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ENBANC

[G.R.No.140835.August14,2000]

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY

COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive
Secretary COMMISSION ON AUDIT ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on
Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential
Adviser for/on Political Affairs VERONICA IGNACIOJONES, as Presidential Assistant/
AppointmentSecretary(Inchargeofappointments),respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGAREYES,J.:

InthispetitionforprohibitionandmandamusfiledonDecember9,1999,petitionerRamonA.Gonzales,inhiscapacityas
a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR)andofthepositionsofpresidentialconsultants,advisersandassistants.PetitionerasksthisCourttoenjointhePCCR
andthepresidentialconsultants,advisersandassistantsfromactingassuch,andtoenjoinExecutiveSecretaryRonaldoB.
Zamorafromenforcingtheiradviceandrecommendations.Inaddition,petitionerseekstoenjointheCommissiononAuditfrom
passinginauditexpendituresforthePCCRandthepresidentialconsultants,advisersandassistants.Finally,petitionerprays
foranordercompellingrespondentZamoratofurnishpetitionerwithinformationoncertainmatters.
OnJanuary28,2000,respondentHon.AndresR.Narvasa,impleadedinhiscapacityasChairmanofthePCCR,filedhis
Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed
theirCommentwiththisCourtonMarch7,2000.PetitionerthenfiledaConsolidatedReplyonApril24,2000,whereuponthis
casewasconsideredsubmittedfordecision.
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I.PreparatoryCommissiononConstitutionalReform
ThePreparatoryCommissiononConstitutionalReform(PCCR)wascreatedbyPresidentEstradaonNovember26,1998
byvirtueofExecutiveOrderNo.43(E.O.No.43)inordertostudyandrecommendproposedamendmentsand/orrevisionsto
the1987Constitution,andthemannerofimplementingthesame.[1]PetitionerdisputestheconstitutionalityofthePCCRontwo
grounds.First,hecontendsthatitisapublicofficewhichonlythelegislaturecancreatebywayofalaw.[2]Secondly,petitioner
asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitutiontheamendmentofthefundamentalcharter.[3]
Itisallegedbyrespondentsthat,withrespecttothePCCR,thiscasehasbecomemootandacademic.Weagree.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
becomeacademicordead.[4]UnderE.O.No.43,thePCCRwasinstructedtocompleteitstaskonorbeforeJune30,1999.[5]
However,onFebruary19,1999,thePresidentissuedExecutiveOrderNo.70(E.O.No.70),whichextendedthetimeframefor
thecompletionofthecommissionswork,viz
SECTION6.Section8isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
TimeFrame.TheCommissionshallcommenceitsworkon01January1999andcompletethesameonorbefore31
December1999.TheCommissionshallsubmititsreportandrecommendationstothePresidentwithinfifteen(15)working
daysfrom31December1999.
ThePCCRsubmitteditsrecommendationstothePresidentonDecember20,1999andwasdissolvedbythePresidentonthe
sameday.It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6] Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre.
SubsequenteventshaveovertakenthepetitionandtheCourthasnothinglefttoresolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by
petitioner.Basically,petitionerasksthisCourttoenjointhePCCRfromactingassuch.[7]Clearly,prohibitionisaninappropriate
remedysincethebodysoughttobeenjoinednolongerexists.Itiswellestablishedthatprohibitionisapreventiveremedyand
doesnotlietorestrainanactthatisalreadyfaitaccompli.[8]Atthispoint,anyrulingregardingthePCCRwouldsimplybeinthe
natureofanadvisoryopinion,whichisdefinitelybeyondthepermissiblescopeofjudicialpower.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful
invocationofjudicialpowerinsofarasthePCCRisconcerned.
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illuminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions.[9]InassailingtheconstitutionalityofE.O.Nos.43and70,petitionerassertshis
interestasacitizenandtaxpayer.[10]Acitizenacquiresstandingonlyifhecanestablishthathehassufferedsomeactualor
threatenedinjuryasaresultoftheallegedlyillegalconductofthegovernmenttheinjuryisfairlytraceabletothechallenged
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actionandtheinjuryislikelytoberedressedbyafavorableaction.[11]InKilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12]wedenied

standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the
PhilippineGamingManagementCorporation,statingthat,
inValmontev.PhilippineCharitySweepstakesOffice,G.R.No.78716,Sept.22,1987,standingwasdeniedtoapetitionerwho
soughttodeclareaformoflotteryknownasInstantSweepstakesinvalidbecause,astheCourtheld,
Valmontebringsthesuitasacitizen,lawyer,taxpayerandfatherofthree(3)minorchildren.Butnowhereinhispetitiondoes
petitionerclaimthathisrightsandprivilegesasalawyerorcitizenhavebeendirectlyandpersonallyinjuredbytheoperationof
theInstantSweepstakes.Theinterestofthepersonassailingtheconstitutionalityofastatutemustbedirectandpersonal.He
mustbeabletoshow,notonlythatthelawisinvalid,butalsothathehassustainedorinimmediatedangerofsustainingsome
directinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement,andnotmerelythathesufferstherebyinsomeindefiniteway.Itmustappearthatthe
personcomplaininghasbeenorisabouttobedeniedsomerightorprivilegetowhichheislawfullyentitledorthatheisabout
tobesubjectedtosomeburdensorpenaltiesbyreasonofthestatutecomplainedof.
