Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
aure
ClenCe
An Episte molog ical Anal ysis
Progress publishers
Moscow
V,
ar
..
M
iii
no
1ft
Vi
....M<
tho
hi.
01
Ito
01
CONTENTS
Prdace
As
....
M(
CIIapft'r 1. TH E G EN ES IS OF SC IE l'o CE
.
2.1. The Problem of the Begmning'" of S"::len..::e
2.2. S(icnce 111 t he Ancienl Orient
OK
Chapter
.1 1.
3.2.
3 ..1
.1.4.
Mathe matics
Nailiral Sc ie lKl'
TedHlilol KI H)wlcdge
Humall Kn owledge
01 4 (01)- -88
18 88
ISBN 50 10005034
2:n
J 0.1
141
Co n (lu~ i on
Bibliography
Na me inde"
Suttje,", mde"
,.,
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21.1
2.P
2.UI
141\
HI
1,~1
PRHA(T
What i'l the nature of 'Ici cn ce <11 a \,:ategorial-l08ical relation to the world a'i di'ltincl from Ihe other prodUC1l ttl
~piritual-theor e t il.: al a ..... im ilatio n of reality? What is scienct'
conditio ned by'! Wh ere lies th e boundary between sc ie",,:e and
th e ~ph e r e of evt!ryday experience. a rti'ltic think ing, murality.
religi on. a nd other area~ of tht! \OI.:ial superstructu re?
Through out h i')to ry. epi.-.te mologists have allempted 10 a nswer these question':>-to c reate an acceptable model of tlw
scien tiflcit y of kn owledge. T hese allempt<;. howc\er. han',
we believe. failed due to th e inadequacy of the philo.. ophicalmethodological foundati ons of the concept s of seie",,:e de\'doped in pre- and non-Marxian epistemo logy. wh ich rai~d to
an absolute either the empirical and inductive. o r (he rat ional
and deductive. or else the subconscious and intuitive aspects
and components of knowledge. These models of science Were
therefore narrow and non-historical; they ignored the- social
status of cognitive activity and negated practice as the fina l
instrument of ascertaining the scientific it)' of knowl~ge. The':>\:!
difficulties were only overcome in dialectical malerialism,
which provided a truly scientific foundation of epI~=
~
well as a world view basis adequale 10 Ihe ...;,.,
problem.
Be ing a ma nifold phenoilbenon. scie ..ce II studied in the
fra mework of approaches besed on logic and methodoiosy. socia l psycho lo,y, economic statistics. information theory, cybernetics. etc. T he present work. taking the epistemological ap
proach. is focu sed on the gnoseological problems of science as
know ledge. Acc ordingly. other questions which . though associat ed wit h this problem range conceptually. thematically. etc .
merit special consideration. are excluded from the universe of
discourse.
There are various kinds of epistemological units or ta, ~ns: theory. rami ly of theories. paradigm. research programme.
mtellectual tradition. types of knowledge. finally. knowledge
._
.1" a w/1 o le. The prin c ipal IIIltt of Llllaly"i" i!1,:n ' pll' d Ill'rl' i\
..,l' ll'rHi ne knowledge and ih fOfm ... , kind, and I"pl'\.
T ht' \it' w of 'i("ience [I'.. knowktll;l' i .. lI11p(';nalll 1101 nlll\'
=
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express-ing thl" obJt:C'tlve law~ and Ihe Jogic of its historic.1 che....
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multiform cornple:\c\ <'Ind \'\1mrllIH~flh llf ':'("ie,IKe '~Tld an eXlt'tl.,;\t' nel\Hlrk of 'pe..:ial and general crltena ~ll 'l'rent,fluty.
Criteria of ~cie!1tifKiIY are varied ami mullllayt'red: They
are ~ubJi\ided illlo three \eh. The fir,,! of the':'\! (whICh we
shall designale ".,el A") c(,lInpri"~" un.in-f\al criteria of scicntiftei!}' whkh draw the dCl1larcal1on.lul'.-' bClw~t'tl \Clcnce and
non-science. The\' \el down the 1111111\, a.. 11 wen~. of the
ba.,i~. on whidl ttu~' concepl of unitary ,>,:;ence i., constituted
regardle~ of its dilTeferuialion in term" of subjeCl malter,
method. and professional forms. Such norms flgure I,lere as
formal consistency, cause-and-etTL'ct cohesion, experimental
verifiability. rationality. reproducibility. intersubjectivity. elC,
The requiremet1l~ comprised in <,eT A are nece!SSary ones .. For
instalKe, rationally (or logically. practically) unsubslantlated
elements have no place in <;cience-olherwise we are faced
wilh a move beyond its boundaries. The criteria of scienlificity
of M~t A comprise tho<;e illviolablt. ')chemala, archetypes, and
principles of the imelieci which. in their po')ilivenes~. con
dition the identity and integrality of o.;cience a'5 a stable
i!lternallv organi\ed phenomenon. They make science a unifIed
and svnchronically active .. ystem embracing autonomous yet
strul.."lurally similar. epi ..temologil.:ally isomorphic kinds of
knowledge.
The <>econd set, which we .. hall designate "~et BOO. is a
group of hi\torically tran\ienl normatin'" which determine
the process of modelling, simulation. explication, interpreta
tion, and meaning formation: they make the course of events and
the order in nature imelligible and \pecif\" rational ~amples
of connections in terms of which the l'our~e of events can be
meaningfully discu.-.sed. Here belong SUdl Ilormatives as the
requirements imposed 011 ontological "chemala, existence hy
potheses, epistemological a" .. umptions, picture .. of the world.
and so on, which are oriented toward research programmes. ideals of knowledge, elc., accepted in various cultures. Unlike
those of ..et A, the criteria of ..ciel1tiflcity of Sl!t B merely
specify the cuhural-stylist1c dimensions of thl! thinking of
scienti\t .. , being of fundamental \igniflcallce for characterising
knowtl!dge in it\ conuete historicat projection.
The third \et, to be de\ignated "set C", i\ a group of sub
ject-matter critl!ria of \cientiflcity imposed on professional~
Iy differentiated (in terms of subject matter and method)
branches'---Ihe variou\ \y,tem, of knowledge and activity. Requirements 'petiflc for logico-mathematical. !lalUral. and technil'al ~cienle\. a~ well a\ for the "t'parate genera and modifica-
'"
II
,
,,
I
I
I
I
,,
,
I
reanimated il the future. Of this nature is. say. the idea of atomism. which has invariably provided \ustcna;lr.:c for knowledge.
The distinction between these segllleills of science is fruitful
in Iwo respecls. Firstly. it stresses once again the limited
meaning of the idealising iTllerpretntion of scientiflcity. Not
all knowledge that forms science is perfect -if we have in mind
the realisability of such strong criteria as truth. sufficient
substantiation. etc Frontline science contains unidentifled unsubstantiated and false demt!'nts; apart from that which will
become pan of fUlure science, it comprises that which will
remain outside scienct!'. The history of science contains identifled, unsubstamiated and false dements--the ballast that failed
to make the transition from frontline science to the hard core.
Secondly, it lends a graphic quality to the a,,-senion of the
ontologically multi-layered structure of science, which, together
with the realisation of the functions or purpose of each part
integ~ated in science as a whole makes it necessary to
descnbe or represent them (and through them, the manifold
reality of science) in sovereign con'Structs-in specific values
and normatlVes. The latter neces'Sitales a differentiated picture
of >eienlincity.
In frontline science, such regulative figures a'S nontriviality, informativeness, heuristic quality, elc., are focal. At the
same time the requirements of exactness, rigorollsness substan.
'
lIatedne.ss, etc. are weakened and made less radical. The reason
is that the purpose of frontline science is to vary the alternatives, to go through all Ihe possibilities, to extend semantic
horizons, and to produce the new. If the requirements of
exactness, rigorousness, substantiation, etc., were to be imposed
on all Ihe components of science from the OUlsel, science
would be a collection of Irivia. To some extent, informativeness and rigorous substantiation rule each other out: in
frollliine science, the falsity of an informative contradiction
15 preferable to the truth of a truism. Science must contain
rigorously substantiated element~. but not only such elements;
otherwise science will lose its heuristir.: quality. For this
reason, badly
. sub~tantialed elem~n1S (insuffu:ienllv
. confIrmed.
"
\:
,.
I.
.
, - 'I.n Ih
<e 'ond ' with.
Jtienlik
with everyday sdcnllflC
activity.
. e , I.:
.
revolution. The following pO~lbllll1es come to .hghl h~re
.
(I) There i~ a tendcnq to link innOvatlOn5. with .~.
dllional I.:riteria of \I.:i~ntifldty: d . energy I~akage I," 6.~e~~~
and the Pauli hypothesIs (a PO\ltlve example), or the. adaptitl ,
of relativi\ti(.' ideas to the idea of the ether by LaJos Jan~~
(a negative example),
. . , '.
(2) There i\ a lendenl.: I~ r~Jel.:t mnovatum-condltlon.e~
changes o f criteria of sl.:lenl1fu::ilY: c~. e.g. the ~1ff1CUIt~cs
involved in the evolution of the nonclassical theones In phYSICS
(the role of the observer, statistica l laws, etc:). .
..
(3) There is a tendency to preserve crltena of .sc lenu.
li ci ly by discrediting innovations (cf. the way g.eneILl:~ W8i
torpedoed by invoking the proposition that "sueOl.:e IS an
enemy of chan ce").
..'
,
(4) Innovat ions may be accepted and crltena of sClent.14
ficity transformed; d. the rejection of the view of dynamIC
laws as universal when quantum mechanics and genetks were
accepted) .
When is the breakup of criteria of scieOliticity completed? When is it no longer expedient to follow the available
criteria of sc ientiticit y?
Thomas Kuhn actually expressed the view that a clear
answer to these questions is impossible. "Though the historian."
he wrOle, "can always find men " .. who were unreasonable to
resist for as long as they did, he will not find a point at which
resistance becomes illogical or unscientific. At most he may wish
10 say that the man who continues to resist after his whole
profession has been converted has ipso facIo ceased to be a
scientist" (158. 159).
We believe that it is possible to answer these questions.
The conflict between frontline science and the hard core
with the well-established criteria of scientificity associated
with it is over when the innovations as components of frontline science are transformed into hard core, becoming part
of the theoretica l foundation of science. At this moment, the
breakup of norms is comple ted, A new stable normative domain
emerges. and a reilllerpretation of the content of science III
term s of the new values (or criteria of scientificity) begins.
As of thaI moment, it is. as a matter of fact. both unreason.
able and illogical to oppose the new. He who is incapable
of o~ercoming this barrier places himself. de facIO and cit' jllrt'.
OutSide science.
The transference of innovations from frontline science
2,01
no
17
10 Ihe hard core. and the nH,diflCation of crileria of ... dentineity a~ociated wilh thi<;. i... often linked wilh the r~J'llace
ment of one generation of ... cientisl'" b~ anolher. II is 'Said
that opponents are not converted they dIe out. Young pcople,
more receptive to the new, al.-cepl changes more .readlly. We
reject this approach in view of ils non-eplste~nologlcal cha~ac_
ter- although there are ...ome ground.s for II. ~n the epIstemological approach, the real mech~1lIsm of Ihls transference
lie ... in substantiation and proof. It IS true, though. Ihat these
are also more readily accepted by carriers of less conservative
consciOllsness, that is, by young people.
The question of what scientiflCilY is cannot be answered
in any unambiguous and dennite way. Firstly, scienlificity
is not defined ex cathedra by a few hocus-pocus phrases-its
conclusive and reliable deflOition is practice. an all round and
deep-going generalisation of the dala of production and cognition. Secondly, it does not have the status of a supra historical
postulate: it is no permanent label. constant characteristic,
or immutable state.
Scientificity is processual and dialectical.
The real dynamism and multidimensionality of scientificity. and the abundance of its essential ramifications make its
explication difficult.
Exaggeration of the historicity and mutability of the substantive and normative content of science leads to "catastrophism", 10 insistence on the incommensurability of the
structures and standards of knowledge. This latter feature
is characteristic of the descriptivism of the adherents of
the historical trend in postposilivism, with its mosaic doctrine
of science. Scientificity is here viewed as a factor tied to particular cognitive situations and not amenable 10 a logical normative description.
An attempt to avoid the shortcomings of descriptivism.
"implemented as a radical rejection of the "historisation" and
"ecologisation" of scientific norms, leads to another extreme-to
the apriorism of the "critical rationalists". Scientificity is
predestined to the real process of cognition "from above",
being closed on itself rather than on knowledge. Critical
rationalists drive the spirit of realism from epistemology.
We refer in particular to their logico-empirical models of
Kientificily, which do nOI, in principle, express the proper-
"
science.
Vertical unifications are based on the fact that sciC'nce
is an apparatus for the generation and standardisation of
the truth. The lower threshold of scientific it\" is in this l.-ase
specified by the mode of \'erification (obtaining, formulating,
defending) of assertions regulated by the canons of logical.
empirical and nonempirical substantiation satisfying the appropriate criteria of scientificity_
At the same time. the entire fullness of the truth is not
given at the separate stages of cognilion: fictions also form
part of science, although Ihat is neilher deliberate nor known
beforehand. The instrument of identification and elimination
of fIctions is practice, which establishes the truth of scientifically verifiable results of cognition: practice therefore specifIes the upper threshold of scientificity.
Practical verifIcation directs the internal rearrangement
of the content of science according to the principle of concentration of the truth in the hard core and thrusting the
fictions into the history of science.
The axiological scale - the norms. regulators. and stereo-
h " k"
26
27
-a
.r
a:
,.
ils \uhstan.
Ilaliol1. Knowledge is consiliered w llc rdi'lhte if Ihen~ are
lkgfl'C l'(
grounds to assert Ihal ils Irllth ha, been e ... tablislwd, Knowledge
is considered to be probabk if there art' th.) Itnn grounds for
confldenct' in its truth and it needs further logical or practi.
cal substantiation. The dialectics of lhe de\'e!opment of knowledge is subject to the law of transformation of prubable knowledge into reliable knowledge through revealing the foundations for its truth.
The terms "analytical"' and "synthetic" describe knowledge
from the standpoint of Ihe non-triviality of establishing ils
truth. Analytical knowledge is a set of analvtkal assertions
. . . . ~ is immediately obvious and depends only on
!he meanm~ o~ the terms contained in them, requiring no
funher ..e~phcatl0!l' Thus the propOSition "any daughter had a
!'l0ther 15 analytical. Synthetic knowledge is a set of synthetIC statements-statements whose truth cannOI be e<;:tablished
directly. requiring as a rule a non-trivial f<lclUal procedure,
Thus the statement "any body is in 8 state of rest or rectilinea.r and uniform movement if the resultant of the forces apphed to t.h~ .body equals zero" is synthetic.
, The .dlvlslon of knowledge into analytical and synthetic
IS rel,atlve and has no meaning outside the framework of a
certam fixed semantic system.
In . le~ms of cognitive genesis, knowledge is classified into
a prao~1 knowledg,e and a posteriori knowledge, To avoid
any misunderstandlllgs, let us stress that there is no a priori
~no~ledge ~s s,uch. all knowledge is a posteriori, While reJecl1n~ t~e ~ustlfiability of using the terms "a priori" nnd "a
.
. . .1.. In some a bsolute sense, we are convinced
that
,Postenor
It IS ..Jusl1fi~d to use them in a relative sense with a view to
Ihe functlOnal~operative" role and purpose of definite types
~f kno,,:",ledge III the cognitive proc(,ss, On this approa!.:h.
a nnon knowledi!e"
is k
i d ge as premise
. or baSIS
. ensur!lli
.
. _L: _
f'
nowe
the a~tual . unfoldl~g of the co nitive acts in-;'hich --derivative
and, Ill. tillS sellS.e, ~ poslerion know edge is OOtain~d, -'::::,:.:;.
I h,US the a pno,n vs a posterlorT dicllotomyn(1nlhe sense of
premise vs denvatlve knowledge) is justified by referring 10 Ihe
_u
.10
,*
Charier 1
THE GENESIS OF SCtENCF
writ's n . ('. whcn tht." transition from myth 10 10las ... com
plctcd Jnd cognitive sirudurcs look shape in the Middle .net
Far Fa,\I. a~ well as 11\ cla~ical Greece, with which we till oper
all', The dcci\ivC' I'I)f1dilio"s of this leap, i.e . the' (a~lor, Ihal
overcame Ihl" mythological allitude 10 the world und thus oh,le~ ~
lively facilitated the formation of the rudimentS of structures
Ihal led to the sub-sequenl efnoresccnce of seiene!'!, were as fol~
low !i.
(I) The rcjcl'lion Of the "werewolf logic" of the myth. whirh
interfered with the formation of u(;'h fundamental prin""iples
of scientiflc ideology as universality, invariance, etc. II is. weU
known fact that the relation 10 reality of ~oples at rhe NU
stages of intellectual development is based on direct lensual
perception, which excluded the po<;sibility of forming a piClur~
of a nomologically self-suffIcient, internally cohesi\/~, self-iden ..
tical reality. For example, members of Ihe Aranta tribe ty ..
pologise the world in terms of the "I see" \/s "1 do not see" opposition which obviously makes it non-self-identil.:al. In this type
of consciousness, the non-self-identity is det~rminl"d by a kind
of duplication of the worlds, which Follows from man's ability
to perceive an object as existing in the "in\/isibl~" world. apart
from the visible one.
In a similar way, mythological consciousness identiflt.'s an
object with the image in which that obje't is given to man, traniforming the object to suit the various way" of ils pen.:eption
and making it go through metamorphoses alien to it. Every ..
thing therefore merges with everything else 10 f("lfm a singh~
whole, everything is transformed into e\ierything dsl" in the
mind of the carrier of mythological consciousne!.!. (in the mind
of a child, at the early stages of philogenesis). No boundary is
here drawn between the real and the unreal, between th~ objrctive and the subjective. betwren the true and the imaginaryit all appears 10 the mind as disjoint, accidental and, one might
say, only possible and real but in no way neces..-;ary. II follows
that the rejection of the "werewolf logic" of the mylh was a
greal revolution in thought which a-.scrted Ihe piclure of "nOIlbifurcating", "invariant", etc., reality that is !lot subject to arbitrary transformations depending on the properties of the human psyche.
(2) The replacement of the spiritual-personal relation to
reality by the objectlve~substantial one. The drstruction 01 themythological identity of man and reality led to the lOili.'atilln
of an "object ideology". The essential point hrrr is thai In the
framework of that ideology reality emerged as an object struc
.l~
scIence.
Was the primitive savage in any way involved with scie.nce'!
