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AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATION
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
I, STANLEY J. CATERBONE, Pro Se , am the petitioner in the above-entitled case. In support of
my motion to proceed in forma pauperis, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay
the costs of this case or to give security therefor; and I believe I am entitled to redress.
1. For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received from each of
the following sources during the past 12 months. Adjust any amount that was received
weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. Use gross
amounts, that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise.
Income source

Average monthly amount during


the past 12 months

Amount expected
next month

You

Spouse

You

Spouse

Employment

Self-employment

Income from real property


(such as rental income)

Interest and dividends

Gifts

Alimony

Child Support

Retirement (such as social


security, pensions,
annuities, insurance)

Disability (such as social


$ 1,357.00
security, insurance payments)

Unemployment payments

Public-assistance
(such as welfare)

Other (specify):

Total monthly income:

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1,357.00

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2. List your employment history for the past two years, most recent rst. (Gross monthly pay
is before taxes or other deductions.)
Employer

Address

Dates of
Employment

Gross monthly pay


$
$
$

3. List your spouses employment history for the past two years, most recent employer rst.
(Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)
Employer

Address

Dates of
Employment

Gross monthly pay


$
$
$

4. How much cash do you and your spouse have? $


Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other nancial
institution.
Financial institution

Type of account

Members1st
TD Ameritrade

Checking
Money Market

Amount you have


$ 1,000.00
$ 12,000.00
$

Amount your spouse has


$
$
$

5. List the assets, and their values, which you own or your spouse owns. Do not list clothing
and ordinary household furnishings.
X Home
D
Value 25% of 80,000.00

D Other real estate


Value

D Motor Vehicle #1
Year, make & model
Value

D Motor Vehicle #2
Year, make & model
Value

D Other assets
Description
Value

997,000 Shares of NON-MARKETABLE Stock in Advanced Media Group, Ltd.,

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You
Transportation (not including motor vehicle payments)

Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc.

Your spouse

100.00

200.00

Insurance (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)


48.00

Homeowners or renters

Life

Health

Motor Vehicle

Other:

Office/Computer/Copying/Printing/Postage

300.00

Taxes (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)


$

Motor Vehicle

Credit card(s)

Department store(s)

Other:

Alimony, maintenance, and support paid to others

Regular expenses for operation of business, profession,

or farm (attach detailed statement)

Other (specify):

500.00

2,658.00

(specify):
Installment payments

Home Improvement

Total monthly expenses:

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No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STANLEY J. CATERBONE

PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

Superintendent Framingham MCI, et al

RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

U.S. THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stanley J. Caterbone

(Your Name)
1250 Fremont Street

(Address)
Lancaster, PA 17603

(City, State, Zip Code)


(717) 669-2163

(Phone Number)

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QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
July 18, 2016 C.A. 16-1149 ORDER Present Chargaras, Jordan, and Venaskie [The foregoing motion for reconsideration of the Clerk's Order is construed as a motion to review
that order and is denied as meritless. The Clerk has the authority under 3d Cir. LAR 3.3 and Misc.
107.1(a) to dismiss an appeal for failure to satisfy the fee requirement.

Appellant received

written notice of the need to take care of his fee obligation, and he failed to respond with either
payment of the fees or a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Appellant's
contention that he is being unjustly taxed twice for the same appeal is erroneous Appellant
incurred a fee obligation by filling a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e) (Upon filing a
notice of appeal, the appellant must pay the district clerk all required fees.).

He filed two

separate appeals (C.A. Nos. 15-3400 and 16-1149), and he incurred two fee obligations.
Moreover, we note that appellant suffered no monetary loss for his appeal at C.A. No. 15-3400 as
the Court granted his motion to voluntarily withdraw that appeal before his IFP motion was
considered or any fee remitted.
Even if we were to liberally construe appellant's filing as a motion to reopen, we would
deny it. Pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R Misc. 107.2(a), a motion to set aside an order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute must be filed within 10 days from the date of dismissal and must be justified
by a showing of good cause.

Appellant's motion was not submitted until March 15, 2016 a

month after the dismissal order was entered. As such, his motion is clearly untimely. Additionally
the Appellant has failed to provide to the court an excuse for his untimely filing.

He simply

asserts that he wants the Court to do what it has already declined to do, that is reopen C.A. 153400. Accordingly, given appellant's dilatoriness and his failure to establish good cause for the
untimely filing, reopening is not warranted. By The Court.]
WHY DID THE COURT FAIL TO COMPLY WITH OR CONSIDER DOCKET ENTRY NO.
DECEMBER 31, 2015 - THE LETTER TO THE COURT REQUESTING TO RESCIND THE
MOTION TO DISMISS?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

12
OPINIONS BELOW ........................................................................................................ 1

13
JURISDICTION...................................................................................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................................


14
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................
24
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........................................................................
26
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................
27

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A .............................................................................................................. 36

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX C .............................................................................................................. 43
APPENDIX D .............................................................................................................. 47

APPENDIX E .............................................................................................................. 55
APPENDIX F .............................................................................................................. 60
APPENDIX G .............................................................................................................. 64
APPENDIX H .............................................................................................................. 71

APPENDIX I ............................................................................................................... 73

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965);

Appendix B -

STATUTES AND RULES

OTHER

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW
[X] For cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix
the petition and is

to

[ X] reported at U.S.C.A. THIRD CIRCUIT 16-1149 July 18, 2016


; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix
the petition and is

to

[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix
to the petition and is
[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
The opinion of the
appears at Appendix

court
to the petition and is

[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

1.

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JURISDICTION

[ X] For cases from federal courts:


The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case
was June 15, 2016
.
[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely led in my case.
[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
Appeals on the following date: July 18, 2015
, and a copy of the
A
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix
.
[ ] An extension of time to le the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on
(date)
in Application No.
A
.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:


The date on which the highest state court decided my case was
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix
.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
, and a copy of the order denying rehearing
appears at Appendix
.
[ ] An extension of time to le the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on
(date) in
Application No.
A
.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1257(a).

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)

Supreme Court of the United States


Filed: April 5th, 1965
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 1965 U.S. LEXIS 1481
Docket Number: 577
Supreme Court Database ID: 1964-069
Judges: Black
Nature of suit: Unknown

380 U.S. 400 (1965)

POINTER
v.
TEXAS.
No. 577.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 15, 1965.
Decided April 5, 1965.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS.
Orville A. Harlan, by appointment of the Court, 379 U.S. 911, argued the cause and filed a brief
for petitioner.
Gilbert J. Pena, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant
Attorney General, Stanton Stone, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Howard M. Fender
and Allo B. Crow, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment provides in part that:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses *401 against him . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."

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Two years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, we held that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel obligatory upon the States. The
question we find necessary to decide in this case is whether the Amendment's guarantee of a
defendant's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," which has been held to
include the right to cross-examine those witnesses, is also made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The petitioner Pointer and one Dillard were arrested in Texas and taken before a state judge for a
preliminary hearing (in Texas called the "examining trial") on a charge of having robbed Kenneth
W. Phillips of $375 "by assault, or violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury," in
violation of Texas Penal Code Art. 1408. At this hearing an Assistant District Attorney conducted
the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants, both of whom were
laymen, had a lawyer. Phillips as chief witness for the State gave his version of the alleged
robbery in detail, identifying petitioner as the man who had robbed him at gunpoint. Apparently
Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips but Pointer did not, although Pointer was said to have tried
to cross-examine some other witnesses at the hearing. Petitioner was subsequently indicted on a
charge of having committed the robbery. Some time before the trial was held, Phillips moved to
California. After putting in evidence to show that Phillips had moved and did not intend to return
to Texas, the State at the trial offered the transcript of Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary
hearing as evidence against petitioner. Petitioner's counsel immediately objected to introduction of
the transcript, stating, "Your Honor, we will object to that, as it is a denial of the confrontment of
the witnesses against the Defendant." *402 Similar objections were repeatedly made by
petitioner's counsel but were overruled by the trial judge, apparently in part because, as the judge
viewed it, petitioner had been present at the preliminary hearing and therefore had been
"accorded the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses there against him." The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, the highest state court to which the case could be taken, affirmed petitioner's
conviction, rejecting his contention that use of the transcript to convict him denied him rights
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 375 S.W.2d 293. We granted certiorari to
consider the important constitutional question the case involves. 379 U.S. 815.
In this Court we do not find it necessary to decide one aspect of the question petitioner raises,
that is, whether failure to appoint counsel to represent him at the preliminary hearing
unconstitutionally denied him the assistance of counsel within the meaning of Gideon v.
Wainwright, supra. In making that argument petitioner relies mainly on White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, in which this Court reversed a conviction based in part upon evidence that the defendant
had pleaded guilty to the crime at a preliminary hearing where he was without counsel. Since the
preliminary hearing there, as in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, was one in which pleas to the
charge could be made, we held in White as in Hamilton that a preliminary proceeding of that

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nature was so critical a stage in the prosecution that a defendant at that point was entitled to
counsel. But the State informs us that at a Texas preliminary hearing, such as is involved here,
pleas of guilty are not guilty are not accepted and that the judge decides only whether the
accused should be bound over to the grand jury and if so whether he should be admitted to bail.
Because of these significant differences in the procedures of the respective States, we cannot say
that the White case is necessarily controlling *403 as to the right to counsel. Whether there might
be other circumstances making this Texas preliminary hearing so critical to the defendant as to
call for appointment of counsel at that stage we need not decide on this record, and that question
we reserve. In this case the objections and arguments in the trial court as well as the arguments
in the Court of Criminal Appeals and before us make it clear that petitioner's objection is based
not so much on the fact that he had no lawyer when Phillips made his statement at the
preliminary hearing, as on the fact that use of the transcript of that statement at the trial denied
petitioner any opportunity to have the benefit of counsel's cross-examination of the principal
witness against him. It is that latter question which we decide here.
I.
The Sixth Amendment is a part of what is called our Bill of Rights. In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra,
in which this Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to the assistance of counsel is
obligatory upon the States, we did so on the ground that "a provision of the Bill of Rights which is
`fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." 372 U. S., at 342. And last Term in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, in holding that the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination was made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth, we reiterated the holding of Gideon that the Sixth Amendment's right-to-counsel
guarantee is " `a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,' " and "thus was made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 378 U. S., at 6. See also Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52. We hold today that the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront
the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
*404 It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination is
included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him. And
probably no one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of
cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.
See, e. g., 5 Wigmore, Evidence 1367 (3d ed. 1940). The fact that this right appears in the
Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and
safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution. Moreover, the decisions of this Court and other courts [*] throughout the years have

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constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-examination as a protection for defendants in


criminal cases. This Court in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55, 56, referred to the right of
confrontation as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty," and "a right long
deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative
and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of
most if not of all the States composing the Union." Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the Court in
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, declared that the right of cross-examination is "one of
the safeguards essential to a fair trial." And in speaking of confrontation and cross-examination
this Court said in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474:
"They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides
that in all *405 criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right `to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.' This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from
erosion." 360 U. S., at 496-497 (footnote omitted).
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination
is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal. Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process of law. In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, this Court said:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to
be heard in his defensea right to his day in courtare basic in our system of
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." 333 U.
S., at 273 (footnote omitted).
And earlier this Term in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473, we held:
"In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the
very least that the `evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the
witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the
defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel."
Compare Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104.
*406 We are aware that some cases, particularly West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264, have
stated that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation does not apply to trials in state courts,
on the ground that the entire Sixth Amendment does not so apply. See also Stein v. New York,

