Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
of
the
February 7, 2001
2
Inc. (SFI), with the approval of petitioner DMCUSA, as MMI's marketing arm to concentrate on
its marketing and selling function as well as to
manage its critical relationship with the trade.
On 3 October 1996 private respondents MMI, SFI
and MMI's Managing Director Liong Liong C. Sy
(LILY SY) filed a Complaint5 against petitioners
DMC-USA, Paul E. Derby, Jr., 6 Daniel Collins7 and
Luis Hidalgo,8 and Dewey Ltd.9before the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila. Private
respondents predicated their complaint on the
alleged violations by petitioners of Arts.
20,10 2111 and 2312 of the Civil Code. According to
private
respondents,
DMC-USA
products
continued to be brought into the country by
parallel importers despite the appointment of
private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive
distributor of Del Monte products thereby causing
them great embarrassment and substantial
damage. They alleged that the products brought
into the country by these importers were aged,
damaged, fake or counterfeit, so that in March
1995 they had to cause, after prior consultation
with Antonio Ongpin, Market Director for Special
Markets of Del Monte Philippines, Inc., the
publication of a "warning to the trade" paid
advertisement in leading newspapers. Petitioners
DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr., apparently upset
with
the
publication,
instructed
private
respondent MMI to stop coordinating with Antonio
Ongpin and to communicate directly instead with
petitioner DMC-USA through Paul E. Derby, Jr.
Private
respondents
further
averred
that
petitioners
knowingly
and
surreptitiously
continued to deal with the former in bad faith by
involving disinterested third parties and by
proposing solutions which were entirely out of
their control. Private respondents claimed that
they had exhausted all possible avenues for an
amicable resolution and settlement of their
grievances; that as a result of the fraud, bad
faith, malice and wanton attitude of petitioners,
they should be held responsible for all the actual
expenses incurred by private respondents in the
delayed shipment of orders which resulted in the
extra handling thereof, the actual expenses and
cost of money for the unused Letters of Credit
(LCs) and the substantial opportunity losses due
to
created
out-of-stock
situations
and
unauthorized shipments of Del Monte-USA
products to the Philippine Duty Free Area and
Economic zone; that the bad faith, fraudulent
acts and willful negligence of petitioners,
motivated by their determination to squeeze
private respondents out of the outstanding and
3
as
and
for
exemplary
as
and
for
cost
of
The
of the case.
antecedent
facts
Agreement
15
14
WHEREFORE,
premises
judgment is hereby rendered:
considered,
defendant
to
pay
16
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS
CONFIRMING THE ARBITRAL AWARD AND
DENYING
THE
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER OF AWARD.
III
THE
RESPONDENT
JUDGE
GROSSLY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF AND WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
IN
RECKONING
THE
COUNTING OF THE PERIOD TO FILE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NOT
FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THE
COURT'S COPY CONFIRMING THE AWARD,
BUT FROM RECEIPT OF A XEROX COPY OF
WHAT PRESUMABLY IS THE OPPOSING
COUNSEL'S COPY THEREOF. 20
On July 12, 1995, he Court of Appeals, through its
Fifth-Division, denied due course and dismissed
the petition forcertiorari.
Hence,
the
instant
petition
for
review
on certiorari imputing to the Court of Appeals the
following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE MAKATI REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62 WHICH HAS
PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO.
9900 HAD LOST JURISDICTION TO CONFIRM
THE ARBITRAL AWARD UNDER THE SAME
CIVIL CASE AND NOT RULING THAT THE
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION SHOULD
HAVE BEEN FILED AS A NEW CASE TO BE
RAFFLED OFF AMONG THE DIFFERENT
BRANCHES OF THE RTC.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS
ESTOPPED
FROM
QUESTIONING
THE
ARBITRATION AWARD, WHEN PETITIONER
QUESTIONED THE JURISDICTION OF THE
RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 62 AND AT THE SAME
is
hereby
17
II
We do not agree.
28
provides
19
for
not
allowing
direct
considered,
NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
(NIA), petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (4th Division), CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION, and
HYDRO
RESOURCES
CONTRACTORS
CORPORATION, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the National Irrigation
Administration (hereafter NIA), seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolutions 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 37180 dated 28 June
1996 and 24 February 1997, which dismissed
respectively NIA's petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (hereafter CIAC), and the
motion for reconsideration thereafter filed.
