesty in and for itself. Elective numardzy' may well seem the most natural idea [Vorstellrmg], i.e. the one most obvious to superficial thinking; for
since it is the concerns and intel'ests of the people that the
monarch must look after, it can be argued that the people
must also be left to choose whom they wish to entrust their
welfare to, and that it is from this trust alone that the right to
rule arises. This view, like the ideas [Vontellrmgen] of the
monarch as the first servant of the state,Z of a contractual
relationship between monarch and people, etc., bases itself on
the will in the sense of the caprice, opinion, and arbitrariness of
the many - a determination which, as we noticed some time
ago,.u is of primary importance in civil society (or merely seeks
to assert itself as such), but is not the [basic] principle of the
family, let alone of the state, and is completely opposed to the
Idea of ethical life. - Indeed, it is even possible for ratiocination to deduce from the consequences of elective monarchy that
it is the worst of institutions. But these consequences appear
to ratiocination only as a possibility or probability, although they
are in fact an essential concomitant of this institution. That is
to say, the nature of the situation in an elective monarchy
whereby the particular will is made the ultimate source of
decisions means that the constitution becomes an electoral
contract [Wahlkapitulatiou], i.e. a surrender of the power of the
state at the discretion of the particular [partikularen] will; as a
result, the particular [besonderm] powers of the state are
turned into private property, the sovereignty of the state is
weakened and lost, and the state is dissolved from within and
destroyed from without.4
"Tmns/Dtor's not~: See, for example, JSz-189 above.
Etlzical Lift
Addition (G). In order to grasp the Idea of the monarch, it is not enough to
say that kings are appointed by God, for God has made everything,
including the worst [of things).5 The point of view of utility does not get
us far either, for it is always possible to point to disadvantages. And it is of
just as little help to regard monarchy as a positive right. The fact that I
have property is necessary, but this [or that) particular possession is
contingent, and the right whereby one individual must occupy the highest
office appears in a similar light if it is taken in an abstract and positive
sense. But this right is present as a felt need and as a need of the thing
[Sache] in and for itself. Monarchs are not exactly distinguished by their
physical powers or intellect [Geist], yet millions accept them as their
rulers. But it is absurd to say that people allow themselves to be ruled in
defiance of their own interests, ends, and intentions, for they are not as
stupid as that; it is their need, the inner power of the Idea, which compels
them to accept such rule and keeps them in this situation, even if they
appear to be consciously opposed to it. Thus, whereas the monarch
functions as head of state and as part of the constitution, it has to be said
that a conquered people is not constitutionally identical with its sovereign.
If a rebellion occurs in a province conquered in war, this is not the same
thing as a revolt in a well-organized state. The conquered people are not
rebelling against their sovereign prince, and they are not committing a
political crime, for they are not linked with their master in terms of the
Idea or through the inner necessity of the constitution. There is only a
contract, but not a political association. 'Je ne suis pas votre prince, je suis
votre maitre' was Napoleon's reply to the delegates at Erfun.6
Transllltor's nott: 'I am not your prince, I am your master.'
The sovereignty of the monarch is the source of the right to pardon

criminals, for only the sovereign is entitled to actualize the power of
the spirit to undo what has been done and to nullify crime by forgiving
and forgetting.
The right of pardon is one of the highest acknowledgements
of the majesty of the spirit. - Furthermore, this right is one of
those instances in which a determination from a higher sphere
is applied to, or reflected in, a lower one. - But such applications are the concern of particular science, which must deal
with the entire empirical range of its subject (cf. [the first)
325
footnote to the Remarks to 270).- Another example of such
applications is the subsumption under the concept of crime
(which we encountered in an earlier context- see 95-102)
of injuries [Verletzungen] to the state in general, or to the
sovereignty, majesty, and personality of the sovereign prince;
such injuries are in fact classed as crimes of the /zig/zest urder,
and a particular procedure etc. [is applied to them].
Addition (H). Pardon is the remission of punishment, but it is not a

cancellation of right [die aber das Recht nic/11 mifhebt). On the contrary,
right continues to apply, and the pardoned individual still remains a
criminal; the pardon does not state that he has not committed a crime.
This cancellation [AYJeb1mg] of punishment may be effected by religion,
for what has been done can be undone in spirit by spirit itself. 1 But in so
far as it is accomplished in this world, it is to be found only in the majesty
[of the sovereign] and is the prerogative of [the sovereign's] ungrounded
decision.
The second moment contained in the power of the sovereign is that of

pa11icularity or of determinate content and its subsumption under the
universal. In so far as this moment attains a particular existence
[Existenz], it does so in the highest advisory offices and in the
individuals who hold them; these individuals submit to the monarch
for his decision the content of current affairs of state, or the legal
determinations made necessary by present needs, along with their
objective aspects, grounds for decision, relevant laws, circumstances,
etc. The appointment of individUJJ!s for this purpose and their dismissal from office fall within the [competence of the] unrestricted arbitrary will of the monarch, since the individuals in question are in
immediate personal contact with him.1
The only factors for which people can be made accountable- i.e. those
which are capable of objective proof and on which advice distinct
from the personal will of the monarch as such can appropriately be
sought - are the objective aspects of decision such as knowledge
[Kenntnis] of the content and circumstances, and the legal and other
326
Etlzical Lifo
z8z-z86
grounds for determination. It is only for matters such as these that the
advisory offices and their incumbents can be held accountable/ But
the distinctive majesty of the monarch, as the ultimate subjectivity of
decision, is raised above all accountability for the acts of government.
The tllird moment in the power of the sovereign concerns the universal in and for itself, which is present subjectively in the conscience of
the monarch and objectively in the constitution and laws as a whole. To
this extent, the power of the sovereign presupposes the other
moments, just as it is presupposed by each of them.
The objective guarantee of the power of the sovereign and of rightful

succession to the throne by way of inheritance, etc., lies in the fact
that, just as this sphere has its own actuality distinct from that of other
rationally determined moments, so also do these other moments have
their own distinct rights and duties in accordance with their
determination. Each member [of the whole], in maintaining itself
independendy [/iir siclz], thereby also maintains the others in their own
distinct character within the rational organism.
One of the more recent achievements of history has been to
develop the monarchic constitution to the point where hereditary succession to the throne is finnly based on primogeniture.
Monarchy has thereby reverted to the patriarchal principle in
which it had its historical origin, although it now has the
higher determination whereby the monarch is the absolute
apex of an organically developed state. This achievement is of
the greatest importance for public freedom and for a rational
constitution, although it is often very poorly understood - as
we earlier noticed -even if it is treated with respect. Thus, the
history of despotisms and of the purely feudal monarchies of
earlier times represents a succession of rebellions, acts of
violence by rulers, civil wars, the downfall of sovereign princes
and dynasties, and in consequence, general devastation and
destruction on both internal and external fronts. The reason
327
for this is that, in conditions such as these, the division
[Teilrmg] of political business is purely mechanical, with its
different parts distributed among vassals, pashas, etc., so that
the difference [between these elements] is not one of
determination and form, but merely of greater or lesser
power. Thus, each part maintains itselfalone, and in so doing,
it promotes only itself and not the others along with it, and has
within itself the complete set of moments which it requires for
independence and self-sufficiency. In an organic relationship,
the units in question are not parts but members, and each
maintains the others while fulfilling its O'llJ71 function; the substantial end and product of each is to maintain the other
members while simultaneously maintaining itself. Such
guarantees as are required, whether for the continuity of the
succession and of the power of the sovereign in general, or for
justice, public freedom, etc., are secured by means of institutions. Such factors as the love of the people, character, oaths,
coercion, etc. may be regarded as subjective guarantees; but
when we are dealing with the constitution, we are concerned
solely with objective guarantees or institutions, i.e. with organically linked and mutually conditioning moments. Thus, public
freedom in general and a hereditary succession guarantee
each other reciprocally, and their association [Zusammenhang]
is absolute, because public freedom is the rational constitution, and the hereditary character of the power of the
sovereign is, as has already been shown, the moment inherent
in its concept.
b. The Executive Power
The execution and application of the sovereign's decisions, and in

general the continued implementation and upholding of earlier decisions, existing laws, institutions, and arrangements to promote common ends, etc., are distinct from the decisions themselves. This task
of subsumption in general belongs to the executive power, which also
includes the powers of the judiciary and the police; these have more
Ethical Life
immediate reference to the particular affairs of civil society, and they
assert the universal interest within these [particular] ends.
The particular common interests which fall within civil society, and
which lie outside the universal interest of the state as the interest
which has being in and for itself (see 256), are administered by the
corporations (see 25 1) which represent the communities and the
various professions [Gewerbe] and estates, with their authorities
[Obrigkeit], supervisors, administrators, etc. On the one hand, the
business of these administrators is to look after the private property and
interests of these particular spheres, and in this respect, their authority
(Autoritiit] is based in part on the trust of their fellow-citizens and
equals. On the other hand, these circles must be subordinated to the
higher interests of the state. Thus, the filling of such offices will in
general involve a mixture of popular election by the interested parties,
and confirmation and determination by a higher authority/
The task of upholding, within these particular rights, legalily and the
universal inlerest ofthe state, and that of bringing these rights back to
the universal, need to be performed by delegates of the executive
power, i.e. the executive civil senants and the higher consultative
bodies. ,The latter necessarily work together in groups, and they
converge in their supreme heads who are in touch with the monarch
himself. 1
Just as civil society is the field of conflict in which the private
interest of each individual comes up against that of everyone
else/ so do we here encounter the conflict between private
interests and particular concerns of the community, and
between both of these together and the higher viewpoints and
ordinances of the state. The spirit of the corporation, which
arises when the particular spheres gain legal recognition
[Beredlligrmg], is now at the same time inwardly transformed
into the spirit of the state, because it finds in the state the
means of sustaining its particular ends. This is the secret of
the patriotism of the citizens in the sense that they know the
Philosophy ofRight
state as their substance, for it is the state which supports their
particular spheres and the legal recognition, authority, and
welfare of these. In so far as the rooting of the particular in the
universal is contained immediately in the spirit of the corporation, it is in this spirit that such depth and strength of disposition as the state possesses are to be found.
The administration of a corporation's affairs by its own
supervisors will often be inept, for although they know [kennen] and have before them their own distinct interests and
affairs, they have a less complete grasp of the connection
between these and more remote conditions and universal
points of view. Besides, further circumstances have a similar
effect, e.g. the close personal contact and other kinds of
equality between the supervisors and those who should be
subordinate to them, the various ways in which they are
dependent on others, etc. But this personal [eigene] sphere
may be seen as belonging to the moment of fom1al freedom,
which provides an arena in which personal cognition and
personal decisions and their execution, as well as petty passions and imaginings, may indulge themselves. This is all the
more acceptable in proportion to the triviality of the business
which is thereby vitiated or conducted less efficiently, more
laboriously, etc., and to its relative unimportance for the more
general concerns of the state; and the same applies the more
directly the laborious or foolish conduct of such trifling business is related to the satisfaction and self-esteem [Meirmngvon
sich] which are derived from it.
290
The division [Teilung] of labour (see 198) likewise makes its
appearance in the business of the executive. The organization of official bodies accordingly faces the formal but difficult task of ensuring
that civil life shall be governed in a concrete manner from below, where
it is concrete, but that the business in question shall be divided into its
abstract branches and dealt with by distinct bodies; the latter should
function as separate centres whose activities should again converge
both at the lowest level and in a concrete overview on the part of the
supreme executive. 1
330
Ethical Lift
Additiorz (G). The most important issue for the executive power is the
division of functions. The executive power is concerned with the transition from the universal to the particular and individual, and its functions
must be divided in accordance with its different branches. The difficulty,
however, is [that of ensuring) that they also come together again at upper
and lower levels. For although the power of the police and that of the
judiciary, for example, are divergent, they do converge in every particular
case [Geschiifi). The expedient which is often employed in these circumstances is to appoint a State Chancellor, Prime Minister, or Cabinet
Council in order to simplify the highest level of government. But this may
have the result that everything is again controlled from above by
ministerial power, and that functions are, to use the common expression,
centralized. 2 This is associated with a high degree of facility, speed, and
effectiveness in measures adopted for the universal interest of the state. A
regime of this kind was introduced by the French Revolution and further
developed by Napoleon, and it still exists [besteht) in France today. On the
other hand, France lacks corporations and communal associations [Kommtmm) - that is, circles in which particular and universal interests come
together. Admittedly, these circles gained too great a degree of selfsufficiency in the Middle Ages, when they became states within the state
and behaved in an obdurate manner like independently established
bodies. But although this ought not to happen, it can still be argued that
the proper strength of states resides in their [internal) communities
[Gemeirzderz). In these, the executive encounters legitimate [beredlligte)
interests which it must respect; and since the administration can only
encourage such interests - although it must also supervise them - the
individual finds protection for the exercise of his rights, so that his particular [partikulares] interest is bound up with the preservation of the
whole. For some time now, organization has always been directed from
above, and efforts have been devoted for the most part to this kind of
organization, despite the fact that the lower level of the masses as a whole
can easily be left in a more or less disorganized state. Yet it is extremely
important that the masses should be organized, because only then do they
constitute a power or force; otherwise, they are merely an aggregate, a
collection of scattered atoms. Legitimate power is to be found only when
the particular spheres are organized.
"Tr1111Silltor's oou: Gans's version, as translated by the nine preceding words, reads
gmmm ri(h aJifharu w~;~ o/sfiir ridr ~~~~hmd~ Kiirpmci1DjinL Griesheirn's original, of
which Gans's tex1 is a paraphrase, reads gmirtm art/ rir~e hartt Wri~ di~ Amiibung
o/lgonriMr z~&t!, i.e. 'obstructed the implementation of universal ends in an obdurate
manner' (VPR IV, 6gt). Gans appears to have misread gorirtm as gm(~)rtnr.
331
The functions of the executive are objective in character; as such (fUr
sich], they have already been substantially decided in advance (see

287), and they must be fulfilled and actualized by irzdividUills.
Individuals are not destined by birth or personal nature to hold a
particular office, for there is no immediate and natural link between
the two. The objective moment in their vocation [Bestimmung] is
knowledge [Erkermtrlis] and proof of ability; this proof guarantees that
the needs of the state will be met, and, as the sole condition [of
appointment], at the same time guarantees every citizen the possibility
of joining the universal estate/
There is necessarily an ;,determirUJte number of candidates for public

office, because their objective qualification does not consist in genius
(as it does in art, for example), and their relative merits cannot be
determined with absolute certainty. The selection of tins particular
individual for a given post, his appointment, and his authorization to
conduct public business are subjective decisions, in that they link
together an individual and an office as two factors whose mutual
relation must always be contingent. This subjective aspect pertains to
the sovereign as the supreme [souverii,m] and decisive power within
the state.
The particular tasks within the state which the monarch assigns to the
official bodies form part of the objective aspect of sovereignty which is
inherent in him. The specific differerzces between these tasks are like\vise given in the nature of the thing [Sache]; and just as the activity of
the official bodies is the fulfilment of a duty, so also does their
business constitute a right which is exempt from contingency.
The individual who has been appointed to his professional office by

an act of the sovereign (see 292) must fulfil his duties, which are the
332
Ethical Life
substantial aspect of his position [Verhalwis], as a condition of his
appointment. As a consequmce of this substantial position, his appointment provides him with resources, guarantees the satisfaction of his
particularity (see 264), and frees his external situation and official
activity from other kinds of subjective dependence and influence.'
The state does not count on arbitrary and discretionary services (for example, the administration of justice by knights
errant), precisely because such services are discretionary and
arbitrary, and because those who perform them reserve the
right to do so in accordance with their subjective views, or not
to perform them at all if they so wish and to pursue subjective
ends instead. As regards the service of the state, the opposite
extreme to the knight errant would be a civil servatzt who
performed his work purely out of necessity [Not] without any
genuine duty and likewise without any right. - In fact, the
service of the state requires those who perform it to sacrifice
the independent and discretionary satisfaction of their subjective ends, and thereby gives them the right to find their
satisfaction in the performance of their duties, and in this
alone. It is here that, in the present context, that link is to be
found between universal and particular interests which constitutes the concept of the state and its internal stability (see
260). - Similarly, the [civil servant's] relationship to his
office is not one of COtltract (see 7 5), although the parties in
question both give their consent and render a service. The
civil servant is not employed, like an agent, to perform a single
contingent task, but makes this relationship [to his work] the
main interest of his spiritual and particular existence
[Existenz]. Likewise, the task which he has to perform and
with which he is entrusted is not a purely particular thing
[Saclze] of an external character; the value of such a thing is an
inward quality which is therefore distinct from its external
nature, so that it is not impaired [verletzt] if what has been
stipulated is not delivered (see 77). But the task which the
civil servant has to perform is, in its inunediate character, a
value in and for itself. The wrong which is done by nonperformance or positive infringement (i.e. by an action in
violation of one's duty, which applies in both of these cases) is
333
291-294
therefore an infringement of the universal content itself, i.e. a
negatively infinite judgement (cf. 95), and hence a misdemeanour or even a crime.- The guaranteed satisfaction of
particular needs removes that external necessity [Not] which
may induce someone to seek the means of satisfYing them at
the expense of his official activities and duty. Those who are
entrusted with the business of the state find protection in its
universal power against another subjective factor, namely the
private passions of the governed, whose private interests etc.
are prejudiced when the universal is asserted against them.
The protection of the state and the governed against the misuse of
power on the part of the official bodies and their members is, on the
one hand, the direct responsibility [Veranlwortlicllkeit] of their own
hierarchy; on the other hand, it lies with the legal recognition [Bereclltigung] accorded to communities and corporations, f<l" this prevents
subjective arbitrariness from interfering on its own account [fUr sicll]
with the power entrusted to officials, and supplements from below
that control from above which does not extend as far as individual
conduct.
The conduct and education of the officials is the point at
which the laws and decisions of the executive come into contact with individuals [die Einzellleit] and are translated into
actuality. This is accordingly the factor on which the satisfaction and confidence of the citizens in relation to the executive
depend, as does the execution (or dilution and frustration) of
the government's intentions- in the sense that the manner in
which these intentions are executed may well be rated as
highly by the feelings [Empfindung] and disposition [of the
citizens] as the content of the intention to be implemented,
even though this content may itself be of a burdensome
nature. Because of the immediate and personal character of
such contact, control from above can attain its end in this
respect only partially, and this end may also encounter
obstacles in the shape of the common interest of the officials
in maintaining solidarity amongst themselves in opposition to
334
Ethical Life
294-297
their subordinates and superiors. The need to remove such

obstacles, especially in cases where the institutions in question
may still be relatively imperfect in other respects also, calls
for and justifies the higher intervention of the sovereign (as,
for example, of Frederick the Great in the notorious case
[Sache) of the miller Arnold).~
Whether or not dispassionateness, integrity [Rechtliclzkeit), and polite

behaviour become customary will depend in part on direct education in
ethics and in thought, fer this provides a spiritual counterweight to the
mechanical exercises and the like which are inherent in learning the
so-called sciences appropriate to these [administrative] spheres, in
the required business training, in the actual work itself, etc. But the
size of the state is also an important consideration, for it both reduces
the burden of family ties and other private comminnents and lessens
the power - and thereby takes the edge off- such passions as revenge,
hatred, etc. These subjective aspects disappear of their own accord in
those who are occupied with the larger interests of a major state, for
they become accustomed to dealing with universal interests, views,
and functions.
Members of the executive and civil servants constitute the bulk of the
middle class [des Millelstmzdes), which embodies the educated intelligence and legal [rechtliclze) consciousness of the mass of the people.
The institutions which prevent this class from adopting the isolated
position of an aristocracy and from using its education and skill as
arbitrary means of domination are the sovereign, who acts upon it
from above, and the rights of the corporations, which act upon it from
below.
It was in this way that the administration of justice, whose
object is the proper interests of all individuals, was at one time
transformed into an instrument of profit and domination,
because knowledge [Kenntnis] of right hid behind scholarship
and a foreign language, and knowledge of the legal process
hid behind complicated formalities.
335
Addition (H,G). The middle class, to which the civil servants belong, has a
political consciousness and is the most conspicuously educated class. For
this reason, it is the mainstay Qf the state as far as integrity [Redltlichkeit)
and intelligence are concerned. Consequently, the level r:f a state which
has no middle class cannot be high. This is true of Russia, for example,
which has a mass of serfs and another mass of rulers. It is central to the
interests of the state that this middle class should develop, but this can
occur only in an organization like the one we have just considered, i.e. in
which legal recognition [Berechtig1mg] is given to particular bodies which
are relatively independent, and in which the arbitrariness of officialdom is
broken down by institutions of this kind. Action in accordance with
universal right and the habit of such action are consequences of the
opposition offered by bodies which are self-sufficient in themselves.
c. The Legislative Power
The legis/alive power has to do with the laws as such, in so far as they
are in need of new and further determination, and with those internal
concerns of the state whose content is wholly universal. This power is
itself a part ofthe constitution, which it presupposes and which to that
extent lies in and for itself outside the sphere which the legislative
power can determine directly; but the constitution does undergo
further development through the further evolution of the laws and the
progressive character of the universal concerns of government.
Addition (H). The constitution must be in and for itself the firm and
recognized ground on which the legislative power is based, so that it does
not first have to be constructed. Thus, the constitution is, but it just as
essentially becomes, i.e. it undergoes progressive development. This progression is a change which takes place imperceptibly and without possessing the form of change. If, for example, the resources of the German
princes and their families were originally private property but were then
transformed, without conflict or opposition, into crown domains, i.e. into
resources of the state, this occurred because the princes felt the need to
maintain their possessions intact and demanded guarantees to this efTect
from their country and its Estates. 1 Thus, the latter became involved in
the way in which the resources in question were conserved, so that the
princes no longer had exclusive control over them. Similarly, the Emperor
was at one time a judge who travelled round the Empire dispensing
justice. Then, the (merely apparent) progress of culture [Bildurzg) made it
Etlzical Life
297-299
outwardly necessary foc the Emperor to delegate this judicial office

increasingly to others, which led to the transfer of judicial power from the
person of the sovereign ID [judicial] colleges. 2 Thus, conditions evolve in
an apparently peaceful and imperceptible manner, with the result that a
constitution changes its character completely over a long period of time.
These matters are more precisely determined, as far as individuals are

concerned, in the following two respects: (a) in relation to the benefits which the state enables them to enjoy, and (~) in relation to the
services which they must perform foc the state. The former include
the laws of civil right [die privaJrechtliclzen Gesetze] in general, the
rights of communities and corporations, all arrangements of a wholly
universal character, and indirectly (see 298), the constitution as a
whole. But as for services to the state, it is only when these are
expressed in terms of money, as the existing and universal value of
things [Dinge] and services, that they can be determined justly and at
the same time in such a way that the particular work and services
which the individual can perform are mediated by his own arbitrary
will.
It is possible to distinguish in general terms between what is
the object [Gegenstami] of universal legislation and what
should be left to the direction [Bestimmung] of administrative
bodies or to any kind of government regulation, in that the
former includes only what is wholly universal in content- i.e.
legal determinations- whereas the latter includes the particular and the ways and means whereby measures are implemented. This distinction is not entirely determinate, however, if
only because a law, in order to be a law, must be more than
just a commandment in general (such as 'Thou shalt not kill'
- cf. Remarks to I 40, p. I 444 ) , i.e. it must be determinaJe in
itself; but the more determinate it is, the more nearly capable
its content will be of being implemented as it stands. At the
same time, however, so far-reaching a determination as this
would give the laws an empirical aspect which would necessarily be subject to alteration when they were actually
"TrDIIsltltor"s note: p. 176 in this edition (Hegel's reference is to the first edition).
337
implemented, and this would detract from their character as
laws. It is implicit in the organic unity of the powers of the
state itself that one and the same spirit decrees the universal
and brings it to determinate actuality in implementing it. - It
may at first seem remarkable that the state requires no direct
services from the numerous skills, possessions, activities, and
talents [of its citizens] and from the infinitely varied living
resources which these embody and which are at the same time
associated with the disposition [of those who possess them],
but lays claim only to the one resource which assumes the
shape of money. (Services associated with the defence of the
state against its enemies belong to those duties which will be
considered in the following section.) But money is not in fact
one particular resource among others; on the contrary, it is the
universal aspect of all of them, in so far as they express
themselves in an external existence [Dasein] in which they can
be apprehended as things [a/seine Saclze]. Only at this extreme
point of externality is it possible to determine services
quantitatively and so in a just and equitable manner. - In
Plato's Republic, it is the task of the guardians to allot individuals to their particular estates and to specify what particular
services they have to perform (c[ Remarks to x8s). In feudal
monarchies, the services required of vassals were equally
indeterminate, but these vassals also had to serve in their
particular capacity, e.g. as judges.' Services imposed in the
Orient and in Egypt in connection with immense architectural
enterprises etc. are likewise of a particular character. In these
circumstances, what is lacking is the principle of subjective
freedom whereby the individual's substantial activity (whose
content is in any case of a particular nature in the services in
question) is mediated by his own particular will. This right
cannot be enjoyed until the demand for services is expressed
in terms of the universal value, and it is itself the reason
[Grund] why this change was introduced.
Addition (H). The two aspects of the constitution relate respectively to the
rights and services of individuals. As far as services are concerned, nearly
all of them have now been reduced to money. Military duties are now
almost the only personal service required In earlier times, far more
claims were made on individuals in a concrete sense, and they were called
Ethical Lift
upon to work according to their skills. In our times, the state purchases
what it needs. This may at first seem an abstract, lifeless, and soulless
procedure, and it may also look as if the state has become decadent if it is
satisfied with abstract services. But it is inherent in the principle of the
modem state that all of an individual's actions should be mediated by his
will. The justice of equality, however, can be achieved far more effectively
by means of money. Otherwise, if the criterion were concrete ability, the
talented individual would be taxed much more heavily than the untalented. But the very fact that people are now required to deliver only what
they are able to deliver is a sign that public freedom is respected.
In the legislative power as a whole, the other two moments have a

primary part to play, namely the monarchy as the power of ultimate
decision, and the executive power as the advisory moment which has
concrete knowledge [Knmtnis] and oversight of the whole with its
numerous aspects and the actual principles which have become
established within it, and knowledge of the needs of the power of the
state in particular. The final element [in the legislature] is the Estates.
Addition (H,G). One of the misconceptions concerning the state is the

view that members of the executive should be excluded from the legislative bodies, as happened, for example, in the Constituent Assembly [of
France].I In England, ministers must be Members of Parliament, and
rightly so, since those who participate in government should be associated
with, rather than opposed to, the legislative power. The idea [Vontellung]
the so-called independence
powers contains the basic error [of
supposing] that the powers should be independent yet mutually limiting.
If they are independent, however, the unity of the state, which is the
supreme requirement, is destroyed [au.Jkelzohen].Z
301
The role [Bestimmung] of the Estates is to bring the universal interest
(Angeleg1!1zheit] into existence [Existenz] not only in itself but also for
itself, i.e. to bring into existence the moment of subjective fonnal
freedom, the public consciousness as the e1npirical universality of the
views and thoughts of the many.
The expression 'the many' (ol n:ollot) denotes empirical
universality more accurately than the usual term 'alf. For if it
339
Philosophy ofRight
is said to be obvious that the term 'air excludes from the start
at least children, women, etc., it is by the same token even
more obvious that the entirely specific expression 'alf ought
not to be used with reference to something else which is
entirely unspecific. 1 - In fact, such untold numbers of warped
and erroneous ideas [Vorstellungen] and turns of phrase concerning 'the people', 'the constitution', and 'the Estates' have
passed into current opinion that it would be a futile endeavour
to try to enumerate, discuss, and rectify them. The idea with
which the ordinary consciousness usually begins when it considers the necessity or usefulness of a convention of the
Estates will generally be, for example, that delegates of the
people, or indeed the people themselves, must know best what
is in their own best interest, and that their own will is
undoubtedly the one best equipped to pursue the latter. As for
the first of these propositions, the reverse is in fact the case,
for if_the term 'the people' denotes a particular category of
members of the state, it refers to that category of citizens who
do not/mow their own will. To know what one wills, and even
more, to know what the will which has being in and for itselfi.e. reason - wills, is the fruit of profound cognition and
insight, and this is the wiry thing [Saclle] which 'the people'
lack.- It can be seen with a little reflection that the guarantee
which the Estates provide for universal welfare and public
freedom does not lie in any particular insight they may possess. For the highest officials within the state necessarily have
a more profound and comprehensive insight into the nature of
the state's institutions and needs, and are more familiar with
its functions and more skilled in dealing with them, so that
they are able to do what is best even without the Estates, just as
they must continue to do what is best when the Estates are in
session. The guarantee doubtless lies rather in the extra
insight which the delegates have, first of all into the activities
of those officials who are less visible to their superiors, and in
particular into the more urgent and specialized needs and
deficiencies which they [the delegates] see in concrete form
before their eyes; and secondly, it lies in the effect which the
expectation of criticism, indeed of public criticism, at the
hands of the many has in compelling the officials to apply their
340
Etlzical Lifo
301
best insights, even before they start, to their functions and to

the plans they intend to submit, and to put these into effect
only in accordance with the purest of motives. (This compulsion is equally effective for the members of the Estates themselves.) But as for the [belief that there is] particular good will
on the part of the Estates towards the universal welfare, we
have already noted (see Remarks to 272) that it is characteristic of the rabble, and of the negative viewpoint in general, to
assume ill will, or less good will, on the part of the government. If this assumption were to be answered in kind, it would
invite the counter-accusation that, since the Estates have their
origin in individuality [Einzellleit], in the private point of view
and in particular interests, they are inclined to direct their
efforts towards these at the eA-pense of the universal interest,
whereas the other moments in the power of the state are by
their very nature [sclzon jiir sich] dedicated to the universal end
and disposed to adopt the point ofview of the state. As for that
general guarantee which is supposed to lie in the Estates in
particular, each of the other institutions within the state shares
with them the quality of being a guarantee of public welfare
and rational freedom; and in some of these institutions- such
as the sovereignty of the monarch, hereditary succession, the
constitution of the courts, etc. - this guarantee is present to a
much greater degree. The proper conceptual definition
[Begriffibestimmrmg] of the Estates should therefore be sought
in the fact that, in them, the subjective moment of universal
freedom - the personal [eigerre] insight and personal will of
that sphere which has been described in this work as civil
society- comes i11to existerzce in relation [Bezieluozg] to tile state.
As in every other case, the philosophical viewpoint here
enables us to conclude that this moment is a determination of
the Idea when the latter has reached its total development,
and the inner necessity of this moment should not be confused with external necessities and utilities.
Addition (H). The attitude of the government towards the Estates should
not be essentially hostile, and the belief that this relationship is necessarily
a hostile one is a sad mistake. The government is not a party opposed to
another party in such a way that both have to fight fer major concessions
from each other; and if a state does get into a predicament of this kind,
341
this cannot be described as health but only as a misfortune/ Besides, the
taxes which the estates approve should not be regarded as a gift presented
to the state; on the contrary, they are approved for the benefit of those
who approve them. The proper significance of the Estates is that it is
through them that the state enters into the subjective consciousness of the
people, and that the people begins to participate in the state.
Viewed as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government at large on the one hand and the people in their division into
particular spheres and individuals [lndividuen] on the other. Their
determination requires that they should embody in equal measure
both the sense and disposition of the stale and guvernment and the
interests of particular circles and individuals [Einzelnen]. At the same
time, this position means that they share the mediating function of the
organized power of the executive, ensuring on the one hand that the
power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated extreme - and
hence simply as an arbitrary power of domination - and on the other,
that the particular interests of communities, corporations, and
individuals [lndividuen] do not become isolated either. Or more
important still, they ensure that individuals do not present themselves
as a cr011Jd or aggregate, unorganized in their opinions and volition, and
do not become a massive power in opposition to the organic state. 1
It is one of the most important insights oflogic that a specific

moment which, when it stands in opposition, has the position
of an extreme, loses this quality and becomes an organic
moment by being simultaneously a mean.z It is all the more
important to stress this aspect in the present context, because
it is a common but highly dangerous prejudice to represent
[vor.;;ustellen] the Estates chiefly from the point of view of their
opposition to the government, as if this were their essential
position. It is only through their mediating function that the
Estates display their organic quality, i.e. their incorporation in
the totality. In consequence, their opposition is itself reduced
to a [mere] semblance. If this opposition does make its
appearance, and if it is not just superficial but actually takes
on a substantial character, the state is close to destruction.- It
is evident from the nature of the thing [Sacl~e] that the conflict
Ethical Life
301-303
is not of this kind if the matters in dispute are not the essential
elements of the political organism but more specialized and
trivial things [Dinge ], and if the passion with which even this
content is associated consists of factional rivalry over merely
subjective interests such as the higher offices of state.
Additiorz (H). The constitution is essentially a system of mediation. In
despotic states, where there are only rulers [Fiinte7z] and people, the
people function - if they function at all - merely as a destructive mass
opposed to all organization But when it becomes part of the organism,
the mass attains its interests in a legitimate and orderly manner. If,
however, such means are not available, the masses will always express
themselves in a barbarous manner. This is why, in despotic states, the
despot always treats the people with indulgence and vents his wrath only
on his immediate circle. In the same way, the people in such states pay
only modest taxes, whereas in constitutional states, the taxes become
higher as a result of the people's own consciousness. In fact, in no country
are so many taxes paid as in England.
It is integral to the definition [Beslimmung] of the universal estate - or

more precisely, the estate which devotes itself to the service of tlze
gooernment - that the universal is the end of its essential activity; and
in the Estates, as an element of the legislative power, the private estate
attains a political significance and function. In this capacity, the private
estate cannot appear either as a simple undifferentiated mass or as a
crowd split up into atomic units. It appears rather as wlzat it already is,
namely as an estate consisting of t\\'o distinct parts, the one based on
the substantial relation, and the other on particular needs and the
work through which these are mediated (see 201ff.). Only in this
respect is there a genuine link between the particular which has actuality in the state and the universal.
This runs counter to another prevalent idea [Vonteliung]
according to which, if the private estate is raised to the level of
participating in the universal interest [Sac/ze] via the legislative
power, it must appear therein in the form of individuals,
whether representatives are elected to fulfil this function or
whether every individual is in fact to have a vote himself:l
This atomistic and abstract view ceases to apply even within
343
the family, as well as in civil society, where the individual
makes his appearance only as a member of a universal. But the
state is essentially an organization whose members constitute
circles in tlleir o11m rigllt (frir siclz ], and no moment within it
should appear as an unorganized crowd 111e many as single
individuals- and this is a favourite interpretation of [the term]
'thepeople'- do indeed live together, but only as a crowd, i.e. a
formless mass whose movement and activity can consequently
only be elemental, irrational, barbarous, and terrifying. If we
hear any further talk of 'the people' as an unorganized whole,
we know in advance that we can expect only generalities and
one-sided declamations. - The idea [Vontellung] that those
communities which are already present in the circles referred
to above can be split up again into a collection of individuals as
soon as they enter the sphere of politics - i.e. the sphere of the
lligllest concrete universality - involves separating civil and
political life from each other and leaves political life hanging,
so to speak, in the air; for its basis is then merely the abstract
individuality of arbitrary will and opinion, and is thus
grounded only on contingency rather than on a foundation
which is stable and legitimate [bereclltigt] in and for itself. Although the estates of civil society in general and the Estates in
the political sense are represented, in so-called [political]
theories, as remote from each other, linguistic usage still
preserves the unity which they certainly possessed in earlier
times.
The Estates in their political capacity still retain within their own
determination those distinctions between different estates which were
already present in the preceding spheres. Their initially abstract position - namely as the extreme of empirical universality as opposed to the
principle of tile sovereign or monarcll in general - contains only the
possibility of agreement, and hence also the possibility of lwstile opposition. This abstract position becomes a rational relation (i.e. a [logical]
conclusion- cf. Remarks to 302) only when its mediation comes into
existence [Existenz]. just as, in the case of the power of the sovereign,
this function [Bestimmung] is already fulfilled by the executive power
344
Ethical Life
(see 300), so in the case of the estates must one of their moments be
given the function of existing essentially as a moment of mediation.
One of the estates of civil society contains the principle which is in

itself capable of being adapted to this political relation [Bezielzung],
namely the estate of natural ethical life; its basis is the life of the
family and, as far as its livelihood is concerned, landed property.
Thus, in its particular aspect, this estate shares that independent
volition and natural determination which is also contained in the
moment [Element] of sovereignty.
This estate is better equipped for its political role and significance
inasmuch as its resources are equally independent of the resources of
the state and of the uncertainty of trade, the quest for profit, and all
variations in property. It is likewise independent of the favour of the
executive power and of the masses, and is even protected against its
own arbitrariness by the fact that those members of this estate who are
called to this vocation [Bestimmung] do not have the same right as
other citizens either to dispose freely of their entire property or to
know that it will pass on to their children in proportion to the equal
degree of love that they feel for them. Thus, their resources become
inalienable inherited property, burdened with primogeniture.
Addition (H). This estate has a more independent [/iir siclz bestelzeru/]
volition. On the whole, the estate of landowners can be divided into the
educated section and the estate of farmers. Distinct from btth of these,
however, are the estate of trade and industry, which is dependent on
needs and their satisfaction, and the universal estate, which is essentially
dependent on the state. The security and stability of this [landowning]
estate can be further enhanced by the institution of primogeniture, but
this is desirable only in a political sense, for it involves a sacrifice for the
political end of enabling the eldest son to live independently. The justification of primogeniture lies in the fact that the state should be able to
count on a disposition [to political service] not just as a possibility, but as
necessarily present. Now it is true that such a disposition is not tied to the
possession of resources; but the relatively necessary connection between
345
the two consists in the fact that someone of independent means is not
limited by external circwnstances, and is accordingly able to play his part
without encumbrance, and to act in the interests of the state. But where
no political institutions are present, the foundation and furtherance of
primogeniture are merely fetters on the freedom of civil right, and they
must either acquire a political significance, or face eventual extinction.a
Trans/IJiur~ 11Dl~: This final sentence appears to be Gans's own addition, since it has no
counterpan in either Hotho's or Griesheim's notes, on which Gans's Additions are
based.
In this way, the right of this section of the substantial estate is indeed
based on the natural principle of the family; but at the same time, this
principle is given a new direction by stringent sacrifices for the political end, so that this estate is essentially eligible for activities connected
with the latter. Consequently, it is likewise called and entitled to such a
career by birth, without the contingency of an election. It accordingly
occupies a finn and substantial position between the subjective
arbitrariness and contingency of the two extremes; and just as it itself
contains a counterpart to the moment of the power of the sovereign
(see 305)," so also does it share theotherwise identical needs and
rights of the other extreme, so that it becomes a support both of the
throne and of [civil] society.
1wt~: Hegel actually writes 'see the preceding paragraph' (i.e. 306), but
must in fact have 305 in mind.
Trans/IJiur's
The second section of the Estates encompasses the changing element

in civil society, which can play its part only by means of deputies; the
external reason for this is the sheer number of its members, but the
essential reason lies in the nature of its determination and activity. In
so far as these deputies are elected by civil society, it is immediately
evident that, in electing them, society acts as what it is. That is, it is not
split up into individual atomic units which are merely assembled for a
moment to perform a single temporary act and have no further cohesion; on the contrary, it is articulated into its associations, communities, and corporations which, although they are already in being,
Ethical Life
acquire in this way a political connotation. In the entitlement of this
estate to elect deputies at the request of the sovereign power, and in
the entitlement of the first estate to appear [in person] (see 307), the
existence [Existenz] of the Estates and of their assembly acquires its
own constitutional guarantee.
The idea [Vorstellwzg] that all individuals ought to participate
in deliberations and decisions on the universal concerns of the
state - on the grounds that they are all members of the state
and that the concerns of the state are the concerns of everyone,
so that everyone has a right to share in them with his own
knowledge and volition - seeks to implant in the organism of
the state a democraJic element devoid of raJional jom1, although
it is only by virtue of its rational form that the state is an
organism. This idea [Vorstellung] appears plausible precisely
because it stops short at the abstract determination of membership of the state and because superficial thinking sticks to
abstractions. Rational deliberation or the consciousness of the
Idea [/dee] is concrete, and it coincides to that extent with true
practical sense, which is itself nothing other than rational sense
or the sense of the Idea; it must not, however, be confused
with the mere routine of business and the horizon of a limited
sphere. The concrete state is the whole, artiadaJed into its
partiadar circles. Each member ci' the state is a member ci' an
estale ci' this kind, and only in this objective determination can
he be considered in relation to the state. His universal
determination in general includes two moments, for he is a
pnvale person and at the same time a thinking being with consciousness and volition of the universal. But this consciousness
and volition remain empty and lack fo/filmmt and actual lifo
until they are filled with particularity, and this is (to be found
in] a particular estate and determination. Otherwise, the
individual remains a geueric caJegory [Gallung], but only within
the next generic category does he attain his immanent universal
actuality. - Consequently, it is within the sphere of his corporation, community, etc. (see 2 5 r) that the individual first
attains his actual and living determination as universal, and it
remains open to him to enter any sphere, including the
universal estate, fer which his aptitude qualifies him. The idea
347
[Vorslellung] that everyone should participate in the concerns of
the state entails the further assumption that everyone is a11
expert 011 such mailers; this is also absurd, notwithstanding the
frequency with which we hear it asserted. In public opinion,
however (see 3 1 6), the way is open for everyone to express
and give effect to his subjective opinions on the universal.
Since deputies are elected to deliberate and decide on matters of
wliversal concern, the aim of such elections is to appoint individuals

who are credited by those who elect them with a better understanding
of such matters than they themselves possess. It is also the intention
that these individuals will not subordinate the universal interest to the
particular interest of a community or corporation, but will give it their
essential support. Their position is accordingly not that of commissioned or mandated agents, especially since the purpose [Beslimmung]
of their assembly is to provide a forum for live exchanges and collective deliberations in which the participants instruct and convince one
another.
Addition (G). The introduction of representation [Repriise7llalion] means

that consent is not given directly by everyone but only by authorized
deputies, for the individual [der Ei1zzelne] is no longer involved as an
infinite person. Representation is based on trust, but trust is not the same
thing as giving my vote i11 person. Majority decisions are also at variance
with the principle that I should be personally present in anything which
imposes an obligation on me. I can trust a person if I believe that he has
sufficient insight to treat my cause [Sadze] as if it were his own, and to deal
with it in the light of his own best knowledge and conscience. Thus, the
principle of the individual subjective will is no longer applicable, for the
trust is vested in a cause, in the principles of a human being and his
conduct, actions, and concrete sense in general. It is therefore desirable
that anyone who becomes a member of the Estates should possess a
character, insight, and will consistent with his task of participating in
universal concerns. For it is not essential that the individual [Individuunz]
should have a say as an abstract individual entity; on the contrary, all that
matters is that his interests should be upheld in an assembly which deals
with universal issues. The electors require a guarantee that the elected
deputy will promote and accomplish this end.
Etlzical Life
310
In the second section of the Estates, whose members are drawn from
the changing and variable element in civil society, the guarantee that
the deputies will have the qualities and disposition required for this
end - for independent means have already claimed their right in the
first section - consists above all in the disposition, skill, and knowledge [Kenntnis] of the institutions and interests of the state and civil
society which they have acquired through the actual conduct of business in positions of authority or political office, and which have proved
their worth in practice; it further consists in the sense of authority and
political sense which they have developed and put to the test in the
process.
The subjective opinion which individuals have of themselves
may well find the demand for such guarantees, if it is made
with explicit reference to 'the people', superfluous and
perhaps even insulting. But the determination of the state is
objectivity, not subjective opinion and the self-confidence
which accompanies it. The state is concerned only with those
aspects of individuals which are objectively recognizable and
which have been tried and tested, and it must pay all the more
attention to such aspects in the case of the second section of
the Estates, because this section is rooted in interests and
activities which are directed towards the particular, and in
which contingency, mutability, and arbitrary will have the
right to express themselves. -Taken on its own, the external
qualification of possessing a certain amount of property has
the appearance of a one-sided extreme of externality in contrast to the other, equally one-sided, extreme of the purely
subjective trust and opinion of the electorate. Both of these
extremes contrast, in their abstraction, with those concrete
qualities which are necessary for deliberations on political
business, and which are contained within the specifications
[Bestimmungen] indicated in 302.- Nevertheless, the selection of individuals for positions of authority and other offices
within corporations [Genossensclzafien] and communities does
constitute a sphere in which the property qualification has
been able to operate effectively, particularly if some of these
349
308-310
Plrilosoplry ofRight
tasks are performed without remuneration; and it is directly
relevant to the business of the Estates if the members do not
receive a salary.'
In view of the fact that the deputies are elected by civil society, it is
also desirable that they should be familiar with and party to its special
needs, frustrations, and particular interests. Given the nature of civil
society, the deputies are elected by the various corporations (see
308), and this simple mode of procedure is not impaired by abstractions and atomistic notions [Vontellrmge~1] [of society]. Consequently,
it directly fulfils the requirement referred to above, and the election
itself is either completely superfluous or can be reduced to an insignificant play of arbitrary opinion.
It is clearly in the general interest that the deputies should
include individuals who are thoroughly familiar with, and personally involved in, each particular major branch of society
(e.g. commerce, manufacturing industries, etc.)- an important consideration which the idea [Vontellung] of loose and
indeterminate elections leaves entirely to chance. Each of
these branches of society, however, has the same right as the
others to be represented. If the deputies are regarded as
representatives, this term cannot be applied to them in an
organic and rational sense unless they are representatives not of
i1zdividuols as a crowd, but of one of the essential spheres of
society, i.e. of its major interests. Thus, representation no
longer means the rep/ace~nent of one individual by another; on
the contrary, the interest itself is actuol/y present in its
representative, and the latter is there to represent the objective element he himself embodies.- As for mass elections, it
may also be noted that, in large states in particular, the electorate inevitably becomes indifferent in view of the fact that a
single vote has little effect when numbers are so large; and
however highly they are urged to value the right to vote, those
who enjoy this right will simply fail to make use of it. As a
result, an institution of this kind achieves the opposite of its
intended purpose [Bestimmung], and the election comes under
the control of a few people, of a faction, and hence of that
350
Ethical Life
particular and contingent interest which it was specifically
designed to neutralize.
312
Each of the two sections of the Estates (see 305 and 308) introduces a particular modification to the process of deliberation; and since
one of the moments in question also has the characteristic function of
mediation within this sphere- mediation between two existents- this
moment must likewise take on a separate existence [Exisle71z]. The
assembly of the Estates will therefore be divided into two houses.1
This division, by creating a plurality of i11slances, not only provides an

increased guarantee of mature decisions and eliminates the contingent quality which the mood of the moment possesses and which
decisions by majority vote may acquire. Above all, it ensures that the
Estates are less likely to come into direct opposition to the government; and if the mediating moment also happens to take the side of
the second Estate, the latter's view will carry all the more weight, for it
will appear more impartial and its opposition will appear to be
neutralized.
"Transllltor's note: Hegel's phrase 'Stimmung des Augenblicks' is (perhaps intentionally)
ambiguous: it may mean either 'mood of the moment' or possibly 'instantaneous vote'
(although present-day German would use the term Abstimmung in the latter context).
The determination of the Estates as an institution does not require

them to achieve optimum results in their deliberations and decisions
on the business of the state in itself, for their role in this respect is
purely accessory (see 301). On the contrary, they have the distinctive function [Beslimnmng] of ensuring that, through their participation in [the government's] knowledge, deliberations, and decisions on
matters of universal concern, the moment ofjimna/ freedom attains its
right in relation to those members of civil society who have no share in
the government. In this way, it is first and foremost the moment of
351
JIQ-314
Philosophy ofRight
universal knowledge [Ken11tnis] which is extended by the publicity with
which the proceedings of the Estates are conducted.
The provision ofthis opportunity of[acquiring] knowledge [Kenntnissen] has the more universal aspect of permitting public opinion to arrive
for the first time at tme thoughts and insight with regard to the condition and concept of the state and its affairs, thereby enahling it to fonn
more rational judgements on the latter. In this way, the public also
becomes familiar with, and learns to respect, the functions, abilities,
virtues, and skills of the official bodies and civil servants. And just as
such publicity provides a signal opportunity for these abilities to
develop, and offers them a platform on which they may attain high
honours, so also does it constitute a remedy for the self-conceit of
individuals and of the mass, and a means - indeed one of the most
important means - of educating them.
Addition (H,G). If the Estates hold their assemblies in public, they afford
a great spectacle of outstanding educational value to the citizens, and it is
from this above all that the people can learn the true nature of their
interests. As a rule, it is accepted that everyone already knows what is
good for the state, and that the assembly of the Estates merely discusses
this knowledge. But in fact, precisely the opposite is the case, fa- it is only
in such assemblies that those virtues, abilities, and skills are developed
which must serve as models [for others]. These assemblies are, of course,
tiresome for ministers, who must themselves be armed with wit and
eloquence if they are to counter the attacks which are here directed
against them. Nevertheless, such publicity is the most important means of
education as far as the interests of the state in general are concerned. In a
nation where this publicity exists, there is a much more lively attitude
towards the state than in one where the Estates have no assembly or
where such assemblies are not held in public. It is only by informing the
public of every move they make that the two houses remain in touch with
the wider implications of public opinion. It then becomes evident that a
man's imaginings at home in the company of his wife or friends are very
different from events in a great assembly, where one ingenious idea
[Gescheitheit] devours another.
352
Ethical Life
Formal subjective freedom, whereby individuals as such entertain and

express their own judgements, opinions, and counsels on matters of
universal concern, makes its collective appearance in what is known as
public opinion. In the latter, the universal in and for itself, the substantial and the true, is linked with its opposite, with what is distir~ct in itself
[dem fur siclz Eigentiimliclzen] as the particular opinions of the many.
This existence [Existenz] [of public opinion] is therefore a manifest
self-contradiction, an appearance of cognition; in it, the essential is just
as immediately present as the inessential.
Addition (G). Public opinion is the unorganized way in which the will and
opinions of the people make themselves known. Whatever actually gains
recognition within the state must, of course, perform an organic function,
as is the case with the constitution. But public opinion has been a major
force in all ages, and this is particularly so in our own times, in which the
principle of subjective freedom has such importance and significance.
Whatever is to achieve recognition today no longer achieves it by force,
and only to a small extent through habit and custom, but mainly through
insight and reasoned argument
Public opinion therefore embodies not only the eternal and substantial principles of justice - the true content and product of the entire
constitution and legislation and of the universal condition in generalin the fonn of common sense [des gesunden Menschenverstandes] (the
ethical foundation which is present in everyone in the shape of
prejudices), but also the true needs and legitimate [riclztigerz]
tendencies of actuality. - As soon as this inner content attains consciousness and is represented [zur Vorstellwzgkommt] in general propositions (either in its own right [/Ur sic/z] or for the purpose of concrete
reasoning [Rasomlierm] on felt needs and on events, dispensations,
and circumstances within the state), all the contingencies of opinion,
with its ignorance and perverseness, its false information and its
errors of judgement, come on the scene. Since what is at issue here is
the consciousness of the distinctive nature [Eigentiimlichkeit] of the
views and knowledge [Ken111nis] [of individuals], the worse the content
of an opinion is, the more distinctive it will be; for the bad is that
353
Philosophy ofRighi
whose content is entirely particular and distinctive, whereas the
rational is that which is universal in and for itself, and the distinctive is
that on which opinion prides itself.
It must therefore not be regarded as a subjective difference of
views if we are told on the one hand that the voice of the
people is the voice of God [Vox populi, vox dei], and on the
other (by Ariosto, for example):f
Che'l Volgare ignorante ogn' lDl riprenda
E parli piu di quel che meno intenda.1
Public opinion contains these two qualities simultaneously,
and if truth and endless error are so closely united within it, it
cannot be genuinely serious about them both. It may seem
difficult to decide which to take seriously, and this will in fact
be the case even if we stick to the immediate expression of public
opinion. But since the substantial is its inner content, only this
can be taken completely seriously. The substantial cannot be
known [erkamzt] from public opinion itself, however; its very
substantiality means that it can be recognized only in and from
itself [aus zmd fiir sidz ]. No matter how passionately an opinion
is held or how seriously it is asserted or attacked or contested,
this is no criterion of what is really at issue; but the last thing
which this opinion can be made to realize is that its seriousness is not serious at all.- A leading spirit [ei11 grofler Geist] set
as the theme of an essay competition the question 'whether it
is permissible to deceive a people'3 The only possible answer
was that it is impossible to deceive a people about its substantial basis, about the essence and specific character of its spirit,
but that the people is deceived by itselfabout the way in which
this character is known to it and in which it consequently
passes judgement on events, its own actions, etc.
fHegrfs note: Or as Goethe puts it:

