Summary..............................................................................................................................

2
Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus........................................................................................3
Text Box 1....................................................................................................................4
Table 1.........................................................................................................................6
Table 2.........................................................................................................................9
Table 3.......................................................................................................................10
European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010..............................................10
Analysis of ECHR Decision..............................................................................................13
Key Finding...............................................................................................................13
Key Finding...............................................................................................................14
Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling..........................................................................15
Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island..............................................17
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................20
Biblography........................................................................................................................22

1
Summary
The case of the Cyprus conflict differs radically from many other “conflicts”

which are analyzed using post-conflict analysis because, unlike conflicts in

places like Sri Lanka and El Salvador, the conflict in Cyprus is a frozen conflict

which has devolved into a situation where two populations, Greek and Turkish

Cypriot, live in separate states – one recognized internationally, the other a

pariah state with no international recognition other than that of its patron –

Turkey. The two states are almost completely mono-ethnic and their

existence represent the end result of the use of population exchanges as a

method of halting, if not ending, conflict based on religion or ethnicity.

When analyzing the Cyprus conflict’s peacebuilding phase we are therefore

left with a situation which defies the neat analysis applied to other conflicts.

Today a situation like the one is Cyprus exists nowhere in the world

(excepting perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Cyprus conflict is not

an active, on-going conflict involving hostilities, it is not a conflict ended by

the military victory of one side or by a peace treaty acceptable to both sides.

Because the conflict has lasted so long (since 1963 and in its most modern

iteration, since the Turkish invasion of 1974) it has become not only a frozen

conflict but one which is also stale1 – lacking in new ideas, energy and

initiatives engendered to bring about a permanent solution to the problems

underlying the situation. Analyzing the conflict, therefore, proves difficult

1
I will elaborate on the delineation of “stale” vs. “frozen” later in the report.

2
within the context of contemporary peacebuilding models such as those used

by the World Bank, the United Nations or other multilateral institutions.

This report will identify and analyze horizontal inequalities and vertical

dilemmas present in the Cyprus conflict. Following the identification and

analysis portions suggestions will then be offered for remediation of

horizontal inequalities as well as vertical dilemmas. In keeping with the

restricted nature of the analysis the report will try and focus on the human

security and international political economy dimensions of the Cyprus conflict

and in particular focus on the issue of property rights and ownership on both

sides of the divided island. This report will focus, in particular, on the

European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision on property rights within

Cyprus and explore the ability of the decision to act as a “warming agent” on

the conflict –leading to the settlement of long outstanding issues which have

kept the conflict frozen for decades up until today.

Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus

When the Turkish army began its invasion and subsequent partition of Cyprus

in 1974 the island had only experienced, at that point, a little longer than one

decade of independence. But much like the partition and frozen conflict that

were to follow the independence of Cyprus was also afflicted with frozen

dynamics, both horizontal and vertical.

The period after the 1960 independence declaration was supposed to usher

in an era of consocialistic governance and peace between the two constituent

3
communities on Cyprus. Instead, because the Turkish Cypriot community

exercised their minority veto so consistently the Cypriot government made a

conscious choice to remove minority protections in the constitution in favor of

majority rule (Zink 594).

This decision acted to lock into place the horizontal inequalities which pre-

existed independence. Almost every dimension Frances Stewart references in

“Policies Towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Resolution” were

present in both pre and post independence Cyprus – including the areas of

participation in government and the army and police, the issue of land

holdings and income disparity, the use of resources and both private and

public unemployment. Turkish Cypriots were underrepresented in all of these

spheres and in some weren’t represented at all – namely participation in the

government, especially after the abrogation of the 1960 constitution (Stewart

6).

Text Box 1
Horizontal inequalities are more likely to lead to conflict when:
• They’re durable.
• They widen over time.
• Boundaries between groups are “relatively impermeable.”
• When groups are cohesive enough for collective action to emerge.
• When leaders are not coopted into the ruling system and are instead
marginalized.
• When the government is irresponsive or violently repressive.

Source: Stewart 4.