WeapprehendnodifferencebetweenthepetitionerinValmonteandthepresentpetitioners.Petitionersdonotinfactshow
whatparticularizedinteresttheyhaveforbringingthissuit.Itdoesnotdetractfromthehighregardforpetitionersascivic
leaderstosaythattheirinterestfallsshortofthatrequiredtomaintainanactionunderRule3,d2.
Comingnowtotheinstantcase,petitionerhasnotshownthathehassustainedorisindangerofsustaininganypersonal
injuryattributabletothecreationofthePCCR.Ifatall,itisonlyCongress,notpetitioner,whichcanclaimanyinjuryinthiscase
since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.
Neitherdoesheclaimthathisrightsorprivilegeshavebeenorareindangerofbeingviolated,northatheshallbesubjectedto
anypenaltiesorburdensasaresultofthePCCRsactivities.Clearly,petitionerhasfailedtoestablishhislocusstandisoasto
enablehimtoseekjudicialredressasacitizen.
Ataxpayerisdeemedtohavethestandingtoraiseaconstitutionalissuewhenitisestablishedthatpublicfundshavebeen
disbursedinallegedcontraventionofthelawortheConstitution.[13],Thuspayersactionisproperlybroughtonlywhenthereis
an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners
TelecommunicationsandBroadcastAttorneysofthePhilippines(TELEBAP)andGMANetwork,Inc.questionedthevalidityof
section92ofB.P.No.881(otherwiseknowsastheOmnibusElectionCode)requiringradioandtelevisionstationstogivefree
airtimetotheCommissiononElectionsduringthecampaignperiod.[15]TheCourtheldthatpetitionerTELEBAPdidnothave
anyinterestasataxpayersincetheassailedlawdidnotinvolvethetaxingorspendingpowerofCongress.[16]
Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a
disbursementofpublicfundsbythelegislature.InSanidadv.CommissiononElections,[17]thepetitionersthereinwereallowed
to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative
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capacitycallingforanationalreferendum,withtheCourtexplainingthat
...[i]tisnowanancientrulethatthevalidsourceofastatutePresidentialDecreesareofsuchnaturemaybecontestedbyone
whowillsustainadirectinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement.Attheinstanceoftaxpayers,lawsprovidingforthedisbursement
ofpublicfundsmaybeenjoined,uponthetheorythattheexpenditureofpublicfundsbyanofficeroftheStateforthepurpose
ofexecutinganunconstitutionalactconstitutesamisapplicationofsuchfunds.ThebreadthofPresidentialDecreeNo.991
carriesanappropriationofFiveMillionPesosfortheeffectiveimplementationofitspurposes.PresidentialDecreeNo.1031
appropriatesthesumofEightMillionPesostocarryoutitsprovisions.Theinterestoftheaforenamedpetitionersastaxpayers
inthelawfulexpenditureoftheseamountsofpublicmoneysufficientlyclothesthemwiththatpersonalitytolitigatethevalidity
oftheDecreesappropriatingsaidfunds.
Instillanothercase,theCourtheldthatpetitionersthePhilippineConstitutionAssociation,Inc.,anonprofitcivicorganization
hadstandingastaxpayerstoquestiontheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.3836insofarasitprovidesforretirementgratuity
andcommutationofvacationandsickleavestoSenatorsandRepresentativesandtotheelectiveofficialsofbothhousesof
Congress.[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[19] the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit
assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and
improvementoffeederroadswithinprivateproperty.Allthesecasesinvolvedthedisbursementofpublicfundsbymeansofa
law.