Zuschlagen kann die Masse
Da ist sie respektabel;
Urttilm gelingt il" miserabe/.j1
"TrtiiiSialor's note: 'That the ignorant mass finds fault \\ith everyone and talks most of
what i: understands least'.
Trans/a/or's tWit: 'The masses can fight respectably, bill tlleir jullgmrents are miserable.'
354
Ethical Life
Addition (H). The principle of the modem world requires that whatever is
to be recognized by everyone must be seen by everyone as entitled to such
recognition. But in addition, each individual wishes to be consulted and to
be given a hearing. Once he has fulfilled this responsibility and had his
say, his subjectivity is satisfied and he will put up with a great deal. In
France, freedom of speech was always" regarded as less dangerous than
silence, for if people remained silent, it was feared that they were keeping
their opposition to something to themselves, whereas argument [Riisomzement] gives them an outlet and some degree of satisfaction, which also
facilitates the progress of the matter [Sac/ze) in question.
Translator's nott: The word immtr ('always') does not appear in Hotho's notes, from
which Gans compiled this Addition.
Public opinion therefore deserves to be respected as well as despised despised for its concrete consciousness and expression, and respected
for its essential basis, which appears in that concrete consciousness
only in a more or less obscure manner. Since it contains no criterion
of discrimination and lacks the ability to raise its own substantial
aspect to [the level of] determinate knowledge, the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational, either in actuality or in
science, is to be independent of public opinion. Great achievement
may in tum be assured that public opinion will subsequently accept it,
recognize it, and adopt it as one of its prejudices.
Addition (H). Every kind of falsehood and truth is present in public

opinion, but it is the prerogative [Sac/ze] of the great man to discover the
truth within it. He who expresses the will of his age, tells it what its will is,
and accomplishes this will/ is the great man of the age. 1 What he does is
the essence and inner content of the age, and he gives the latter actuality;
and no one can achieve anything great, unless he is able to despise public
opinion as he here and there encounters it.
iTranslator's nott: I translate direcdy from Hotho's notes (VPR 111, 821) which, in Gans's
(inaccurate) transcription, would }ield the translation 'He who tells his age, and accomplishes, what it wills and ex11resses'.
Freedom of public communication (of whose two modes the press has
a wider range of contact than the spoken word, although it lacks the
355
latter's vitality), the satisfaction of the burning urge to express one's
opinion and to have expressed it, is directly guaranteed by those laws
and ordinances, as upheld by the police, which prevent or punish its
excesses. It is indirectly guaranteed, however, by its innocuous
character, which it owes chiefly to the rationality of the constitution
and the stability of the government, but also to the publicity of the
assemblies of the Estates. It is rendered innocuous by the latter
because these assemblies give expression to sound [gediegene] and
educated insights concerning the interests of the state, leaving little of
significance for others to say, and above all denying them the opinion
that what they have to say is of distinctive importance and effectiveness. But it is also guaranteed by the indifference and scorn which
shallow and malicious talk quickly and inevitably brings down upon
itself.
To define freedom of the press as freedom to say and write
whlllever one pleases is equivalent to declaring that freedom in
general means freedom to do whatever one pleases. - Such talk
is the product of completely uneducated, crude, and superficial thinking [Vorstellens ]. Besides, it is in the nature of the
case [Sac/ze] that formalistic thinking [Fonnalismus] is nowhere
so stubborn and uncompromising as it is with this matter, for
the subject in question is the most fleeting, contingent, and
particular aspect of opinion in the infinite variety of its content
and modulations. Beyond direct incitement to theft, murder,
rebellion, etc. lie the art and cultivation [Bildung] ofits expression, which seems in itself ffiir sich] quite general and indeterminate yet at the same time conceals another quite specific
meaning, or leads to consequences which are not actually
expressed and of which it is impossible to determine whether
they follow legitimately [richtig] from it and whether they were
meant to be drawn from it or not. This indeterminacy of the
material and its form makes it impossible for laws on such
matters to attain that determinacy which the law requires; and
since any misdemeanour, wrong, or injury [Verletzung] here
assumes the most particular and subjective shape, judgement
on it likewise becomes a wholly subjective decision. Besides,
such an injury will be directed at the thoughts, opinion, and
will of others, and they are the element in which it attains
Ethical Life
actuality. But this element is part of the freedom of others,
and it will therefore depend on them whether or not the
injurious action constitutes an actual deed. - Laws in this area
are therefore open to criticism on account of their
indeterminacy, and also because turns of phrase and forms of
e:x]>ression can be devised in order to circumvent the law or to
maintain that the judicial decision is a subjective judgement. It
can further be argued, if the [offending] expression is treated
as an injurious act, that it is not an act at all, but only opinion
and tlwught on the one hand and talk on the other. Thus, it is
argued in one breath that mere opinion and talk should be
exempt from punishment because their form and content are
purely subjective and because they are i71Significa1lt and tmimportant, and that this same opinion and talk should be highly
respected and esteemed on the grounds that the former is personal property of the most spiritual kind, and that the latter is
the expression and use of this personal property. - But the
substantial [issue here] is and remains the fact that all injuries
to the honour of individuals, slander, abuse, vilification of the
government, of its official bodies and civil servants, and in
particular of the sovereign in person, contempt for the laws,
incitement to rebellion, etc., are crimes and misdemeanours
of widely varying degrees of gravity. The fact that such actions
become more indeterminable as a result of the element in
which they are expressed does not annul [hebt niclzt atif.l this
substantial character, and its effect is therefore simply [to
ensure] that the subjective sphere [Boden] in which they are
committed also determines the nature and shape of the reaction.
It is this very sphere in which the misdemeanour is committed
which necessarily leads to subjectivity of view, contingency,
etc., in the reaction to it, whether this reaction consists of
measures taken by the police to prevent crime, or of punishment proper. Here as always, formalistic thinking [Fomzalismus] endeavours to rationalize away (wegzuriisonnieren] the
substantial and concrete nature of the thing [Sache] in favour
of individual aspects which belong to its external appearance
and of abstractions which it derives from these. -The sciences,
however- that is, if they really are sciences- have no place at
all in the sphere of opinion and subjective views, nor does
357
their presentation consist in the art of allusions, turns of
phrase, half-utterances and semi-concealment, but in the
unambiguous, determinate, and open expression of their
meaning and sense. Consequently, they do not come under
the category of public opinion (see 3 16). 1 - Besides, as I
have already pointed out, the element in which views and their
modes of expression as such become completed actimzs and
attain actual existence [Existe11z] is the intelligence, principles,
and opinions of otllers. Consequently, this aspect of actionsi.e. their proper effect and the dar~ger they hold for individuals,
society, and the state (cf. 2 I 8) - likewise depends on the
nature of this element [Bodell], just as a spark thrown on to a
powderkeg is far more dangerous than if it falls on solid
ground, where it disappears without trace. - Thus, just as
scientific utterances have their right and safeguard in their
material and content, so also is there a safeguard, or at least
[an element of] toleration, for wrongful utterances in the contempt which they bring upon themselves. Some misdemeanours of this kind, which may even be legally
punishable in themselves, are attributable to that variety of
nemesis which inner impotence, when it feels oppressed by
superior talents and virtues, is impelled to exact in order to
reassert itself in the face of such superiority and to give
renewed self-consciousness to its own nullity. Thus, the
Roman soldiers used to inflict a relatively harmless nemesis
on their emperors by singing satirical songs during triumphal
processions in order to compensate for their arduous service
and obedience, and especially for the fact that their names
were not included in the roll of honour; in this way, the
balance was to some extent redressed. 2 The former base and
spiteful variety of nemesis is rendered ineffectual by the contempt which it incurs, and, like the public which may provide
an audience for such activities, it is confined to empty malice
and to the self-condemnation which is implicit within it.
320
Subjectivity, whose most extemal manifestation is the dissolution of the
existing life of the state by opinion and ratiocination as they seek to
Ethical Life
319-322
assert their contingent character and thereby destroy themselves, has

its true actuality in its own opposite, i.e. in subjeaivity as identical with
the substantial will, the subjectivity which constitutes the concept of
the power of the sovereign and which, as the ideality of the whole, has
not up till now attained its right and its existence [Dasein].
Addition (H). We have considered subjectivity once already in connection
'vith the monarch as the apex of the state. Its other aspect is its arbitrary
appearance in public opinion as its most extemalG manifestation. The
subjectivity of the monarch is in itself abstract, but it should be concrete
in character as the ideality which penades the whole. The peaceful state
is that in which all branches of civil life subsist, while their collective and
separate subsistence proceeds from the Idea of the whole. This process
[Heruorgehen] must also make its appeartliiCe as the ideality of the whole.
"TmnsltllOr's not~: Gans here uses the adjective iiftmtm ('most extreme'), which should
in fact be iiftmidzsten ('most external'), as in Hotho's original notes (VP R 111, 8z6) and
in ]ZO itself.
II External Sovereignty
321
Internal sovereignty (see 278) is this ideality in so far as the moments
of the spirit and of its actuality, the state, have developed in their
necessity and subsist as members of the state. But the spirit, which in its
freedom is infinitely negative reference to itself, is just as essentially
being-for-itself which has incorporated the subsistent differences into
itself and is accordingly exclusive. In this determination, the state has
individuality, which is [present] essentially as an individual and, in the
sovereign [Souveran], as an actual and immediate individual (see
279).
322
Individuality, as exclusive being-for-itself, appears as tlze relation [of
the state] to otlzer states, each of which is independent [selbstiindig] in
relation to the others. Since the being-for-itselfof the actual spirit has
its existence [Dasein] in this independence, the latter is the primary
freedom and supreme dignity of a nation [eines Volkes ].
359
Philosophy ofRight
Those who speak of the wishes of a totality [Gesamtheit] which
constitutes a more or less independent state with its own
centre to abandon this focal point and its own independence
in order to form a whole with another state know little of the
nature of a totality and of the self-awareness which an autonomous nation possesses. 1 - Hence, the primary authority
[Gewalt] which states possess when they make their
appearance in history is quite simply this independence, even
if it is completely abstract and without any inner development.
It is therefore in keeping with this original appearance that the
head of state should be an individual, such as a patriarch or a
tribal chief.
In existence [Dasein] this negative relation [Beziehung] of the state to

itself thus appears as the relation of another to another, as if the
negative were something extemal. The existence [Existenz] of this
negative relation therefore assumes the shape of an event, of an
involvement with contingent occurrences coming from without.
Nevertheless, this negative relation is the state's own highest moment
-its actual infinity as the ideality of everything finite within it. It is that
aspect whereby the substance, as the state's absolute power over
everything individual and particular, over life, property, and the latter's rights, and over the wider circles within it, gives the nullity of
such things an existence [Dasein] and makes it present to the
consciousness.
This determination whereby the interests and rights of individuals

[der Einzeblt'n] are posited as a transient moment is at the same time
their positive aspect, i.e. that aspect of their individuality [/ndividualitiit] which is not contingent and variable, but has being i11 and for
itself. This relation and its recognition are therefore the substantial
duty of individuals - their duty to preserve this substantial individuality - i.e. the independence and sovereignty of the state - even if
their own life and property, as well as their opinions and all that
naturally falls within the province of life, are endangered or sacrificed.
Ethical Life
It is a grave miscalculation if the state, when it requires this
sacrifice, is simply equated with civil society, and if its ultimate
end is seen merely as the security of the lifo and property of
individuals [/ndividuen]. For this security cannot be achieved
by the sacrifice of what is supposed to be secured - on the
contrary. - The ethical moment of war is implicit in what was
stated above. For war should not be regarded as an absolute
evil [Ubel] and as a purely external contingency whose cause
[Gnmd] is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies
in the passions of rulers or nations [Vo1ker], in injustices etc.,
or in anything else which is not as it should be. Whatever is by
nature contingent is subject to contingencies, and this fate is
therefore itself a necessity - just as, in all such cases, philosophy and the concept overcome the point of view of mere
contingency and recognize it as a senzblance whose essence is
necessity. It is necessary that the finite - such as property and
life - should be posited as contingent, because contingency is
the concept of the finite. On the one hand, this necessity
assumes the shape of a natural power, and everything finite is
mortal and transient. But in the ethical essence, i.e. the state,
nature is deprived of this power, and necessity is elevated to a
work of freedom, to something ethical in character. The transience of the finite now becomes a willed evanescence, and the
negativity which underlies it becomes the substantial
individuality proper to the ethical essence.- War is that condition in which the vanity of temporal things [Dinge] and
temporal goods- which tends at other times to be merely a
pious phrase - takes on a serious significance, and it is
accordingly the moment in which the ideality of the particular
attains its riglzt and becomes actuality. The higher significance
of war is that, through its agency (as I have put it on another
occasion), 'the ethical health of nations [Volker] is preserved in
their indifference towards the permanence of finite
determinacies, just as the movement of the winds preserves
the sea from that stagnation which a lasting calm would produce- a stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace
would also produce among nations'.' Of the allegation that
this is on{y a philosophical Idea or - to use another common
expression - a justification of providence, and that actual wars
require a further justification as well, more will be said below.2
-The ideality which makes its appearance in war in the shape
of a contingent external relationship is the same as the ideality
whereby the internal powers of the state are organic moments
of the whole. This is apparent in various occurrences in
history, as when successful wars have averted internal unrest
and consolidated the internal power of the state. 3 Other
phenomena [Erscheinrmgtm] of the same kind include the following: nations which are reluctant or afraid to accept internal
sovereignty may be subjugated by others, and their failure to
attain honour and success in their struggles for independence
has been proportionate to their initial failure to organize the
power of the state from within (i.e. their freedom has died
from the fear of dying); and states whose independence is
guaranteed not by their armed strength but by other factors
(as in those states which are disproportionately small in relation to their neighbours) have been able to survve [bestehtm]
with an internal constitution which would not on It.. own have
secured either internal or external peace.
Additim1 (G). In peace, the bounds of civil life are extended, all its spheres
become firmly established, and in the long run, people become stuck in
their ways. Their particular characteristics [Partikularitiiten] become
increasingly rigid and ossified. But the unity of the body is essential to the
health, and if its parts grow internally hard, the result is death. Perpetual
peace is liten demanded as an ideal to which mankind should approximate. Thus, Kant proposed a league of sovereigns to settle disputes
between states, and the Holy Alliance was meant to be an institution more
or less of this kind4 But the state is an individua~ and negation is an
essential component of individuality. Thus, even if a number of states join
together as a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and create an enemy. Not only do peoples emerge from wars with
added strength, but nations [Natimltm] troubled by civil dissension gain
internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies. Admittedly,
war makes property insecure, but this rm/ insecurity is no more than a
necessary movement. \Ve hear numerous sermons on the insecurity,
vanity, and instability of temporal things, but all who hear them, however
moved they may be, believe that they will none the less retain what is
theirs. But if this insecurity should then actually become a serious proposition in the shape ofhussars with sabres drawn, the edifying sentiments
which predicted all this turn into imprecations against the conquerors.
Etlzical Life
But wars will nevertheless occur whenever they lie in the nature of the
case [Sache]; the seeds germinate once more, and talk falls silent in face of
the solemn recurrences of histol'y.
"Translator"s nou: This sentence has no counterpart in the corresponding section of
Griesheim's notes (VPR IV, 733ff.), on which Gans based this Addition.
Since sacrifice for the individuality of the state is the substantial

relation of everyone and therefore a universal dUly, it itselfbecomes, as
one aspect of the ideality (as distinct from the reality) of particular
subsistence [Bestehen], at the same time a particular relation with an
estate of its own - the estale ofvalour - attached to it.
Disputes between states may have any particular aspect of their mutual
relations as their object [Gegenstand], and therein lies the chief vocation [Bestimmrmg] of the particular group to which the defence of the
state is entrusted. But in so far as the state as such and its
independence are at risk, duty requires all citizens to rally to its
defence.' If the entire state has thus become an armed power and is
wrenched away from its own internal life to act on an external front,
the war of defence becomes a war of conquest.
The fact that the armed power of the state becomes a standing
amzy and that the vocation [Bestimmung] for the particular task
of defending it becomes an estale is [a result of] the same
necessity whereby its other particular moments, interests, and
functions become estates such as those of marriage, trade and
industry, the civil service, business, etc. Ratiocination, which
goes back and forth over the reasons in question, indulges in
reflections on the greater advantages or disadvantages of
employing standing armies, and opinion readily comes down
on the side of the disadvantages, because the concept of a
thing [Sache] is more difficult to grasp than its individual and
external aspects, and also because the interests and ends of
particularity (the costs involved and their consequences,
higher taxes, etc.) are rated more highly in the consciousness
of civil society than what is necessary in and for itself, which is
accordingly regarded only as a means to particular ends.
Valour is in itself a fom1al virtue, because it is the highest abstraction

of freedom from all particular ends, possessions, pleasure, and life
(although the way in which it negates these is external and actual), and
because the alienation [Entiiuflenmg] of these, as the enactment of
valour, is not in itself of a spiritual nature; besides, the inner disposition [associated with it] may be [the product of] this or that [particular] reason [Gnmd], and its actual result may exist [sein] only for
others and not for itself.
Additi011 (G). The military estate is the universal estate to which the
defence of the realm is entrusted, and its duty is to give existence
[Existenz) to the ideality within itself, i.e. to sacrifice itself. There are, of
course, various kinds of valour. The courage of an anim~ 'lr a robber,
valour for the sake of honour, and knightly valour are not its true forms.
The true valour of civilized nations [VOlker] is their readiness for sacrifice
in the service of the state, so that the individual merely counts as one
among many. Not personal courage but integration with the universal is
the important factor here. In India, five hundred men defeated twenty
thousand who were not cowards, but who simply lacked the disposition to
act in close association with others.'
The significance [Gehalt] of valour as a disposition lies in the true,

absolute, and ultimate end, the suvereignty of the state. The actuality of
this ultimate end, as the product of valour, is mediated by the surrender of personal actuality. This phenomenon [Gestalt] therefore
embodies the harshness of extreme opposites: alienation [Entiiuflenmg]
itself, but as the existence [Existenz] of freedom; the supreme selfsufficiency of being-for-itself, which at the same time exists in the
mechanical service of an external order; total obedience and renunciation of personal [eigenen] opinion and reasoning [.Rasonieren], and
hence personal absence of mind [des Geistes], along with the most
intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decisiveness at a
given moment; the most hostile and hence most personal action
Ethical Life
against individuals, along with a completely indifferent or even benevolent attitude [Gesinnung] towards them as individuals.
To risk one's life is certainly superior to simply fearing death,
but it is also purely negative and therefore indeterminate and
valueless in itself. Only a positive end and content can give
significance to such courage. Robbers and murderers whose
end is crime, adventurers whose end is a product of their own
opinion, etc. also have the courage to risk their lives. - The
principle of the modem world -tlzouglzt and the universal- has
given a higher form [Gestalt) to valour, in that its expression
seems to be more mechanical and not so much the deed of a
particrJar person as that of a member of a whole. It likewise
appears to be directed not against individual persons, but
against a hostile whole in general, so that personal courage
appears impersonal. This is why the principle of thought has
invented the gun, and this invention, which did not come
about by chance, has turned the purely personal form of
valour into a more abstract form. 1
The outward orientation of the state derives from the fact that it is an
individual subject. Its relationship with other states therefore comes
under the power of tlze sovereign, who therefore has direct and sole
responsibility for the command of the armed forces, for the conduct
of relations with other states through ambassadors etc., and for making war and peace and concluding treaties of other kinds.
Addition (G). In almost all European countries, the supreme individual

authority is the power of the sovereign, who has control of external
relations. Where the Estates form part of the constitution, the question
may arise whether they should not be responsible for making war and
peace, and they will in any case retain their influence on the provision of
financial means in particular. In England, for example, no unpopular war
can be waged. But if it is imagined that sovereign princes and cabinets are
more subject to passion than parliaments are, and if the attempt is accordingly made to transfer responsibility for war and peace into the hands of
the latter, it must be replied that whole nations are often more prone to
enthusiasms and subject to passion than their rulers are. 1 In England, the
entire people has pressed for war on several occasions and has in a sense
compelled the ministers to wage it. The popularity of Pitt arose from the
fact that he knew how to comply with the nation's current wishes.a Only
later, when emotions had cooled, did people realize that the war was
useless and unnecessary, and that it had been entered into without calculating the cost.2 Besides, the state has relations not just with one other
state, but with several; and the complexities of these relations become so
delicate that they can be handled only by the supreme authority.
"TrDnS!Jltor~
nou: The preceding sentence has no equivalent in Griesheim's notes, on

which this Addition is based (see VPR IV, 738f.}.
B. International Law [Das iiuftere Staatsrecht]
International law [das iiuflere Staalsreclzt] applies to the relations

between independent states. What it contains in and for itselfthetefore
assumes the form of an obligation, because its actuality depends on
disti11d and sooereign wills.

Addition (H). States are not private persons but completely independent
totalities in themselves, so that the relations between them are not the
same as purely moral relations or relations of private right. Attempts have
often been made to apply private right and morality to states, but the
position of private persons is that they are subject to the authority of a
court which implements what is right in itself. Now a relationship
between states ought also to be inherently governed by right, but in
worldly affairs, that which has being in itself ought also to possess power.
But since no power is present to decide what is right in itself in relation to
the state and to actualize such decisions, this relation [Bezielllmg] must
always remain one of obligation. The relationship between states is a
relationship of independent units which make mutual stipulations but at
the same time stand above these stipulations.
The nation state [das Volk als Staal] is the spirit in its substantial
rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute
power on eartlz; each state is consequently a sovereign and
independent entity in relation to others. The state has a primary and
Ethical Life
329-331
absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the

eyes of others, i.e. to be recognized by them. At the same time, however,
this entitlement is purely forma~ and the requirement that the state
should be recognized simply because it is a state is abstract. Whether
the state does in fact have being in and for itself depends on its
content- on its constitution and (present] condition; and recognition,
which implies that the two [i.e. form and content] are identical, also
depends on the perception and will of the other state.
Without relations [Verlziilt1zis) with other states, the state can
no more be an actual individual [Individuum] than an
individual [der Einzelne] can be an actual person without a
relationship [Relation] with other persons (see 322). On the
other hand, the legitimacy of a state, and more precisely - in
so far as it has external relations - of the power of its
sovereign, is a purely internal matter (one state should not
interfere in the internal affairs of another). On the other hand,
it is equally essential that this legitimacy should be supplemented by recognition on the part of other states. But this recognition requires a guarantee that the state will likewise
recognize those other states which are supposed to recognize
it, i.e. that it will respect their independence; accordingly,
these other states cannot be indifferent to its internal affairs.In the case of a nomadic people, for example, or any people at
a low level of culture, the question even arises of how far this
people can be regarded as a state. The religious viewpoint (as
in former times with the Jewish and Mohammedan nations
[Vii/kern]) may further entail a higher opposition which
precludes that universal identity that recognition requires.
Addition (G). When Napoleon said before the Peace of Campo Formio
'the French Republic is no more in need of recognition than the sun is' ,Q1
his words conveyed no more than that strength of existence [Existenz]
which itself carries with it a guarantee of recognition, even if this is not
expressly formulated.
Tramilztor"s nou: The remainder of this sentence has no equivalent in Griesheim's

notes, on which this Addition is based (see VPR IV, 741).
The immediate actuality in which states coexist is particularized into

various relations which are determined by the independent arbitrary
wills of both parties, and which accordingly possess the formal nature
of contracts in general The subject-matter [Stoff! of these contracts,
however, is infinitely less varied than it is in civil society, in which
individuals [die Einzelnm] are mutually interdependent in innumerable respects, whereas independent states are primarily wholes which
can satisfy their own needs internally.
333
The principle of intemaJionallaJ1J [Vo/kerrecllt], as that universal right
which ought to have international validity in and for itself (as distinct
from the particular content of positive treaties), is that treaties, on
which the mutual obligations of states depend, should be observed. But
since the sovereignty of states is the principle governing their mutual
relations, they exist to that extent in a state of nature in relation to one
another, and their rights are actualized not in a universal will with
constitutional powers over them, but in their own particular wills.
Consequently, the universal determination of international law
remains only an ob/igatio11, and the [normal] condition will be for
relations governed by treaties to alternate with the suspension
(!1uj1zebung] of such relations.
There is no praetor to adjudicate between states, but at most
arbitrators and mediators, and even the presence of these will
be contingent, i.e. determined by particular wills. Kant's idea
[Vorstellung] of a perpetual peace guaranteed by a federation of
states which would settle all disputes and which, as a power
recognized by each individual state, would resolve all disagreements so as to make it impossible for these to be settled
by war presupposes an agreement between states. But this
agreement, whether based on moral, religious, or other
grounds and considerations, would always be dependent on
particular sovereign wills, and would therefore continue to be
tainted with contingency.
Etlzical Lifo
332-336
334
Consequently, if no agreement can be reached between particular
wills, conflicts between states can be senled only by war. Since the
sphere of the state is extensive and its relations [Beziehungen] through
its citizens are extremely varied, it may easily suffer injuries
[Verletzzmgen] on many occasions. But which of these injuries should
be regarded as a specific breach of treaties or as an injury to the
recognition and honour of the state remains inlzeroztly [an siclz]
indeterminable; for a state may associate its infinity and honour with
any one of its individual interests, and it will be all the more inclined
to take offence if it possesses a strong individuality which is encouraged, as a result of a long period of internal peace, to seek and create
an occasion [Sto.DJ for action abroad.
335
Furthermore, the state, as a wholly spiritual entity, cannot confine
itself simply to noting that an injury has actually taken place. On the
contrary, a further cause of discord arises in the idea [Vo1'stel/ung] of
such an injury as a danger threatening from another state, in changing
estimates of greater and lesser degrees of probability, in conjectures
as to the other state's intentions, etc.
The relationship of states to one another is a relationship between

independent entities and hence between particular wills, and it is on
this that the very validity of treaties depends. But the particular will of
the whole, as for as its content is concerned, is its own welfare in general.
Consequently, this welfare is the supreme law for a state in its relations with others, especially since the Idea of the state is precisely that
the opposition between right as abstract freedom and the particular
content which fills it, i.e. the state's own welfare, should be superseded within it, and it is on this Idea as a co11crete whole that the initial
recognition of states is based (see 331).
Plzilosophy ofRiglzt
337
The substantial welfare of the state is its welfare as a particular state in
its specific interest and condition and in its equally distinctive external
circumstances in conjunction with the particular treaties which govern them. Its government is accordingly a matter of particular wisdom,
not of universal providence (cf. Remarks to 324), just as its end in
relation to other states and its principle for justifying wars and treaties
is not a universal (philanthropic) thought, but its actually offended or
threatened welfare in its specific particularity.
There was at one time a great deal of talk about the opposition
between morality and politics and the demand that the latter
should conform to the former. 1 In the present context, we
need only remark in general that the welfare of a state has
quite a different justification from the welfare of the
individual [des Einzelnen]. The immediate existence [Dasein]
of the state as the ethical substance, i.e. its right, is directly
embodied not in abstract but in concrete existence [Existenz],
and only this concrete existence, rather than any of those
many universal thoughts which are held to be moral commandments, can be the principle of its action and behaviour.
The allegation that, within this alleged opposition, politics is
always wrong is in fact based on superficial notions (Vtmtellungen] of morality, the nature of the state, and the state's
relation to the moral point of view.
The fact that states reciprocally recognize each other as such remains,
even in war- as the condition of rightlessness [Reclztlosigkeit], force,
and contingency - a bond whereby they retain their validity for each
other in their being in and for themselves, so that even in wartime, the
determination of war is that of something which ought to come to an
end. War accordingly entails the determination of international law
[Vti/kerreclzt] that it should preserve the possibility of peace1 - so that,
for example, ambassadors should be respected and war should on no
account be waged either on internal institutions and the peace of
private and family life, or on private individuals.
Ethical Life
Addition (G). Modem wars are accordingly waged in a humane manner,
and persons do not confront each other in hatred. At most, personal
enmities will arise at military outposts, but in the army as such, hostility is
something indeterminate which takes second place to the duty which each
respects in the other.
339
Otherwise, the conduct of states towards one another in wartime (e.g.
in the taking of prisoners), and concessions of rights in peacetime to
the citizens of another state for the purpose of private contacts, etc.
will depend primarily on national customs, for these are the universal
aspect of behaviour which is preserved under all circumstances.
Addition (G). The European nations [Nationer1] form a family with respect
to the universal principle of their legislation, customs, and culture
[Bildung], so that their conduct in terms of international law is modified
accordingly in a situation which is otherwise dominated by the mutual
infliction of evlls [Obeln ]. The relations between states are unstable, and
there is no praetor to settle disputes; the higher praetor is simply the
universal spirit which has being in and for itself, i.e. the world spirit
Since states function as particular entities in their mutual relations, the

broadest view of these relations will encompass the ceaseless turmoil
not just of external contingency, but also of passions, interests, ends,
talents and virtues, violence [Gewalt], wrongdoing, and vices in their
inner particularity. In this turmoil, the ethical whole itself - the
independence of the state - is exposed to contingency. The principles
of the spirits of nations [Volksgeister] are in general of a limited nature
because of that particularity in which they have their objective actuality and self-consciousness as existent individuals, and their deeds
and destinies in their mutual relations are the manifeSt [mcheintmde]
dialectic of the finitude of these spirits. It is through this dialectic that
the univmal spirit, the spirit oftire llJOT'ld, produces itselfin its freedom
from all limits, and it is this spirit which exercises its right- which is
the highest right of all- over finite spirits in llJOT'Id history as the world's
court ofjudgement [Weltgericht].l
371
C. 111orld History'
341
The element of the universal spirit's existence [Dasein] is intuition and
image in art, feeling and representational thought in religion, and
pure and free thought in philosophy. In world llistory, it is spiritual
actuality in its entire range of inwardness and externality. World
history is a court of judgement [Geridzt] because, in its universality
which has being in and for itself, the particular- i.e. the Penates, civil
society, and the spirits of nations [Vulker,geister] in their multifarious
actuality- is present only as ideal, and the movement of spirit within
this element is the demonstration of this fact.
Furthermore, it is not just the power of spirit which passes judgement

in world history - i.e. it is not the abstract and irrational necessity of a
blind fate. On the contrary, since spirit in and for itself is reason, and
since the being-for-itself of reason in spirit is knowledge, world
history is the necessary development, from the concept of the freedom
of spirit alone, of the moments of reason and hence of spirit's selfconsciousness and freedom. It is the exposition and the actualization of
tile universal spirit.
343
The history of spirit is its own deed; for spirit is only what it does, and
its deed is to make itselfin this case as spirit - the object ofits own
consciousness, and to comprehend itself in its interpretation of itself
to itself. This comprehension is its being and principle, and the
completion of an act of comprehension is at the same time its alienation
[Entiiriflenmg] and transition. To put it in formal terms, the spirit
which comprehends this comprehension anew and which- and this
amounts to the same thing - returns into itself from its alienation, is
the spirit at a stage higher than that at which it stood in its earlier
[phase of] comprehension.
The question of perfectibilitj and of the education oftile lluman
372
Etlzical Life
341-345
race arises here. 2 Those who have proclaimed this perfectibility have had some inkling of the nature of spirit, which is
to have fv<i:rth oeam:ov as the law of its bei1zg,l and, as it
comprehends what it is, to assume a higher shape than that in
which its being originally consisted. But for those who reject
this thought, spirit has remained an empty word, and history
has remained a superficial play of corzti1zgent and allegedly
'merely human' aspirations and passions. Even if they at the
same time profess their faith in a higher power by references
to providence and a providential pi a1z, these remain empty ideas
[Vorstellrmgerz], for they also declare explicitly that the plan of
providence is beyond their cognition and comprehension.
"Translator's
not~:
'Know thyseJr.
344
The states, nations [Viilker], and individuals involved in this business
of the world spirit emerge with their own particular a11d detemzi1zate
pri11ciple, which has its interpretation and actuality in their corzstitutiorz
and throughout the whole extent of their corzditio11. In their consciousness of this actuality and in their preoccupation with its interests, they
are at the same time the unconscious instruments and organs of that
inner activity in which the shapes which they themselves assume pass
away, while the spirit in and for itself prepares and works its way
towards the transition to its next and higher stage.
345
Justice and virtue, wrongdoing, violence [Gewalt], and vice, talents
and their [expression in] deeds, the small passions and the great, guilt
and innocence, the splendour of individual and national life
[Volkslebens], the independence, fortune, and misfortune of states and
individuals [der Ei11zelnm]- all of these have their determinate significance and value in the sphere of conscious actuality, in which judgement and justice -albeit imperfect justice - are meted out to them.
World history falls outside these points of view; in it, that necessary
moment of the Idea of the world spirit which constitutes its current
stage attains its absolute riglzt, and the nation [Volk] which lives at this
373
point, and the deeds of that nation, achieve fulfilment, fonune, and
fame. 1
Since history is the process whereby the spirit assumes the shape of
events and of immediate natural actuality, the stages of its development are present as immediate natural principles; and since these are
natural, they constitute a plurality of separate entities [eine Vie/l~eit
aujJereinander] such that one oftl~em is allotted to each nation [Vo/ke] in
its geographical and anthropological existence [Existenz].
347
The nation [Vo/k] to which such a moment is allotted as a 11atural
principle is given the task ofimplementing this principle in the course
of the self-development of the world spirit's self-consciousness. This
nation is the dominant one in world history for this epoch, and on{'y once
in history can it have this epoch-making role (see 346). In contrast with
this absolute right which it possesses as bearer of the present stage of
the world spirit's development, the spirits of other nations are without
rights, and they, like those whose epoch has passed, no longer count
in world history.
The particular history of a world-historical nation contains,
on the one hand, the development of its principle from its
latent [eingehiilltm] childhood phase until it blossoms out in
free ethical self-consciousness and makes its mark in universal history, and on the other, the period of its decline and fall
- for these denote the emergence within it of a higher
principle which is simply the negative of its own.1 This signifies the spirit's transition to the higher principle and hence the
transition of world history to another nation. From this period
onwards, the previous nation has lost its absolute interest, and
although it will also positively absorb the higher principle and
incorporate it in its own development, it will react to it as to an
extraneous element rather than with immanent vitality and
vigour. It will perhaps lose its independence, or it may survive
or eke out its existence as a particular state or group of states
374
Etlzical Life
345-349
and struggle on in a contingent manner with all kinds of

internal experiments and external conflicts.
At the forefront of all actions, including world-historical actions, are

individUtJJs as the subjectivities by which the substantial is actualized
(see Remarks to 279). 1 Since these individuals are the living expressions of the substantial deed of the world spirit and are thus immediately identical with it, they cannot themselves perceive it and it is not
their object [Objekt] and end (see 344). They receive no llonour or
thanks on its account, either from their contemporaries (see 344) or
from the public opinion of subsequent generations; all that they are
accorded by this opinion is undying fame [in their role] as formal
subjectivities.2
349
In its initial stage, a nation [Vo/k] is not a state, and the transition of a
family, tribe, kinship group, mass [of people], etc. to the condition of a
state constitutes the fomral realization of the Idea in general within it.
If the nation, as ethical substance - and this is what it is in itself- does
not have this form, it lacks the objectivity ofpossessing a universal and
universaUy valid existence [Dasein] for itself and others in [the shape
of] laws as determinations of thought, and is therefore not recognized;
since its independence has no objective legality or firmly established
rationality for itself, it is merely formal and does not amount to
sovereignty.
Even in the context of ordinary ideas [Vontellrmg], we do not
describe a patriarchal condition as a constitution, nor do we
describe a people living in this condition as a state, or its
independence as sovereignty. Consequendy, the actual beginning of history is preceded on the one hand by dull innocence
which lacks all interest, and on the other by the valour of the
formal struggle for recognition and revenge (cf. 33 1 and
Remarks to 57).
375
Philosophy ofRight
It is the absolute right of the Idea to make its appearance in legal

determinations and objective institutions, beginning with marriage
and agriculture (see Remarks to 203), whether the form in which it
is actualized appears as divine legislation of a beneficial kind, or as
violence [Gewalt] and wrong. This right is the right of heroes to
establish states.'
The same determination entitles civilized nations [Nationen] to regard

and treat as barbarians other nations which are less advanced than
they are in the substantial moments of the state (as with pastoralists in
relation to hunters, and agriculturalists in relation to both of these~ in
the consciousness that the rights of these other nations are not equal
to theirs and that their independence is merely formal.
Consequently, in the wars and conflicts which arise in these
circumstances, the feature which lends them significance for
world history is the fact [Moment] that they are struggles for
recognition with reference to a specific content [Gehalt].
The concrete Ideas of national spirits [Volkergeister] have their truth

and destiny [Bestimmu11g] in the concrete Idea as absolute universality,
......-~
i.e. in the world spirit, around whose throne they stand as the agents
of its actualization and as witnesses and ornaments of its splendour.
As spirit, it is simply the movement of its own activity in gaining
absolute knowledge of itself and thereby freeing its consciousness
from the form o~iaq and so coming to itself. The
pririCiples behind the configurations [Gestaltmzgen] which this selfconsciousness assumes in the course of its liberation - i.e. the worldhistorical realms- are accordingly four in number.
----
353
In its first and immediate revelation, the spirit has as its principle the
shape of the substantial spirit as the identity in which individuality
Ethical Life
35o-3ss
[Einzelheit] is submerged in its essence, and in which it does not yet

have legitimacy for itself.
The second principle is knowledge on the part of this substantial
spirit, so that the latter becomes a positive content and fulfilment of
spirit and its being-for itselfas its own livingfonn- i.e. beautifiJ ethical
individuality [Individualitiit].
The tllird principle is the self-absorption of this knowing beingfor-itself to the point of abstract u11iversalitv; it thereby becomes the
infinite opposite of the objective world which has at the same time
likewise been abandoned by the spirit
The principle of the fourtll configuration [Gestalttmg] is the trimsformation of this spiritual opposition in such a way that the spirit
attains its truth and concrete essence in its own inwardness, and
becomes at home in and reconciled with the objective world; and
since this spirit, having reverted to its original substantiality, is the
spirit which has returned from infinite opposition, it produces and knows
its own truth as thought and as a world of legal actuality.
In accordance with these four principles, the world-historical realms

are four in number: r. the Oriental, z. the Greek, 3 the Roman, 4
the Germanic.
355
1. The Oriental Realm
The world-view of this first realm is inwardly undivided and substantial, and it originates in the natural whole of patriarchal society.
According to this view, the secular government is a theocracy, the
ruler is also a high priest or a god, the constitution and legislation are
at the same time religion, and religious and moral commandments or rather usages - are also Ia ws of right and of the state. Within this
magnificent whole, the individual personality has no rights and disappears altogether, external nature is immediately divine or an adornment of the god, and the history of the actual world is poetry. The
distinctions which develop between the various aspects of customs,
government, and the state take the place of laws, and even where
customs are simple, these distinctions become ponderous, elaborate,
377
and superstitious ceremonies - the accidents [Zuflilligkeiten] of personal power and arbitrary rule - and the divisions of social estates
harden into a natural system of castes. Consequently, the Oriental
state lives only in its movement, and since nothing in it is stable and
what is firmly established is fossilized, this movement turns outwards
and becomes an elemental rage and devastation. The inner calm [of
such a state] is that of private life and of submersion in weakness and
exhaustion.
The moment in the state's development [Staatsbildrmg] at
which spirituality is still substantial and naltlral constitutes, as a
fonn, the absolute beginning of every state's history. This has
been emphasized and demonstrated with learning and profound perception, and with reference to the history of particular states, by Dr Stuhr in his work 17u Downfo/1 of Natural
States (Berlin, 1812), which has cleared the way for a rational
view of constitutional history and of history in general.' The
author has likewise shown that the principle of subjectivity
and self-conscious freedom is present in the Germanic
nation; but since his treatise goes no further than the downfall
of natural states, this principle is followed only up to the point
where it either appears as restless mobility, human arbitrariness, and corruption, or assumes the particular shape of emotion without having developed to the objectivity of self-conscious
substantiality or to organized legality.
z. The Greek Realm

In ~his realm, the substantial unity of the finite and the infinite is
present, but only as a mysterious substratum, banished as a dim
recollection into the recesses [Hiilllenr and images of tradition.
Reborn from the self-differentiating spirit into individual spirituality
and the daylight of knowledge, this substratum is modified and
transfigured to become beauty and a free and serene ethical life.
Within this determination, the principle of personal individuality
accordingly emerges, though it is not yet engrossed in itself [iu sich
selbst befo11gm] but still retains its ideal unity. Consequently, the whole
"Translator's nou: Literally 'caves'.
Ethical Lifo
355-358
splits up into a series of particular national spirits [Vol sgeister], and on

the one hand, the ultimate decision of the will is not yet assigned to
the subjectivity of self-consciousness which has being for itself, but to
a power which stands above and outside it (see Remarks to 279),
while on the other, the particularity associated with needs has not yet
become part of [the realm of] freedom, but is confined to a class of
slaves [S /avenstandj.
357
3 The Roman Realm
In this realm, [the process of] differentiation comes to an end with the
infinite diremption [Zetreiftung] of ethical life into the extremes of
personal or private self-consciousness and abstract universality. This
opposition, which begins with a collision between the substantial
intuition of an aristocracy and the principle of free personality in
democratic form, develops into superstition and the assertion of cold
\~nd acquisitive power on the one hand, and into a corrupt rabble on
lhe other. The dissolution of the whole ends in universal misfortune
ftnd the demise of ethical life, in which the individualities of nations
/[Volker] perish in the unity of a pantheon, and all individuals
[Einzelnetl] sink to the level of private persons with an equal status and
with formal rights, who are accordingly held together only by an
abstract and arbitrary will of increasingly monstrous proportions.
4 The Germanic Realm

