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America Online has been confounding its critics since its initial launch in 1989.
nicknaming it, “America on training wheels” (Borrus). When free Internet service
providers entered the market, many industry analysts predicted it would be the end of
AOL, which charges a monthly subscription fee of $21.95, but they were wrong. AOL
survived the dot-com meltdown and has more subscribers then ever, while many of its
competitors were forced to close their doors or began charging subscription fees of their
own. The company is one of the hottest companies to emerge from the Internet, and with
its acquisition of Time Warner, Inc., AOL has become one of the world’s most powerful
media companies.
When the all-stock transaction was announced January 10, 2000 it was the biggest
merger in corporate history, a marriage of old-and new media-titans. A lot has changed
since the two companies announced the deal. From the wealth perspective, the merger
was worth $183 billion on the day of the announcement. Over the past year, the
combined companies have dropped in value to $112 billion, as stock prices of both
companies declined (Guardian Newspapers). Wall Street analysts blame the evaporation
of investor confidence in the Internet revolution and the rapid deceleration of the U.S.
economic growth for taking some of the “gloss” off the deal. Still, the merger
dominant Internet service provider with about 29 million subscribers worldwide, and the
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venerable Time Warner brands, including Time magazine, CNN, HBO, Warner Brothers
After more than a year of battling with bureaucrats, competitors, and Internet
advocates on both sides of the Atlantic, AOL Time Warner cleared its last regulatory
January 11, 2001, when the FCC officially approved the merger. That may have been the
easy part – now they’ve got to make it work. The media giant faces the daunting task of
making good on its promise to dramatically transform the advertising and media
landscapes – in the words of AOL Time Warner’s chairman, Steve Case, “lead the
Although most agree the mega-merger has tremendous potential, many obstacles
remain. When AOL agreed to take over Time Warner the dot-com world had not yet
melted down, advertisers had not started withdrawing from AOL’s Web sites, Turner
Broadcasting’s cable networks, and Time Inc.’s magazines, and spending on developing
businesses was still considered a good thing. “A year ago all you saw were the
opportunities,” said an executive at one Time Warner division. “Now you see all kinds
AOL Time Warner is under tremendous pressure to show positive results almost
immediately. With a softening economy, aggressive goals for revenue and profit growth,
impending layoffs, and the watchful eyes of the media and business communities, AOL
Time Warner certainly has a tough task. But perhaps the biggest challenge for the new
company will be its ability to convince two companies with very different corporate
cultures to work together as a cohesive team. I will explore the merger in depth by
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examining the reasons behind the union, as well as some of the challenges the new
corporate cultures. I will use one of the mega media mergers of the 1980’s, Sony’s
acquisition of Columbia Pictures, to illustrate just how difficult this type of integration
can be. Finally, I will discuss the results of the merger so far, and the potential
Countless articles have been written about the merger – most discussing the deal’s
strategic benefits. These benefits are real – the merger took place because each company
had something the other wanted. Time Warner realized that the future of an infotainment
company was in digital technology, but its attempts establish a dominant presence on the
Internet were unsuccessful. AOL provided Time Warner with a Net presence to serve up
movies, music and information, as well as a connection with the world’s premier Internet
brand. For AOL, the opportunity to use Time Warner’s cable-TV wires to carry high-
speed “broadband” access to millions of subscribers was one they did not want to pass
up. “Time Warner’s unique combination of content, great brands and cable assets are a
perfect fit with AOL,” according to Mike Kelly, AOL Time Warner’s CFO (Sloan).
Together, the new company has unprecedented control over the flow of
information and entertainment. AOL Time Warner delivers magazines to more than 200
million readers a week, and will be able to target subscribers on the Internet with AOL’s
MovieFone, news from CNN, and music clips from Warner’s Music Group. But critics
say there is a real danger in one company trying to be all forms of content and delivery.
“That’s a shaky premise on economic grounds,” says Eli Noam, professor of finance and
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economics at Columbia Univeristy. “The old Time Warner was hard enough to manage.
Now you add AOL to the mix and I’m not sure that’s the way to go” (Walsh).
McCutcheon, former president of Time Inc.’s New Media. “It will be genetically
impossible” (Walsh). That warning addresses what some predict could be the undoing of
the merger – getting all of the companies divisions to work together. AOL Time Warner
officials groan each time the phrase “culture clash” comes up saying it’s an invention of
the media, but to many, the chemistry seems lethal. On one side are the hard-driving,
khaki-wearing “masters of the networking universe” who emerged in the 1990’s as the
“kings of the Internet domain” (Walsh). On the other side are the more conservative
media masters who’ve been around for almost 80 years, and deep down, may feel like
they’re behind the times. “This merger has created a really big company,” says Bill
Saporito, Time magazine’s business editor, “and the history of big mergers in other
industries is that they really don’t work well. So the success of this one is far from
guaranteed” (Karon).