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346 U.S. 156, 195-196. But of course since Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, it no longer can broadly
be said that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to state courts. And as this Court said in Malloy
v. Hogan, supra, "The Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions according the
Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which
was contemplated by its Framers when they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme."
378 U. S., at 5. In the light of Gideon, Malloy, and other cases cited in those opinions holding
various provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the statements made in West and similar cases generally declaring that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to the States can no longer be regarded as the law. We hold that
petitioner was entitled to be tried in accordance with the protection of the confrontation guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment, and that that guarantee, like the right against compelled selfincrimination, is "to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to
the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Malloy v.
Hogan, supra, 378 U. S., at 10.
II.
Under this Court's prior decisions, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of confrontation and crossexamination was unquestionably denied petitioner in this case. As has been pointed out, a major
reason underlying the *407 constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with
crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. See, e. g., Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474; Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55-56; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243. Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
581; Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, 295. This Court has recognized the admissibility against an
accused of dying declarations, Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151, and of testimony of a
deceased witness who has testified at a former trial, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240244. See also Dowdell v. United States, supra, 221 U. S., at 330; Kirby v. United States, supra,
174 U. S., at 61. Nothing we hold here is to the contrary. The case before us would be quite a
different one had Phillips' statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had
been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to crossexamine. Compare Motes v. United States, supra, 178 U. S., at 474. There are other analogous
situations which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of
witnesses. The case before us, however, does not present any situation like those mentioned
above or others analogous to them. Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against
petitioner at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circumstances affording petitioner
through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, its introduction in a federal
court in a criminal case against Pointer would have amounted to denial of the privilege of
confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Since we hold that the right of an accused to

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be confronted with the witnesses against him must be determined by the same standards whether
the right is denied in a federal or state proceeding, *408 it follows that use of the transcript to
convict petitioner denied him a constitutional right, and that his conviction must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the result.
I agree that in the circumstances the admission of the statement in question deprived the
petitioner of a right of "confrontation" assured by the Fourteenth Amendment. I cannot subscribe,
however, to the constitutional reasoning of the Court.
The Court holds that the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in federal
criminal trials is carried into state criminal cases by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is another
step in the onward march of the long-since discredited "incorporation" doctrine (see, e. g.,
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill
of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746
(1965)), which for some reason that I have not yet been able to fathom has come into the
sunlight in recent years. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23;
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1.
For me this state judgment must be reversed because a right of confrontation is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, reflected in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment independently of the Sixth.
While either of these constitutional approaches brings one to the same end result in this particular
case, there is a basic difference between the two in the kind of future constitutional development
they portend. The concept of Fourteenth Amendment due process embodied in Palko *409 and a
host of other thoughtful past decisions now rapidly falling into discard, recognizes that our
Constitution tolerates, indeed encourages, differences between the methods used to effectuate
legitimate federal and state concerns, subject to the requirements of fundamental fairness
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The philosophy of "incorporation," on the other hand,
subordinates all such state differences to the particular requirements of the Federal Bill of Rights
(but see Ker v. California, supra, at 34) and increasingly subjects state legal processes to
enveloping federal judicial authority. "Selective" incorporation or "absorption" amounts to little
more than a diluted form of the full incorporation theory. Whereas it rejects full incorporation
because of recognition that not all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be deemed
"fundamental," it at the same time ignores the possibility that not all phases of any given
guaranty described in the Bill of Rights are necessarily fundamental.
It is too often forgotten in these times that the American federal system is itself constitutionally

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ordained, that it embodies values profoundly making for lasting liberties in this country, and that
its legitimate requirements demand continuing solid recognition in all phases of the work of this
Court. The "incorporation" doctrines, whether full blown or selective, are both historically and
constitutionally unsound and incompatible with the maintenance of our federal system on even
course.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the result.
I join in the judgment reversing this conviction, for the reason that the petitioner was denied the
opportunity to cross-examine, through counsel, the chief witness for the prosecution. But I do not
join in the Court's pronouncement which makes "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him . . . obligatory *410 on the States." That questionable tour de
force seems to me entirely unnecessary to the decision of this case, which I think is directly
controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The right of defense counsel in a criminal case to cross-examine the prosecutor's living witnesses
is "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,"[1] and "one of the safeguards
essential to a fair trial."[2] It is, I think, as indispensable an ingredient as the "right to be tried in
a courtroom presided over by a judge."[3] Indeed, this Court has said so this very Term. Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473.[4]
Here that right was completely denied. Therefore, as the Court correctly points out, we need not
consider the case which could be presented if Phillips' statement had been taken at a hearing at
which the petitioner's counsel was given a full opportunity to cross-examine. See West v.
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, concurring.
I agree with the holding of the Court that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront
the witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 403. I therefore join in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
My Brother HARLAN, while agreeing with the result reached by the Court, deplores the Court's
*411 reasoning as "another step in the onward march of the long-since discredited `incorporation'
doctrine," ante, at 408. Since I was not on the Court when the incorporation issue was joined, see
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, I deem it appropriate to set forth briefly my view on this
subject.
I need not recapitulate the arguments for or against incorporation whether "total" or "selective."
They have been set forth adequately elsewhere.[1] My Brother BLACK'S view of incorporation has

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never commanded a majority of the Court, though in Adamson it was assented to by four Justices.
The Court in its decisions has followed a course whereby certain guarantees "have been taken
over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth
Amendment," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326, by a process which might aptly be
described as "a process of absorption." Ibid. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (dissenting
opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
761 (1961). Thus the Court has held that the Fourteenth *412 Amendment guarantees against
infringement by the States the liberties of the First Amendment,[2] the Fourth Amendment,[3]
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,[4] the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination,[5] the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,[6]
and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel for an accused in a criminal
prosecution.[7]
With all deference to my Brother HARLAN, I cannot agree that this process has "come into the
sunlight in recent years." Ante, at 408. Rather, I believe that it has its origins at least as far back
as Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99, where the Court stated that "it is possible that some of
the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also
be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of
law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226." This passage and the
authority cited make clear that what is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are "rights,"
which apply in every case, not solely in those cases where it seems "fair" to a majority of the
Court to afford the protection. Later cases reaffirm that the process of "absorption" is one of
extending "rights." See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, and cases
cited by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN in his dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, supra, at 156. I
agree with these decisions, as is apparent from my votes in *413 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335; Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, and my concurring
opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297, and I subscribe to the process by
which fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment
and thereby applied to the States.
Furthermore, I do not agree with my Brother HARLAN that once a provision of the Bill of Rights
has been held applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not apply to the
States in full strength. Such a view would have the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the States
"only a `watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.' "
Malloy v. Hogan, supra, at 10-11. It would allow the States greater latitude than the Federal
Government to abridge concededly fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution. While I
quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system

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that a . . . State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,"
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (dissenting opinion), I do not believe that
this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights. My Brother HARLAN'S view would also require this Court to make the extremely
subjective and excessively discretionary determination as to whether a practice, forbidden the
Federal Government by a fundamental constitutional guarantee, is, as viewed in the factual
circumstances surrounding each individual case, sufficiently repugnant to the notion of due
process as to be forbidden the States.
Finally, I do not see that my Brother HARLAN'S view would further any legitimate interests of
federalism. It would require this Court to intervene in the state judicial process with considerable
lack of predictability and with *414 a consequent likelihood of considerable friction. This is well
illustrated by the difficulties which were faced and were articulated by the state courts attempting
to apply this Court's now discarded rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455. See Green, The Bill of
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869, 897-898. These
difficulties led the Attorneys General of 22 States to urge that this Court overrule Betts v. Brady
and apply fully the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, at 336. And, to deny to the States the
power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to increase federal power, but, rather, to
limit the power of both federal and state governments in favor of safeguarding the fundamental
rights and liberties of the individual. In my view this promotes rather than undermines the basic
policy of avoiding excess concentration of power in government, federal or state, which underlines
our concepts of federalism.
I adhere to and support the process of absorption by means of which the Court holds that certain
fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are made obligatory on the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although, as this case illustrates, there are differences among members
of the Court as to the theory by which the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
liberties of individual citizens, it is noteworthy that there is a large area of agreement, both here
and in other cases, that certain basic rights are fundamentalnot to be denied the individual by
either the state or federal governments under the Constitution. See, e. g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449; Gideon v.
Wainwright, supra; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466.
NOTES
[*] See state and English cases collected in 5 Wigmore, Evidence 1367, 1395 (3d ed. 1940).
State constitutional and statutory provisions similar to the Sixth Amendment are collected in 5
Wigmore, supra, 1397, n. 1.
[1] Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55.

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[2] Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692.


[3] Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727.
[4] See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, where the Court said that "due process requires as a
minimum that an accused be given a public trial after reasonable notice of the charges, have a
right to examine witness against him, call witnesses on his own behalf, and be represented by
counsel." 349 U. S., at 134.
[1] See Adamson v. California, supra, at 59 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter); id., at
68 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1; id., at 14 (dissenting
opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (concurring opinion of
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS); id., at 349 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 509 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS); Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 746; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 865 (1960); Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, 36 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 761 (1961); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Green, The
Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869 (1948);
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L. J. 74 (1963).
[2] See, e. g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293,
296; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
[3] See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
[4] Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226.
[5] Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1.
[6] Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660.
[7] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE


On June 23, 2015 APPELLANT, Stanley J. Caterbone, filed an Amicus Curei Brief in the U.S.
District Court Case No. 14-02559 in PETITIONER LISA MICHELLE LAMBERT'S HABEUS CORPUS,
which was originally filed on May 14, 2014. On September 2, 2015 APPELLANT filed a MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.

On September 14, 2015 U.S. District Judge Paul S. Diamond

ORDERED that Mr. Caterbones Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 8, 9) and
Motions to File Exhibits or Statements (Doc. Nos. 10, 11, 12, 14) are DENIED as
frivolous. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Stanley J. Caterbone may no longer submit
filingswhether electronic or in paper formatin the above-captioned case. The Clerk
shall not docket any such filings without my approval.
On September 30, 2015 APPELLANT filed an APPEAL to U.S.C.A. To the Third Circuit Case
No. 15-3400. On November 24, 2015 Stanley J. Caterbone FILED a Motion for a 30 Day Extension
of Time, which was GRANTED. On December 14, 2015 Stanley J. Caterbone FILED a LETTER to
the Clerk requesting to WITHDRAW appeal no. 15-3400 in the Third Circuit due among other
things the APPELLANT'S computer was taken by the GEEK SQUAD, whom refused to return it. On
December 17, 2015 APPELLANT FILED a LETTER to the Clerk CLARIFYING the Withdraw as a
MOTION to WITHDRAW WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

On December 31, 2015 Stanley J. Caterbone

FILED a LETTER to the COURT RESCINDING his MOTION TO WITHDRAW.1


On January 12, 2016 FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, ISSUED AN ORDER
in Case No. 15-3400 MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.2 On January 12, 2016 FISHER, JORDAN
and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, ISSUED AN ORDER in Case No. 15-3400 MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GRANTED.3 On January 13, 2016 Stanley J. Caterbone FILED a MOTION TO REINSTATE the Appeal
in the Third Circuit.

On January 15, 2016 (FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

ISSUED AN ORDER DENIED MOTION TO REINSTATE the Appeal in the Third Circuit. On January
17, 2015 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Case No.
14-02559 APPELLANT FILED a NOTICE OF APPEAL and U.S District Court, 14-02559, January 17,
2015 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Case No. 1402559 Clerk's Notice to USCA re 25 Notice of Appeal : (jpd, ) (Entered: 01/20/2016). On January
1

The Letter to Rescind was either hidden from FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE or FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE
ignored the Letter to Rescind. This would have preserved the entire Record of Case No. 15-3400 including EXHIBITS,
MOTIONS, ETC.,.
2
This DELETED AND REMOVED FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN and from DELIBERATIONS the entire the Record of Case No.
15-3400 including EXHIBITS, MOTIONS, ETC., which SUPPORTS AND PROVIDES EVIDENCE FOR AFFIRMATION OF THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT in Case No. 14-02559 and a FAVORABLE Ruling in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Complainant, and Pro Se Appellant.
3
This DELETED AND REMOVED FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN and from DELIBERATIONS the entire the Record of Case No.
15-3400 including EXHIBITS, MOTIONS, ETC., which SUPPORTS AND PROVIDES EVIDENCE FOR AFFIRMATION OF THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT in Case No. 14-02559 and a FAVORABLE Ruling in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Complainant, and Pro Se Appellant.

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22, 2016 in the U.S. THIRD CIRCUIT Clerk Issues New Docket No. 16-1149.
On February 16, 2016 the Clerk ORDERED the APPEAL dismissed due to F.R.A.P. (3) a and
FRAP 3.3 and Misc 107.1(a) for failure to pay the filing fee for the Notice of Appeal. On March 15,
2016 APPELLANT filed a Motion for Reconsideration and finally on July 28, 2016 Judges Chargaras,
Jordan, and Venaskie ORDERED The foregoing motion for reconsideration of the Clerk's
Order is construed as a motion to review that order and is denied as meritless.