Having suffered this loss of itself and its world and the infinite pain
which this entails (and for which a particular people, namely the
Jews, 1 was held in readiness), the spirit is pressed back upon itself at
the extreme of its absolute negativity. This is the turning point which
has being in and for itself. The spirit now grasps the infinite positivity
of its own inwardness, the principle of the unity of divine and human
nature and the reconciliation of the objective truth and freedom
which have appeared within self-consciousness and subjectivity. The
task of accomplishing this reconciliation is assigned to the Nordic
principle of the Gernza11ic peoples.1
379
Philosophy ofRight
359
The inwardness of this principle is the - as yet abstract - reconciliation and resolution of all opposition, and it exists in feeling
[Empfindung] as faith, love, and hope. It reveals its content in order to
raise it to actuality and self-conscious rationality, to [make it into] a
secular realm based on the emotions, loyalty, and companionship of
free individuals - although it is also, in this subjectivity, a realm of
ethical barbarism and of crude arbitrariness which has being for itself.
This stands in opposition to an otherworldly and intellectual realm
whose content, although it is indeed the truth of the spirit within it,
has not yet been thought and is therefore still veiled in the barbarism
of representational thinking; as a spiritual power set over the actual
emotions, this realm adopts the role of an unfree and terrible force in
relation to these. 1
In the hard struggle between these two realms- whose difference has
now reached the stage of absolute opposition, despite the fact that
both are rooted in a single unity and Idea - the spiritual realm brings
the existence [Existenz) of its heaven down to earth in this world/ to
the ordinary secularity of actuality and representational thought. The
secular realm, on the other hand, develops its abstract being-for-itself
to the level of thought and to the principle of rational being and
knowing, i.e. to the rationality of right and law. As a result, their
opposition has faded away in itselfand become an insubstantial shape.
The present has cast off its barbarism and unjust [rmreclztliche]
arbitrariness, and truth has cast off its otherworldliness and contingent force, so that the true reconciliation, which reveals the state as
the image and actuality of reason, has become objective. In the state,
the self-consciousness finds the actuality of its substantial knowledge
and volition in organic development; in religion, it finds the feeling and
representation [Vontellung] of this truth as ideal essentiality; but in
science, it finds the free and comprehended cognition of this truth as
one and the same in all its complementary manifestations, i.e. in the
state, in nature, and in the ideaiJIJOrld.
(
I
\
Editorial notes
Prefe
I Hegel lectured on the topics in 17~e Plzilosoplzy of Jaglzt seven times:
I Heidelberg, I8I7-I8I8. Text: EH (see note 2 below). Transcription: P. Wannenmann, a law student VPRI7 35-202).
2 Berlin, I8I8-I8Ig. Text: EH. Transcription: C. G. Homeyer,
VPR 1, 2I7-352; cf. VPRI7 203-285). By this time Hegel probably had completed a manuscript version of P R, which the sudden
imposition of censorship (see note IS below) caused him to withdraw and revise.
3 Berlin, I8Ig-I82o. Text: EH. Transcription: anonymous
(VPRig). PR was completed in I82o and appeared early in I82I.
4 Berlin, I82I-I822. Text: PR. Transcription: None extant.
5 Berlin, I822-I823. Text: PR. Transcription: H. G. Hotho (VPR
Ill, 87-84I).
6 Berlin, I824-I825. Text: PR. Transcription: K. G. von Griesheim
(VPR IV, 67-752).
7 Berlin, I 83 I. Text: P R. Transcription: David Friedrich Strauss
(the Young Hegelian theologian) (VPR IV, 905--925). (Hegel had
barely begun this series of lectures on P R when he was stricken
with cholera and died on I4 November I831.)
Throughout most of the I 82os, Hegel preferred not to lecture on P R
himself, leaving this task to his younger colleague Eduard Gans
(I798-I839). The transcriptions by Hotho (I822-I823) and
Griesheim (I824-I825) were used by Gans as the basis for the
'Additions' to PR, first published with the I833 edition; cf. Eduard
Notes to pages 9-11
Gans, Natllrreclzt zmd Universalreclztsgerclziclzte (Natllral Riglzt and tlze

Universal HisiOTJ' ofLaw} (1827-1833}, ed Manfred Riedel (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1981}.
Hegel first published his Erzcyclopaedia of tlze Plzilosoplzical Sciences in
Heidelberg in 1817. The topics dealt with in PR are covered (but
much more briefly and sketchily} under the heading of 'Objective
Spirit' (EH 4oo-452}. This discussion is expanded in subsequent
(3-volume} editions of the Encyclopaedia (second edition 1827, third
edition 1830} (EG 483-552}.
Penelope, wife of Odysseus, promised the suitors who beset her in
her husband's long absence from Ithaca that she would marry one of
them as soon as she completed weaving a shroud for her father-inlaw, Laertes. But each night she secretly undid the day's weaving, so
that the task would never be completed (Homer, Odyssey
I9.137-155}.
Hegel regards the 'speculative mode of cognition' as the distinguishing mark of his philosophy. His fullest introductory exposition of the
differences between speculation and other philosophical approaches
is to be found in the introduction which he later wrote for his
Erzcyclopaedia in 1827 (EL 1-83}.
Hegel's best brief exposition ofhis speculative method before I 820 is
to be found in the Prefaces and Introduction of 17ze Science of Logic
(WL v, 13-56lz5-59}.
Cf. Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843}:
To us Germans the splendour of the virtues of patriotism and
piety has recently appeared in our life, and their significance for
the life of every individual has become clearer. May the German
people grow stronger in the healthy spirit of the virtues of public
life: so we will and believe! For this great work I think I can do my
part by further developing the scientific presentation of ethical
truths in the German language.
(Fries, HPP vi}
Hegel and Fries were long-time personal rivals. Both held the position of Privatdozent at the University of Jena from 1801 to 1805,
when Fries was promoted to professor of philosophy at the University
of Heidelberg. Hegel bitterly resented Fries's advancement, and Fries
continued to do everything he could to hinder Hegel's career. In 181 I
Hegel wrote the following to his friend Niethammer:
I have known Fries for a long time. I know that he has gone
beyond the Kantian philosophy by interpreting it in the most
superficial manner, by earnestly watering it down ever more,
making it ever more superficial ... The first volume [of Fries's
Notes to pages II-IS

System of Logic) is spiritless, completely superficial, threadbare,
trivial, devoid of the least intimation of scientific coherence. The
explanations [in the second volume] are ... the most slovenly
disconnected explanatory lecture-hall twaddle, such as only a
truly empty-headed individual in his hour of digestion could
come up with. I prefer to say nothing more specific about his
miserable thoughts.
(B I, 338-33g/257)
Fries remained professor in Heidelberg for eleven years; during most
of this time Hegel languished as headmaster of a Nuremberg
gymnasium (secondary school). When Fries moved to a professorship
at Jena in 1816, Hegel returned to university life by becoming his
successor. In 1818, however, Hegel was promoted to the prestigious
chair of philosophy at Berlin. In 1820, as part of the so-called 'demagogue persecutions' (carried out by the newly ascendant reactionaries
in the Prussian government (see note 18 below)) Fries was deprived
of his professorship at Jena for his participation in the Wartburg
Festival (see notes 11-12 below). (The professorship was restored to
Fries in 1824.)
In 1819, several of Hegel's students and assistants (including
"- Gustav Asverus (1798-1843), Friedrich Wilhelm Carove (17891852), Friedrich Christoph Forster (1791-1868), and Leopold von
Henning (1791-1866)) were subject to these same persecutions.
Hegel intervened on their behalf, not always with success (he put up
soo imperial dollars - nearly three months' pay- as bail for Asverus,
who was nevertheless not released until 1826). Hegel had some
reason to fear both for his own position and for the fate of P R in the
hands of the censorship. In the Preface of PR, Hegel wants to
reassure the censors that his philosophy of the state contains nothing
dangerous or subversive; Hegel's unattractive perpetuation of his old
vendetta against a victim of political persecution is thus also being
used to serve the end of self-protection.
7
Luke 16:29.
8 In this passage, Hegel once again has mainly Fries in mind. Fries's
DBS was dedicated 'To Germany's Youth' (DBS 3).
a.
Religious convictions of the holy origin of all things, of the

existence of God and eternal life, should not be scientifically
supported and proved, nor should they be applied scientifically as
principles of proof; rather, they are properly the immediate
fundamental thoughts of those living feelings of presentiment
(;lhndtmg) which recognize eternal truth through inspiration and
devotion to the beauty of natural appearances and above all to the
(Fries, HPP 6-7)
spiritual beauty of human life.
383
Notes to page 15
More generally, he probably intends to refer to the anti-rationalistic
philosophy of the Romantics, and especially those influenced by
Clrristmdorn or Europe (I799) (often attributed to Friedrich von
Hardenberg ('Navalis') (I772-I8oi)), and by the later political
thought ofJohann Gottlieb Fichte (I762-I8I4), such as his posthumously published 171eory of the State (I8IJ). See Reinhold Aris,
History of Political Thought it~ Gemzany IJ8(j-I8rS (London: Allen &
Unwin, I936), especially Chapters 6-I2i and H. S. Reiss (ed.), 17ze
Political 17zought of the Gen11at1 Romat1tics (Oxford: Blackwell,
I9Ss).
9
Psalms I27:2: 'It is vain for you to rise up early, to sit up late, to
eat the bread of sorrows: for so he giveth his beloved sleep.' A literal
translation of Luther's German version of the last clause (which
Hegel typically quotes imperfectly, from memory) would be: 'To his
friends he gives it [bread] in sleep.'
IO Compare the following footnote from Hegel's Scie11ce of Logic:
a.
1be latest treatment of [the science oflogic] which has recently

appeared, the Sjstern of Logic by Fries, reverts to anthropological
foundations. The superficiality of the notion (Vo,.stelltmg) or
opinion on which it is based, both in and for itself and in its
execution, relieves me of the trouble of taking any notice
whatever of this insignificant publication.
(WL v, 47/52)
Fries tried to prevent the first volume of Hegel's Scimce of Logic
(containing this footnote) from being reviewed at all; &tally, he
reviewed it himself in I8I4- at greater length than Hegel's co~ent
just quoted, but with no greater respect (cf. B n, 38I-382). ,
I I Hegel is referring to the Wartburg Festival of October I8I7. ,bn I8
and I9 October, the student fraternities (Bursclzmsclzaftm) held a
festival at the Wartburg, in the town of Eisenach, to celebrate both the
tricentennial of the Lutheran Reformation and the fourth anniversary
of the victory over Napoleonic troops at the Battle of Leipzig. About
five hundred students from about a dozen universities took part, as
did a few of their professorial mentors. Prominent among the latter
were Lorenz Oken (I 779-I 85 I) and Fries. The festival was one of
the earliest expressions of 'student dissent' in the German universities. It founded a 'General German Student Fraternity' whose
'Principles' favoured German unity, national representation and constitutional government, opposing feudal social organization and the
police state. Their spirit was an emotional combination (not always
coherent) of the ideals of the French Revolution \vith German
nationalism, Romantic organicism and Christian piety. At the end of
the first day, there was a burning of'un-German' books, including the
Notes to pages 15-16

Napoleonic Code, the Prussian Police Laws, and the writings of
reactionaries such as Karl Ludwig von Haller (q68-I854) (see note
IS below) and August von Kotzebue (I76I-I8Ig) (see note I8
below). See Thomas Nipperdey, De11tsc/ze Gesclziclue r8oo-r866
(Munich: C H Beck, I983), p. 280.
The German authorities perceived the Wartburg Festival as a
direct threat to them. Hegel's reference here to the 'notorious' Wartburg Festival is apparently hostile. But on closer inspection we see
that it is his enemy Fries who absorbs all the hostility. Hegel was
himself a professorial sponsor of the Bt~rschellsci/JJftetl both in
Heidelberg and Berlin. Though he was not present at the Wartburg
Festival, he had numerous ties to those who were. He was a close
friend of Oken, and several of his students were active in the Bllrsclzmsclzaftm, as were Hegel's brother-in-law, Gottlieb von Tiicher,
and also Robert and Wilhelm WesselhOft, with whose family Hegel's
illegitimate son lived for some time (see Jacques d'Hondt, Hegel;, His
Time, tr. J. Burbidge (Lewiston, NY: Broadview, Ig88), pp. I IJII4). Hegel's pu.blisher and friend Karl Friedrich Ernst Frommann
(I765-I837) had a son who was also present at the festival, and
published a glowing account of the proceedings (Friedrich Johannes
Frommann, Das Bt~rschetrfest a11jder Wartb11rg Gena: Friedrich Frommann, I 8 I 8)).
Carove spoke prominently at the Wartburg Festival and was
founder of the 'General German Student Fraternity'. (Hegel later
tried to have Carove appointed his assistant at Berlin, but failed owing
to Carove's unacceptable political activities.) Within the German
student movement, Hegel and Fries represent conflicting tendencies.
Fries is a republican, and a proponent of German unity and German
nationalism. Hegel is a supporter of constitutional monarchy (cf. P R
273, 278R) and representative institutions (cf. PR 302-3 I4),
and a consistent opponent of feudal institutions (cf. PR 46, 62R,
64, 75R, I72A, I8oR, 273R, 278R, 286R). He attacks the reactionary
Haller (cf. PR 258R) but admires the Prussian and Napoleonic
Codes (cf. PR 2 rr,R, 2 I6, 258R; VPRig I72). Hegel's attitude
toward German nationalism and German unity is less than
enthusiastic: as a south German from the Duchy of Wiirttemberg
with indigenous traditions of representative government, he is wary of
the absorption of the smaller German states into a 'German nation'
(cf. PR 322R and note I); Hegel's contemptuous pun on the
German nationalist watchword Deutsclzt11m ('Teutonism') is Deutsclzdllmm ('German stupidity') (B 11, 431'3 I2).
rz Hegel is apparently referring to the following remarks from Fries's
speech:
Notes to page 16
But if the spirit of a people were to attain to a genuinely
common spirit, then justice, chastity and self-sacrificing patriotism would rule in this people; then life in this people would come
from beneath, from the people, in every business of public concern. Not only the form oflaw and authority, not only the private
compulsion of official duty, but also the spirit of subordination
would drive the individual; the desire for knowledge and the
striving of the student would drive the teacher to enthusiasm, the
spirit of the people would drive the judge to justice. And in this
people living societies would dedicate themselves to every
individual work of popular education and service of the people,
unbreakably united through the holy chain of friendship.
(Fries, FDB; cf. HPP 328-329)
Hegel's attacks on Fries have often been cited as evidence of his
'conservatism', in opposition to Fries's 'liberalism'. Hegel's
defenders, in response, have often contrasted Hegel's defence of
equal civil rights for Jews (PR 209R, 27oR) with Fries's vicious
anti-Semitism (Walter Kaufmann, 'The Hegel Myth and Its
Method', in Kaufmann (ed.) Hegel's Political Pllilosoplly (New York:
Atherton, 1970), pp. 145-147; see PR 270, note 6). Nevertheless,
whatever it may do to our moral sensibilities, anti-Semitism (or lack of
it) is not, in this period, a reliable barometer of a person's general
political position. More to the point is the judgement of the French
liberal Victor Cousin (1792-1867):
In politics, M. Hegel is the only man from Germany with
whom I was always on the best of terms. He was, like me, infused
with the new spirit; he considered the French Revolution to be
the greatest step forward taken by humankind since Christianity
and he never ceased questioning me about the issues and men of
this great epoch. He was profoundly liberal without being the
least bit republican.
(Victor Cousin, 'Souvenirs d'AIIemagne', Rev11e des deux morules,
August 1866, pp. 616-617)
In the Preface to PR, Hegel emphasizes his (quite real) philosophical
differences with Fries, but probably gives the impression of a much
greater disagreement between them on political issues than really
exists. For instance, Hegel quotes with apparent disapproval Fries's
opinion that public business should gain its life 'from below', but
Hegel himself asserts that 'civil life should be governed in a coru:rete
manner from below, where it is concrete' (PR 290). Fries, like
Hegel, favours 'gradual change of the constitution' (Fries, DBS 1,
Notes to pages r6-r7

I6S) as a way of realizing the modem spirit without the terrible effects
of the French Revolution (toward which Fries's attitude, unlike
Hegel's, is unreservedly hostile) (Fries, DBS 1, 4I-56); both men
advocate a constitutional government with Estates assemblies with
representatives of both the nobility and the bourgeoisie (cf. P R
289-320 and Fries, DBS I, I46-I62). Philosophical differences
cannot fully account for Hegel's attitude toward Fries; Hegel was on
good terms with the aging F. H. Jacobi (I743-I8I9), whose
philosophical position was in many ways quite close to Fries's. The
differences between Hegel and Fries were more philosophical than
political, but more personal than philosophical.
I3 The Greek philosopher Epicurus (c. 34I-27I B.c.) believed that
nothing exists in nature except atoms and the void, but he tried to
reconcile this with incompatibilist-indeterminist views about freedom
of the will, which led him to postulate a degree of randomness in
nature. His extant writings do not contain the doctrine articulated by
the Roman Epicurean Lucretius (c. 99-55 B.C.) that in their motion
atoms swerve randomly into parallel paths, but this doctrine is widely
enough attributed to Epicurus himself to make it probable that he
held it. Hegel may also have in mind Epicurus' denial of any natural
teleology. Cf. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 111e Hellt~1istic Pllilosopllers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I987), pp. 52, 57,
72, I02-112.
I4 Hegel's quotation from Goethe, which contains minor inaccuracies,
runs together several lines of Mephistopheles' speech: Fa11st, Part I,
lines I8SI-I8ss:
Do but despise reason and science
Highest of all the human powers,
Let yourself, through magic and delusion,
Grow strong through the spirit of deception,
Then it's certain I will get you!
and lines I866-I867:
And even if he hadn't given himself over to the devil
He would perish just the same!
Goethe, Werke 111, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, I982), p. 6I
The same passage was (mis)quoted by Hegel at PhG ~ 360.
IS
a. PR 2S8R. The remark was made, however, in the course of

criticizing the views of the reactionary Romantic Karl Ludwig von
Haller (I768-I854), whose Restoratim1 ofPolitical Sdt~ICe, or Tlleor)' of
tile Natllrai-Social Corulitim1, Opposed to tl1e Cllimaera of tile ArtifidalCivil Cmulitim1 (Winterthur: Steiner, I8I6-I82o) was me of the
.387

books burnt at the Wartburg Festival (see PR zs8, note 3). Hegel's
defenders sometimes point to this as an example of Hegel's evenhandedness - balancing his attack on the liberal Fries with an attack
on the conservative Haller. But there is something craftier than evenhandedness going on here. Hegel is trying to portray his scathing
critique of the authoritarian reactionary Haller (who, at the time the
Preface was written, was still something of a favourite at the Prussian
court) as if it were a rejection of Fries's views. (The favourable
attitude of the Prussian reactionaries toward Haller changed suddenly
in 18z1 when it was revealed to them that Haller had secretly converted to Roman Catholicism, on the ground that he had come to
regard the spirit of the Lutheran Reformation as leading inevitably to
the French Revolution, from which he felt he must distance himself
as far as possible.)
16 Cf. Plato, Gorgias 463a-.sd; Retmblic 493a-495e; Soplzisl ZI7aZI8a and passim.
17 'Wer ein Amt erhiilt im Land, der erhiilt auch den Verstand'
('Whoever receives an office in the land, also receives understanding')
(Derllsches Spric/111J0rter-Lexiko11 1 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1977), p. 71.70; cf. Leonhard Winkler, Dtlllsdu:s
Reclzt im Spiegel deutsclzer Spric/zJIJijrter (Leipzig: ~elle & Meyer,
1927), p. zos). The proverb is usually meant ironically, as it is in
Hegel's use of it here.
18 This refers to the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 and to the consequent
censorship to which publications like P R had recently become subject. The decrees were a prominent part of a movement of political
reaction which took place quite suddenly in the summer of 1819.
Mter the defeat of Prussia atthe hands of Napoleon in I 8o8, an era of
reform had been initiated by Heinrich Karl vom Stein (1757-I83I).
It achieved the abolition of serfdom, administrative reorganization of
the government and the army, and the partial emancipation of a
capitalist economy from feudal and guild encumbrances. Stein's
idealism, refusal to compromise, and unbending nationalistic hostility
to Napoleon led to his dismissal in 181o. But many of his reforms,
which (despite his attitude toward Napoleon) imitated French examples, were continued after 18n by Karl August von Hardenberg
(1750-I8zz).
On ZJ March 1819, the reactionary poet August von Kotzebue
(176I-I819) was assassinated by a student, Karl Ludwig Sand
(1795-I8zo), who believed (very likely correctly) that Kotzebue was a
Russian (Tsarist) agent. Sand was an associate of Karl Follen (1795I84o), a student of Fries, who advocated a 'theory of individual
19
zo
ZI
zz
terror', according to which such an assassination was a noble deed, if

carried out from political motives, 'a war of individuals, a war of one
individual against another' (K. G. Faber, 'Student und Politik in der
ersten deutschen Burschenschaft', Gesclziclzte i11 JVissmsdzaft rmd
Umerridzt ZI (1970); cf. Karl Alexander von Miiller, Karl Ludwig
Sa11d (Munich: C. H Beck, 19zs), and Richard Preziger, Die politisclzm ltken des Karl Folle1z (Tiibingen: Mohr, 191Z)}.
The murder of Kotzebue became a cause celebre for Prussian reactionaries, who used it as a rallying point for the nobility's reaction
against the entire reform movement. It was equally an opportunity for
Mettemich and the forces of continental reaction outside Prussia,
who looked askance at the liberal direction in which affairs were
moving there. In August 1819, a meeting of continental powers was
convened in Carlsbad (now in Czechoslovakia}, resulting in the Carlsbad Deer ee5~ which resolved on the institution, throughout the states
belonging to the federation there convened, of statutes providing for
the dismissal of all university teachers deemed to have 'an influence
on the minds of the young through the propagation of corrupt doctrines, hostile to public order and peace or subversive of the principles
of the existing political institutions'; imposed censorship on
academics and academic publications; and established a commission
for the investigation of 'revolutionary activities and demagogical
associations' (quoted in Theodor Schieder, Vom de~llsdze11 Bzmd zmn
der/Jsdzetz Reich IBls-I87I (Stuttgart: Klett, 1970}, pp. 3o-3 1). Hegel
had completed a draft of P R, but withdrew and revised it in the light
of these new circumstances. As we have already seen, the Preface in
particular is designed to quiet any possible suspicions the censors
might have concerning Hegel's political opinions.
Johannes von Miiller, Sii"nntliclze JVerkexxxn, ed. Johann Georg Miiller (Stuttgart and Tiibingen: J. G. Cotta, 183s), p. z4o. Johannes von
Miiller (175Z-I809) was a Swiss historian and diplomat, political
progressive and associate of Goethe, Schiller and Herder. He served
the Elector of Mainz, Joseph II of Austria and, in his last years,
Napoleon Bonaparte. The quoted remark is from a graphic description of the dismal and demoralized conditions prevailing in Rome
under French occupation.
Cf. PhG ~ 48z; VPG 38o-38s/314-318.
Hegel is apparently referring to the passage two paragraphs earlier,
where he claimed that in the modem world philosophy has a public
existence, in contrast to its existence as a private art among the
Greeks.
In his later expositions of this famous (or infamous) saying, Hegel is at

pains to point out that it does 1101 mean that everything is as it ought to
be, or (more particularly) that the existing political order is always
rational:
But if I have spoken of act11ality, then it is self-evident that you
are to think of the sense in which I use this expression, since I
have treated of actuality in a worked-out Logic, distinguishing it
precisely not only from the contingent, which has existence, but
also from [two senses of] existence (ExisletlZ, Daseitl) and other
determinations ... When [the understanding] with its 'ought'
turns to trivial, external and transitory objects, institutions, conditions, etc., which perhaps may have a great relative actuality for a
certain time and in a certain sphere, it may be right and in such
cases it may find much which does not correspond to universally
correct determinations. For who is not clever enough to see much
in his environment which is not in fact as it ought to be? But this
cleverness is wrong to imagine that such objects and their 'ought'
have any place within the interests of philosophical science. For
science has to do only with the Idea, which is not so impotent that
it only ought to be without actually being; hence philosophy has to
do with an actuality of which those objects, institutions, conditions, etc. are only the superficial exterior.
(EL 6; for Hegel's discussion of 'actuality' in his logic see E L
I42-I47 and WL VI, I86-2I3/54I-550; cf. also VGP II,
I Io-I I I/95-96 and VPR IV, 923--924)
Far from hallowing the status quo, Hegel's formulations of the rationality of the actual in his lectures of I8I7-I82o emphasize the dynamic
and progressive aspect of the reason which is at work actualizing itself
in the world: 'What is actual becomes rational, and the rational
becomes actual' (VPRI9 5 I); 'What is rational must happen, since on
the whole the constitution is only its development' (VPRI7 I 57); cf.
also PR 258A.
23 Cf. Plato, Laws 789b-790a; Fichte, GNR 2I, 295/379
24 'Here is Rhodes, jump here.' This saying is drawn from one of
Aesop's fables:
The Braggart
An athlete who had always been criticized by his fellow
townsmen for not being much of a man once went away and came
back after a time boasting that besides performing many feats of
valour in other cities, at Rhodes he had made such a jump that
none of the Olympic victors could equal it. Moreover, he claimed
that he would offer people who were there as witnesses if any of
390

them ever came to town. One ri the bystanders spoke up and said
to him, 'Well, my friend, if what you say is true, you don't need
any witnesses. Here is Rhodes, [jump here].'
(Lloyd W. Daly (tr.), Aesop Without Morals (New York: Thomas
Yoseloff, I96I), p. Io7)
25 Hegel now apparently means: to leap over the city of Rhodes, or over
its harbour, which was straddled by the Colossus of Rhodes, a huge
statue of Apollo erected about 300 B.C. after Rhodes had withstood
siege by the navy of Antigonus I, King of Macedonia.
26 In Greek, Rhodos means either 'Rhodes' or 'rose', and in Latin, salta
means either 'jump' or 'dance'. The pun suggests to Hegel that to
meet the challenge of comprehending the rationality of the actual is
also to find a way of rejoicing in the present.
27 Compare the following from Hegel's hand-written lecture notes:
'The present appears to reflection, and especially to self-conceit, as a
cross (indeed, of necessity)- and philosophy teaches [us] to recognize
the rose - i.e. reason - in this cross' (VPR n, 89, cf. also VR I,
272/1, 284-285). The image of the rose in the cross was apparently
suggested to Hegel by the name (and the visual emblem) of the
'Rosicrucians', the secret religious society, apparently begun in the
seventeenth century, and prominently represented by Michael Maier
(I568-I622) and Robert Fludd (I574-I637). The name 'Rosicrucian' was based on that of the (alleged) founder of the society,
Christian Rosencreutz (fourteenth century). But the name itself also
has doctrinal significance for Rosicrucians, associated with their proverb 'No cross, no crown': i.e., one reaches the 'rose' (the divine),
only through the 'cross' (earthly suffering) (see Harry Wells Fogarty,
'Rosicrucians', 17ze E11cyclopedia o[Religi011 XII (New York: Macmillan,
I987), pp. 476-477)1,28 'A little taste of philosophy perhaps moves one to atheism, but more
of it leads back to religion' (Francis Bacon, 17ze Adva11cement ofLearnillg, Works I, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath (London: Longman,
I857-I874), p. 436; cf. 17ze Essayes or Cotmsels, Civil/ a11d Moral/, ed.
Michael Kiernan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, I985), Number
I 6: 'Of Atheisme', p. 5 I).
29 'So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will
spue thee out of my mouth' (Revelation 3: I 6).
30 Compare also the following, from Hegel's lectures of I8I9-I82o:
The modem age has determined what is in itself rational and
perfect through thought, and simultaneously removed the cloak
of dust and rust from the positive. This is nothing but the
fundamental principle of philosophy, of the free cognition of
39I
truth, no longer cloaked by contingency. The age has at present

nothing to do except to cognize what is at hand, and thus to make
it accord with thought. This is the path of philosophy.
(VPRig 290)
3 I The owl is the sacred bird of Minerva (Greek: Athena), goddess of
wisdom. The apparent meaning of this famous saying is that a
}..J culture's philosophical understanding reaches its peak only when the
{I culture enters its decline (cf. VG 66/s8, I78-I8oh45-I47).
I
I Ordinary thinking identifies a 'concept' (Begrijj) with something
general abstracted from particulars. Hegel's name foc this is a
!I:J!resentation' (Vomelltmg) or ~nnin~und~g'.
FOr Hegel, the .~c_.Qp.cept' is 'the fre..e', 'the principle of life and so at
the same time the absolutely concrete' (EL I6o,A); 'the concept, in
so far as it has attained to a [deVei(;ped] existence [Existmz] which is
free, is nothing other than the "I" or pure self-consciousness' (WL
VI, 2S31s83). The concept strives to give itself actual objective
existence, and then it is called the 'Idea' {/dee): 'the Idea is the
adequate concept' (WL VI, 462/755), 'the Idea is the true in and for
itself, the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity' (E L 2 I3).
2
I The developme~ or .J.ro~t.was given in the
Er1cyclopaedia (cf. EG 485-~7). PR is an expansion of the part of
Hegel's system presented~iii'EG 488-552.
2 The thesis that philosophy forms a circle seems to lie behind Hegel's
choice of the title 'Encyclopaedia' for the complete exposition of his
system (EL IS-I8).
3 'In civil law all definitions are hazardous' Uustinian, Digest 50.I7.202;
see PR 3, note 2). The proposition is usually attributed to the
Roman jurist Iavolenus, first century A.D.
4 The phrase 'facts of consciousness' recalls Fichte's 17u Facts ofCmrsciousrless (I8I3) (FW n, 537-69I), but Hegel's remarks seem to be
aimed especially at Fries's psychologizing of Kantian transcendental
philosophy:
Kant committed the great mistake of holding transcendental
cognition to be a kind of a priori cognition, and he thus missed its
392

empirical psychological nature. This mistake is an unavoidable
consequence of the other one, which we have already reproved,
of confusing a philosophical deduction with a kind of proof,
which he called a transcendental proof.
(Fries, AKV, Introduction, 1, 29; cf. HPP 367-370; cf. Hegel,
VGP 111, 4I8-4I9/5I0-5II)
In the mid-I79QS, the phrase 'facts of consciousness' was also closely
associated with the Kantian epistemological theories of the Jena
philosopher Christian Erhard Schmid (I76I-I8I2), who was the
object of a contemptuous attack by Fichte (FW u, 42I-458). (See
Preface, notes 7, 9-n, I8.)
J
I See 'The geographical basis of world history' (VPG I05-I3V79I02) and 'The natural context or the geographical basis of world
history' (VG I98-24III52-239).
2 The b1stit111es ~nd Pmulects (Latin title: Digest) were the first two of
four parts of the legal code (later given the collective name Corp11s i11ris
civilis) compiled and promulgated in A.D. 529 by the Roman Emperor
Justinian (reigned 527-565). The Coi"/JIIS i11ris civilis consists of:
I The butit111es: a general and comprehensive textbook of Roman
law. I twas based on the lt~stitllles ofGaius (c. A.D. uo-I8o), a jurist
of the reigns of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. ijustinian
destroyed the sources of his codification, but the main text of
Gaius' b1stit111es was discovered in a palimpsest in I 8 I 6 by the legal
historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr (In6-I83I).)
2 The Parulects (from parz ded1estllai - 'taking in all'): a lengthier
compilation of earlier legal sources, organized under headings.
3 The Codex, a collection of enactments by past emperors.
4 The Nrmels, new laws enacted by Justinian himself.
On account of its reception by the eleventh century revival (chiefly at
the great law school of Bologna), the Corp11s i11ris civilis was later to
become the basis for all modem continental European systems oflaw.
The standard edition of the Corp11s iltris civilis was edited by Mommsen and Krueger (I895). Cf. also Corp1u i11ris civilis: T11e butit11les,
translated by Thomas C. Sandars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
I970). The standard edition of the b1Stit11les of Gaius is by F. de
Zulueta (2 volumes, I946, I953). The standard reference work on
Roman law in English is W. W. Buckland, Textbook ofRomarz Law from
A11g1tst1ts to ]1tstirziarz, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, I963).
393

3 Compare the following passage from Montesquieu:
The government most conformable to nature is that which best
agrees with the humor and disposition of the people in whose
favor it is established . . . Law in general is human reason,
inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular
cases in which human reason is applied. They should be adapted
in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it
should be a great chance if those of one nation should suit
another. They should be in relation to the nature and principle of
each government: whether they form it, as may be said of political
laws, or whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.
They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the
quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal
occupation of the natives . . . They should have relation to the
degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion
of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners and customs. In fine, they have relations to each
other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to
the order of things on which they are established; in all of which
different lights they ought to be considered.
(Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, 111e Spirit of
tile Larus, tr. by T. Nugent (New York: Hafiter, 1962) 1, 1.3, pp.
6-7)
4 These remarks are directed against the ~p~ school oflaw, whose
chief representative was Hegel's colleague in B~rich Karl
von Savigny (1779-1861) (see 211, note 4). The historical school
reacted against Enlightenment attempts to interpret law in terms of an
ahistorical reason, approaching it instead by grasping it historically, in
~ms of the original meaning legal provisions had within the social
context in which they arose. This approach represented a genuine
respect for the empirical history of law, but also a Romantic reverence
for tradition and national heritage and a rejection of the claims of
human reason in the social and political sphere, which went along
with the Romantic rejection of the Enlightenment and the ideals of
the French Revolution. It is this latter aspect of the historical school
which draws Hegel's criticisms. Savigny was a leading academic
representative of Prussian conservatism; he and Hegel did not get
along well, either philosophically or personally. Hegel never mentions
Savigny by name in PR (cf.,however, VPR17 54), but he is doubtless
a target here and again in PR 211R, 212R.
5 Gustav Ritter von Hugo (1764-1844), a member of the historical
394
Notes to pages y-33

school of law, was professor of law at Gottingen. Hegel refers to his
riimiscl~e~z Reclzts (Textbook ofRomarz Law), 5th ed. (Berlin:
A. Mylius, r8r5).
The Twelve Tables was the early Roman legal code, promulgated
about 450 B.C. The reference is to the following passage from Marcus
Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.c.): 'Truly it seems to me that all the collections of philosophical books are outweighed, both in their importance
and in the wealth of their utility, by the one little book which contains
the Twelve Tables of Law' (Cicero, De oratore r .44).
Aulus Gellius lived in the second century A.D. His Noctes Atticae (Attic
Nights) are twenty books of essays on a wide variety of subjects, which
is a valuable source of anecdotes, quotations, and observations on life
in classical Rome. Favorinus was a second-century philosopher, born
at Aries in Gaul, whom Aulus Gellius admired. Sextus Caecilius was
a jurist from Africa. Both Favorinus and Sextus Caecilius belonged to
the court of the Emperor Hadrian (A.D. r q- r 38). The conversation
between them serves Hugo's purpose (see notes 4 and 5 above)
because in it a jurist learned in the history of the law corrects the
philosopher's criticisms of traditional statutes by showing them to be
based on misunderstandings caused by ignorance of the historical
circumstances in which the laws were made.
In 376 B.C., under the Roman Republic, the nibunes P. Licinius Stolo
and L. Sextius Lateranus proposed certain measures (commonly called the 'Licinian Rogations') which were aimed at agrarian reforms, at
reducing political inequalities between patricians and plebeians, and
at remedying the distress of the poor (especially debtors). The law of
Stolo limited each citizen's ownership of land to soo jugera. Over
patrician objections, they were adopted in 367 B.C. with great success,
but by A.D. roo they were considered antiquated (see Livy, History of
Rome 2.6.35-38).
The lex Vocmzia (promulgated r69 B.c.) regulated the inheritances of
women (see Cicero, De re p11blica 3.10).
As Aulus Gellius makes clear, the 'Licinian Law' intended here was a
sumptuary law, which prosperity had since rendered obsolete (Noctes
Atticae 2o.r.2s).
Shylock lends 3,ooo ducats to Bassanio, on condition that if he fails to
repay, Shylock may take a pound of flesh from Antonio, who, out of
friendship to Bassanio, generously agrees to the bargain (Merclzatzt of
Verzice r.ili). Shylock is prevented from enforcing the bond by the
precise interpretation placed on it by Portia.
This is what Au! us Gellius reports as Sextus Caecilius' opinion (Noctes Atticae 20. L41-5o).
By A.D. roo i11merztrurz meant a draft animal; when the law was made, it
Lehrbuch des
9
ro
rr
r2
13
395
Notes to pages 3.1-37

referred to a vehicle drawn by yoked animals (Noctes Atticae 20.1.2830). An arcera is a covered vehicle; Favorinus thinks it extravagant to
specify it as a conveyance for bringing sick witnesses to court (Noctes
Atticae 20. I .29-3 I).
I4 Hugo cites Leibniz's authority for the claim that jurists are generally
superior to metaphysicians in drawing rigorous deductive inferences
from principles: 'Jurisprudence itself is a science having very much to
do with reasoning, and among the ancients I find nothing which
approaches the style of the geometers as much as that of the pandects'
(Philip Wiener (ed.) Leib1ziz: Selectiorzs (New York: Scribner, I9S I), p.
s8o). But Hegel regards deductive inference as only a superficial side
of philosophy (EL I8I, 23I), characteristic of the dogmatic
metaphysics of the understanding (cf. EL 26-36).
IS The Twelve Tables did not permit children emancipated from their
father's authority (patria potestas, see I 72, note I and I So, notes 2,
3> 9) to inherit from their father's estate; rather than revoke this
outright, praetorian edicts permitted emancipated children to share in
the estate by a legal fiction under the name bonomm possessio - 'possession of goods'. This device is recorded in Gaius, bzstitutes 3.25-28.
I6 This legal device is mentioned by one of Hegel's main sources for the
history ofRoman law: Johann Christian Gottlieb Heineccius (I68II 7 4I ), Antiqrlitatllm Roma11anmr irtrispnulmtiam illllstrarztillm S)'1llagma
(li/11Strated Treatise tnl A1zcierll Roma11 Jrtrispmdmce) (Ist ed., Halae de
Magdeburg: Novi Bibliopolli, I7I9).
a.
Genesis 2:22-23.
I
2 This is a reference to the Kantian position on freedom of the will, and
specifically to the position of Fries (VPG III, 4Io/srr). Kant
sometimes regards freedom of the will, along with the existence of
God and the immortality of the soul, as objects of moral faith or belief
(Critiq11e ofP11re Reasorz, B xxx); but he rejected the view that we have
any immediate consciousness of freedom (KpV 4f4). Fries, on the
other hand, thinks that 'for the human being basic ethical truths are
valid with immediate, irrefutable necessity, hence he is conscious of
his freedom'; sometimes he infers from this that we do not need to
believe (gla11hen) in it, as we do need to believe in God and
immortality; but in other places he does speak of the 'belief' or 'faith'
(Gimthe) which we have in our freedom on the basis of moral consciousness (Fries, AKV I, xvii-xviii; 11, 259; III, 25 I).
3 EG 44o-482.
4 EG 444-
Notes to page 38
s
I From Hegel's lectures of I822-I823: 'Freedom is just thinking itself.
Whoever rejects thinking and speaks of freedom, does not know what
he is talking about' (VGP rn, 308/402). From what Hegel says
elsewhere, the intended target of these remarks seems to be Wolffian
rationalism (EL 28,A; cf. V G P 111, 3 I 2/407, E G 468; cf. below
I 5, note I).
2 Cf. VR 1, 345-35o/u, 3I-4o.
3 In PR, Hegel has few good words to sayaboutthe French Revolution,
but this is uncharacteristic of him (perhaps a concession to the Prussian censors, see Preface, note 6). Compare, however, his remark in
258R, which alludes to it as 'the overthrow of all existing and given
conditions within an actual major state a11d the revisio11 ofits coristitutio7l
from first principles mid p11re/y iri temis of tho11ght' (emphasis added).
Hegel regards the Terror as resulting from the first, merely abstract
form in which the principle of freedom was applied to the state, but he
regards the Revolution as having accomplished the overcoming of
spirit's self-alienation, bringing the other-worldly aspirations of
Christianity to actuality in the here and now (PhG 1111 584-593).
Though never a Jacobin, He:;el always regarded the Revolution as a
colossal and progressive world-historical event (VP G 53 I-SJs/449452). In I8o7, after the army of Napoleon had conquered Prussia, he
wrote:
Thanks to the bath of her revolution, the French nation has
freed herself of many institutions which the human spirit had
outgrown like the shoes of a child. These institutions accordingly
once oppressed her, and they now continue to oppress other
nations as so many fetters devoid of spirit. What is even more,
however, is that the individual as well has shed the fear of death
along with the life of habit- which, with the change of scenery, is
no longer self-supporting. This is what gives this nation the great
power she displays against others. She weighs down upon the
impassiveness and dullness of these other nations, which, finally
forced to give up their indolence in order to step out into actuality, will perhaps ... surpass their teachers.
(B 1,8sh23)
A student reported that in I 826 Hegel still drank a toast to the
Revolution on Bastille day: 'He explained its significance and said that
a year never passed without his celebrating the anniversary in this way'
(quoted by T. M Knox, 'Hegel and Prussianism', in Walter Kaufmann (ed.) Hegel's Political Philosophy (New York: Atherton, I970), p.
20). See also Jean Hyppolite, Sllldies iri Hegel mid Marx (New York:
397

Harper, Ig6g), pp. 35-69; and Joachim Ritter, Hegel a11d the Frmch
Revoftuio11 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, I975).
4 Compare the following, from Hegel's lectures of I824-I825: 'The
human being can abstract from every content, make himself free of it,
whatever is in my representation I can let it go, I can make myself
entirely empty ... The human being has the self-consciousness of
being able to take up any content, or ofletting it go, he can let go of all
bonds of friendship, love, whatever they may be' (VPR IV, II I-I I z).
6
I In Fichte's Scie71Ce of Ktzowledge (WisserJSclzafislehre}, the first principle
is the identity of the 'I' with itself (W I, gi-IOI/93-IOZ). The
second principle is that of opposition, in which the 'I', in order to form
a determinate conception of itself, must posit a not-'I' (W z, IOII051roz-I05). Hegel's position is that self-consciousness and consciousness of a not-self are not two successive principles, but are
inseparable from one another (EG 449-450), cf. Hegel, VGP III,
388-3g6/48I -489.
7
I EL I63-I65.
z Cf. EG 471.
8
I Cf. EG 440.
IO
I The target here seems to be Wolffian rationalism, cf. E L 35,A. (See
I5, note r.)
a
I Compare the following, from Hegel's lectures of I824-I825:
r\
Not all drives are rational, but all rational determinations of the
will also exist as drives. As natural, the will can also be irrational,
. partly against reason, partly contingent . . . Irrational drives,
drives of envy, wicked drives, have no substantial content, none
determined through the concept, they are contingent, irrational,
and so they are not our concern here.
(VPR IV, Iz8)
\Y

IJ
Descartes, Medi1a1io11s IV, locates the possibility of error in the fact
that the freedom of the human will is infinite, while the human
intellect is finite.
2 A reference to the ideal of the 'beautiful soul' put forward by Goethe,
Schiller, and the Romantics (cf. PhG 11 668). See I 40, note I9.
3 As usual, Hegel's quotation is not quite accurate. It is drawn from the
last three lines of Goethe's sonnet 'Nature and Art':
I
Whoever wills something great must collect himself

It is only in limitation that mastery shows itself
And only law can give us freedom.
Goethe, Werke 1, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, I982), p. 245
14
I Cf. EG 476-478.
IS
I Christian Wolff (I679-I754), a follower of Leibniz, was the most
important German philosopher in the first half of the eighteenth
century. In I723 he was dismissed from his professorship at the
University of Halle at the instigation of the pietists (he was restored to
his position at Halle in I740, upon the accession of Frederick the
Great). One of the points of controversy was the allegation that Wolff
denied freedom of the will because he held that every volition is
determined by a sufficient reason (VGP 111, 256-257/350-35I; cf.
EL 35,A).
2 Kant does maintain that only Willldir, and not Wille, is free (TL 2 I 22IYCJ-IO). But he does not mean bythisthatwe act most freely when
we act arbitrarily. Rather, he means that our freedom consists in our
capacity to choose which maxim we adopt (the faculty of Willldir, Lat.
arbi1rirm1) rather than in the faculty of Wille (Lat. volrmlas}, which
rationally legislates to our capacity to choose. Hegel also attributes
this view to Fries, on equally dubious grounds (VGP 111, 4I9/511).
But the view that freedom consists in arbitrariness was held by some
of the Romantics, such as Friedrich Schlegel (see following note).
3 Phidias (c. 500-430 B.c.), a friend of Pericles, was one of the greatest
of Athenian artists, creator of three statues of Athene on the Acropolis, and sculptor, or at least supervisor, of the frieze of the Parthenon. Hegel's remark here is a critical reference to Romantic
399
theories of art, which locate the superiority of modem poetry (Poesie)

to ancient poetry in the fact that among the modems the work expresses the personal peculiarities and arbitrariness of the artist. In particular, it seems to be a response to the contrast of 'Romantic' to
'Classical' poetry formulated by Friedrich Schlegel (I767-I829):
Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry. It can lose
itself so completely in its subject matter that one may consider its
supreme purpose to be the characterization of poetic individuals
of every kind; and yet there is no form better suited to the
complete self-expression of the spirit of the author, so that many
an artist who merely wanted to write a novel [Roma11] willy nilly
portrayed himself ... The Romantic genre ... alone is infinite, as
it alone is free; its supreme law is that the arbitrariness [Wi//krv)
of the author shall be subject to no law. The Romantic genre is
the only one that is more than a genre, but is, as it were, poetry
itself; for in a certain sense, all poetry is or should be Romantic.
(Friedrich Schlegel, 'Atheniiums-Fragment' I I6 (I798), Kritische
Friedrich Schlegel Arugabe 11, CIIIJTakteristikm rmd Kritiken I, ed.
Hans Eichner (Munich: Paderbom, I966).
q
I
The 'tedious platitudes' are probably what Kant calls 'counsels of

prudence', 'e.g. those of diet, economy, courtesy, restraint, which are
shown by experience best to promote well-being on the average'
(Kant, G 4I8/36). Like Kant, Hegel thinks that because human
desires and circumstances are so variable, there are no universal
principles which lead, always and without exception, to human
happiness.
r8
I
The idea that human nature was fundamentally good was in Hegel's
day commonly associated with the name of Rousseau. Kant had, to
the chagrin of Goethe, defended the Christian idea that human
nature had a fundamental propensity to evil. But Kant's position was
not that natural human drives and inclinations were evil, only that the
human will, which is free to subject natural desires to the law of
reason, has a propensity to do the reverse (R 26hi, 36/3I).
400
I This is probably a snide reference to Fries's discussion of 'The

Drives of Human Reason', AK VIII, Part 3, I78-I83, which treats
our intellectual and moral aspirations to formative education (Bild1111g)
as 'drives' found in us empirically: 'It is a matter of experience what
can contribute to my education (Bildur~g), and even that I am interested in this education is for me only a fact of inner perception; hence
I cognize (erkermro) here the impulse (Ar~lrieb) only in empiricaljudgments and not with a priori necessity' (AKV III, 72, I82).
2 Cf. PR I33, I48.
zo
We start with the question: What should a human being do? To
this the answer is that we have to get to know human nature. A
human being has such and such drives. When they are summarized as a single end, then this gives rise to the theory of
happiness. In what should a human being ~k satisfaciiOilffu
drives, but not in individual ones; instead we should calculate to
what extent the one must take precedence over the other.
(VPR III, I43-I44i cf. EG 479-480)
2 Cf. I 23, note 2.
21
I
a. EL IS8-IS9
zz
I Cf. EL 54A.
zJ
I Hegel speaks of freedom in the abstract as being 'with oneself: 'I can
make myselfentirely empty. Only I am I, with myself' (VP R rv, I I Ii cf.
PR 5, note 4 and PhG 11 I97). But he speaks of concrete or
absolute freedom as 'being with oneself ;, at1 otller (PR 4Ai E G
382,A and 469; EL 24A). I am absolutely free when even that
which I oppose to myself as an object is also me. 'That in which I am
free, is to be I myself' (VPR 111, I8o). I am 'present in it' (VPR rv,
Notes to pages s.r-sB