A rigorous approach to this question requires, as w~ pomted
out above, a method for Ihe identitication of "primitive knowledge" with the epistemological standard of science. What is
that standard? As a basis for such a standard, let us take a e+od'01 suggested by I. Ro.hansky (84), which we shall reproduce
here in brief outline. In Rozhansky's view, which we share, the
model having a minimum of extremely general (even "weak")
characteristics specifying science should be as follows.
(I) Any science is knowledge. Much more importantly, however, this knowledge is a result of an activity aimed at ~btain
ing it. The determining feature of science is thus the eXIStence
of a special type of activity undertaken with the goal of produc~
ing new knowledge. From the sociological viewpoint. th.
ity can only be ensured by Ihe availability of Ie;,,....
ply of time thai becomes available when a Jl'oe. fill
freed from material production; this su~ 01 .... II ....t on
development of nonmaterial production.
39
40
ORtENT
Let u<; hegin Willi tilt' ~()C"io-pnljlical causes for the ~nprecr-
dented lIp~lIrge ill Greek culture in the 6th-4th <,en,ur.lft I. C.
The <;trllgp:le hltween the ucm()~ and the ',anded a.rtstocr~~y
ended in the rcfnrm'i of Sulon (Athell<;, 5.)4 B. ( . ). whh;h
wh.,li.IntiiJlly limited the real pnwc.r uf tht.' .trl'h)ni:IC~ . I he: S l~
niflf.:ancc of Solon\ reform .. lay 111 Ihe dc.. trlll"tHHl. ,uIll <.tholl
tion of all c<;tate., and in the declaration of Ihe prinCiples of pll~
litieal and legal equality of free citizen ..,. a~ n:c~lr(Jeu 10 the
constitution of Cli\thcnes promulgated in Athens 111 509 B. C.,
after the overthrt)w of tyranny.
.
These event., had the following effect on the ~!.I superstruclUre, and in particular on problems of cOlfllt".. " .
the individual endowed with civil freedoms was not depenonalised here, as he was in the tyrannical IIlS.litutions o~ powe~ depriving everyone of their rights. as, e.g . m th.e ancient Orl~nt.
The democratic form of the sot:ial structure III Greel.:e ~h.. ch.
on the one hand, assumed the participation of each free l"1~ILen
in political life (in popular assemblies. public debate~ 'iotlllg),
and on the other, encouraged in a practical. m.anner the free
play of the citizen's talents and potential. ehmm~ted the pr~~
rogatives of birth and. moreover. wac; not condut:l~e to ~umll
ity in the face of rulers and bureaucrats, espen.ally as the
Jailer were elected and held their offices in su<.ce...oiIOI1 . That IS
why the core of axiological consciousnes.s among Greeks w~~
the concept of the individual's personal dignify rather than hiS
birth or social position.
.
..
Second, the establishment of generally valid cl~'1I law determined the extremely difficult transition from t.he I~t~rprelatlon
of the order of social life in terms of The-OliO;; (.ul\:me statute
sent, as it were, from above owing to a predestmed order or
things) to its interpretation in terms of Nomos (a statute th~1
has the status of a legal idea duly debated a~d a?opl.ed): ThiS
move signified a kind of secularisation of s<?clal life, Its liberation from the power of religious and myslKal I~otlons.
Third. the attitude to social law as a democratic norm who.. e
civil excellence was proved in popular debate and accepted
by the majority, and nm as a blind force dictated from abo.ve,
was based on the practice of rhetoric -the art of persliaslO.n
and argument. Indeed. a .. the strength of argument and Critique became the instrument of making laws. the power 01
words grew, and the skill of handling words became a
"form of political and intellel'tual activity.... a '!Ie~
,:on,:
scious choice of a political line, and a mode or a~hJeY~n8 ~USIIC\
(41. 20). The Greeks even introduced a special deity III thel
'?'
,.<
concerning the unity and at the same time the non-idC'n t~ry o(
a ll things appears in the "physiologies" of the pre-Socraf lcs 85
an element of rational deduction rather than an element of a
poeticised worldview characteristic of the anc ient Oriental and
Orphil.: myths.
. .
If we take rational substantiation as the minimal necessary
premise of science, i.e., cognition in the for~ of proof through
appeal to actually verifiable (not mystical) rea.')oll'i and
grounds. this principle underlies (even if we discount the ' ~phys-
iological" natural science of the pre-Socratics, the ethiCS 01
Socrates, the astronomy of Eudoxus a nd Ca lippus ) the plani .
metry of H ipparchus of Chios, Hippoc rates' medicine. Herodotus' history. Euclid's geometry. e tc. All these unq uestionably fa ll
within the domain of sc ience.
To fi X more exactly the premises for the eme rgence of science
we must discuss the employment of slave labour as a feature
of Greek life. At the level of social consciousness. the univer.
sal employ ment of slave labour and the fact that free c;tirens
were relieved from participation in the sphere of material production we re the reasons why the Greek had such profound
conte mpt for anything that had to do with instrumental-p ractical activity, which was naturally complemented by a contemplati ve ideology, an abstract, speculative and artistic attitud " to
rea lity. The Greeks drew a line between The mind's free play
with an intellectual object and the productive labour activity
with a materia l object. The former was regarded as worthy of
a fr ee cit iz.en and termed science, the Jailer was suitable to a
sla ve a nd was called handicraft. Even such a highly artistic activi ty as scu lpture had the status of a handicraft in ancient
G reece, being con nected with "matter". The outstanding Greek
sc ul ptors- Ph idias, Polykleitos. Praxiteles and others-were
the refore regarded, in fact, as just so many craftsme n. Art and
handic raft we re id entified. both being covered by one word
and conce pl - techne.
Int erestingly, in sc ience itself the Greeks separated true
sc ie nce from its applica tions, and interest in the latter was not
approved of. T hus the Greeks opposed phys ics as the science
studying natllre to mechanics- an applied branch, the art of
building technical apparatus, of designing and building ma c hines. It is clea r in this context why P lalo reproac hed Eudo lCu5
a nd Arc hytas for thei r stud ies in mec ha nics; Aristorle ~Iso
disapproved of e nth usiasm for mec hanics. In mathem a tiCs,
th e art of ca rrying out concrete calculations fell in the
domain of the lowl y techne. wh ile a rithme tic was rega rded
sCience.
It would not be appropriate to discuss in this study the extremely complex question of the degree of scientificity or. let
us say, the Greeks' naturalscientific doctrines compared to
their ancient Oriental analogues on the meaningful plane. An
evaluation of this knowledge in terms of form will be more definite and fruitful. Certain propositions are more or Ie&. obvious. It seems clear, for instance, that the ancient Greeks' cognitive potential for producing science was much more preferable than the corresponding potential of ancient Oriental culture. What we mean here is this. Although both in the ancient
Orient and in classical Greece there was knowledge which could
hardly be described as scientific in terms of meaning, only in
Greece, and not in the traditional Oriental societies, did
such forms of cognitive activity arise as systematic proof,
rational substantiation. logical deduction, and idealisalionforms out of which science later developed.
The reasons for thai lay in the specific features or the socio-political order in Greek society. We refer here to the institution of slave-owning democracy. which was ravourable both
to the development of an apparatus of intersubjective systematic rational-logical proof and to the elaboration of various
devices for the designing of. and operation with, ideal objects.
On the basis of the above. the formation of science in ancient
Greece may be reconstructed as follows, Mathematics in Greece
did not differ at the beginning from ancient mathematics in the
East. Arithmetic and geometry functioned as an ensemble of
technical procedures in land surveying, falling in the domain of
techne. Both in Greece and in the ancient Orient. these procedures were neither textually formulated in any detail nor rationally and logically substantiated. To become science, they had
4-014711
48
,.
10
I.""
of departure, we may say that Ihe experimental type of cognition was alien to the Greek.~ hecause of (I) the complete dominion of the contemplative attitude at the time, (2) an aversion to separate "insignifICant" concrete action,> which were regarded as unworthy of the attention of the intellectuals -Ihe
free cilizens of demoaatk polises and un.<.uitable for the cognil ion of the world a.<. a whole undivided into parts.
It is no accident Ihat the Greek word "physics" is often used
in qlloles in modern studies in the hi.<.lory of science, for the
Greeks' physics is something quite different from the modern
discipline of that name. To the Greeks, physics was a "science
of nature as a whole, but not in the sense of our natural seience" (83,9), The Greek word II I'm; means "creation", so that
the science of physics was a science of nature which included
cognition through speculation on the origin and essence of the
nalural world as a whole and not through experimental testing. It was an essenlially conlemplative science very similar to
later natural philosophy relying on the method of speculation.
The following two queslions have 10 be answered: whal are
the premises for the emergence in antiquity of an ensemble of
natural-scientific concepts, and what are the causes that determined their concrele epistemological characler?
The premises for the emergence in antiquity of this ensemble of natural-scientific concepls include, first, the view. which
asserted itself in the struggle against anthropomorphism (in
the works of Xenophanes of Colophon and others), of nature
as a naturally emerging structure (we hardly dare say "naturalhiSlorical structure") whose foundation is to be found in itself
rather than in Themis or Nomos. The signilicance of eliminating anthropomorphism from cognition lies in the delimilation
of the domain of the objectively necessary from the subjectively arbitrary. This provided organisational and epistemological grounds for tfle inlroductiOI1 of certain norms in cognition,
for its oriental ion towards quite delinite values, and in any case
for preventing the merging in one whole of mirage and reliable fact, phantasm and result of rigorous resear..ch.
The second premise was the implanting of the idea of "onIOlogical nonrelativily" of being, which followed '''from the cri
tique of the naive empirical worldview stressing continual
change, of which a philosophical-theoretical version was worked
OUI by Heraclitus.
The focus of Heraclitus' universe is the law of mutual transition, of continual self.rc.')lOralion, conniC!, and renovation of
the substances of which the source and principles of motion he
-'1
plished unity of all" (8,2). The rea~on for that lay in the fact
that the normative model of mediaeval knowledge was the cia.
sical epistemological model, described above9 of true-univer
sal and apodictil.: --knowledge, a model that was amply substantiated by the new liocio-cultural and world view materials.
The actual basis of that model was the idea of the unity of man
and cosmos, a unity rooted in their genetil.: community, or community in the act of creation; it followed from this that only he
could know something who grasped the es.<;ence of divine creation; inasmuch as creation was universal, anyone having knowledge of it knew everything; conversely, he who had no such
knowledge had no knowledge at all. Naturally, there wu no
place in this paradigm for partial, relative, incomplete or nonexhaustive knowledge; knowledge could only be universalotherwise it was no knowledge at all.
Symbolism. Symbolism as an element of the mediaeval worldview was fully universal, covering both the ontological and the
epistemological sphere. The sources of "ontological symbolism" become clear if one takes into account the radical nature
of the propositions of creationism. Once created, any thingfrom a mote of dust to nalUre as a whole-lost the status of
ontological substantiatedness. lts existence, determined on a
certain supreme plane, was not independent and was therefore
necessarily symbolic, merely reproducing, embodying, or personifying the underlying fundamental essence of which it was
an imperfect prototype and replica.
The ontological formula "The stamp of the Most High is imposed on all" produced as its epistemological equivalent the
formula "Everything is filled wilh supreme meaning", which
in its turn determined the conceptualisation of realiry on the
basis of a revived mythological and highly symbolic causeand-meaning typology. The roots of the "epistemological symbolism" of the Midd le Ages go back to the familiar precept of
the New Testament: "In the beginning was the Word, and the
Word was with God, and the Word was God" (189. I, 1). The
word here is an instrument of creation, an ontological element-but not only that. Passed on 10 man, it also figured as
a universal way of comprehending creation. a means of joining
in and reconstructing divine creative acts.
As concepts were directly identified with their objective analogues, and linguistic structures were universally hypostatised,
the question of chimeras and flctions did not even arise; everything expressible in language, thinking, concepts and words
was inherent in reality. The realistic isomorphism of concepts
55
'
.
cal and the epistemological w~~~tfl ld enlUY of the. Onlologi_
possibi~ity of knowledge.'
~
gllred as a condition of the
0
f '
or
ural
.,' . was not dl'sllllt'd
.
, ~":Il'nce as suem:e
10cOIl",IITon
I k' 'I for,nat.
Middle Ages - for a variet," If .
a c slape III the
(I) Th
..
. \.
reasons.
sin~
by ob
~as something. created, it was controlled bv the 'Mak e !18Iu.re
n; dc~a~ge hthLS I?aradigm. important ideoiogical .shi~t~ S:111.
I .
uequate cognitIOn.
Th e qualitative character of .. '
essence (e~entia) and
.
SCIence, the separation between
.
.
eXIstence (existe t ' )
b
hng, et.;:., made it impossible to evo I
. n /Q 0 Jecl modelthe teleological concept of anth
ve the c.oncept o,f law. s.ince
tie's doctrine of four causes) b~oPkomdorphlc cau5allly (Anstooc e the development of the
The following processes accompanied the formation of natural science as science in Modern Times: the collarse of the archaic cosmosophy of antiquity and the \fiddle Ago under the
onslaught of maturing natural;:;t ideology; the ~~")mbinalion of
the abstrac t theoretical (speculative natural-philosophica/) trad ition with the technical traditions of the handierafes: the axio ..
logical reorientation of intt'lIt'ctual activity product'd by tht'
asse rtio n of the hYPolhct1cO-deduclive method of cognition.
The collap.H' oftht! cowlowphv of antiqllit} and tire Middf~
Ages. Even a simple list of the causes of the intellectual revolution which brought down the classical and mediaeval view
of Ihe world and resulted in tht' formation of natural science
as science would require a whole study. which would co\er the
production progress. the socio-political disintegration of feudal
society; the Reformation, which eroded the sulid struCwre of
church ideology; Puritanism. which played a \.ettain role .in th~
evolution of rationalism; the consolidation I.)f the inslilUtton 01
absolute monarchy; the strcngthening of hdiocentrt"m.
0'
a qualitative whnll' inll:'grally l'oJiliected wilh uther similar intt'gralities in an all -emhracing and all-permeating latality.l This
was the ba\i'l for the vil:'w of the unity of the world as community of its fnrm1a view that undermined the qualit.ilive
pen:t!ption of the world as an infmite multiformity. The entire
diversity of reality wa .. now dt.~ribed in term' of mel.:hanical
combinatorics of ..everal fundamental forms re!tponsible for
certain qualities. An:ordingly, to know reality meant to know
the rules of I.:ombining the form ... The latter also determin~d
such specifIC features of the nl:'w ideology as instrumentalllY
and mechanicity, which played an important rote in the forma~
lion of natural science as such.
Quantitalil'iwJ. Combinatorines..'i formed the basis for the
development of quantitativism--a universal method for quantitative comparison and evaluation of forms constituting any
object: to know meant to measure. A considerable impetus to
these advances in the methods for quantitative description of
forms was given by the development of the apparatus of analytical geometry by Descartes and his followers, which substantiated the idea of the unity of geometrical forms and figures
united by formal transformations.
It was also essential that qualities which had pre,,iously appeared incommensurable (thus Aristotle was unable to cr~"ite
the theory of value, although he came close todoing sol now
proved commensurable, so that a picture ,?f a unitary, hOl:00geneous, and quantitative cosmos emerged III place of the hlerarchised, heterogeneous, and qualitative one.
Ca/lse-and-e/Jeci automatism. An essential ~ontribution to
the moulding of the image of the natural cause-and-effect cohesion of phenomena was made by Hobbes, who eliminated
the last twO of the four types of causes introduced b~ Arist<:
tle.-material, efficient, formal. and final. This world view pOSItion, which was actively supported in scientific thinking (GaUleo, Boyle, Newton, Huygens, and others) removed the. shades
of symbolism and teleology from the picture of reahty a!,d
opened the way to its description in terms of obj.ective ,:,ecesslty
and regularity. We should also point out the mcreaslllg consolidation in that epoch of the monotheistic character of belief, which was absent ;n antiquity and which did much ~ore
Ihan the classical ideas of obligation and order to assert the ldu
of uniformly and regularly determined reality.
.
Analyticity. "Among the Greeks," wrote Engels. "Just because
they were not yet advanced enough to dissect. analyse na!urenature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The umversal
.'
The key to the cau\Cs for the preservation and further de.
velop'."en~ of the activit~. characteristic of antiquity. of con~tructlOg Id~al ~bJ~cts, without whi(' h s('ience h. impossible, lies
111 Ihe spe.Clal signifIcance of med iaeva l cult ure, which played
an exceptIOnal role in this re!tpecl. Ina~ m uc h as the formation
of nalural science neces.<>ilated a synth e.. is of ab!ttra<;t theore ti.
cal and experimental practical a(' tivity, and this synthesis, as we
have established, could 1I0t have taken place under the .. lave.
owning. system of antiquity, it was necess:ary, at the initial stage .
to retam the principles of working with idealisations while
changing the sy~lem of production relations that stooo in the
way of this synthesis. Something like that had been realised in
the early Middle Ages, of which the economic basis was no long.
er the slaveowning system but feudali sm while Ihe intellectual basis was abstract theoretical act ivity' involving ideal con.
structs (the th eol ogica l specu lative system of the world) . The
extremely specific conditions of mediaeval ('uiture explain both
the funher advances in th e " th eoretical" study of nature and
the absence of social bans on its "e xpe riment al" study (in al.
cherny, natural magic, etc .). In an y case, the palh from ideal
modelling of reality to experiment was broken precisely in that
period.
We can see just how difficult and far from simple that path
was by considering that it took fourteen centuries for mankind
to combine the abstracttheoretical (specularive-naluraJ philosophical) tradition and thaI of the crafts.
Thus an essential extrascientilic premise for the formation of truly scientific natural knowledge was. along with the
development of capitalist relations. the faci of assimilation within the framework of feudalism of the cultural traditions of
antiquity. Taking this into account, Ihe formation of natural
science as true science, in terms of the socio-cultural determination of the synthesis of empirical and theoretical activity, can
be reconstructed in the briefest outline as follows.
(I) The specific circumstances of the Middle Ages permilled
the translation of the ratiocinative achievements of antiquity
(lhe experiences of ideal modelling of reality) into the culture
of the Renaissan ce, and the specific circumstances of the Re
naissance permitted a substantive transformation of these
achievements (this process, as we have pointed out, began
already in the Middle Ages-there were fountainheads of
experimental natural science in the monasteries) - an advan ce
from the orientation towards the search for epistemological
means of verifying the results of natural scientific research to
.7
th~
"
of the foundalll)l1\ of the prevailing Peripatetic dynamics Idlptcd to the analy~is of empirically recorded movements. Nc.'f .....
cour~e of action did Galileo choose'}
He worked out a special type of re~arch tactics which
pre~ribed the study of ideal or theoretical motion described by
the apparatus of mathematics, rather than of empirkal motion.