4
The invasion of Turkey acted to separate the two sides of the islands in a

partition enforced by UN peacekeeping forces with one side of the island

recognized as the legal ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and the other seen as a pseudo-

state, a blank spot on the island of Cyprus occupied by Turkish forces and

completely cut off from the legally-recognized Republic of Cyprus

(Theophanous 55). Horizontal inequalities which were present on Cyprus were

then magnified by the situation – with one side availing itself of its legal

recognition to develop a modern, European welfare state while the other,

unable to gain access to the same resources as their neighbor to the south,

relied heavily on Turkey for support and also on a number of shady

enterprises such as gambling, off-shore banking and more overtly illegal

activities like the use of northern Cyprus as a transshipment point for human

trafficking and drug and gun-running (CIA World Factbook).

The TRNC is often referred to as a “sleepy” state which due to an ECHR ruling

in 1994 which forbade exports from the unrecognized state, was forced to

find other means of income. Yet this synopsis is incorrect – the Turkish

community in Cyprus has long been alienated, even before the invasion of

Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. The most recent iteration is but a continuation of

the long-term horizontal inequalities between the two states (Bryant and

Hatay 3).

The two community’s perceptions of horizontal inequalities, in particular the

economic disparities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, speaks to the

importance of these issues in contributing to and prolonging the conflict

5
between the two sides of the island. A recent poll conducted in Cyprus

amongst both communities indicated that 58% of Greek Cypriots and 67% of

Turkish Cypriots agreed that social and economic inequalities have

contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the conflict (Hadjipavlou 26).

The higher percentage of Turkish Cypriots agreeing indicated the less

privileged position of the Turkish Cypriot community before the conflict

began – as well as the continuation of that status after the Turkish invasion in

1974.

The cessation of hostilities between two or more parties is supposed to be

marked by peace milestones. These include the following:

• Cessation of hostilities and violence

• Signing of peace agreements
• Inception of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
• Return of Refugees
• Establishment of the foundations for a functioning state
• Initiation of reconciliation and societal integration
• Startup of economic recovery.

Source: World Bank

Table 1
Action Turkish/Greek Cypriot End Result
Implementation?
Cessation of hostilities Yes, Ceasefire signed Ceasefire remains in
and violence place today. No active
hostilities since 1975
Signing of peace No, attempted but failed Frozen conflict
agreement
Inception of No No demobilization, no
demobilization, disarmament and no
disarmament and reintegration between
reintegration either side in Cyprus.
Return of refugees No – exchange of Both sides are now
refugees nearly monoethnic

6
 states.
Establishment of the Yes – separately. Both Horizontal inequalities
foundations of a sides developed (HI) based around
functioning state separate states, locking economic assets,
in the inequalities which incomes and
existed before the 1974 employment and social
Turkish invasion aspects strengthened.
Initiation of No, some small private The two sides remain
reconciliation and efforts but no official separated by a great
societal integration efforts. distance.
Startup of economic In Greek Cyprus – Yes. HIs remain strong
recovery In Turkish Cyprus – No. between the two sides.

In the Cyprus conflict these seven peace milestones never fully developed

and only three were partly implemented between the two sides (Greek and

Turkish Cypriots). A peace agreement wasn’t signed – a cease-fire agreement

was. Refugees weren’t returned – they were exchanged between the two

sides of the islands – creating monoethnic states on each side of the Green

Line and additional massive displacement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

And each state began to set up its own administrative and statebuilding tools

on each side of the island – further increasing the distance between the two

sides.

Because of the pseudo-state status of the Turkish Republic of Northern

Cyprus (TRNC) reliable statistics on its economic performance are difficult to

come by. Nonetheless data does exist which shows wide variances between

the two sides of the divided island in GDP growth, public vs. private sector

employment and unemployment rates (Theophanous 28). The skewed

economic situation in Cyprus has preserved and exacerbated the horizontal

inequalities present before and after independence and the Turkish invasion

in 1974. While the Republic of Cyprus is well integrated into the European

7
and global economies the TRNC remains locked out of both and heavily

dependent on Turkey for trade and budgetary support.2

Much of what is seen on Cyprus today is also seen in other core-periphery

conflicts within the European theater – specifically the conflict in the north of

Ireland which was solved with the Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998

(Zink 583). While the Republic of Cyprus through its international recognition

and membership in the European Union has been drawn into the core of

Europe its northern part – the TRNC, remains (along with Turkey) on the

periphery. The old horizontal inequalities pre-dating the Turkish invasion

remain. Actors in the conflict on both sides of the island have interests which

are threatened by the possibility of peace and many have become defenders

of the status quo.