I24), when ai; 'posited by me' (VPR IV, Io6), when ai; 'mine' (VPR
I02), or when I am 'at home' in it (VPR IV, 105). Here 'the subject
is in its homeland [Heimat), in its element' (VPRI9 I22). Hegel's
claim that the state is the actuality of concrete freedom (PR 26o) is
the claim that it is in the state that the individual self is most fully at
home or 'with itselr, or at least that those objects in which the self is
at home require the institutions of the state for their actuality.
IV,
24
I
cr. EL I68-I79
26
The ethical will is [the will's] most universal existence
[Existenz]. In so far as t~~~.El

[Sitte], it is ethical, but only objectively, universally. This will can
be ethical, but it can have an unethical content, in so far as it is
only objective in general. Subjective freedom is lacking in it and
this is cognized in our time as an essential moment.
- (VPR IV, I46; cf. VPR 111, I6I)
29
I Compare the fdlowing, from Hegel's lectures of I824-I825:
Right is grounded on freedom, which must be Idea, must have
existence [Dasein], reality; and this is what right is. Right also
often has the significance of a recta linea [straight line], something
which confonns to an other, to a rule, but here right is the
existence of the free will ... We do not begin with the representation of right, with what people take right to be; our vocation
[Bestimmung] is freedom, which must realize itself, and this
realization is right But further, we now say that the other
representations of right are false, for only this one is necessary,
that freedom gives itself existence; this is the necessary content,
this definition will be elucidated by examples, and the entire
treatise is such an example.
(VPR IV, I49)
402
.Votes to pages sB-63

2 Kant's fundamental principle of right is: 'Act externally in such a way
that the free employment of your power of choice [Willkiir] could exist
together with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law'
(Kant, RL C, 230/35).
3
PR 261A.
4 Hegel is probably referring to the French Revolution and the Terror.
Cf. PR 5 and note 3
a.
JO
1 Compare the following from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of I8I7I8I8: 'Right expresses in general a relation which is constituted by
freedom of the will and its realization. Duty is such a relation in so far
as it is to count for me as essential, I have to recognize, respect or
produce it' (VPR17 40; cf. PR 148-149).
JI
1 Cf. V G P II, 62-86/49-7 1. But in the E"cJ'dopaedia Hegel himself
describes dialectic as having a purely negative result, contrasting it
with the speculative stage of reason, whose function it is to apprehend
the dialectical opposites in their unity (EL 81-82).
2 Cf. Hegel's 18o2 essay, 'Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy,
Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the
Latest Form with the Ancient One' (SP); cf. PhG U 202-206, V G P
II, 358-4oz/328-373 See also Michael Forster, Hegel a"d Skepticism
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
1 Hegel intends the PR to be structured according to the speculative

method, whose stages are moments of the absolute idea (EL 236242). These moments correspond to the structure of speculative
logic: (1) immediate being (EL 240), (2) essence (EL 241), (3) the
concept, and (4) the Idea (EL 242). Abstract right apparently corresponds to the stage of immediate being (cf. PR 34), morality to
the stage of essence or reflection (cf. PR 105), and ethical life to the
sphere of the concept; and this implies that the state, as ethical life
fully developed, would correspond to the Idea. But Hegel describes
ethical life as the Idea (PR 142) and the state as the actuality of the
ethical Idea (PR 257).
2 Compare the following, from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of
1817-1818:
~Votes
to pages 63-69
Here there is a distinction between morality [Moralitat] and

ethics [Sittlicllkeit]. Morality is the reflected; but ethics is the
interpenetration of~6Tective. (Alihougliit
-is to tie WJShed dilat we coUld express e~ our language,
philosophy has made it so that we use a foreign [Latin] name for
the more distant. the reflected --~!_with being [Seirz] and
-~~~J~p.~~lZ] ._~~ht a~d- m~r~!ty areoruy~
-~~~~~~c~E.!Y--....Uleililca"flif~tuil ~~I!~
--
- ______
_the ll)..O.Wi.!I._of_!}le
in effiicarlife.
- ..... .....whole
..,
.__,.....__.,.,..,.
~-
(VPIG7 8g)
'Morality' refers to the subjective life of the individual agent, in so far

as it abstracts itself from ils social and historical situation and reflects
critically on them, or considers its moral predicament without taking
them explicitly into account; Hegel tends to identify morality with the
standpoint ofKantian moral philosophy (cf. PR 105-108, PhG 'l'l
596-598, EG 503-512). 'Ethics' or 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit)
means something like 'customary morality'. Hegel uses it to refer
simultaneously to a system of social institutions (PR I 44) and to the
moral attitude of the individual who identifies with and lives them
(PR I46-I47). Ethical life is supposed to harmonize or reunite
what is separated by morality (PR I4I; cf. PR I4Z-I57; PhG 'i~
347-357, 438-445; EG 5I3-5I6).
35
I Cf. PR 5
z cr. PhG
I66-I67; EG 424.
3 PhG 'l 48o.
36
I Cf. the following remark from the EP1cycfopaedia: 'It is a d11ty to possess
things as property, i.e. to be as a person; which, in the relation of
appearance, positing the reference to another person, develops itself
into the duty of the other to respect my right' (EG 486R).
37
I
Cf: PR IZ7-IZ8.
I Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures: '"Permitted"

means "possible according to right"' (VP RI 7 45); 'That is permitted
. ..r---- ---
404
Notes to pages &)-71

which does not violate my free will; a warrant [Befitgnis] is that others
have to recognize this' (VPR I, 255).
2 'All commands of right are only prohibitions (except the command
"Be a person")' (VPRI7 45; cf. PR 36 and note I).
40
I For the traditional division of right into the rights of persons, things,
and actions in Roman law, see Justinian, blStilttles 1.2.12; Justinian,
Digest 1.5.I, and Gaius, bzstitzl/es 1.8.
2 Kant, RL Io, 260. 'Right of things' is the right of ownership over
them (RL II-I?); 'right of persons' is the right to a voluntary
performance of actions by some person or persons, acquired by contract (RL I8-2I); 'personal rights of a real kind' (RL 22) are
rights involved in family relationships: the right of spouses over one
another (RL 24-27) and the right of parents over children (RL
28-2g).
3 According to one of Hegel's main sources for Roman law: 'In law,
man and person are quite distinct. A man is a being who possesses a
human body and a mind endowed with reason; a person is a man
regarded as having a certain status' G. G. Heineccius, Elemerzta iuris
cilifis (Eiemerzts ofCivil Law) (Amstelodami [Amsterdam], I 726 ), 75.
4 Caput refers to the possession of a certain legal status; a person
undergoes capitis dimimllio when this status is changed or lost, as by
being sold into slavery Gustinian, ft~stitzlles I.I6.I-2; cf. Gaius,
blStitzl/es I.I6o).
5 Perhaps the basis for identifying the right of persons with family law is
that in Roman law three things were required for someone to be a
'person': (I) caput, or status (see above, note 4), (2) libertas, or the
capacity to be subject to the rights and obligations of a Roman citizen,
and (3) familia, or the capacity to be subject to the rights and obligations of membership in a Roman family (Justinian, Digest I .5). But as
Hegel was aware, 'person' was sometimes used in a looser sense in
Roman law, so that even a slave could sometimes b'"e called a 'j)erson'
(PhG 1 477; VPG 383/3I6).
6 Kant, RL 22-30.
7 Kant, RL I8-21.
.p
a. Fichte, GNR 4I-44/63-68.
42
I
cr. PR z6.
4J
I This is an allusion to Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason, in which it is

argued, for example, that matter is neither finitely nor infinitely divisible (Asz4-53z1Bssz-s6o). Hegel argues, on the contrary, that matter can be seen as both finitely divisible and infinitely divisible in so far
as the concept of quantity contains both the determination of discreteness and the determination of continuity (WL v, zi6-zz7/I9cr
I99; cf. EL IOO).
\, I An allusion to Kant's thesis that we can think, but cannot know,

\ l things as they are in themselves; cr.Pii'G"'f74.[L 44z Cf. PhG, Io9.
45
I In other places, Hegel follows Fichte (GNR I3oh8z) in holding that

what turns possession into property is the_ro. itioll ofm ossession
_Ey...Q!berpersons (NP Z37; VPRI7 s6-s7; EG 490; cf. PR 7IR).
I .~n to the struggle over the land refonns carried out by

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and his brother Gaius Gracchus during the second century B.c. The refonns had to do with the ager
publiau, 1r lands obtained by Rome through conquests, and the
appropriation of these lands by individuals. Legislation instituted in
I33 B.c. by Tiberius Gracchus limited the amount of land an
individual could own, providing for the confiscation of excess holdings and their distribution to smaller landholders. The large landed
interests arranged for the assassination ofTiberius Gracchus in I33,
but the laws were enacted by Gaius Gracchus in IZ4 (in IZI he was
.Votes to page 77
also murdered). In I I I B.C. the lex T11oria annulled many of the Gracchan reforms. Hegel apparently views the Gracchi as asserting the
right of the community over the ager p11blims and their opponents as
asserting the right of individuals to appropriate land.
.
z An entailment (fideicommissa) limits the rights of heirs to dispose of
inherited property, requiring them to keep it in the family: 'When it is
required, pertaining to a certain parcel of land or to a certain capita~
that it should remain in a family either perpetually or for a specified
number of generations, this is called a family entailment [Fideicormnij!J' (Pmssiarl Get1eral Legal Code of I794, Part z, Title 4.z, z3.;
cf. Justinian, Institllles z.z3, Gaius, lrutit11tes z.z46-z47). Hegel
regards such provisions as undue limitatim.s on the right of private
property (cf. PR I8o). But he argues, too, that family property is
,rea!J.y commQ[l_propem, with the father acting merel~
tor; this means that Hegel also limits a father's right to bequeath
property outside the family, since it is held in common by the family
and is not his private property in the first place (PR I78-I8o).
3 Plato's Rept~blic specifies that the guardians' life-style should be governed by the proverb ~~sin co~ amon~
wies, childrel!....and!~ (R;piililic 4z4:i:449C). The most specific
provisions, however, requ1re of the guardians that they liy~~!e
owned quarters, that they possess no money, and that they hold
'pri\iai~ry 'only if it is necessary' (Rept~blic 4I6e). Later it is
claimed, perhaps hyperbolically, that the guardians will own nothing
b~their own bodies (Rept~blic 464d-e). These strictures, however,
apply only to the guardians, not to the most numerous class in Plato's
state, who have no share in political rule, but are owners of property:
'of land, grand and beautifhl houses, and furnishings appropriate to
them, gold and silver and all the possessions which are thought to
make men happy' (Replwlic 4I7b). But compare the comments of the
Athenian stranger in Lar1Js 739b--d:
You'll find the ideal society and state, and the best code of
laws, where the old saying 'friends' property is genuinely shared'
is put into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire
state. Now I don't know whether in fact this situation - community of wives, children and all property - exists anywhere
today, or will ever exist, but at any rate in such a state the notion
of 'private property' will have been by hook or by crook completely eliminated from life.
(Plato, Lar1Js 739b--d, tr. T. J. Saunders (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, I970), p. zo7)

47
I Cf. EN 337-35z; EL ZI3, zi6 and EN 376; EG 399
I T. M. Knox points out that the 'sophistry' condemned here can be

found in Luther's treatise On Christimz liberty (/lege/'s Plzilosophy of
Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, new edition I967), p. 376).
But Hegel's lectures make it plain that he was thinking not of Luther
but of August von Rehberg, a critic of the French Revolution (VP RI 7
55; VPR IV, I96).
z Cf. WL v, IZS-I3IIII7-IZZ.
49
I Compare the following remarks from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of
I8I7-I8I8:
The person has one body by nature; human beings have only in
the abstract sense eqruzl right to the totality of other external
things, the earth ... Each has really an equal right to the whole
earth, as some say. Such a distribution has colossal difficulties,
and with each newborn [person] the division would have to be
taken up once again. ~ity ~an attribute which~~l!_~
external reference. All have an equal right to the world; but
ios~ct !!ght must~aliZe itself,aiia-~~tsreji_

the sphereof contingency;-e.g. ~f preference, need, and,
h~-Driile"qualfty~(VPR17 47)
1iito
~~
Cf. 'Equal right is a right of inequality in its content, like every right'
(Karl Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program', MtlT.t' Engels Seleded
Wom (New York: International Publishers, I968), p. 3z4).
z This requirement is derived from Fichte, for whom its consequences
are far from trivial. Fichte maintains that if anyone is propertyless,
then he has a right to the property of others: 'Each possesses his civil
property only in so far, and on the condition that, all citizens of the
state can live from what is theirs; and in so far as they cannot live, it
becomes their property' (GNR ZI3Iz93; cf. SL Z9Sf3II-3IZ). In
Fichte's view, the state has both the right and the responsibility to
redistribute property so that all its members can carry on a productive
life on the basis of what they possess.
.Votes to pages 81-84

so
1
The rule of Roman law is res mdlius occupa11ti cedit 'A thing belonging
to no one is,.........______.....
ceded to the occupant' (Gaius, Institutes 2.66). Hegel
probably has in mind Fichte's version of the saying: Res mdlitiS cedit
primo occt~pami (GNR I331I85). In Roman law a res mdlitiS was not
necessarily something which had not yet been appropriated by
anyone; it could also be a sacred object, consecrated by pontiffs or by
the Church: such objects were regarded as not properly subject to
human ownership, and their sale or mortgage was forbidden
ijustinian, Institutes 2. 1.8). Like Kant and Fichte, Hegel rejects the
possibility of the latter sort of res mdlitiS (Kant, RL 2, 246-24715253; Fichte, GNR I331I85; Hegel, PR 44; cf. Hegel's views on
endowments, 64A and note 2).
I Cf. Fichte, GNR I9, 2I7-2I9Iz99-300. Fichte's principal application of the idea is to the ownership of land, implying state dominion
over land, along with redistributive responsibilities (see 49, note 2).
At one point, Hegel suggests that it is Fichte's view that the matter of
a formed object belongs to God (VPRI7 48). But this idea would
have been as repugnant to Fichte as to Hegel himself (see 50, note
I).
SJ
I A positive judgement is of the form 'x is F' (e.g. 'the rose is red'); a
negative judgement is of the form 'x is not F' (e.g. 'the rose is not
red'); an infinite judgement is of the form 'x is non-F', i.e. x has a
property which complements F (e.g. 'the rose is some colour other
than red') (cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reasm1 A7I-73IB97-98). This
distinction might be employed, for example, by someone who wants to
preserve the law of the excluded middle while denying both the
(positive) judgement that the number 7 is blue and the (infinite)
judgement that the number 7 is 71071-blue. Such a person could still
assert the (negative) judgement that the number 7 is r10t blue, because
this does not imply that it is any other colour. Hegel discusses these
forms of judgement in WL VI, 3 II-326163o-643, cf. E L I72I73 Apparently, Hegel thinks that the will's positive judgement on athing consists in declaring it mine, the will's negative judgement
consumes the thing or uses it up, and the will's infinite judgement
declares it to be someone else's (cf. 65A).
ss
I Cf. Fichte, GNR I9C, 2Icp/3o6.
2 Both Roman law and the Pnusim1 Ger1eral Legal Code of I794 provide
that the owner of a piece of land becomes proprietor of alluvial
deposits, and the owner of an animal becomes proprietor of its offspriiig. In Roman law the name for this is accessio (Justinian, bulilllleS
2.I.I8-37; cf. Gaius, Inslilules 2.66-79; Pntssiatl Gmeral Legal Code,
Part I, Title I; Title 9).
57
I WL v, 2I61I90.
2 An 'appearance' for Hegel is an existence (Existem~) which issueS forth
from a ground (\VL I2+' 499; EL I3I). An 'untrue appearance' or
'semblance' (Scheir1) is not something unreal or imaginary, but rather
something defective or imperfect, which does not adequately cor"-fesnond-t!rTtScoocept{Wl.:
VI-;- IIJ-24-'395-399)..An iniusticeiSJij"
___..,--.,, ... tliat sense a mere 'untrue appearance' because it is the act of a free
..../
"
~ -~~~J!:th~~----mtt~
!
]
:,I
..,
m itself, and thus at OliOs with its own concept (PR 82). In the same
WiiY.:,;-~~~awe-ar~ce"'"Ofahuman bein8.!_ since the

$1tUSof sliivery
is opposed to the concept 01'aliuman 6cing
as a free
........__... __ _,....._ __ ---..-_ _ ...
.....
-person.
I78-I96; EG 43o--436.
---~--
~-~............-,
p---""'-~
3 P"ilGH
6r
a.
I
PhG
I36--I39; WL VI, I72-I85/5I8--528; EL I36-I4I.
2 Cf. Fichte, GNR I9, 2I7-2Icp/299-3oo.
62
I This paragraph is directed against the feudal conception of 'divided
property' which distinguishes the 'supreme proprietor' (the overlord)
from the 'utilizing proprietor' (the vassal) (Prussim1 Ger1eral Legal Code,
Part I, Title I8, I4).
2 Cf. EG 408.
3 In Roman law, res mm~eipi are things whose ownership is supposed to
be transferred by a formal ceremony of'mancipation' (included in this
category were:landwilffinindy;-slave~-beasfS of burden); res rite
mar~cipi are things whose ownership is transferred by simply handing
them over to the new owner (Gaius, butiltlles 2.I5-I7). Domir~i11m
4IO
~Votes
to pages 91-94
Q]tiritarim11 was originally the only type of property formally

recognized by Roman law; later it was treated as a higher status of
ownership, attributable only to Roman citizens; it was distinguished
from domiruum Bor~itarirm1, an ownership recognized by law despite
certain formal defects in the owner's legal title to it (Gaius, lrmitutes
z.40). (Both the distinction between res mar~cipi and res rite rnaru:ipi and
the distinction between quiritarian and bonitarian ownership were
abolished by Justinian.) Hegel regards these distinctions as merely
matters of positive law, irrelevant to the philosophical science of right.
4 Dombumn direaum is a landlord's ownership of land, while domirzirur~
utile is the ownership pertaining to the tenant who uses the property.
From Kant Hegel derives both the notion of 'co-ownership' (corzdonurtium) and the distinction between the 'direct owner' (dornirms
directus) and the 'owner for use' (domimiS 11tilis) (RL I7, z7o). An
emphyteutic contract grants the proprietor the full and unconditional
use of a piece of land, either perpetually or for a long period of time,
in return for a tithe or rent Oustinian, Novels 73I-z; Digest
I37I6.z). Unlike the conceptions of property discussed in note 3,
Hegel finds these (feudal) conceptions quite relevant to the
philosophical science of right, because he thinks they violate the very
concept of property as free and full ownership (see note I above).
5 Cf. VPG 3I!I8; VGP 11,507/111, IO.
6J
I Cf. Hegel's conception of'measure' (WL v, 387-394/3z7-33Z; EL
I07), which seems to be the basis for his treatment of value in this
paragraph. Hegel was, however, a student of Adam Smith's Wealth of
Natim1s; in his lectures of IBI9-I8zo he endorses Smith's labour
theory of value: 'Manual labour in general, a day's wages, these are
the final elements of the price of things in relation to each other'
(VPRig I6z).
For some legal rights, a statute of limitations is specified ('prescribeq')

by law, and the right expires or lapses (verjiihrt) 'afthat nme{Jusnrua'n,
Digest I 8. 1.76 ). A 'prescriptible' right is one which will be lost after a
certain length of time unlessTtisrenewed.;e5peaai!yaiight whichWill
6e lost if 1t IS not used for a long time. Hegel holds thatthefundamental abstract nght of per~n-;-(Which others call 'natural
rights' or 'human rights') are .'imprescriptible' (they cannot expire or;
be lost through disuse or the
ordm~) just as they are 'inalien-i,
able' (they cannot be given up or bartered a~y) (seeP'if"f~).- _:
pfssage

2 In the Middle Ages, an endowed mass (missa fimdata) was one common form of 'pious fegacyuegtiiilmPi111n), by which a sum was set
aside in perpetuity for the purpose of having masses said regularly on
behalf of the soul of the departed. During the English Reformation,
and on the continent after the French Revolution, the abolition of
such endowments and their appropriation by secular authorities was a
prominent feature of~ecclesiastical legislation and the secularization of Church property. In Germany, for instance, it was provided for
by Article 55 of the Resolutions of the Deputation of the Empire
(I8o3) (see 'Endowment', 17ze Catllolic Enqclopedia v (New York:
Appleton, I9IO) pp. 42I-422).
6s
I According to Roman law, an owner might abandon (dere/iuq11iere) a
piece of property by displaying the intention no longer to own it; such
a thing then becomes a ~ and can ,;e appropriated by
someone else. Such things were distinguished from items thrown
overboard in a storm to lighten the vessel, where no intention of
abandonment is present (Justinian, bzstitules 2.1.47-48).
66
\ I This is Spinoza's definition of'substance'. or God, with which Hegel
wants to equate his conception ,~f th;~ti~ate reality, spirit (cf. PhG,
I7).
2 Cf. PhG, I8; EG 38I-384.
I!
69
a.
I
PR 55R and note I.
2 Issues concerning the ethics of copyrights were discussed in several
places by Kant (RL 3I, 289-29Ii 'On the Unjust Printing of Books'
(I785), GS IX, 77-88; 'On Publishing' (I798), GS IX, 43I-438).
I Philosophers Qf Hegel's time were often troubled by the case of pagan

heroes who committed suicide in defiance of Christianity's absolute
prohibition against it. According to Greek legend, Heracles, the
greatest of all Greek heroes, was given a robe poisoned with the blood
of a hydra. It clung to his flesh and caused horrible and incurable
4I2

suffering. To escape this Heracles had himself carried to the summit
of Mount Oeta and burned to death on a pyre. After the death of
Pompey, Marcus Porcius Cato (95-46 B.c.) chose to take his own life
rather than be captured by Julius Caesar. Marcus Junius Brutus,
adopted son of Julius Caesar, conspired to murder Caesar and then,
with Cassius, attempted to resist the triumvirs. Defeated by the
armies of Marcus Antonius and Octavianus at the battle of Philippi,
Brutus preferred death to capture, and took his own life by falling on
his sword. In the last analysis, however, Hegel and his contemporaries
generally sided with Christianity even when confronting these cases
(cf. Kant, TL 42I-423/84-86 and Fichte, SL 26I-267h79-284).
Fichte, however, held that although suicide is contrary to moral duty,
persons have a right over their own lives and the state has no right to
forbid suicide by law (GNR 33I/425). Once in his lectures, Kant
appears to admit that in the case of Cato, 'suicide is a virtue', but he
hastens to add that 'this is the only example which has given the world
the opportunity of defending suicide' (Kant, VE I 87 II49).
71
I The basis of personhood for Hegel, as for Fichte, is the mutuality of
recognition between free self-consdousnesses (cf. PhG 1111 I78-2oo;
EG 43o-437; Fichte, GNR 3-4, 3o-s6/<JS-83).
_R_9l_IIan~ts
a contract as an accord of two wills Oustinian, Digest

I.I2.3), as doesKant (RL I8, 27I). It is from Fichte that Hegel
derives the idea that a contract establishes a 'common will' (GNR
I93hii).
---~
2 Hegel alludes to Kant's notorious remark that 'the contract of marriage [is one in which] man and woman will the reciprocal enjoyment
of one another's sexual attributes' (Kant RL 24, 277-278).
3
2S8R and note I. The contractarian tradition in modem political thought includes Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, but its most
immediate representative for Hegel was Fichte, GNR I7, I9I2ogh09-233 It is interesting that what Hegel finds most objectionable about this tradition is that it intends to found the state on relations of abstract right, in particular on property relations. Ih:i~-~~
t}l~nu: time~j~!di,on to.!~acrionary absolutism, which treats the
state as the monarch's private property (cf. PR 258R). Hegel credits
I
a.
.. ~
---~
4I3
~Votes
to pages IOS-ICXJ
Frederick the Great with overcoming the idea that the state is the
_!ruinarar~roperty (VPR IV, 253).

4 -a. P'K 162.
77
In Roman law, a contract of sale could be voided on the grounds of

'excessive damage' if an item was found to have been sold fa- less than
half its true value ijustinian, Codex 444-2).
2 In Roman law, a stip11kztio was a solemn formal promise to perform
Oustinian, lrzstittlles 3-I5i Gaius, lmtittlles 3.92).
3 See PR 2I7.
4 Following Justinian, (lrzstitt1tes 3-I3), Kant distinguishes 'unilateral
contracts' (gifts, A in Hegel's table in So) from 'bilateral contracts'
(exchanges, Bin the table) (Kant, RL 3I, 285).
I
78
I Cf. EG 458-459
79
I
In Roman law a pact11m (or pacttmz mul11m) was an agreement which

could be the basis of a legal obligation, but which did not take the
form of a legal contract, while a cmztracttu was a formal contract
Oustinian, Digest 2.I4). Hegel seems to regard a pacttmz as a declaration of an intention to alienate a thing or put oneself under an obligation in the future, as distinct from a contractual agreement which
actually alienates or obligates as of the time of the contract. Only the
latter sort of agreement, he thinks, should create an obligation.
Fichte's theory of right is based on a sharp distinction between right
_and morality, involving a strict interpretation of the idea that relations
of right have to do only with external actions, and not at all with inner
intentions. Hegel interprets this idea as implying that I am obligated
only by the external performance of the other. What Fichte actually
held in I793, however, was the highly paradoxical view that not even
the performance of a contract by one party obligates the other party to
perform, since the performance would rather ground a right of
restitution or reparation for losses incurred by the performance, at
least until the second party's performance had been completed
(Fichte, FR I I4). Later Fichte argued on similar grounds that no
contract can obligate if it is made simply between the two parties
involved in it, because neither can have a sufficient reason to judge
.Votes to pages IO()-III

that the other intends 1D perfonn, and each has the right 1D withhold
perfonnance indefinitely until such a reason is present (GNR
I95/:z2o). This argument fonns part of his transcendental deduction
of the necessity of a 'union contract' (Vereir~igur~groertrag), through
which individuals establish a real common whole uniting them; only
through such a union, he argues, do valid contracts in general become
possible (GNR I98-207l:z23-23 I).
3 Concerning the 'false infinite', see WL v, I66-I7III50-I54; EL
94-95
4 Roman law distinguishes four kinds of contracts, in descending order
of explicitness:
I Contracllls re, involving an actual perfonnance, such as the
handing over of a thing (traditio rl!l).
2 Cor~lractus litteris, in which the agreement was written down.
3 Cotltracllls verbis, through an explicit oral agreement, such as a
stipulation (see 77, note 2).
4 Contractus cotlset/SII, involving a tacit sign of agreement, such as
the acceptance of some benefit (e.g. the taking possession of
something bought or rented).
Qustinian, btstitules 3.I3.2; cf. Digest 447-I, Gaius, btslitules
3.88-89)
8o
I Hegel does indeed follow Kant's table of contracts (RL 3 I, 285286) quite closely. In Kant's taxonomy, Hegel's AI and A3 are in
reverse order; Kant draws no distinction between Hegel's B2a and
B2(3; but Kant distinguishes mamlatum as B2y, instead ofleaving it as
an afterthought; and under C, Kant distinguishes between (a) a
pledge (pig7lus), (b) vouching for the promise of another (fideittssio),
and (c) giving a personal guarantee for another (praeslatio obsidis).
2 Under real contracts (cmztractus re, 79, note 4), Roman law in tum
distinguishes four kinds:
I Mutuum, or loan for consumption, to be repaid in kind
Qustinian, btstittlles 3.I4.I). E.g. I borrow a bushel of grain
from you, eat it, and give you a different bushel of grain in
return. Here the grain was called a res jimgibilis, because it was
a thing on which a claim to a different thing could be founded
(see note 6 below.) A mtltlmm was supposed to be a loan
without charge (see note 5 below).
.Votes to pages III-II5

Commodatum, or loan for use only, where the loaned item itself
was to be returned Oustinian, 171stitules 314.2). E.g. I borrow
your plough, use it, and return the very same plough to you.
Here the plough was called a res 11011 fongibilis (see note 6
below). Again, the loan was supposed to be free of charge (see
note 5 below).
3 Depositum, a deposit or bailment, a thing left with someone for
safe-keeping Oustinian, biSiitules 314.3).
4 Pigmu, pledge. A pledge (Lat. pigmu, Ger. Pfo,uJ; cf. the
English word 'pawn') is a thing used as collateral for a loan,
especially when the thing is turned over to the creditor until the
loan is repaid. A pigmu is also a kind of contract, viz. one
establishing a certain thing as a pledge Oustinian, bwitutes
3144> See note 8 below.
2
3 See note 2 above.

4 Sale (emptio, ve11ditio) refers to the transfer of a thing for a specified
monetary price Oustinian, butitules 3 .23).
5 Strictly speaking, mutuum and commodatum were supposed to be
gratuitous loans; if rent was to be paid, then the loan was called a
'letting' or 'hiring' (locatio et c01uiuaio) Oustinian, butittlles 3.24).
6 A resfimgibilis is a thing to be returned in kind, as in a muttmm, where
the thing loaned is intended to be consumed; a res non fimgibilis is a
thing which is to be returned itself, as in a commodatum Oustinian,
Digest 12.1.6) (see note 2 above).
7 Roman law distinguishes three kinds of locatio: (a) locatio cOTuiuctio
renm1, 'letting for hire of a thing', (b) locatio cmuiuctio operanm1, 'letting
for hire of labour', and (c) locatio c07uiuaio operis faciendi, 'letting for
hire of a labour to be done' Oustinian, bwitutes 3.24, cf. Digest
19.2.2). In (b), a person hires out services without reference to the
particular labour to be performed, while in (c) the person is hired to
perform a specified task.
8 See note 2 above. Hegel, however, treats the pledge not as a specific
kind of contract, but as a 'moment which completes a [certain kind of]
contract', e.g. a loan.
82
1
See 57, note
2.
Notes to pages IIJ-12I
86
I Again, see 57, note z.
88
I
a.
EL I73. and PR 53. note I. A 'positively infinite judgement'

is a judgement which asserts the abstract identity of subject and
predicate, e.g. 'a lion is a lion'. A 'negatively infinite judgement'
asserts the incompatibility of subject and predicate, e.g. 'the mind is
no elephant', 'a lion is no table'. This apparently differs from a simple
negative judgement in that it asserts the incompatibility of the subject
not merely with a certain specific predicate, but with all predicates of a
certain kind. Hegel also compares disease to a negative judgement,
because it negates a particular life-function of the organism; but death
is like a negatively infinite judgement because it negates the organism's life in its entirety. Hegel regards a civil suit (or unintentional
wrong) as like a simple negative judgement which denies a person's
right to a particular thing; he says that this is parallel to a judgement
such as 'This rose is not red'; a crime, on the other hand, attacks the
right of the})erson in geii'eral, and is parallel to the (false) judgement
'l'.h!s rose has no colour at...a.ll' (or, presumably, to the (true) judgement 'The number 7 has no colour at all' (EL I73A)). Cf. also WL
VI, 324-3z6/64I-643
gr
a. NR 476-48o/88-ijz.
lJ]
I Cf. VG I00-105/83-89.
94
I An allusion to Kant's equation of'right' with 'warrant to use coercion'
(RL Z3Zf37>
gs
I WL
VI,
324-3z6/64I-643; cf. 88, note I.
~votes
to page 122
96
I There seems little foundation for the claim that the Stoics believed
there is only one virtue and one vice. They apparently did hold (with
Plato) that the virtues,__are
from one another:
__ ....inseparable
_...,..,-.. ..,---- ___
..,.~-
,..~r--..r-.r-'
,_Zeno [founder of the Stoic school] admits several virtues, as

Pl~io lloes, namely,~ence, courage, moderation and justice,
on the grounds .!!!Dt altiloiigh inseparable they are distinct and
different from one another ... [The Stoics] say that the virtues
J ~-entailin~ not only because he who has one has them all
oilt also lJecause he who does any action in accordance with one
does so in accordance \vith them all.
(Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictiotls I034C-F, in A. A. Long
and D. N. Sedley, 111e Heffetustic Plulosopllm 1
(Cambridge University Press, I987), pp. 378-379)
IfHegel is alluding to a Stoic doctrine which might be compared with
the notion tha~_gi,!!!c:,utre of ~qual gravity, then he may be thinking
of the Stoic rejection of Aristotle~at virtue and vice admit of
degrees: 'It is their [the Stoics'] doctrine that nothin;,is in between
virtue and vice, though the Peripatetics say that progress is in between
~~ey say, a stick must be either straigirtOr crooked, so a
man must be either just or unjust but not either more just or more
unjust, and likewise with the other virtues' (Diogenes Laertius 7. I 27,
in 111e Helfetustic Plulosopllm 1, p. 380). .1
2 Draco recodified Athenian laws in 62I B.C., with the aim of replacing
private vengeance with public justice. The proverbial rigidity and
severity of his punishments 'is probably exaggerated in most accounts,
such as Plutarch's description ofSolon's reforms of them in 594o.c.:
'Being once asked why he made death the punishment of most
offences, [Draco] replied, "Small ~mes deserve that, and I have no
higher for the greater crimes';;(Piutarch, Lifo of Solon in Pf11tard1's
Lives, tr.John Dryden (New York: Random House, I96o), p. I07; cf.
Aristotle, Politics 2.I2.I274b).
3 Roman law distinguishes 'theft' (jil1'111111) from 'robbery' (rapiPia, vi
bona rapta) which involves the taking of a thing by force Oustinian,
b1Stit11tes 4.I-2). F111111rn, however, has a much broader meaning than
the English 'theft', and includes embezzlement and conversion
(lnstit11tes 4.1.6), the application of a borrowed item to a use not
intended by the lender (/nstit111es 4-\ .7) and even the use of one's own
property ifit has been pledged to another (/nstit111es 4 1. I o).

99
I Hegel may be alluding to the following passage: 'By punishment in
the most universal sense is understood an evil [Ube/] which follows
upon an illegal action as such. In so far as such an evil is used for the
effecting of future lawful actions or omissions, a punishment in the
usual signification is present. A genuine punishment in the usual
signification presupposes that the evil is voluntarily [JDillkiiTiiclt] combined with the unallowed action toward the end specified' (Ernst
Ferdinand Klein (I744-I8Io}, Gnmdsiitze des gernei11er1 derllschen tmd
pmlftisclten peirtlichert Redtts (Prirripler ofCommort Gen11m1 artd Pnurimt

Pertal Law} (Halle: Hemmende & Schmetzke, I799}, p. 6}. Klein was
one of the co-authors of the Pnusimt Gerzeral Legal Code of I794
Hegel thinks that it is an el'l'or to build conseguentialist consider.!!.~
_!!ons into the very concept of punishriiept, as Klein suggests here.
Instead, Hegel ms1sts that the concept of punishment involves
.retributive considerations 'wron and ustice'}, even if punishment is
a:~~~d to achieve desirable consequences (such as preventing
fiJture violations oflaw}.
2 Paul Johann Anselm Riner von Feuerbach (I775-I833}, father of the
Young Hegelian philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (I8o4-I872}, was
author of the inti uential Lehrbr~th des gerrteirtert irt Derllscltlartd giiltigert
peit~licllert Recltts (Textbook of the Penal Law Commort/j Valid i11 Germa11)'} (I8oi}. He was a proponent of penal reform, best known for
successfully implementing the rule rmlltmt crimert, rtlllla poerta sirte lege
('no crim~t~.e..mJD~w'} -which restricted the power
o~ to administer punishment Gnless there was a crime and a
corresponding punishment for it provided by legal statute. He was
also author of the Bavariart Perial Code (I8I3} which, along with the
Napoleonic Code, formed the basis of continental penat$.gjs!_~tion
~JX(~?J!l,_~Ost~~~~hical theory
of punishment,based on the idea of a threat published in advance, is
found in his Textbook: Book 1 ('Philosophical or Universal Part of
Penal Law'} (5th ed., Giessen: G.F. Heyer, I8u}, pp. I3-I8.
/
10o
I Cesare Beccaria (I738-I794}, often considered the father of modem
ErlniiiiDloi}':iS the most impo~lfstli~~e
eighteenth century. His influence is based almost entirely on his Dei
delitti e delle perte (On Crirnes artd Ptmisltmertts} (I764}, which was best
known in the French translation of the Abbe Morellet (I766}. It
influenced enlightened sovereigns throughout Europe, including the
. r --------- ---...----.
-._,.-...-------
.Votes to pages 126-IJO

Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany, Frederick the Great of Prussia,
Catherine the Great of Russia (who invited Beccaria to reside at her
court), and Maria Theresa and Joseph II of Austria. Jeremy Bentham
and John Adams were among Beccaria's admirers. Beccaria_!lpg_~
capi~ent., ~Q.t~ on the contractarian ground that citizens
ca~not:lJe uild~r~i~ t~ _hav~4eii~~4~~~~~s1~~~
-~c:..k.ill~, imd. on ~~e ~onse9ue~~!'lis_t g-~~l!_nd_ th~~-llfc:_!!n...P-risomnent is

a more effective deterrent than the death penalty. See Beccaria, On
Crimes a11d Prmisl,iiiills," ti-. Hency-PaoiilCci .(indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1963), pp. 10-14, 45-53, 62-64.
2 The Emperor Joseph II of Austria (reigned 1765-1790) promulgated
a new penal law in 1787 which substituted life imprisonment fer the
death penalty, but th"t death penalty was reinstituted in 1795. The
death penalty was retained in the French Penal Code of 1791, but
only with restrictions and after a long and searching debate.
3 Hegel criticizes the English practice of using the death penalty to
punish theft (VPR 111, 304-305).
101
'Eye fer eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for
burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe' (Exodus 21:24).
2 See above 99, note 1.
--3 'Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto
wrath: for it is written, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay", saith the
Lord' (Romans 12:19); cf. 'To me belongeth vengeance, and
recompense' (Deuteronomy 32:35).
4 According to Hesiod, the Erinyes (the Furies) were primeval beings,
born from the blood of Uranus, who was mutilated by his son Zeus.
Their office it was to avenge crime, especially crimes against ties of
kinship. ('Eumenides' is a propitiatory name for them, meaning 'the
kindly ones'.) They are represented as three winged women,
sometimes with snakes about them. Their vengeance against the
matricide of Orestes, and their appeasement at the court of Athens
through the intercession of Apollo on Orestes' behalf and the final
verdict of acquittal by Athena, are the focus of Aeschylus' tragedy 77re
1
Eume~rides.
102
1
In Roman law, both theft ([rata) and robbery (rapitra) are classed as
crimitra privala, as distinct f!!JJD..frimJ,a-pu/zlff~_?! crimes a~~e
420
Notes to pages IJo-145

-~
(Gaius, lr1Stit11tes 3.I82). A civil action for damages could be

brought against a thief Qustinian, lr1Stit11tes 4.1.11-I5, 4.2, cf. Digest
4474 Gaius, b1Stit111es 3.I82, 4.8). In jewish law, thefts are punishable by restoration to the victim of more than was stolen; the victim of
a theft is permitted to wound or even kill the thief, if the theft occurs
at night (if such a killing occurs during the day, it is murder and
punishable by death) (Exodus 22:I-4). Blackstone also draws the
distinction betw~en private and public crimes (Cormm:111aries 011 the
Laws ofEnglandm (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I979) p. 2).
109
I
The distinction between 'limit' (Gnmze) and 'restriction' (Schrarzke)

occurs as part of Hegel's development of the determination of true
infinityoutoffinitude. See WL v, I42-I50II31-I38, EL 9I-94
II7
I
Without knowing it, Oedipus.f::!j.@!cl.!Jl.Ul~ that he would kill

his father and marry his mother. When he discovered the truth, he
blinded himself and left Thebes, arriving at Colonus, near Athens.
There he took refuge in the sacred grove of the Furies, under the
protection of Theseus, the ruler of Athens (Sophocles, Oedip11s at
Colon11s, lines I7-I8, 36-45, 92o-<J23). Similarly, after killing his
mother, Orestes followed the advice of Apollo and fled from the
avenging Eumenides, taking refuge on the Areopagus (or Hill of Ares)
in Athens, where he was acquitted in a trial presided over by Athena
(Aeschylus, 17ze E11mmides, lines 79-84, 235-240, 287-289,
680-7IO).
II8
I
In general, the 'nature' of anything for Hegel is what we grasp from

!lltional reflection upon it and its connection with -other--iliings (EL
23). Accordingly, the nature of an action includes those consequences which rational reflection might have anticipated. 'In general
it is important to think about the consequences of an action because in
this way one does not stop with the immediate standpoint but goes
beyond it. Through a many-sided consideration of the action, one will
be led to the nature of the action' (NP 230).
42I
Notes to pages 146-ISI

Oedipus killed his father and married his mother, but did not believe
(and had no reason to believe) that he was committing parricide in the
first case or incest in the second; yet he regarded himself as a criminal. Hegel regards this as indicative of the naive simplicity (Gediegen/zeit) of the attitude of Greek ethical life, iii:Whlclilfieeoilcept of moral
subjectivity had yet to develop (cf. PhG ,, 468"-470). Hegel has
simirarfemarks concerrung the ancient Greeks' view of responsibility
for acts. ~J>_ne in madn!!s: 'e.g. Ajax, when he killed the Greeks' cattle
and sheep in an insane fury because he had not received the arms of
Achilles; he did not attribute the guilt to his insanity, as though in it he
were another being, but took the whole action upon himself as its
perpetrator and did away with himself from shame' (NP 224).
3 See note I above.
2
ng
I
'The distinction between dolus directra and irulirectus, in the sense that,
in the latter case, the intention of the agent was not to commit the
wrong which resulted, but only a slighter one, is now quite obsolete,
though it still obtains in Austria' (Franz Joachim Wilhelm Philipp von
Holtzendorff, Enzyklopiidie der Reclltswissensclrafi ;, systenratiscller rmd
alplrabetisdrer Bearbeitrnrg 1 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, I875), p.
402).
'Wenn der Stein aus der Hand ist, so ist er des Teufels' (When the
stone is out of the hand, it is the devil's); the upper Austrian version of
the proverb is: 'Der Stein aus der Hand, ist des Teufels Pfand' (The
stone out of the hand is the devil's pawn), see Deutsclres SpriclriiJiirterLexicmr IV (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, I977), pp.
8IO.ISI, 809.20, cf. 809.20I.
123
I Cf. EG 478-48o.
According to Herodotus (whose account cannot be true, since it is
chronologically impossible), the Lydian King Croesus asked the
Greek sage Solon: '\\'ho is the happiest man you have ever seen?' The
question was rhetorical, since Croesus expected to be told that he
himself was the happiest. Solon, however, denied that he could
estimate Croesus' happiness until he had seen the end of his life. Life
is such a chancy thing, said Solon, that we should call no man happy
until he is dead. Solon's caution was confirmed when Croesus was
defeated by the Persian King Cyrus. According to Herodotus, Cyrus
422
Notes to pages I_I)I-152

was about to have Croesus burned alive, when he was told of-Soli:llt';
remarks, and (reflecting on his own possible fate) he set Croesus free
(Herodotus, TI1e Histories I .30, tr. A. de SCiincourt (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, I954) pp. 23-25; cf. Aristotle, Nicomad1ea11 Etlncs
I.Io,rrooaio-b7). Compare the following remark from Hegel's lectures of I822-I823:
If we consider the history of Greek philosophy, then we find
that an [idea of) universal happiness occurred to Solon when he
spoke to Croesus. With such a theory of happiness milder mores
[Sille71) naturally supervene, since you strive after a universal and
the power of human nature is broken. Solon also demands of
Croesus that happiness is not constituted by what one has right
now, but rather by one's whole way of life and death. Solon's
thought did not go beyond this happiness.
(VPR m, I44; cf. EG 395A, 396A)
124
~
Compare the following remarks from Hegel's

and the lectures on it:
Et~CJ'Ciopaedia
A human being - as he is externally, i.e. in his actions

(obviously, not in his merely bodily externality), so he is inwardly;
and when he is virtuous, moral, etc. 011/y inwardly, i.e. 011/j in
intentions, dispositions, and when his externals are not identical
with this, then the one is as hollow and empty as the other.
(EL I4o)
We are accustomed to say of human beings that everything
depends on their essence [West'71] and not on their deeds and
condl)ct. Now in this lies the correct thought that what a human
being does should be considered not in its immediacy, but only by
means of his inwardness and as a manifestation of that inwardness. But with that thought we must not overlook the point that
the essence and also the inward only prove themselves as such by
stepping forth into appearance. On the other hand, the appeal
which human beings make to inwardness as an essence distinct
from the content of their deeds often has the intention of validating their mere subjectivity and in this way of escaping what is
valid in and for itself.
(EL I uA)
2 As usual, Hegel's quotation from Schiller is from memory, and not
precisely accurate:
,Votes to page 152
Scruples of Conscience
I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it by inclination
And so I am often bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous.
Decision
There is no other way out but this! You must seek to despise
them
And to do with repugnance what duty bids you.
(Schiller, Xer1ier1: 'The Philosophers', see Goethe, Werke r, ed.
Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, 1982), p. 221; the Xenier1 were
published jointly by Goethe and Schiller)
3 The French bo11 mot 'No man is a hero to his valet de c!Jambre' is
usually attributed to l\larie de Rabutin-Chantal, Marquise de 5evigne
(1626-1696). But the best evidence, a letter by Charlotte Elisabeth
Aisse (1695-1733), attributes it to Mme Comuel (1605-1694): 'I
remind you of what Mme Comuel said, that there is no hero at all for
his valet de chambre, and no Fathers of the Church for their contemporaries' (Lellres de Mile Aissi Mme Calmdri11i (Paris: Stock,
Delamain & Boutelleau, 1943), letter of 13 August 1728. The idea,
however, was much older: 'Few men have been admired by their
domestics' (Montaigne (1533-1592), Essays III, 2); when the
J\1acedonian general Antigonus (c. 382-301 B.c.), was described by
Hermodotus as 'Son of the Sun', he replied: 'My servant is not aware
of it' (quoted by Plutarch, Apothegms, 'Antigonus'). Hegel was the first
to add: 'Yet not because the former is no hero, but rather because the
latter is only a valet de c!Jambre' (PhG ~ 665). Goethe used the saying
(with a slightly different version of Hegel's wry addition) two years
later in the novel Die Wa!J/vemalldtscllafterJ (Elective Affir~ities): 'There
is, it is said, no hero for his chamber servant. That is only because a
hero can be recognized only by a hero. The- servant will probably
know how to evaluate only his equals' (Elective Affir~ities, Part 5, Chapter 2, Ottilie's diary, Goethe, Werke vr, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich:
Beck, 1982), p. 398; cf. VG 104/87). The attitude targeted by
Hegel's remarks in P R was expressed by Fries in the following
passage:
Reflective, living strength of soul gives a human being character; but not yet morality of character ... Morality of character
consists in the will's subjecting itself to the higher law with pure
respect. Someone might show reflectiveness, patience and

tranquillity, valour and moderation, yet without being led by any
idea of the good. Rather, such a reflective steadfasmess will be
proper to the most dangerous characters in history, who are ruled
by crude ambition and lust for power.
(Fries, HPP 242)
4 The quotation is fiom Propertius, Elegies 2.Io.6. Sextus Aurelius
Propertius (c. so-Io B.c.) wrote lyric verse pervaded by a spirit of
melancholy, self-absorption, and self-pity, original in its time but later
common in Latin elegiac poetry.
126
I cr. 'The Law of the Heart', PhG