Records show that in a competitive bidding held
by NIA in August 1978, Hydro Resources
Contractors Corporation (hereafter HYDRO) was
awarded Contract MPI-C-2 for the construction of
the main civil works of the Magat River MultiPurpose Project. The contract provided that
HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos
and partly in U.S. dollars. HYDRO substantially
completed the works under the contract in 1982
and final acceptance by NIA was made in 1984.
HYDRO thereafter determined that it still had an
account receivable from NIA representing the
dollar rate differential of the price escalation for
the contract. 2
After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA,
HYDRO, on 7 December 1994, filed with the CIAC
a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim.
HYDRO nominated six arbitrators for the
arbitration panel, from among whom CIAC
appointed Engr. Lauro M. Cruz. On 6 January
1995, NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned
the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause
of action, laches and estoppel in view of HYDRO's
alleged failure to avail of its right to submit the
dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period
as provided in the contract. On the same date,
CONTROVERSY,
THE
AUTHORITY
TO
DECIDE AND THE DECISION. IF IT IS NOT
APPEALED
SEASONABLY,
THE
SAME
BECOMES FINAL.
A
RESPONDENT CIAC HAS NO AUTHORITY OR
JURIDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THIS
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE HEREIN PARTIES AS
E.O. NO. 1008 HAD NO RETROACTIVE
EFFECT.
B
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
SHOULD BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH GC NO. 25, ART. 2046 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND R.A. NO. 876 THE GOVERNING
LAWS AT THE TIME CONTRACT WAS
EXECUTED AND TERMINATED.
F
THE LEGAL DOCTRINE THAT JURISDICTION
IS DETERMINED BY THE STATUTE IN FORCE
AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THE ACTION DOES NOT ONLY APPLY TO THE
INSTANT CASE. 11
C
E.O. NO. 1008 IS A SUBSTANTIVE LAW, NOT
MERELY PROCEDURAL AS RULED BY THE
CIAC.
D
AN INDORSEMENT OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL DECIDING A CONTROVERSY IS A
DECISION BECAUSE ALL THE ELEMENTS
FOR
JUDGMENT
ARE
THERE;
THE
28
available
remedy.
but
also
speedy
and
adequate
x---------------------------------------------------------x
May 5, 2003
5.0%
7.5%
32
10.0%
35
with
and
violated
by
xxx
xxx
c.
Financial
Capability:
The
project
proponent must have adequate capability
to sustain the financing requirements for
the
detailed
engineering
design,
construction
and/or
operation
and
maintenance phases of the project, as the
case may be. For purposes of prequalification, this capability shall be
measured in terms of (i) proof of the
ability of the project proponent and/or
the consortium to provide a minimum
amount of equity to the project, and
(ii) a letter testimonial from reputable
banks attesting that the project
proponent and/or members of the
40
xxx
xxx
NAIA IPT III project at the time of prequalification. With respect to Security Bank,
the maximum amount which may be invested
by it would only be 15% of its net worth in view of
the restrictions imposed by the General Banking
Act. Disregarding the investment ceilings
provided by applicable law would not result in a
proper evaluation of whether or not a bidder is
pre-qualified to undertake the project as for all
intents and purposes, such ceiling or legal
restriction
determines
thetrue
maximum
amount which a bidder may invest in the project.
Further, the determination of whether or not a
bidder is pre-qualified to undertake the project
requires an evaluation of the financial capacity of
the said bidder at the time the bid is
submitted based on the required documents
presented by the bidder. The PBAC should not be
allowed to speculate on the future financial
abilityof the bidder to undertake the project on
the basis of documents submitted. This would
open doors to abuse and defeat the very purpose
of a public bidding. This is especially true in the
case at bar which involves the investment of
billions of pesos by the project proponent. The
relevant government authority is duty-bound to
ensure that the awardee of the contract
possesses the minimum required financial
capability to complete the project. To allow the
PBAC to estimate the bidder's future financial
capability would not secure the viability and
integrity of the project. A restrictive and
conservative application of the rules and
procedures of public bidding is necessary not only
to protect the impartiality and regularity of the
proceedings but also to ensure the financial and
technical reliability of the project. It has been
held that:
The basic rule in public bidding is that bids
should be evaluated based on the required
documents submitted before and not after
the opening of bids. Otherwise, the
foundation of a fair and competitive public
bidding
would
be
defeated. Strict
observance of the rules, regulations,
and guidelines of the bidding process
is the only safeguard to a fair, honest
and competitive public bidding.30
Thus, if the maximum amount of equity that a
bidder may invest in the project at the time the
bids are submittedfalls short of the minimum
amounts required to be put up by the bidder, said
bidder
should
be
properly
disqualified.