The

Clerk has the authority under 3d Cir. LAR 3.3 and Misc. 107.1(a) to dismiss an appeal
for failure to satisfy the fee requirement.
It is clear that the omission for considerations the Letter of December 31, 2015 instructing
the COURTS to rescind the Motion to Withdraw was a clear violation of APPELLANT'S right to due
process and right to appeal that set in motion filings and decisions which should be considered as
MOOT to the original APPEAL. The APPELLANT wishes the COURT to reverse this obstruction of
justice.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION


It is clear that the omission for considerations of the Letter of December 31, 2015
instructing the COURTS to rescind the Motion to Withdraw was a clear violation of APPELLANT'S
right to due process and right to appeal that set in motion filings and decisions which should be
considered as MOOT to the original APPEAL. The APPELLANT wishes the COURT to reverse this
obstruction of justice.

That being said there is a broader issue that is woven through the history of this
unprecedented case starting; with the original HABEUS CORPUS written and filed by PETITIONER
Lisa Michelle Lambert in 1997, the findings of U.S. District Judge Stewert Dalzall's that this case
contained one of the worst cases of prosecutorial misconduct in the English speaking language
and releasing Lisa Michelle Lambert from prison;
wrongdoings in this case.

and ultimately the contamination of

This again is another case of JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT and

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT at the WORST or a case of ERRORS and OMMISSIONS at best


regarding the adjudication of the APPELLANT'S original Amicus Curie Brief and Motion for
Summary Judgment in PETITIONER'S Lisa Michelle Lambert's Habeus Corpus of May of 2014.
This case was of national importance and received national attention immediately following
the findings of U.S. District Judge Stewert Dalzall and the release of Lisa Michelle Lambert from
prison in 1997.

A&E TV did a documentary, which aired on national television titled American

Justice: A Teenage Murder Mystery and also sells the DVD online today. See Appendix H. The LA
Times published a 3-part series beginning on November 10, 1997 by Journalist Barry Seigel. See
Appendix I.
It is in the public's best interest to restore integrity to the COURTS and to the Prosecutors
and Judges and the COURTS that are honest and fair;

and provide the means to which Lisa

Michelle Lambert's meritorious plight for RELIEF and RELEASE from Prison can then be
accomplished, as it should.

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PROOF OF SERVICE

Mr. Craig Stedman,


Lancaster County District Attorney
50 N. Duke Street
Lancaster, PA 17602
Mr. XXXXXXXXX
Doug Behmer,Bruce Beemer
Pennsylvania State Attorney General
16th Floor Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Ibrahim, Jeremy
Ibrahim Jeremy Attorney
1700 Race St
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Phone: (215) 568-1943
Lisa Michelle Lambert /Superintendant
MCI - Framingham
P.O. Box 9007
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xx 01704
Framingham,
PA
Framingham, MA 01704

The Honorable Paul S. Diamond


U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
601 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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October 2015
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE INDIGENT PETITIONERS FOR WRITS OF

CERTIORARI

I. Introduction
These instructions and forms are designed to assist petitioners who are proceeding in
forma pauperis and without the assistance of counsel. A copy of the Rules of the
Supreme Court, which establish the procedures that must be followed, is also enclosed.
Be sure to read the following Rules carefully:
Rules 10-14 (Petitioning for certiorari)

Rule 29 (Filing and service on opposing party or counsel)

Rule 30 (Computation and extension of time)

Rules 33.2 and 34 (Preparing pleadings on 812 x 11 inch paper)

Rule 39 (Proceedings in forma pauperis)

II. Nature of Supreme Court Review


It is important to note that review in this Court by means of a writ of certiorari is not
a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. The primary concern of the Supreme
Court is not to correct errors in lower court decisions, but to decide cases presenting
issues of importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. The Court
grants and hears argument in only about 1% of the cases that are led each Term.
The vast majority of petitions are simply denied by the Court without comment or
explanation. The denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari signies only that the
Court has chosen not to accept the case for review and does not express the Courts
view of the merits of the case.
Every petitioner for a writ of certiorari is advised to read carefully the Considerations
Governing Review on Certiorari set forth in Rule 10. Important considerations for
accepting a case for review include the existence of a conict between the decision of
which review is sought and a decision of another appellate court on the same issue.
An important function of the Supreme Court is to resolve disagreements among lower
courts about specic legal questions. Another consideration is the importance to the
public of the issue.
III. The Time for Filing
You must le your petition for a writ of certiorari within 90 days from the date of the
entry of the nal judgment in the United States court of appeals or highest state
appellate court or 90 days from the denial of a timely led petition for rehearing. The
issuance of a mandate or remittitur after judgment has been entered has no bearing
on the computation of time and does not extend the time for ling. See Rules 13.1 and

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13.3. Filing in the Supreme Court means the actual receipt of documents by the Clerk;
or their deposit in the United States mail, with rst-class postage prepaid, on or before
the nal date allowed for ling; or their delivery to a third-party commercial carrier,
on or before the nal date allowed for ling, for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar
days. See Rule 29.2.
IV. What To File
Unless you are an inmate conned in an institution and not represented by counsel,
le:
An original and ten copies of a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
an original and 10 copies of an afdavit or declaration in support thereof. See Rule 39.
An original and 10 copies of a petition for a writ of certiorari with an appendix
consisting of a copy of the judgment or decree you are asking this Court to review
including any order on rehearing, and copies of any opinions or orders by any courts or
administrative agencies that have previously considered your case. See Rule 14.1(i).
One afdavit or declaration showing that all opposing parties or their counsel have
been served with a copy of the papers led in this Court. See Rule 29.
If you are an inmate conned in an institution and not represented by counsel, you need
le only the original of the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, afdavit or
declaration when needed in support of the motion for leave to proceed in forma pau
peris, the petition for a writ of certiorari, and proof of service.
If the court below appointed counsel in the current proceeding, no afdavit or declara
tion is required, but the motion should cite the provision of law under which counsel
was appointed, or a copy of the order of appointment should be appended to the motion.
See Rule 39.1.
The attached forms may be used for the original motion, afdavit or declaration, and
petition, and should be stapled together in that order. The proof of service should be
included as a detached sheet, and the form provided may be used.
V. Page Limitation
The petition for a writ of certiorari may not exceed 40 pages excluding the pages that
precede Page 1 of the form. The documents required to be contained in the appendix
to the petition do not count toward the page limit. See Rule 33.2(b).

VI. Method of Filing


All documents to be led in this Court must be addressed to the Clerk, Supreme Court
of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543 and must be served on opposing parties
or their counsel in accordance with Rule 29.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING FORMS

I.

Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis - Rule 39


A. On the form provided for the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
leave the case number blank. The number will be assigned by the Clerk when
the case is docketed.
B. On the line in the case caption for petitioner, type your name. As a pro
se petitioner, you may represent only yourself. On the line for respondent,
type the name of the opposing party in the lower court. If there are multiple
respondents, enter the rst respondent, as the name appeared on the lower court
decision, followed by et al. to indicate that there are other respondents. The
additional parties must be listed in the LIST OF PARTIES section of the
petition.
C. If the lower courts in your case granted you leave to proceed in forma pau
peris, check the appropriate space and indicate the court or courts that allowed
you to proceed in forma pauperis. If none of the lower courts granted you
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, check the block that so indicates.
D. Sign the motion on the signature line.

II. Afdavit or Declaration in Support of Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma


Pauperis
On the form provided, answer fully each of the questions. If the answer to a question
is 0, none, or not applicable (N/A), enter that response. If you need more space
to answer a question or to explain your answer, attach a separate sheet of paper,
identied with your name and the question number. Unless each question is fully
answered, the Clerk will not accept the petition. The form must either be notarized
or be in the form of a declaration. See 28 U. S. C. 1746.
III. Cover Page - Rule 34
When you complete the form for the cover page:
A. Leave case number blank. The number will be assigned by the Clerk when
the case is docketed.
B. Complete the case caption as you did on the motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
C. List the court from which the action is brought on the line following the
words on petition for a writ of certiorari to. If your case is from a state court,
enter the name of the court that last addressed the merits of the case. For
example, if the highest state court denied discretionary review, and the state
court of appeals afrmed the decision of the trial court, the state court of
appeals should be listed. If your case is federal, the United States court of

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appeals that decided your case will always be listed here.


D. Enter your name, address, and telephone number in the appropriate spaces.
IV. Question(s) Presented
On the page provided, enter the question or questions that you wish the Court to
review. The questions must be concise. Questions presented in cases accepted for
review are usually no longer than two or three sentences. The purpose of the question
presented is to assist the Court in selecting cases. State the issue you wish the Court
to decide clearly and without unnecessary detail.
V. List of Parties
On the page provided, check either the box indicating that the names of all parties
appear in the caption of the case on the cover page or the box indicating that there are
additional parties. If there are additional parties, list them. Rule 12.6 states that all
parties to the proceeding whose judgment is sought to be reviewed shall be deemed
parties in this Court, and that all parties other than petitioner shall be respondents.
The court whose judgment you seek to have this Court review is not a party.
VI. Table of Contents
On the page provided, list the page numbers on which the required portions of the
petition appear. Number the pages consecutively, beginning with the Opinions
Below page as page 1.
VII. Index of Appendices
List the description of each document that is included in the appendix beside the appro
priate appendix letter. Mark the bottom of the rst page of each appendix with the
appropriate designation, e.g., Appendix A. See Rule 14.1 pertaining to the items to
be included in the appendix.
A. Federal Courts
If you are asking the Court to review a decision of a federal court, the decision
of the United States court of appeals should be designated Appendix A.
Appendix A should be followed by the decision of the United States District
Court and the ndings and recommendations of the United States magistrate
judge, if there were any. If the United States court of appeals denied a timely
led petition for rehearing, a copy of that order should be appended next. If
you are seeking review of a decision in a habeas corpus case, and the decision of
either the United States District Court or the United States Court of Appeals
makes reference to a state court decision in which you were a party, a copy of
the state court decision must be included in the appendix.
B. State Courts
If you are asking the Court to review a decision of a state court, the decision of
which review is sought should be designated Appendix A. Appendix A should
be followed by the decision of the lower court or agency that was reviewed in
the decision designated Appendix A. If the highest court of the state in which a

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decision could be had denied discretionary review, a copy of that order should
follow. If an order denying a timely led petition for rehearing starts the run
ning of the time for ling a petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 13.3,
a copy of the order should be appended next.
As an example, if the state trial court ruled against you, the intermediate court
of appeals afrmed the decision of the trial court, the state supreme court denied
discretionary review and then denied a timely petition for rehearing, the appen
dices should appear in the following order:
Appendix A Decision of State Court of Appeals
Appendix B Decision of State Trial Court
Appendix C Decision of State Supreme Court Denying Review
Appendix D Order of State Supreme Court Denying Rehearing

VIII. Table of Authorities


On the page provided, list the cases, statutes, treatises, and articles that you reference
in your petition, and the page number of your petition where each authority appears.
IX. Opinions Below
In the space provided, indicate whether the opinions of the lower courts in your case
have been published, and if so, the citation for the opinion below. For example, opin
ions of the United States courts of appeals are published in the Federal Reporter. If
the opinion in your case appears at page 100 of volume 30 of the Federal Reporter,
Third Series, indicate that the opinion is reported at 30 F. 3d 100. If the opinion has
been designated for publication but has not yet been published, check the appropriate
space. Also indicate where in the appendix each decision, reported or unreported,
appears.
X. Jurisdiction
The purpose of the jurisdiction section of the petition is to establish the statutory
source for the Courts jurisdiction and the dates that determine whether the petition
is timely led. The form sets out the pertinent statutes for federal and state cases.
You need provide only the dates of the lower court decisions that establish the timeli
ness of the petition for a writ of certiorari. If an extension of time within which to
le the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, you must provide the requested
information pertaining to the extension. If you seek to have the Court review a deci
sion of a state court, you must provide the date the highest state court decided your
case, either by ruling on the merits or denying discretionary review.