367-380.
2 Possibly an allusion to Schiller's play 77re Robbers (I78I) (Schiller,
Werke I (Frankfurt: Insel, Ig66), pp. s-I30), in which Franz l\Ioor, a
young man unjustly deprived of his inheritance, organizes a band of
robbers with the aim of fighting tyranny and rectifying injustices.
Schiller's play, however, is only the best known example of the type;
the motif of the noble-hearted criminal was common in the drama of
the Gennan Stumzmul Dra1zg in the I77os.
3 According t&"the story, a scandalmonger attempted to excuse himself
to Cardinal Richelieu with this plea, and got this often quoted pithy
rejoinder.
4 St Crispin and St Crispinian (third century A.D.) were brothers, converts to Christianity from a noble Roman family. They are the patron
saints of cobblers and other leather workers. Hegel's reference here,
however, is either obscure or in error; I am unable to locate any
source which says anything about their stealing leather for their noble
labours. See Sabine Baring-Gould, Lives of the Saints (Edinburgh:
John Grant, I9I4), October, Part 2, pp. 628-630.
127
I cr. Kant, RL 23S-23614I-42.
2 Berzejici11m competemiae or 'beneficence of need': Under certain provisions deriving from Roman law, a debtor or unsuccessful defendant
in a civil action could not be required to pay more than his means
permitted (q11at1t11m facere potest'); for example, he could not be
deprived of the tools necessary to ply his trade. cr. Justinian, blStitutes
4.6.29, 37-38.
~Votes
to pages 157-161
130
1
Fiat justitia, pereat mzmdus is attributed to the Holy Roman Emperor

Ferdinand I (IS03-IS64, reigned ISS6-IS64) f.Manlius, Loci Commzmes 2.290). The saying is quoted (with approval) by Kant (EF
378h23); cf. also Kant's infamous remark about the justice of capital
punishment for murder: 'If justice should perish, it would no longer
be worthwhile for men to remain alive on earth ... Even if a civil
society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members ... the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed
... for if they fail to do so, then they may be regarded as accomplices
in this public violation oflegal justice' (Kant, R L 332-333hoo-102).
IJ2
1
The explicit reference here is to Christian Wolff (see above, IS,

note 1) and his theory of clear and obscure ideas (see Wolff, Psychologica empirica, Gesarmnelte Werke u.s (Halle, 1962), 220). Hegel's
actual target is probably Fries's account of moral imputability (H P P
48-s2). Fries distinguishes between legal and moral imputability
(HPP pp. 186-203). Regarding the former, the question is simply
whether the agent did the deed intentionally (HPP pp. 189-190);
regarding moral responsibility, however, Fries argues that we must
distinguish within the agent's character between what comes from
nature and what is due to the agent's freedom (HPP pp. I9Q-I9I).
Fries argues that acts must be judged morally by nothing but the
degree to which the decision to perform them is motivated by duty.
This motive may sometimes arise from moral feelil1g, which Fries
characterizes (in Leibnizian-Wolflian terminology) as 'obscure
thought', that is, thought which has not been logically resolved into its
rational grounds (HP P pp. 207-208). For Fries, the educability
(Bildwlgsflilzigkeit) of conscience consists in developing one's thoughts
about duty toward clarity, possibly with consequent revisions in what
one understands the content of one's duty to be (HPP pp. 208, 2Io2 11, 213-ZIS). Fries does not say that people are responsible only for
acts accompanied by such 'clear thoughts', but he apparently does
hold that we are not to be blamed for following our sincerely held
moral convictions, even if clarification of our moral thoughts would
reveal them to be objectively wrong. See below, 140, note 13.
Notes to pages J6I-I66

m
I Cf. Kant, G 397-4oo/I3-I6. Kant's usual expression, however, is
'from duty' [a11s Pjlicht] rather than 'for duty's sake' [11m der Pjlicht
wille11]. Note also that while Hegel says that duty should be done for
duty's sake, he does not insist, as Kant does, that it should be done
011/y for duty's sake.
IJ4
I 'Jesus said unto him, "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou
hast, and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and
come and follow me." But when the young man heard that saying, he
went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.' (Matthew I 9:2022; cf. Luke Io:25).
IJS
Cf. PhG ,, 596-63I, EG 503-5I2. Hegel's most extensive
critique of Kantian ethics and the alleged 'emptiness' and 'formalism'
of its standpoint is NR 459-468!75-83. The same criticisms are
presented again in summary form here in PR I35R and also in PhG
,, 429-437, EL 54,A and VGP m, 367-369l458-46x.
2 'Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law' (G 42II39). Kant formulates the same principle in a number of other ways, but never in
exactly the words Hegel uses.
I
IJ6
I Cf. PhG ,, 632-67I.
IJ7
I Hegel's principal discussion of religious conscience is EG 552.
I Hegel often ties the rise of moral subjecti~ to the decline ff ethical
!ife in the ancient world, especially in iniJ?erial Rome. He connects it
With the nse 01 StmaSrii-and the social alieiiailoil involved in life
under the Roman Imperium (PhG ,, I97-I99i VPG 384-385i3I73 I 8). But he also suggests that the~ of an ethical life founded
427
Notes to pages I66-171

on custom is inevitable, because subjective reflection on the ethical
--17eofrustoffi~'lmble and because such reflection inevitably finds
this ethical life limited and hence unsatisfactory (VG I77-I8o, 7I72h45-I47, 6z; VPG n, z86/z67).
1]9
I See Genesis z:8-I7, 3:I-Ig. For Hegel's exegesis of the myth of the
Fall, see E L z4A3; cf. PhG ~ 775-778.
140
I Pascal's Pruvi1u:ial Lette,.'S (I656) are a polemical contribution to disputes in Catholic moral theology between the Jesuits (members of the
Society of Jesus) and the Jansenists (followers of Cornelius Jansenius
(I585-I638), Bishop of Ypres in Flanders). Specifically, they are a
defence of Antoine Arnauld (I6II-I694), who was censured in I655
for his adherence to certain Jansenist doctrines. The passage quoted
by Hegel is an ironic comment on the views expressed in the following
excerpts from the writings of various Jesuits:
For someone to sin and incur guilt before God, he must know
that what he intends to do is no good, or at least have doubts or
fears on that score.
(quoted from Father Etienne Beauny, St~mmary ofSills (I633)]
Anyone with no thought of God, or his sins, or any apprehension of an obligation to perform acts of love toward God, or acts
of contrition, has no actual grace to perform these acts; but it is
also true that he commits no sin if he omits them.
(quoted from FranCJois Annat, 77ze Good Faith of the Ja11Je11ists
(I655)]
I. On the one hand God imparts to the soul a certain love
which inclines it toward the thing commanded, and on the other
rebellious concupiscence invites it to do the opposite. 2. God
inspires the soul with a knowledge of its weakness. 3 God
inspires it with knowledge of the physician who is to cure it. 4 God
inspires it with the desire to be cured. 5- God inspires it with
the desire to pray and implore his help. And unless all these
things take place in the soul, the action is not strictly sinful, and
cannot be imputed.
(quoted fiom Pierre Lel\loine, a close associate of Cardinal
Richelieu]
.Votes to pages IJI-IJ2

Pascal's comment on these views immediately precedes the passage
quoted by Hegel:
Oh Father, what a blessing for some of the people I know! I
must bring them along to you. You can hardly have met people
with fewer sins, for they never think of God; vice has warped their
reason: They have never knoW11 their infirmity nor the physician
who can cure it. They have never thought of desiring spiritual
health, still less of praying God to grant it, so that they are in a
state of baptismal innocence according to M. LeMoine. The
thought of loving God has never entered their heads, nor that of
being contrite for their sins; thus, according to Fr. Annat, they
have committed no sin through being without charity or repentance; their life is a continual search for pleasure of every kind,
uninterrupted by the slightest twinge of remorse. Such excesses
had led me to believe that their damnation was assured; but I
learn from you, Father, that these same excesses ensure their
salvation . . . I had always thought that the less one thought of
God the more sinful one was. But, from what I can see, once one
has managed to stop thinking of him altogether the purity of all
one's future conduct becomes assured. They will all be damned,
these half-sinners ...
(Blaise Pascal, 77u Provi11cia/ Letters, tr. A. J. Krailsheimer
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, I 967 ), pp. 62-65)
2 Luke 23: 34
3 Aristotle distinguishes actions done 'in ignorance', including those
done in rage or drunkenness, from cases of actions 'done by reason of
ignorance' or 'caused by ignorance' (of particular circumstances).
The latter sort of action is involuntary, but the former is not a case of
involuntariness, and the agent is to blame.
4 Aristotle, Nicomachea11 Ethics 3-I.IIIOb30-IIIIa2I.
5 Aristotle, Nicomac!Jemz Ethics 3. 1. II Iob28-30.
6 This is a reference to Fries (see note I3 below and I32, note I
above).
7 This is a theological topic also discussed in Pascal's Provi1zcial Leiters.
Catholic and Lutheran theology customarily distinguish 'prevenient
grace', which makes the human will free, from 'co-operating grace',
which assists in the salvation of those who seek it. Co-operating grace
may be either 'efficacious grace' which is so strong that the soul
cannot resist it, or it may be of lesser strength and resistible (if
accepted, however, the latter is called 'sufficient grace'). The controversy is whether grace is ever 'efficacious', in other words, whether
the will retains the freedom to reject co-operating grace. Jesuits were
Notes to pages IJ2-I'JS

inclined l> answer this question in the affirmative, Jansenists to
answer it in the negative. Hegel apparently interprets the issue in
terms of the relationship between objective knowledge of the good
and subjective conscience; siding with Pascal's Jansenist position (as
he has reinterpreted it) Hegel wants to deny that the relation between
objective knowledge and subjective conscience is one of separability,
indifference and contingency.
8 Cf. PhG
66o-666.
9 Probabilism is a Jesuit doctrine, for which Hegel's source is once
again Pascal. According to probabilism, we incur no guilt even if we
do wrong, so long as the moral opinion according to which we act is
'probable'. Pascal's attack on the doctrine is part of the Jansenist
~that the Jesuits have acquired secular and ecclesiastical
influence by sycophancy, adapting their theological and moral advice
to the desires and interests of the rich and powerful. To this end,
Pascal quotes from various Jesuit fathers the following account of
what the 'probability' of a moral opinion consists in:
An opinion is called probable when it is founded on reasons of

some importance. Whence it sometimes happens that one really
grave doctor can make an opinion probable ... You may perhaps
doubt whether the authority of one good and learned doctor
makes an opinion probable ... I reply that ... a probable opinion
is one with a basis of some importance. Now the authority of a
pious and learned doctor is of no small importance, but rather of
great importance ... Very often Pearned doctors] do have different opinions; but that does not matter. Each one makes his
own opinion probable and safe ... One may even do what one
thinks lawful according to a probable opinion, although the contrary is more certain . . . It is even lawful to follow the least
probable opinion, although it is the least certain ... A doctor,
when consulted, may give advice not merely probable according
to his opinion, if it is considered probable by others, but contrary
to his opinion, when this view, contrary to his own, happens to
prove more favourable and attractive to the person consulting
him.
(Provi11cial Letters, pp. 82-84)
Io Cf. GW 426/r84-I85; PhG ~ 635.
This is probably a reference to Sand's assassination of Kotzebue, see
Preface, note I8.
I2 The saying 'The end must justify the means' is usually attributed to
the English poet Matthew Prior (I664-172I), but cf. ' ... the line
often adopted by strong men in controversy, of justifying the means by
the end' (St Jerome (c. 342-420), Epistle 48).
I I
430
Notes to page 1]6

13 The target c:i these remarks is Fries. 'The command c:i duties of
virtue commands: to act from respect for the law according to one's
conviction of what the duty of virtue requires' (Fries, NKV m, 189).
The 'immediate command of virtue' is: 'Give allegiance to your own
conviction of duty!' (Fries, HPP 243, cf. HPP 158, 164). Fries
distinguishes 'conviction' (Oberzeugrmg) from mere 'opinion'
(Mei11ung). Conviction is formed by a process of moral education and
experience, yet 'not by learning rules but by the exercise of the moral
sentiment' (Fries, NKV m, 2o6-2o8; cf. Fries, JE ssh3). In fact,
Fries insists that to be morally genuine, my conviction must be 'pure'
(Iauter): 'By the virtue of purity I understand a man's truthfulness and
sincerity toward himself and in himself' (HPP 344); self-deceiving
moral beliefs and rationalizations do not count for Fries as 'pure
convictions'. Fries allows us no faculty for the infallible knowledge of
our duty. Conscience, he insists, is 'educable' (bildtmgsfiiltig) (HPP
214); but he still maintains (as did Kant and Fichte before him) that
conscience is 'infaUible':
It can easily appear that the doctrine of the infallibility of
conscience stands opposed to this doctrine of the educability of
conscience. The following should clear this up. For the man who
has attained to purity (La11terkei1), conscience is irtfollible according to an identical proposition; for no more can be demanded of
any man than that he faithfully follow his p11re conviction. Now
since conscience expresses this conviction, it is always right for
every individual man at the given moment.
(HPP 214-215)
a. also:
The first law of the philosophical theory of virtue is the good
disposition of character: respect for the practical spirit. Correctness of conviction in respect of the command is by contrast only
the second law. Hence the first rule by which I should compare
the actions of others with the duty of virtue must be distinguished
from the rule which tells me what duties are imposed on me. For
each can be judged only according to his own conviction, and
what it would be wrong to do according to a correct conviction
can for the individual be precisely what accords with duty.
(Fries, NKV m, 190)
If we wish to pass judgement upon the true worth of someone
else's life, we must remember that virtue is not the law. What is
important is not the fact that an externally virtuous action has
been performed but that virtue has been internally willed and
practised . . . If we now ask, 'What then is the good?' only the
431
Notes to pages J76-18o

educated understanding could give a correct reply. The decision
is no longer a matter of the will but of insight, so that here even
the purest and the best in earthly life could err and be mistaken.
(Fries,JES 49-'zo, 55h3)
14 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-I819) was an influential figure in
late eighteenth-century German philosophy. He was a critic of both
Enlightenment and German idealist rationalism, advocating a philosophy of faith or intuition which had much in common with the views
of Fries which are under attack in PR 140 (cf. VPG ill1 41o/511).
For this very reason, however, Hegel is anxious to quote Jacobi
against Fries. Hegel criticized Jacobi in the 1802 essay Faitlz a"d
K,owledge, but in later years he and Jacobi were on good terms, and
Hegel's discussions ofJacobi in his later writings are generally favourable (cf. EL 61--78, VGP 315-329/4Io-423). Jacobi's remarks
refer to the conversion to Roman Catholicism of the poet Count
Friedrich Leopold von Stolberg (I7SO-I8Ig), see 141, note 1.
15 The most familiar form of this saying is: 'To err is human, to forgive
divine' (Alexander Pope, Essay 011 Criticism 2.325). But Pope was
alluding either to the anonymous Latin proverb: Errore humarzmn est,
or to Plutarch: 'For to err in opinion, though it be not the part of wise
men, is at least human' (Morals: Of Marls Progress i" Virtue. Agai,st
Colotes).
16 Hegel is referring to the theory of irony put forward by Friedrich
Schlegel (1772-I82g), chiefly in the Lyceum Fragmerlls (Schlegel,
Kritisclze Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean-Jacques Anstett, and Hans
Eichner (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1957ff.), Volume n:
Characteristiken und Kritiken 1 (1966)). The classical definition of
irony is that of the Roman rhetorician <l!Jintilian (c. A.D. 35-95): a
figure of speech in which 'what is to be understood is something
contrary to what is said' (Quintilian, butituti011es oratoriae 9.22.44).
Originally, the Greek term ELQOVLa meant 'dissemblance' or
'deception'; but through the life and image of Socrates, the consummate ironist, its meaning was subtly transformed until 'irony' came to
signify (as in Quintilian's later definition) not a dissemblance of one's
thought but a special way of expressing it by saying the opposite (see
Gregory Vlastos, 'Socratic Irony', Classical Q}1arter/j 37 (1987)). As
Schlegel understands it, Socratic irony is the essence of artistic communication: '[In irony) everything should be both playful and serious,
both frank and obvious and yet deeply hidden' (Schlegel, Lycemn
Fragrne11t 108). Irony for Schlegel is the form of communication best
suited to express a (pantheistic) religious consciousness of 'the
infinitely full chaos' whose ineffability makes its adequate expression
432
~Votes
to page 1Bo
impossible in finite tenns (/deen 69, K ritisclte A11sgabe n). 'Irony is, as
it were, the ostension (epideixis) of infinity, of universality, of the
feeling for the universe' (KritisclteA11sgabe xvm, I28). '[Socratic irony]
contains and arouses a feeling of the irresolvable conflict of the limitless and the limited, of the impossibility and the necessity of complete
communication' (J..yceum Fragment Io8). '[In irony there is] the mood
which surveys everything and rises infinitely above everything that is
limited, even above one's own an, virtue or genius' (Lycttlm Fragment
42).
Hegel insists that Romantic irony is fundamentally different from
Socratic irony; he interprets Schlegel's concept of irony not as an
expression of the paradoxical human situation confronting the opposition of finite and infinite, but rather (invidiously) as an expression of
an extravagant, self-indulgent (even self-deifying) subjectivism. He
regards __ it as one of the (irrational, unserious, unphilosophical)
developments of Fichte's philosophy of the abstract subjective 'I'
(VGP m, 4I5-4I6/so7-so8). It was this Hegelian image of Schlegel
which Kierkegaard was both attacking in 17te Concept of lrot~y and
unfavourably portraying in Either(_Qr I; Schlegel's actual theory of
irony, however, seems quite close to the conception of 'indirect communication' which Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym ofJohannes
Climacus) advocated in the Cone/tiding Usriouific Postscript. Hegel
locates Schlegel at the extreme point where moral subjectivity is
transformed into evil; Hegel's and Kierkegaard's images of Schlegel
as libertine were always coloured by the associations of his scandalous
novel L11rinde (see below I64t note I). However, Schlegel's portrait
of Hegelian philosophy was equally invidious, virtually the mirror
image of Hegel's portrait of him. For Schlegel, the Hegelian dialectic
was the self-deification of 'the spirit of denial': (see Ernst Behler,
'Friedrich Schlegel und Hegel', Hegei-Sttldien 11 (I963), p. 243. 'The
spirit of denial' (der Geist, der stets vemeint} is of course
Mephistopheles' self-description, in Goethe, Faust, Part I, line I 338.)
I7 According to Hegel's aesthetics lectures: 'It was Solger and Ludwig
Tieck who accepted irony as the highest principle of art' (VA I,
98/93). Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (I78o-I8I9) was Hegel's
colleague in philosophy in Berlin, whose speciality was the philosophy
of fine an, especially literature (though he also lectured on ethics and
political philosophy). Solger published a lengthy review of Schlegel's
reflections on irony in two pans, the first appearing in I 809, the
second in I8II. (The text from which Hegel quotes has been
photographically reproduced inK. W. F. Solger, EniJirl, ed. Wolfhan
Henckmann (Munich: Wilhelm Funk, I97I) (for the quoted passages, see pp. 407-409).) Ludwig Tieck (I773-I853) was a leading
433
.Votes to pages I8cr184
r8
I9
20
2I
Romantic poet, novelist, dramatist, and critic; together with Friedrich

Schlegel's brother August Wilhelm Schlegel (I767-I 845) he produced the definitive German translation of Shakespeare's works.
Adolf Miillner (I774-I829), Die Sc/11dd (G11ilt) (I8I3), a popular
melodrama in which the central character murders a man with whose
wife he is in love, only to commit suicide when he finds out that the
man was his brother (cf. VA m, 5371Iv, 3 I I).
PhG ~~ 733--'743
PhG 1~ 632-67I. The notion of the 'beautiful soul' was common
among the Romantics (see I3, note 2). It was derived from Schiller's treatise On Grace arld Digrzity (I 793) and used by Goethe to refer
to the aunt of Natalie in Willzelm Meister's Apprenticeship (I795) ('Confessions of a Beautiful Soul', Goethe, Werke vn, ed. Erich Trunz
(Munich: Beck, I982), pp. 350, 358; cf. Iphigenie in Tarlris IV, ii, Werke
v, p. 48). In hi<; manuscripts ci I797, Hegel himself applies the tenn
(with wholly favourable connotations) to Christ (TJ 349-35IIETW
234- 236). In PhG ~ 658, it is usually thought to refer to the poet
Friedrich von Hardenberg ('Navalis') (I772-I8or). In Goethe,
Navalis, and PhG ~ 658 (but not in Schiller or in Hegel's early
writings), the term signifies a personality who shuns the active life,
since that might defile its inward purity. 'Beauty of soul' (but once
again without quietistic connotations) was later to be Fries's term f~r
the chief object cithe moral life (HPP I9). See]. Hyppolite, Gerzesis
Qlzd Stntarzre of Hegel's Phenomenolog)' of Spirit (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, I974), pp. 512-517; and E. Hirsch, 'Die
Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegels Phiinomenologie', De111sclze
Vierteljahrssclzriftfiir Literatri17Dissetzschaft und Geistesgesclziclzle 2 (I924),
pp. SID-532. In PhG as in PR, the dialectical inversion of conscience
into evil marks the limit of the moral sphere, and its transition into a
higher one. In P R this leads to (modem) ethical life as the foundation
on which moral subjectivity rests. But in PhG, ethical life was treated
as the immediate stage of spirit and identified with ancient Greek
culture; morality was the outcome of the historical development which
began with ethicallife. The discussion of conscience and evil thus led
instead to forgiveness and the reconciliation of spirit with itself in the
form of religion (PhG ~1 672-683).
Hegel regards the Romantics generally as followers of Fichte, carrying a one-sided subjectivistic interpretation of his philosophy to its
final extreme (see note IS above~ Under this heading, Hegel includes
Friedrich Schlegel (I772-I829), Friedrich Schleiermacher (I768I834), Friedrich von Hardenberg ('Navalis') (I772-I8oi),J. F. Fries
(I773-I843), Friedrich Bouterwek (I766-I828), and Wilhelm Trau434
Notes to pages r8rr89

gott Krug (I77o-I842). In Hegel's opinion, however, these Romantics were not genuine philosophers at all; the first to make a genuine
advance beyond Fichte was F. W. J. Schelling (I775-I854) (VGP
4I5-420/5o6-512). The definitive discussion of Hegel's relation to
the Romantics is Otto Poggeler, Hegels Kritik der Romantik (Bonn:
Bouvier, I956).
I4I
I One convert to Catholicism who caused consternation in Protestant
intellectual circles was Count Friedrich Leopold zu Stolberg (see
I4o, note I4). Several prominent German Romantics also converted to Roman Catholicism;"perhaps the most famous was Friedrich
Schlegel (see I 40, notes I 6 and 2 I). The chief motivations of such
converts were a hostility to the Protestant de-sacralization of the
natural and social worlds, and a rejection of the rationalist ideals of
the French Revolution in favour of the security of a faith rooted in
institutional tradition and authority. According to some, Hegel himself may have briefly considered converting to Catholicism in I 804 f crsuch reasons (see Clark Butler (ed.), Hegel: Tile Letters (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, I984), p. 8), but the outcome of this consideration was apparently a reaffirmation of the very things from
which the converts to Catholicism wanted to flee.
rp
This appears ll be an allusion to Aristotle's conception of the
unmoved mover, which moves as an object of desire does: 'There is a
mover which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance
and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move
in this way; they move without being moved' (Aristotle, Metapll]sics
I2.7.1e>72a25).
I 52, 258.
a.
144
I Antigone justifies her defiance of Creon
the gods:
appealing
ll
'Your edict, King, was strong,

But all your strength is weakness itself against
The immortal unrecorded laws of God.
435
the laws of
~Votes
to pages IBg-194
They are not merely now: they were, and shall be,
Operative for ever, beyond man utterly.'
(Sophocles, Antigone,lines 453-457)
Hegel cites the same lines in PhG 11 437, VPG 56/38-39
145
I
The reference to 'waves' may be an allusion to the penultimate stanza

of Goethe's poem 'Limitations of Mankind' (Goethe, Werke I, ed.
Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, I982), pp. I46-I47).
147
I
a. 'He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himselr
(I John po).
148
I
In TL, Kant provides a taxonomy of moral duties under the title
Etlrisc/1e Elementarlehre ('ethical theory of elements'); Section Three of

Fichte's S L is entitled Die eiger1tliche Pfiiclltenlelwe ('the genuine
theory of duties'); Fries introduces Part Two ('The Theory of Virtue')
ofHP P by referring to its contents also as Die allgemeirre Pfiiclltenlehre
('the universal theory of duties').
2 Cf. 2, note 2.
149
I
Another reference to the French Revolution as the natural outcome of

the idea of negative freedom, cf. 5, note 3
ISO
I
Hegel wants to distinguish genuine tragic ethical collisions (PhG

464-475, VA 1, 266-283lz72-288) from the artificial collisions
manufactured by moralizing reflection (PhG 11 635, D 8gii5o, GW
427II84-I85).
Compare the following comments from Hegel's lectures on
aesthetics:
The Greek heroes step forth in a pre-legal age, or they are
themselves the founders of states, so that right and social order,
law and custom [Sitte], proceed from them, and actualize them-

selves as their individual work, remaining connected to them ...
We may add that he was not soictly a moral [moralisclz] hero, as is
shown by the story about him and the fifty daughters ofThespius,
who were all received by him in one night ... Instead, he appears
as an image of this perfect, self-dependent force and strength of
right and justice, for whose actualization he undertakes countless
oibulations and labours by free choice and his own arbitrary will.
(II A 1, 24o-24Ih.so)
3 See Aristotle, Nicomachemz Ethics I.I3.1102a-II03a, 2.6.uo6aI I07b. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel has the
following to say about Aristotle's conception of virtue:
Aristotle determines the concept of virtue more precisely by
distinguishing a rational aspect of the soul from an irrational one;
in the latter 11otzs [reason] is only dynamei [potentially] - sensations, inclinations, passions, emotions apply to it. In the rational
side, understanding, wisdom, reflectiveness, knowledge
[Kamtnis] all have their place. But they do not constitute virtue,
which consists only in the unity of the rational with the irrational
side. We call it virtue when the passions (inclinations) are so
related to reason that they do what reason commands. If insight
(logos) is bad or not present at all but passion (inclination, the
heart) conducts itself well, then goodness of heart [G11tmiitigkeit]
may exist, but not virtue, because the ground (logos, reason) or
11otu is lacking, which is necessary to virtue . . . Because the
virtues, considered as the unity of the desiring, actualizing element with the rational element, have an alogical moment in them,
[Aristotle] posits their logos as a mea11, so that virtue is a mean
between two extremes.
(1/GP II, 222-224-'204-206)
151
I Cf. 'Custom is almost a second nature' (Plutarch, R11les for tlze
Preservatimz ofHealtlz I8).
152
I See I42, note
1.
ISJ
I Elsewhere Hegel attributes this saying to Socrates (VPR II, s68) on
the basis of Xenophon, Memorabilia I. 3 I. Diogenes Laertius (8. I. Is)
attributes it to Xenophilius the Pythagorean.
437

2
Rousseau proposes to educate Emile 'as a man' by separating him

from the corrupting influences of (modem) society. He distinguishes
this from educating someone 'as a citizen' inconformity with the laws
of a good state, as could have been done in the ancient world (Rousseau, Emile, tr. B. Foxley (New York: Dutton, Ig6g), p. 8).
J6r
I
a.
EN 367-370.
Perhaps an allusion to Samuel Pufendorf, Tl1e Law of Na111re a11d
Natimu XVI, ch. I. Also: 'The chief end of marriage is the generation
and bringing up of children' (Pnuria11 General Legal Code, Part 2, Title
I, I).
3
75. note 2.
4 Cf. below, I64, note I.
2
a.
162
Cf. the following remarks from Hegel's lectures m aesthetics: 'What
matters primarily in ancient drama, tragedy and comedy, is what is
universal and essential in the end which the individuals achieve ... In
modem, Romantic poetry, on the other hand, the primary object is
personal passion, whose satisfaction can deal only with a subjective
end, and in general the fate of a particular individual and character in
special relationships' A III, 53S-s361Iv, 301)-3IO).
rv
r63
I Cf. EL ISI.
In Roman religion, the perwtes were spirits of the cupboard (pemiS);
together with the lares (spirits of the hearth) they were worshipped as
guardians of the house, in rites which focused on the family meal.
There were also state Penates, however, regarded as protectors of
Rome, to whom state officials had to swear an oath.
3 '[Christ] saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your
hearts suffered you to put away your wives' (Matthew Ig:8).
2
r64
I In I798, Friedrich Schlegel began an affair with Dorothea Veit,
daughter of the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn and wife of Berlin
banker Simon Veit. Late in that year, Dorothea left her husband,
438

obtaining a divorce in I799 In the summer of that year, Schlegel
published a novel Luci11de, chronicling the illicit relationship between
Lucinde and her lover Julius. The novel, especially in Julius'
somewhat didactic prologue, contains an attack on traditional sexual
mores, which condemns marriage without love as mere concubinage,
insists on the priority of personal love over public standards of social
respectability, blasts the unnatural hypocrisy of the prudery women
are expected to show in good society, and, perhaps most significantly,
criticizes the one-sidedness of prevailing moral ideals of masculinity
and femininity, insisting that for either sex a healthy personality and
successful love relationships are possible only if there is a harmonious
balance between the active impulses commonly attributed to the
masculine and the passive tendencies associated with the feminine.
Julius' attack on hypocrisy involves an explicit defence of his own
'effrontery' or 'impertinence' (Frechheil). (See Hans Eichner, Friedrich
Schlegel (New York: Twayne, I970), Chapter 4.) Schlegel's views
were defended by the anonymous Leum 011 Schlegel's 'Lucirtde' (I Boo),
whose real author was the philosopher and theologian Friedrich
Schleiermacher. The real-life identities of Lucinde and Julius were
well known, and L11ci11de was widely regarded as obscene; its notoriety
followed Schlegel.through !ife (even after he had become grotesquely
obese and reactionary). Lucirule was a work far ahead of its time,
though by the standards of our day, Lucirule is not sexually explicit and
Schlegel's ideas a bout love and sex no longer appear radical.
166
a.
PhG ~~ 464-468,473-475 and VA II, 6o/n, 215, III, 550/IV, 3I8.

'Antigone is the most beautiful description of femininity; she holds
fast to the bond of the family against the law' (VPR 1, 30I).
z Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures of r8zz-r8z3:
The man's dominion is scientific universal cognition, and so

art is also the object of the man, for although it is presented in
individuality, it is a universal, a universal idea, the imagination
inspired by reason, the Idea of a universal. These are the man's
provinces. There can be exceptions for individual women, but the
exception is not the rule. Women, when they trespass into these
provinces, put the provinces themselves in danger.
(VPR m, 525-526)
439
167
I Compare the following, from Hegel's lectures of I8I8-I8I9: 'The
woman must come into her right just as much as the man. Where
[there is] polygamy, [there is] slavery of women' (VPR I, 30I).
rp
I In the earliest times, the chief consequence of Roman marriage was
that the wife passed ir1 rnarmm viri ('into the man's hands'), falling
under her husband's patria potestas and becoming in effect his proJ!_9JThis provision seems to have applied to the pamcian class only,
not to the plebeians.) By the time of the Twelve Tables (c. 450 B.c.), if
a wife was absent from her husband for three nights in a year, she
could avoid becoming an uxor ir1 marm by remaining technically a part
of her birth family, remaining under her own father's patria potestas.
Her husband then acquired no right over her property and she was
tenned a matror~a rather than a materfamilias. Both modes of marriage
were considered legal, and coexisted into the era of later Roman law
(see Gaius, butit11tes I. I 36). The children of a matrm1a as well as a
materfamilias were, however, under the patria potestas of their father
Oustinian, Digest I.I6.I95S>
174
I See 3, note IS, and I8o, notes z and 9
z Educating children by teaching them to reason was advocated by John
Locke, Some 1110ugllts Concemir~g Educati0r1 (I693); this characterization seems to be an allusion to Rousseau's criticism of Locke, in Emile
tr. R Foxley (New York: Dutton, I969), pp. 53-55.
3 Rousseau opposes the policy of making children feel confined by their
condition of immaturity and so creating in them a desire to grow up
(Emile, pp. 42-43).
qs
I Cf.PRS7
z The chief Gennan proponents of the 'play theory' of education were
Johann Bernhard Basedow (I7Z3-I790) and Joachim Heinrich
Campe (I746-I8I8). Both are criticized by name elsewhere in
Hegel's writings (Werke XJ, z83, VA I, 384fn, 404, TJ z6/fE 43,
VPR I, 306; EG 396A). Kant endorsed Basedow's methods in his
440

essays on Basedow's academy, the
445-452).
Pllilat~thropi"
(see GS
II,
178
I The 'notion' in question is apparently Fichte's (GNR 367/467).
Contrary to what Hegel implies, however, it is not Fichte's doctrine
that a deceased person's children usually inherit because they happen
to be near by the property when it falls ownerless. Rather, Fichte
regards the state as 'the first proprietor' of such things (G N R
z57/34I); his aim is to give the state maximal discretion to determine
matters ofinheritance as it sees fit.
180
I
3
4
5
6
8
9
This seems to be a reference to Fichte's actual doctrine, which does

indeed hold that the validity of a testamentary disposition is contingent on its recognition by the state (G N R z 56-257/340-34I).
According to the Twelve Tables 4.z, a father has the right to sell his
children into slavery, and if they are manumitted, he has the power to
sell them again. However, after they are freed for a third time, they
cease to be under his patria potestas.
According to Justinian, Codex IZ.36, a father has no right over spoils
taken by his son in war.
See I7z, note I.
See 3, note I5.
Lucian of Samosata (c. A.D. 115-zoo) was an author of satiric dialogues, including a speech in a law-court by a son who had been twice
disinherited by his father (Lucian, 'The Disinherited', Works II, tr. H.
W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler (Oxford: Clarendon, I905), pp. I83zoi). Similar cases appear in the Cm1truveniae of Lucius Annaeus
Seneca (called Seneca 'the Elder' or 'the Rhetorician'), father of
Seneca the Roman philosopher.
In 46 B.c. Marcus Tullius Cicero divorced his wife Terentia and
married Publilia, who had been his ward, acquiring her considerable
inheritance in the process. His grief upon the death of his beloved
daughter Tullia one year later led to a falling out, and the marriage to
Publilia also ended in divorce.
See 46, note z.
The patria polestas of a Roman father did indeed include the right of
life and death (i11s vitae rrecisq11e) over his children. The most famous
case of its exercise occurred in 507 B.C. when Lucius Junius Brutus,
consul and founder of the Roman Republic, ordered his two sons
44I

Titus and Tiberius to be beheaded before his eyes m account of their
conspiracy to restore the Tarquins to power {Uvy, History of Rome
2.5). This right was affirmed in the Twelve Tables about fifty years
later. But it was modified in later Roman law, where the father was
permitted to inflict only moderate chastisement (Justinian, Codex
443I)i following a judgement of Constantine, a father who killed his
child could even be sentenced to the same punishment as a parricide
ijustinian, Codex 9I7.I).
181
I See EL I3I ff., I42 fT.
IBJ
I Schiller appears to equate the 'state of necessity' (Staat der Not) with
the 'natural state', which is 'based on force and not on laws'; this is
contrasted with the 'state of reason' or 'state of freedom', founded on
a 'moral unity'; the task of humanity is to exchange the state of
necessity for the state of freedom (Schiller Werke IV (Frankfurt: Insel,
Ig66), p. 202; Friedrich Schiller, Lettm on tile Aestlletic EdriCiltiorr of
Man, tr. Reginald Snell (New York: Ungar, I965), Third and Fourth
Letters, pp. 29-34). Like Schiller, Fichte identifies the 'state of
necessity' with the existing state, and looks for a gradual progress
from it toward the 'rational state' (Fichte, S L 238-239lz5I-252).
Hegel is perhaps implying that these thinkers have viewed the existing
state only in its relation to civil society, missing altogether the rational
state as it actually is.
I&f
I Plato, Rep11blic 462a-e, argues that the ideal state should be like an
organism; when any one part is pleased or pained, the other parts
should share in it, and when one member of the state suffers or
rejoices, the whole should suffer or rejoice with him. Hegel rejects
tllis application of the organic conception of the state, because it does
not provide for the principle of modernity, the principle of subjective
freedom, that each individual should have a separate and selfdetermined life. See above, 46, note 3, and below, I85, notes I-3
185
I Concerning property in Plato's state, see 46, note 3
2 Along with little or no private property, Plato's guardians are sup-
.Votes to pages 22;r231

posed to share wives and children (Republic 424a, 44gc). Again, it is
only the guardian class about which Plato says this; neither private
property nor the family are excluded for the majority in Plato's state.
3 Plato's state is founded on the principle that all should do what they
are best fitted by nature to do (Republic 453b). This principle lies
behind the division of the state into rulers, auxiliaries, and farmers or
artisans. Within the guardian class, rulers are to be carefully selected
and trained from an early age (Republic 535a-537d); further, the
rulers are responsible for determining in which of the three classes a
child should be placed (Republic 415a-d). Beyond that, however, Plato
does not say how people are supposed to find the particular jobs they
are best suited to do, and he neither affinns nor denies that a person's
occupation should be a matter of choice for that person.
187
I A reference to ideas put forward by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Discvurse on the Arts and Sciences (I7 so), Discourse on the Origin of
/11equality (1755), Emile (1762), and other writings.
I Adam Smith (I723-I79o), author of Alz bzqzury i7llo the Nature and
Causes ofthe Wealth ofNatiOizs (I776);Jean-BaptisteSay (I767-I832),
author of Traili d'iconomie politique (180J); David Ricardo (1772I 823), author of Principies ofPolitical Eco1zomy and TOXlltiOII (I 8 17).
I Once again a reference to Rousseau, especially to his account of the

innocence, freedom, and contentment of'natural man' in the first part
of Discom~e on the Origin ofbzequality (1755).
195
I The Cynic school of philosophy was founded in Athens by Antisthenes (born c. 440 B.C.), a pupil of Socrates. He taught that happiness consists in virtue and in freedom from excessive desires. The
school's most famous representative was Antisthenes' pupil Diogenes
of Sinope (4th century B.C.), who lived for a time at Athens but was
buried in Corinth. He advocated, and practised, an extreme simplicity
in his manner of !ife; this, along with his blunt, witty contempt for his
fellow citizens, as well as for civilized life generally, made him the
subject of many amusing anecdotes. Cf V G P 1, 55 1-s6o/479-487.
443
Compare the following remarks from Hegel's Jena lectures:

In the machine, man abolishes his own formal activity and
makes [nature] work for him. But this deception, which he
perpetrates on nature, takes vengeance on him. The more he
takes from nature, the more he subjugates it, the baser he
becomes himself. By processing nature through a multitude of
machines, he does not abolish the necessity of his own labour; he
only pushes it further on, removes it from nature and ceases to
relate to it in a living way. Instead he flees from negative life, and
that work which is left to him becomes itself machine-like. The
amount of labour decreases only for the whole, not for the
individual; on the contrary, it is being increased, since the more
mechanized labour becomes, the less value it possesses, and the
more the individual must toil.
OR I, 237)
Through the work of the machine, the human being.becomes
more and more machine-like, dull, spiritless. The spiritual element, the self-conscious plenitude of life, becomes empty
activity. The power of the self resides in rich comprehension: this
being lost. He can leave some work to the machine; his own doing
thus becomes even more formal. His dull work limits him to one
point, and labour is the more perfect, the more one-sided it is.
OR I, 232)
199
I
Perhaps an allusion to the well~known doctrine of Adam Smith that

we most successfully procure help from others when we offer them a
bargain, enlisting their self-love in our favour (17ze Wealtlz ofNatiorzs
I.2 (New York: Random House, I937), p. I4).
20J
I Georg Friedrich Creuzer (I77I-I8S8), Symbolik urzd Mytlzologie tkr
a/ten VOlker, besORikn der Grieclzerz (Symbolism arzd Mytlzology ofArzcient

Peoples, especially tlze Greeks) (Leipzig: Leske, I 8IO-I8I2), 4 volumes.
During Creuzer's lifetime, there was a second edition of this work
(I8I9-I823) and a third (I836-I843).
444

2o6
When Hegel wrote this, the legal freedom to choose one's occupation
was only a little over a decade old in Prussia, and was still a matter of
controversy. The Pnusia11 Gt11eral Legal Code of I794 still provided
that people were to belong to the estate into which they were born
(Part I, Title I, 6). This was altered through Stein's economic
reforms of I8o8, many of which were introduced by Theodor von
Schon (I773-I856). Motivated by the free-trade doctrines of Adam
Smith and the German political economist Christian Jakob Kraus
(I753-I807), these reforms abolished serfdom and other hereditary
occupational restrictions, together with most guild monopolies. See
Friedrich Meinecke, 17ze Age of GemUJrt Liberatimz, 179s-r8ts
(I906), tr. Peter Paret (Berkeley: University of California Press,
I977), Chapter 5
2 See above, I85, note 3 The Indian caste system was codified in the
Law of Manu (c. zoo A.D.). It regulated the relations between the
hereditary castes: the priestly (bralmzirz) caste, the warrior and ruler
(kiatriya) caste, the agricultural, craftsmanship and trade (vaisiya)
caste, the labouring (sudra) caste, and the 'untouchable' (dlll1ulala)
caste.
VPG I80-I85h44-I48.
I
a.
2IJ
I
The most famous treatment of this theme is Sir William Blackstone

(I723-178o), Comme11taries orr tlze Laws o[Engla11d (I765-I769) (Chicago: Chicago University Press, I979), 4 volumes. For the relation of
lex scripta (statute law) to lex rzo11 scripta (laws given by judicial precedent), see Cmmrzt~~taries 1, 63.
Compare the following remarks of Francis Bacon concerning the
authority of judges to make law:
Judges ought to remember, that their Office is Jru dicere [to
pronounce law1 and notJru dare [to give law]; to lrzterpret Law,
and not to Make Law, or Give Law. Else it will be like the
Authority, claimed by the Clmrclt of Rorne; which under pretext of
Exposition of Scripture, doth not sticke to Adde and Alter; And
to Pronounce that, which they doe not Finde; and by S/zew of
Arttiquitie, to introduce Nuveltie.
Francis Bacon, 17ze Essayes ed. M Kiernan, 56: Of Judicature,
p. I65
445

3 The 'law of citations' was promulgated in A.D. 446 by the Emperor
Valentinian III (reigned 425-455) and included in the Theodosian
Code I 4 3 According to it, cases were to be decided by citing the five
great Roman jurists: Papinian, Paul, Gaius, Ulpian, and Modestin.
When these authorities disagreed, the majority was to be favoured;
when the authorities were evenly divided, Papinian's opinion was to
be preferred to the others.
4 It was the principal thesis of Karl Friedrich von Savigny, Vorn Beruf
zmserer Zeit fiir Gesetzgebrmg zmd Reclltsruisserzsclza.ft (I815) (English
translation by Abraham Hayward: Oftlze Vocatiorz ofourAgefor Legis/atiorz arzd ]11rispnuierzce (New York: Argo, I97 5)} that Germans should
not follow ~e French example ar codify their law. Savigny was
replying to Ober die Notweruligkeit eirzes al/gemeirzen biirgerliclzen Reclzts
fiir De11tsclz/arzd (Orz tile Necessity ofa Urzivmal CiUI Law for Genrumy)
(I8I4) by Hegel's friend Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut (I772r 840 ). See 3, note 4
5
3. note 2.
a.
214
I Perhaps an allusion to Deuteronomy 25:I-3.

2 In the German currency of Hegel's time, there were 24 groschen in
one dollar (Reiclwlzaler).
215
I Dionysius I (43o-367 o.c.), a man oflow birth, commanded the army
of the Syracusan republic against the Carthaginian invaders of Sicily
in 406. His campaign to drive them out was unsuccessful, but he
managed to make an unfavourable peace with them, and in 405 he
used his military command to establish himself as tyrant, ruling 405367. His son, Dionysius II (c. 395-343), ruled as tyrant from 367 until
357, when he was deposed by Dion, his uncle and his father's
sometime advisor. Dion hoped to re-establish a constitutional government, but he was assassinated in 353, and Dionysius II ruled again
until 344 Plato's friendly relations with Dion - and his unsuccessful
attempts to reform the rule ofDionysius I and educate Dionysius II.:.
are the main subject of Plato's Epistles 3, 7, and 8. Hegel's reference
to 'hanging the laws at such a height that no citizen could read them'
is, however, either obscure or misinformed; it is not even clear
whether he intends to refer to the father or the son.