Considering that at the pre-qualification stage,
42
xxx
xxx
45
Concession
xxx
xxx
to its suppliers,
contractors.
contractors
and
sub-
xxx
xxx
(b)
In
the
event
Concessionaire
should default in the payment of an
Attendant Liability, and the default
resulted in the acceleration of the payment
due date of the Attendant Liability prior to
its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid
Creditors
and
Concessionaire
shall
immediately inform GRP in writing of such
default. GRP shall within one hundred
eighty (180) days from receipt of the joint
written notice of the Unpaid Creditors and
Concessionaire, either (i) take over the
Development Facility and assume the
Attendant Liabilities, or (ii) allow the
Unpaid Creditors, if qualified to be
substituted as concessionaire and operator
of the Development facility in accordance
with the terms and conditions hereof, or
designate a qualified operator acceptable
to GRP to operate the Development
Facility, likewise under the terms and
conditions of this Agreement; Provided,
that if at the end of the 180-day period
GRP shall not have served the Unpaid
Creditors and Concessionaire written notice
of its choice, GRP shall be deemed to
have elected to take over the
Development
Facility
with
the
concomitant assumption of Attendant
Liabilities.
48
xxx
xxx
(c) GRP
agrees with
Concessionaire
(PIATCO) that it shall negotiate in good
faith and enter into direct agreement
with the Senior Lenders, or with an
agent of such Senior Lenders (which
agreement shall be subject to the approval
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), in such
form as may be reasonably acceptable to
both GRP and Senior Lenders, with regard,
inter alia, to the following parameters:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Take-over
of
.
(c) In the event the development Facility or
any part thereof and/or the operations of
Concessionaire or any part thereof,
become the subject matter of or be
included in any notice, notification, or
declaration concerning or relating to
acquisition, seizure or appropriation by
GRP in times of war or national emergency,
GRP
shall,
by
written
notice
to
Concessionaire, immediately take over the
operations of the Terminal and/or the
Terminal Complex. During such take over
by GRP, the Concession Period shall be
suspended;
provided,
that
upon
termination of war, hostilities or national
52
Regulation of Monopolies
A monopoly is "a privilege or peculiar advantage
vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to
carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the
sale
of
a
particular
commodity." 66 The
1987 Constitution
strictly
regulates
monopolies, whether private or public, and even
provides for their prohibition if public interest so
requires. Article XII, Section 19 of the 1987
Constitution states:
Sec. 19. The state shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
Clearly, monopolies are not per se prohibited by
the Constitution but may be permitted to exist to
aid the government in carrying on an enterprise
or to aid in the performance of various services
and
functions in
the
interest
of
the
public.67 Nonetheless, a determination must first
be made as to whether public interest requires a
monopoly. As monopolies are subject to abuses
that can inflict severe prejudice to the public,
they are subject to a higher level of State
regulation than an ordinary business undertaking.
In the cases at bar, PIATCO, under the 1997
Concession Agreement and the ARCA, is granted
the "exclusive right to operate a commercial
international passenger terminal within the Island
of Luzon" at the NAIA IPT III. 68This is with the
exception of already existing international
airports in Luzon such as those located in the
Subic Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone
("SBFSEZ"), Clark Special Economic Zone
("CSEZ") and in Laoag City.69 As such, upon
commencement of PIATCO's operation of NAIA IPT
III, Terminals 1 and 2 of NAIA would cease to
function as international passenger terminals.
This, however, does not prevent MIAA to use
Terminals 1 and 2 as domestic passenger
terminals or in any other manner as it may deem
appropriate except those activities that would
compete with NAIA IPT III in the latter's operation
as an international passenger terminal. 70 The
right granted to PIATCO to exclusively operate
NAIA IPT III would be for a period of twenty-five
(25) years from the In-Service Date 71 and
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at
the option of the government.72 Both the 1997
Concession Agreement and the ARCA
53
xxx
xxx
Concession
(e) GRP
confirms
that
certain
concession
agreements relative
to
certain services and operations currently
being undertaken at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport passenger Terminal
I have a validity period extending
beyond the In-Service Date. GRP
through DOTC/MIAA, confirms that these
services and operations shall not be
carried over to the Terminal and the
Concessionaire
is
under no
legal
obligation to permit such carryover except
through
a
separate
agreement
duly
entered
into
with
Concessionaire.