In accordance with thi~. Galileo's new dynamics fell into two
parts, tentatively speaking, The fIrst was intended to derive
the laws of motion in pure form by logical deduction. The second, organically connected with the fin~1. had to achieve an
experimental verifIcation of the abstract laws of motion obtained in the first part.
In developing his new dynamics. Gameo c,idcll.' 1IIe
Peripatetic proposition "there is no action without a cause",
which was only intended to cover the state of rest, in some
such form: no body can move from the state of rest to the stale
of motion without application of some additional force. The
Peripatetics believed that the cessation of motion was connected
with the action of empirical conditions (friction. resistance
of the medium) in case of cessation of the action of the motive
force. Galileo introduced an essential correction in this interpretation: no body changes its velocity either in magnitude or
direction without the action of some additional force. In other
words, having once received an impulse. a body continues to
move, when the action of the force has stopped, at a constant
velocity regardless of the resistance of the medium and friction
effects. This proposition revolutionised not only the field of sci~
ence, signifying as it did the actual beginning of physics (the law
of inertia), but also the domain of epistemology. as it destroyed
Aristotle's naive physicalist views.
The point of departure of Galileo's physics is abstract
and hypothetical. Aristotle described aetuaOy observed phenomena, while Galileo. logically possible ones. Aristotle considered the real space of events, and Galileo, relatively ideal
space in which immediate research in the processes of nature
was supplanted by analysis of mathematical limiting laws which
could only be verified under exceptional circumstances. Characterising .Galileo's epistemological method, students of his
work point to mental experiment as a cognitive element
which made an essential contribution to the arsenal of scientific
activity. What is the essence of mental experiment. according to
Galileo? The book of nature, Galileo believes, is written in
the ideal language of mathematics. In reading it, one should
resort 10 abstraction from the conditions of the empirical given71
70
ne~
"
72
lug.
2.10.1111. NAf"! WI. Of MOtJtR:" S("II N(!
L".
Mildern science
epi.nemnlog1\:ally. u mul1idimC'tl'tonal
phenmnenon with numerous a"pc.."tli. Thl.!' .:t1gl1lll"C coml,'ext"S
fonning il are extremely polymorphOUS an~ ~hllig to :lItfe~enl
levl.'l\. Mooern ')cien("e i, a hnoad a~OClal10n of mafh~.~811C~~:
natural ... cienlifK, human and technt~al branc~~. (If dl~IP
nary" and interdi~iplinary lIudles.hlghly ,pe~lahsed and
plex .. ubdivi'Siom functioning <d dISCrete units ~
empirical, formal, meaningful, fundamenlal, applied. and
kinds of knowledge.
. .
At the .. arne time there are grounds for a~umlllg B certalll
"single axi\'". an essential unit)' of modern sdenn:. c(lnnecled
with the ,>pecificily of r(\Carch strategy, 1he style ll( the
formulation and ~tudy of problems. the mode of Ihe pnw.1ul"l.l(l.n
and functioning of knowledge. the nature of prospecting aclWlty. elc. -in short. with e\erylhing thai 1,.-oO!olitutcs the Spe~l~
flcity of Ihe total potential of scien-.:e lixed 111 1erms of ~tS
temological analys;...
Methodological works that ha ..e appeareti in the last twentyfive years often stress the inner afflnit)" of different types
of knowledge integrat!!d in modern sden-.:e. e\"t!n lh{l~e that be~
long to the rigorou\ natural science'S and non-rigl,n,u ......ocial
and human sdences.
To find out the nature of that l-ommunity. and to identify
the ground .. that unite factually d;\Cr'Se phenomena in the
single whole that we call modern ,cIl'nce. il is not enough to
carry out a fUllctional analysi, of its "ynchronnu~ly active
structures. We must al .. () eillploy the instrument of l."omparativl'
analysis permitting a typological juxtap()"ition Qf modern .. cicnce and the cpi,temologil.'al structure genetically preceding II.
This compari'Son sh()w" the following.
In 'peaking of the need to correlate modern "idence with
the 'truc lure of the same order which hi"ilorically precede, it.
and ill which it ... direct ..ources lie. we refer to classical
sl'ience. It, critique and reinterpretation of the cllgnitivt'
nOfln') and ideal-. .. pecifle.... properlv speaking. Iho...e inner ba ... i-.:
relat;om which fully determine the- l'pi ... temological feature-s and
cOllstitul1.' the l'onditions of integrality of modern "icnce.
Cla".. ical scienl-e j.; here taken to mean quile a deflOite re\earch and cognili\!!' culture which was realised a ... a predaml-
nant tenden~y betw~en the 17th and early 20th century, at the
end of which penod the quantum-reiativisl epoch began.
In the framework of a typological comparison which inter_
pre~s t~e transiti~n from das,sical to modern science as crys_
talhsahon of a different research culture corresponding to a
new spiritual formation rather than as a mcre shift in problems
and subject matter, in the experimental and lechnical equipment
fundamental stylistic features of classical science must b~
pointed out which distinguish it from modern science, which
make it a separate cognitive epoch and a stage in the develop_
ment of the scientific intellect.
Classical science functioned as an entirely integral struc_
ture; .the foundaliOl.ls of .this i~tegrality were determined by
a senes of substanllve onentatlons. Of these, lei us especial_
ly single out two.
(I) Orientation towards a final-objective system of knowledge embodying truth in its final and accomplished form. Based
on classical mechanics, which was regarded as a universal method of cognition of the world's phenomena and at the same time
as a standard for any science, Ihis orientation was supported by a
whole series of particular tendencies.
(a) The tendency towards single-valued interpretation of
even Is; exclusion from cognitive results of chance and probability seen as indication of incompleteness of knowledge or
subjectivism.
(b) The tendency towards eliminating from the context of
science the characteristics of the researcher, which were alleged to interfere with adequate identification of the truth, rejection of the need for laking into account the specific 'features (modes, means, and conditions) of the subject's cognitive
assimilation of the object.
(c) The attempts at establishing the substantionality and
the primitive elements of the world.
(d) Th~ tendency to regard ~now l edge fo rming the actual
b~y of sCIence as absolutely reliable and non-prob lematisable.
:rhlS featu:e was, of co.urse. fIxed in philosophical-methodologacal ~~nscl0':l5ness, which founded science on the proposition
that . there 15 only ~ne truth about each thing, and whoever
finds II, knows about II as !"uch as anyone can know" (132, 15).
..(e) _The tendency to I~terpret the nature of cognitive actIVIty m. terms ~f the .nalve re~listic correspondence concept
posfulatmg a mirror-like and Immediately obvious harmony
betwe~n knowledge and reality. that is to say, uncritically
acceptmg the dogma that everything cognised as belonging
7.
, .
I f '1' allrihute of that thins
ttl a thing 1'I.ln al'fllla al all. whole immediately given (rom
(2) The view II Il<lturt> as a
,
. nd dcVt)IIJ of <levelthe very bl.'ginnJIIg, always equal Itl It'l:elf.S::
l"ternal iJlltllirnme
opment, going round amJ rnun.d alf~ngllhl<'l WOl'i l'(ln('rl'! 'ted 111
- -I' (~()b ~ 19) TllI"O onen a II
Ited clrc C~ " , . ,
-f' f
('I as.'iI("<J I sckm:e. tl'l
i
such rc!ocarch <,Iralagefm, "pec It: (lr
. I anlj.evl 1 Iulit'T1'
empha .. i<; on !otalionary .. laICS. elemt'nfan"lll. ant
IsmThe effort .. of cia .... ical ..cienti.,ts were. lIlo<,lly alllled air
-elcmenlS
the identification and deflllltlOn
0 f Ih eSHnr1c
.
" -" ,1
complex structures, while the complex fUI1(.'lIonal-gen~tI( links
and relations existing within Ihe<;e structures as. dynamiC ~holes
were obviously and consciously ignored. Th~ mterrretalto~ ..of
the phenomena of reality was there~ore enllr~ly ~etaphYMl~l,
i.e., devoid of the perception of their contradlc1<:,nness, mula~
bility, transformability, historicity, etc. Suffice, It 10 ment.lIln
in this connection the following principles, tYPical of cla<;.. lCal
science and fully reflecting and expressing .its. ideological
aspirations as the principles of constancy4: the pnnclple of ma~
constancy (Newton), the criterion of the constancy of. ~hc
composition of a chemical compound (Proust). the proposillon
concerning the qualitative and quantitative immutability of the
organic species after their divine creation (Linnaeus), etc
What has changed since the classical epoch. what mark.,
the entry of science in the non~classical phase of its development? A great deal has changed, but we are only intere- ted
in the epistemological aspect of all these changes.
The transition from classical to non-classical (modern)
science, and the changes it produced in the objective conlcnl
of knowledge, in its foundations (the modes of the analysis
of objects. in obtaining, developing, and siructuring of the
ingredients of science), in the type of the- self-con<;ciousn~ss
of sc ience itself, have been called a revolution". In brief,
~he essence of this revolution may be described as follow ... :
II was produced by one single factor- t he entry in the body of
knowledge of Ihe subject of cognition, of his activity,
a
necessary and inalienable component. Ii would be hard te exaggerate the fundamental imporlance of this circumstance
The paradigm of classical science, with its orielllatiu~
towards the .co~nitive assimilation of the object in itself,
so. to speak, III liS essential naturalistic immediale glvt>nness
raised to an ab 1
h
re
.
so ute t..e concept of natural pfl."k.:e~s "peciflt.'d
m~~~Ie-~ ?f t~le condIlIO.~S of ifS stu~y. 'This e~tailed the fa.
eltmlllatlon from sCIence of subJecllve activity and neg-
a. .
situations.
(b) The awareness of the dependence of the object on re
search and transformation stimulated the transition of science
from "the study of things regarded as immutable and capable of
forming certain connections to the study of conditions under
which a thing does not just behave in a certain manner but can
be or not be something, can exist or not exist as a given dell
nileness only under these conditions" (88, 73), For this reason,
modern scientific theory begins with the specification of the
procedural basis, with identifying the modes and conditions of
the study of the object, which forms the semantic and operational outline of the theory, safeguarding the objectiveness and
harmoniousness of the description of the facts it describes,
(c) The dependence of the picture of the object on the
relation to the instruments of cognition, and the consequent
need to organise knowledge with proper regard for the real operalional procedures, determine the special role of the m,eas~r
ing devices (or experimental apparatus) in modern sc~enufic
coanilion, Without such devices, it is sometimes irnposs~ble t,o
identify the object of science (or theory), as il is only Ide~tI
lied in the interaction between the object and the deVice,
(d) The inlcral,tion between object ,and d,evice. which jUlliflc~ only the analyo;is of (oncrele manlfesta,lIons of th,e ~
and properties of the object at different t.. mes ~nd an dIfferently reali!-ied 'iitualions. cannot but result an a kmd of, spread~
entirely obje(live, in the fmal results of research, ~hLs, form s
the basis of complementarity, in the ~road sense; , mdlcatmg the
various manifestations of the properties of ~n object dependmg
011 the type of its interaction wi~~ the deVIce under dlffere~t.
often mutually exclusive condlllon~" such compl,eme~tarl.ty
shows that different types of Ihe deSCription ?f t~e object. us different conceptual images, are all equally Justifiable. Proper;ly
speaking, this explains the fact that m~er~ research ~Ylty
has moved from the single infinite "obJect m general with an
unambiguous and immutable" "nucleus", an object, "r,eHected
in the only possible true manner", to a "world remmdmg one.
ralher, of a kaleidoscope of a great many projections" (ibid,),
to a world described in a system of finite pictures related to,
and dependent on, the instruments of cognitive assimilatio n,
none of which can claim to represent an allround and comprehensive type of description,
,
(e) The rejection of the contemplative spirit and naIve
realism of classical science reflected, in particular. in the
new practice of specifying the object of knowledge with due consideration for the mode of its cognitive assimilation, in the
understanding of the dynamics of the links between (he empir.
ical and the theoretical, etc" has changed the status of fact
as verification instance, What we mean here is this, The in
creased dynamic element in science-greater mathematisation,
the merging of fundamental and applied research, expansion of
the quest from the domain of the real to that of the ~ble. the
study of extremely abstract types of reality absolutely untncnrn
to classical science-potential ones in quantum mechanics and
virtual ones in high-energy physics-and so on, has resulted in
a sort of mutual penetrability of fact and theory. This mutual
penetrability sometimes, as, e,g" in the case of resonances,
assumes such unexpected and Quaint forms that the boundary
between the empirical and the theoretical is difficult to draw,
and the familiar line between fact and theory disappears, In
this connection, the conception of verification experiment has
~hanged, Firstly, it is no longer able to act as a . . . . . .
Judge of theory, and is now realised. as 8n episcemolQlical P"'eed,ure. as part of a package together with other mod_ of verification of knowledge-Ihe intratheoretical ones., IUC'h as the
principle of correspondence, the establishment of the inner and
78
7.
"hin" in a\"ailahle kn,)wledgl' Il' \,)rhid il. Thi ... in ...... prl'la .
e
. I
I I
I .
litlll is restricted by Iht" ,nailnbk "wd. \l~ ,,'HlW l" ~e (w lid,
l'an be extended a ... (Uflht'r law" pnlhihlllll.!!. Ihe l'\,I\ll'lll.:l' of
III
e,i"tcIKt',
of modern
scien~e.
whkh art'
than individuals and fequire the
undoubtedly become Ie ...," obvious.
eh: .. and in Ihis sense less
S1andpoinl of l'Iasskal sdent'e.
point. The main point is that, as Ihe
of the develOJlmeni of science have
The proofs
obtained
wide
w.
..
_jell
n
~ hl..~~
:uited
{lr Ihl'
i.II..:II\'il~'~(\ril'nkd
. . ,
01
exclud~
middle.
eh:.; ill.HI
Ihe
il1tr(ld~IClil)1I
of Ihe conccpt
o.
""
is medi'tecl by practice
0(
many IIIIIlhOlllUil:a1
(RQ'1Jnical) lUI>-
el\lQlocicai iIib.1"O.
~ axkMII 0(
intmiQ
*"
he believed that
from IIJe MIl _.
DOl
of theory.
A forma.lised theory, according to Hilbert, permitted a
number of lIl.terpreta.tions, as its pro~ositions w.ere ~ot directly
correla!ed with reality. Before an mterpretatlon IS provided
(a ~patlal one as in Euclid, or an arithmetical one as in Felix
~Iem, In the case of geometry), an abstract deductive system
IS therefor~ no mor~ a g~ometry than any other theory.
The deSire to aXJOmatlse and to formalise the system of
know~edge stems from the fact that (a) it is impossible to use
effec~lv~ly the apparatus of logic in a non-formalised system;
.(b) It IS not always clear if such a system is complete if it
IS not
co mp I.ete. .
.
~t .IS not clear whether it contains premises
~hlch can give flse to contradictions, under definite circum stances .
. Exactness and rigorousness. The following are the underIYIn: causes of ~x~ctness and rigorousness.
The apodlctlc ~atu.re of proof, resulting from the axiomatIC-deductive o.rgan!satlon of mathematical knowledge.
fb) The algOrithmic nature of proof, interpreted as the
eXistence of fixed m~es of solving mathematical problems in
the form of syste":lallca lly deduced unambiguous instructions.
.(c~ The deductive ~ature of mathematics embodied in the
~rmclples of constructing discourse in it, ba~ed on the transition fn:>m one meaningful <informational) structure to another
accordmg to cJear:cut .an~ rigid rules of logic. The deductiveness of ~athemalics signifies the exi<.;tem:e of a logical path
from aXioms to. theory, and that path is logical inference,--a
concentrate, as II were, of the eswnce of mathematics. In view
(.!
'"
at".
ror
fiw
7-01470
.,
incomplete formalisability
(d.
Godel's limiting
theorems) .
(2) The axiomatic character of organisation; axioms are
'8
,.,J.
,,,,.11'
to t
'or
V(x) (P (x) -
Q (x
106
later that the criterion differentiating laws (nomolo,ical propo<;ition<;) from accidental universal propositionstn implic: ive
furm i\ the deducibility from the former of conditional coun.er..
factual propO')ition'l demon\trating the exio;tenn:' of true
necec,sary relatiun'>, the difficulties ~hould be pointed out of
establi<;hing nomology by reformulating univer.. al impli('ativt
propMition'i as counterfactual ones. The diffu.:ulty lies in the
fact that there is no formal
'
procedure for substantiating
etabli..hed factually.
j the material relationo;
the nomological character of the connection between
consequent and antecedent. That is precisely where the
difficulty lies, for carrying out this type of analysis is nol a
trivial task at all.
Propositions concerning facts and laws form the semantic
corpus of a theory. A natural-scientific theory i5 a set of propositions ordered by the relation of deducibility of varying
degrees of rigorousness specified for it. or. in more formal
notation.
T (C, A, L) = PI
Pn ~'
where T is a natural-scientific theory; C, basic or derived
constructs; A, a set of axioms: L, derivation rules; P, the propositions of the theory. P includes propositions about individual
facts, empirical dependences and theoretical laws.
Propositions about individual faclS are formulated in terms
of the language of direct observation (i.e., they do not include
quantifiers) at the empirical level of research. Propositions
about empirical dependences are wri"en down in the l!lnguage
of emplrlc-al construclS" and ulc1ude terms that 00 nol pertain
to direct observation but correspond to the empirical level of
research (that is to say. they do not assume explanation).
Propositions about theoretical laws are expressed in the
language of theoretical constructs, include terms of the two
above-mentioned types of sentences, contain propositions with
quantifiers, and correspond to the theoretical level of research
(l 05). These three types of propositions are connected by
reduction rules specifying the modes of transition from the
language of observation (propositions about the readings of a
measuring device) to the language of empirical and theoretical
constructs (e.g., statements about objects acting on the
measuring devices, etc.).
The formula for a natural-scientific theory is as follows:
n = (Fet. Lw, Cnst. Int. Abstr mdl. Frml. L)
107
10'
10'
(Ine
re~lity.
)C
'v
110
j(
S:'
112
113
1\
114
. . . - . dnail.
"adt~lics pr~uces onlologically unspecified structures;
..
E <": -- E
..;;:I
(2)
From the physical standpoint, (2) is meaningless, ao.; meaningless as many mathematically meaningful rOOls of nth-degree
equations. However, Dirac did not reject the po5,.<;ibility (we
repeat, the physically meaningless possibility) of a negative
solution; the search for an interpretation of this solution led 10
the idea of existence of the positron, which was predicled in
1931 and discovered in 1932.