2 Hegel may be referring to the Pn1Ssia11 General Legal Code of I 794; but
his model for 'an orderly and specific legal code' was the Napoleonic
Code, which he greatly admired and desired to see imitated in German states. Compare the following remark from Hegel's lectures of
I8II}-I820:
Where it was introduced, the Code Napoleon is still
recognized as a deed of beneficence. It is at least Napoleon's
work that this legal code is complete, even if its material content
does not belong to him. It is the bad habit of Germans never to be
-~-~le to complete anything ... I he Code Napoleon contains those
great principles of the freedom of property and the abolition of
everything arising from the age of feudalism. (VPRI9 I72-I73)
3
Goethe's Farberzlellre (I8ro), Goethe, Werke XIII, ed. Erich Trunz

(Munich: Beck, I982), pp. 3 I4-523; Goethe, 17zeory of Colors, tr.
Charles Locke Eastlake (I840) (Cambridge: MIT Press, I976) was
widely read and discussed in Hegel's day, and it attracted some
prominent admirers, including both Hegel and Schopenhauer; but it
was generally dismissed by the scientific community in its own day
and has usually been treated in the same way since then.
I This proverb is best known from its use by Voltaire ('La Begueule,
conte morale' (I772), CEzrores completes x (Paris: Garnier, I877), p.
so):
Dans ses ecrits, un sage ltalien

Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.
In his writings, a wise Italian
Says that the better is the enemy of the good.
In his lectures, Hegel uses another proverb to rebut Savigny's argument (see above, 2 I I, note 4): 'It is the bad habit of Germans never
to be able to complete anything. Bad weather is always better than no
weather at all' (VPR I9 I72).
219
I See above, Preface, note IS; and below PR 258, note 3
2 It was only since the time of Stein's reforms (see Preface, note I8)
that the system of justice was unified under state control. Before
447

I807, much of Prussia was under the feudal system of 'patrimonial
justice'; landowning nobles were empowered to do justice to the
peasants who lived on their lands. See Walter Simon, 171e Failure of
tlze Pmssia11 Refoml Moveme111, r8o7-18I9 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, I955), pp. 2.7-2.9, 94-95.
223
I
The following account of the 'equity court' is given by one legal

historian: 'Equity refers to the power of a judge to mitigate the harshness of a statute ... Equity is, in other words, a limited grant of power
to the court to apply principles of fairness in resolving a dispute tried
before it' 0. H. Merryman, 171e Civil Law Traditio11 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I985), p. 49). Courts of equity, or 'chancery
courts' were an institution in English common law. Unlike Hegel,
Kant denied the legitimacy of such courts, on the ground that they
violate the republican principle of the separation of powers. It seemed
to him that a judge empowered to overrule the provisions of strict
justice according to the law was empowered to trespass on the proper
functions of the legislator (RL 2.33-2.35/39-4I). Within the continental law tradition, the majority position on this issue was clearly
Kant's:
German law -like other continental laws- knows no parallel to
the two distinctions which are paramount in importance in
English law, i.e. the distinction between common law and equity
law and between case law and statute law. German has always
been one unified system of law in which there was and is neither
need nor room for a separate system of equity.
(E. J. Cohn, Ma1111al oJGerma11 Law m (London: British Institute
of Comparative Law, I968), p. 3)
Thus Hegel's admission of courts of equity constitutes an (uncharacteristic) preference on his part for British legal institutions over continental ones.
In the Prussia of Hegel's time, trials were not held in public.
225
I
In the system of Roman law, there were two officials present at a trial:
the magistral/IS or magistrate, and the iudex or judge. A magistrate was
~Votes
to pages 255-258
a legal expert, whose task it was to prepare the aaio, or formulate the
legal question posed by the case. The judge was generally not an
expert in the law; it was his job to examine wiblesses, determine the
facts, and rule on the case in accordance with the legal formula. The
pronouncement of a magistrate was called ius, while the decision of
the iudex was called the iudicium. After 367 B.C., legal proceedings
were under the control of a new class of magistrates, called praetors. In
early Roman law, only a senator was eligible to be a iude:r; but with the
Gracchan reforms (see 46, note I), the task of being a judge passed
to the Equestrian Order, a somewhat more numerous body of the
Roman nobility. (The Equestrians were so called because they
derived from an order of cavalrymen; but in later times they generally
had no military connections and were often merchants or financiers.)
After the demise of the Republic, eligibility to be a iudex was even
wider, extending even to some plebeians. The iudexwas usually selected by mutual agreement of the parties to a case; if they could not
agree, the iudex was chosen by lot from those eligible. Although in
legal matters the iudex was to act under the guidance of the
magistrate, Hegel is mistaken when he suggests that the authority of
the iudex was restricted to determining the facts of a case. Hegel's
depiction of the two roles is designed to provide a defence of his
recommendation that a trial should be presided over by a professional
judge, who leaves issues of fact to be decided by a jury.
See Blackstone, Commerrtaries IV, p. 333
227
I
The formula in which a Roman iruiex pronounced judgement was ex

arrimi sentelllia, meaning (in substance, if not literally) 'upon my conscience and to the best of my belier.
228
I
Just as trials were not public in Hegel's Prussia (see 224, note I) so
verdicts were always given by an appointed magistrate or judge. Trial
by jury was never part of the Prussian judicial system in Hegel's
lifetime. The jury system had earlier been advocated by Anselm
Feuerbach (see 99, note 2), in Corrsideratiorrs Corra:rnirrgJmy Courts
(I 8 I 2). Under Napoleon's rule, jury courts were established in Magdeburg, Hanover, and Westphalia; but they were later abolished (see
Eduard Gans, Naturreclrt rmd Urriversalreclrtsgesclriclrte, ed. Manfred
Riedel (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, Ig8I), p. 8g).
449
~Votes
to pages 26o-2.61
a. The Police
1 Hegel uses the term 'police' (Polizer) in what seems to us a very broad
sense, defining the term as 'the state, insofar as it relates [sic/z bezie/11)
to civil society' (VPR19 187); '"Police" is here the most suitable
name, even though in ordinary use it has a more limited significance'
(VPR IV, 587). The 'police' in this sense includes all the functions of
the state which support and regulate the activities of civil society with
a view to the welfare ofindividuals. Thus it includes publicworks (e.g.
highways, harbours, and waterways (VPR IV, 595)), all economic
regulatory agencies, and also what we would call the 'welfare' system.
In r8zo, however, this broad meaning of Polizei was not in the least
technical or idiosyncratic. The word in German originally had the
broad meaning Hegel gives it, and in the Pntssia71 General Legal Code
r1 1794, Polizei includes building regulation, fire protection, public
health, and relief for the poor. As a consequence, the term Polizeistaal
was used by Fichte with no derogatory connotations whatever (also
occasionally by Hegel with positive connotations). (For Germans of
Hegel's day, the meaning of Polizeistaal was perhaps closer to our
term 'welfare state' than to our term 'police state'.) Only later in the
nineteenth century was the meaning of Polizei limited to the maintenance of peace and order, 'law enforcement' in a narrower sense
(see G. C. von Unruh, 'Polizei, Polizeiwissenschafi: und
Kameralistik', inK. G. A.Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and G. C. von Unruh
(eds.) De11tsdze Vemalttmgsgesdliclzte 1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1983), pp. 388-427). In several places, Hegel emphasizes the
derivation of the word Polizei from the Greek politeia ('constitution')
along with differences between ancient Greek and modem constitutions which derive from the modem principle of subjective freedom
(VPR17 111, 259, z66, VPR IV, 587; cf. also Fichte, GNR 292303/374-387, and Hegel's criticisms of him in VPRr9 152, VPR IV,
19o-19I, 617, VPRr7 139).
2J4
r Obviously, Hegel's view that no sharp line can be drawn between
legitimate and illegitimate state interference with individuals is not
equivalent to the view that any form of state interference can be
justified. Hegel insists that individual freedom from state interference
(which he calls 'civil freedom'), along with the freedom to participate
in the state (which he calls 'political freedom') are both essential to the
health of the economy and the state (VPRr7 140-141). For this
450

reason, he attacks Fichte's insistence that the police should have a
right to know at all times who each person on the public streefis, and
what business he is about (GNR 298/378):
Fichte's whole state is police ... The police should know of
each citizen what he is doing every moment, where he is, but of
course his inner life is not to be inspected. If someone buys a
knife, the police have to know why, and then follow him around to
prevent his stabbing someone to death. A traveller is immediately
suspicious, and it is not enough to legitimate him that he have a
pass or a mere identity card, the pass has to be his portrait.
(VP R IV, 6I7)
Hegel insists that, to be consistent, in Fichte's state the police themselves would have to be overseen, leading to an infinite regress of
police spies. The only solution, he says, is that 'the universal should
be essentially not external but an inward, immanent end, the activity
of individuals themselves' (VP R IV, 6I7). Both Fichte and Hegel
insist that the police have no right to enter private dwellings without a
special order 'for the internal doings of the family should be unobserved' (VPRI7 I38; cf. Fichte, GNR 240-24zl322-324). Hegel
thinks that the police ought not to make its presence obvious: 'It is
something equally obnoxious when one sees police officers
everywhere ... But (even] the hidden [activities] of the police must
have the end that public life should be free' (VPRI7 I39). Again
agreeing with Fichte (GNR 303/386-387), Hegel criticizes the
British institution of police spies (VPRI7 I39).
2J6
I Probably an allusion to Fichte. See above 23 I, note I and 234,

note I.
240
I 'Amasis [of Egypt] established an admirable custom, which Solon
borrowed and introduced at Athens, where it is still preserved; this
was that every man once a year should declare before the Nomarch, or
provincial governor, the source of his livelihood; failure to do this, or
inability to prove that the source was an honest one, was punishable by
death' (Herodotus, The Histories 2.I77, tr. Aubrey de Selincourt
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, I954), pp. I7I-I72). Even before
6oo B.C., an Athenian citizen was enfranchised at maturity by being
45I
Notes to pages 2.64-266

admitted either to a 'clan' (ger.re) or a 'guild' (orgem.res). Clan membership involved his family's (inalienable) property rights over land, and
signified that the citizen lived by agriculture. Guild membership
signified the citizen's admission to a definite trade or handicraft.
These economic provisions formed the basis of the legal and constitutional reforms of Solon and Cleisthenes (seeN. G. L. Hammond,A
History of Greece (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I967), pp. I53-I54). In
Fichte's political theory, all citizens are also required to give an
account of their livelihood to the state (GNR I8,
zio-2.1 5lz8crz95).
242
I
Compare the following remark from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of

I8I7-I8I8:
The beneficent person has the intention of helping others, and
this depends on his arbitrary will. But in this system of mediation,
those who care for themselves also care for others. He who pays
out his money for his needs, gives others his money, but makes it
a condition of this that they do their duty, that they be
industrious, and so he gives them a more correct feeling of self
than the one who gives his money to the poor; for the poor man
who receives alms does not have a feeling of independence ... In
general, the state must prevent general distress through its
arrangements. A subjective distress can arise, whereby a person's
disposition is helped through advice and deed; but it is better if
the state cares for the needs of the individual ... Subjective
helping of the poor must be minimized as much as possible,
because giving subjective help, instead of being useful, can do
harm.
(VPR17 125)
243
I
Hegel distinguishes an 'estate' (Staml) from a 'class' (Kiasse):

The different estates of a state are in general concrete distinctions, according to which the individuals are divided into classes;
classes rest chiefly on the ;,eqruzlity of wealth, upbringing, and
education, just as these again rest on inequality of birth, through
which some individuals receive a kind of activity which is more
useful for the state than that received by others.
(NP 63)
452
Notes to page 267

244
I The problem of poverty in modem civil society plainly disturbed

Hegel greatly, and Jed to thoughts which are not easily reconciled with
his generally optimistic attitude toward the ethical prospects of
modem civil society. Consider the following remarks from his lectures of I8Ig-I8zo:
The emergence of poverty is in general a consequence of civil
society, and on the whole it arises necessarily out ofit ... Poverty
is a condition in civil society which is unhappy and forsaken on all
sides. The poor are burdened not only by external distress, but
also by moral degradation. The poor are for the most part
deprived of the consolation of religion; they cannot visit church
often, because they have no suitable clothing or must work on
Sundays. Further, they must participate in a worship which is
chiefly designed for an educated audience. In this connection,
Christ said that the Gospel is preached for the poor ... Equally,
the enjoyment of the administration of justice is often made very
difficult for them. Their medical care is usually very bad. Even if
they receive treatment for actual illnesses, they Jack the means
necessary for the preservation and care of their health ...
The poor are subject to yet another division, a division of
emotion [Gemiit) between them and civil society. The poor man
feels excluded and mocked by everyone, and this necessarily gives
rise to an inner indignation. He is conscious of himself as an
infinite, free being, and thus arises the demand that his external
existence should correspond to this consciousness. In civil society
it is not only natural distress against which the poor man has to
struggle. The poor man is opposed not only by nature, a mere
being, but also by my will. The poor man feels as if he were
related to an arbitrary will, to human contingency, and in the last
analysis what makes him indignant is that he is put into this state
of division through an arbitrary will. Self-consciousness appears
driven to the point where it no longer has any rights, where
freedom has no existence. In this position, where the existence of
freedom becomes something wholly contingent, inner indignation is necessary. Because the individual's freedom has no
existence, the recognition of universal freedom disappears. From
this condition arises that shamelessness that we find in the rabble.
A rabble arises chiefly in a developed civil society ...
Earlier we considered the right of distress [P R I 27] as something referring to a momentary need. Here distress no longer has
merely this momentary character. In the emergence of poverty,
453

the power rf particularity comes into existence it opposition to
the reality of freedom. 1bat can produce the negatively infinite
judgement of the criminal. Of course crime can be punished, but
this punishment is only contingent ... On the one hand, poverty
is the ground of the rabble-mentality, the non-recognition of
right; on the other hand, the rabble disposition also appears
where there is wealth. The rich man thinks that he can buy
anything, because he knows himself as the power of the particularity of self-consciousness. Thus wealth can lead to the same
mockery and shamelessness that we find in the poor rabble. The
disposition of the master over the slave is the same as that of the
slave ... These two sides, poverty and wealth, thus constitute the
corruption of civil society.
(VPRI9 I94-I96; cf. VPR 1, 322)
247
I Horace, Odes I.J.
I About thirty years after the independence from Britain of a large part
of North America in I776, Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the
New World began a drive for independence, led by Simon Bolivar
(I78J-I8Jo). These movements achieved success in the years
immediately preceding the composition of Tile Plzi/osoplzy of Riglzt:
Ecuador declared its independence from Spain in I 809, followed by
Venezuela in I8Io, Paraguay in I8n, Mexico in IBIJ, Argentina in
I8I6, and Chile in IBIS; Brazil declared its independence from
Portugal in I 8 I 5.
250
I 'Corporation' for Hegel includes not only a society of people sharing
the same trade or profession, but any society which is officially
recognized by the state but is not itself a part of the political state.
Thus Churches (PR 270R, p. 296) and municipal governments (PR
288) are also called 'corporations'.
I 'Privilege' is a thirteenth-century derivation from the latin privrts

(private, special, particular, or exceptional) and lex (law, legal statute):
454
Notes to pages ZJI-277

il originally referred to a legal statute conferring some special right or
benefit on a designated individual or individuals.
255
I See I 99, perhaps also I 84.
z On the basis of their firm belief in the principle of freedom of enterprise, Stein proposed, and Hardenberg carried into effect (through
the edicts of z November I8Io and 7 September I8n), the abolition
of guild monopolies (see Meinecke, Tlze Age ofGemzmz Iiberatiorz, pp.
86-88, and Max Braubach, Von der frarzzijsisclzen Revolutiorz his zmn
Wierzer Kongrr:ft (Stuttgart: Klett, I974), Chapter 17). Though he
approves of the abolition of'the miserable guild system', Hegel plainly
has mixed feelings about this development:
The natural difference between social estates [Sttirzde] must not
remain merely natural, but must also exist as a universal, so that it
can be recognized as a universal. Each in his civil existence (as
bourgeois) must belong to a determinate estate [StamJ]. But it must
first be determined whether he has the skill and resources for-it
These estates, which at first refer only to needs, must become
firm corporations. The rational aspect of corporations is that the
common interest, this universal, actually exists in a determinate
form. According to the principle of atomicity, each cares merely
for himself and does not concern himself about anything in common; it is left to each whether he is destined for a certain social
estate, without considering the utility of his choice from a political
point of view; since, according to those who want it this way,
someone; whose work no one approves will go into another trade
on his own. This principle [of atomicity] gives such a person over
to contingency. Our standpoint of reflection, this spirit of atomicity, this spirit of finding your honour in your individuality and
not in what is common - this is destructive, and has caused the
(VPRI7 I4Z-I43)
corporations to fall to pieces.
258
I Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Cmllratl (I76z); for Fichte's
somewhat complex version of social contract theory, see G N R I7,
I9I-zo91zo9-Z33
455

2 The French Revolution, see 5, note 3
3 Karl Ludwig von Haller (I768-I854), Restoratio11 of Political Scinue
(I8I6-I82o; 2nd ed., I834), 6 volumes. See Preface, note I5- For an
account of Haller's political thought, see Robert M. Berdahl, 171e
Politics of the PniSSiml Nobility: Tile Developmem of a Co11seroative
Ideology, T/J0-1848 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Ig88),
Chapter 7
4 In the Holy Roman Empire there evolved during the Middle Ages the
institution of the Reichstag or Imperial Diet, a council composed
exclusively of the nobility, whose function was to advise the emperor.
In the thirteenth century it contained two houses, the Council of
Electors and the Council of Greater Princes. The so-called Golden
Bull of I356 empowered the Archbishop of Mainz to call the Estates.
In I 489 the Imperial Diet came to include representatives of the free
imperial cities. It was now organized into three colleges or curiae,
known as the 'imperial Estates' (Reicl!sstiil!de): (I) the six electors (who
chose the emperor); (2) the princes, including prelates, counts, and
lords; and (3) municipal representatives of the free cities. See J.
Zophy (ed.) 17le Holy Romm1 Empire (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, rg8o), pp. I08-IOg. During the eighteenth century there were
such Estates assemblies or diets in many of the German states. Like
the Imperial Estates they were composed not of elected representatives but of certain members of the nobility and officials from the
larger municipalities. Hegel is attempting to see such institutions as
precedents for a modem system of representation; in fact, the diets
were usually anything but progressive institutions. They often
defended their members' own entrenched privileges simultaneously
against the centralized sovereign power and against the aspirations of
the wider population for political participation. In Hegel's home state
ofWiirttemberg, it was such an assembly that in I8I6 turned down
the king's proposal for a new and comparatively progressive constitution, including genuine representative institutions. Hegel, who
favoured the king's proposal, was highly critical of the diet and its
fixation on the 'good old law' (L W 493-508lz7I-284).
5 At Runnymede in I2I5 the English barons compelled Kingjohn to
sign a document guaranteeing baronial privileges against royal incursion. Later, after concluding favourable negotiations with the papal
legate Cardinal Pandulph, John succeeded, with papal support, in
repudiating the agreement. Subsequent tradition, however, has
viewed the Magna Charta as one of the most important documents in
English constitutional history, establishing the principle of the
supremacy of constitution over king.
6 The English Bill of Rights of I 68g, issued by William and Mary after
Notes to pages 28cr286

the expulsion of the Stuart monarchy, recognized certain civil and
political rights of British citizens, and established the political
supremacy of Parliament.
7 The Pmssim1 Gmeral Legal Code of I794 was viewed by many, including Hegel, as an important part of the legacy of Frederick the Great
and the Enlightenment: 'Frederick II deserves special mention here,
because he grasped in thought the universal end of the state ... His
immortal work was the domestic legal code- the [Prussian] General
Code' (VPG 523/44I). (Though Frederick died in I786, the project
of legal codification had been initiated by him.) For the same reason,
the Ge,eral Code was a common object of attack by Romantic reactionaries, including Haller and Savigny.
259
I The Holy Alliance was concluded in September I 8 I 5 by the three

main continental opponents of Napoleonic France: Austria, Russia,
and Prussia. It was seen by its enthusiastic supporters, especially Tsar
Alexander I, as a pact for the maintenance of permanent peace under
Christian principles, as well as for the protection of traditional
Christian values against the impious and subversive tendencies of
modem times, such as those leading to the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic empire.
261
I See J, note 3
2 See 30, note I.
3 See I37, note I.
262
I See also 206, note I.

2 See I85, note 3
263
I On the basis of 256A, the institutions in question are apparently

marriage and the corporation. But elsewhere Hegel says that 'the
guarantee and actuality of the free whole lies in the institutions of the
freedom of the person and property, public laws, a system of justice
involving equality, trial by jury, and public trials' (VPRI7 27I).
457
.Votes to pages 29cr296
I In so3 B.c., a section of the Roman plebeians seceded from the city in
protest against patrician privileges. Menenius Agrippa, consul of
Rome, is supposed to have persuaded them to return, by telling them
a fable: All the members of the body rebel against the belly, accusing
it ofliving idly off their labours; the belly replies that they receive their
food only through it. Menenius Agrippa likens the Roman Senate to
the belly, and the rebellious plebeians to the members. The original
source for this fable is Livy, History ofRo,e I .z.3z, but it is probably
best known in Shakespeare's version, CoriolatUIS I.i.g3-ISI. Hegel
also refers to this fable elsewhere (VPG I sis; VA Ill, 368/Iv, I48).
z Cf. EL z8-zg; VR u, zz4/III, I3-I4.
270
a.
I
VR I, Z36-z46/z46-ZS7
z cr. VR I, 373/11, 63, u, 4I7/11, 94, I, 433/11, uz.
3 Cf. EG SS3-SSS
4 None of these appear to be direct quotations from anyone. The best
known saying expressing a similar idea is St Augustine's Dilige el quod
vis fll&, 'Love and do what you want to' (St Augustine, /rz epislolam
/oarmis lractalus 7.8). Hegel himself, in the manuscripts of his Frankfurt period, maintained (in opposition to what he regarded as the
spirit of both Judaism and Kantian morality) that Jesus' religion of
love transcends and abolishes both duty and the law (T J 3Z43Z61ETW ZI3-ZIS).
s This is another polemic against Fries, whose ethics of conviction (see
I40, note n) was often given a religious set~ng.
6 In Hegel's time there was no military conscription in Prussia (see
below z7 I, note z). But after it was introduced later in the
nineteenth century, religious objections to military service were
recognized there, until the time ofthe Franco-Prussian War.
7 Mter I 8 Is, there was a resurgence of anti-Semitism in many quarters
(not least among the liberal German nationalist wing of the student
Brmcllerzsdtafierz). More specifically, the 'viewpoint' criticized here is
probably that of Hegel's enemy Fries, in his vicious pamphlet of I 8 I6:
Jews can be s11bjects of our government, but as Jews they can
never become cilizeru of our people, for as Jews they want to be a
distinct people, and so they necessarily separate themselves from
our German national community. Indeed, they form not merely a
people, but at the same time they form a slate. The basic laws of
Jewish religion are at the same time the basic laws of their state,

their rabbis are at the same time their chiefs, to whom the people
owe the highest reverence and the most blind obedience ...
Their nationality signifies in itself only their physical origin
from a distinct people. Here we have to judge them as favourably
as possible. No man who loves justice wants to stand by the
proposition that black is the colour of slaves, or any other proposition of that kind. In every civilized state, the same innate rights
of a free man, equal protection and equal civil rights, pertain to
everyone, whether by origin a Saxon, Wend, or Jew. But let us
observe that we may not concede these same innate rights to
anyone if he is not ready to fulfil to the state in full measure all the
duties of a free man and a citizen. And here, even disregarding
religion, state, and trade, and considering their mere derivation,
we encounter the first great failing of Jewishness. They have
existed for millennia between all other peoples on the earth, and
they have cultivated themselves only in becoming rich through
bargaining and haggling; they teach this to one another and that is
how they preserve the purity of their race ...
It is not against the Jews, our brothers, but against J ewish7less,
that we declare war . . . Jewislmess is a relic of an earlier,
uncivilized age, which must not be merely limited, but wholly
extirpated. To improve the civil condition of the Jews would be
precisely to extirpate J ffi17J', to destroy the society of conniving
second-hand street peddlers and tradesmen ... For the Jews
themselves it is of the greatest importance thatJewishness should
be made an end of as soon as possible ...
So the Jewish caste, wherever it has been admitted, has always
had over the whole people, above and below, from the highest to
the lowest, a frightful demoralizing power. Here is the most
important moment of this whole affair: that this caste sho11ld be
extirpated root a7ld brm~eh, sb~ee of all societies a7ld states, secret or
p11blic, it is plaildy the most da11gero11s to the state.
(Fries, GD) 3 12, 1o--11, 18)
8 This is a reference to Chancellor Hardenberg's 'Edict Concerning
the Ovil Relations oftheJews' (11 March 1812), which declared that
Jews were to enjoy full equality of civil and political rights in Prussia.
9 Hegel takes this to be the condition of the Christian Middle Ages, cf.
PhG
484-487, VPG 385-400/318-336.
10 Giordano Bruno (1548-16oo) was an Italian philosopher, condemned by the Church for pantheism and the denial of Church
authority. He was declared a heretic and burned at the stake in Rome.
11 Galilee Galilei (1564-1642) defended the Copernican theory that the
459
.Votes to pages JOo-JOs

earth moves about the sun in bit; Dialogue Otl tire T11J0 Clrief World
Systertls (I632). In I634 he was called before the Court of the Inquisition and compelled to abjure his doctrine that the earth moves, which
had been declared heretical in I6I6. With all due deliberate speed in
righting the Church's past wrongs, Pope John Paul II reversed the
Church's condemnation of the Copernican theory in I979, admitting
that the Church had done Galileo an injustice. Hegel's mention of the
cases of Bruno and Galileo may have been occasioned in part by the
Roman Church's re-establishment of the Inquisition in both Italy and
Spain in I8I4.
12 In the concluding section of his treatise Signatrtr des Zeitaltm
(Signatrtre of tire Age) (I82o-I823), Friedrich Schlegel praises the
thinkers of bit; age who have variously propounded and defended the
idea of a 'Christian state, with an absolute monarchical constitution,
founded on the institution of the Church' (Friedrich Schlegel Kritisclre
ArtSgabe VII, p. S6I); this seems to be the idea of the 'unification of
Church and state' which Hegel has in mind. Schlegel gives chief
credit for developing this idea to Adam Miiller (I779-I829), Elert~ente
der Staatslmnst (Berlin: Sander, I8o9); others he especiaUy credits are:
Louis Gabriel Ambroise, Vicomte Bonald (I754-I84o), Karl Ludwig
von Haller, Joseph Gorres (I776-I84B), and Joseph deMaistre
(I753-I82I).
I 3 Cf. Aristotle, Politics I .2. I 253a: 'The city has priority over the household and over any individual, for the whole must be prior to the parts.
Separate a hand or foot from the whole body and they will no longer
be a hand or a foot- except in name, as one might speak of a hand or
foot sculptured in stone.'
271
I Under the Roman Republic, it was customary for a general to have a
personal bodyguard, made up of his friends and clients, called his
'praetorians' (from praetorirtrtl, a Roman army headquarters). Later
these private armies grew in size and consisted largely of mercenaries.
The resulting system of private armies turned the de facto government of Rome more and more into a military dictatorship, leading to
the fall of the Republic and the transition to the Empire, whose rulers
often became emperor through their positions of military command.
2 After its humiliating defeat by the French in I8o6, the Prussian army
was reorganized under Stein's reforms. The directors of the military
reforms were August GrafNeidhartvon Gneisenau (I76o-I83 I) and
Gerhard von Scharnhorst (I755-I8I3). The plan of the reformers
was to end the nobility's exclusive privileges in the officer corps, and

replace an army of mercenaries with a 'citizen army' for which all
adult males would be eligible. A system of conscription was to be
instituted, and at least minimal military training was to be provided (as
Scharnhorst colourfully put it) for 'anyone who can piss against a
wall'. The conservative nobility prevented these plans from being
carried out, but the political values which lay behind them would
naturally be endorsed by those (such as Hegel and Gans) who shared
the goals of the reform era. (See Friedrich Meinecke, The Age of
Gen11a11 Liberatio11 IJ9s-rBrs (I9o6), tr. Peter Paret (Berkeley:
University of California Press, I977), Chapter s; and Constantin de
Grunwald, Baro11 Stei11: Elltll{)' of Napo/eo11, tr. C. F. Atkinson
(London: Cape, I940), Chapter 8, especially pp. IZ4-I3I.)
2]2
I This i; evidently another reference 1D Fries, whose treatise 771e Gertnilll Fetleratio11 a11d Gen11m1 Co11stitutim1 advocated 'a pure German
Federal state' in the form of 'a republican union' of all Germanspeaking peoples (Fries, DBS 1, I67-I68, cf. u, uz).
z Kant (RL 49. 3I6-3I818I-84) regarded the separation of executive and legislative powers as the fundamental principle of a republican form of government. The originator of the idea of separation of
powers, however, was the constitutional monarchist Montesquieu (see
Tlze Spirit oftlze Laws 1, u.6).

3 Universality, particularity, and individuality are the three moments of
the concept in Hegel's speculative logic (WL VI, Z73-3oo/6oo-6ZI;
EL I63-I65).
4 The French Revolution of I789, as well as the English Civil War of
I64o, involved conflicts between the Crown (the executive) and the
Parliament or Estates (the legislative).
2 73
I In place of Montesquieu's division of governmental powers into
executive, legislative, and judiciary, Hegel constructs his division on
the three moments of the concept (see above 272, notes z and 3).
z For this taxonomy of constitutions, see Aristotle, Politics 37.1279a
and Montesquieu, Tlze Spirit oftlze Laws 1, 3
3 Cf. EL 99
4 Fichte firmly believes that there must be a check on the power of the
government, but he is equally opposed to any division of powers
~Votes
5
6
7
8
to pages JO()-JI2
within the state. His solution ID this dilemma ic; to de\ise an institution
which he called the 'ephorate'. The ephors ('overseers') are to be a
group of the oldest and wisest citizens, chosen by the people. They
are to have no governmental power themselves, but they are
empowered to dissolve the government at any time and call a comention of the people to sit in judgement on those who had been in charge
of it (Fichte GNR I66-I78Izs3-27I).
Montesquieu, Tile Spirit oftile Lmus I, 33 I, 5-I-7.
Montesquieu, Tile Spirit oftile Lmus I, I I.6.
Montesquieu, Tile Spirit oftile La'lfJs I, 34 I, s.8.
Montesquieu, 17ze Spirit oftile La'lfJs 1, 3-7-IO, 1, 5-9-12. For Hegel's
discussion of 'honour' as the principle of early modem feudal
monarchy, see PhG ,, sos-s Io.
Despite his general advocacy of written, codified laws (see PR
211-2 I 8), in P R Hegel is silent on the question of whether the
constitution should be written. In I8I7 Hegel was a supporter of the
king's plan for a written constitution in his home state of Wiirttemberg, and criticized those who prevented the plan from being adopted
(see L W). In Prussia, too, the issue of a written constitution had been
raised. In I8IO, and again in IBIS, Friedrich Wilhelm III promised in
writing that he would draw up a written constitution. In I8Ig both
Hardenberg and Humboldt drew up constitutional plans (which,
especially in their prO\isions for representative government, both follow the earlier plans devised by Stein and bear a striking resemblance
to the political system described in PR). In I8Ig conservatives gained
ascendancy over the reformers (see Preface, note I 8), Humboldt was
dismissed and the king's promises for a written constitution (which
were opposed by the conservatives) were never fulfilled. Hegel's pronouncements in his lectures on the relation of the constitution to
written law and to the legislative power are various and not easily
reconciled with each other. Some suggest that the constitution is
something beyond written law, and which must always remain so:
'The constitution itself lies outside the legislative power; but in the
development of the laws lies also the development of the constitution'
(VPRig 259). In other places, however, the constitution is spoken of
along with the laws, as one moment of the state:
In the concept of the state three moments are contained: [I]
the universal, rational will, partly as the constitution and the laws
of the constitution, partly as the laws in the genuine sense - the
constitution itself and the legislative power; [z] . . . the govern(VPRI7 ISI)
mental power; [3) ... the sovereign power.
Notes to pages JI2-JI4

2 74
I Napoleon expelled the Bourbons from Spain in I8o8 and established

his brother Joseph Bonaparte as Spanish monarch under the Constitution of Bayonne. Devised according to Jacobin principles, this
constitution gave the king very little power, completely disenfranchised the clergy, and invested chief authority in the Cortes (or
Estates), from which the royal ministers were barred (see 300, note
I). The Constitution of Bayonne was eJo.tremely unpopular: the
Spaniards had no experience with representative institutions, and no
politically educated middle class; they resented the impositioQ of
French ideas on them; they were disoriented by the absence of royal
authority in their political life and outraged by the exclusion of the
Church from all political influence. Largely through British naval
power, the French were driven out of Spain in I8IZ-I8I3; the Cortes
formulated the equally liberal Constitution of Cadiz, but it was no
more favourably received than the Constitution of Bayonne had been,
and never really took effect. When the Bourbon King Ferdinand VII
was restored in I8I4, the people are said to have greeted the event
with cries of 'Long live the absolute King!' and 'Down with the
Constitution!' It is revealing of Hegel's general political orientation
that he regards the Constitution of Bayonne as inherently rational and
ascribes its failure solely to the political immaturity of the Spanish
nation.
275
I 'The constitution and laws comprise the foundation of the sovereign
power, and the sovereign must govern according to them' (VPRI7
I6z).
276
I See z6g, note I.
277
I Under feudal institutions, which still existed in many German states
at the end of the eighteenth century, some state functions (e.g. a
military command, a magistracy or local administrative authority over
a certain territory) were the hereditary property of a noble family. The
administrative and military reorganization of the Prussian state under
Notes to pages JirJ23

Stein abolished such functions, replacing them with civil servants
appointed by the king. This was achieved chiefly by doing away with
the system in which the departments rf government were divided
along regional lines, and put in the hands of local administrators,
replacing it with a system of ministries with nationwide responsibility
for specific departments of government (see 289). The idea that all
offices in the state, including that of the sovereign, are private property, was one of the basic principles of Haller's theory of the state (see
Preface, note IS and 258, note 3). He maintained. that the
fundamental error of the Pmssia11 Gerteral Legal Code of I794 was
Frederick the Great's erroneous Enlightenment notion that state officials are 'servants of the state' whose functions are public rather than
private property (Haller, Reslat~ratiorz 1, pp. I8I-I8s).
278
I
cr. EN 371.
279
I Regarding Socrates' daimo11, see Plato, Apo/o?J 3 I. The Greeks
sometimes made political decisions based on the advice of oracles
(e.g. the oracle of Apollo at Delphi) or on the results of divination,
using the entrails of animals or the flight of birds.
z8o
For Hegel's defence of the ontological proof of God's existence
against Kant's objections, see EL 52, VR 11, 5I8-s2g/m, 4I6-430.
2 Compare the following remarks from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of
I8I7-I8I8 and his Berlin lectures of I8I9-I82o: 'The monarch acts
only as a subject, and only what is objective in an action can be
justified. Hence he is not [to be held) responsible' (VPRI7 I64).
Laws and institutions are something in and for themselves, and
the monarch does not decide them ... The responsibility can fall
only on the ministers. To be responsible means that actions must
be according to the constitution and so on. This objective side
pertains to the ministers. The majesty of the monarch is not at all
to be held responsible for the actions of the government ... It is
the government which must always finally take up [the people's)
thoughts about improving things.
(VPRig 252-253, 246)
These quotations echo the words of Article I3 of the French 'Charte
.Votes to pages J2rJ25

constitutionelle' of IBis: 'The person of the king 6 inviolable and
sacred. His ministers are responsible' 0. Godechot, Les Corzstitutirms
de Ia Fra1ue deptlis 1789 (Paris: Gamier-Fiammarion, I970), p. 219).
This provision was understood in one way by the ultra-royalists and in
another by constitutionalists. The ultras took it to mean that the
ministers are responsible to the kirzg, and the king is utterly inviolable,
responsible to no one (but God). Constitutionalists, such as Benjamin
Constant (I767-I83o), Victor Cousin (I79Z-I867), Pierre RoyerCollard (q6J-I84s), and Fram;ois Guizot (I787-I874), interpreted
it as meaning that the ministers are responsible to the people, and that
since they are, the substantive decision-making powers ought to lie
with them; that, in their ~iew, is the price the royalists must pay for the
inviolability of the king. Here Hegel is expressing agreement with the
constitutionalist interpretation of the principle of sovereign-imiolability and executive-responsibility.
2&
I In Hegel's time, the notion of elective monarchy was associated with
the institution of the Holy Roman Emperor, who was chosen by a
college of six electors, whose positions were hereditary. Hegel is
probably also thinking of the elective monarchy in Poland (VPRI9
Z47; VPG 5 I714Z7)
z The motto of Fries's The Gen11arz Federatio11 arzd Genrzarz Cmzstitutiorz
(I8I6) was: 'Frederick [the Great] alone appeared and from the
throne declared the sovereign to be the first servant of the state'
(Fries, DBS z). Fries was quoting from August Ludwig Schltizer
(I7JS-I8og), Al/gemei11e StaaJsrechts- tmd Staatsveifassungslehre (Gtittingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1793), p. zg, but Frederick's
remark was famous and often quoted (e.g. by Kant, EF Jszhoi).
Hegel denies that 'first servant' is an appropriate title for the
sovereign (VPRI9 z48).
3 See, for example, above PR I8z-I8g.
4 The weakness of the Holy Roman Empire was treated by Hegel in his
early untitled manuscript now customarily called 'The German Constitution' (DV). The 'Golden Bull' of IJS6 established the system of
electors for the Holy Roman Empire. From the time of the election of
Charles V in IS I9, the emperor had to agree to an 'electoral contract',
which involved recognizing the electors' proprietary right in certain
offices.
5 Cf. Rousseau's remark: 'I admit that all power comes from God. But
all disease also comes from him. Does that mean that it is forbidden to
call for a doctor?' (Rousseau, 17te SCJcial Cmttract 1, Ch. 3).

6 After his victories over Prussia and Austria, Napoleon met Tsar Alexander I at Erfurt in October I 8o8. Representatives of a number of the
conquered German states attended, in the hope of gaining concessions from him by adopting the position of dutiful subjects petitioning
their sovereign. The quoted remark indicates the manner in which
Napoleon rebuffed them.
282
I Compare the following remark from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
'Spirit, in the absolute certainty of itself, is master over every deed and
actuality, and can cast them off, and make them as if they had never
happened' (PhG, 667).
28J
I Compare the following remarks from Hegel's Heidelberg lectures of
I8I7-I8I8:
The ministers must be chosen by the sovereign, and he also
has to choose all the other officials, but he can arbitrarily dismiss
only the former ... [But] the guarantee of the Estates of the realm
in particular requires the monarch to take up suitable subjects,
and requires that the ministers be chosen on the basis of talent,
virtue, rectitude, and diligence. The Prince Regent [of England,
later King George IV, governing during the incompetency of his
father George III] who had his friends in the opposition party and
his enemies in the ministry, could not, when he took up the
regency, make his friends into ministers. Hence the French
ministry [in I 8 I 7 under King Louis XVIII] is made up of
enemies of the royal family, the ultra-royalists. These examples
show that the choice of ministers in a well-constituted monarchy
is not a matter of the mere arbitrary will of the regent.
(VPRI7 I66-I67)
284
I Regarding the accountability r1 executive officials, see above z8o,
note 2.
Notes to pages J2cr3JI
288
I Here Hegel follows Stein's reforms of I807-I8o8, which created
local government by municipal councils:
Local administration was to be the sphere of self-government
and elected officials. This innovation could be based on the
existing administration of the rural diStrict [Laudkreis]; [that
administrator] was a representative of- and nominated by- the
county Estates, and [was] simultaneously a state official by royal
appointment.
(Friedrich .Meinecke, The Age of Genuau liberatiou, I'J9s-J8rs
(I906), p. 74 [English translation amended])
Again, Hegel's executive is structured according to Stein's reforms:

Stein demanded the replacement of cabinet government by a
ministerial system. He wanted the Council of Ministers to work
directly with the king so that major decisions were no longer
made in the monarch's office but in council. It is no exaggeration
to regard Stein's proposals as a revolt of the senior bureaucracy
against the autocratic absolutism in power until then, as a
preparation for the eventual transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy ... He introduced another fiJndamental change
in the position of the ministers: they no longer administered
separate provinces but were now responsible for departments that
covered the entire state . . . Departmental ministries were
established for interior affairs, finance, foreign affairs, war and
justice.
(Meinecke, 111e Age oJGen11a11 liberatiou, pp. 70-72)
This is an allusion to Hobbes's description of the state of nature as a

'war of all against all' (Leviathan 1, Ch. IJ; De cive, Preface).
290
I See 288, note I and 289, note I.
Elsewhere Hegel also criticizes the French system in which local
officials are appointed by the central government (VP G 537/454).
291
I During Hegel's lifetime, the ministry and highest levels of the civil
service and the military were open only to the nobility. Hegel appears
to have accepted this situation in some of his early writings (cf. NR
48c)/C)9-IOO). Stein attempted to reform this system, making
everyone legally eligible for all state offices; but his proposals were
successfully resisted by the nobility. In PR, Hegel evidently favours
Stein's plan. In his lectures, Hegel indicates that the 'objective qualifications' are to be determined by examinations: 'The only condition
of entry into the universal estate is the proof of one's capacity. Hence
examinations must be arranged, in order to prove this capacity'
(VPRI7 I7I).
294
I This closely follows the Pntssiml Ge11e,.al Legal Code's provisions for
the rights and duties of civil servants (Part z, Title IO).
295
I This is an allusion to the celebrated legal battle involving Arnold the
Miller of Ziillichau. The Miller was unable to pay his rent after the
Count von Schmettau cut off the water to his mill in order to build a
fish pond. For several years the Miller was denied justice, until
Frederick the Great himself heard his case. He found in the Miller's
favour and dismissed three magistrates who had earlier ruled against
the Miller.
298
I This change was effected in the Pn1Ssia11 Ge11eral Legal Code, Part z,
Title I 4, I 1. Through an executive order of I 8zo the lands were
used as collateral for state debt.
z Before I495, the Holy Roman Emperor dispensed justice personally
through the Imperial Court of Justice (Reichs/l(fgericht). In that year
the imperial reform movement, led by Archbishop Berthold von Henneberg of Mainz (I484-I504) created the Imperial Cameral Court
(Reichskammergeric/11), controlled not by the Emperor Maximilian I
(reigned I493-I5I9) but by the Imperial Estates (see 258, note 4).
The emperor appointed the chief justice and two presidents, but
sixteen associate justices were nominated by the Imperial Estates. By

I648 these associate justices had grOINil to over fifty in number (see J.
Zophy (ed.} Tile Ho(J' Roma11 Empire, pp. 232-234}.
299
I Such provisions were still included in the Pmssim1 Gel1era/ Legal Code
ri I794: 'Through investiture the vassal assumes the duty ri fealty to
the chief proprietor, and the services or other obligations bound up
with the possession of the tier (Part I, Title I8, I43}.
Joo
I Members of the executive were excluded from all legislative functions

according to Section 3, 4 of the French revolutionary constitution of
I79I. The rationale for this was Rousseau's insistence that the
government, or executive power, which applies the laws to particular
cases, should be distinct from the sovereign- the people (or, as the
revolutionaries interpreted it, their representatives} - who makes the
laws (Social Cm1tract Ill, Ch. I}. Hegel intends the executive to have a
share in legislation, not by themselves being members of the Estates
(after the English model}, but instead by advising on and proposing
laws. The Estates, on the other hand, are to be the legislative province
exclusively of the private estate (see 303}. In the constitutional
proposals for Wiirttemberg, which Hegel favoured, the Crown
(through the executive} was to initiate all legislative proposals, but the
Estates were to have the power of veto over all legislation affecting
personal freedom or property or the constitution; the Estates might,
however, submit legislative proposals to the Crown, and if the proposals were rejected, the Crown would have to give reasons for the
rejection (L W 470lz53}. In Wilhelm von Humboldt's I8I9 constitutional plan for Prussia, it was similarly provided that only the Crown
could initiate legislation, but the Estates were to have the power of
veto over legislation generally; there were special provisions regarding
consent to taxation by the Estates and for the rejection of a governmental administration by the Estates (cf. below, 30I, note 2}
(Wilhelm von Humboldt, 'Denkschrift iiber PreuBens stiindische
Verfassung (I8I9}', Gesammelte Scllrifierl XII.I, ed. Bruno Gebhardt
(Berlin: Behr, I904}, 23-42, pp. 236-243}.
2 Cf. 272R,A.
JOI
I In Hegel's day, the voting franchise throughout Europe (where it

existed at all} was not only limited to males, but further restricted by
Notes to pages J4D-342

property or occupational qualifications. Among those (such as Hegel)
who advocated the introduction of representative institutions where
they had not pre\-iously existed, all but the most radical favoured such
electoral qualifications. In the proposed constitution for Wiirttemberg, for instance, voters had to be twenty-five years of age and have
an income of at least zoo guilders from real property (L W 47ol:zs3).
Hegel supported this provision, regarding the property qualification
as 'insignificant' (L W 48I/:z6:z). Kant argues that eligibility fa'active' citizenship should be restricted ID those who are, by occupation, 'their own masters'; this is intended to exclude not only all
women and children, but also all servants, wage labourers and tenant
farmers (RL 46, JIJ-3ISI78-8o). The main reason for all such
restrictions on the franchise was the idea that those who are economically dependent on others would therefore be obliged to vote in a
manner prescribed by their patrons, and so there would he no point in
extending the franchise to them.
:z In his Heidelberg lectures of I817-IBI8, Hegel maintains that the
government must always have the support of the majority party in the
Estates, and that there must also be an opposition party (apparently
after the English model):
Hence there must always be an opposition within the Estates
assembly; the ministry must be in the majority in an Estates
assembly, but the existence of an opposition is equally necessary .
. . If in general the ministry is in the minority, then another
ministry must step into the place of this ministry, and it can hold
its place only as long as it in general has the majority for it.
(VPRI7 I87)
J02
I Compare the following remarks from Hegel's Erzcyclopaedia:

The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the
'people': but as such an aggregate it is v11lglls, not pop11lru: and in
this regard the principal aim of the state should be that the people
should not exist or come to power and action, as s11cll arz aggregate.
That condition of the people is a condition of lawlessness,
unethicality, brutishness: in it the people is only a shapeless, wild,
blind force.
(EG 544)
:z Cf. EL 1g:z.
470
.Votes to pages J4rJSI

JOJ
1
In the constitutional projects of Stein, and the later proposal of

Wilhelm von Humboldt, representatives were to be deputies of corporations, not of geographical districts (Humboldt, 'Denkschrift',
Gesarnmelte Sclzrijter1 XII.I, 6I-62, pp. 252-253). In Hardenberg's
constitutional proposal, the deputies to the general Estates were to be
chosen from and by the provincial Estates assemblies, but the latter
were representatives of corporations (Hardenberg, 'Verfassungsentwurf fiir PreuBen vom 3 Mai 1819 in Form eines Kg!. Kabinetsbefehles', printed in Alfred Stem, Geschidlte Europas r8rs-r8-p 1
(Berlin: Hertz, 1894), pp. 649-653.) One of Hegel's criticisms of the
English system ofrepresentation generally, and of the English Reform
Bill of r83I in particular, was the fact that Members of Parliament
were elected from geographical districts; there was nothing to ensure
that voters would have social or economic solidarity with their
representatives. Under these circumstances, Hegel thought, extension of the franchise has chiefly the effect of alienating voters from the
political process by making each individual vote that much less significant (RB 113/318).
310
I
In the constitutional proposal for Wiirttemberg, there were no property qualifications for deputies, but eligibility was restricted by age
(thirty years minimum) and religion (deputies had to be members of
either the Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist Churches). Further,
Crown officials, clergy, physicians, and lawyers were all barred from
serving as deputies (L W 469/z52). Hegel does not comment on the
age. or religious qualifications, but he endorses the occupational
restrictions, especially the prohibition against lawyers. He quotes
Napoleon's remark that lawyers are 'the people most unfitted to
advise on and transact public business' (L W 473lz56). Hegel's advocacy of these restrictions and of property qualifications reflects the
opinion that deputies to the Estates should be genuine representatives
of the people (that is, members of the specific professions and corporations they represent); they should not be professional politicians.
JI2
I
Like Hegel's theory of representation here, both Harden berg's and

Humboldt's constitutional plans called for a bicameral Estates assembly, with an 'upper house' (analogous to the British House of Lords)
47I
Notes to pages JSI-358

composed of the hereditary nobility (Humboldt, 'Dcnkschrift',
Gestmnnelte Scllrifiell XIL I, 6o, p. 252; Harden berg, 'Verfassungsentwurr, Stem, Gesclucllte EriTopas I, p. 6so). The constitutional proposal
for Wiirttemberg, however, was unicameral; it provided fifty-three
seats for the nobility and seventy-three for elected representatives
(L W 47IIz54).
JIJ
I
2
Ariosto, Orltmdo fiuioso 28. I.