Meanwhile,inBugnayConstructionandDevelopmentCorporationv.Laron,[20]theCourtdeclaredthatthetrialcourtwas
wronginallowingrespondentRavanzotobringanactionforinjunctioninhiscapacityasataxpayerinordertoquestionthe
legalityofthecontractofleasecoveringthepublicmarketenteredintobetweentheCityofDagupanandpetitioner.TheCourt
declaredthatRavanzodidnotpossesstherequisitestandingtobringsuchtaxpayerssuitsince[o]nitsface,andthereisno
evidencetothecontrary,theleasecontractenteredintobetweenpetitionerandtheCityshowsthatnopublicfundshavebeen
orwillbeusedintheconstructionofthemarketbuilding.
Comingnowtotheinstantcase,itisreadilyapparentthatthereisnoexercisebyCongressofitstaxingorspendingpower.
ThePCCRwascreatedbythePresidentbyvirtueofE.O.No.43,asamendedbyE.O.No.70.Undersection7ofE.O.No.43,
theamountofP3millionisappropriatedforitsoperationalexpensestobesourcedfromthefundsoftheOfficeofthePresident.
Therelevantprovisionstates
Appropriations.TheinitialamountofThreeMillionPesos(P3,000,000.00)isherebyappropriatedfortheoperational
expensesoftheCommissiontobesourcedfromfundsoftheOfficeofthePresident,subjecttotheusualaccountingand
auditingrulesandregulations.AdditionalamountsshallbereleasedtotheCommissionuponsubmissionofrequirements
forexpenditures.
TheappropriationsforthePCCRwereauthorizedbythePresident,notbyCongress.Infact,therewasnoanappropriationat
all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
ConstitutionthatmoneymaybepaidoutoftheTreasury,whileappropriationmadebylawreferstotheactofthelegislature
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setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors. [21]ThefundsusedforthePCCRweretakenfromfundsintendedfortheOfficeofthePresident,intheexerciseof
theChiefExecutivespowertotransferfundspursuanttosection25(5)ofarticleVIoftheConstitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a
taxpayerssuit.[22]Inthecaseatbar,therebeingnoexercisebyCongressofitstaxingorspendingpower,petitionercannotbe
allowedtoquestionthecreationofthePCCRinhiscapacityasataxpayer,butrather,hemustestablishthathehasapersonal
andsubstantialinterestinthecaseandthathehassustainedorwillsustaindirectinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement.[23] In
otherwords,petitionermustshowthatheisarealpartyininterestthathewillstandtobebenefitedorinjuredbythejudgment
or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.
II.PresidentialConsultants,Advisers,Assistants
Thesecondissueraisedbypetitionerconcernsthepresidentialconsultants.Petitionerallegesthatin1995and1996,the
Presidentcreatedseventy(70)positionsintheOfficeofthePresidentandappointedtosaidpositionstwenty(20)presidential
consultants,twentytwo(22)presidentialadvisers,andtwentyeight(28)presidentialassistants.[25]Petitionerassertsthat,asin
thecaseofthePCCR,thePresidentdoesnothavethepowertocreatethesepositions.[26]
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue
beforetheCourt.Firstofall,hehasnotproventhathehassustainedorisindangerofsustaininganyinjuryasaresultofthe
appointmentofsuchpresidentialadvisers.Secondly,petitionerhasnotallegedthenecessaryfactssoastoenabletheCourtto
determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an
executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative
order,memorandumorder,orotherwise,thePresidentattemptedtocreatethepositionsofpresidentialadvisers,consultants
andassistants.Thus,itisunclearwhatactofthePresidentpetitionerisassailing.Insupportofhisallegation,petitionermerely
annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the names and positions of such presidential
consultants,advisersandassistantstohispetition.However,appointmentisobviouslynotsynonymouswithcreation.Itwould
beimprovidentforthisCourttoentertainthisissuegiventheinsufficientnatureoftheallegationsinthePetition.
III.RighttoInformation
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his
letter(AnnexD)datedOctober4,1999requestingforthenamesofexecutiveofficialsholdingmultiplepositionsingovernment,
copiesoftheirappointments,andalistoftherecipientsofluxuryvehiclesseizedbytheBureauofCustomsandturnedoverto
Malacanang.[27]
TherighttoinformationisenshrinedinSection7oftheBillofRightswhichprovidesthat
Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andto
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documents,andpaperspertainingtoofficialacts,transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedas
basisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
Underboththe1973[28]and1987Constitution,thisisaselfexecutoryprovisionwhichcanbeinvokedbyanycitizenbefore
thecourts.ThiswasourrulinginLegaspiv.CivilServiceCommission,[29]whereintheCourtclassifiedtherighttoinformation
asapublicrightandwhena[m]andamusproceedinginvolvestheassertionofapublicright,therequirementofpersonalinterest
issatisfiedbythemerefactthatthepetitionerisacitizen,andtherefore,partofthegeneralpublicwhichpossessestheright.