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XI. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved


Set out verbatim the constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances and regu
lations involved in the case. If the provisions involved are lengthy, provide their cita
tion and indicate where in the Appendix to the petition the text of the provisions
appears.
XII. Statement of the Case
Provide a concise statement of the case containing the facts material to the consider
ation of the question(s) presented; you should summarize the relevant facts of the case
and the proceedings that took place in the lower courts. You may need to attach
additional pages, but the statement should be concise and limited to the relevant facts
of the case.
XIII. Reasons for Granting the Petition
The purpose of this section of the petition is to explain to the Court why it should
grant certiorari. It is important to read Rule 10 and address what compelling reasons
exist for the exercise of the Courts discretionary jurisdiction. Try to show not only
why the decision of the lower court may be erroneous, but the national importance of
having the Supreme Court decide the question involved. It is important to show
whether the decision of the court that decided your case is in conict with the decisions
of another appellate court; the importance of the case not only to you but to others
similarly situated; and the ways the decision of the lower court in your case was errone
ous. You will need to attach additional pages, but the reasons should be as concise as
possible, consistent with the purpose of this section of the petition.
XIV. Conclusion
Enter your name and the date that you submit the petition.
XV. Proof of Service
You must serve a copy of your petition on counsel for respondent(s) as required by
Rule 29. If you serve the petition by rst-class mail or by third-party commercial
carrier, you may use the enclosed proof of service form. If the United States or any
department, ofce, agency, ofcer, or employee thereof is a party, you must serve the
Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsyl
vania Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 205300001. The lower courts that ruled on your
case are not parties and need not be served with a copy of the petition. The proof of
service may be in the form of a declaration pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 1746.

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Case: 15-3400

Document: 003112168218

Page: 1

Date Filed: 12/31/2015


DRAFT COPY

Stan J. Caterbone
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
scaterbone@live.com
717-669-2163

December 31, 2015


To:

United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals


Clerk of Courts

Re:

Case No. 15-3400 Lambert Appeal


Motion to Dismiss of December 14, 2015
RESCIND MOTION TO DISMISS

Dear Clerk of Court:


Unfortunately there have been many developments regarding my issues in
the courts, including the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and of
course the U.S.C.A.

There have also been a fluid and horrendous amount of

computer and electronic hacking attacks upon my electronics, including my


computers. Since I filed my motion to dismiss there have also been developments in
the Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane scandal that directly involves
myself and my issues. In addition, on Wednesday, December 30, 2015 I was able to
take back possession of my new Lenovo Laptop and have been able to file
electronically in the ECF system.

IMPORTANT

Accordingly, I wish to rescind my MOTION TO DISMISS and would ask that if

you require a Motion to contact me as soon as possible.

/S/
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se APPELLANT
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
scaterbone@live.com
717-669-2163

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LISA MICHELLE LAMBERT,
Petitioner,
v.
LYNN BISSONETTE, et al.,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civ. No. 14-2559

ORDER
I previously dismissed Petitioners pro se motion for habeas relief so that she could file a
counseled motion.

(Doc. No. 3.)

She has not yet done so.

On June 23, 2015, Stanley

Caterbonewho has nothing to do with Petitioner, her motion, or this casefiled a pro se
amicus brief in support of the dismissed motion. (Doc. No. 4.) Caterbone neither sought leave
to file, nor indicated that he had received the Parties consent to file an amicus brief. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 29(a).
The amicus briefalthough providing some arguments in apparent support of the
dismissed motionessentially focuses on the damages Caterbone allegedly suffered from his
years of torture as a victim of U.S. Sponsored Mind Control or as a victim of gang-stalking or
organized stalking by more than 100 people. (Doc. No. 4 at 7, 9). He also includes a lengthy
discussion of the perplexing question of Stan Caterbones intelligence, or lack thereof, and his
work on a digital movie that is directly responsible for the development of the internet.
(Id. at 16-26). In addition, he details thirty governmental attempts at mind control, including:
1) Blanketing my dwelling and surroundings with electromagnetic energy; 2) Invading my
thoughts via remote sensing technologies; and 3) Making me mentally hear others voices

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through the microwave hearing effect. (Id. at 27-30.)


Caterbones involvement in the matter did not end with his amicus brief. On July 6,
2015, he filed with this Court an email that he had sent to the Lancaster Police, asserting that he
has synthetic telepathy. (Doc. No. 5.) On September 2 and 3, 2015, Caterbone moved for
summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) On September 3, 2015, he moved to file a copy of his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis in
Pennsylvania state court, (which had been dismissed as frivolous). (Doc. No. 10.)

On

September 9, 2015, he also moved to file: 1) an email exchange with the subject Muslims Using
My Situation to Fight Against the USA; 2) a Wikipedia article on Entrapment; and 3) an
exhibit of billing statements of his estimated fees for his 2007 work on wholly unrelated federal
and state court cases. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 14.)

On September 9, 2015, Caterbone called my

Chambers, demanding to speak with me, and then abruptly hung up.
I have already denied Caterbones request to file documents electronically. (Doc. No. 9.)
He has nonetheless continued to submit filings that have nothing to do with this case.

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AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED that Mr.
Caterbones Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 8, 9) and Motions to File Exhibits or
Statements (Doc. Nos. 10, 11, 12, 14) are DENIED as frivolous. It is FURTHER ORDERED
that Stanley J. Caterbone may no longer submit filingswhether electronic or in paper format
in the above-captioned case. The Clerk shall not docket any such filings without my approval.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul S. Diamond


_________________________
Paul S. Diamond, J.

September 11, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISlf"RICT COURT


FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLNAIA
\

LISA MICHELLE LAMBERT,

Petitioner

v.
LYNN BISSONETTE, SUPERINTENDENT,
MCI-FRAMINGHAM,
and
CRAIG STEDMAN, THE DISTRICT ATfORNEY OF LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
and
KATHLEEN KANE, THE ATfORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondents

Civ. No. 5:14-cv-02559-PD

S 17=n
F uu~t:
lY

SEP - 3 2D15
MICHAELE. KUNZ, Clerk
By
Dep. Clerk

MOTION TO FILE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF THE SAID COURT:


AND NOW comes before the said court Stanley J. Caterbone, appearing Pro Se, and Advanced
Media Group, as Movant, to file the following Motion for Summary Judgement according to rule 56
which reads:
"Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(a) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

(b) TIME TO FILE A MOTION. Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise,
a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery,

II

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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMNT

Given the preponderance of evidence associated with the MOVANT'S AMICUS and STATEMENTS,
the courts must conclude that In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Federal Judge Stuart Dalzall's findings of April 14, 1997, in the Lisa Lambert case identifying acts
of prosecutorial Misconduct, now, by virtue of the MOVANT'S AMICUS and STATEMENTS, now discloses
evidence of a bona fide pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
in the County of Lancaster.
Criminal law may determine if these disclosures would warrant investigations of a possible criminal enterprise. The MOVANT'S AMICUS and STATEMENTS is of material interest to the Habeus Corpus
filed by Lisa Michelle Lambert in May of 2014, for the very fact that this MOVANT'S AMICUS and
STATEMENTS compromises the very same integrity of the court, which would tip the scales of justice
even further from the peoples deserving rights.
In the truthfulness of MOVANT'S AMICUS and STATEMENTS, The Commonwealth must concede
and immediately release Lisa Michelle Lambert from incarceration in order to balance the scales of justice, which no other act could accomplish. The Commonwealth must yield the criminal culpability of
Lisa Michelle Lambert to the superior matter of restoring the integrity to the courts; by it's own admission of wrongdoing, assuring the peoples of it's commitment to administer equalities of justice, not inequalities of justice, balancing the scales of justice. Anything less, would take the full scope of jurisdiction out of the boundaries of our laws, negating our democracy and impugning the Constitution of the
United States.
In addition the MOVANT must be restored to whole by administering SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS in
cases 05-2288; 06-4650; and all other cases filed by the MOVANT in this court. SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS must also be administered in Case No. 08-13373 in the Lancaster Court of Common Pleas, and
other cases filed by the MOVANT in that said court.

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AFFIDAVIT OF 1998 TO HONORABLE JUDGE STEWART DALZELL

"I, Stanley J. Caterbone being duly sworn according to law, make the following affidavit concerning the years during which I was maliciously and purposefully mentally abused, subjected to a
massive array of prosecutorial misconduct, while enduring an exhaustive fight for the sovereignty of
my constitutional rights, shareholder rights, civil liberties, and right of due access to the law. I will detail a deliberate attempt on my life, in 1991, exhibiting the dire consequences of this complaint. These
allegations are substantiated through a preponderance of evidence including but not limited to over
10,000 documents, over 50 hours of recorded conversations, transcripts, and archived on several digital mediums. A "Findings of Facts" is attached herewith providing merits and the facts pertaining to
this affidavit. These issues and incidents identified herein have attempted to conceal my disclosures of
International Signal & Control, Pie. However, the merits of the violations contained in this affidavit will
be proven incidental to the existence of any conspiracy.
The plaintiff protests the courts for all remedial actions mandated by law. Financial considerations would exceed $1 million. These violations began on June 23, 1987 while I was a resident and
business owner in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and have continued to the present. These issues
are a direct consequence of my public disclosure of fraud within International Signal & Control, Pie., of
County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, which were in compliance with federal and state statutes governing
my shareholder rights granted in 1983, when I purchased my interests in International Signal & Control., Pie.. I will also prove intentional undo influence against family and friends towards compromising
the credibility of myself, with malicious and self serving accusations of "insanity". I conclude that the
courts must provide me with fair access to the law, and most certainly, the process must void any
technical deficiencies found in this filing as being material to the conclusions. Such arrogance by the
Courts would only challenge the judicial integrity of our Constitution."1. The activities contained herein
may raise the argument of fair disclosure regarding the scope of law pertaining to issues and activities
compromising the National Security of the United States. The Plaintiff will successfully argue that due
to the criminal record of International Signal & Control, including the illegal transfer of arms and technologies to an end user Iraq, the laws of disclosure must be forfeited by virtue that "said activities
posed a direct compromise to the National Security of the United States".; the plaintiff will argue that
his public allegations of misconduct within the operations of International Signal & Control, Pie., as
early as June of 1987 ;demonstrated actions were proven to protect the National Security of the United
States .. The activities of International Signal & Control,

Pl~.,

placed American troops in harms way. The

plaintiff's actions should have taken the American troops out of harms way causing the activities of the
International Signal & Control, Pie., to cease and desist.

All activities contained herein have greatly

compromised the National Security of the United States, and the laws of jurist prudence must apply towards the Plaintiff's intent and motive of protecting the rights of his fellow citizens. Had the plaintiff
been protected under the law, and subsequently had the law enforcement community of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the County of Lancaster administer justice, United States troops may have
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been taken out of harms way, as a direct result of ceasing the operations of International Signal &
Control, Pie., in as early as 1987.
2. The plaintiff will successfully prove that the following activities and the prosecutorial misconduct were directed at intimidating the plaintiff from continuing his public disclosures regarding illegal
activities within International Signal & Control, Pie,. On June 23, 1998, International Signal & Control,
Pie was negotiating for the $1.14 billion merger with Ferranti International, of England. Such disclosures threatened the integrity of International Signal & Control's organization, and Mr. James Guerin
himself, consequently resulting in adverse financial considerations to all parties if such disclosures provided any reason to question the integrity of the transaction, which later became the central criminal
activity in the in The United States District Court For The Eastern District Of Pennsylvania.
3. The plaintiff will prove that undo influence was also responsible for the adverse consequences
and fabricated demise of his business enterprises and personal holdings. The dire consequences of the
plaintiff's failed business dealings will demonstrate and substantiate financial incentive and motive. Defendants responsible for administering undo influence and interference in the plaintiff's business and
commercial enterprises had financial interests. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a taxing authority, Lancaster County had a great investment who's demise would facilitate grave consequences to it's
economic development.. Commonwealth National Bank (Mellon) would have less competition in the
mortgage banking business and other financial services, violating the lender liability laws. The Steinman Enterprise's, Inc., would loose a pioneer in the information technologies industries, and would
protect the public domain from truthful disclosure. The plaintiff will also provide significant evidence -of
said perpetrators violating common laws governing intellectual property rights.
4. Given the plaintiff's continued and obstructed right to due process of the law, beginning in June of
I