(2) Ideas of harmoniously elegant relations conformin, with
the principles of symmdry. Historically realised programmes
of malhematisation of natural science are connected with these
ideas. Among them are the ideas of number (Pythagoras), regular polyhedrons (Plato), perfect geometrical figures (Eudoxu"i,
Ptolemy), etc., expressing the idea of quantitative proportionaiity-ideas that made a noticeable impact on natural-scientific
research. H we accept that an inalienable concomitant of mathematisation is the awareness of the applicability of mathematics to natural scientific phenomena, a ..:-ommon feature of all
programmes of mathematisation of natural science will be
recognition of the fact that nature is the realisation of the most
elementary mathematically thinkable elements. and that it is
possible to find, by using purely mathematical constructs, the
concepts and the regular connections between them which provide a key to an understanding of the phenomena of nature.
For instance, it followed from Faraday's experimental works
that rot H = O. Maxwell added the missing term ~~
without any experimental substantiation whatever. What was
that step prompted by? It is hard to establish now the actual facts
of the maller, but Max Born's explanation appears convincing.
In his view. that step was prompted by Maxwell's desire for
achieving the mathematical ideal of perfection, harmony. and
beauty (119) that was not attained in electrodynamism as elaborated by Faraday. It was this striving for a mathematical ideal
that compelled Maxwell to make an arbitrary addition to the
equation.
(3) Formal viewpoints. which restrict, in a sufficient degree,
the infinite variety of possibilities.
A world without limitations on diversity would be entirely
chaotic (William Ross Ashby). In science. the instrument for
117
116
m.c1
in tfOO ucin g o rd.er in tl ~e w ~) rld ,.. th e llry. ('h enr i!..... pre\elll d
~ough, sche mall.c.andldeal .<.L.d .p Klure l )f th e. w(lrld . \ecin g it
m lerms of a flllllt:' set (If basIc prllll:lple ... . In thei r tu rn . the bas'
principles. the image~ and 11.' t' <,yslclll .ui c l"(lnnec lion<, belwe:~
them can. as a rO,le. 'be. arnHd al by tht.' prilK ipie \If look.ing
'"
spedal theory of relativity). as well as the differentiaJaeomet rical (in the general theory of relativity) and fhe funclionaJ
analytical (in quantum mechanics) approaches. Their prom. ..,
synthesis underlies the programme for the construction of the:
physics of the future.
The freedom of choosing mathematical apparatus for corresponding theories is limited by the pressure of empirical facts.
by the need to take into account the existence of the objective
logic of the given domain; in the final analysis, it is this objective
logic rather than the mathematical apparatus that determ ines
the positive content of the theory.
Natural science is an association of experimental sciences
connected with concrete fragments of reality; the choice of
certain type of mathematical apparatus must be preceded by a
careful analysis of its adequacy in the sense of agreement with
the content of experience reflecting the appropriate fragment
of reality. For the natural sc ientist, of the greatest importance
is the identifiability of the mathematical apparatus with certain
magnitudes- only in this case can it perform the . descriptiv~ ,
generalising. codifying, normative. and other funcllons, only III
this case can it assert something about objective reality.
A consistent mathematical apparatus may be unacceptable
as an instrument of describing reality in one theory, yet it may
prove quite acceptable in another. T~e general foun~ation for
this faci is the assumption that consistent mathematical structures can be given substantive interpretati~n. As for the sources
of fundamental applicability of mathem~lI.cal app~ratus to the
description of reality, they lie in the. ~mp~ncal ongl~ of ":,athematical structures. This last proposItion is substantiated III the
dialectical-materialist theory of reflection. which permits the
development of the most adequate epistemological theory of
science without defects or blind alley~- .
.
(d) Specifying the principles of obJecllv~ fixation of r~ults
in the form of the requirement that equations (formulat~ons.
laws) must be invariant in respect to groups of transf~rm.atlons.
mathematics acts as a kind of guarantor of the oblectlV~ness
of natural-scientific knowledge. This will have to b~ explamed.
The point is that the equati~ns of abstrac~ mathematls~d nat.ural
science do not directly descnbe the behaViour of maten~1 obje<:lS.
Being formulated with respect to idealised or ~onstructlve Re~l
ity, they describe the behaviour. of abst~act obJects-:-mad1e~
al points (in classical mechamcs). pomt evenlS (Ill the spec~al
theory of relativity>. elc.-which have the statUS of ~odels ViSa-vis their objective analogues. Quite clearly. the reqUirement of
119
and
120
122
of
natural
.
_'-I
t 26
.ell.
ved
t
Iation can be
of !l1athe11lalic~ and hoW t 1\ rans...
. (onnection wi*
. lar the serious rrobl ems arising In
la
In parllell ,'" .' r h:ology call 13rgely be eliminated by c Ihe ~nathemaI!Sallo.n. ~ ,I. r the" arguments. by tran->posing Ihe
rifylllg.lhe semantic . ~~IS 0 Ived from a vague. general plane
discussion o.r the topa:s InVO
Let us draw a parallel. On the
onto a ddlilite and.co~crele one. '. not free from illl.: <,n~I'iIt."n
o~e hand. mal~em~t~~,3J S:~el~~~;t;~ of studying contradlCllIHlS
CICS. 0." the ot er
'.
'cs The conclusion thus ... uggt,.~t'i
:~~e~r t~~t ~~~ree~~ean~~'e~I:~~clt~tr~dUcing Ihe dialectical c1emt.:nt
in set theory (14, 166).
..
be' _
The question arises, however: How IS thl~ ele~en.t t~
In
troduced? What must be done LO achi~ve thiS obJective. There
are no suggestions for this-for t~e Simple ~eason that. 111 our
view no such suggestions can be given on thiS approach. Meth~
ods f'or eliminating antinomies in set theory ~~ould be s?ught for
in mathematics itself- either on the traditional ba\l~ of the
familiar programmes for the foundati?l1s of mathe.malH.: or .~n
the non-traditional basis of constructlOg paraconslst~nt 10gK ....
In any case, appeals.to dialectic~ are i."appropnate ht:.r~.
Dialectics does not prOVide concrete instructions for the solulI~n
of intrascientific problems; it acts as a heurisllc-methodologlc~
al , normative , worldview-basis for special scientific .research.
.
To go back to biology: the mathematisation of thiS SCience
is hindered by vague talk about the allegedly irrational. mathematically inexpressible nature of its reality. The fact thai
biology deals with a special kind of reality is obvious. Thus the
behaviour of non-equilibrium, non -stationary, self-organising
open systems-the kind of systems to which biological objeclS
belong-differs from the behaviour of mechanical . . - .
However, the problem does not lie in the fact thaI biol.al
systems are characterised by integrality, development, cle. The:
problem lies in the existence of extremely vaaue ideas of integrality, development, etc., in general and in the absence of
special concepdons of integrality. developmenl. etc . of a concrete (biological) level. In this connection. wide prospects are
open.ed ~p, we believe. by synergetics, which provides a properly ~clenl1fic model of d~velopment. The heuristics of the synergellc approach comprises such natural-scientific concepts as
m~, energy, stru~ture., etc . which permit the modelling of certam asp~cts of bIOlogical development in terms of increased
compleXity of structure, growing levels of organisation and
other feat~res resulting from mass-energy exchange proc'esses.
The queSllon of mathematical servicing becomes much clear.
h
127
of ()pcr<.II1I1~ wllh Ihe local time of the ~y"lcm~ Involved. of funcwrY)/lIpi.lfl \OI1<; of Iolrul:lures, et(,; . provided individ uality. muwhdllY. elL. Me !>pt:clflcd b.y suitable substantive axioms. There
is a 'potclllli.ll. hc~e f(~r bUilding bridg~ between biology tind
phYSIC." beanng III .n1lJJd t~al. progress I~ the lalter, a~c:ording
10 John Whcelcr, will cormst In the tran.,111011 fr()m rdal;vity w
mutability (192. 242) .
.
It may thm very wdl be that new axioms rather than a new
mathematit:s tire necdcd for the mathematisation of many a ...
yet non-mathematised theories.
The adoption of empirical grounding as the central crit.rion of scientijicity, which covers fundamentaJ ot.ervaWIitJ
and experimental jUC:itiflability.
The requirement of fundamental observabiJiry was implicitly introduced by Ein stein in his critical evaluation of the nature of such basic physical concepts and principles as absolute
rest, remote action. etc., which were show n to be pure fictions.
We owe explicit introduction of this principle to Werner Heisenberg, who formulated the rule of exclusion from quantum
mec hanics of the classical conceplS of orbit. trajectory. etc.,
which have no empirical analogues there. In the course of time
this requirement assumed the status of the methodological principle that concepts which refer (0 distinctions beyond possible
exper ience have no physical meaning and ought to be eliminated (120).
The question now is. what is the real content of this principle?
If we were to verify theories on the basis or this principle.
"we would have to reject all molecular. atomic and electronic
theories, ... the theory of relativity, the Quantum theory; .....
fact, almost the entire new physics would be gone, as til _ .
great part of the old physics" (165. 168).
Does the principle of observablhty lD1~le'!lenl an unlena~le
e mpir icist idea l? Let us stress thaI the prmcJple. of ~bservabll
ity is polysemantic. It can. ~e ~iven .the followl~g mterpretations: (I) Direct observablhty, Imply~ng t~e f1~dmg of o'p~ra
tional criteria and procedures for th~.ldentJficatlOn (defi~I."o~)
of t he empirical meaning of .proposltlOns. (2) ObservablillY 111
principle, the content of wh.lc:h. can be red~c.e~ to the sea~ch
for the laws of exclusion re)ect1l1g the POSSibility of observ~
an Object (e.g . of any conlradictory object). A defect 01 ....
demand is, perhaps. the fact that .we .do ~ot ~noW' aU die ,.~
of exclusion that can restrict SClen!I~C mqulrY .(3~ Expenmental verifiability. reduc~ble 10 emptrlcaJ substantiation of hypothetico-deductive theones.
'I {) 1470
IlQ
.,.,.<
."ide
Iheory permis...<;ible'!
A theory is an integral system of mutually cOllnecled pro
positions which, taken in their unity. are correlated with reality,
describing and explaining il. These theoretical propositions
taken in their totality are Ihe instruments of carrying oul and
explaining experiments. of identifying and fOfming scieminc
faels. and of conceplualising the empirical basis assimilated by
the theory. When contradictions between the facts of a theory
are revealed, it is impossible to say which particular theoretical \
proposition leads to this contradiction; we must analyse the
interrelation between theory and the empirical facts as a whole.
The set of theoretical assumptions is in such cases often extended to include further assumptions and modifications facilitating the elimination of the contradictions of the facts of the
theory. This latter move is justified by the DUhem-Quine
principle; from the integrality and systematic cohesion of theoretical scientific reality, Quine concluded that "any statement )
can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system" (179, 43).
Do we know which component of theory leads 10 contradiction between theory and empirical facts? The greater the number of auxiliary assumptions m the theory, the more difficult il
is 10 answer Ihis Question. If the structure of a proposition to
be . . erified is presented in the form
(Hi l i n ),
where H is a hypothesis; and J, a set of assumptions, the formula
(H.J ... J,,)--+OJ -O-(--Hv - i 1v ... V-in)
shows that both H and any of the J's can lead to a contradiction
~1I!,.n theory and experiment, and it is impossible to say
'tIIIiIII _ the J's hu thas effect.
f ~ admitted possibility of contradictions between the facts
oat eory ~ests on the following. (I) Facts cannot correspond
to .theory with absolute precision; theory operates with idealisat~s. con~eptual.and logieo-mathematical structures where~. (~~g;;eoer~~l~~ t~~~~y is non-id~al and non-malhematicfact contradicting it y whic~rves the. fI~ht to conceptualise the
,
may ellmmate the contradictions.
1.12
"J
f\
----.-
1.34
(
)
the whole of its content; they are not absolute ly strict and re li.
able. There are no pure observation records, no immutable and
hard empirical basis of knowledge which classical empiricists
dreamed of and believed possible.
Experiment is not guaranteed against error, the more so that
verification of many theories, such as the general theory of re~
lativity, requires extremely precise measuring techniques.
There is a difficulty, called the confirmation paradox, which
complicates the task of optimising the procedure of confirmation. The conlirmation paradox arises if we assume that (a) the
propositions (hypotheses. laws) of a theory are confirmed by
the entire universe of data that do not contradict them; (b) the
data may confirm any logically equivalent propositions (hypo~
theses, laws). The paradox consists in that the facts confirming
a certain proposition include, among others. facts which the
proposition in question does nol mention explicitly. The para~
dox arises in view of the following considerations. If H is a hypothesis of the type
v (x)
(P(x)-Q(x
(I)
v (x)
(-Q(x) _ _ P(x
(2),
H is confirmed both by (I) and by (2). Thus the universal pro~
::!;
136
Tile t: 1)i1hrnliltlnll paradox, an .. t!S in connection wich the 10-gll'i~t apprnadl to the prch.. edure:" of c(mtirmarion. ~t is .-II,.
illtl'rpreted a'i " an argument whi<.:h can, if only parllally. fill tile
gap hetween the IIniver'> ality n~ th~ verified hyputhesis and rhe
limitation .. of thl' fal"l 'i conflrmmg It. However, a purely JogJ~al
expansion of the sct of f<1ct'i involved in (he:" prOl.:l"dure of con
[Jrl1lat ion cOil t rad it:t'i Ih e aU ual 51: ientiflc process" (ibid.). Thert"
is a real po...... ibilily of overcoming the blind alleys of the logicist
approach to the study of confirmation; It li~s in the prat:tical
approach worked out in dialectical materialism. to tht: aniJly .. is )
of this procedure. However, the practical approach - ." funda
mental method of solving the problem-proves to be too general to be an effective instrument of confirmation of concrete in.
dividual hypotheses as they occur; however. this does not cancel the task of optimising the procedure of confirmation of uni~
versal propositions in terms of a limited ensemble of empirical
data.
Experiment is not an instrument of meaningful evaluation
of the heuristic potential of theories; this follows from the fundamental experimental verifiability of both the original and
bold theories stimulating progress in science and the ineffectual ad hoc constructs slowing down scientific development.
There exists a general epistemological problem of justifying
induclion. of substanlialing the necessary character of inductive
conclusions having a non-demonstrable. factual status. The familiar programmes for substantiating induction-deductive
(John Stuart Mill. John Keynes), pragmatist (Charles Pierce.
Hans Reichenbach), inductive analytical (Rudolf Carnap,
Kaarlo Hintikka) . conventionalist (Henri Poincare. Edouard
Le Roy), and linguistic (Alfred Ayer)-are none of them fully
adequate. Rationalists. and critical rationalists in particular,
therefore felt justified in describing experience as an inade~
quatl! inst rum ent of attaining the truth. and knowledge obtained with the help of this instrument as unobligatory. unreliable,
"doxophic" and thus unscientific; true science was limited to
demonstrative logico~malhematical knowledge.
The rationalistic critique of experience and induction as
"untenable" instrumenTs of cognition is iTself untenable. First,
it relies on an inadequate conception of absolute metaphysical
truths, which cannot (unless of course we postulate their su
pernatural origin) be arrived at either through experien<"e or
by applying any other cognitive instruments available to man.
Second. it permits the unacceptable antidialectical interpretation of deductive knowledge as absolutely certain. As we have
1]7
pOinte (
'
b "
(,( ~t'neralin n of k~l owJed gt' ,.., " non - o VI(lll\; aXI~)Il1 ~ and Other
'\lpaque" p r opOSltl on <;, r ules and law::; ~..:n,'pl (.'d ~lIhoUI proof .
fhe a xiom ... of c hoice. the theoreTll') 01 pure t'xl\1e ll ce, the rule
of exduded middle. elc.
E:-.perimenlal. induclive knowledge i.., relati\'t!" hut it s rela.
li\'il\' is not 13111amounl to il ~ non-objectivene<; .... Relativit y is
a n iildication of the hislOricai condilioning. a charal'(crislic of
the limib of approximation of Ihe truth by knowledge. The ra tionalist ru.sertion of the epistemological unlenabilil y of induc_
tion. of experimental knowledge. is therefore ba::;icall y wrong.
Strictly speaking. indu clion is just as reliable a method as any
other. and knowledge obtained by induction is just as effective
as knowledge obtained by any other method used in
"cience. This view is substantiated in the programme of practical and mediated justification of induction developed in dialec(ical materialism. There are cerlain problems here as well.
Practice only guarantees the necessity of inductive conclusions
as a tendency. which determine.s the probabilistic status of concrete inductive conclusions. distinguishing them from clearly
apodictic. demonstratively obtained conclusions.
In .. iew of this, the polynomial tendency inherent in experience does not permit any single-valued substantiation of Ihe
truth of theories in terms of their empirically confirmable consequence!:.. The same can be said about the proce~ure o~ ~ubs
tanliation of the falsity of theories in terms of their emplrtcally
rejected consequences.
.
,
.
A':o. we have pointed out above. the IllusIOn of the eXistence
of an ex"erinuntum crucis providing ;;absolute" c ounterexamples of. theory is al present dispelled. Any practising
scient. . with his obsessive faith in the correctness of the theory
he....-ks on. interprets suc h counter-examples either as fluctuation or as stimuli for a partial revision of the theory intended
to improve it. Generally speaking, falsification cannot be an
instrument of unequivocal and radical rejec ti on of theories for
the foUowinc reasons.
I!, .,iew 01 the systemic nature of knowledge. refutation of
derived h)'pOthE! :5 is merely evidence of the falsity of cerlain
elements ~ ~ theory. and not of its falsity as a whole.
ContradtCtlOils between facts and theories can be eliminated by compensatory ad. hoc modifications.
Theo~i!S can ful~y ~etain their fundamental laws even if the
untenablhty of theIr mterpret~tive and explanatory apparatus
becomes apparent-by bemg mcluded in new and more ade1.18
lbe:
theoldooe.
l.lQ
)(
S ce~~ra~le;
" ce .
scien
nO!t
~~
~bstantiation
t40
ing and design. Correct lIl e th ~olo~lc? 1 ,mte rpre tat ion of the
problems of n on- cl as..\lC~ 1 Ie-c hnl,ca l (liSl' ,p rlnl'" and non-classical
engineering (as .well as liS cl as.,)ll"a l fo rm) IS 3 n ece~\ary condi.
lion of tle\-'e loplIlg a correc t concept ion of tec hn ICa l knowi.
edge-- ils organ isation , func tionin g . .a nd s ubjec t-ma u e:, Only an
adequa te method ology of both claSSical and non-claSSical forms
of scientifIc-techn ica l knowledge a nd en gln cer ing o pens up th e
perspectives for the developme nt of a corn'C I vie w of techn ics
as the subject-mailer of tec hn ica l kn owledge.