However,Congressmayprovideforreasonableconditionsupontheaccesstoinformation.Suchlimitationswereembodiedin
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to
ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonableclaimsofconfidentiality.[30]
Elaboratingonthesignificanceoftherighttoinformation,theCourtsaidinBaldozav.Dimaano[31]that[t]heincorporation
ofthisrightintheConstitutionisarecognitionofthefundamentalroleoffreeexchangeofinformationinademocracy.There
canbenorealisticperceptionbythepublicofthenationsproblems,norameaningfuldemocraticdecisionmakingiftheyare
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigenciesofthetimes.Theinformationtowhichthepublicisentitledtoarethoseconcerningmattersofpublicconcern,aterm
whichembrace[s]abroadspectrumofsubjectswhichthepublicmaywanttoknow,eitherbecausethesedirectlyaffecttheir
lives,orsimplybecausesuchmattersnaturallyarousetheinterestofanordinarycitizen.Inthefinalanalysis,itisforthecourts
to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.[32]
Thus,weagreewithpetitionerthatrespondentZamora,inhisofficialcapacityasExecutiveSecretary,hasaconstitutional
and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is,
appointmentsmadetopublicofficesandtheutilizationofpublicproperty.Withregardtopetitionersrequestforcopiesofthe
appointmentpapersofcertainofficials,respondentZamoraisobligedtoallowtheinspectionandcopyingofthesamesubject
tothereasonablelimitationsrequiredfortheorderlyconductofofficialbusiness.[33]
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisdismissed,withtheexceptionthatrespondentZamoraisorderedtofurnishpetitionerwiththe
informationrequested.
SOORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, YnaresSantiago,
andDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Bellosillo,J.,abroad,onofficialbusiness.
Puno,J.,votetodismissonthegroundthatthecaseismoot.
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[1]E.O.No.43,sec.1.
[2]Petition,1118
[3]Ibid.,1822.
[4]Santiagov.CourtofAppeals,285SCRA16(1998)Garciav.CommissiononElections,258SCRA754(1996).
[5]E.O.No.43,sec.8.
[6]CommentofrespondentNarvasa,79.
[7]Petition,2930.
[8]Aguinaldov.CommissiononElections,308SCRA770(1998).
[9]Kilosbayan,Incorporatedv.Morato,246SCRA540(1995),citingBakerv.Carr,369U.S.186,7L.Ed.2d633(1962).
[10]Petition,2.
[11]TelecommunicationsandBroadcastAttorneysofthePhilippines,Inc.v.CommissiononElections,289SCRA337(1998).
[12]246SCRA540(1995).
[13]TheAntiGraftLeagueofthePhilippines,Inc.v.SanJuan,260SCRA250(1996).
[14]Flastv.Cohen,392US83,20LEd2d947,88SCt1942.
[15]TelecommunicationsandBroadcastAttorneysofthePhilippines,Inc.v.CommissiononElections,289SCRA337(1998).
[16]SeealsoTheAntiGraftLeagueofthePhilippines,Inc.vs.SanJuan,260SCRA250(1996)Kilosbayan,Incorporatedv.Morato,246SCRA540(1995)Dumlao
v.Comelec,95SCRA392(1980).
[17]73SCRA333(1976).
[18]PhilippineConstitutionAssociation,Inc.v.Gimenez,15SCRA479(1965).
[19]110Phil331(1960).
[20]176SCRA251(1989).
[21]Gonzalesv.Raquiza,180SCRA254(1989).
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[22]Dumlaov.CommissiononElections,95SCRA392(1980),citingTanv.Macapagal,43SCRA677(1972)Sanidadv.CommissiononElections,73SCRA333
(1976).
[23]Peoplev.Vera,65Phil50(1937).
[24]RulesofCourt,Rule3,sec.2BoardofOptometryv.Colet,260SCRA88(1997).
[25]Petition,6.
[26]Ibid.,67,22.
[27]Ibid.,12,6
[28]Sec.6,ArticleIII,1973Constitution,provided
Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocumentsandpaperspertainingtoofficial
acts,transactions,ordecision,shallbeaffordedthecitizensubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
[29]150SCRA530(1987).
[30]RepublicActNo.6713,sec.5(a)and(e)seeRulesImplementingtheCodeofConductandEthicalStandardsforPublicOfficialsandEmployees,RuleIV.
[31]71SCRA14(1976).SeeEchegarayv.SecretaryofJustice,297SCRA754(1998).
[32]Legaspiv.CivilServiceCommission,150SCRA530(1987).
[33]Lantaco,Sr.v.Llamas,108SCRA502(1981).

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