1987 and continuing to the present, the plaintiff must be given fair access to the law with the opportunity for any and all remedial actions required under the federal and state statutes. The plaintiff will
successfully argue his rights to the courts to rightfully claim civil actions with regards to the totality of
these activities, so described in the following "Findings of Facts", regardless of any statute of limitations. Given the plaintiff's genuine efforts for due process has been inherently and maliciously obstructed, the courts must provide the opportunity for any and all remedial actions deserving to the
plaintiff.
5. Under current laws, the plaintiff's intellectual capacity has been exploited as means of discrediting the plaintiff's disclosures and obstructing the plaintiff's right to due process of the law. The
plaintiff has always had the proper rights under federal and state laws to enter into contract. The logic
and reason towards the plaintiff's activities and actions are a matter of record, demonstrated in the
"Findings of Facts", contained herein .. The plaintiff will argue and successfully prove that the inherent
emotional consequences to all of the activities contained herein have resulted in Post Traumatic Stress
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Syndrome. The evidence of the stress subjected to the plaintiff, will prove to be the direct result of the
activities contained herein, rather than the exhibited behavior of any mental deficiency the plaintiff
may or may not have. The courts must provide for the proper interpretations of all laws, irrespective of
the plaintiff's alleged intellectual capacity. The plaintiff successfully argue that his "mental capacity" is
of very little legal consequence, if any; other than in it's malicious representations used to diminish the
credibility of the plaintiff.
6. The plaintiff will demonstrate that the following incidents of illegal prosecutions were purposefully directed at intimidating the plaintiff from further public disclosure into the activities of International Signal & Control, Pie., consequently obstructing the plaintiff's access to due process of the law.
Due to the fact that these activities to which the plaintiff's perpetrators were protecting were illegal activities, the RICO statutes would apply. To this day, the plaintiff has never been convicted of any crime
with the exception of 2 speeding tickets. The following report identifies 34 instances of prosecutorial
misconduct during the prosecutions and activities beginning on June 23, 1987 and continuing to today.
7) Given the preponderance of evidence associated with this affidavit, the courts must conclude
that In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Federal Judge Stuart
Dalzall's findings of April 14, 1997, in the Lisa Lambert case identifying acts of prosecutorial Misconduct, now, by virtue of this affidavit, now discloses evidence of a bona fide pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and in the County of Lancaster. Criminal law must
now determine if these disclosures would warrant investigations of a possible criminal enterprise. This
affidavit is of material interest to the Lambert case, for the very fact that this affidavit compromises
the very same integrity of the court, which would tip the scales of justice even further from the peoples deserving rights .. In the truthfulness of this affidavit, The Commonwealth must concede Lisa
Michelle Lambert to balance the scales of justice, which no other act could accomplish. Commonwealth
must yield the criminal culpability of Lisa Michelle Lambert to the superior matter of restoring the integrity to the courts; by it's own admission of wrongdoing, assuring the peoples of it's commitment to
administer equalities of justice, not inequalities of justice. Balancing the scales of justice. Anything
less, would take the full scope of jurisdiction out of the boundaries of our laws, negating our democracy and impugning the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff must be restored to whole."

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.#

Case 5:14-cv-02559-PD Document 9 Filed 09/03/15 Page 6 of 6

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Date: September 2, 2015

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It is one of the more extraordinary cases ever tried in Pennsylvania, not because of the crime,
which was certainly heinous, but for what has come afterwards. One woman has been convicted
twice, by the same judge, of the same crime, and has gone to jail twice.
AMERICAN JUSTICE recounts every step of the strange journey of Lisa Michelle Lambert in this
gripping program. Hear from Hazel Snow, the victim's mother, who says her daughter whispered
"Michelle did it" as she lay dying in her arms with a slit throat and a rope around her neck.
Examine the conflicting testimony that Lisa and her two codefendants have given. And unravel the
bizarre web of legal decisions that have made this case into one of the most complicated in the
history of Pennsylvania.
Featuring interviews with the prosecutors who tried the case, the Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, friends of the victim and Lisa herself, this is a fascinating look at a case that may
yet have surprises in store.

This DVD is one of the many titles in our DVD Library and is created in the DVD+R format.
This disc does not feature menu pages or special features like standard DVDs, simply the high
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U.S.C.A. 16-1149 To US Supreme Court


ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP

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05.28.2007

5/28/2007 3:35 PM

APPENDIX I

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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lisa Michelle Lambert


A Bitter Lesson for Lancaster County; Judge says Pennsylvania community 'lost
its soul' in push to convict woman of murder.
Residents claim he, not they, are mocking justice.
Right or wrong, his ruling challenges U.S. court system's balance of power.
[Home Edition]
BARRY SIEGEL.

Los Angeles Times


Los Angeles, Calif.: Nov 10, 1997. pg. 1
Full Text (8866 words)
By midmorning on the first day of Lisa Michelle Lambert's federal habeas corpus hearing, U.S. District
Judge Stewart Dalzell already could be seen displaying alarm over what he was hearing. From the lawyers'
briefs alone, he'd read enough to persuade him to grant Lisa's request for this uncommon federal review
of a state murder conviction. He'd read enough to suspect that just possibly, Lisa Lambert, although
sentenced to life without parole, hadn't killed Laurie Show over a teenage romantic rivalry. He'd read
enough to surmise that just maybe, Lisa's boyfriend,
Lawrence "Butch" Yunkin, along with a girl named Tabitha Buck, had killed Laurie. Now, he was listening
to evidence that served only to deepen his concerns regarding Lancaster County's prosecution of Lisa. It
was March 31. Computers, boxes of documents and piles of papers filled the small hearing room on the
fifth floor of the federal courthouse in downtown Philadelphia. Lisa's parents sat in the first row, Laurie
Show's behind them. Reporters and court personnel occupied the jury box. On the stand, an expert
witness for Lisa's side, Northwestern University speech professor Charles Larson, was testifying.
Contrary to the autopsy report, Larson believed--as did three emergency medical technicians and the
Philadelphia medical examiner--that Laurie Show's left carotid artery had been severed by whoever
slashed her throat. This, he explained, left her unable to say "Michelle did it," as Laurie's mother, Hazel,
had claimed. Her vocal tract was "destroyed," her left brain hemisphere "dying." She was "totally
incapable of speech."
How, asked Lisa's attorney, Christina Rainville, could two doctors have signed an autopsy report saying
that the carotid arteries weren't "involved"?
Those two doctors were both Lancaster County physicians, one the part-time coroner, the other an earnose-and-throat specialist. "I don't think they were telling the truth," Larson replied. Dalzell peered over
gold wire-rimmed bifocals at the witness.
"Oh," he said. "Well, OK."
So it went, hour by hour, for 15 days.
That this hearing was even being held appalled most in Lancaster County, about 75 miles west of
Philadelphia. In the 1991 killing of Laurie Show, Lisa had already been found guilty of first-degree murder,
Tabitha Buck of second-degree, Butch Yunkin of third-degree.

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Now here was Lisa, claiming her innocence, claiming all sorts of prosecutorial abuse. Now here was Lisa,
seeking a federal order freeing her because the state had illegally imprisoned her.
For Lisa to cast herself as an innocent victim was maddening enough. For a federal judge to take her
seriously was unimaginable. Yet that was just what was happening in this Philadelphia courtroom.
The second day of the hearing found Dalzell puzzling over two quite different versions of a videotaped
police search of the Susquehanna River. The one initially provided by the Lancaster County district
attorney, eight minutes long, had no soundtrack, and no images of police finding a pink bag Lisa said
she'd thrown there. The second, obtained through discovery only after Rainville realized she'd been sent
an edited tape, was four minutes longer. It had sound. It also had an officer kicking at a pink bag while
another asked, "What do you got, a bag?"
After watching these tapes, Dalzell removed his glasses and rubbed his eyes, something he'd do more
than once during the three-week hearing. He studied Lisa, also something he'd do more than once,
especially in the hearing's early days. Lisa, sobbing off and on, was staring down at the table where she
sat, bent over, her hands between her legs. Dalzell looked as if he were trying to fathom her character.
The third day found Dalzell puzzling over Lisa's initial statement to the police. He listened to East
Lampeter Police Det. Raymond Solt try to reconcile the typewritten first page, where Lisa says she wore
her own clothes at the murder scene, and a handwritten last page where Lisa says she wore Butch's
sweatpants. He listened to Solt explain how he destroyed all his notes from the interview. By the time Solt
stepped down, the judge was referring openly to "Ms. Lambert's alleged statement."
With Det. Ronald Barley on the stand later that afternoon, Dalzell grew even more openly dissatisfied.
Barley was a well-regarded detective in Lancaster County. A "very thorough investigator" is how Ted
Darcus, chairman of Lancaster's City Council, considered him. Barley "dealt well with people in our
community accused of crimes." Yet this wasn't apparent to Dalzell.
Barley, being questioned about the taped interview he helped conduct with Butch Yunkin--a tape full of
laughter, clicks and obvious gaps--kept waffling so much that Dalzell finally snapped: "Answer her
question! Yes or no?" Rather than heed the suggestion, Barley grew even more evasive. Asked about a
critical spot where the recorder clicked off, he denied even being in the interview room at that moment.
Dalzell had heard enough.
He called a recess and ordered all the lawyers into his chambers. "I want to know what is going on here,"
he told Lancaster County Dist. Atty. Joseph Madenspacher. "I'm hearing perjured testimony. . . . As we
had with Det. Solt, {Barley} is contradicting his own statement. . . . My patience has just run out. . . . I'm
afraid the commonwealth is allowing perjured testimony in federal court. . . . I'm being lied to. . . . This
man gives me the unbelievably fantastic statement that suddenly he 'evaporated.' It's totally incredible,
and I'm afraid I'm going to have to refer this, if this keeps up, to the United States attorney. . . ."
Madenspacher shifted uneasily. This hadn't been his case to try. He'd left the prosecution to his seasoned
first assistant, John Kenneff. "I understand what the court is saying . . .," he replied. "I don't know what
I'm going to do, but I'm going to do something."
Little changed, though, when Barley resumed the stand. He didn't recall his colleague, Det. Ronald "Slick"
Savage, turning the tape recorder on and off. He destroyed his notes after taking Butch's statement.
"No, no . . . please answer her questions. Will you do that?" Dalzell interrupted at one point.
"You knew . . . because you took the statement?" the judge asked later. "Or did you disappear for that
part? . . . Oh, do you have that ability to appear and disappear at will?"
By the time Barley tried to explain how he "completely forgot" they'd found a pink bag during the river
search--a pink bag that Lisa told them contained Butch Yunkin's bloodied sneakers--Dalzell was beside
himself. It helped his mood little when, with Barley still on the stand, Rainville moments later played the
segment of unedited videotape that showed an officer kicking the pink bag, then waving the camera off.

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"No, that's not me," Barley said.


Rainville inched the videotape ahead a moment. "No, no ma'am."
Again she moved the tape forward. Now the man at the river could be seen clearly.
"That is me," Barley allowed. "I don't know why I waved at that point."
Dalzell again peered over his eyeglasses. "Who were you waving to? The record should reflect that the
witness definitely waved directly at the camera. What in the world were you doing, if you weren't waving
to the camera?"
Barley looked blank. "I don't recall, sir."
Defendant Alleges Gang Rape On the seventh day, Dalzell began to hear Lisa Lambert's story of being
gang-raped by three policemen six months before Show's murder.
Lisa--her extravagant eye makeup toned down but still too thick for Rainville's taste--had started
testifying the previous day.
Now she described being stalked by an officer named Robin Weaver, of vainly calling his police chief to
complain, of receiving threatening calls after the alleged attack. She explained how fear had kept her from
telling this story before. Finally, she explained why she now was willing to talk.
In a deposition given to Lisa's attorneys before the hearing, Weaver, without being asked, had referred to
the gang- rape accusation. He thought Lisa had cited it in her habeas petition, but she had not. The
charge had never been raised publicly. To Lisa, Weaver's comment, therefore, provided independent proof
of her claim: "There is no way that he could have ever known about that unless he was there and he did
it. It was not raised in the petition."
Dalzell interrupted: "Is that true?"
"That is true, your honor," said Rainville, who had been appointed by the judge to represent Lisa on a probono basis.
Dalzell again had heard enough: "We'll take another recess. . . . I want {Weaver} here this afternoon, and
I don't want anyone to say a word about what has come up here. If he resists, please tell me. I will have
the marshal arrest him, OK?"
Moments later, Dalzell learned that prosecutor John Kenneff already had discussed the rape allegation
with Weaver.
"So he's been coached . . . ," Dalzell exclaimed.
The judge's budding animosity toward Kenneff was palpable. The prosecutor had not yet appeared before
him, but the residue of his work at the Lambert trial was everywhere.
"I'm going to direct that Mr. Kenneff have no further contact with any witness in this case. . . ," Dalzell
declared. "And he might want to consult with counsel. . . . I'm going to want to hear about this, because
in the context of this case, Mr. Kenneff, God help untruths" being aimed at our police, urged East
Lampeter Supervisor Chairman John Shertzer. Don't "rush to judgment." It's "unfortunate that so much is
being made of such insignificant points."
In his opening statement at the hearing, Madenspacher, the district attorney, had allowed that the
investigation hadn't been "perfect," that maybe they'd been a little "careless," maybe a little "sloppy."
Others, though, refused even to acknowledge that much. All sorts of citizens instead continued to offer
glowing tributes to the police and prosecutors.