Insufficient attention to th e meth odology of e ngin eerin g and
design and lack of studies in the spec ifl c il y of engin eering even
in its classical forms make specialists in epistemological qu estions
of technical sciences include engineering in the domain of
technical knowledge. In this case, transformation of natural
materials into technical instruments, construction of tec hnical
objects. etc., are believed to be the principle task and the most
important function of technical kn owledge (or sciences) .
This conception of technical scien ces and technical know ledge in general has been critic ised in the literature. Indeed,
science. the technical sciences included. is an activity, but it is
a special kind of activity - it is the production of knowledge
taking place in the sphere of the ideal. The activity of Implementing knowledge in reality, of transforming reality, takes
place on the basis of kn owledge but in a diffe re nt sphere- in
the sphere of engineering, of tec hn ological prac tice. Howeve r,
this is only one aspect of the question. Tech nical sc ie nces of
the class ical Type must not, indeed , comprise e ngineerin g activities. But non-classical scientifi c lechn ica l d isc iplines (ergonomics, industr ial design, syste ms engineering. elc.) embrace
not only designing bUI also the introduction of tec hnOlogical
systems in practice.
In view of lIle close links existing at the present stage between engineering and the scientific and technical disciplines,
the problem of their methodological analysis presents two
aspects of one and the same issue. The fact that engineering
and design have been little studied in the Soviet literature is
mostly due, in our view. 10 analysis of engineering in terms of
the lechnical. sciences. The le~hnic al sc ien ces emerge as a re.m ~f mergl~g o~ natural scIen ce and of tec hnical practice,
that lS, of e.ngm~ermg pr~ctice at the initial stage of its developIDmL Engmeerlllg pracl1ce as the activity of applying sc ien-
lift\.' kllowledg ... to protlul'I iol1. tn t...chnology. has not been iden
liflet! a .. a .. pt'l'ia l obJel'l nr .. tudi ... d III the ph~losophy ~ u~...
nology. h lgineer ing adivi ly, the in t ro~ ut: tlon of JC lenuftc
knowlcdge intu produt: linl1 , til ... Objt'cilflcatlon of knowledge ha ~
bel'11 con.. idered in Ihe contexl of the functiOning of tedllllca l
w1c III'I'''. At prc ..cnt. there i.. an urgent need for a m... thod~l l ng~
il'al analy.. is of engineeri ng activi ty a .. <,"d. of Ih gen....slS a.nd
.. peciftd lY, il\ d ilTerent:t''' from other fo~m~ .of practIce. lhe
,growing in tcre .. t for thi .. problem in Sov iet Ilteralure ha.. ahn
borne fn llt in the dari fH:ation of th e .. ubJect- mat1er and gt'n:->~
i\ of the tcchn il'al "Cien cd. We !.hall return 10 thi~ qut!'Stlnn
below.
Th e qu est ion of the s ubj ... ct -matte r of t,ec h.nical knowled~e
is always linked in tht' mt'th odology of ~cle nll fl c cognitIon : III
epistemology. wi th Ihe study of the relatlon be t,ween le t:. hnl ~ al
kn owledge and lechnics. In anal ys ing this relatIOn. th e I~ e a IS
oft en expressed . in one form or an oth e r, that tec hmcs I.S the
subject-matter of techn ical knowledge. Such a standpOin t IS
natura l, b ut me th odologica lly it is merely the fi rst step towards
cla rify ing the su bjec t-mailer of tec hnical kn owledge. Cons Ist ent deve lopme nt of this slarting point invol ves complex and
large ly unsolved problems.
It is probabl y a lack of clarit y about the proopecb a n ,~ the
paths of the solution of th~se p ~ o b le m s, t ~at engenders allempts
to give a different theore llca l interpretation of the problem. of
the subjec t-matter of techn ical knowledge. Of the gre.a tesl 111terest in this respec t is th e approach based on a na l;.:s!'!' of ao.:tivity-of man's prac tical ac tiv ity i ~ vol.\ing o bjec t ~. T .h e laller
is con side red Oil two planes-subjectIVe and objective. The
subjective e le ment is constituted by the subject and hls. aCli~ns
with objects. The objective aspect is represented by obJt'c(S 111el uded in the ac ts of ac tivit y and interacting with each ot~er .
This ac ti vity-orie nted approac h to the slUdy of technical
knowledge is conn ec led wilh the use of suc h debatable p:olysemantic con cepts as pr ac t~ c e and activity, object and s U.~Je c t,:
mailer of cognition . The paIrs of lerms connec t.ed he re by . a nd
are oftc n llsed as synonyms. Despile a cert a m co mm uni ty of
these cat egories, th ey al so have r~al diffe~en ces in mea n ing a nd
the cl asses of obj ec ts Ih ey compnse. In differe nt contexts. these
differe nces may lead to a lac k of agreemenT. .
.
In parti c ular, the emphasis in Ihis a pproac h I.S on practical
aClivilY involving objects, whi ch naturall y c 01l1~nses. a narrowe r elass of phenomena and processes than ~ CU\1t y In ~e ll e ral .
nOI to mention practice. From this standp01l11. th e objel- I (o r
142
tB
{l
fIelds which are, 111 t heIr t urrI, dm;d y.nmncc led wuh e n g in ee r ~
sense is man 's Objec tive prac tice int e rn rel 'd (~. e III ~ H~ broad
b " r"
d b"
.
' " Co:
sa lIllIl y of th
~~ Jee Ive an 0 Jectl~'e asre~ t~. Thus it b no longer fh e ob" e
Ive struc tures of practica l aC II\'lI y or even of
.
Jeel_
h
h
.
practi ce as a who!
f al are t e s~bJ~cl -m a rt er of tec hnical kn ow ledge bu t
e
whole of pract ice In th e u ni ty of Ih e subjec tive a nd ob' ~he
aspects.
JeCllVe
Neither this way of reasoni ng nor th e concl usion are a .
de~ta l : Their prem ises are cont a ined in th e int e rpre ta tion Of~~I;
:r
The stud y of th e Objective stru ct ures of ac tivi ty o n this apPI roach shows that the ir stru c tures are de te rm ined by 'he goal
n. other words , teo
h
b"Jectlve
" struc tures of activity ace goal-"
d lreeted or p t '
. d' If
..... of '. ~ tlllg l~ I erently, they are goal-directed strucbeing th act~~lty. ThiS proposition, in conjunction with their
intereSli~ su Ject-m.aucr of technical knowledge, warrants some
th
g. concluslon.s. Below we shall substantiate th
'
_ at tec hmcs may be mterpreted as artificial '
~ view
uu.rumcnts of activity. In principle goal d-"e., goal-direc ted
.. -aivity and goal-directed instru '
- flreCl~~ Structures
VlOuIly identical.
ments 0 a ctivity are obOn die basis of the above
.._.,
we may conclude that tec hnics can
'"
145
"
"
ll1ea~ll11g:l; at
In
lec hl11 cs as a(II\'II), (Skill, an. ell" ) and Ilc hnil ... in the nar.
aClivity",
146
be pushed into the foreground. Since labour I' . ,~~ ... die
su bstan ce of tec hnics. attempts to interpret Ihe ph en .......
of tec hnics (in partic ular, to give a def1l1ition of it). in
terms of other concepts, ~u c h as the co nc rpt of labour function.
appear to be well-founded and pro m i~ ing. The co nceP.t of labour
fun c tion is effectively used by Sov Iet researc hers tn the desc ription of the labour proc ess. This atte mpt is all the m~re
well-founded as works on the history and theo ry of tec hOlcs
often con c retise goal -direc ted activity in terms of la bou r
fun ctions (61,27; 94, 9).
Five functions are usually distinguished in the labour process in the literature on the philosophical-methodoJoaicl'
problems of technics: the tec hnological function proper, the
transport fun c tion, the energy fun ~ tion. the controlling and
the logical fun c ti on (61; 102, e tc.).2
.
.
The id e ntification of the pr incipal fun c tions tn the complex
process of human labour has a considerable heurist~c potential. In partic ular, it permits a better understandmg of
the purpose of tec hnology and a sufficiently consistent ~Ias
sification of it. The concretisation. in terms of these functions.
of goal-directed activity in labour clarifies the ~ence of
the nodal elements in the development of techOlcs, of the
man-machine system. Thus the present-day sc ientific and
technological revolution (of which . the n uc.leus. is a uto.mation and cybernetisation of production), which IS essentially
the process of handing over to machines certain logical functions pertaining to human mental labour, frees man from ~r
forming various functions in the management of productIOn.
Just as the 18th-cenlUry industrial revolution freed the human
hand, passing some technological functions ~ver to mac~incs. so
does the modern scientific and technological revolution free
man's mind by handing over certain logical and management
functions to cybernetical machines and devices. to automata.
The development of technics. being a process o~ gradually
freeing man from direct performance of labour funcllons, res~lts
in the fact that direct COnlacts between man and the object
of labour are replaced by contacts mediated by technology,
..
by artiflcial means of lab.o~r.
In view of the eXlstmg tradition of methodological
analysis of labo~r and tech~ics in .terms of the c.oncepl 01
labour function II would be mteresttng to apply IhlS concept
to the description of simple elements of labour. In ~th~r
words, we can a!templ a " consideration of human labour m 1IS
abstract form as a funCllon.
147
r,,,. ,
10
1 If .1
genera a oru ....
l1alUr~
- Il \
IilbtlUr I-lIlIt" IO
Ihe C(llKn..'le
11\
our
11 01
inn
the
or
wh ic h 10 one domai n of
of
= ..
:j=?~s I~ro~uf~~~~i~~~nic~),
" 8
dehne~
'"
?!
150
net"d~
154
o bleels
0 his need- become accessible 10 (hi,....
""ed IIlrough
"
f a II lng. mto a natural hole. through being struck down b
a falhn~ Iree or slone. etc. Thlls Illan fIrst observed I Y
mec.halllsms ~f combination of goals and instruments for thte~~
achievement In nature. Moved by his needs, he began to
fir~t of a,II,. Ih~ cognit.i~e arsena~ inl~eriled from animal ~~~~
ceslors - If!1I1~IJ~n. abJlIIY for sItuatIOns transference. That
was why, IIllJl3fmg natural situations, man al first drove ani~nals 1I~1O. natural holes, bogs, etc. At the nexi Mage, continu_
mg 10 !nlltate nature and at the same time realising a situation
transference, man c~an~ed ~atural forms, digging holes, felling
trees, etc., constructing In thiS ~ay situations for the attainment
of ~03ls. For example~ observmg animals who died through
g.eumg caught ~m~ng hanas. primitive man constructed snares
on the same pnnclple (163. 76-Q2L
The process of c~:mst:u~tin~ the fust self-acting devices developed from mechal1lcal. Imllatlon to creative changes of the natural factors o~ th~ ~asl~ of.the analogy principle. We find evid.
ence of creallve Imitation 111 constructing the fIrst lab
.
I
ments not onl .
h d
I
. . .
our Imp eautomatic devi~els~ s~Ceh a~v: ~~::n~~t a~;lI1!rtlve si~g!e-action
with various types of fences direcl,'ng Ihe 0111 combll1lng.them
p' ..
movement of an I I
nmilive technical structures embody k i d
rna s.
types: knowledge of the functional an
now e. ge of two
teristics of the implements of lab
k d morphological characor purpose of a labour implemen~~~d now ledge of the function
materral of which it is made The
. ~~owledge of the natural
implement what it is is the k;lOwle~lall1 :. Ing that. makes a labour
ge
for which it is created. Appare tl ~ liS function. the purpose
Ihe. p.rimiti\le technical structure~ ir a '~~~Ied.ge materialised. in
aChvtly. of the functions of labour' I ectlon of goal-setting
mor~h.ological, material characterist!;~po~menls. ~nowledge of
.. wl1Uoncd by the knowledge of f
. labour Implements is
. Goal-dir~cted activity as an obyn~t,on.
IOdePC'~den~ of technical knowled Jecllve process is an object
,("~ge In. p.r~milive technical Slru ge and reOected by this knowWHit. p.nmlltve technical structurc:~ur~~. KnOwledge correlated
cons1S~m.g of at lea\! Iwo rarts
as a Complex structure.
~:~~n:I~~dl m labour impleme~'lslt i~e:I~l"ts purposive activity
. n a so Ihe propenie<. -me'Ch . er Word!), their fUllcanlcal , Ph YSlcal,
.
chemical,
SIrUC:'U'"
.
of \ Ol..' lt:l y .1110 nature. Are I ey
'.
fo r mati o n
I I.
'I'dge" We believe that m.a
~ ulJj cc t - ll1 a Il C r ?f Icc hnic <J "no\\ c. ' " rOCeSS (51. 38.
oal -\dlin g a..:l lvll y as a form of Iht: objective p 0 'ectiveness
g188) is Ihe o hj eu of ICdllllt: <J1 knowledge. The bJ
.
- " " .1
'nocn e e from c onSClOUS. tur '
of goal -sclon g 3..: II Vll y. I.e ., Its,' lIlucpt:
" 'e
t' ,
I uepcnuen
s is a c on sequ e nce 0 f tlC
l.: of. goals
. 'on na
I
~~s natural laws. G oal -selling ac tivity i'i . objective In contcn ~
in it s depe nd e nc e 0 11 I he need .... and In Jt\ rt"Sult ~. . '. .
h
Man 's goal -setting al.: livit y is not. of coune. objedl\e.1n t. e
same sen se as nature . There are twO form~ of .the objeCtl~e
process. Man' s goal -setting activity apparently Ineludes
jeclive factor s as well. A goal may exist i~ different forms 0 t h ~
psyche, of consciousness, and goal -setting. ':lay take place. a
different psychical level s. Besides, the activity of goal:seHl.ng
and achievement of goals includes a purely psych~loglcal 111gredient (74. 157-167). This las t poi~t is of grea~ Importance
for understanding the mechanisms of Implementatio n of kn o.wledge about goals in technol ogical structy.res. fo~ u.nderst a ndlng
purposive activit~ as the o~ject of cognJtlo~. It IS I,n. t~e sphere
of the psychological constlluent of purposive aCll~)() (of the
result of this activity) that technic al knowledge 1$ formedat the initial stage, at any rate.
. ' .
The subject-matter of technical knowledge IS matefl~hs~d
purposive activity, i.e.,. ~echnics !11 the above se,:se - artlfiC131
material systems realismg man s labour funcl1o~ s (go~~s).
As we have pointed out, the term "artificial" in thiS defillltion
is synonymous with "man-made".
The problem of the artificial is the key problem. as far as
technics is concerned. The fundamental nature of IhlS problem
explains certain difficulties in its solution-in the analysis. for
instance, of the first stone labour implements and of their difference from stones "processed" by nature . The idea about close
links between goals and the artificial seems to be one of the most
reasonable and well-founded ideas concerning the general
approach to this problem (183,6-7). These close links permit.
in fact, the transition from the definition of tec hni cs as a m e an s
of purposive activity to its defll1i.tion as arti~ c ial means c:'f. a c tiv ity, artificial systems .. etc, Previousl y conSidered definitions of
technics despite all differences between them, have a common
objective content, they pertain to one and the same class of phenomena.
It has been pointed out above that, in the framework of the
activity-oriented approach to technical knowledge, technics
can be interpreted as the subject-matter of technical know-
'58
159
stea111 - engi~e
..., ar
;U
'"
lI
oped hl'n:, c reu tl'S Ihe prl'tII i'St'3 ror an ex planat ion, more cooc~ete
Ihan other exi~ l ing cxp lanutioll o;, of Ih e content of ledllaial'
know ledge in il'i pre - ~dl'nt i fll':. claSSical and no n.c1ao;sicaJ forms.
and of th e rela lion uf Ihi<; COn1e111 to objective real it y. On this
approach, certa in 1'\\\:111 ia I a\pe(" t \ C<111 be Ir<lled of the re nc(tion
in tec h nica l knowledge of its objec t and \ubjecl-matter.
Th e view of the \ubjct: t- m<l ll er of technical knowledge a\
a rti fici al ma leri al sy\lem\, a~ objec tiflcd goal-"etting activity,
enabl es li S 10 ta ke a more adva ntageo us approac h, su pportt:d by
aClual enginee rin g and techn ica l practice, to the analY !> ls of till
conce pti ons of Ih e subject- mailer of tec hnical knowledge in contemporary fore ign lileratu re, especially Brilish and American.
In eva luating th e meth odological, epistemolog ica l interpretations
of technological knowledge (and of lech nology) by Mar io
Bunge. James Feib leman , Henryk Skolimowski. I. C. Jan- ie,
Stanl ey Ca rpente r, and others, we must point ou t the act ual
aspecls of tec hnological knowledge and the rational elements in
its in terpretat ion wh ich were raised to an absolute and exaggerated in th ei r th eor ies.
Anal ys is of the works of these aUlhor'S, collected, e.g., in the
well -known book (172) . shows that they sha re a number of
common theses. The firsl of these is. of course. Ihe correlati on
of technological knowledge and lechn ology, just as techn ic al
knowledge is correlated with techn ics. "Tec~nology " is a p<:,lysemantic word, so that in some cases the relatIOn of technological
knowledge and technology assumes the Quality of identity. tech nology being regarded as a type of know ledge. It is ob ...: ~ ous , however that the two senses of the term " Iechn ology m u!st be
diffe'rentiated this is clearly realised by those scienlists who
closely study ;he problem. Thus Carl Mitcham believes that. the
term "t ec hnology" ha!s fOllr sen!se!s: (I) technology as object:
(2) tec hnol ogy as process ; (3) technology as knowledge, and
(4) technology as voliti on (171 . .106). Tech~ology as knowledge (technological knowli:'dg~) I ~ conne~ted III the first pla ce
with technology as proce.s..<;, whIch IS especiall y st ressed by Ca r penter (124, 162) .'
..
.
.
The common feature of variOUs IIlt erpretatlons of technolog)
as process, ra nging fr om F e ibl e ll1 ~ n 's skill to ~ arv i es. know-h<:,w.
to Bunge's lechnol ogicalth eor ies, l!s techn olog ical action 10 which
tec hnological kn owledge IS rel ated . The dearest. b~st thoU~I-OUI
and logic all y accolllpli <:; hed th eory of t echnolo~lcal. acllon has
been suggested. in our view. by Eugen. Olsioewskl. HIS system of
proposition s o n Ihis problem may be said 10 have ded.u ced al.l the
conclusions frolll the principles desc ribing technolog ical aC ll ons.