Thus the question must be – how can these horizontal inequalities be

remediated within the context of peacebuilding based on a European

perspective and utilizing the resources of the main actor in the region: the

European Union? It is a fact that the European Union’s body of law and

regulations which all members must adapt, the acquis communautaire, is

applicable to all of Cyprus but has been suspended in the TRNC (Nathan

Associates 9). From the point of view of the ease of application of law the

European theater must be the one which takes precedence in the

amelioration of the conflict in Cyprus (Mavrommatis 14). A recent decision by

2
Much has been made of the TRNC’s high growth rates during the early part of the decade, which
averaged 10% per year compared to the Greek Cypriot state, which was closer to 2.6%. The TRNC’s
figures are misleading because they were mostly the product of a building boom predicated on illegal
expropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Much like the rest of the world the TRNC is now
experiencing a deep recession brought on by a bust in property values.

8
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on property rights within the

TRNC will be focused on in this paper as a valuable tool towards the

resolution of the issue of property rights on both sides of the island – this is

one of the most key issues in attempting to bring about a settlement

between the two sides and one where both sides, as of now, have the widest

divergence in expectations of what a peace agreement can and will achieve.

The issue of landownership, in particular the ambiguous status of property

rights in the TRNC is also one of the greatest horizontal inequalities present

in Cyprus. Perceptions regarding property rights immediately after the defeat

of the Annan plan in 2004 and continuing through today are critical in

deciding how to approach this issue.

Table 2
Perceptions in April 2004 Scope for perceptions to
evolve
North North
South South

Perceived Fear of Negative view Improved prospects This

remains
effect on disruption from on credibility with local remedy a
major (and now
property movements of proposed
tougher) hurdle.
settlement deal

Source (Wilson 266)

The table above is provided to show the perceptions and scope for

perceptions to evolve around the issue of property settlement or restitution.

9
TYhe matrix below, created by the United States State Department, provides

a useful tool for focusing more intently on the issue of property rights as a

symptom and means of remediating horizontal inequalities.

Table 3
Initial Response Transformation Fostering
Sustainability
Evaluate existing laws Establish procedure to Ensure equitable
pertaining to land resolve property rights implementation of laws,
rights, registration of for land and regulations and codes.
the property, and subterranean
collateralization of resources.
movable and
immovable property. Draft laws and codes to
establish or strengthen
Take immediate steps property rights
where needed to including customary or
establish process to traditional concepts
resolve property issues. where appropriate.
Establish process to
reconcile and address
claims of
expropriations.

Adopt appropriate laws

regulations and codes.

Source: US State Department

Utilizing this matrix the report will next focus on the European Court of

Human Rights decision in March 2010 which will be used as a major focus for

remediation of horizontal inequalities based around property rights in Cyprus.

European Court of Human Rights Decision of

March 2010

10
In March of 2010 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights

issued a ruling on the matter of a number of property claims by Greek

Cypriots. I intend to examine this ruling in detail and use its legal reasoning

and the structures it put in place as a base from which to examine and

compel settlement of outstanding land claims in Cyprus – the outstanding

status of which has contributed to horizontal inequalities and the lack of

human security on the island.

At issue in the case was the matter of the status of properties left behind by

Greek Cypriot refugees who had fled the north of the island in advance of

invading forces from Turkey in 1974. Members of the Greek Cypriot

community had brought the case forward in hopes of being awarded

compensation from the court – whose decisions cannot be appealed and

which are binding on its members, which include 47 states (including Turkey

and Cyprus) which are members of the Council of Europe.

All of the applicants in this case were claimants of immovable property in the

TRNC. All brought forward their claims because they felt the domestic

remedies provided by the TRNC did not provide an effective remedy for their

claims. Their specific claims were offered under Article 8 of the Convention

for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states

the following:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his home.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except in accordance with the law is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country.