In
the
event
Concessionaire becomes involved in any
litigation
initiated
by
any
such
concessionaire
or
operator,
GRP
undertakes
and
hereby
holds
Concessionaire free and harmless on full
indemnity basis from and against any loss
and/or any liability resulting from any such
litigation, including the cost of litigation
and the reasonable fees paid or payable to
Concessionaire's counsel of choice, all such
amounts shall be fully deductible by way of
an offset from any amount which the
Concessionaire is bound to pay GRP under
this Agreement.
During the oral arguments on December
10, 2002, the counsel for the petitioners-inintervention for G.R. No. 155001 stated
that there are two service providers whose
contracts are still existing and whose
validity extends beyond the In-Service
Date. One contract remains valid until
2008 and the other until 2010.77
We hold that while the service providers presently
operating at NAIA Terminal 1 do not have an
absolute right for the renewal or the extension of
their respective contracts, those contracts whose
duration extends beyond NAIA IPT III's In-ServiceDate should not be unduly prejudiced. These
contracts must be respected not just by the
parties thereto but also by third parties. PIATCO
cannot, by law and certainly not by contract,
render a valid and binding contract nugatory.
PIATCO, by the mere expedient of claiming an
exclusive right to operate, cannot require the
Government to break its contractual obligations
to the service providers. In contrast to the
arrastre and stevedoring service providers in the
case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v.
Lazaro78 whose contracts consist of temporary
hold-over permits, the affected service providers
54
LM
POWER
ENGINEERING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
CAPITOL
INDUSTRIAL
CONSTRUCTION
GROUPS,
INC., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs -like arbitration, mediation, negotiation and
conciliation -- are encouraged by the Supreme
Court. By enabling parties to resolve their
disputes amicably, they provide solutions that are
less
time-consuming,
less
tedious,
less
confrontational, and more productive of goodwill
and lasting relationships.1
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the January 28, 2000
Decision of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 54232. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties
are ORDERED to present their dispute to
arbitration in accordance with their Subcontract Agreement. The surety bond
posted by [respondent] is [d]ischarged." 4
The Facts
On February 22, 1983, Petitioner LM Power
Engineering Corporation and Respondent Capitol
Industrial Construction Groups Inc. entered into a
"Subcontract Agreement" involving electrical
work at the Third Port of Zamboanga. 5
On April 25, 1985, respondent took over some of
the work contracted to petitioner. 6 Allegedly, the
latter had failed to finish it because of its inability
to procure materials.7
Upon completing its task under the Contract,
petitioner billed respondent in the amount of
P6,711,813.90.8Contesting the accuracy of the
amount
of
advances
and
billable
accomplishments listed by the former, the latter
refused to pay. Respondent also took refuge in
the termination clause of the Agreement. 9 That
clause allowed it to set off the cost of the work
that petitioner had failed to undertake -- due to
termination or take-over -- against the amount it
owed the latter.
Because of the dispute, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (Branch 141)
a Complaint10 for the collection of the amount
representing the alleged balance due it under the
55
First
Whether Dispute Is Arbitrable
Issue:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Issue:
of
request
for
58
61
June 5, 2009
PARK
ASSOCIATION,
SAMANTHA MARIE T.
ALMENDRAS
and
PIA
ALMENDRAS, Respondents.
ANGELA
T.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision1 dated August 31, 2005 and the
Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81069.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha
Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras
purchased from MRO Development Corporation a
residential lot located in Maria Luisa Estate Park,
Banilad, Cebu City. After some time, respondents
filed with petitioner Maria Luisa Park Association,
Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to construct a
residential house, which was approved in
February
10,
2002.
Thus,
respondents
commenced the construction of their house.
Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found
out that respondents violated the prohibition
against multi-dwelling3 stated in MLPAIs Deed of
Restriction. Consequently, on April 28, 2003,
MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents,
demanding that they rectify the structure;
otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit
respondents construction bond and impose
stiffer penalties.