The quotation is from Goethe, 'Sprichwortlich', Goetlres poetisclre
Werke I (Stuttgart: Cotta, I959), p. 44I:
What should I say?
The masses can fight, anyway.
At that, at least, they are respectable.
But at judging, they are miserable.
3 In I78o, Frederick the Great proposed as the theme of an essay

competition whether it could ever be 11seji1/ for a ruler to deceive the
people.
318
I
Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures on world

history:
The spirit's inward development has outgrown the world it
inhabits, and it is about to progress beyond it. Its self-consciousness no longer finds satisfaction in the present, but its dissatisfaction has not yet enabled it to discover what it wants ... Worldhistorical individuals are those who-were the first to formulate the
desires of their fellows explicitly.
(VG 97/84)
JI9
I
When PR was published, it was subject (under the Carlsbad Decrees)

to the censorship from which it here declares that scientific works
should be exempt (sec Preface, note I 8).
After a Roman victory, it became customary to hold a 'triumph' (a
triumphal procession celebrating the conquest and honouring the
general). The most prominent example of what Hegel refers to is
Suetonius' description of the behaviour of Julius Caesar's soldiers
during his triumph after his victories over Gaul. Caesar had recently
given preferments to a man named Nicomcdcs in gratitude for his
sexual favours. During Caesar's triumph, his soldiers arc suppost.-d to
472
Notes to pages 358-]6I

have followed his chariot, chanting irreverent verses which comically
juxtapose Caesar's glorious conquest with the rather less glorious
conquest of Caesar himself by Nicomedes:
Caesar did subdue the Gauls, and him did Nicomedes subdue.
Behold how Caesar triumphs, who did the Gauls subdue.
But Nicomedes does not triumph, though he Caesar did subdue.
(Suetonius, Gaius Julius Caesar 49)
]22
I Hegel's high praise for the modem nation state has given him the
reputation of being a cultural nationalist But from what Hegel says
here in 3 22R, it is clear that despite what both some of his Prussian
interpreters and liberal enemies have maintained, he would not have
looked favourably on the swallowing up of the smaller German states
(including his own homeland of Wiirttemberg) by Prussia, as
occurred later in the nineteenth century. Unlike Fries, he did not
advocate that the various German nations should form a political
union; in fact, he was generally opposed to this. See Franz
Rosenzweig, Hegel rmd der Staatn (Berlin: Oldenburg, I920), p. I68
and Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modem State (Cambridge
University Press, I972), pp. 45-46, 7g-8o, 24o-24I. Nevertheless,
Hegel's views about the relationship between the cultural and political
realms were not inflexible: 'Small states can be united into a larger
one, if this larger state formed out of them is well organized' (VPR IV,
732).
324
I
cr. NR 48r/93 The reference to 'perpetual peace' is an allusion to

Kant, E F. Hegel's metaphor of the winds over the sea seems also to
be an allusion to a remark by the French statesman, economist, and
philosopher of history Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (I727-I78I),
whose views concerning the effects of war on human progress were
well-known:
War desolates only the frontier of empires; [in war], towns and
country places continue to breathe in the bosom of peace; the ties
of society unite a greater number of men; the communication of
ideas becomes more prompt and further spread; the arts,
sciences, and manners make progress at a more rapid rate. Thus
like the storm which agitates the waves of the sea, the evils
inseparable from revolutions disappear, the good remains and
humanity perfects itself.
473

('Discourse at the Sorbonne on the Successive Advancements of
the Human Mind' (17 so), CErwres de Trtrgoll, ed. Gustave Schelle
(Paris: Alcan, 1913), p. 218)
2 Cf. 334, 337
3 Perhaps an allusion to the dying words of Shakespeare's King Henry
IV, Kirrg Henry IV. PaTt Two, IV.v.I81-213.
4 See above, 259, note 1.
J26
1 See above, 271, note 2.

327
1 In 1751, Lord Robert Clive (1725-1774) was besieged in the citadel

of Arcot in India. At twenty-six, he was not an experienced officer and
he had only 500 soldiers to defend the citadel against 18,ooo men, led
by Raja Chandra Sahib, nawab ofCamatic. Mter fifty days, Clive had
only about 320 men left and Raja Sahib decided to storm the fort.
Mter one hour, the attackers retreated, having lost over 400 men,
while Clive had lost only six. The siege was then lifted, and Clive had
begun Inaking his legendary reputation as a British military hero in
India.
J28
1 Cf. Hegel's earlier description of war, and the effect of the introduction of firearms on the attitude of soldiers:
The military estate and war are the actual sacrifice of the selfthe danger of death for the individual, his looking at his abstract
i(llmediate negativity, just as he is his immediate positive self ...
The end is the maintenance of the totality, against the enemy who
is out to destroy it. This extemalization must have this same
a~stract form, must be without individuality - death, coldly
received and given, not in a standing fight where each individual
looks his opponent in the eye and kills him out of immediate
hatred, but instead by giving and receiving death emptily, impersorral/y, out the smoke gunpowder.
(JR 261-262II71)
J29
1 This is probably intended as a rebuttal of Kant's contention that

republican governments are most conducive to peace (EF 3511Ioo).
474
Notes to pages 366-J7I

z William Pitt 'the Younger' (I7Sri8o6) became Prime 1\linister of
England in I783. Personally, Pitt was initially disposed toward peace
with the French Republic, but in I 793, after the execution of Louis
:X'VI, he yielded to popular sentiment (and the urgings of such foes of
the Revolution as Edmund Burke). Organizing a coalition of states
(including Holland, Spain, and Portugal), he attempted to bring down
the revolutionary Republic ('War of the First Coalition'). The coalition soon dissolved, and the war was effectively ended by the Peace
of Campo Formio in April I797 (to which, however, the British were
not a party). In I798 Pitt attempted to assemble a new coalition,
enlisting Russia and Austria as allies ('War of the Second Coali~on').
But once again the effort was unsuccessful; Russia withdrew in I799
and Austria agreed to a separate peace at Luneville in I8oi. By that
time, Pitt's war policy had become extremely unpopular in England,
and he resigned as Prime Minister in I8oi.
JJI
I On the Peace of Campo Formio, see 32.9, note 2..
lJ7
I For example, by Kant, EF 37tr3861I I6-I30, who was himself
alluding to Christian Garve, Abha711llrmg iiber die Verbi111lrmg der Moral
mit der Politik (Treatise Otl the Comzectimz of Morality with Politics)
(I788).
JJ8
I On this point, Hegel is apparently agreeing with Kant:
No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility
as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future
time of peace. Such acts would include the employment of assassit~s
(permssores) or poismzers (ve~zefia), breach of agreemetzts, tire

hzstigatiotl oftreasmz (perd11ellio) within the enemy state, etc.
(Kant, EF 346/)
340
I The dictum Die Weltgescllichte ist das Weltgericlzt ('World history is the
world's court of judgement') is often attributed to Hegel himself; but
475
.Votes to pages J7I-J7J

he is actually quoting it from the penultimate stanza of Schiller's
poem 'Resignation' (1794) (Schiller, 1Verke 111 (Frankfurt: lnsel,
1966), pp. 61-62).
343
I Cf. The following famous passage from Rousseau's second discourse:
[It is] the faculty of self-perfection, which, by the help of

circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and
is inherent as much in the species as in the individual. It would be
melancholy were we forced to admit that this distinctive and
almost wilimited faculty is the source of all human misfortunes;
that it is this which, in time, draws man out of his original state, in
which he would have spent his days insensibly in peace and
innocence; that it is this faculty, which, successively producing in
different ages his discoveries and his errors, his vices and his
virtues, makes him at length a tyrant both over himself and over
nature.
(Rousseau, Discorme 011 the Origitz ofltzequality, in 17ze Social Cmztract a11d Discourses, tr. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950),
pp.2o8-209)
A less pessimistic estimate of the same trait was provided by a number
of thinkers between Rousseau and Hegel. See, for instance, Herder's
discussion of the same quality under the name 'Hrmumitiit'- 'the end
of human nature [through which] God has put the fate of our race in
its own hands' (Ideas T011Jard the Philosoph)' of History of Marzki1zd,
Herders Siimtliclze 1Verke, ed. B. Suphan (Berlin: Weidmann, r8n1913), XID, pp. II5-166, XIV, pp. 204-252).
2 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-178I), 'The Education of the
Human Race' (1780), Lessi1zg's 17zeologica/1Vritings, tr. Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 82-g8.
3 Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history and on the E11C]'dopaedia:
The business of spirit is to produce itself, to make itself its own
object, and to gain knowledge of itself; in this way, it exists for
itself ... The spirit produces and realizes itself in the light of its
knowledge of itself; it acts in such a way that all its knowledge of
itself is also realized. Thus everything depends on spirit's selfawareness; if the spirit knows that it is free, it is altogether different from what it would be without this knowledge ... The aim
of world history, therefore, is that spirit should attain knowledge

of its own true nature, that it should objectivize this knowledge
and transfonn it into a real world, and give itself an objective
existence.
(VG 56, 74/48, 64)
K1ww thyself, this absolute commandment, considered either in

itself or where its expression first occurred historically, does not
have the significance merely of a self-knowledge in respect of the
partiadar selfs capacities, character, inclinations and weaknesses;
rather, its significance is the knowledge of the truth of humanity
and the true in and for itself, of the essmce of spirit . . . The
demand for self-knowledge made by the Delphic Apollo on the
Greeks thus does not have the meaning of a law imposed on the
human spirit externally by an alien power; on the contrary, the
god who impels us to self-knowledge is nothing other than the
absolute law of spirit itself.
(EG 377,A)
'Know thyself was the Delphic oracle's injunction to Socrates.
345
1
Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history:
World history moves on a higher plane than that to which
morality properly belongs, for the sphere of morality is that of
private convictions, the conscience of individuals, and their own
particular will and mode of action; and the latter have their value,
imputation and reward or punishment within themselves.
Whatever is required and accomplished by the ultimate end of
the spirit, which exists in and for itself, and whatever providence
does, transcends the obligations, liability and responsibility which
attach to individuality by virtue of its ethical existence. Those
who, on ethical grounds (and hence with a noble intention), have
resisted what the progress of the Idea of the spirit required, stand
higher in moral worth th!!n those whose crimes have been transfanned by a higher order into the instruments of realizing its will.
But in revolutions of this kind, both parties alike stand within the
same circle of corruptible existence, so that it is merely a fonnal
kind of justice, abandoned by the living spirit and by God, which
those who have the existing law on their side defend. The deeds
of the great men who are the individuals of world history thus
appear justified not only in their inner significance (of which the
individuals in question are unconscious) but also in a secular
sense. But from this latter point of view, no representations
477

should be made against world historicai deeds and those who
perform them by moral circles to which such individuals do not
belong. The litany of private virtues - modesty, humility, charity,
liberality, etc.- must not be raised against them. (VG I7Ih41)
347
I
The nation must know the universal on which its ethical life is
based and before which the particular vanishes away, and it must
therefore know the determinations which underlie its justice and
religion . . . This spiritual self-consciousness is the nation's
supreme achievement ... The nation now has both a real and an
ideal existence. At such a time, we shall therefore find that the
nation derives satisfaction from the idea of virtue and from discussion of it - discussion which may either coexist with virtue
itself or become a substitute for it. All this is the work of the
spirit, which knows how to bring the unretlected - i.e. the merely
factual - to the point of reflecting on itself. It thereby becomes
conscious to some degree of the limitation of such determinate
things as belief, trUSt and custom, so that the consciousness now
has reasons for renouncing the latter and the laws which they
impose. This is indeed the inevitable result of any search for
reasons ... This dissolvingactivityofthoughtalso inevitably gives
rise to a new principle ... Spirit, in its new inward determination,
has new interests and ends beyond those which it formerly possessed.
(VG I78-r8olr45-I47)
J-t8
I
2
a. vG 96--iJS/Sz-84 and 3 8, note

I
I.
(World-historical individuals] cannot be said to have enjoyed
what is commonly called happiness ... It was not happiness that
they chose, but exertion, conflict, and labour in the service of
their end And even when they reached their goal, peaceful
enjoyment and happiness were not their lot. Their actions are
their entire being, and their whole nature and character are
determined by their ruling passion. When their end is attained,
they fall aside like empty husks ... They die early like Alexander,

are murdered like Caesar, or deported like Napoleon. One may
well ask what they gained for themselves. What they gained was
that concept or end which they succeeded in realizing. Other
kinds of gain, such as peaceful enjoyment, were denied them.
(VG 99/85)
JSO
I Cf. ISO,note2.
JSS
I Peter Feddersen Stuhr (I787-I8SI), under the pseudonym Feodor
Eggo, wrote U11tergmzg tkr Nat11ntaatm (17ze DOJ1mjizll ofNatrual States)
(Berlin: Salfeld, I8I2). 1bis work was a discussion, in the form of
letters, of Barthold Georg Niebuhr (I776-I83i), Critical History of
Rome (I8I I).
358
I Compare the following remarks from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history:
External unhappiness has to become a sorrow of the human
being within himself: he has to feel himself as the negative of
himself, he has to see that his unhappiness is an unhappiness of
his nature, that he is within himself a separated and divided
being. This vocation of self-chastisement, sorrowing over one's
own nothingness, one's own wretchedness, the longing to go
beyond this condition of inwardness, is to be sought elsewhere
than in the Roman world. This vocation is what gives the JetDish
people its world-historical significance and importance. For from
it the higher [spirit] has arisen, spirit has come to absolute selfconsciousness, since it is reflected out of its otherness, which is
its division and sorrow.
(VPG 388132 I)
2 Hegel's use of'Germanic' (germmzisch) is very broad in its reference: it
includes 'Germany proper' (das eigerztliclze Derusclzlaml) -which Hegel
understands to include the Franks, the Normans, and the peoples of
England and Scandinavia (VPG 42If349). But it also encompasses
the 'Romanic' peoples of France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal (in which
he includes not only the Lombards and Burgundians, but also the
Visigoths and Ostrogoths) (VPG 42a/348). The Germanic world
even includes the Magyars and the Slavs of Eastern Europe (VPG
479

422/350). But the prominence he gives both to Tacitus' image of the
Teutonic character and to the Lutheran Reformation indicates that
Hegel gives a prominent role in the development of the modem spirit
to German culture in a narrower sense (cf. Tacitus, Gennany in
Agricola, Gmnany, Dialogtte 011 Orator:s, ed. Herbert W. Benario
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 37-65; DV 465-467h46150, 532-533/202-203; VPG 494f414).
359
1
Hegel sees the Christian Middle Ages as a time of self-alienation,

whose deepest form consists in the sense of separation between the
social realm, which is seen as belonging to a fallen world of finitude
and evil, and the individual human personality, which is destined for
487).
an otherworldly spiritual realm (cf. PhG
360
1
Elsewhere Hegel identifies the French Revolution as the event which

'brings heaven down to earth' (PhG 11 581). See 5, note 3
Glossary
An asterisk denotes those English terms which are followed, in the
text, by the original Gennan tenn in square brackets. Where the
English tenn in question occurs more than once in any one of Hegel's
numbered paragraphs (including its appendages) or in the Preface,
the Gennan original is nonnally supplied only on the first occurrence,
unless the interval between occurrences is so long as to justify its
repetition.
For further comments on the scope and function of the glossary see
p. xli.
Absicht
Aktion
allgemein
anerkennen
Anmerkung
Ansclzauung
Ansehen
an sich
Ansiclzsein
intention
action [cf. Handlung]
universal; general
to recognize [cf. erkennen ]; to acknowledge
Remarks [Hegel's designation for the
indented comments which he appends to
many of the numbered paragraphs of his
work]
intuition; perception
authority* [in the sense of 'standing' or
'reputation'; cf. Autoritiit, Berechtigung,
Macht, Obrigkeit]
in itself, in themselves [cf. for sich, in
siclz]; implicitly*; inherently* [cf. in siclz]
being-in-itself [cf. lnsiclzsein]
481
Glossary
Arbeit
aujfassen
miflzeben
Aufticht
Ausbi/dung
Auskommen
aufleres Staatsrecht
Au toritat
work; labour
to apprehend [cf.Jasst'7z]; to interpre~
to supersede; to cancel; to annul; to
dissolve; to overcome [cf. also comments on p. xlii]
oversight; supervision
trainin~; development [cf. Bi/dung, Entfaltung, Entwick/ung]; construction
livelihood [cf. Subsistt'lzz]
international law
authority [frequently used by Hegel in
general contexts; cf. Ansehen, Berechti-
gung, Macht, Obrigkeit]

Bemnte
Bedeutung
Bediirfnis
begreifen
Begriff
BehOrde
bei sich
Be/ieben
Bemdzung
berechtigt
Berechtigung
besch/iejlen
beschrankt
Beschrankutzg
official; civil servant

significance [cf. Gelza/t]; meaning
need
to comprehend [cf. eifassen]; to conceive
concept
official body
with itself, with themselves
caprice; discretion; preference
use [cf. Gebrauch]; employment
entitled, authorized; legally recognized;
legitimate [cf. richtig]
justification [cf. Rechtfertigung]; entitlement; authority [cf. Ansehen, Autoritat,
Macht, Obrigkeit]; legal recognition;
righ~ [cf. Recht]
to resolve
limited; circumscribed
limitation [cf. Grenze]; restriction [cf.
Schranke]
Besitz
bestmder
Bestmderlzeit
bestelzen
Bestel~erz
possession(s)
particular [cf. partiktJar]; special
particularity [cf. PartiktJaritat]
to subsist; to (continue to) exist [cf.
existiere1z, sein]; to survive; to consist
subsistence [cf. Subsistenz]; (lasting or
Glossary
continued)
existence
[cf.
Daseirz,
Existenz]; survival
bestimmen
bestimmt
Bestimmtheit
to determine
determinate; specific; definite
determinacy, determinateness; determinate character
determination; specification; definition
Bestimmung
[cf. Definition]; destiny; vocation;
purpose [cf. Vonatz]; function; role;
facto~ [cf. also comment on pp. xxxviiixxxix]
Beweggrund, Bewegungsgrund motive [cf. Motiv, Trieb, Triebfeder]
Bewufttsein
consciousness
Beziehung
reference; relation(ship) [cf. Relation,
Verhii/tnis ]; relevance
education [cf. ETZiehung]; culture [cf.
Bi/dung
Kultur]; development [cf. Ausbi/dung,
Entfa/tung, Entwick/urzg]; formation [cf.
Gesta/tung]
Boden
soil, land; ground, basis [cf. Gnmd];

sphere [cf. Sphiire]; element [cf. Ele-
bOse
evil [adjective]
evil [noun, of evil in general; cf. Obel]
citizen
civil
ment, Moment]
Bose
Burger
biirgerlich
dante/len
Dante/lung
Dasein
to portray, to depict; to (re)present; to

display
description; presentation; expression
existence [rendered by some translators
as 'determinate being'; cf. Bestehen,
Existenz]
Definition
Dijfererzz
Ding
definition [cf. Bestimmung]

difference [cf. Untenchied, Venclziedenheit]
thin~ [cf. Sadze]; object [cf. Gegenstand,
Objekt]
Elzre
honour; dignity [cf. Wiirde]
Glossary
eige71
eige~lllich
Eigentum
eigenliim lich
Einfa/1
eingehiillt
Einheit
einhiillen
Einteilung
Einzelheit
einzeln
(der) Einzelne
eitel
Eitelkeit
Element
Empjindu11g
entiiuflem
Entfalten, Entfoltrmg
enlsclrlieflen
Entwicklrmg
Emzweiung
eifasse71
erkennen
own; inherent*; personal*; unique*

proper (usually after noun); properly; in
fact
property; ownership
distinct(ive), distinguishing; characteristic; peculiar; proper [usually before
noun]
fancy; notion* [cf. Vorstellung]; insight*;
(good) idea* [cf. Idee]
[past participle of einhiillen, q.v.] invisible*; latent*
unit; unity, union
to veil [see also eingelliillt]
classification; subdivision(s); division [cf.
Entzweiung, Teilung, Trennrmg]

detail, individuality* [cf. lndividualitiil];
individual characteristic*; individual
unit*
individual [cf. individuellj; single; occasional*
individual* (noun; cf. Individuum]
vain
vanity; emptiness*
element [cf. Boden, Moment]
sensation; feeling* [cf. Gefiihlj
to alienate [as applied to goods or property], to dispose of [cf. veriiuftem]
development* (cf. Ausbildung, Bildrmg,
Entwick/urzg]; unfolding
[reflexive verb] to decide
development (cf. Artsbildu11g, Bildung,
Entfaltung]
division [in the sense a splitting asunder
or into two opposing parts; cf. Einteilung,
Teilrmg, Trennrmg]
to grasp [cf. fassen]; to comprehend [cf.
begreifen]
to recognize [cf. anerkennen]; to know*
[cf. kennen, wissen]
Glossary
Erkennen, Erkenntnis
cognition; recognition; knowledge [cf.
Kenmnis, Wissen]
erscheinen
Encheinung
to appear; to seem [cf. scheinen]

appearance;
phenomenon
[cf.
Pha11omen]
ETZiehung
Existenz
existieren
upbringing; education [cf. Bildu11g]

existence [cf. Bestehen, Dasei11]
to exist [cf. bestehen, sein]
Faktum
folsch
Fami/ienrecht
fassen
fact [cf. Moment, Tatsache]

false [cf. u11wahr]
family law
to grasp [cf. eifassen ]; to apprehend [cf.
auffassen]; to understand [cf. verstehen]
to require; to demand
requirement; demand
form [cf. Gestalt]
formal [cf. note to 8, p. 43]
for itself, for themselves; in itself, in
themselves [cf. a11 sich, in sich ];
independent(ly); on its own, on their
own
being-for-itself
sovereign [cf. Souveriin]; (sovereign}
prince; ruler>!~
Jorden'
Fordenmg
Fo,
formal, forme/1, fonnlich
for sich
Fiirsichsei11
Fiint
Gattung
Gebiet
gebildet
Gebot
Gebrauch
gediegen
Gefohl
Gegensatz
Gegensta11d
genus; generic character>~~; species [cf.

note to 161, p. zoo]
province; realm [cf. Reich]
educated;
cultivated;
refined;
civilized
precept; commandment
use [cf. Benutzung]
unalloyed; undifferentiated; sound
feeling [cf. Empfitulung]
antithesis; opposite [cf. Gegenteil];
opposition; discrepancy
subject [cf. Subjekt, U11terta11]; (subject-}
Glossary
matter [cf. Materie, Sache, Stoff]; object
[cf. Objekt and comments on p. xl]
gegenstiindliclz
objective [cf. objektiv]
opposite [cf. Gegensatz]; (the) contrary
Gegenteil
import, significance [cf. Bedeutung]; conGehalt
tent [cf. /nhalt]; substance [cf. Stoff,
Substanz]
Geist
spirit; intellect; mind
geistig
spiritual; intellectual [cf. inte/lektuei!J;
menta!
gelten
to be valid, to have validity; to count; to
be recognized
Gemeinde
(religious) community
Gemeinsclzaft, Gemeinwesen community
Gemiit
emotion(s), emotionality [cf. Riihrnng];
disposition [cf. Gesinnung]; heart [cf.
Herz]
Genossensclzafi
association; corporation [cf. Korporation]
gerecht
just
Gerechtigkeit
justice [cf. Recht]
Gericlzt
court (of law), lawcourt [cf. GerichtshojJ;
tribunal; court of judgement
gericlzdiclz
court-; legal [cf. gesetzlich, gesetzmiiflig,
reclztliclz]
Gerichtsbarkeit
[power of] jurisdiction [cf. Reclllsprechen]
Gerichtshof
court of law, lawcourt [cf. Gericht)
Gesc/ziifi
business, occupation; function; task
Gesetz
law [cf. Recht]
Gesetzbuclz
legal code [cf. Gesetzgebung]
Gesetzgebung
legislation, legislature; legal code [cf.
Gesetzbuc/z]
gesetzliclz
legal [cf. gericlztliclz, gesetzmiiflig, reclzdiclz]
gesetzmiiflig
legal [cf. gerichtliclz, gesetzlich, reclztliclz]
Gesetztsein
positedness
Gesiclztspunkt
viewpoint; point of view [cf. Standpunkt]
Gesinnung
disposition [cf. Gemiit]; attitude [cf.
Verlza/ten]
Glossary
Gestalt
shape; figure; form [cf. Fonn]; guise;

[cf.
Manifestation,
manifestation
Scheinen]
Gestaltrmg
GeJlJalt
Gwalttiitigkeit
Gewerbe
Geruissen
Gewiftheit
Gewohnheit
Gewolmheitsrecht
G/iedenmg
Grenze
shape; formation [cf. Bildrmg]; configuration

force; power [cf. Macht]; violence [cf.
Gwalttiitigkeit]; coercion [cf. Zwang]
violence [cf. Gewalt]
trade (and industry) [cf. Verkehr]; profession
conscience
certainty
habit; practice; custom [cf. Sitte]
customary right, right of custom
articulation
bound(ary); limit(ation) [cf. Be-
schriinkung, Schranke]
ground [cf. Boden]; basis [cf. Boden];
reason [as a specific ground or cause; cf.
Vernunft]; cause [in the sense of ground

or reason; cf. Sache]
[plural of Gnmd] reasons
Griintk
Grundlinien
Grundsatz
[in title of Hegel's work] elements

principle [cf. Prinzip]; maxim [cf. Max-
giiltig
Gultigkeit
valid
validity
Handel
handeln
Handlrmg
Herz
commerce [cf. Verkehr]

to act
action; act [cf. Tat]; deed [cf. Tat];
transaction
aggregate; mob
heart [cf. Gemiit]
/ch
ld1heit
ideal, idee//
Idee
(the) 'I'
self hood
ideal
Idea
ime]
Haufen
Glossary
/ndividUJJ/itiit
individuel/
Individuum
/nhalt
inneres Staatsreclzt
/nner/iclzkeit
/nnigkeit
in sich
lnsidzsein
individuality [cf. Einzellzeit]

individual [adjective; d: einzeln]
individual [noun; cf. Einzelne]
content(s) [cf. Gehalt]
constitutional law
inwardness [cf. /nnigkeit]
inwardness [cf.lrmer/ichkeit]; intensity [of
feeling]
(with)in itself, (with)in themselves [cf. an
siclz,fiir sidz]; into itself, into themselves;
inherently [cf. an siclz]
inward being; being-in-itself" [cf.
Ansichsein]
intellektuel/
intellectual [cf. geistig]
Jurisprudenz
Jurist
J uristenstazzd
jurisprudence [cf. Reclztswissensclzafi]

jurist [cf. Rechtsgelehrte]
legal profession
Kammer
Kapital
kennen
house [of parliament]

capital
to be familiar with; to
kno~
[cf. erken-
nen, wissen]
Kennen
K/asse
Korporation
Kraft
knowing [in the sense of being familiar or

acquainted with]
knowledge [cf. Erkennen, Wissen];
cognizance
[socio-economic] class [cf. Stand]
corporation [cf. Genossensclzafi]
force [cf. Gewalt]; strength; power [cf.
Kultur
culture [cf. Bildu11g/
La,drecht
Lebendigkeit
Lehre
law of the land

vitality; life; living principle
doctrine; theor~ [cf. 17zeorie]
Macht
power [cf. Gewalt, Kraft]; authori~ [cf.

Anselzen,Autoritiit, Berechtigung, Obrigkeit]
manifestation [cf. Gestalt, Sclzeinen]
(raw) material [cf. Sto./JJ; medium
Kenntnis, Kenntnisse
Gewalt, Macht]
M anifestatimz
Material
Glossary
Maurie
Maxime
Mensch
matter [as physical substance; cf. Gegenstand, Sache]; topic [cf. Stof!J
maxim [cf. Grundsatz]
human being; man(kind) [cf. also com-
Moral, Mora/itiit
Motiv
Mut
ments on p. xliv]
means [cf. Vermittlrmg]; commodity
middle class [cf. Stand and comments
on p. xliii]
moment [in the sense of 'essential component']; element [cf. Boden, Element];
fact [cf. Faktum, Tatsache ]; concern
morality
motive [cf. Beweggnmd, Trieb, Triebfeder]
courage
Nation
Naturrecht
niclztig
Nichtigkeit
Not
nation [cf. Volk]

natural law
null and void; insignificant; futile
nullity; insignificance
want [cf. Notdurft]; necessity
Mille/
Mittelstand
Moment
[cf.
Notwendigkeit]
Notdurft
Notrecht
Notstaat
Notwendigkeit
requirements; want [cf. Not]

right of necessity
state of necessity
necessity [cf. Not]
Objekt
objektiv
Obrigkeit
object [cf. Ding, Gegenstand]

objective [cf. gegenstii7ldlich]
authority, authorities* [of publicly constituted bodies within the state; cf. Anse-
hen, Autoritiit, Berechtigung, Macht]

partikllfar, partikuliir
Partikularitiit
Person
Plliinonum
Pobel
Pofizei
Prinzip
Privatrec/11
particular [cf. besfmder]

particulari~
[cf. Besonderlleit]
person
phenomenon [cf. Ersclleinurzg]
rabble
police [cf. comments on pp. xlii-xliii and
450]
principle [cf. Gnmdsatz]
civil law*
Glossary
Riisonieren, Riisonnenzent
real
Realitiit
Reclzt
Reclztens
Reclll[ertigung
reclztliclz
Redztlichkeit
reclztsclzaffen
Reclztscllllffenlzeit
Reclztsgang
Reclztsgelelzrte
Reclztsgnmd
Reclztspflege
Reclztspreclzen
ratiocination; reasoning; argument

real [cf. reel~
reality
right [cf. Bereclztigung]; law>t [cf. Gesetz,
Naturreclzt, romisclzes Reclzt); justice [cf.
Gereclztigkeit] [see also comments on p.
xxxvili]
lawful
justification [cf. Bereclztigung]
rightful; legal [cf. gericlztliclz, gesetzliclz,
gesetzmiiftig]; right-minded
rightness; inte~
upright; honest
rectitude
process oflaw, legal process
jurist [cf.Jurist]; lawyer
legal claim; legal argument
administration of justice
dispensation of justice; legal dispensation; [act of] jurisdiction [cf. Gericlzts-
barkeit]
Reclztswissenscllllfi
science of right; jurisprudence [cf. Juris-
romisclzes Reclzt
Riilzrung
prudenz]
real [cf. re~
government; executive
executive power
realm [cf. Gebiet]
wealth [cf. Vermogen]
relationship [cf. Bezielzung, Verlziiltnis]
representation [cf. Vorstellung]
judge; magistrate
judicial
correct; accurate; legitimate [cf. bereclztigt]
Roman law
emotion [cf. Genziit)
Saclze
thing>t [cf. Ding]; matter [cf. Gegenstand,
reel/
Regierung
Regierungsgewalt
Reiclz
Reiclztum
Relation
Repriisentation
Riclzter
riclzterliclz
riclztig
490
Glossary
Mlllerie]; cause [as a principle espoused;

Schein
scheinen
Scheinen
schlecht
scldechte Unend/ichkeit
Scldechtigkeit
Schranke
cf. Grund~ concern; case

semblance; pretence
to seem; to appear [cf. erscheinen ]; to
manifest itself-'
manifestation [cf. Gestalt, Manifesttllion]
bad; wicked; inferio~
false infinity
wickedness
limit [cf. Gren.ze]; restriction [cf. Be-
sclviillkung]
Sein
se/bstiindig
responsibility [cf. Verantwortung]; guilt

to be; to exist [cf. besteherz, existieren~ to
be present; to have being [cf. also comment on pp. xliii-xliv]
being [cf. Wesen]
self-sufficient;
independent
[cf.
Se/bstiindigkeit
Se/bstgefiihl
Setzen
Sitte
self-sufficiency; independence
self-awareness; self-esteem
to posit
ethics [cf. Sittliclzkeit]; custom [cf.
Schuld
sein
unabhiingig]
Gewohnheit]
sitt/ich
Sitt/ichkeit
So/len
souveriin
Souveriin
Souveriinitiit
SpMre
Spitze
StatU
StalliSrecht
Sttllllswissenscllllft
Stamm
Stand
ethical
ethics [cf. Sitte]; ethical life
obligation; something which ought to be
sovereign [adjective]; supreme
sovereign [noun; cf. Fiint]
sovereignty
sphere [cf. Boden]
apex; culmination; supreme office,
supreme position; head (of state)
state
see aiijleres Sttllllsredzt, inneres Staatsrecht
political science
kinship group; tribe
estate; class [cf. K/asse]; status [cf. also
comment on p. xliii]
491
Glossary
Stiinde
[plural of Stand] Estates [as a parliamentary institution]; estates [as social groupings or classes; cf. also comments on
Standpunkt
point of view; viewpoint [cf. Gesic/ztspunkt]; position [doctrinal or ideological];

level [cf. Stuft]
material [cf. Material); substance [in the
sense of 'material'; cf. Gehalt, Substanz];
topic [cf. Materie]; subject-matter [cf.
p. xliii]
Stoff
Gegenstand]
Stuft
Subjekt
Subsistenz
substantie/1
Substanz
stage; level [cf. Standpunkt~ phase

subject [cf. Gegenstand, Untertan; see also
comments on p. xli]
livelihood [cf. Auskommen]; subsistence
[cf. Bestehen]
substantial
substance [in the metaphysical sense; cf.
Stoff)
Tapferkeit
Tat
Tatbestand
Tiiligkeit
Tat sache
Teil
Teilung
valour; bravery
deed [cf. Handlung]; act [cf. Handlung]
facts of the case
activity [cf. Wirksamkeit)
fact [cf. Faktum, Moment)
part; component; section
division [in the sense of 'partition'; cf.
Einteilung, EntZ1lleiung, Trennung]

Theorie
tremum
Trennrmg
Trieb
theory [cf. Le/zre]

to separate; to divide
separation; division [cf. Einteilung,
Entzweiung, Teilung]; disjunction
drive; urge; motive [cf. Beweggrund,
Triebfeder
Motiv, Triebftder]
motive [cf. Beweggrund, Motiv, Trieb ];
spring [of action]
Obel
evil [usually of a specific evil; cf. Biise]

492
Glossary
Umstand
unablliingig
unbefongen
unbegrenzt
unbesclzriinkt
ungebildet
ungerecht
Ungereclztigkeit
unmittelbar
Unrecht
unrechtliclz
U7lrechtmiiflig
Untersclzied
Untertan
unveriiuflerliclz
unwahr
unzweckmiiflig
Veranstaltung
Veratztwortung,
Verantwortliclzkeit
veriiuflerliclz
veriiuflern
Veriiuflerwzg
Verbreclzen
Verfassung
Verge/zen
Verlza/ten
Verlziiltnis
circumstance [cf. Verhiiltnisse]

independent [cf. se/bstiindig]
ingenuous; unintentional [of a wrong
committed in good faith]
unbounded
unlimited; unrestricted
uneducated; uncivilized
unjust [cf. unreclztliclz]
injustice [cf. Unrecht]
immediate0y); direct0y)
wrong, wrongdoing; violation of right,
something contrary to right; injustice
[cf. Ungereclztigkeit]
contrary to right; wrong; unjust [cf.
ungerecht]
unlawful
distinction; difference [cf. Dijjerenz, Versclziedenheit]; differentiation [cf. Versclziedenheit]
subject [of a state or sovereign; cf.
Gegenstand, Subjekt]
inalienable
untrue; false [cf.folsclz]
inappropriate
arrangement
accountability; responsibili~ [cf. Sclzultlj
alienable
to alienate [as applied to goods or property], to dispose of [cf. entiiuflern]
alienation [of goods or property], disposal
crime
constitution
misdemeanour; offence [cf. Verletzwzg]
conduct; attitude [cf. Gesimzung]
relation(ship) [cf. Bezielzung, Relation];
situation [cf. ZustantlJ
493
Glossary
Verlziillnisse
Verjiilzrung
Verkelzr
[plural of Verlziillnis] relation(ship)s;

circumstances [cf. Umslarulj
prescription
trade [cf. Gewerbe]; commerce [cf.
Handel]
Verlelzung
vermilteln
Vermilllung
Vermogen
infringement, violation; injury; offence

[cf. Vergelzen]
to mediate
mediation; means [cf. Mine/]
capacity; faculty; resource(s); wealth [cf.
Reiclzlum]
Verniclzlung
Vernun.ft
verniin.ftig
Versclziedenlzei1
nullification;annWruilation;destruction
reason [i.e. rationality in a universal
sense; cf. Grund]
rational
difference [cf. Differenz, Unlersclzied];
diversity; variety; differentiation [cf.
Unlersclzied]
Versland
verslelzen
Vertrag
venuirkliclzen
Venuirkliclzung
Volk
Volkerreclzl
Volksgeisl
Vorsalz
Vorsorge
vorslellen
Vorslellen
Vorslellurzg
Walllkapilu/alion
walzr
walzrlza.ft(ig)
understanding
to understand [cf. fassen]
contract [cf. Walz/kapilulalion]
to actualize
actualization
people; nation [cf. Nation]
international law
national spirit, spirit of the nation
purpose [cf. Zweck]
provision(s); foresight
[reflexive verb] to represent to oneself; to
imagine; to envisage
representational thinking; imagination
representational thought; representational thinking; representation [cf.
Reprasenlalion]; (common) idea; notion
[cf. Einfa/1; see also comments on p. xlii]
electoral contract'* [cf. Vertrag]
true
true; genuine
494
Glossary
Wahrheit
We/tgeist
Wert
Wesen
Wille{n)
Willkiir
wiIIkiir/ich
wirklich
Wirkliclzkeit
Wirksamkeit
wissen
Wissen
Wissensclw.ft
Wahl
Wollen
Wiirde
Zeiclzen
Zufall, Zuftilligkeit
zuftillig
zureclmen
Zureclmung
zuredmungsflilzig
Zusammenhang
Zustand
Zwang
Zweck
zweckmiiftig
truth
world spirit
value; worth
essence; essential being; being [cf. Sein]
will
arbitrariness; arbitrary will
arbitrary
actual
actuality
activity [cf. Ttitigkeit]; effectiveness
to know [cf. kennen, erkennen]
knowledge [cf. Erkennen, Kenntnis]
science; learning
welfare
volition; willing
dignity [cf. Ehre]
sign; symbol
contingency; chance; eventuali~
contingent
to hold responsible for
imputation; making (or holding)
responsible (or accountable) for
responsible (for one's actions)
context; link, connection(s); association;
continuum; complex
condition; situation [cf. Verlliiltnis]
coercion [cf. Gewalt]
end [in the sense of 'aim' or 'purpose'];
purpose [cf. VoTlatz]
appropriate; expedient
495
Selected bibliography
For references to Hegel's own writings, see key to abbreviations, pp. xlv-xlix.
For a thorough bibliography of secondary sources on Hegel to I 980, see Kurt
Steinhauer (ed.) HegrJ Bibliographie: Materialien zur Gesclziclue der inlemationalen Hegei-Rezeption und ZIIT Plzilosoplrie-Gesdzidlle (Munich: K. G. Sauer,
I98o). For a good bibliography of secondary sources on Hegel's PR before
I 957, see the appendix (by Hans-Martin Sa8) to Joachim Ritter, Hegel und die
franzijsisclze Revolution (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, I957). The following
is a selected bibliography of secondary sources in English, French and German on PR and topics in Hegel's philosophy related to it.
Albrecht, Reinhart. HegrJ und die Demolmztie. Bonn: Bouvier, I978.
Althusser, Louis. Politics and History, tr. B. Brewster. London: New Left
Books, I972.
Angehm, Emil. Freiheit urzd S]!tem bei Hegel. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, I 976.
Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel's Theory of tlze Modem State. Cambridge University
Press, I 972.
Barion, Jakob. Hegel und die marxistisclze StaatslellTe, 2nd ed. Bonn: Bouvier,
I970
Benhabib, Seyla. 'The Logic of Civil Society: A Re-consideration of Hegel
and Marx', PllilosOfizy and Social Theory (I972).
Berry, Christopher J. Hume, Hegel and Human Nature. The Hague: Nijhoff,
I982.
Bitsch, Brigitte. Sollensbegrifj" und Moralitiitskritik bei Hegel. Bonn: Bouvier,
I977
Bloch, Ernst. Subjekt-Objekt: Erliitderurzgen zu Hegtl (I95I). Bloch,
Werkausgabe. FrankfiJrt: Suhrkamp, I985. Volume vm.
Billow, Friedrich. Die EnlllJicklung der Hegtlsclu:n Sozialpllilosoplrie. Leipzig:
Meiner, I92o.
Cassirer, Ernst. The Mytll oftile State (I946). Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
I955
Charnley, Paul. Econor11ie po/itique et plzilo!Dplrie clzez Steuart et Hegel. Paris:
Dalloz, I963.
Select bibliograplzy
Colletti, Lucio. Mar.rism and Hegel, tr. L. Gamer. London: Verso, 1979
Cullen, Bernard. Hegefs Social and Political Thought. New York: StMartin's,
1979
Fackenheim, Emil L. 'On the Actuality of the Rational and the Rationality of
the Actual', Rme111 ofMetllphysics 13 (1970).
Fleischmann, Eugene. La Philosophie politique de Hegel. Paris: Pion, 1964.
Foster, Michael B. The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (1935). New
York: Garland, 1984.
Fulda, Hans-Friedrich. Das Rechl der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des
Rechls. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1968.
Garaudy, Roger. La Pensie de Hegel. Paris: Bordas, 1966.
Habermas, Jiirgen. Theory m1d Praxis, tr. J. Viertel. Boston: Beacon,
1974
Harris, H. S. Hegel's /JnJelopment: TOIDflTd the Sunlight r;,rrr8or. Oxfml:
Clarendon Press, 1972.
Hegefs DnJelopmenl: Night Thoughls (Jena, r8or-r8o6). Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983.
Haym, Rudolf. Hegel und seine Zeit. Berlin: Gaertner, 1857.
Henrich, Dieter. Hegel im Kontat. Frankfurt Suhrkamp, 1971.
Henrich, Dieter and Horstmann, Rolf-Peter (eds.) Hegels Philosophie des
Rhts: Die Theorie der Rechlsfomn 1md ihre Logik. Stuttgan: Klett-Cotta,
1983.
Hinchman, Lew. Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenmenl. Tampa: University of
Florida Press, I 984.
Hocevar, Rolf K. Stande und Repriisenlation beim jungen Hegel. Munich: Beck,
1968.
Hegel und der pretif/ische Staat. Munich: Beck, 1973
d'Hondt, Jacques. Hegel in his Time (1968), tr. J. Burbidge. Lewiston, NY:
Broadview, 1988.
Hyppolite,Jean. Studies on Marx a"d Hegel, tr. J. O'Neill. New York: Harper &
Row, 1969.
Kaufmann, Walter (ed.). Hegel's Political Philosophy. New York: Athenon,
1970.
Kelly, George Armstrong. !dl!lllism, Politics and History: Sources of Hegelian
Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Knox, T. M. 'Hegel and Prussianism', Philosophy (1940).
Kojeve, Alexander./mmduaion to the Reading ofHegel, tr. J. H. Nichols. New
York: Basic Books, 1969.
LOwith, Karl. From Hegel to Nielzsche, tr. David F. Green. New York:
Doubleday, 1967.
Lukacs, Gyorgy. 7"M Young Hegel, tr. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1975.
MacGregor, David. The Communist !dl!lll in Hegel andMar.r. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
Macintyre, Alasdair (ed.) Hegel: A Colleaion of Critical Essays. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1972.
497
Marcuse, Herbert Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Soda/ Theory
(I94I, 2nd ed. I955). Boston: Beacon, I96o.
Marx, Karl. Critique ofHegel's Philosophy ofRighi, tr. j. O'Malley. Cambridge
University Press, I970.
Miskell, Thomas. Hegels Lehre vom abslrflklen Recht. Freiburg i.B.: AlbertLudwigs-Universitiit, I 972.
Mitias, Michael. The Moral Foundation of the Stale in Hegel's 'Philosophy of
Right'. Amsterdam: Rodopi, I984.
Moran, Philip. Hegel and I he Fundamental Prohlems ofPhilosophy. Amsterdam:
Gruner, I988.
Mure, G. R. G. 'The Organic State', Philosophy (I949).
Nicolin, Friedheim. Hegels Bildungslheorie. Bonn: Bouvier, I955
'Hegel iiber konstitutionelle Monarchie', Hegei-Studien IO (I975).
Nusser, Karl-Heinz. Hegels Dialeklik und das Prinzip der Revolution. Munich:
Pustet, I973
O'Brien, George Dennis. Hegel on Reason and History. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, I975
O'Hagan, T. 'On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy',
in Stephen Priest (ed.) Hegefs Critique ofKant. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
I987.
Ottmann, Henning; Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel. Berlin: W. de
Gruyter, I977
Parkinson, G.H.R. 'Hegel's Concept of Freedom', in M. Inwood (ed.) Hegel.
Oxford University Press, I985.
Pelczynski, Z. (ed.) Hegel's Political Philosophy: Prohlems and Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, I 97 I.
(ed.) The Stale and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, I 984.
Pippin, Robert. 'Hegel's Political Argument and the Problem of
VerwirklidJunj, Political Theory 9 (I98I).
Plamenatz,john. Mar~ and Society, Volume o. New York: McGraw-Hill, I963.
Plant, Raymond. Hegel: An lntroduaion, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, I983.
Piiggeler, Otto. Hegels Krilik der Romonlik. Bonn: Bouvier, I956.
Piiggeler, Otto (ed.) Hegel: Einfiihnmg in seirJe Philosophie. Freiburg/Munich:
Alber, I977
Prior, Andrew. Revolution and Philosophy: The Significance oft he French Revolution for Hegel and MatX. Capetown: D. Philip, I972.
Reyburn, Hugh A. The Ethical Theory of Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
I921.
Riedel, Manfred. Biirgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat bei Hegel. Neuwied: Luchterhand, I970.
System und Geschichle. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, I973
(ed.) Materialien zu Hegels Redllsphilosophie, 2 volumes. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, I975
BehDeen Tradition and Revolution. Cambridge University Press, I984.
Ritter, Joachim. Hegel and the French Revolution (I957; 2nd ed., I965). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, I982.
'Person und Eigentum: Zu Hegels "Grundlinien der Philosophie des
Rechts"', MD1%ismusstudien 4 (1962).
Metaplrysik rmd Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1969.
Rose, Gillian R. Hegel Contra Sociology. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press, 1981.
Rosenkranz, Karl. Hegels Leben. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1844Rosenzweig, Franz. Hegel und der Staat, 2 volumes. Munich and Berlin:
Oldenbourg, 1920.
Rothe, Klaus. Selbstsein rmd biirgerlidre Gesellscha.ft: Hegels Theorie der konkreten
Freiheit. Bonn: Bouvier, 1976.
Shklar, judith. Freedom and Independence: A Study ofthe Political Jdou ofHegefs
'Phenomenology ofMind'. Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Singer, Peter. Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Smith, Steven B. Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Contat. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Steinberger, Peter. Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy ofRight. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988.
Stepelevich, L. S. and Lamb, D. (eds.) Hegefs Philosophy ofAaion. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983.
Stillman, Peter. 'Hegel's Critique of Liberal Theories of Right', American
Political Science Revita~ 68 (1974).
'Property, Freedom and Individuality in Hegel's and Marx's Political
Thought', Nomos 22 (198o).
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Theunissen, Michael. Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer
Traktat. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1970.
Die VenDirklichung der Vernun.ft: zur Theorie-Praxis-Diskussion inAnschlujJ an