11
The court, after walking through the particulars of the case and referencing

past judgments, issued its ruling.

The following is a broad overview of the court’s ruling and focuses on key

issues germain to the focus of this report:

• The court found that the claimants had failed to avail themselves of a

suitable domestic remedy for their claims – which is the Immovable

Property Commission (IPC).

The IPC is a body established by an act of the TRNC parliament. It is

composed of 7 members, two of which are required to be non-citizens or
residents of either the TRNC, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Britain or
Turkey. It has the power to order compensation and as of November, 2009
had awarded over 47 million Euros in compensation and adjudicated 361, 493
square meters of property (ECHR 9).

What marked this decision as so momentous in the issue of the mitigation of

horizontal inequalities relating to property in Cyprus is that for the first time

in the history of the court hearing cases on the subject it ruled that an

effective legal remedy now existed and that the claimants should avail

themselves of that remedy before coming to the ECHR for remedy. The

court’s reasoning is as follows:

• The Court cannot emphasize enough that it is not a court of first

instance.
• In the present applications, some thirty-five years have elapsed
since the applicants lost possession of property in northern Cyprus in
1974. Generations have passed. The local population has not remained
static.
• Accepting the functional reality of remedies is not tantamount to
holding that Turkey wields internationally-recognized sovereignty over
Cyprus…

12
• The Court considers that there is an effective remedy for their
[the claimants] provided under the auspices of the respondent
government. The court finds that the [IPC] provides an accessible and
effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about
interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots
• For these reasons the Court decides unanimously to join the
applications; and declares by a majority the applications inadmissible.

Analysis of ECHR Decision

By ruling that the TRNC had established a suitable and in the court’s

estimation, impartial method of adjudicating property claims in the TRNC the

court had firmly set barriers around an issue which previously had appeared

open-ended and whose insolvability had plagued the Cyprus issue from 1974

onwards. As shown from polling data the issue of horizontal inequalities,

including property, has been shown to be of strong concern to both

communities. The Greek-Cypriot community in particular has indicated that it

out of a list of 11 possible challenges to peace in Cyprus the 3rd most

indicated answer is “poverty of the Turkish community overburdening the

Greek Cypriot community” (Georgiades 580).

Key Finding

The decision of the ECHR should therefore be cast as a major part of the
solution to the issue of poverty in the north by finally solving the outstanding
issues of property claims (proper ownership of land and immovable property
being a necessary perquisite for any capital-based economy) and removing a
barrier to growth in the north as well as forcing the full financial responsibility
for payment of property claims in the north directly onto the TRNC and
Turkey.

13
It is not only Greek Cypriots who are impacted by the ambiguous state of

property in the north. Turkish Cypriots are also well aware of the difficulties

the ambiguous situation of the TRNC represent:

Annan Planı'nın Kıbrıs sorununa çözüm getirmesi beklenirken,

arazi parçaları gibi gayrımenkul mülkler ile diğer gayrımenkul
mülk konuları daha da karmaşık ve içinden çıkılması hayli zor bir
hale gelmiştir. Bu sebepten ötürü, Kıbrıs'taki sorunlar adada
yaşayan vatandaşlar için de oldukça karmaşık bir görünüm
kazanmıştır.

Also because of the Annan Plan failed, which was supposed to

resolve the Cyprus issue, the real estate properties such as a
parcel of land, and the other real estate property issues get
complicated and obscured in Cyprus. The reasons for this are
the problems in Cyprus, which are too complicated actually for
the citizens (translated from Turkish by report author) (Tefik
142).

The issue of property therefore now has the potential to be transformed

within the minds of both communities, moving from one which was previously

static to one which is now dynamic, from one which was previously viewed as

a possible costly hindrance on the south and whose solution could act as a

catalyst for solving the overall problem of the division of Cyprus, only one

aspect of which is horizontal inequalities (Berutti 27).

Key Finding
For the north the decision can act to resolve the ambiguities over property

which have plagued domestic and international ownership for so long. The

frozen dynamics of Cyprus, which includes a lack of support from elites on

both sides of the island for a comprehensive settlement, could be warmed by

the utilization of the decision to provide movement forward in negotiations.