In a Letter4 dated April 29, 2003, respondents, as
represented by their father Ruben D. Almendras
denied having violated MLPAIs Deed of
Restriction.
On May 5, 2003, MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out
respondents specific violations of the subdivision
rules, to wit: (a) installation of a second water
meter and tapping the subdivisions main water
pipeline, and (b) construction of "two separate
entrances that are mutually exclusive of each
other." It likewise reiterated its warning that
failure to comply with its demand will result in its
exercise of more stringent measures.
In view of these, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, a
Complaint5 on June 2, 2003 for Injunction,
Declaratory Relief, Annulment of Provisions of
Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a
62
associations
therewith;
registered
in
accordance
xxxx
Moreover, by virtue of this amendatory law, the
HIGC also assumed the SECs original and
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A to hear and decide
cases involving:
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between
any and/or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are
stockholders,
members
or
associates,
respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership or association and the state insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity;13(Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Consequently,
in Sta.
Clara
Homeowners
Association v. Gaston14 and Metro Properties, Inc.
v. Magallanes Village Association, Inc.,15 the Court
recognized HIGCs "Revised Rules of Procedure in
the Hearing of Home Owners Disputes,"
pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
RULE
II
Disputes Triable by HIGC/Nature of Proceedings
Section 1. Types of Disputes The HIGC or any
person, officer, body, board or committee duly
designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving the following:
xxxx
xxxx
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations between and among members of the
association, between any or all of them and
the association of which they are members,
and
between
such
association
and
the
state/general public or other entity in so far as it
concerns its right to exist as a corporate
entity.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
64
February 27,
DEVELOPMENT
MANUEL
N.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision dated 19 July 2007 1 and
the Resolution dated 10 December 2007 2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97731. The
appellate court, in its assailed Decision, affirmed
the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 06-2000CFM, denying the Motion to Dismiss of petitioner;
and in its assailed Resolution, refused to
reconsider its decision.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation duly organized
under Philippine laws, is engaged in the real
estate development business. Respondent is the
assignee of L and M Maxco Specialist Engineering
Construction
(LMM
Construction)
of
its
receivables from petitioner.
On 5 July 2000, petitioner entered into a Trade
Contract with LMM Construction for partial
structural and architectural works on one of its
projects, the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium.
According to the said Contract, petitioner had the
right to withhold the retention money equivalent
to 5% of the contract price for a period of one
year after the completion of the project.
66
under
11.
May 8, 2009
FORT
BONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDWIN D.
SORONGON
and
VALENTIN
FONG, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner
Fort
Bonifacio
Development
Corporation (petitioner), a corporation registered
under Philippine laws, is engaged in the business
of real estate development. Respondent, Valentin
Fong (respondent) doing business under the
name VF Industrial Sales is the assignee of L & M
Maxco Specialist Constructions (Maxco) retention
money from the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium
Phase 1 (BRCP 1).
In this Petition for Review,1 petitioner assails the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated
November 30, 2006 which ruled that it is the
regional trial court and not the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) that has
jurisdiction over respondents claim.
The facts are as follows:
On July 2000, Petitioner entered into a trade
contract with Maxco wherein Maxco would
undertake the structural and partial architectural
package of the BRCP 1. Later petitioner accused
Maxco of delay in completion of its work and on
August 24, 2004 sent the latter a notice of
termination. Petitioner also instructed Maxco to
perform remedial measures prior to the contract
expiration pursuant to Clause 23.1 of the
contract.
Subsequently, Maxco was sued by its creditors
including respondent for debts unrelated to BRCP
1. In order to settle the collection suit, on
February
28, 2005, Maxco assigned its
receivables representing its retention money from
the BRCP 1 in the amount of one million five
hundred seventy seven thousand one hundred
fifteen
pesos
and
ninety
centavos
(P1,577,115.90). On April 18, 2005, respondent
wrote to petitioner, informing the latter of
Maxcos assignment in his favor and asking the
latter to confirm the validity of Maxcos
receivables.3 Petitioner replied, informing the
respondent that Maxco did have receivables,
however these were not due and demandable
70
April 24,
HUTAMA-RSEA
JOINT
OPERATIONS,
INC., Petitioner, vs. CITRA METRO MANILA
TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision2 dated 23 May 2007 and
Resolution3 dated 16 November 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92504.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner
HUTAMA-RSEA
Joint
Operations
Incorporation and respondent Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation are corporations organized
and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner is a
sub-contractor engaged in engineering and
construction works. Respondent, on the other
hand, is the general contractor and operator of
the South Metro Manila Skyway Project (Skyway
Project).