Hegel. Tiibingen: Mohr, 1970.
Toews, john Edward. Hegelianism. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Tugendhat, Ernst. Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, tr. Paul Stem.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
Verene, Donald P. (ed.) Hegel's Social and Politica/17wught. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980.
Walsh, W. H. Hegelian Ethics. New York: Garland, 1984.
\Veil, Eric. Hegel et l'itat, 2nd ed. Paris: Vrin, 1966.
Wildt, Andreas. Autonomie und Anerkennung. Stuttgart: Klen-Cotta, 1982.
Wilkins, Burleigh T. Hegefs Philosophy of History. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1974
Wood, Allen W. 'Hegel's Concept of Morality', in I. Patoluoto (ed.),J V.
Snellmanin Filosofiaja snr Hegelilaitletl Tausta. Helsinki, 1984.
'The Emptiness of the Moral \VIII', Monist 72 (1989).
Hegefs Ethical Thm~ght. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
'Does Hegel Have an Ethics?' Monist 74 (1991).
499
Index of subjects
Absic/11, su intention
absolutism, viii-x, 385, 387-388
abstraction, 37-39 s6-s7
mSio natura/is, 85, 99, 410
actions, legal, 117; stt also aials
actuality [Wirklimktit], ZD-Z3, zs, 53.
389-390
llf"OO" [dyvociiv], 171
agriculture, 235-236
alienation, 379-38o, 411, 479
alienation [Vtrauflmmg] ofproperty,stt
property, alienation of
Anabaptists, stt index of names
antinomies, 4o6
anti-Semitism, 386, 458-459
appearance [End!tinung], 43, 87, 115116, 137, 139, 219, ZZI, 410; Stt
also semblance
appropriation, 75-17, 83-88
arbilrllrilless [Wi//kiir], xi-xii, 16, 48so, s6, s8, 1os-1o6, 115, 167, z11,
zz6-zz7,Z37-Z38,336,399
fli'CNII, 33o 396
aristocracy, 311, 379
art, 399-400; as property, 94
assassination, political, 388~89, 430
atomism, 197, 343-344, 387, 455
btntficium amrpettnliat, 155, 425

&scliit/ltn, su resolVe
better, enemy of the good, z48, 447
Bible, su index of names
Bildung, su education
Bill of Rights, English, z8o, 456-457
boniJI'IIm passasio, 34, 396
bo~~~geois, xviii, zz8; ~t also civil
society; estate, formal
Brahman, stt index of names
brothels, tolerated, like universities, 18
mpitis dimirrutio, 71, 405
castes, z38, 445
censorship, Wi-x, 355-358, 388-38g,
47Z
charity, xxii, z6s, 45z
children, 45, 57, 75, 81, 136, 160,
169, Z1o-z18, z64, 405;
emancipation m, ZI4-ZI5i
upbringing m, z1o-z14
choice [Wahl], 47-50
Christianity, su index of names
Church, 214, zg6-J04, 471
citizen, z84-z8s
civil service, 328-336; duties of, 332336; organization of 329-331, 467;
qualification for, x, 33Zi sua/so
executive power
civil society [biitgtrlid!t Gatllschafi],
xvil-xxii,6z,64,8o, 198,z19-27~
z83-z86; as universal family, z64
claims, legal, 117
class [Kiasse~ 4SZ
classicism, 399-400
bad conscience, 17o-17z

bad weather, better than none at all,
447
beautiful soul [schiintSk], 47, 399
&griff, stt concept
being-with-oneself [Btisich~lbststin],
xii, xiv, 4Zo 54o 401-402; SU also
freedom
sor
Index
coercion [Z~R~r~g), 119-121; warranl m
use, 121, 417
collisions, elhical, 181, 193, 436
colonies, 276-270; independence rL,
454
commerce, 237
mmmotlatum, 110, 415-416
commun~,77-78,407
concepr(&gritJI, 14. 25, 61, 392, 403

concubinage, 203
confession of guill, 257
conscience [Gt~~~isun), xv, 96-97, 121,
141, 158, 163-184, 218, 427-435;
bad, 17o-172; formal, 164-165;
religious, 165, 427; 1rue, 164-165
conscientious objection, 295
consenralism, vii-xi, xxx; su also
absolutism; Prussia, reaction of
1819 (in index of names);
romanticism
conslilution (Jitifasnmg), 198, 290,
304-313, 343; wrillen, 311-312,
462; s~~ olso law, conslilutional
constirulionalism, ix, 38 s, 388; su also
monarchy, constirutional
contingency [Z'Ifiilligkrit), 48-49, 167,
279
COnlraCl (Jitnrag), 70, 102-114. 247,
368; common will in, 104-1o6; four
kinds rL, 415; momenlS rL, lo6l l o; rL exchange, 106-107, 111; rL
gift, 1o6-107, 111; ofloan, 11 o111, 415-416; of sale, 111, 416; of
wages, g8-gg, 111-112, 416;
performance of, 1o8-110, 414-415;
real and consensual, 110, 415;
unilateral and bilalera~ 107-1o8
conlraCl lheory of 1he s1a1e, 277-278,
324
conlraCl, union (Jitrdlligun,pvtrtrag],
415
conversion, 418
conviction [Ob=tusrmg), 159; elhics
of, 176-180, 184, 431-432
copyrighl, 99-101, 412
corporation [Kflf110ration), :xix-x:xii, 226,
259, 27o-274, 329-330, 335, 342,
388, 457; as second family, 271;
decline rL, 273, 455; spiril rL, 329330
Carpus iuris t:irJilis, s~~ law, Roman
cosmopoli1anism, 240
of subjects
counsels of prudence, 400
courrs, 214, 251-259; of equiry, 254,
448; ~~ also justice, administration
of; lrials
craftsmanship, 237
creation, 168-170
crime (Jitrhr/1~11), 63, 116, IIC}-131,
159-16o, 25o-259; as violation of
law, 122; compensation for, 124;
involves consen110 be punished,
124-126; nulliry of, 123-126
crimina privata, 130, 420-421
CUSlom [Sitk), 241, 275, 371; as
second nalure, 195, 437; su also
ethical life
Cynics, su index of names
Dasdn, su e:xislence
dea1h penally, 122, 126-127, 418-420
debl, 32
deception [lkh'llg), 116, 118-119
deed [Tat), 143, 145-148
definition, 26, 392
demagogue persecutions, viii, 383, 389
democracy, 310,318-321,339-342,
379
deposi1, u o-111, 416
deputies 10 Es1a1es, 346-350; no110
receive a salary, 350; qualifications
rL, J46-J4g, 469-471
determinacy [BtstimmtNit), 38-40, 42
dialectic, xxvii, 6o, 403
disposition [GtsiiiiiUng), 121, 210, 310,
330; elhical, 194-195; politica~
288-289
division of labour, 232-233, 266, 330
divorce, 210, 213-214
dolus dir~ctus d indir~ctus, 148, 422
dominium dirtum d uti/~, 91-92, 411
dominium J2lliritarium ~~ Bonitarium,
91, 41o-411
drives [Tri~k), 45-46, 50-52, 3g8,
401
duties, doclrine of; 191-192, 436
duly [Pfticlll), :xiii, XXV, Sl, 149 152,
161, 164, 197 275. 284, 403. 424;
duties, conflia rL, 181, 193, 436;
conlenl rL, 161-162; elhical, 191192; moral, 161-162; should be
done for duly's sake, 161-162, 427
economic regulation, 261-264
soz
Index of subjects
education [Bildng], xix, 52, 61, IJ6IJ7, 159, 212-21], 224-226, 2Jo2J4oZ40,264,2go-2gi,J76-J77o
401, 426, 438, 440; ethical, 195196; play theory fi, ZI2-21J, 440;
stt a/ so upbringing
education [Piidagugik], 195
elections, 348-35 1
embezzlement, 418
emptiness of moral Slalldpoint, 162163, 427
end [ZD&1 xxiv-xxvi, 42-43, 149,
157, 189; subjective, 43
end justifies !he means, 175-176, 430
endowments, 94, 412
English law, stt law, English
ephorate, 309, 461-462
equality, 391 So-81, 128, 2JO, 2]41
240, 408. 457
error, 399; moral, 171-172, 178-180,
432
Enchtinung, stt appearance
estate [Stand], ldx-xxii, xliii, 71, 2JJ2J9, 347; choice of an, 237-238;
formal (business), 234, 236-237.
270-271; honour of, 271; middle,
335-336; military, 363-365; private,
343; substantial (agricultural), xxxxi, 234-236, 270; universal (civil
service), 234, 237, 270, 328-336
Estates [Stlinde1 x, xxiii-xxiv, xliii,
339-353, 469-470; as mediating
organ, 342-343; bicameral system,
345-352; lower house, 346-348;
publici!)' of debate in, 352, 356;
upper house, 345-346
e!hicallife [Silllidlktit1 xii, xv-xvi,
xxxix, 12, 53, 59, 62-63, 137, 185186, 189-198, 402, 404; as custom,
195; objective side, 18C)-1go;
subjective side, 190-191
etbics, 10-11, 20
evil, 51, 167-184, 194, 428; origin of,
167-170
excessive damage, 107, 414
executive power, 316, 328-336;
accountability r:I, 326, 334, 464465; role in legislation, 339
existence [.Dastin, .Ezistm:], 2o-2z, 25,
IJ8,Jg0,410
faC!S of consciousness, 27, 51, 392393
family, xxiii, 33-34. 62, 64. 71, 77,

198-219,272, 28J-286,J77-J78,
396, 405, 407, 451; feudal, 201)210
family-member, 199-200, 228
feudalism, xvii, 77, 106, 388, 407,
41o-411, 469
fiat iustitia, ptrtlll ""'rulus, 157, 426
jidticommisso, n. 407
finitude, 39-40, 46--4 7, 137, 139, 399
foe niTa, 85, 99, 41 o
foreign trade, 268
form-giving, as mode of appropriation,
83, 85-86
fraternities [Bimchtnsckltn1 383-385
free will, development r:I, 35-45
freedom [Freiheit], xi-xvii, xxvii-xldx,
35-58, 119-120, 189, 2J0-2JI,
288, 396-397; absolute, 52-55;
abstract, 37-38, 67-68, II C)-I ZO,
192-193, Jg8; aflinnative, 193; as
arbitrariness, 48-50, 399-400: as
contingency, 49; as its own object,
ST. civil, 261, 45o-451; concrete,
401-402; external, 79: formal, 3738, 224-226, JJO, JS I; negative,
38-39. 398, 436; objective, 275282; of commerce, 262; of public
communication, 355-358; personal,
68, zl4; subjective, xiv-xxii, zo, 22,
149-152, 166-167, 196, 201-ZOZ,
221-226, 2J0-2JI, 237-238, 246,
256,258,282-288, JJ8,J5J,J55359 402, w-44J; substantial, 192,
275
Geist, stt spirit

genius, e!hical, 193-194
German nationalism, set nationalism,
German
Gtsinnang, set disposition
gnothi stiJIItOR (fvcilih OEI1Utov1
373 477
God, 18, 22, 168-170, 279-281, 290,
325, 354, 465, 476-477; ontological
proof of, 322, 464
good, 6z, % 141, 157-161
good will, 158, 173-176
grace, efficacious, 172, 429
guilds, xx-xxi, 445, 452; stt also
corporations
habit, 194-195
Index of subjeas
happiness (G/iick, G/iickstligmt], sosz, 15~155. 287, 4oo-401, 422423, 479
Hegelianism, ix, xxx-xxxi
heroes, 102, 194, 376, 436-437; right
of, 120,376
Hinduism, 38-39; su also India (see
index of names)
historical school of law, 28-,34,
242,248394-395.446
human being (Mmsdz], xliv, 228
hypocrisy, 17o-172, 177-178, 183,
428-429
I (das IchJ, 37-42, 47-48, s6-s1. 67,
184> 398
Idea (Ida], zo, zs, 27, 57-58, 6o-f11,
157-158, 185, 189-190, 275, 392,
403
idealism, 76
ignorance, acting from and acting in,
171
in1putability,143-149, 426; lega~ 159,
426; su also responsibility
incest, 207-208
indeterminacy (Unbestimmthat], 36-38,
42
individuality, 41-42, 46
industry, 236-237
infinity, 4o-41, 54, 399; false infinite,
110,415
inheritance, 34, 111, 396, 425, ~
441
inner and outer, identity ci, 151-152,
423-424
Inquisition, su index of names
insight (Einsicht), 191; right ci, 158161
intention !Absicht], 141, 146-149, 170;
cannot justify wrong action, 15 3154- 175; right ci, 148-149
international law, su law, international
rrony, 18o-184,432-434
Islam, su index of names
iummtum, 33, 395
Jesuits, su index of names
Judaism, su index of names
judge (iutla1 242, 255, 448-449
judgement (Urtnl], 148; negatively
infinite, 121-122, 417; positive,
negative and infinite, 83-84, 409
justice (Gtr~chtigktit], 125, 157, 226,

426,468-469
justice, administration of (R~clltspfl~uJ,
239-259, 328; applicable to heads
of state, 221; patrimonial, 252, 448
kinship group (Stamm], xxiii, 201}-21 o,
214. 218, z6s, 375
knowledge (Wissm], right ci, 144
labour, 224-226; se~ also resources,
work, wages; division of, su division
of labour
laesio monnis, 107, 414
language, 27, 232
law (Rht], 13-14, 16-17; Chinese,
245; codification of, 242-243, 246249446-447;conunon,242,445;
constitutiona~ 281-358; English,
242-243, 255, 421, 44s; historical
school of, set historical school of
law; international, 281, 365-371;
Jewish, 130, 421; Roman, z8-35,
71, 75, 91, 105-107, 130, 211-212,
247,249,392-396,405-416,418,
42o-421, 425, ~441, 445-446,
448-449
law of citations, 242
laws, ethical, 189-191, 435-436
laws, of nature and right, 13-14, 195
laws, positive (Gtsttu], X"\'-xvi, 28-34,
241-246, 394; penal, 122, 127-128;
promulgation ci, 246-251; unjust,
29-34> 243-244
lawyers, 247 254> zs8; should be
excluded from legislature, 4 71
lectures, Hegel's on right, vii, xxxiiixxxvi, 9, 381-382
kgatumpium, 412
legislative power, 336-353
Ia Voconia, 31, 395
liability, 144
liberalism, x-xi, xiii, xvi, xxvii-xxxi,
386, 389; economic, 445
Licinian law, 31, 395
Licinian rogations, 31, 395
life, 16, 151, 425; right over one's
own, 101-102
limitation (Grmu, Scllrank~J. 138, 421
literary works, ownership of, 98-101
loan, 110, 415-416; collateral on, 112;
contract ci, 110-111
lotatio tl conduaio, 111-112, 416
Index of subjects
logic, formal 34
logic, speculative, 10, z7-z8, 42, 38z
lord and servant, 87
love, rgg-zoz, zog-z11; illicit, 438439; parental, zro-zrr; Platonic,
Z03
luck, i!S role in moralicy, 148
magisb'ale (mDgistr/JIUs), 255, 448-449
Magna Chana, stt index of names
mDndlltum, 11 o, 415
manufacture, 237
many, the (hoi polloi; ol xollot1 339,
353, 47Z
marking, as mode of appropriation, 88
marriage, zoo-zoB, 457; arranged,
ZOI-ZOZj as COnlraCI, ZOI, Z03j
ceremony of, zor-zoz, zo5;
monogamous, zo7; Roman, zo9,
440
Mancism, ix, lOOii
masses, endowed, 94, 412
mathematics, 34
melhod, philosophical, 10,59
military, x, 305, 338-339, 361-365,
46o-461, 474; conscription, 295,
305, 46o-461
monarch, xxiii, 313-3z8; as lim
servant of the stale, 324, 465;
inviolability of, 464-465; righ11o
appoint ministers, 3z6; role in
legislation, 339
monarchy, constitutional, xxiii-xxiv,
308, 313-3z8; elective, 324, 465;
feudal, 310, 315, 463-464j
heredilal'y, 3Z 1-325
monasticism, 78, zo3
money, 93, 337-338, 343
monogamy, zo7
moralicy, xi, xxvii-xxix, 53, 59, 6z-64,
131-132, 135-186, 404> 421-435
moralicy and politics, 370, 475
mongage, 11 z
motive, 149-150, 15z, 16o, 178
mutuum, 110, 415
Napoleonic Code, 419, 447
nation (Jiolk), xxxii, zB, 88, 359-369,
375-376; principle of, 374-377,
478
National Socialism, vii~ xn-lOOii
nationalism, 36o; German, viii-ix, 383,
385, 461, 473
natural stales, 378, 479

nature, rz, 19o-191; does no
injustice, So, z66-z67; laws of, 13
nature of an action, 145-148, 421
necessicy, right of, 154-156
needs, zz6-z4o, z 59; natural, zz8zz9; refinement of, zz9, 231; social,
ZZ9-Z30
negationofnegation, 115-116,131
negati\ily, 37-40
nobilicy, feudal, 235-236, 345-346,
46o-461,468
nullum &rimtn, nuiiD potnD sint ltgt, 419
objectivicy, 42-43, 55-56, 13B-14z,
159
obligation, 117, 137, 197
office, he who gets one gelS
underSianding, 18, 388
opinion (Mtinung), 11-IZ, 16; stt olso
public opinion
Orienlal Realm, stt index of names
'ought', zz, 88, I 58, 390
ouk titlos [oilx d6~J, 171
owl of Minerva, 23, 39Z
0\\1lerlessness, 81, 94, 409, 41z
109, 414
pardon, 161,325-3Z6,466
particularicy, 39-40. 69, z ICJ-ZZ4,
z8z-z88; stt olso freedom,
subjective
parties, political, 470
passion, zoz-zo3
pDtriD pottstDS, 29, 75, z11-Z13, zrB,
396.440
pauiolism, xxv-xxvi, z88-z89
peace, perpetual, 36z, 368, 473
peasantry, Z35-Z37
people, the, 15-17, 318-3z1, 33934Z,349-355465,47Z
perfectibilicy, 376-377, 476-477
permission (Erlllllbnis), 69-70, 404405
person, xiii-xvii, 67-69, 71, 199, zo7,
ZZ4-ZZ6,zz8,379,404-407,457
philosophy, 15-16, ZI-Z3, Z5-z8, 34
40, 391-392; as a circle, z6-z7
philosophy and jurisprudence, zB-34,
395
piety, 16, Z75 Z93
plagiarism, roo-1o1
pledge (Pfontl), IIZ-113, 415-416
ptJaum,
sos
Index of subjects
police (Polizn], xx-xxii, xlii-xliii, zz6,
259-270, 296, 328, 450; police
state, 450
police spies, 45 I
political economy, x~iii-xix, 227, 443
possesgon,70,76, 1o8-109
poverty, xix-xxii, 265-267, 452-454;
remedies for, 267
practice, 35-36
praetorians, 305, 460
prescription (Vtrjiihrung~ 93-94, 411
primogeniture, 2 17, 34 5
privilege, 271, 454-455
probabilism, 172-173, 183-184, 430
profe~on, choice of a, 237-238, 445
promise, 109-110, 414
proof, 392; deductive, 34, 396; legal,
253; philosophical, 26, 392
property (Eigmtum), 70, 73-103, 1o8109, 118, 2o8-2o9, 214-218, 239,
247-249. 404-413; abandonment
of, 95, 412; alienation of, 84, 95102, 411; as complete and free
ownership, 90-92; as external
sphere of freedom, 73; communal,
77-78, 407; entailed, 77-78, 407;
feudal, 91-92, 410-411; in matter
as well as form, 82-83, 409i in
works of an, 94; inequality ci', 8o8t, 4o8; monastic, 78; private, xvxvi, 77-78, 2ZZ-22J, 407, 442-443;
redistribution of by the state, 409;
use of, 88-94
propogtion, 148
proprietor, first, 81, 409
Protestantism, 22, 299, J34; su also
Reformation
Prussian Gmerol L~l Cotk, ut index
of names
psychologism, 392-393
public memorials, 94
public opinion, 352-355, 358-359,
472
punishment, 63, 122-131, 16o-161,
250-259, 325-326, 419-421; and
revenge, 129-131; as criminal's
right, 126-127; as educative, 124125; as retributive, 124-129;
contract theory ot; 126-127, 419420; deterrence theoty ci', 124-127,
419; measure of, 127-128, 245246, 25o-25 I; takes place only in
the state, 127; threat theory ci',

125-126, 419
purpose (Jiorsatz], 141, 143-146
Quakers, set index of names
rabble (Pokl], xxi-xxii, 266-267, 452454
rationality (Vnnii'!/iigktit], su reason
realism, 76
realm (Reidt], world-historical, 376380
reason (Vmumfi), xii, xviii, xxvi, 11,
16, t8, 20-23, 45, 55, 190, 279,
387, 389-390. 403
Recht, stt law; right
recognition (Antrkmnrmg), 81, 103,
117-118, 240. 248, 367, 413
reconciliation (Vmil1mung), 22-23
rectitude (Rtchtsdtaffinhtit), 193
Reformation, ProtesMnt, xvii, 94, 480;
stt also Protestantism
religion, 16, cfo-97 203, 2o6-207,
29Q-J04o377-J78,J80,J9IiaS
foundation of the state, 292; as
relation to absolute in terms of
representation and feeling, 292294, 298-299; conscience in, 97,
298-299, su also conscience,
religious; doctrine, 100, 296-297,
299; fanaticism in, 293-294, 304;
should not hold the reins of
government, 304; stt also God;
Church
representation (Vonttllung), 36-37,
108
representation, political, stt Estates
republicanism, 3t8-3t9, 385, 461,
474
rtsfungibilis, 111, 416
rts miJIIdpi, ~' miJIIdpi, 91, 410
rts nullius, 81, 409, 412
resolve (lkschlit}Jm], 46-47
resources (Vmnogtn], 233-234; family,
2o8-210
responsibility, 143-149. 159, 171-173,
421-422,426,4z8-429
revenge, I2C)-IJI, t6o, 252, 375
Rhodes, stt index of names
right (&chi}, XXlliv, II, 13-14. 25, 5859, 102-IOJ, 197, 370, 402-403;
abstract, m-xvii, 62, 67-132, 157,
404-421; abstract, as coercive, 58,
so6
Index of subjects
1:n; abstract, contains only
prohibitions, 7fJ, 40s;
commandment of, 69, 4os;
infringement of, ng-1z1; Kant's
principle of. sS. 40]; of heroes,
1zo, 376; of persons, things and
actions, 70-71, 40s; punishment as
actuality of, 1z3-1z5; punishment
as restoration of, I Z4; system m,
S3-6Z
right of insight, 158-161
right of knowledge, 144
right of necessity [Notr<lt], 154-156
rights, civil, xvi, 4 59; collisions m,
117; human, z4o; imprescriptible,
g6-97, 411; inalienable, 95-g6,
107, 411; political, 459
robbery [rapiiiD], IZZ, 1z8, 418, 4Zo4ZI
Roman Catholicism, 186, 435, 45946o
Roman law, su law, Roman
romanticism, 180-184. zo1-zoz, 304,
J84,387-388,399-4~ 4ZS, 4JZ435 4J8, 457. 46o
sale, 111, 416
science, 38o; freedom of, 357-358;
philosophical, g-rz
seizure, as mode of appropriation, 84
self-ownership, 78-79, 86-88, 408
self-satisfaction, xiv, 149-150, 15z
semblance [Schein], 115-117, 410
serfdom, xvi, 96, 336, 388
sex. zoo, zo4-zo6, zo8, 4JII-439
sexes, differentiation 0, Z04-Z07,
438-+40
Schtin, s~~ semblance
simplicity [Gftii~gmhnt], 146, 356, 4zz
scepticism, 403
slander, 357
slavery, xvi, z7, JZ, 71, 86-88, 95-98,
1zz, 197, zn, 379; antinomy of, 87
Sophists, su index of names
sovereign power [Piint], 313-3z8; s~~
also monarch; monarchy
sovereignty, external, 359-366
sovereignty, internal, 315, 359
sovereignty, popular, 318-319
space, 44
species [Gallung), zoo, z 11, 347
spirit (G~ist], 35-37, 51, 68, 87, 197-
199,Z76,466,476-478;natiorud,
371
Stamm, se~ kinship group
Stand, u~ estate
Sriinde, s~~ Estates
state (Staal), xxii-xxvii, ZI-ZJ, 6z, 64.
78, 198,z7s-z8z,J6S-J70,J8o;
and Church, zgo-304; as monarch's
private property, 314. 413-414,
464; contract theory of, 105-106,
1z6-1z7, 413-414; external
sovereignty of, 359-366; internal
sovereignty of, 315; its relation to
individuals, z8z-z86; natural, 378,
479; of necessity [Nowaat], zz1,
44Z; organism O, z88, Z90, J04313, 3Z7, 46o; regulation of the
economy, xix, z61-z64
stipulation, 107-110, 414
Stoicism, 1zz, 418
stone, belongs to the devil when it
leaves the hand, 148, 4ZZ
subject [Untntan], z8s
subjectivity [Sufddtivit4t), xiii-xvii, zo,
ss. 135-14Z, 195-196, zz8; law not
applicable to, 1z1, Z44-z4s; right
of, 164-167; s~~ also freedom,
subjective; morality
substance [Subs/an:], xvi, 17, 96, 189191, 195-197, 41Z
suicide, 38, 101-IOZ, 398, 41Z-41J
surety, nz
taking possession [Besil%nahm~], 83-88
toation,JJ7-JJ8,J43
testaments, Ill, ZIS-Z18; sua/so
inheritance
theft [/ilnum], nz, 418, 4zo-4z1
theocracy, 377
theory, 35-36
'thesis-antithesis-synthesis', xxvii, xxxii
thing [Sam~). 73-77
thing-in-itself, 76, 79
thought, 14, 17, ZJ, 53, 147, 158-161,
191, Z40, Z78
time, 44,93
tradesman [Gm>erbsmann], Z71
tragedy, 181, 436
treaty (Vtrtrag), 365-371
trials, ZS4-ZS9; by jury, X. ZSS-ZS9
449; public, 457; publicity m, x,
ZS4,+48
Index of subjects
Twelve Tables, ]I-]Z, 34, 395-396,
~442
understanding [Jimtand], Io, 3o-34,

]8-]C), 392
unintentional wrong (uniRfangmes
Unrtdtt), n6-119
universality, xii, 37-38, 54-55, 67,
I4D-I4I, I46-I48, I 57 z I9-zzo,
zz4-zz6, z76; forma~ 52; selfdetermining, 52-53
unmoved mover, I8g, 275, 435
Urr/11, s~~ wrong
use of property, 83, 88-94
valet, no man a hero to his, I5z, 424
valour [T~/trM"t), 363-365
value [Wm), 92-93, I07, IZ7-IZ8,
411
1/emunft, se~ reason
1/m/j/mung. su reconciliation
~mtand, su understanding
vinue (Tug~ml), IZZ, I94-I95, 4I8; as
mean, I94o 437
1/olk, su people; nation
1/DnQZ:, su purpose
11rmJellung, s~~ representation
voting franchise, 469-470
wages, contract of, g8-gg, I I z, 4I 6

Wa/11, se~ choice
war, xxvi-xxvii, IOI-Ioz, 36o-365,
369; modem, 365, 474i prisoners
of, 37Ii rules of, 370-37I, 475
warrant (Btfognis), 69-70, 404-405
welfare [ Wohl), xvii-xviii, xxiv-xxv,
I4I, I50-I58, I97 zzo-zzi, z83z88, 369
will (Will~). 35-58, 78-79; common,
I04-Io6; freedom of, 35-37, 396397i immediate, 44-45; natural,
I67i subjective, I]5-I4Z
Willltiir, se~ arbitrariness
women, zo6-zo7, 439-440
work ~bftt), Z]I-Z]], 444
world-historical individua~ 375, 477479
world history, xxv, 6z-63, z8I, 37I38oi its right is absolute, 63-64,
373-374 477-478
world spirit, su spirit
wrong (Urr~dll), xxi, 70, II], 115I]I, z6o; civ~ 116-119
youth, I5, 383
z-g. s~~ coercion

ZRck,
so8
se~
end
Index of names
Adams, J., 4zo
Aeschylus, 4zo-4z1
Aesop, 390
Agricola, 48o
Agrippa, M., 458
Aisse, C. E., 4Z4
Ajax, 4z1
Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 466
Alexander (the Great), King of
Macedonia, 478-479
America, stt Latin America; Nonh
America; United States of America
Anabaptiscs, Z95
Annat, F., 4z8-4z9
Antigon~ 189,zo6,435-436,439
Antigonus, Macedonian general, 4Z4
Antigonus I, King of Macedonia, 391
Antisthenes, 443
Antoninus Pius, Roman emperor, 393
Ariosto, 354, 47Z
Aris, R., 384
Aristotle, 171, 418, 4Z3, 4Z9, 435,
437.46o
Arnauld, A., 4z8
Arnold, the Miller of Ziillichau, 335,
468
Asverus, G., J83
Augustine, St, 458
Austria, viii
A\ineri, Shlomo, lOOii, 4 73
Bacon, F., 391, 445
Baring-Gould, S., 4Z5
Basedow, J. B., 440-441
Bastille Day, 397
Bavarian Penal Code, 419

Bayonne, Constitution of, 3tz-313,
463
Beauny, E., 4z8
Beccaria, C., 1z6-1z7, 419-4Z0
Behler, E., 433
Bentham,J., 4zo
Berdahl, R., 456
Bible, 16, 19, 1z9, z13, 310, 384,
391, 4ZD-4ZI, 4Z7-4Z9, 436, 4J8,
446
Bill of Rights, English, z8o, 4s6-457
Bismarck, Otto von, viii
Blackstone, W., 4ZI, 445,449
Bolivar, S., 454
BoUand, G. J., xxxvi
Bologna, law school of, 393
Bonald, Vicomt~ 46o
Bonapane, Joseph, King of Spain, 463
Bonapane, Napoleon, stt Napoleon
Bouterwek, F., 434
Brahman, 39
Braubach, M., 455
Bruno, Giordano, 300, 459-46o
Brutus, L. Junius, 441
Brutus, MarcusJ., 1oz, 413
Buckland, W. W., 393
Burke, E., 475
Burkhardt, D., xxxiii
Caecilius, Sextus, 31-33, 395-396
Caesar, julius, Roman emperor, 413,
47Z-473.477-478
Campe, J. H., 440
Campo Formio, Peace of, 367, 475
509
Index o[11ames
Estates [Standt], stt index of subjec!S
Eumenides, 129, 420
Europe,371,378-38o,479-48o
Carlsbad Decrees, viii, 388-J119, 4 72

Carove, F. W~ 383, 385
Cassius, Caius, 413
Ca!herine II (!he Great), Tsarina of
Russia, 420
Cato, Marcus Porcius, 413
Ceylon, 109
Chalybius, H. M., xxxii
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 465
China,245
Christianity, xvii, 51, 92, 151, 223,
380, 397 48o
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 31, 217, 395,
441
CleiS!henes, 452
Oive, R., 474
Cohn, E. J., 448
Constant, B~ 465
ConS!anline, Roman emperor, 442
Copernicus, N., 300
Comuel, Mme, 424
Cousin, V., 386, 465
Creon, 435
Creuzer, G. F., 235, 444
Crispin, St, 154, 425
Crispinian, St, 425
Croesus, King of Lydia, I sr, 422-423
Cynics, 23 I, 443
Cyrus, King of Persia, 422
Faber, K. G., 389

Favorinus, 31-33, 395-396
Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor,
426
Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, 463
Feuerbach, A., 125-126, 419, 449
Feuerbach, ~ 419
Fichte, J. G., xvi, xxxii-xxxiv, li, 21,
40,109-110, 277309-310,384,
387.392-393398,410,413-415,
433-436, 441, 4o6, 4o8-4og, 455
461-462
Filmer, R., xxx
Fludd, R., 391
Fogarty, H. W ., 391
Follen, K., 388-389
Fiirs!er, F. C., 382
ForS!er, M., 403
France, 194, 264, 339, 367, 446, 465,
467
French Revolution, xvii, 38-39, 143,
277386,388,397403,412,436,
457 461, 48o
Friedrich II (the Great), King of
Prussia, 335, 399 414, 420, 457,
464-465, 468, 472
Friedrich Wilhelm ill, King of
Prussia, ix, 462
Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of
Prussia, viii
Fries, J. F., viii, xxx, Ii-lli, 15-17, 49,
172-180,382-389,392-393396,
399401,424-426,429,431-432,
434,436,4S8-45946I,46S,473
Frommann, F. J~ 385
Frommann, K. F. E., 385
Furies, 420
deMaislre, J., 400

Descanes, R., 399
Dewey,J., xxxi
rHogenes,231, 443
Diogenes Laertius, 78, 418, 437
Dion, ruler of Syracuse, 446
Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, 246,
446
Dionysius U, tyrant of Syracuse, 446
Draco, 122, 418
Eggo, Feodor, stt Stuhr, P. F.
Egypt, 94, 291, 338
Eichner, H., 433, 439
England, 218, 242-243, 269,310,
339.343.36s-366,44B,4sr,4s4
English Civil War, 461
English law,sttlaw, English (index of
subjec!S)
Epicurus, r6, 78, 387
Erdmann, J. E., xxx
Erinyes, 420
Gaius, Roman jurist, 393, 396, 405,

407 409-411, 415, 421,440,446
Galilee, 300, 459-400
Gans, E., xxii, xxxi-xxxi~ xxxv-xxxvi,
13, 47, rgo, 218, 226, 237, 289,
30S,307,33I,346,3SS359362,
381-382, 449 461
Garve, c., 475
Gellius, Aulus, 31-33, 395-396
German Imperial ES!ates, 280, 456
sro
Index of 11ames
German nationalism, su nationalism,
German (index of subjects)
Germanic Realm, 377, 379-Jllo, 47948o
Germany, 194, 2.48, 2.57, 2.69, 446,
473
Geuss, R., xxix
Gneisenau, A. N. von, 46o-461
God, su index of subjects
Godechot,J., 465
Goethe:,]. W., 16, 47 190, 2.47, 354,
387.389.399-400,42.4433-434.
436, 447. 472.
Giirres, j. von, 460
Gracchus, Gaius, 406-407
Gracchus, Tiberius, 406-407, 449
Greece:, ancient, :..-vii, 17, zo, 193-195,
zo6-zo7,z64-z65, z69,z85-z86,
311}-32.1, 377-379, 389, 436-437,
451-452., 464
Griesheim, K. G. von, xxxvi, 2.18, 305,
315,32.1,331,346,36Z,367,381
Grunwald, C. de, 461
Guizot, V., 465
Hadsian, Roman emperor, 395
Haller, K. L. von, 17, 2.52., 2.78-z81,
385,387-388,456-457,46o,464
Hardenberg, F. von, su Novalis
Hardenberg, K. A. von, ~x, xx, 388,
455.459462.,471-472.
Haym, R., xxx
Hegel, G. W. F., vii-xi, xxxiii-xxxiv,
xlv-xlix, 381-382.
Hegelianism, see index of subjects
Heimsiith, H., xxxi
Heineccius,J. G., 34, 71, 3, 405
Henneberg, B. von, Archbishop of
Mainz,468
Henning, L. von, 383
Henrich, D., xxxi
Hercules, 102., 194, 412.-413, 436437
Herder,]. G., 389. 476
Herodotus, 42.2.-42.3, 451-452.
Hesiod, 42.0
Hinduism, see index of subjects
Hirsch, E., 434
Hobbes, T., xxx, 413, 467
Hoffmeister, j., xxxvi
HoltzendorfT, F. J. W. P. von, 42.2.
Holy Alliance, z8z, 457
Holy Roman Empire:, 32.4, 456, 465,

468
Homer, 382.
Homeyer, C. G., 381
Hondt,]. d', xxxi, 385
Horace:, z68, 454
Hotho, H. G., xxxvi, 47, 2.18, zz6,
2.37. 2.59,Z89.305,307,31Z,J46,
359, 381
Hugo, G. von, 31-34, 2.42., 394-395
Humboldt, W. von, x, XX, 462., 469,
471-472.
H)ppolitc:,J., 397-398,434
Iavolenus, Roman jurist, 392.
Dting, K.-H., xxxi, xxxv-xxxvi, 32., 97,
101, 160, 168, 2.2.7, 2.31, 2.48, 309
India, 2.38, 2.91-2.92., 364, 474
Inquisition, 300-301, 459-400
Irnin, T., xxix, 171
Islam, 367
Jacobi, F. H., 178, 387, 432.
Jansenius, C., 4z8
Jerome, St, 430
jesuits, 17o-1 73, 42.8-430
jesus, 171, ZOJ, 42.7, 434, 438, 453,
458
John, King of England, 456
john Paul D, Pope:, 460
joseph II, emperor of Austria, 12.7,
389.42.0
judaism, 130, 2.95-2.96, 367, 379, 386,
458-459.479
julius Caesar, ueCaesar,julius
justinian, Roman emperor, 2.9. 91,
2.47,392.-393405,407,409-416,
418,42.1,42.5,44D-442.
Kant, I., xii, xxxii, xlix-1, 34, 40, 49,
58, 63, 71, 105, 111-112., 161-163,
2.01, z81, 362., 368, 396, 399-400,
403-406,4Q9,412.-415,417,4Z64Z7, 436, 44D, 458, 461, 464-465,
470, 473. 475
Kaufinaru1, W., 386
Kierkegaard, S., 433
Klein, E. F., 12.4. 12.9, 419
Klenner, H., xxx
Knox, T. M., xxxi, xxxvii-xxxix, xlii,
47. 12.9, 397. 4o8
Kotzebue, A. von, 385, 388-389, 430
Kraus, C.]., 445
SII
bulex of names
Napoleon, vii-viii, x:xxiii, 312-313,
325, 331, 367, 388-389, 397, 447,
449. 461, 463. 466, 477-478
Napoleonic Code, su index of subjects
National Socialism, su index of
subjects
Nicomedes, 472-473
Niebuhr, B. G., 393, 479
Niethammer, F. 1., 382
Nipperdey, T., 385
Nisbet, H. B., xxix
North America, 295, 454
Navalis, 384, 434
Krug, W. T., 434-435

Laplace, P. S. de, 300
Lares, 438; su also Penates
Lasson, G., :axvi
Lateranus, L. Sextius, 395
Latin America, 454
Leibniz, G. W. von, 34 396, 399, 426
Leipzig, banle of, 384
LeMoine, P., 428-429
Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany,
420
Lessing, G. E., 476
Licinian law, sel index of subjects
Licinian rogations, su index of
subjects
Uvy, 395, 442, 458
Locke,j., 413,440
Lucian, of Samosata, 217, 441
Lucretius, 387
Luther, M., xvii, 22, 384, 4o8, 480
Octavianus, 413
Oedipus, 144, 146, 421-422
Oken, L., 384-385
Orestes, 42o-42 1
Oriental Realm, 377
Ottrnann,'H., xxx-xxxii
Pandulph, Cardinal, 456
Papinian, Roman jurist, 446
Pascal, B., 171-173, 4zB-430
Paul, Roman jurist, 446
Penates, 203, 211, 275, 438; Ul also
Lares
Penelope, 10, 382
Pericles, 399
Persia, 377-378, 423
Phidias, 49, 399
Pitt, William (the Younger), 366, 475
Plato, 18, 2o-2 1, 77, 180, 222-223,
238,286,388,390,407,418,442443446,464
Plutarch, 418, 424, 432, 437
Piiggcler, 0., 435
Pompey, 413
Pope, A., 432
Popper, K. R., xxxi
Prcgizer, R., 389
Prior, M., 430
Propertius, Sexrus Aurelius, 425
Protestantism, su index of subjects
Prussia, administration, 388;
Machts/1141, viii; milital)', 388;
reaction of 1819, vii-x, xxx, 388389; reform era, vii-xi, xx-xxi, 329332,383,388-389,447-448,453.
459-462, 467-472
Prussian Gmua/ L~a/ COik, 281, 410,
419,438,445450,457.464,468469
Magna Charta, 280, 456

Maier, M., 391
Manu, 445
Marcus Antonius, 413
Marcus Ausclius, Roman emperor,
393
Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria,
420
Marx, K., ix, 4o8
Marxism, su index of subjects
Mamnilian I, Holy Ro~nan Emperor,
468
Meinecke, F., 445, 455, 461, 467
Mendelssohn, M., 438
Mephistopheles, 16, 433
Merryman,j. H., 448
Menernich, W. L. von, 389
Michel, K. M., xxxv
Michele!, K. L., xxxi
Mill, j. S., xv, xx, xxiv, xxxii
Minerva, 23, 392
Modestin, Roman jurist, 446
Moldenhauer, E., lO.:'I:V
Montaigne, M. de, 414
Montcsquieu, C. L. S. de, 29, 283z84,310-311,394461-462
Mueller, G. E., xxxii
Miiller, A., 46o
Miiller, j. von, 19, 389
Miiller, K. A. von, 389
Miillner, A., 434
512
Index of names
Ptolemy, 300
Pufendorf, S., .uS
Pythagoras, 11}6, 437
Quakers, 295
Quintilian, 432
Raja Chandra Sahib, 474
Reformation, Protestant, ut index of
subjects
Rehberg, A. von, 408
Rhodes, 21, 390-391; Colossus r:I,
391
Ricardo, D., xvii, 227, 443

Richelieu, Cardinal, 425, 428
Riedel, M., xxx, xxxii
Ritter ,j., xxxi, 398
Roman Catholicism, set index of
subjects
Rome, ancient, 19, 27-34o 130, 358,
377, 379, 472-473; Stt 11/so law,
Roman (index of subjects)
Rome, French occupation of, under
Napoleon, 1g, 389
Rosen, A., xxix
Rosenberg, A., xxx-xxxi
Rosencreutz, C., 391
Rosenkranz, K., xxxi
Rosenzweig, F., xxxi, 473
Rosicrucians, 391
Ross, W. D., 171
Riissler, C., xxx
Rousseau,j.-j., 11}6, 277, 400,413,
43B,44~443.45546S,469,476
Royer-Collard, P., 465

Russia, viii, 336, 475
Sahib, Raja Chandra, stt Raja
Chandra Sahib
Sand, K. L., 388-389, 430
Savigny, F. K. von, 394, 446-447, 457
Say,J.-8., xviii, 227, 443
Scharnhorst, G. von, 46o-461
Schelling, F. W. j. von, xxxii-xxxiii,
435
Schieder, T., 389

Schiller, F., 389, 399-400, 423-425,
434.442475-476
Schlegel, A. W., 433-434

Schlegel, F., 180-184, 205,
399-4~
4JZ-435.438-439.46o
Schleiermacher, F., 205, 434, 439

Schliizer, A. L., 465
Schmid, C. E., 393

Schiin, T. von, 445
Schopenhauer, A., 447
Schulze, j., vii, xxx-xxxi
Seneca (the Elder), 441
5evigne, Marie de Rabutin Chantal,
Madame de, 424
Shakespeare, W., JZ, 395, 434, 458,
474
Simon, W., 448

Smith, Adam, xviii, 227, 411, 443-445
Smith, E., xliv
Socrates, 166-167, 18o, 313, 432433, 437. 443 477
Solger, K. W. F., 18o-182, 433-434

Solon, 151, 418, 422-423, 452
Sophists, 18, 180, 388
Sophocles, 206,421, 435-436, 439
Spain, 269, 312-313, 366, 454, 463
Sparta, 238
Spinoza, B., 96, 412
Stahl, F.j., xxx
Stein, H. F. K. von, x, xx, 388, 447,
455460-462,467-468,471
Stoicism, set index of subjects

Stolberg, F. L. von, 178, 432, 435
Stolo, P. Licinius, 395
Strauss, D. F., 381
Stuhr, P. F., 378, 479
Suetonius, 472-473
Tacitus, 48o
Theseus, 42 1
Thespius, 437
Thibaut, A., 446
Tieck, L., 433-434
Toews,j. E., xxx-xxxi
Tiicher, G. von, 385
Tiicher, M. von (\we of Hegel), xxxiii
Turgor, A.-R.-J., 473-474
Turkey, 94
Twelve Tables, see index of subjects
Ulpian, Roman jurist, 446
United States of America, 295, 454
Unruh, G. C., 450
Uranus, 420
Valentinian Ill, Roman emperor, 446
Varrentrapp, C., xxx
Veit, D., 438-439
Veit, S., 438
Vlastos, G., 432
513
Index of names
Voltaire, 447
Wannenmann, P., 381

Wanburg Festival, 15, 383-385, 388
Weil, E., xxxi
Wesselhiift, R., 385
Wesselhiift, w., 385
WoiiT, C., 48, 161, 3911-399, 426
Wood, A., xliv

Wood, R., xxix
Wiimemberg, vii, 456, 46z, 46cr-H3
Xenophilius, 437
Xenophon, 437
Zeno lhe Stoic, 418
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Elements of the Philosophy of Right

Images of Hegel's political thought

Hegel and the Prussian state

Personhood and subjectivity

Estates and corporations

The political state

The family's sole remaining function is to enable individuals to find

The state and the individual

was also aided by the informative editorial apparatus in Hermann

Notes to editor's introduction

.Votes to pages viii-ix

.Votes to pages :riii-:r:rvii

Born 27 August, Stuttgart, Wiirttemberg.

Lectures f<r the first time on the system of ideas later

Werke: Theorie Werkmugabe. Frankfurt:

Hegels Briefe, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister and

Dijferet~ des Fidzte'sc/~e~z

zmd Sc/zeOing'sclren S)Stetlls der

Die Veifasstmg DeuJschlands, Werke 1.

Clarendon Press, I 964.

Enz.yklopiidie der plrilosophischen Wissensdra.fterr 1 (I8I7,

der philosoplrischcn Wissenschafterr (I8I7

ber. Additions are indicated by an 'A'.

EriZyklopiidie der philosoplrischen Wissenscha.ften II (I 8 I 7,

Enz.yklopiidie Jer philosophischen Wissenschaften 111

Glauben und Wisserr (I8o2), Werke II.

Jenaer Rea/plrilosophie (I8os-I8o6) (previous title:

[Beurteilung der] Verllandlzmgen in der Versammlung der

Niimberger Propiideutik (18o8-18u), Werke rv.

Uber die TIJisserzscllafilicllerl Bellandlungsarter1 des Naturrecllts (1802), Werke 11.

Pllanomer1ologie des Geistes (1807), Werke 111.

Pkilosopllie des Recllts (1821), Werke vn.

Uber die englisclle Re[on11bill (1831), Werke XI.

System der Sittlicllkeit (1802), edited by G. Lasson.

System of Ethical Lifo and First Pmlosophy of Spirit,

17zeologisclze Jugerzdschrifierz (179 3- I Boo), Werke 1.

Hegel: 17zree Essays, I'J9J-I'J95, translated by Peter

Early 11zeological Writi11gs, translated by T. M. Knox.

Vor/esu11gerz iiber die Asthetik, 3 vols. Werke XIII-XV.

Die Vennmfi i11 der Geschichte, edited by J. Hoffmeister.

Lectures (Jrl the Philosophy of World History: lntroducti011,

Vorlesungetz iiber die Gesclziclzte der Plzilosophie I-III,

Vorlestmgerz iiber die Plzilosophie der Gesclzichte, Werke

11ze Plzilosoplzy ofHistory, translated by J. Sibree. New

Pllilosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesrmg von r8r()lr82o,

Lectures 011 the Pllilosophy of Religion, 3 volumes,

Wissenschaft der Logik (I8I2, I8I6), Werke v-v1. Cited

In writings cited by paragraph(), a comma used before 'R' or 'A'

Kritik der reintm Vernunft, edited by Raymund

Zum ewigen Fneden, GS vm.

Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Ausgabe der

Gnmdlegzmg der Metaphysik der Sillen, GS IV.

Kritik der praktisclzen Venzunfi, GS v.

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