11 _0 1410
161
10,
164
t05
cess.
The examples cited by Bunge to illustrate his viewpoint can be
used to show the erroneousness of his position. He writes, for
instance. that ';a theory of flight is essentially an application of
fluid dynamics" (172, 63). An analysis of the mechanism of
this application of fluid dynamics and of the result of such applicarion-flight theory (169) shows that this application results in
new knowledge that is absent in fluid dynamics.
We get similar resu!t~ in studying ~un~e's another example,
that ?f psychology (IbId.). In .consldermg the possibility of
applYing psychology .to th~ solution of production tasks. Bunge
actually Ignores engmeermg psychology which is born in the
J!'OCes5 of this application and has a content of its own. II is very
cliIfIcult to expla.lIl. fro.m Bunge's pOsitions. the differences be.clePOtOllCal sciences emerging on the basis of electroas radio engineering and electrical engineering.
apparatus merely permits the statement that
h
1 e two subs tantlve technolog
I th
..
Ica
eones
are
applications
of
e Iectr od ynamlcs.
Applied and technological'.
..'
on the basis of the e .
sCiences .are sometimes Identified
lines-whereas BunX~t:;r~e and an~l~sls o~ tec~nological discippure and applied r!.earch~es at thiS Identification via a study of
t66
,.7
ti mes rhe only possi ble mean s and ways of solving 'heore! kal and
praclil.'sl tasks o f rh e develop.menl o~ Ih~ given discipline.
In rhe case of rock phYSICS, liS claSSlflcallon as a scientific.
n d Kal n)f1 crc ll" al'lion 'S of the- de-f.:t 'i1.:al engineer are ..... on
~f~xwdl \ has ic equCJlinn'i. Similar lC"ndencies are .
."'_
Ihe forrn alioll I)f olher snt:lln~'s ba'ied on elecirodynamlcs-rllllo
engineering, lalcr radinlncatioll, etc
.
_
,.
Researc h in Ihl" aclual development of sCIe-ntlfic cognllion
suggcSb lhat the study of the "fundamental sciences applied
.sc ien ccs techni cal ')(. ien ces" triad l'i of fundamental ~lglllfJ.
can ce for Ihe analysis o f su ch an important problem of the "talUs
of technical knowledge as the in..:eption and later devt:! opment
of lechni cal sciences. Moreover, this schema may be said to be
of prime interest for the methodology of science, reftect!ng as .It
does the essential elements of the development of technical SCIences.
Before reaching the scientific stage, technical knowledge- went
through a number of form s in its development. In the above,
we described in sufficient detail the inception of technical knowledge. its initial forms and methods. Accepling on the whole Ihe
schema for the formation and development of technical kn owledge suggested in (35), we must clarify certain details and
concretise a number of p~opositions-a natural move in the elaboration of any schema. '
Relying on the evidence of archaeology, anthropology, ethnography, etc., a study of the prescientilic stage in the de velo pment of technological knowledge permits something more Ihan
just placing it in the period bel ween the. prim itive c~mm.unal
structure and the Modern Times and partially structunng It, so
to speak-it also permits approximate. dating o~ the emergence
of techological knowledge. The solution of thiS problem may
appear to be trivial: we can gel a.da.'ing, albeit approxi.mate,. of
technical knowledge merely by pOlOtlOg 10 Ihe firsl tools 10 which
technical knowledge was malerialised. It appears. however,
that the act of such pointing assumes Ihe solution of eXlremely
complicated problems of anthropogenesis, the Slructure of human labour, the artilicial and the natural, elc.
The view was accepted in (he previous section thai the first
type of labour implemenls were choppers. Despite differen ces
in the tirst tools, repetition of Ihe form s and s imi laril ies in working in stone poinl to Ihe goal-directed ness of th e handling of
these IDols. The constancy of the form s of tools handed down
from generalion to generatio n indicates conscious purposive
actions involving the lirst labollr implements. Thus choppers and
other tools of the Oldovan cuhure are a materialisalion of goaldirected action: in other words. Oldovan 10015 are Ihe firsl constant, systematic form of obje":lilied lechnological knowledge.
tM
"t "
, ,
e",_
them "c! VlS. The hirth (If technit'aJ sciences was more the raull
of implantation of natural-sc ientific and mathematical k.....tr
edge in tcdlllolng k al m:tivity . It is therefore wrong both to
the role of nutural -",il"ntiflc knllwledge in the emergence of the
technic al s,ien cl"" and tn inlerprel the Ja1ler 8$ mere deri ... ativ~
of fundamental natural-scientifIC theories. It ha') already been
pointed out that the proces.. of applkation of nalural S4;:lcnce to
the technological problem\ of pmduction give') rise to new know
ledge irreducible to the knowledge of ba'ilc theory and the
common sense of tc'hnology.
The hypothesis of derivation of technical sciences from natu~
ral science, which i., regarded as independent from technical
knowledge, appears especially doubtful in the ..:ontcxl of the
study of the birth of experimental science of tht: :"1odern Times.
At the initial stages of its de ...elopment. experimental natural
science of the Modern Times sianed OUI from the ontology
which emerged as a result of the objectification of prc"cientific
forms of technical knowledge. i.e., of contemporary tec hn ic...
The engineering tasks which stimulated the emergence of technical sciences also emerged on the basis of this technkal ontolog).
But technics was also the domain which served as the "'expericntial basis for the emergence ... of the theoreticallhinking of new
physics" (4.214).
In studying the emergence of scientifiC knowledge in the Modern Times. historians and methodologi<;(s of scienc e note the
inAuence of technic!>, of its spreading and impro\ement. on the
social conditions and the mode of thinking. Technics (objectified
technical knowledgC>, as a new ontology, made an impal:t 0\1 the
worldview, laying the foundation of new culture. The social
processes determined by the development of technics. and technics itself, naturally made an impact. 100. on the thinking of
major scientists. such as Galileo. who stood at Ihe beginning
of new science. Their theoretical thinking was ine\itably affected
by the influenl:e of Ihe technical ont?logy. and by the ~ngineer
ing, experimental tasks that II gave flse to. Moreover. III analysing Ihe stale of affairs in terms of derivation of some sc iences
from others. we see that we deal with the following , prohably
somewhat simplified. situation, as far as physics is con cerned :
"One might in fact say that new physics was born from an
experimental branch of applied medlanics" libid .. 2IS) .In othC'r
words. physical-.mathel.nallcal natural scielll'e emerged ~s a
branch of tl~hJl1cal sCience th ..l1 was born at that same time.
The inception of technical "clences falls approximately in the
period bctwt'cn the IlIlddle of the 151h century and the 1810,,:
i,II.'
'"
8 ,:haral"ferisl iI..' fea lure of (his period is Ihl' USl' of , . '. '.
"
hi "
f
"
- lIl.:lIlllI _
kfltlw/t'dgc l o r I e so ullon 0 prOdUl..'llOn IIldUSfrial fa -k'
l
pracfil..'al problems in general. During Ih~ fJn;f 'tag 'i sr' nOI
" d (lIe
I secon d h a If 0 r the 151h Ihrougl1lhe l'arly
- '.1811"
e 0 "11~"
reno
" ) lee h"
llenlu.
rtes
nlea I k
nowledge'
did nol WI allain a fheor"I"1 "al
I
"
II f
.....
"- l: evel
Since we - ormed theones In natural sCIence dId n,)1 yel
"'
JUSf
.
!lClences emerged
Ihe 19th century, while the rISe 01 applied sci~nces falls.on the beginning of the 19th century (10, 81-82). It
IS also obvIOus that electrical engineering as a technical science
'*De into bei~g somewhat la!er than the 1870s- the period
when. Maxwell s famous equations of the electromagnetic field
~cam~ m0'7 or ~ess widely known. A similar situation existed
In r~lo en~meenng. Importa~tly. this schema obtained in the
hn
tec .,..'. scle!,!ces connected With physics, chemistry and mecha ~ beml, In fact, the schema of the inception of the
t~hnical sciences of the classical type. ll One can therefore agree
With ~uch ~ers as G. Ruzavln, .who insists that "initially.
technical ~enca emerge for the SOlution of purely applied tasks
- die . . . of t~e resul~ of such !undamental sciences as mehydraulics, phYSICS, Chemls!.ry, etc. Later, the process
more~omplex (107,53). Jndeed the de" techmcal
I 'disciplines becomes muc'h more
m. non-c asslcal disciplines.
and the forms of the evolution of new
" "fi cantly already in the
-0....
19toh chang
. e slgm
.... I -mld-20Ih cenl " ) r
opment of technical knowledg A
.
unes 0 the develof the emergence of techn~' It t~1S stage, the traditional
the basic natural science ~ca t~lences through derivation
paillied out, derivation should ~n ~nued to exist. As we have
.
Interpreted as synthesis of
practice and natural-scientific theory.
172
became the object of serious epistemoAt that time, the material of methw~, as a rule, the classical technological sciences. The emphasIs was on the specificity of technological
compared to natural science, on establishing its
.
~ructth ure, ~tc. However. differentiation of technical
ICII!DCes 1ft e c lasslcal n.riod
.
dO . r
......., an d th e mushroommg
of new
ISClp mes at present. require greater concreteness
174
17S
,,,,'e
..as. _ which tn~rates dIfferent means and styles of think11110 ~erC:iit conceptIOns, va lu es, etc.
A SClentlflc movement deve lo s in
.
If a synthesis is achieved of
p . to a complex sCience onl y
of knowledge methods and pr~vlo.usly autonomous fragments
,
SCIentIfic disc ipi"
S
h . .
funher stage in the deve lo
f .
m,es. y nt eSls IS
a sc ientific mo veme11l , Chara!; ~e~i~~~ ~ mtegratlv: proc esses in
mo us and different fo rms of k ' 1 dY th~ mergmg of autononOwe ge m a uniform whole.
D!
an?
176
177
gineering, sys tems des ign, and oth e r 1l11 I1 -class lI.:al tec hnical
scie nces.
Th e structure of techllical kllo wledKe. T echn ica l kn owledge
is a sys tem of its pre -sc ie ntific and sc ie ntifIc form s, an ensemble
of classical and non -classical sc iences. Conside red from the
ep istemological an gle, the sc ientifIc-tec hnologi cal disciplines are
in their turn integral stru c tures comprising theories, hypotheses
and laws, facts and ideas, technological tasks, etc. They can be
eithe r at the theoreti cal stage of development or at the empirical
one, or else in between - in the process of theoretical formation,
As a type of human knowledge. technical knowledge is a schematisation of technical practice and of technics in the above
sense. At the initial stages of development, in its initial structures,
technical knowledge is not a schematisation (which is theoretical in nature) but rather an interiorisation-assimilation and
trmWpOSition of external laws onto the internal, ideal plane of
ConSCIOusness.
enti flc- tec hn ical disc ipline. Emphasis on this uni.' ill
odologica l a nalysis of tec hnical knowl~dge ~rmus an .
desc ripti on of va rious aspec ts of techlllcal sciences, openm, up.
in parti cul a r, good prospec ts for the study of the structure of
sc ientilic- tec h nical knowledge.
. . ,
Methodological analysis of a scientifIc-tec hnical diSCipline
necessarily assum es the study of the formation of th e theoret ..
ical schemata of that con crete discipline. In other words, one
of the fIrst questions that ar ises in this case is the question of the
formation of theory in a concrete technical science. In technical
knowledge . just as in scientific cognition in generat. a thwiy
the prin cipal structural unit (15, 110) . At present, the c~nb~
problem of epistemological, methodological research of scle!""lic-technical knowledge is therefore the problem of techOlcal
theory- its formation, structure, functioning, etc. Analysis of the
meaningful and formal aspects of a technological theory reveals
deeper strata of technological knowledge than , say, t~e study of
technological rules, which is the principal task of the episte mology
of technological knowledge according to Bunge (172. 68) .
Emphasis on technical theory as the central problem of the
methodology of scientific and technical knowledge does nor
contradict the view, which we share, that the most adequat e
unit of methodological analysis of technical knowledge is a scientific-technical discipline. At present, there is a need fo r meth odological studies in concrete scientific-technical disciplines, e~
pecially non-classical o~es. The f~us here must be on analysIS
of problems of theory m these sciences.
.
It is pointed out in the literature on the method~logy of SCientific cognition that, on the standard. meth~olo~lcal approach.
a theory is the basic st~uc,tur~1 umt of SCientifIc knowh~4ge.
Although this approach IS Justifiable on the gener~1 met.hodo~
logical plane, it should be noted that as far tech~lc~1 sciences
are concerned, even this standard m~el , of sclentlfIclty has
not been properly analysed so far. ~o".sldenng the role ~f tech nical sciences in this age of the sclenttfic and ~echn ologlcal r~
volution methodological research of theoretical sche mata 111
the sc ie~tifIc-technical disciplines is necessa ry from the practical
standpoint as well.
...
'
A promising approa~h to thiS Iss ~e IS co nnec te~ wl~h the ust
of experiences in meanll1~ful analysIS of natural-sclentt~c. abo.ve
all physical, theories which have been accumulated In . Soviet
methodological studies. On the analogy of physical Ihe,ones, the
following components c~n be singled oul in technological theories: theoretical (ontological) schemata, and conceptual and ma 179
Ihematical appar ~tu st"~ . These elcmc l.lh na turnlly di ller in COn.
tent ill techn ologi cal and natural-sc1t~ ntt fl L" thtor ies.
_ T hi s approach to the study of tedllt il..'al ~heor i es is developed
~n a n~mber of ~orks (22: . 1.11 ), SU IllIllUl ~ up th e principal
~deas ~ t these stud ies and O I~lI11 Ul g SO lll t' deta ils a nd term inolog_
Ical diffe ren ces that 8.re. Ir releva nt in th e prese llt contex t,
we can say that three prm clpal stra ta a re si ngled ou t ill tec hn ical
theories: functional, "asse mbly-l in e", and st ru ctural. It shou ld
further be noted th a t, alth ough a non-dassicaltechni ca l th eory is
built differently from a cl assical one. th e principal componentsonlO log ical (t heore tica l) sc hemat a, conce ptua l apparatus and
mat hematical apparatus-figur e in both cases. Unlik e a natural_
scient ific theory, a technical theory does 110t contain new logical
connections. The principal distinctive feature of a technological
is the constructive function; such a theory does not just
and pndict; primarily, it ideally generales engineering
~ical
t"
.an11
111 non-classical sciences Th
'
.
u Ion, especla y
of th e "configuration" p~
~t .IS espec lall~ true of the study
riel..
ocess In non-claSS ical technical theoLet us consider some aspec t f l
where most problems ha y b soc aSSlcal techni cal theory,
e een solved and the mechanisms of
180
fI om natural science,
of their theories,
is the I... graphically
two features,
expressed feature of the
nical disciplines of the
type. nis is largely due to the fact that theory in
iI, rule, at the initial stage of development.
of which the basis is in variance of knowledge,
results, methods, etc., is very weak in init is somewhat stronger in systems design.
~~ ~ low
of the intersubjectivity of industrial, "piece
~"design
largely determined by its nature, its closeness
to art father than science. Generally speaking, the grouping
of industrial design together with non-classical scientific-technical disciplines is due to convention more than anything else,
and to its kinship with systems design.
As for systems design. the intersubjectivity of its methOds,
is fairl~ ~igh. In recent years, however, the
of the prmclples and methods of artistic thinking
seems to have brought about
.
.
in systems design. That
In .the level
scientiflcity in this sphere
.
rather Its restructuring and the strengthening
of links
the human sciences.
The i~b~rivity o~ other non-classical scientific-technical
*jk~ higher; eV.I~ence of this is found, in particular,
h I systemat,c,ly of these disciplines The complex
... l)'IIems c .racter of objects designed in these d'ays determines
182
knowledp
illlporranl methodological regulator 01
'''1
t83
dologica l ana. lyses of tf'I.' llIlic 1al know ledge 10 d<lrify the ~ pe
' r
(11
city of tel..' hnlc al knowledge IlfOUg h Ihe stud y of th eir construc_
tive -pr actic a l na ture (.see, e.g . (lOb ; 114 .
One of the bas il.." el e me nb of our v iew of Ihl" constru ctiv _
correl~_
(180, 12).
;on!:;ts I:
186
r k
no ws
by w h a .s. a rs he IS to g Uide his life" ( 177 79)
~r cogmtl?
" n: (he cris is sta te of soc iety i~ fl f st O~ all the fo rms
III the artistic fo rm . in the images of a r t N
0
a ll reOec led
gene ric, the mOSI charac te r i!)li c fea ture-s (~f t~~' wh a t a re the
answer to this is cont ai ned in the titl e o f O~~en:w a rt ? Th,e
other we ll-kn o wn wo rk. written in 1925-~ TJ D '~ y ~aSS~l s
of Art. where he wrote this. a mo ng o th e r 'thint ~.u~~lalll:.at,on
S
we look. we see the same thing: night fro II h . Wherever
(1 76. 30) .
m 1e uman pe rson"
. One aspec t in particular can be sin led
of the cultural.
soc iety and human disciplines It is a
fofegula1rl y revived idea of
mt~rconnections
p.nd0pu~ar Iin~nd
_ec
eu ture through
u gems
th~~c::~~~~~t: o~h~i~~:~mIY
..
'"
and artistic
forms,lI
The CH.
,,,
place. difference
sc ie nces.
between
the flf st
of concrete
In
<,\.: ICIKI.:
objec
t.
.
Among
late Si o ics a nd ear Iy Ch
nstlans.
a dff
I e re nt c ooepti o n of Jlllmallita ... evolved. one th at was close to Greek
~ hilanthropy" and ha d a bea r ing o~ an,Y man regardles,s o f
P ,.rr or edu cati on ra lh e r th an ee rtam elitist strata of soc iety.
Ortg
. .lcs a nd up to the begmnmg
"
Binning wilh ea rly pat Tlst
.ofh
t e
R~~l aissance, Christian theology developed the concepti on (If
lJ _ nl~711
I Q.\
IlIIm(lllilaS
"4
. 1
mallcal
natura I sCIence In tIe 17th and 18th centuries. The hI
.
. d f h .
1 1
flnanlSt
~tlltU e 0 t e tImes was C ear y expressed by Pascal es
.
In Thoughts on Religion.