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No one official drew more accolades than did John Kenneff. He is a big, heavyset man with a full, broad
Irish face. Growing up in Lancaster County, Kenneff was considered a fine schoolboy, a high achiever. Not
Harvard-level material, but his college, Villanova University, was nonetheless a good school. Not as good
as the University of Pennsylvania, but the next step.
He'd come back after law school, opened a private practice, worked his way up through the D.A.'s office.
He came to all the Fourth of July picnics; he brought his family, he brought his dog. He was known as a
committed, persistent prosecutor, one of the fairest and most reasonable in the county.
Even the defense attorneys who went up against him said as much. Even they called him a decent, honest
guy. To Terry Kauffman, a dairy farmer and chairman of the board of county commissioners, that
particularly carried a lot of weight: "A lot of people I know here, from both sides of the aisle, say he's the
best. I know them, and I've known Jack Kenneff for years. I don't know Stewart Dalzell."
Darcus--the chairman of the Lancaster City Council, a black man from West Virginia who followed a Boys'
Club job to Lancaster 30 years ago and happily settled--believed he possessed an especially close take on
John Kenneff's character. They'd been involved together in a "Weed and Seed" anti-crime development
program in Lancaster's minority community. So Darcus saw Kenneff not just as a prosecutor, but a
community leader. Also as a father: Kenneff's children went to the same Catholic school as Darcus' son.
"I've seen how he cares about people," Darcus said. "I've seen him deal with people in my community.
I've seen him go beyond what was needed. Knowing Jack Kenneff, I just can't picture this man doing what
the judge says. I wonder how that judge sleeps at night."
Denials From the Prosecutor No, John Kenneff insisted. No, he didn't think Butch Yunkin's sweatpants
were a critical issue at the murder trial. No, he had no recollection of looking at the sweatpants the state
put into evidence.
It was April 15, the hearing's 11th day. Kenneff had taken the witness stand soon after court convened.
Questioning him was Peter Greenberg, Rainville's husband, a partner at their law firm and one of
Philadelphia's most-accomplished litigators.
At the trial, the state's theory of the murder had Lisa wearing Butch's extra-large men's sweatpants,
found full of blood in a dumpster after the attack. Trial judge Lawrence F. Stengel accepted this theory
and thought it significant. So Kenneff's answers now caused Dalzell to lean forward.
"Did you make a conscious judgment at trial as to who was wearing the clothing that you put into
evidence?" Greenberg asked.
"It was my understanding that Miss Lambert had admitted to wearing the clothing . . . ," Kenneff replied.
Dalzell interrupted: "I don't think that's the question he asked you. And I think you ought to listen more
carefully to Mr. Greenberg's questions because I don't think you're answering them. . . . That question can
be answered yes or no."
So it went through much of the morning. Lancaster County citizens were right: Dalzell by then couldn't
hide his dismay for their assistant district attorney. The moments when the judge removed his glasses and
rubbed his eyes were adding up.
For 10 days he'd been exposed to an ever-more disturbing portrait of how Kenneff had prosecuted Lisa
Lambert. He'd listenedto the pathologist Isidore Mihalakis--a defense witness at Lisa's murder trial-describe private conversations with Kenneff that Dalzell thought constituted witness-tampering. He'd
heard how authorities had concealed critical testimony by Hazel Show's neighbor Kathleen Bayan. He'd
been presented evidence that convinced him the state had "lost" an earring of Butch's found on the
victim's body. He'd been presented evidence that convinced him the state had edited critical video and
audiotapes.
Now the man who oversaw the state's efforts sat before Dalzell on the witness stand.
No, Kenneff was testifying. He didn't recall looking at the river-search video.

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"You didn't think it worthwhile to look at the video?" Greenberg asked.


"I didn't think what happened at the river was a contested issue," Kenneff replied.
This time, Greenberg snapped before the judge could: "You've been in this business long enough to know
that when I ask a question you're supposed to answer it?"
"Right," Kenneff agreed.
Dalzell joined in now: "It would be nice if you would do that. . . . I want to warn you, sir, that, if you don't
do that, you are going to put me into a position where this will have to get unpleasant. Do you understand
that? . . . The record should reflect that you have been consistently unresponsive to the questions. . . . "
Greenberg turned back to the matter of Butch's sweatpants. Now, Kenneff has even resisted saying he
based the case on the theory that Lisa wore Butch's clothing. He no longer, in fact, was sure whether the
sweatpants were Butch's.
The pair he'd produced for the habeas hearing, after all, were much smaller than men's extra-large. "The
sweatpants would have looked ridiculous if worn by 6-foot-1-inch-tall Butch," Kenneff had argued in a
written response just before the hearing.
"You are the same person . . . " Greenberg asked, "saying that the sweatpants would have looked
ridiculous on Butch, who put Butch on to testify in Lisa's trial . . . that they were his sweatpants, these
very same sweatpants that would have looked ridiculous on him?"
"Correct."
"These are the same sweatpants that Judge Stengel found belonged to Butch?"
"Correct."
"And if you had your way, Lisa would have been executed based on that evidence, wouldn't she?"
Kenneff hesitated; Dalzell spoke: "Yes or no," the judge ordered.
"That would be correct."
Greenberg erupted: "Do you think this is some kind of game? . . . Do you realize that there is a human
being sitting here who is in jail serving a life sentence based on the evidence you put on . . . that you are
now disowning. . . . Not only are you disowning it, you are committing perjury. . . . Are you sure it is Miss
Lambert who is a dangerous person in this courtroom?"
Handling of Letter Infuriated Judge In the end, the commonwealth's handling of the controversial 29
Question Letter was what most inflamed Dalzell.
Lisa had written Butch from jail, asking a series of questions. The answers Butch had scrawled under each
question, the judge felt, left no doubt that he was the murderer of Laurie, and that his accomplice was
Tabitha Buck. That the letter was authentic seemed equally certain to Dalzell: Both the state and defense
experts had affirmed there'd been no alteration.
Yet, Kenneff--after stipulating to the experts' opinions--had let Butch testify at Lambert's trial that the
questions were altered.
That the prosecutor knew his witness was committing perjury appeared obvious to Dalzell. At Butch's
plea-bargain hearing after Lisa's conviction, Kenneff wanted to revoke their deal precisely because of this
perjury.

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Experts had reviewed the 29 Questions Letter and Butch's trial testimony, Kenneff told the judge at that
Oct. 10, 1992, hearing.
"They advised us that his testimony . . . regarding that {letter} that was false . . . . It is our opinion that
he testified falsely . . . on that basis we feel we are entitled to withdraw from the original plea
agreement."
There just was no ambiguity, Dalzell felt: Kenneff knew that Butch committed perjury on a material issue,
regarding a document that established Lisa's innocence.
Under such circumstances, Dalzell believed Kenneff had an unambiguous ethical obligation to take
remedial action with the court that convicted Lambert. The Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct was
clear about this: "A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial steps."
Yet far from complying with this rule, it looked to Dalzell as if Kenneff had encouraged Judge Stengel to
accept Butch's perjured testimony. "I think he's just like any other witness," Kenneff told Stengel when
Lisa's attorney moved for a mistrial based on Butch's perjury. "You can believe some of it, all of it, or
none."
It was worse than that, in Dalzell's eyes. For, after obtaining a conviction based partly on this perjured
testimony, Kenneff had coolly proceeded to seek the death penalty for Lisa Lambert.
Now, remarkably, Kenneff at this habeas hearing--and in written responses that looked to Dalzell to be
blatantly false--was back to arguing that some of the 29 questions had been initially written in pencil, then
altered. In other words, Kenneff, before Dalzell, was defending testimony by Butch that he had told two
other judges was a lie.
"Do you want to take remedial actions with Judge Dalzell?" Peter Greenberg asked.
Here the judge interceded: "I was just going to ask that myself. . . ."
It was the morning of April 16, the hearing's 12th day. Kenneff had been on the stand for hours.
"Well, your honor," Kenneff responded. "I think I still feel the same way about the 29 questions. . . . That
there is some type of tampering with it. . . . "
"No, no, no, sir," Dalzell interrupted. "I am going to jump in here. You said in your answer to me that
there was pencil. And you have testified under oath here that your expert and the defense expert said
there was no graphite. . . . "
"Judge," Kenneff began.
Dalzell spoke over him: "I want to warn you, sir, you are under oath, and you are subject to the rules of
professional responsibility. . . . Do you retract that statement that you signed . . . as to pencil? Yes or
no?"
"I just don't think I can answer that question yes or no, judge."
Dalzell turned to Madenspacher, Kenneff's supervisor. "Does the commonwealth retract it?"
Madenspacher rose. "Yes, your honor. We retract it."
"Thank you," Dalzell said. He turned back to Kenneff. "Your boss just retracted it. Next question."
Their confrontation hadn't peaked yet.
The climax came minutes later, when Greenberg began listing all the pieces of evidence that the district
attorney's office kept from Roy Shirk, Lisa's attorney at her trial. What if Shirk had the names of the

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emergency medical technicians? What if he knew the police had found a pink bag? What if he had the
unedited river-search video? What if he knew a neighbor had seen Butch at the crime scene?
"Well," Kenneff tried to answer, "the Pennsylvania Rule provides for certain . . . "
That's as far as he got. Dalzell exploded: "No. Excuse me. We're talking here--let me just make something
clear to you. We're talking here about something called the United States Constitution, and in particular
the 14th Amendment thereof, which has a clause in it that refers to due process of law.
OK? Have you heard of that?"
"Yes sir."
"That's what we're talking about. . . . So we're not talking about the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure. We're talking about due process of law here. . . . That's what we're talking about here. You got
it? Do you understand?"
"Yes," Kenneff replied.
Biggest Drama Begins to Unfold As it happened, the confrontation between Dalzell and Kenneff was
neither the most dramatic nor revealing sequence to occur on this 12th day of Lisa's habeas hearing. The
event that would eclipse it began only after Kenneff left the witness stand, and court adjourned for lunch.
Madenspacher, walking toward his hotel, bumped into Hazel Show's brother, who reported that his sister
needed to talk to him.
Back at the Holiday Inn in downtown Philadelphia, where both were staying, Madenspacher walked up to
Show's room.
Sobbing as she talked, the murder victim's mother told him her story.
During the hearing that morning, she'd suddenly recalled the morning of the murder: As she drove up
Black Oak Road to her condo, on her way to find Laurie's body, a brownish-colored car passed, heading
out of the condo complex. It was Butch's car.
She looked at Butch. There was recognition on his face. He pushed down someone with blond hair. There
was also a third person in the back seat, with black hair.
She'd told this to Det. Ron Savage back then. Savage had come to her house saying one of her neighbors
had seen Butch's car leave the complex. She'd started to say she had too. Savage had stopped her, told
her not to dwell on that. They had so many witnesses saying Butch wasn't there. Besides, this neighbor
lady was kind of disturbed anyhow. Probably wouldn't be a reliable witness. We were better to go with
Butch not being there.
Hazel was sobbing harder now. She'd forgotten about it, she told Madenspacher. She'd put it aside. Until
now.
Madenspacher was reeling. Hazel's story fit exactly with testimony given by that "neighbor lady," Kathleen
Bayan, on the hearing's fourth day. Testimony that Hazel hadn't heard because she'd left the courtroom
early that day. Testimony that had never been produced at Lisa's murder trial. Testimony that Kenneff
knew about back then but had never shared with Lambert's attorney. Testimony that Savage had tried to
water down while taking Bayan's initial statement, then dismissed as coming from a woman with "an
emotional problem."
Hazel's story also fit perfectly with something else: Lisa Lambert's testimony at her trial. There she'd told
of driving by Hazel Show, of Butch saying, "Oh . . . it's Hazel," of Butch pushing her head down.
Madenspacher pondered. If true, it seemed to him that this story knocked out the underlying theory of the
trial, which was that Butch wasn't at the condo. It didn't mean Butch was actually inside; it didn't clear

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Lisa; it could be explained. But it was a new story. It changed the theory of the case. Madenspacher felt
as if he were slipping into shock.
"You sure?" he asked. "Let's hear it again."
Hazel repeated her story.
Madenspacher had no choice: He had to get this to the judge. He couldn't suppress it. The only question
was, when and how? It was going to come out anyway, Madenspacher figured. So let's get the bad news
over with.
The conference in Dalzell's chambers began at 1:40 p.m. that day. Present were the judge, the lawyers
for all sides, Hazel Show and Lisa Lambert.
Hazel Show told her story
courtroom today, I realized
condominium complex. . . .
about it until I was sitting in

again, this time before a court reporter: Well, when I was sitting in the
that I had seen Lawrence's {Butch's} car with passengers drive out of our
Det. Savage said that I wasn't to dwell on it. . . . I never thought anymore
there. . . . It all just came back.