On 25 September 1996, petitioner and
respondent
entered
into
an
Engineering
Procurement
Construction
Contract
(EPCC)
whereby
petitioner
would
undertake
the
construction of Stage 1 of the Skyway Project,
which stretched from the junction of Buendia
Avenue, Makati City, up to Bicutan Interchange,
Taguig City. As consideration for petitioners
undertaking, respondent obliged itself under the
EPCC to pay the former a total amount of
US$369,510,304.00.4
During the construction of the Skyway Project,
petitioner wrote respondent on several occasions
requesting payment of the formers interim
billings, pursuant to the provisions of the EPCC.
Respondent only partially paid the said interim
billings, thus, prompting petitioner to demand
that respondent pay the outstanding balance
thereon, but respondent still failed to do so. 5
The Skyway Project was opened on 15 December
1999 for public use, and toll fees were
accordingly collected. After informing respondent
that the construction of the Skyway Project was
already complete, petitioner reiterated its
demand that respondent pay the outstanding
balance on the interim billings, as well as the
"Early Completion Bonus" agreed upon in the
EPCC. Respondent refused to comply with
petitioners demands.6
On 24 May 2004, petitioner, through counsel,
sent a letter to respondent demanding payment
of the following: (1) the outstanding balance on
the interim billings; (2) the amount of petitioners
final billing; (3) early completion bonus; and (4)
interest charges on the delayed payment.
Thereafter, petitioner and respondent, through
their respective officers and representatives, held
several meetings to discuss the possibility of
amicably settling the dispute. Despite several
meetings and continuous negotiations, lasting for
a period of almost one year, petitioner and
respondent failed to reach an amicable
settlement.7
73
18
defines
of
the
Dispute
December 18,
EQUITABLE
PCI
BANKING
CORPORATION,1 GEORGE L. GO, PATRICK D.
GO,
GENEVIEVE
W.J.
GO,
FERDINAND
MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, OSCAR P. LOPEZDEE, RENE J. BUENAVENTURA, GLORIA L.
TAN-CLIMACO, ROGELIO S. CHUA, FEDERICO
C. PASCUAL, LEOPOLDO S. VEROY, WILFRIDO
V.
VERGARA,
EDILBERTO
V.
JAVIER,
ANTHONY F. CONWAY, ROMULAD U. DY
TANG, WALTER C. WESSMER, and ANTONIO
N. COTOCO, petitioners, vs. RCBC CAPITAL
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
79
Representations
and
where
X=
Amount
by
which
negative
adjustment exceeds P100 Million
-------------------------------------------338,000,000
xxxx
Section
7. Remedies
Warranties
for
Breach
of
not
entitled
to
82
85
for
Breach
of
from the
supplied.)
Closing
Date.
(Emphasis
right
to
due
process
was
not
cross-
We
explained
the
principle
of
estoppel
in Philippine Savings Bank v. Chowking Food
Corporation:
97
- versus -
YNARESSANTIAGO,
J.,
CAPITOL
INDUSTRIAL Chairperson,
CONSTRUCTION GROUPS,
INC.,
AUSTRIARespondent.
MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,* and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
September
2008
26,
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated November 3,
2004 and its Resolution2 dated May 10, 2005, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58980. The assailed decision
modified the Decision3 of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) dated
May 16, 2000 in CIAC No. 39-99.
The facts of the case, as found by the CIAC and
affirmed by the CA, follow:
On February 12, 1997, petitioner Empire East
Land Holdings, Inc. and respondent Capitol
Industrial Corporation Groups, Inc. entered into a
Construction Agreement4 whereby the latter
bound itself to undertake the complete supply
and installation of "the building shell wet
construction" of the formers building known as
Gilmore Heights Phase I, located at Gilmore cor.
Castilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila. 5 The
pertinent portion of the aforesaid agreement is
quoted hereunder for easy reference:
ARTICLE II - SCOPE OF WORK
2.1. The CONTRACTOR shall complete the
civil/structural and masonry works of the building
based on the works (sic) items covered by the
CONTRACTORs Proposal of Complete Supply and
Installation of Building Shell Wet Construction
Works as indicated in the plans and specifications
at the Contract Price and within the Contract time
herein stipulated and in accordance with the
plans and specifications. The CONTRACTOR shall
furnish and supply all necessary labor, equipment
and tools, supervision and other facilities needed
and shall perform everything necessary for the
complete and successful masonry works of the
building described hereof, provided that it
pertains to or is part of the above mentioned
work or items covered by the Contract
documents.
2.2. The scope of works as stated hereunder but
not limited to the following:
a) CONCRETE WORKS foundation and footings,
tie beams, walls, columns, beams, girders, slabs,
stairs, stair slabs, cement floor topping, ramps,
rubbed concrete.
100
i) Garbage Chutes
2.3. The work of the CONTRACTOR shall include
but not be limited to, preparing the bill of
materials, canvassing of prices, requisition of
materials for purchase by OWNER, following up of
orders, checking the quality and quantity of the
materials within the premises of the construction
site and returning defective materials.6
Respondent further agreed that the construction
work would be completed within 330 calendar
days from "Day 1," upon the Construction
Managers
confirmation.7 Petitioner
initially
considered February 20, 1997 as "Day 1" of the
project. However, when respondent entered the
project site, it could not start work due to the ongoing bulk excavation by another contractor.
Respondent thus asked petitioner to move "Day
1" to a later date, when the bulk excavation
101
III.
IV.
Counterclaim
for
Liquidated
February 11,
ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORLD
INTERACTIVE
NETWORK
SYSTEMS
(WINS)
JAPAN
CO.,
LTD., respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
February 16, 2005 decision1 and August 16, 2005
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81940.
On September 27, 1999, petitioner ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation entered into a licensing
agreement with respondent World Interactive
Network Systems (WINS) Japan Co., Ltd., a foreign
corporation licensed under the laws of Japan.
Under the agreement, respondent was granted
the exclusive license to distribute and sublicense
the distribution of the television service known as
"The Filipino Channel" (TFC) in Japan. By virtue
thereof, petitioner undertook to transmit the TFC
programming signals to respondent which the
latter received through its decoders and
distributed to its subscribers.
A dispute arose between the parties when
petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine
episodes of WINS WEEKLY, a weekly 35-minute
community news program for Filipinos in Japan,
into the TFC programming from March to May
2002.3 Petitioner claimed that these were
"unauthorized insertions" constituting a material
breach of their agreement. Consequently, on May
9, 2002,4 petitioner notified respondent of its
intention to terminate the agreement effective
June 10, 2002.
xxx
xxx
107
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The same
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA, in effect, ruled
that: (a) it should have first filed a petition to
vacate the award in the RTC and only in case of
denial could it elevate the matter to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 and (b) the
assailed decision implied that an aggrieved party
to an arbitral award does not have the option of
directly filing a petition for review under Rule 43
or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA even if the issues raised pertain to errors of
fact and law or grave abuse of discretion, as the
case may be, and not dependent upon such
grounds as enumerated under Section 24
(petition to vacate an arbitral award) of RA 876
(the Arbitration Law). Petitioner alleged serious
error on the part of the CA.
The issue before us is whether or not an
aggrieved party in a voluntary arbitration dispute
may avail of, directly in the CA, a petition for
review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of
filing a petition to vacate the award in the RTC
when the grounds invoked to overturn the
arbitrators decision are other than those for a
petition to vacate an arbitral award enumerated
under RA 876.
RA 876 itself mandates that it is the Court of First
Instance, now the RTC, which has jurisdiction over
questions relating to arbitration,9 such as a
petition to vacate an arbitral award.
Section 24 of RA 876 provides for the specific
grounds for a petition to vacate an award made
by an arbitrator:
Sec. 24. Grounds for vacating award. - In
any one of the following cases, the
court must make an order vacating
the award upon the petition of any party
to the controversy when such party proves
affirmatively that in the arbitration
proceedings:
(a) The award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means; or
(b) That there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators or any of
them; or
108
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
March 24,
DIESEL
CONSTRUCTION
INC., Petitioner, vs.UPSI
HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
CO.,
PROPERTY
111
attorneys
fees
are
114
such
as
riots,
on
the