' peclally
Humanity, forced out of the fIeld of scientifiC cognil"
(of ~lassic~1 slcience~ in .'he I7t.h. l~th, a~d.early 19th centllr:~
was intenSive y studIed In art, I.e., III artlSIlC cognition The '
of that ~riod also underw~nt signiflcant changes. By 750, t~~
CO~c~pl!on .of art as cr.eatlon of beauty rather than creative
actIvity subject to defilllte rules finally asserted itself. Charles
Batt~ux set apar~ the so-called fllle arts: painting, sculpture,
archlleclUre, musIC, poefr~ and danc.ing. Previously, at the end
of the 17th century, logiC and arithmetic were transferr d
from the arts to the sciences.
e
In the l.1t~-l ~th .centuries the tendency gradually increased
towards dlStmgUlshmg two aspects of humanilas: on the one
hand. the anthropological. generic features of man, and on the
other. the emotl'!nal-moral qualities of man concretised in
lei diS of pe~nahty and individuality (13. 145-155) .
By the ~11ld-19th cent~ry, an independent and stable sphere
of humanity became fairly clearly defined; it covered. in the
fIrst pl~~~: such phenomena as pers.onality, individuality, the
hur:nan I . In philosophy and the SOCIal and biological sciences,
whlc~ had more or less taken shape by that time, the elements
of thiS sphere (as, e.g., the individual) were interpreted in terms
of man's generic characteristics.
. O~viously, the specificity of this domain is not fully exhausted
~n thlS wa;:. The study of the same held by artistic consciousness
IS clearly madequate. Th~ ne~d .a~ises for a scientific study of
the problems of personality, mdlvlduality the human "I" et
In. the mid-19th century, this was mos; acutely realised b~
Klerkegaard an? Peuerbach. w~o almost simultaneously anacked
Hegel embodymg at that lime the philosophical-scientific
approach .to problems of personality and individuality However
nel~her Klerkegaard nor Feue~bach succeeded in sUbstantiatin '
an lfttqral theory of the specifically human of hu
.
~
azslinS in this way the found t"
f
'.
maOlty, an
cfttliLh of adequately handlin a I~n 0 a philosophical science
beings.
g t e problems of real human
196
5
dlll'erence between the human and the
sc.enc J. .The concept of humanities has not yet become
..;arked by a c~mplete absence of a consensus
with th~e hu.mt n ~Iences and in the views of their
SOCia SCiences and artistic knowledge.
'98
...... ~cholOlY.
poi-ud out above that these sciences are human
beea. . of the significant share in them of human
knowledge proper that has not yet become separated out,
and because of their relatedness 10 objects that are specifically
human at the present stage in the development of culture.
C"''7idering the tendencies of development of these disciplines,
tIIptICially the evolution of their applied aspects at a time of
the sc:ienlifsc and technological revolution, these may be said to
have remained human sciences for the present, although that
fact is now questioned-for various reasons (33; 40). The knowledge of the human sciences proper in their applied aspects
that have not yet become separate from the body of the base
disciplines, is practically indistinguishable from the rest of
knowledge in these disciplines. We therefore use the "classical"
human sciences like linguistics and psychology to characterise
the specificity of applied studies in human knowledge.
linguistics as one of the two primary aspects of
(alona with fundamental studies) ( 18S), uses linguistic
fe:.- the lOlution of various practical tasks (32; 18S) .
........ iftcity of these tasks shows them to be
and questions: establishing mutua l undermen-mac~ine system~ speech control of production.
. automatic processmg and classification of
ecli, tnfo.m:'auon, of technological documents, etc, At the same
ci<"l<eh,n_~lulStIC kno,wl~dge can be applied, e.g., in historical
estabhshmg the areas of settlement of different
I
peop es and other problems wh
I'
"
.
, '
ere mgulstlcs lS not used In Its
204
.mer-'a,
sCIence.
This aspect is well represented in Werner Heisenberg's
book (142), in particular in the author's dialogues with Niels
Bohr. The gisl of Bohr's argument substantiating the new
conception of atOI~l slructu~e, as Hei.senbe~g remembers it. w~s
as follows. In claSSical physICS and SC ien ce m general. to explam
a new phenomenon meant to reduce it, through a\'ailable
concepts and instruments. 10 familiar phenomena and laws.
This method and structure of thoughl were complelely unacceptable in th~ description of fhe structure of the atom
in nuclear physl(S, ror one would have to resort to the
concepts of classical physics. which are in this case inade21n
102),
The human sciences are at present in a situation like that-before a breakthrough into new territory. One of the first
problems that arise in this connection is the problem of methods
adequate to the solution of urgent theoretical and practical
tasks. Method as an analogue of the fragment of reality toward
which a concrete human science is directed and in the space of
which it moves can develop into a theory thus taking the science
to the theoretical level of cognition of its subject-ma"er.
The problems of the specifIcity of methods, which are now
SO urgent in the methodology of the human sciences, were
already clearly realised a hundred years ago. Wilhelm Dilthey
was one of the philosophers of the end of the 19th century who
felt an acute need for a new methodology of the human sciences
different from the natural-scientific methodology. In his methodological analysis of the hUman sciences ("sciences of the
mind") Dilthey expressed the rational idea of "rebuilding the
S1ruclure of thOUght" (Heisenberg) in the process of studying
new objects different from the objects of natural scienceWW"".4""ity. personality, etc.
Tbia ~e~ was explicitly Slated by Dilthey in his statements
o~ dn::nptive ~chology. In Niels Bohr's terms, Dihhey, having
dISCovered cenam real connections in the sphere of the psychical, began to move carefully toward definite knowledgeknowledge that cO~,ld not be obtained by Contemporary "explanatory psy.chOI?gy . That was why Dilthey, not unlike Bohr,
.
chose as hIS bndgehead for a breakthrough.
II1to new terf/tory.
208
1"UI47!l
!IN
!I!!:!..
80;
lIo
\/
;<.
( harl-r'
Till'. [)IAtl.("TI(\ 01 I)IVI,-LOPI .... C, "' .... O""LHXj[
NtlJ1-Murxi .. t phil()~(lphl;r'S are incapable of ~dcyu'Hely rcfleding Ihe: diakl.:lin of Ihc dcvelupmelil of scl~nllfl,: knowledge. They l.:al1nOI explain Ihe phen(~mcn(ln, of science S sleady
'ogress IOward objcl.:li\t!, knowledge increasingly ~onform.mg, 10
and confIrmed by sacio-hislorical practice. ThIS
abilil)' to provide acceptable explanallOns of Ihe prog~('S$ 0
science was one of Ihe main cau.<;es of Ihe CrlSlS of \\ CSlern
"philosophy of Sl.:ience", ,
f h
The present chapter Will be .de\'OIed 10 an anal~'SlS () I IS
complex and topical probiemallc-
~;alilv
InC
US u<,t' in
Ll"
(hi,;
COl1l1l'l'Iioll
thl'
l'OllCt'PI
,r
I .
Theoretical _courses
are
regularl\'
rl'-wnlll'1l
.'
.
. _
'.
<.
alter p.
digmat"' d".K
gres.s
Isco\t'nes or SCll'ntlfh:
rl'VOltlli~)lls
.,
ilra
I"
t .
, l": t'TllllTlLng
Ih,at certain
,.
0 mu tllevel
c Iou d shrOUding the "ideal'
of adequacy (problem I" sCIence and n.on-uni~orm in terms
a process of necessar a lC and hypolhetlcal), IS realised as
"idea'''.
y and often difficult evolution toward the
. The most fundamellial r
.
IS mankind's ag re ate P ~mJs,e of ,the development of science
quite clear if w~ I;ke sOCIO-hlsloncal p,ractice. This will be
practice is a slimulaloraccfount ~f, IwO Circumstances. Firstly,
from the conditions of thO CO~nltlve progress, which follows
_....... I
e SOCial funclioni
f'
~~.ye y orpnised inslitut'
.
ng 0 sCIence as a
nC1'toducrion on a large sc l~n s;r~mg Ihe needs of society and
men! ofsu~antialion of seie: e. ~~ondly. practice is an instrulIy of verification, confirmaf ce , w Ich, fol!ows from the possibilbelw~en tr.uth and falseho~~n or rejection (of distinguiShing
Of
8:ct!\'lIy which is nOI self_sufflcien . the products of theoretical
Ilated ~x principio inferno.
1111 Ihe sense of being subslanTak1l1g InlO consideration
the fundamental mediating fune214
-> 1.>-
.. "
.,.
on
ogH.:a errors like ignorafio ('/ellt'lI;'
quadrupllllg
r .
or
terms. etc. And yet
' b
'"
I k f
m leteness is
In completeness. Incompleten.ess. o~ ac 0 h cO P I logi'~al
a 01 semantic factor which. If we Ignore t e f orma \,;
P Y
'he following--as far as problems of developmeru
usage, mealls
of knowledge are concerned.
bse -e
Meaningfully interpreted. incomple!eness ~eans the a a~~a
of exhaustive information ab~ut .realllY st~dle~ ~~e spo:s.:ibility
I d
which is an objective premlse-.o
.
of know e g,e, . . . '
were not so, sCience would ha\e
of 'progress In SClen~e, :rotl~~~r rogress, To clarify this. let us
neither room nO.r dl,ree
",onPess of available Iheories deter, obJ'ecl1ve IIlcomp.. ..
..' [
state Ih a
. . ,' 'e stimulating the subJecme deSire or
min:s progre~s I~' slUf~~~n~~. which is expressed in Ihe tend~n
achlevlIlg .thelr cc01;sfemolOgically desirable exhausti~'e, dl!'scflpc.y to. attain ;~~m~llate more powerful theories pro\"ldll1~ m~re
lion. I.e .. , to
]"t . , In a more formal interpretanon. 111informallon ab?ut.rea I~.
.
f absolute closedness. or the
comrl~~eness .Slg,llIf:Sse~o~~~I~~\" considerations or assumptions
POSSIbility 10 .II~'O,~ d' the prop(",sitions of systems of knowlthat are not 1f\1,; hlue III
et.l~t>
220
~t~~~
O[t~ec~~:~
~nf/q,eh~~~17~~:~~~f
~~~e~~~i~~~
a~!itO:~et~er~~i:~~:~
of discreteness
e pr
0
r .'
--'"
~lallon
,
,
'logic.
are twO paths of the development .of knowl.edge--:-Ihe
The.re
(extensive) and the revolutionary (mtensl\e~.
evOIU~\~I::~ary development. which does not assume any ra~lEv
.
of 'he theoretical fund of knowledge. conSists
.
h ,.
al renovallon
~
. d'
the sphere of application of available t eones
III exlen mg
..,
h
d by the fair new phenomena of reailty. ThiS IS ac I~ve
..
'.,
cov~
rocedures: denvallon of consequences (the, ~outme.
IO":Il~~ Por scientists ill the logko_method.ologleal dl~Clpl!nes~.
aell V y.
of a general theon' to the solutll)J1 of speelahsl tasks
adaptallon
.
21.\
222
!?
1.~j)II7j)
ed~e-
".
IheMy of rl'lalivilY has 110 rig~11 dl all to be regarded a .. a subsequent physical thcmy emerging 111. Ihe c~mrse of resolution of
the crisi':t CllVeiOP1l1g d<l\!.lcal ph)"tlcs. It IS nn1 dear. then, ~()W
. nd when il l'mergcd and what cau':tes brought It II1tO bC1I1g.
a The in'li':ttclH:e 011 the incnmmeno;;urahililY of mutually mttrchangeable theories <11,,0 aPJll'ar~ to be gros.'.. ly exaggerated.
Thus there arc obvious nmnectlon\ betweC'n the {'(mceptual
apparatllses of relativist and c1a~ical mechan,\Cs, despl,te I~e~r
non-identity. For examrle. a.lthough Newt.on s and ~mstem s
masses have different semantic and operatlo~al meanings, the
interpretation of mass as a measure of mertla ~olds for both
cases. as Einstein's mass docs not become an. object. absolutely
different from Newton's mass, etc. The ~oclnne ~f mcommensurability of theories. which actually reJec,:> the mterconnectedness of previolls and subsequent stages l.n .the development
of knowledge, is opposed in diale~tical r:nalen.ahsm by the Mar~
ist theory of development of SCience m which development IS
interpreted as coherent continuous. movement. from the old to
the new. accompanied by a deepenmg of pr~vto.usly elaborated
conceptions and their reproduction al a quahtatlvely new level.
.U, THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
01. 1C1eDCC.
. C~ivism. In cumulativism, the development of science
perceived as a linear quantitative self-expansion of aggregate
knowledge through monotonous addition of new truths, How
do. these new truth~ emerge? In answer 10 this question, let us
poutt. out th~t t~e tnstrument of implementation of cumulativISIII IS contmulSm9 postulation of uninterrupted continuous
movement from past through present to future states of science
when the transition from one state to another is conditioned
~Y ~ natural permanent addition to original knowledge of nextm-h~e elements of the same genetic and epistemic provenance.
~olvmg the pr?~lem of the sou.rce of the new from these positions. cumulatIvlSts hold the view that "the new is the transfOIlIk.MI. ol~", d.iscovering a certain historical precursor of any
oew ICtentlflc Idea-which enables them to regard the develat ICtence
.
.
as a lammar
process free from crises and
IS
rrograml1lcd hy variOus Imtrll,tioO'S. impe.ra[~ves, regulatiOl1\, rccolllmcndatiml'i, s(:hcmata of model prulc1ples tlf analysi~, rt.'.,earch prtljcd'S, heuri.,tic instructions, norms, standards,
etc.
'
The whole of thi' ar.,enal determines and ~penfles the generally valid. "normal", standard conceptual and ,meth~.()I()gi(al
rhythm of scientifIC activity. QUIte clearly, .thls activity produces, so to say, the pre-planned new. Nothlllg fundamentally
new can be created and produced here. Hence the correc~ncss
of the appeal to the intuitive, subconsciou" non-dio;cur\lve, Irrational strata as tools for the production of the fundamentally
new.
The problem of the emergence of new Knowledge has largely
remained unexplicated, since researchers mostly confmed themselves to references to intuition in their discussions of the source
of new ideas in science, and the task of logical reconstruction
of inlllitive acts was not solved (probably because it was selfcontradictory) .
To make some headway in the solution of the problem, let
us consider this question: What is intuition as a source of the
new?
In answering this question, the following facts have 10 be
taken into account.
.
.
Intuit ive activity is always based on a shortage of mformatlon
needed for discursive-logical processing of knowledge.
.
Being responsible for the gen~rat.i~n of the ~ew: the p:>ychlcal mutagenesis determining IIltUlt.'ve ac~s IS Iml?lemented
through re-combining the traces of lmp:resslons re..::elv~d . from
without: it is not controlled "by a. conscIOUS ~ffort of Will. only
the results .,. of activity are submitted to the Judgement of consciousness" (90, 26)..
.
.
_.
I'
The inlllition underlymg a dlscov~ry IS not an aC\"ld.e~ta, suatural or non-intelligible mutatIOn of thought. FIT:;t.ly. supern
.
ss itse lf "carries out the primary selectiOn of
perconsclousne
. '
I
t ecombinations and subnllts to consclousn.ess on Y
elmerg~~1 t ~re marked by a certain probability of Ih~lr cor~e
t lose na eta aclual reality" (ibid.). In other words. Ideas with
spon d e c
. I
k'"
.. but not
an intuitive genealogy a~e. strict y spea lI~g. craz~'.
"mad". Set:ondly, the aCllvlty of superconsclOusness IS from the
"channelled by the quality of the dommanl need and
.,
1
ou
.
i d ge .. (ibid .. 28) .
h s olume of preVIOusly
al'cumu Iate d k
nowe
~t ~o~IOWS Ihat t.he time .must be ripe for the discovery. and new
ideas must be III the air.
.
I
The general melhodological ideas on the non_acl"Identa na-
psychlca
e eXistence
0 r goal-direl.:ling derof
.
nalH.s in the form of the need for eliminating "hot Spots" d~lml
minalion of sUI?erconscio~ness by the avail~ble fund of 'kno!~~
edge and practical .expenence-:-are conereltsed in various mo_
dels,.One of them mterprets dlscov~ry as a porism. i.e., an Un_
predictable, unplanned result that IS not a direct object of re.
search ~nd thus ~ot expected bY,the res~archer. ~ fesuil obtained
as an mtermedlate corollary 10 solVing a sCientific task. Of
this nature is, e.g., the discovery of imaginary numbers which
as Felix ~Iein points out. recurred ~gain and again in variou~
computations regardless of and sometimes wholly against the will
of the mathematician carrying out these calculations' only
gradually, as their usefulness became more and more apparent
did imaginary numbers become more and more widespread
054,61).
The idea of porism is a heuristic one. It sweeps aside the
unacceptable view that a discovery is an illogical and irrational act, a consequence of discursively incomprehensible, inexplicable inspiration. Indeed, "the usual mode of reasoning is something like this: if a scientific discovery were a logical consequence of available knowledge, it would be predictable and
thus could not be unexpected. But as a scientific discovery is
unpredictable and unexpected, it is illogical" (23, It 4). Porism
rejects this type of argument; "unpredictability" and "unexpec tedness" as a result of non-formalisability of creative activity
can no longer "be arguments in favour of illogicality or irrationality"; "arguments against the 'logicality' of scientific discoveries also collapse" (ibid.),
Another model specifies the details of the mechanism of recombining the new out of the details of available knowledge,
of the entire actual experiences. As the first step in the solution
of the problem, two things must be opposed to each other: science and its immediate creator, the seientist. It must be borne in
aind lbat the scientist does not always act in a way prescribed
the acientiftc community). Inasmuch as seienand controlled by rigid model proconstrain the activity of the seienthEI? model programmes is, even on the
1
lid
.
3
Pure Y
. e, a preau.e for the emergence of the new.
P rom Ihe mean .....w .
f
.... POlOt 0 View, an explanation of the phe~ of the em~rgenc.e of the new comes with the realisa~: the fact that In reahty, the scientist works in several rathan one research programme (in view of his educational,
2.12
(86).
2.B
'
_e
(~)
I
.
d E in (2) differ from E and E, respectIVe y
E I~ (l). an
land extensionally. E and E; are anomalies
both 1I1tenslO~~lly f an old theory which cannot assimilate
from the pOSlllons 0" e fa"'ors" of ~ new theory, which is as
h
d "pro voca IV
..
f
t em, an.
whereas El and E1 are logically den~ed rom
yet nOIl-exlst~nl, gram med consequences. 1 and Elmclude a
the theory as. pro theories of potential verificators, and are
class of predlcta b1 e
broader ,han E and j.