By now, Lisa was sobbing along with Hazel.


"It's OK, Miss Lambert," Dalzell said. "It's OK."
To Dalzell, this revelation was the final straw. Throughout Lisa's trial the state had been at pains to keep
Butch as far from the Show condo as possible. No doubt that was why the state had never disclosed
anything about Hazel's report or Bayan.
To Dalzell, it wasn't just that Hazel's and Bayan's accounts were consistent with Lisa's testimony at trial
five years ago: Just about everything being revealed at this hearing was consistent with Lisa's testimony
back then.
From all he'd heard, Dalzell now believed that the commonwealth's misconduct had been so substantive, it
had undermined the state court's ability to find the truth. He believed the commonwealth had committed
at least 25 separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct--all constitutional violations, all violations of the
norms of a civilized society.
It seemed clear to him that Laurie Show did not say "Michelle did it." It seemed clear that Butch, in the 29
Questions Letter, confessed to the murder. It seemed clear Lisa didn't wear Butch's sweatpants on the
morning of the murder. It seemed clear the police had fabricated Lisa's initial statement.
Worse yet, in Dalzell's view, the commonwealth still hadn't stopped its treachery. At this habeas hearing
the state had produced not the extra-large sweatpants of Butch's from the original trial, but a smaller
girl's pair. The commonwealth, Dalzell believed, had perpetrated a fraud on the federal court; the
commonwealth had swapped evidence.
At least six state witnesses, by Dalzell's count, had perjured themselves before him. One, Ron Savage-now an elected district justice in Lancaster County--likely obstructed justice. And now this: now Hazel's
revelation, right before his eyes. Hazel had every reason to want Lisa's petition denied; Hazel sincerely
believed Lambert did it. Yet still she'd felt compelled to tell this story. Dalzell had never seen a more
courageous act.
"Well," the judge told those gathered in his chambers. "Now we come to the question of relief. Does the
commonwealth intend to defend this case?"
All eyes turned to Madenspacher.
The Lancaster County district attorney had been looking uncomfortable in recent days. Nothing he'd heard
rose to the level of conscious misconduct or obstruction, he kept insisting. But he had to admit, it hadn't
been a perfect trial or investigation. He wished certain things had been done differently.

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In Lancaster County, then as now, there were many who wanted their district attorney to fight ferociously.
There were many who wanted their district attorney to defend their honor, to insist they'd done nothing
wrong, to match Lisa's lawyers blow for blow.
Yet, Madenspacher, at this moment, wasn't sure what should be done. Everything, he would say later, was
"spinning in my mind." It was "awful tough" operating away from the office. It "would have been nice" to
have known everything from the start.
"Now, obviously . . . " he finally told the judge. "There is some relief that is justified in this particular case.
. . ."
That was all Dalzell needed; he now had the commonwealth's assent. The state hadn't even put on its
case yet, but he meant to get Lisa out of prison. He also meant to get Savage off the bench forever; he
didn't see how Savage could hear cases anymore, and he planned to tell the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
just that.
"You can make a choice overnight," Dalzell advised the district attorney, "whether you want to defend this
case, put on your own witnesses. In the meantime, I'm going to release Ms. Lambert into some agreedupon custody. . . . Because it's quite clear now that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the only question is
how much."
Off to one side, a dismayed Hazel Show tried to interject: "Laurie told me she did it. . . . "
Madenspacher's voice overrode hers. "Yes, I agree relief is warranted, and I think we're talking now. . . . "
"About what relief," the judge said.
"What relief, your honor . . . "
"I can tell you, Mr. Madenspacher, that I've thought about nothing else but this case for over three weeks,
and in my experience, sir, and I invite you to disabuse me of this at oral argument, I want you and I want
the Schnader firm to look for any case in any jurisdiction in the English-speaking world where there has
been as much prosecutorial misconduct, because I haven't found it. .
. . So are we agreed that the petitioner will tonight be released into the custody of Ms. Rainville?"
Madenspacher nodded. "I don't see how I can object to that, your honor."
Stunned Response in Lancaster County In bars and cafes, street corners and living rooms, the citizens of
Lancaster County gasped at the news of Lisa's release. Their district attorney may not have seen reason to
object, but they did. Most sounded stunned; many sounded enraged. One man, at 8 a.m. on the morning
after her release, anonymously called in a phone threat to the Lancaster Sunday News, saying he would
kill Lambert if she returned to Lancaster.
Maybe there were "mistakes," the more rational by now were willing to allow. Maybe there was "sloppy"
police work. Maybe Lisa even deserves a new trial. Nothing more than that, though. Certainly not her
freedom. She was there, she was an accomplice, she was a co-conspirator. Give her a new trial, remand it
elsewhere even. But don't just let her go. You can't just let her go.
"Lambert is not innocent--how could she be?" the Lancaster New Era editorialized the day after Hazel
Show's revelation. " . . .
even with newly revealed evidence that supports her claims, Lambert is still irrevocably involved in the
events that lead to Laurie Show's murder. These facts must not be drowned out by the explosive
revelations at Lambert's federal appeals hearing. . . . "
As it happened, these thoughts exactly echoed those offered by Judge Stengel, who'd presided at Lisa's
murder trial. "Even if Lambert's story at trial was completely credible," Stengel had declared in his written
opinions, "she would still be an accomplice to the crime of murder. . . . The single most important fact on

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the issue of guilt is whether Ms. Lambert was present in the Show condominium at the time of the killing.
By her own admission, she was present. . . . "
Dalzell, however, simply did not accept this notion, at least not in a federal habeas hearing.
On the proceeding's final day, when Madenspacher in his closing argument spoke of Lambert being guilty
at least as an accomplice or conspirator, Dalzell waved him off. "She wasn't charged with conspiracy was
she?" he declared. "She was charged with first-degree murder. So the only issue before me is actual
innocence of first-degree murder. That is what she was convicted of."
In fact, the law is murky on this point. Lisa was actually charged with criminal homicide, which in
Pennsylvania encompasses all degrees of murder. How her conviction for first-degree murder affects her
exposure to lesser murder charges is a matter for debate.
So, Madenspacher tried to argue: "What I am saying here is that charged with criminal homicide, she
could be found guilty of murder in the first degree . . . or she could have been found guilty of second
degree . . . or she could be found guilty of third degree."
That didn't sway Dalzell: "But if one took her testimony, she said that she did everything possible to deescalate what spun out of control. . . . By her own testimony she exited when it started spinning out of
control. So therefore, it was not 'reasonably foreseeable' from her point of view, so the argument would
go."
The judge then cut things off: "Let's not waste time debating that."
Dalzell had good reason for not wishing to bother further with this issue. By then--after 14 days of
testimony covering 3,225 pages of transcript--the judge wasn't thinking only about Lisa's conduct at the
Show condo. He was thinking about the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, and the role of a federal
habeas corpus in upholding the unalienable right of due process.
Among other historic cases, Dalzell's mind was on a 1973 opinion by then-Justice William H. Rehnquist, in
United States vs. Russell. There, Rehnquist predicted that "we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking the judicial processes to obtain a conviction."
That day, Dalzell decided at the close of Lambert's hearing, had come.
While presiding at a habeas hearing, he reminded himself, he effectively sat as a court of equity--a court
operating under a system of law designed to protect rights and deliver remedial justice. He recalled the
ancient maxim that "equity delights to do justice, and not by halves." To give Lisa full relief, it seemed to
him imperative that he do nothing to benefit or empower those who had wronged her.
He would not just release Lisa, Dalzell decided. An outrageous violation of due process required even more
severe sanction. He would bar the state from ever retrying her. He would strip the state of its natural right
to adjudicate a murder committed within its boundaries.
He wrote his 90-page opinion over the weekend, after court adjourned at 4:10 p.m. on Friday, April 18.
Before a packed courtroom late the following Monday morning, he declared Lisa "by clear and convincing
evidence" to be "actually innocent of first-degree murder."
"If Lisa Lambert's is not the 'situation' to which Chief Justice Rehnquist referred, then there is no
prosecutorial malfeasance outrageous enough to bar a reprosecution. . . ." he proclaimed. "We have now
concluded that Ms. Lambert has presented an extraordinary, indeed, it appears, unprecedented case. We
therefore hold that the writ should issue, that Lisa Lambert should be immediately released, and that she
should not be retried."
In scorching language, Dalzell explained just why: "We have found that virtually all of the evidence which
the commonwealth used to convict Lisa Lambert of first-degree murder was either perjured, altered or
fabricated. Such total contempt for due process of law demands serious sanctions. The question we must

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now answer is whether . . . the commonwealth is entitled to get another try at convicting Lisa Lambert
and sending her to prison for the rest of her life. . . . In short, the question is whether we may accept a
promise from anyone on behalf of the commonwealth that a trial will be fair 'next time.' "
No, Dalzell concluded, we cannot.
"We hold that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment bars the commonwealth from invoking
judicial or any other proceedings against Lisa Lambert for the murder of Laurie Show. . . . Equitable
considerations preclude our leaving the decision whether to retry Lisa Lambert in the hands of those who
created this gross injustice. . . . "
As far as legal researchers could tell, there was an accepted basis, but no exact precedent for a federal
judge in Dalzell's situation to take such action. Dalzell did not stop there.
He was, he announced in his opinion, going to refer the matter of Kenneff's "blatantly unethical and
unconstitutional" actions to the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board. He also was going to refer the whole
Lambert prosecution to the U.S. attorney for investigation of "possible witness intimidation, apparent
perjury by at least five witnesses in a federal proceeding, and possible violations of the federal criminal
civil rights laws."
Still, Dalzell wasn't finished. He felt compelled, in the two final pages of his opinion, to address the
question of just why all this had happened in Lancaster County.
"Those who have read this sad history," he wrote, "may well ask themselves, 'How could a place idealized
in Peter Weir's'Witness' become like the world in David Lynch's 'Blue Velvet'?' Because it is so important to
that community and indeed tomany others to prevent a recurrence of this nightmare, we offer a few
reflections on the record."
Laurie Show's grandfather, Dalzell pointed out, was, in the 1980s, the coroner of Lancaster County. Her
mother was "a paragon of morality" who kept "a picture-perfect home." By contrast, Lisa Lambert was "as
though delivered from Central Casting for the part of villainess." By the testimony of even those who loved
her, "she was at the time literally 'trailer trash.' " The community "thus closed ranks behind the good
family Show and exacted instant revenge against this supposed villainess." Almost immediately after "the
snap judgment" was made, law enforcement officials uncovered "inconvenient facts," but soon "discovered
a balm for these evidentiary bruises, Lawrence Yunkin." Thus "Lancaster's best made a pact with
Lancaster's worst to convict the 'trailer trash' of first-degree murder."
Dalzell's parting words: "In making a pact with this devil, Lancaster County made a Faustian bargain. It
lost its soul and it almost executed an innocent, abused woman. Its legal edifice now in ashes, we can
only hope for a 'Witness'-like barn-raising of the temple of justice."
Uprising Began With Calls, Letters The uprising in Lancaster County in the wake of Dalzell's ruling began
first with the usual letters to editors and calls to radio talk shows.
The legal system is a "crock of crap." How could Dalzell destroy the reputation of "honorable and decent
people" for the purpose of freeing a "cold-blooded killer?" What kind of justice do we have?
Soon enough, such talk escalated. All sorts of theories about Dalzell's motives began circulating.
Something's been going on behind the scenes, it was suggested. Something behind what Dalzell did,
something we don't know about.
Ted Byrne, the conservative radio talk show host in Lancaster County, pored through Dalzell's decisions in
a law library. Then, seeking hidden connections, he analyzed the activities of the attorneys at Dalzell's old
law firm and Rainville's firm.
It was considered significant that Dalzell and Greenberg, 30 years before, had been classmates at the
University of Pennsylvania. Some talk had it that they were old pals. Some talk had it that Dalzell had
handed the Lambert case to his own "carefully assembled defense team."