14
Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling

While originally caught off-guard by the ECHR decision the government of the

Republic of Cyprus seems have settled on an position of urging its citizens to

ignore the ruling and asking them not to apply to the IPC for remediation of

their cases.

“The government does not favour seeking recourse to the so-

called commission, especially now during the negotiations,”
government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou said. “The property
issue will not be solved in the courts; it will be solved on the
negotiating table.”

Stefanou said the ECHR decision did not take away any of the
political and legal arguments supporting the Greek Cypriot
positions concerning the property issue that were submitted in
the negotiations (Cyprus Mail).

Yet the government of the Republic of Cyprus failed to mention that the IPC

in the TRNC is not open-ended. The commission has expiration date –

November 2011. While the government’s position is that its citizens should

not avail themselves of the remedies the IPC offered, it has not (nor could it –

legally) prevented its citizens from doing so. The statement also represents

the continued manipulation of the desire of refugees to return to their homes.

This occurs from within the political elites on both sides of the island and is

itself a refusal to accept the reality of framework documents and high-level

agreements since 1977, which all state that the return of every refugee to

their property is impossible (Hadjipavlou 67).3

3
Furthermore the manipulation of the expectations of refugees has been a powerful tool used by elites on
both sides of the island to win elections. We see this in other frozen conflicts as well – Palestine and
Western Sahara are two prime examples of this.

15
As the Department of State essential tasks matrix shows the issue of property

rights can be transformed through establishing procedures, laws, codes and

processes designed to establish the principles of egalitarianism and justice in

dealing with the issue. The IPC commission meets these standards and thus

fulfills this role in alleviating horizontal inequalities in Cyprus related to

property claims. The issue, therefore, is moved from the sphere of the

political (dealing with claims through the negotiation and bargaining process

– as in the Annan plan) to that of the judicial (ameliorating the issue through

the use of the IPC).

The final portion of the matrix is designed to create long-term objectives to

achieve sustainability in post-conflict reconstruction. Strengthening the rule

of law is a key portion of sustainability in post-conflict situations like that of

Cyprus (United Nations 3). The recommendation in this report on the

utilization of the IPC is designed with the short and medium-term interests of

the situation in Cyprus in mind. Longer-term the requirements of the situation

will include a more permanent and cohesive set of initiatives to strengthen

the rule of law within the TNRC and align its legal system with that of the

south and the European Union.

To accomplish this it is then recommended that the TRNC begin the process

of adopting the European Union’s acquis communautaire (Melakopidis 191).

When Cyprus was admitted to the European Union the acquis communautaire

was suspended in the north. By beginning the process of adopting the acquis

communautaire the TRNC will show it is serious about its future as a

European Union member and signal to the south that the destiny of the two

16
states is beginning to converge. The TRNC should also work to make sure the

EU-Turkey Customs Union is implemented fully. The Customs Union has been

held up by the refusal of Turkey to open its ports and airspace to Greek

Cypriot ships and aircraft. The TRNC can act as a mediator in this dispute and

signal its willingness to compromise by privately urging Turkey to follow

through on its commitments to the European Union (Turk 105).

Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of

the Island
Within Cyprus there has never been an elite-masses consensus on the issue

of reunification. While horizontal inequalities have and continued to exist

there also exist vertical dilemmas which must be mitigated for any successful

strategy on reunification to be implemented successfully. As the defeat of the

Annan plan showed us – without the support of elites the masses will not

follow. Completely lacking in the 2004 referendum was a comprehensive

strategy for dealing with this issue – particularly within the Greek-Cypriot

community where an almost entirely united front (excepting the trade unions

and a few civic society-based actors) opposed the Annan plan with

devastating consequences for the agreement. Actors in the TRNC were more

varied in their responses but as the recent election of an anti-agreement

president in the TRNC shows us the previously amenable position of Turkish

Cypriots is in danger of changing for the worse.

In order to address the issue of vertical dilemmas in Cyprus it is

recommended that two-track diplomacy be utilized in order to involve all

elements of society in the process of conflict transformation (Sisk 245).