.
therefore
. of the development of a theory, Its heurTh safety margm
...
h theor . .s
. . e . . , and non_triviality are not umhmlled; as t ~
. J
Isue quall t) I
e is exhausted (as indicated by the mevllable
lUal C larg
I' ft 'ation) it
conce P .
f 'nner perfection and extenla lusl1 l:
deformation 0 I
Tp, ~T"J
CON(LUSIO~
Tp -T,
"
" pictures C: TP) -alteri.e., ( - I) entails a set of theoretical
native research programmes. theoretisations and descriptions.
Interestingly, (~ TP) does not entail a set of empirical pictures
(~ EP). This lasl assumption would correspond to the methodological doctrine of pantheorism. wh ich exaggerates the fact of
theoretical saturation of E and Br . In actual fact the autonomous ingredients of (~ TP) differ conceptually, being obtained
th~ough stratification and proliferation of Be and having a
unitary B fixed and presented In terms of a standard (for a
local operation)
operational basis B0 (measuring and comput
' .
IIlg deVices. vanous apparatuses).
Bo and Br are relatively stable and independent from Be and
can thus be instrumental in the testing and critical substantiation of the laller; Ihis results in discarding elements of B yielding ~ TP and in asserting some preferred variant whfch becomes generally accepted. This last point must be stressed for
two reasons. First, we would like 10 show the untenability of
both the "critically rationalist" and "historica'" trends in postpositivism: the former sees B only as a mechanical 1001 for selecting irrationally generalelelements of B while the latter interprets Br merely as an appendage of B cdevoid of any indec:osnitive role, Second, our inteCntion is to assert the
materialist view that Band B, despite their indeI
rom each other are not "structures of the same order;
lS more fU~damental both in le~ms of g.enealogy of Bc' which
~e consldera?l~ and not ea!Hly "peclflable but necessarily
eX~rJe.nlall~-emplrlcal. and in lerms of substantiation of B,_,
whIch IS ultImately always experimental.
: !;lOle
duclion. f h'
eels of course Ihe polymorphous quality
None 0 t IS can.
,
b'
Iter
.
'IS diversity in term::; of history, su Ject-ma
,
of sClence-;1 This circlIImtance determines the. nee~ for divermethods,
.
. rt'g U I.,or"' and prescriptions Imposed . on
'f'
theet normallve
I
Sl
ylllg Iypes ( 1
f .knowledge.
and the conSlrllction of sreclaconcrete
"
',sed p',elures of sClenl.lflcIlY.
,
f
h
in the construction 0 SUi,:
TI 1e Pres!.'111 work
. 'IS an cs.."ay
pIcture::;.
genera I and speCial
'
I
I
NOTES
To Chupl17 I
In Ihl' m!;'re COmpad symb(llic' 1I0tali(ln, all Ihi, ""L!'>t' clInvey... J In Ihe
f(lllo"'ing rl\rmula~: if III Ihe harJ cor ... l\f ~cienre \\1' ha"n'-- P fT,hlh)
I,
T<J Ch<)pla 1
Cr.
Aristolle'5 vee .. Ihal science enl ... rgl'd ..... h ... re m<;'11 haJ lei~ure_
Thesr ,-otJId be 'primary concrelion!;, or corpu:;cles" (BIlyk), 'aloms"
(G~ndi), elc.
Which is lanlamount 10 Ihe view vf phy'iical action IS a fundion of mall'rial bodies. nOf 01 space: it<;(:\f,
The referen(e here is 10 a characteristic feature of c1a~icJI "ient;sl~ and
nOf tl? Ihe concrele principles of (:onser~'ation, which cont;lwe 10 pla\' a greal
role In non ..dassical science as .... tlr.
'
To Chllpla 3
in Ihe Iheralure, Ihal Homo hllhil,\ wa~ a dead~ canc;el the human nalure and quality of Homo
~I ~flrmed. Ihe human characteriMi," I-f IImm)
Inhrst ory '
'
IIIh
t e $lime wily 31 all Ihe Iribe\
anJ
peoples Ih..
fo, ,(l()tJ remam
- -In h1\lory a~ members of
1M human rke.
Of the numerous WI"k.s On Ihe
b
authors rna, .., m
.
d
lu Jeel conlnbutl(ln~ by Ihe fllllow1ll!t
enllone
m IhlS con
I
J R
J.C JOl1t'$ (ISO)' E,V, Krid
nec Ion:
.
Dlxun (U4).
1(57). O. Mei\lt:r (1117), I,e. Wilson auJ
I
I
~~: ~d
I
I
I
>
2]8
or
The. same iJe~ wa.\expres:scd many years laler by David Hilberl III con~ecIIO~ wlrh hI:\' critique Of. the EUcliJian melhod of con~lrucl;ng gCOIllt'lry,
Oesplte Iht' hIgh pedagogIcal and heurl\Iic value of Ihe ,elletic methoJ"
he wrOle "Ih
"
'
'_. e a_XlOmallt' me.'h?d " preferable in Ihe fmal presentation
~nd defllllllve 10~lCal Subslanllallon of our knowledgc" 11M, 242).
n our VIt'W, a "xlh labo,or function should be added 10 Ihe~e, namely Ihe
one, whICh IS dIfferent from the 0lher1 and exi~t\ from Ih ... very
01 human labour. II con~i'>I'i, g... nerally lpeaking, in lending
to a product of hllrnur. and i\ al pr~cnl JIl\! a, importanl
~u
2.N
I
IS For details of "r' Jud il\ 'InJ,'Hlre ~ ... e (4]; 77).
" 'Iia,or So\iet '><:ienlj,,, ha-c' aho p<>intfil \)111 the Ill',",j for dUIIl[ling th
principles of e'l.planati,'" til the \olulwn {\( the fllmlal1l1."11131 Phil'''l'l'hi~
cal-human~1 pH1bll"m
Ihal of l'\lrrdatiorl "f brain and con.... inu\l1"'
(30. 821
To Chapler <#
, CompleteneJ;1; is [hI' abilil) of a IhC'(lry 10 \\'Oh". pfoblem\ an\ltlg within
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I
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5V
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L '
"v.... ow_ .. nmgrad. 19-15
242
'"3?
'18.
~45}A.M.
,,
,"
2-13
~\~Il"m "f Sub.il"... ObJn' Rl"lat't>'I\", fil'''''f'~i\'I' 11" /.. ' III
S.,,_ Semn>tll": ',.I,n OulIinl" t\f 111., D"\l'I"pmen:
,X2. /lio,_ 5
Cullllrl" Jnd F~OIH"111\ "r the Pal\-,'hlhi'-- TI
\
the \Iatenal
:1:'
1,' . "urn',
01
IfIlf/lUllir.
1983
IQ66
1111. G. B,lf'Ile, ('oI/ecINl V~I('ul Wor"~. Vol. II. Chiuso and londoo,
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or th,'/III('l:ru/iOll
If
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0"
Ie unction
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apcr~,
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he All-Union
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fl~ Emt'rKtnCt unti F
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1m, Pili/Owphim/ Q
untlllllllni(. Nnvo~lblrsk 1979
'0' Ph ilos()pll/('al P,uhlnm
1It'111On! ()f Ted) . I '
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of
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IQ79
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e,hm('ul Science\, M~'o\\.
P
S. EnKln,"inK Th.
mgrtu, VilniU$, 1982
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157.
158.
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16.1.
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177. J. Orlega y (;a,<;el, TIll' MildI'm
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~ew
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D"ubleda~'
_, R
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~i6~lanck,
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R
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178.
In
11)(,~ Rickert,
ISO. H.
Klllfllrl<'i.\.It'nKlruI I
'"lid
..
N(llur\\i~\t'nfClrull.
Freiburg,
ISI)9
.
., 1 "'ethod' 'feaningful
P
R'
,
Ur "Human SClence<; aod HermeneulI~a,
181. Acllon
' . I(Oee onSluere
'...
TeJo.I" ~plorulio",
in Phl.'nom('nology, The
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Hague MarlinllS NijhofT. 197]
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and Kegan
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h~ \lIT Press.
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of
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on
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d,,'
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f 'T~hnolog)" and "Tcchnol('lj:i~al
188. L.. Ton~I:. Onlhe. C(l~.e~ISplr~/(lS()PJI\' "f Tt'chnolrnu. BO'>lOn. 11)";"4
SCiences . COlllrlhll/wnI lie; . I AcC/)~dinli to S, John, Carnbndge.
181). Th(' Ne .. TI'IIU"'(,III ' The _ O~::;e,\ 1903
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11)0. The Renai~lall("e Pin/mop Y (I
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JI)2
'
193.
194.
195.
6
II) .
Press. 1948
Sdfl/('I!.\. Deakin UniversilY. 1?8.0
Tht'St'arch for.lhe HR/~u; 'il" 10 MUlahiliIY". The Physicul I C"n(t'pJ.A. Wheeler," rom ea.",
DReidel PllblishingCornpany,IQ73
I
'V
Dor.Jrechl- oslon. .
.
I d-a a
lion () " alllrl'.
,
f R fl' '/lom BloomingLonLonu(ln. n 1 n
E. Wigner, S)'mlllr~~;1 am
e t(
-,
Univers.ilY Pre~~,
E Wil-Oil, Munul!l'lllelll. lnfllll'alion und .'1.1'\/1'1'1
I.G., WIIsOI,1 .and M. e'rba~hS Pl1bli\her~. 11)71
,
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'. M'IIrQjI ill RioIOIlI. Cambndl!;e. The
J H Woodgc-r. Thl' A,uom"/H
I
.
. .
[lH7
J
I
Uni~ersily Pr~'>S, ..
-. I R 01 of S~ience" The Ameri"ull (lurna
E Zil~e1. '"The SoclOlogl~a
(I'
.
4'
S()(:;O/OIl)', Chkag(l. lQ42. Vol. 47. No.
(Ii
NAME INDEX
Ackermann, W. 106
Ackolf, R. L.- 158
Ampere, A. M.--222
Archimedes- 53
Archylas- 47
Aristotle- 46.47.50, 52, 53, 60, 63.
64, 68-73. 238
Ashby. W. R. 117
Augustine Saint- 74
Averintsev, 5.5.- 21 1
Avogadro. A.- 140
Ayer, A. 137
Bacon, F.- 74
Bacon, R.- 61, 68
Bakhtin. M.M. -192,199,202
Banach. S.-- 85, 98
Bar_Hillel, Y. ,- 99, 101
Balkin, L.M.-201
Batteux, Ch.- 196
Behmann. H. - 99
Beltrami, E.-224
Bergson, H.- 125
Betti, E.-209, 210
Boethius A.M.S. 194, 239
Bogolyubov, A.N. 172,173
Bohr, N.H.D.- 14, 187, 207, 208
Bolzano, B.- ,92-94
Boole. G.-93
Borel, F.E.E.-98
Born, M.-1I7
Bourbaki, N.-90
Boyle. R. -63, 238
Brahe, T.-135, 233
Bruno, G -68
Bunse, M.- 161, 165, 166
Buridan, J.-,61
Burks. A,W.-106
Calippus-47
Cantor, G. -81, 93. 98, 218
Capella, M, 194
Caralheodory, C.- .105
Carnap, R.-137
Carpenter, S.R.- 161, 162. 170
Carlan. E.- 116
Cassiodorus-194
Cauchy, A.L.-93
Childe. V.G.-154
Church, A.-97, 98
Ciro, M.T.-193
Ciairaul. A.C.-1J3, 135
Clillbmea- 45
CopcmKus, N.-64
Coulomb. 0.A.--222. 224
Crombie, A,C.-61
d'Alemben, J. 218
Oallon, J .C.- ., 140
Dedekind, J.W.R __ 93
Democritus-50
Odeanes. R.-81. U9
Dieudonne, J.-220
Dilthey. W.-I 2S, 189, 208-210
Dioaenes-48
Dirac, P._A._1I6
Dirichlet, p.G.L.-1 16
Dixon, J.R. --238
Dokuchayev, V.V.--26
Do.Sloyevsky. F.M.-187
Oriesch. H.-131
Drobnitsky, O.G.- 20b
Duhem. P. - 6I, 132, 228
Dummet, M. -210
t'abri. K.E. In
Faraday. M. 117
Feihh-rnan. J.K. I!"II. 1!"I5. 1M
Fermal. P. Q7
Peuerbarh, L.A. I Q!"I
Fe),erabcnd, P.K. 1.\, 22S
Feyman, R. ILl
FitzGerald. G.P, 1.\5"
P(\II~ad.
D. 210
Io.:ulinkin, A,T. (I
I\alli. I, In. 21, 1)1, 1)2
Io.:~pler, J.- 27, 1.l.'i, 224
KeYIlt'\, J.M,
137
Kierkt'.aanl, S.A. 187,
v,
Kleen{"
en, 102
Keill, F. 1.1. 121,224. 232
"\llnlllgm~)\', A,N.
QO
K()yr~ , A. 170, 23q
Kral1l.bcr~. M.
167
Krick. E. V. 2.W
Kuhn. Th.S. 17,228, 2]4
Kuznelsov. B.G. 239
S.c.-
P ... DS
4b'
1.-137
of ('biOi -47. 48.
li'ppt .... r.'n. 41
Hobb? , Th .. 63
H'HUI. f, 32. 188
Hu)"ena. CII.
1I),ln V.V.6
63
S]
,.<
M(>rlll" ....
2(,
Wl
N.""c-r, I_Mil
218
Nd<;<lI1, L - I"~,
NeUlI1lHUI, J . "'Oll tltl, 101. lO.OS"
Newl\lll, I. 17, fill, 6], 77, I
LB.
n.
1]("
227
Ntwikov, p.s.
l/7
202
MaCkey, R. -2.W
188
Mandctshlam, L.I. 220
Mundryka. A.P. 168
M.r~'eI, G.
202
Markov, A.A, 97
Marx. K. 15, 145. 146, 148, 151,
I 53
Maliya~vich, Yu.-97
Maupcrtuis, P.L .M. 217. 218
Maxwell. J,C. III. 117, 121, 168,
169. 172, 222
Mei.'Jlc-r, D. HQ
Mendel. G. 10.1, 104
Meyc-I"Whll, E. 116
Michehon. A. 221
Mik.hailov, N.A. 26
Mucham. C
161 ,2.19
HO
(;.I ',
MU\IUW,ki, A.
Malin(lw~ki, B.K.
III
Mllrky, I W
Ortega y
N.
6I
Ca~I,
J .. 187. 188
Quine, W.V.O.
Rlem.nn, G. IlfI
Roemer, 0_ ntl
RtlDCr, G.B. tl7
Rl>lha"~ky, U>. Jl/
RiUSC'IJ, 8. 112
Ruz. lVin, G_'- 172
Salam, A, 122
Samios, N.P. 116
S.-hriXIinger. F. 11.1
Sh ... yryo .... V.S. .11
Single,on. W.T.- 2.IQ
Skolimlnv,ki, U, - IhI
Soaal"' lin. 20t
Solon -45
Spencer. H. .18, .~~
Spinou. B. 60
SlolI, R.R.- t4~
Tarski, A.- . 84
Taylor. B. --9Q
Thales-- 50
Thorndikc-. L. 61
Tikhono,', A.N. It~
TondJ. L. -HQ
Toulmin, S. 228
Toushek. B. J!2
Trendelenburg, F.A.
Vernacbky, V.I. 115
Vollaire. F. -60
M_ 18S
Wc-ic-TStra.<;s, K. -QJ
Wheeler. J.A.- 11Q
Wightman, A. 105
Wilson. I.C. -l.lQ
W il~on. M, E. HQ
Woodgt'r, J,R 104
Wc-~r.
1.12
Xenophane' SI
Rsbinovirh, V.L 5Q
Rakiltw, A_I. ISN
Rt'irhell~a~'h, II. 1.17
Rickert. 11 .- IS5
Ricoeur, P. 210
Zt'no of Elea SO
Zermelo. E - 115
Zilo;el, E. (l(l
251
31
SUBJECT INDEX
An
-artistic cognition- 210-11
-liberal and auxiliary artS-19)
B~li~f-2I,
22
Crit~ria
of sci~ntilicify_7_20
Cumulativism_ 228-29
Descriptivism-18_20
Ocv~lopm~nt of knowl~dge
-evolutIonary (ext~nsive) -223-25
-revolunonary(int~v~)_22J
27
225'
Dialogue
-and discussioo-203
-in European science and philosophy-201
-in human sciences-202
-link with understanding- 201, 2 10
-as a major characteristic of human
knowledge_201
-and monologue-202
-and polyphony-203
-quality and truth of -200-202
Doubt-22
84, 94-103
Pact-lOS, 106
~- of ~ientific knowledge _. 89
en lCaences-205
--vb II a'''''-19
e
Human knowledge
applied aspects-203
-dialogue quality and trUlh of_
200203
-epistemological status of- 184
-hIStory of-192-97
-princi!"al component pans of-184
200-210
'
-subje<:t-mafter of-190
Human sciences- 191 -92, 197, 205
-human and social sciences- 191
198
'
-subject-mailer of - 192
Knowltdie
-ana lytical-30
anti-science-7
-a posteriori-30_3 1
- a priori -3O.31
-applied-2729
-artistic-2 10
background-30.31
-derivative-3031
-desc ript ive_ 27 -28
-discursive-23-14
--empirical-26-27
-- everyday-31.33
-explanatory_27.28
-fundlmentat_27_29
-human--184, 200-01
-~um.,n-5Cien\ific_184, 20S
- LntULuve-imageful
kmotional)2324
- mathematical_ 89-103
helerOBeneous- 224
hOUlogrneous- 224
RI&urou,nns. 83,14. 'J4-I01
149
Labour
-and animals' instrumental actions153-55
_ initial (orms- ISS
- labour functions--14950
_ primitive instruments-156
Law (in natural sciencel-IOS-107
M..
an "ensemble of the social relations"-197
-and "1"-200, 239
-and the human-192
-human individuality-200
-and humlnity- 193-94, 199
_subjec t_matter of human knowledge-184, 190-92
Mathematisation-122-29, 174
-IS
Te<:hnical knowledge
_methods and forms-US
-Slatus-163
_Slructure_163. 178
_subject.maner_14I, 157-.(,3
Technical sciences
-and applied sciences-16S-67
-classical and non_classical_17S,
177, 180, 182
_inception Ind development- -161-
"
Technics
_initial structurtS--UO
-problem of defaning the concept
of t._14S_50
_1$ the subject-miller of tec.:hnical
knowltdSc-159-60
Text-2oo
TheoT)'
_altiomatic-89-90
_dtducth'e_89, 93
_hypolhelico--deducli\e- -68-74
_tec.:hnical_ 179-80
Truth
-and dialogue-200.02
- in human sciences-20J
- recognition of t.-20-22
Value-2Ob
253
I..
34-40
Understanding-209
!..
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