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Had Dalzell reached the end of a career path? Had he felt unfulfilled? Had he wondered how he might
become an appellate judge? Had he seen a challenge to the controversial habeas corpus situation as a
means to garner attention?
For that matter, how did the Lambert case get to Dalzell in the first place? Had not Dalzell displayed an
excessive personal interest in Lisa in his chambers? Was it possible that they had a relationship?
"We must begin to think who it was that had to gain from this travesty of justice other than Lambert,"
suggested one citizen in a letter to the editor. "My vote goes to Judge Stewart Dalzell. It would appear
that it is an appropriate time for this newspaper to dig very deep into the archives of the noteworthy
judge to determine what it was or who it was that set him on his grudge mission to 'punish' the county for
sins of the past committed against him."
Such comments reflected as much bewilderment as paranoia. They came from a citizenry who well knew
Lisa Lambert, and well knew those who had prosecuted her. Yet rarely did anyone, amid all the outpouring
of emotion and speculation, feel inclined to discuss the particulars of the Lambert case as revealed in
Dalzell's courtroom.
More common was East Lampeter Supervisor Chairman John Shertzer's response. "There were a lot of
false accusations throughout the trial. . . . We never had the opportunity to address those," Shertzer told
a reporter, before confessing that he, in fact, couldn't address them: "There are some things about this
that I don't have a lot of background in. But I just know these people. . . . They were treated very
abusively on the stand by Lambert's attorneys as well as the judge."
Lancaster's citizens were struggling to hold together a way of viewing their world. Even those willing to
acknowledge certain blemishes in that world--even those willing to acknowledge official wrongdoing in the
Lambert case--found themselves laboring to understand what Dalzell had done. No matter what was
revealed in a Philadelphia courtroom, no matter what Lancaster authorities did or failed to do, it seemed
incomprehensible that Dalzell would let Lisa Lambert walk free, without at least a retrial.
Not even Lisa's parents had hoped for that back when their daughter's appeals first started. Their dream,
Leonard Lambert told a reporter then, was that Lisa receive "a level of punishment that's not greater than
what's deserved. . . . It's a known fact that she was there. But something could argue that maybe she
doesn't deserve more than aggravated assault or third-degree murder."
Dalzell went too far, even the more reasonable in Lancaster County now declared. He was a disgrace to
the legal profession.
He had made a mockery of justice. He was a man without honor.
Hazel Show, more than anyone, sounded the clarion. "Thank you for listening to me," she'd told Dalzell on
the hearing's last day. "My parents brought me up to be truthful, and I believe in God. . . . So it is up to
me to tell the truth." Yet soon after, whether out of confusion or regret at what she'd wrought, Show
began to backtrack and revise.
Never in her "wildest dreams," she declared, had she thought her story would free Lisa. All her story
proved was that she got home just as the killers left, in time to hear her daughter's dying declaration. But
the judge "didn't want to hear that." The judge "wouldn't let me say that."
No matter that Madenspacher insisted Hazel never mentioned this notion to him in their hotel meeting. No
matter that she never mentioned this notion while on the witness stand on the hearing's last day. It now
became her constant refrain. "We have to get this judge off the bench," she began declaring publicly.
"There is not one bit of justice in him."
They began first with a petition drive. Hazel's ex-husband, John Show, drew it up, calling for Congress to
"investigate" Dalzell and take "corrective action," including impeachment. Show's girlfriend took it to her
beauty shop, where customers clamored to sign it. Local businesses started stocking piles on their front
counters. Volunteers called for extra copies, carried them door to door, offered them at yard sales. One
couple outside a Kmart parking lot on a hot Sunday collected more than 500 signatures.

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On the morning after an ad for the petition appeared in the Lancaster newspapers, John Show walked to
his mailbox and found 300 envelopes. By mid-September, he had 37,000 signatures.
Then came Hazel Show's 10-page "Citizens Action Report," the keystone of her newly launched national
campaign seeking to reform the entire federal judiciary. Now the Shows wanted, among a host of items,
to bar federal judges from banning retrials, to fix stricter guidelines for appointing federal judges, to limit
federal judges' terms in office. Hazel Show's words and image soon became ubiquitous in Lancaster
County.
Television provided one forum, both local talk shows and the national tabloids. Politicians provided
another. The Washington-based Judicial Selection Monitoring Project, an arch-conservative organization
seeking to block the appointment of what it calls "activist liberal judges," featured both Shows in a 15minute videotape that lambasted Dalzell and misidentified him as a Clinton appointee.
The Shows, accompanied by 16 friends and relatives, took their campaign to Washington on Sept. 17,
where Pennsylvania Sen. Arlen Specter, along with Reps. Joseph R. Pitts and George W. Gekas, accepted
cartloads of petitions. The lawmakers, weeks before, had introduced legislation that would severely
restrict federal judges' power to bar retrials during habeas proceedings--a bill specifically designed to
reverse Dalzell's decision. Now, to the Shows, Specter agreed to call it the "Laurie Bill" and promised them
a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. Wherever they went, the Shows were applauded and courted.
"How often do you get to do this?" Hazel observed.
"I think we made an impact," John offered.
Argument That Judge Brought It on Himself It can fairly be argued that Dalzell brought some of this on
himself. He may have overly embraced Lisa Lambert's account of events, and unduly diminished her role.
He may not have needed to rough up witnesses in his courtroom as much as he did. He certainly need not
have painted Lancaster County with such a broad brush at the end of his opinion.
How could he claim to know this county, his critics asked. How could he claim to know our citizens? How
could he say such things about us?
Yet, valid as such claims may be, it most likely will be Dalzell who leaves a lasting impact, not those
fueling the backlash against him.
Whether right or wrong, whether he operated entirely within his bounds, a federal judge consumed by
moral outrage has, as he intended, sent a message. The idea behind Lisa Lambert's outright release was
not, finally, to let a guilty person go free. It was to let the powers of the state know they can't violate
bedrock principles of the Constitution and get away with it.
They haven't.
In early May, the U.S. attorney's office in Philadelphia, responding to Dalzell's referral, announced it had
launched a criminal investigation into those who investigated and prosecuted Lisa Lambert. Aiding them
will be the FBI and the Justice Department's civil rights division. They will focus on John Kenneff and
seven police officers, among them Ronald Savage, Ronald Barley, Robin Weaver and Raymond Solt.
Days later, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in refusing Lancaster County's motion for a temporary
stay of Dalzell's order, said "the commonwealth has not demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the
merits of its appeal. . . . We remind the commonwealth that Judge Dalzell's factual findings are based on
his view of the credibility of the witnesses and testimony. . . .
We can only reverse if we find them clearly erroneous."
In that written opinion, the appellate panel also chastised the commonwealth for calling Lisa Lambert a
"convicted killer" in its brief. She "no longer has that status," the 3rd Circuit reminded. "Indeed, that
description is inflammatory and inappropriate, given {Dalzell's} findings of actual innocence. . . . "

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What remains to be seen is whether Dalzell will ultimately be allowed his unprecedented involvement in a
state's sovereign affairs. At the habeas hearing's end, Lancaster County hired its own high-powered
Pennsylvania law firm, Sprague & Lewis, known for its political connections, particularly to the Republican
Party. On Oct. 21, when lawyers for both sides argued the merits of the county's appeal before a 3rd
Circuit panel, the appellate judges grilled them on a critical question: Did Lisa Lambert exhaust all her
appeals in Pennsylvania's courts before turning to a federal judge for help?
This issue, rather than any question of Lisa's innocence or a prosecutor's malfeasance, is what presently
fuels a nationwide debate in the legal community and beyond. Elemental principles of law and government
in this country normally restrain federal intrusion until a state has heard all claims, and has been given
the chance to correct its own errors. Just weeks ago, a 3rd Circuit panel--saying "we are sensitive to the
independence of the Pennsylvania courts and of that state's sovereignty"denied another convict's habeas
petition because he hadn't exhausted his state appeals.
Dalzell, in his opinion, recognized these principles, then essentially dismissed them. The Pennsylvania
General Assembly, he pointed out, amended its statutes in 1995 to exclude "actual innocence" as a basis
for certain appeals. By doing so, Dalzell declared, Pennsylvania, in effect, relinquished its jurisdiction over
claims such as Lisa Lambert's, and placed them "squarely into the federal forum." And even if
Pennsylvania were willing to consider some of Lambert's claims, Dalzell added, "we find that the state
proceedings that would follow if we dismissed this action are ineffective to protect the rights of Ms.
Lambert."
By thus declaring his utter distrust in Pennsylvania's ability to deliver justice, Dalzell has challenged the
fundamental balance ofpower between state and federal courts that governs the judicial system. This is
why five state attorneys generalincluding California's--have joined Pennsylvania in an amicus brief that
talks of the Dalzell ruling's "potential to seriously weaken, if not to dismantle entirely, the system for
litigating habeas actions." This is why law-and-order-minded national politicians have their knives out for
Dalzell. This is why Lisa Lambert's federal hearing promises to be one of the most carefully reviewed cases
in criminal law for a long time to come.
This is also why Dalzell's actions will leave a legacy no matter what the outcome of the present appeals.
His ruling may or may not stand, his ruling may or may not establish a formal precedent, but--by granting
a hearing and allowing widespread discovery--Dalzell has required that attention be paid to what
happened in a Lancaster County courtroom in the summer of 1992. He's shown why the federal habeas
corpus action is essential to the integrity of the judicial system.
Dalzell has also set a moral, if not legal, example. Rulings in one case often affect other rulings. One
judge's decision shapes not just the outcome of a particular case, but also the character of justice. What
he doesn't allow, others likewise forbid.
In mid-May, in Lancaster County court, Lisa Lambert's original trial lawyer, Roy Shirk, serving as defense
attorney in a routine burglary case, rose to ask for a mistrial. As in the Lambert case, he argued,
prosecutors in this one had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Shirk most likely
meant only to put this commonplace claim into the record for later review, but Judge Paul K. Allison, to
the lawyers' astonishment, promptly granted his request.
Yes, the judge said in declaring a mistrial, this is exactly what Dalzell felt happened to Lisa Lambert.
PHOTO: Lisa Michelle Lambert walks ahead of lawyers, Peter Greenberg and Christina Rainville, to court
hearing.;
PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press;
PHOTO: Lancaster County Dist. Atty. Joseph Madenspacher talks to news media after judge ruled Lisa
Michelle Lambert innocent of charges.;
PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press;
PHOTO: Hazel Show, left, stands in bedroom where daughter, Laurie, was murdered.;
PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press;

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PHOTO: Laurie's father,


John Show, above, hugs woman identified as his girlfriend, after judge ruled Lisa Michelle Lambert
innocent.;
PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press;
PHOTO: U.S. District Judge Stewart Dalzell was assigned the writ of habeas corpus that
set him on a course to freeing Lisa Michelle Lambert.;
PHOTOGRAPHER: Associated Press
Credit: TIMES STAFF WRITER
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited
without permission.
Subjects: Judicial reviews, Acquittals & mistrials, Murders & murder attempts, Prosecutions, Series &
special reports
Locations: Lancaster County Pennsylvania
People: Lambert, Lisa, Show, Laurie
Document types: News
Dateline: LANCASTER, Pa.
Section: PART-A; National Desk
ISSN/ISBN: 04583035

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