17
Negotiations in Cyprus have traditionally followed the “top down” approach

as seen below:

Source: Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The top-down approach as illustrated above has been destructive to attempts

to bring both sides of the island together. In particular UNFICYP, the United

Nations peacekeeping force on Cyprus, has acted as a guarantor of

separation between the two communities (Fisher 261) when in reality

UNFICYP is probably the best-placed actor on the island to work to achieve

the mitigation of vertical dilemmas because it is perceived as a neutral party

and it already has a long record of working with elites on both sides of the

island. The top-down approach has also enabled elites who may have an

interest in perpetuating the frozen state of negotiations on the island.

The role of UNFICYP should be modified. The UN Security Council (UNSC),

when next renewing the mission of UNFICYP, should change its mandate from

one of peacekeeping to one of peacebuilding. UNFICYP already peripherally

18
carries out peacebuilding activities in the Cyprus by bringing together both

sides on issues relating to the dividing line – these meetings usually take

place in Nicosia in the Ledra Palace Hotel. By broadening and strengthening

its mandate the UNSC can act to utilize UNFICYP as a warming agent on the

frozen conflict in Cyprus. After nearly 40 years on the island the United

Nations should re-think the “peacekeeping in perpetuity” approach and move

forward on the utilization of its mission to build and strengthen the mission of

peace in Cyprus.

Source: Hemmer, Garb, Philips and Graham.

The image above is used to illustrate the role UNFICYP could play in

negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus. By acting as a track two

diplomacy organization UNFICYP could fulfill the role of warming agent in the

frozen conflict. Possible other actors in this role could include the European

19
Union or the Non-Aligned Movement. But because UNFICYP is viewed as a

neutral agent by both sides it would be the ideal candidate for this role.

Conclusion
This report has recommended two courses of action on Cyprus in order to

“unfreeze” or “warm” the frozen conflict. In addition Cyprus is characterized

as not just a frozen conflict but one which is “stale,” stale being the opposite

of ripeness as articulated in the second report on this issue. “Staleness”

means that the conflict requires aggressive new approaches in order to inject

energy into negotiations as well as the penumbra surrounding negotiations –

the “aura” of citizen and civic society activity which surrounds any

negotiation process. Staleness coupled with frozenness is an extremely

dangerous combination because it means not only are negotiations

surrounding the conflict trapped in a dead-end of repetitive policy

recommendations and endless negotiations but that no new activity is taking

place around and from within the society involving the negotiating parties.

Examples of this include the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept the IPC as a

solution to their long-held demand for justice on property rights or the

previous refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to engage in good-faith negotiations

with the European Union unless they were treated as a state on equal footing

with the south side of Cyprus.

By proposing the utilization of the IPC to mitigate the impact of long-term

horizontal inequalities this report is recommending action, specifically the

amelioration of the issue of property rights, which were a large factor in the

defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. By acting on the issue of frozen dynamics

20
in negotiations and utilizing UNFICYP to ameliorate the role of vertical

dilemmas this report is proposing to create momentum forward with new

agents and a “bottom up” approach to stalled negotiations and peacebuilding

on the island.

Ameliorating and reversing the corrosive effects of staleness in frozen

conflicts is difficult. Positions have hardened and generations have become

locked into their view of the “other.” But peacebuilding requires risk and it

demands initiative and creativity on the part of all parties. By seeking to

unfreeze and ripen the conflict in order to push it more aggressively towards

settlement the recommendations within this report are acting within the best

traditions of peacemakers and peacebuilders. The long-frozen conflict in

Cyprus demands creative, innovative and original thinking. Beginning with a

campaign to convince Greek Cypriots to utilize the IPC and continuing with

creating a multi-track approach to diplomacy using United Nations personnel

already on the ground in Cyprus this report and its recommendations are

moving beyond the stale rhetoric and actions of the past.

Utilizing the recommendations of Frances Stewart, which include political

and/or economic entitlements designed to ameliorate the impact of long-

standing horizontal inequalities on conflict situations, while at the same time

avoiding the earlier mistakes of post-independence Cyprus, which saw the

consocialistic arrangement become a source of conflict vs. a solution to it,

this report is designed to encourage a remediative approach to the horizontal

inequalities through economic, specifically property rights, which have long

plagued Cyprus.

21
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