Sony knows just how complicated integrating two very different companies.
Although the electronics giant established itself in the 1990’s as one of the world’s most
powerful media and entertainment companies, it has been a difficult and expensive
process. Sony waltzed into Hollywood in the 1980’s with dreams of synergy and a
fistful of dollars. It acquired a motion picture company, and hired two legendary
“hucksters” to run its studios. What followed was a slow-motion, $3.2 billion dollar
catastrophe.
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The decision to become a major media player was made by Akio Morita, the
founding chairman of Sony. Morita was a historic figure in Japan’s postwar economic
recovery, and was responsible for introducing the transistor radio, Trinitron color
television, the Walkman, and the Watchman to the world. However, by the mid 1980’s,
the company whose motto had been “something new, something different,” was growing
bloated and bureaucratic (Klein, Hollywood). Along with the rest of the Japanese
electronics industry, Sony hadn’t come up with a big new hit in years.
the mid 1980’s. As a result of slowing growth rates, Sony executives were concerned
future revenues would not be sufficient to pay for the mounting costs of research and
development and capital investments. What’s more, the electronics giant had suffered a
costly and humiliating defeat a few years earlier when its Betamax videocassette recorder
was trounced by the VHS format promoted by its arch-rival, Matsushita. Akio Morita
viewed the defeat of the Betamax videotape technology as a humiliating setback, and was
The Sony chairman believed the next electronics war would be fought on a vast
global scale over direct satellite broadcasting and high definition television. Expanding
TV markets in Asia and Europe desperately needed software, and Morita wanted to make
sure his company had the software that would make consumers buy Sony’s hardware. He
believed that Sony stood on “the threshold of a new wave of consumer electronics
videotapes, digital videodiscs” (Klein, Tycoon). Morita was convinced the best way to
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achieve an exponential hardware-software synergy was through the ownership of
entertainment companies.
Sony purchased CBS records in 1988, then set its sight on a motion picture
company. Other cash-rich Japanese companies had put up money to make some movies
in the past, but Morita wanted Sony to be the first Japanese company to own a
Not all of Sony’s top executives were convinced purchasing a studio would be
synergy” sounded less than totally convincing, especially after Sony’s chairman decided
to purchase the Columbia Picture group for $3.4 billion for the studio, which some people
in Hollywood estimated was $1 billion more than Columbia was worth. A struggling
studio like Columbia, which had less than a 10 percent share of the domestic market in
the 1980’s, hardly had the power to drive the sale of Sony’s hardware. Many people in
Japan speculated that at least in part, Morita’s acquisition of an American film studio was
motivated by his “bruised ego and an overwhelming desire to awe his opponents into
Sony’s top executives were not the only ones with reservations about the
acquisition. Business associates also warned Akio Morita that the management styles in
Japan and America were not compatible calling the decision to purchase the troubled
studio a “mistake.” Keiji Shima, then the chairman of NHK, the Japanese public
won’t work. You’re asking for trouble. You’re getting into a business that you won’t be
able to control. Don’t do it!’” (Klein, Hollywood). Despite the concerns, Sony’s board
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of directors approved Morita’s plan to purchase Columbia Pictures in 1989. Morita was
reportedly proud of the fact that this acquisition would rank as the most expensive foreign
To head Sony’s new motion picture division, Akio Morita turned to veteran
producers Peter Guber and Jon Peters, a producing team riding high on the international
success of Batman and Rain Man, two of the biggest blockbusters of the 1980’s. Despite
the team’s limited high-level executive experience, the partners managed to dazzle the
Sony chairman, who decided to buy out Guber-Peters Entertainment Company for $200
million, and hired the two producers to run Sony Pictures Entertainment.
Many entertainment industry insiders believed Sony’s decision to hire the two
producers was a recipe for disaster, and guaranteed the failure of their venture into
Hollywood. Frank Price, former head of Columbia who worked briefly with Sony in the
late 1980’s said, “What the Japanese got with Guber and Peters was two hustlers” (Klein,
Tycoon). After Guber and Peters were brought onboard, Sony learned that the two
Warner Brothers refused to release Guber and Peters from their contract until Sony paid
The clash between the Japanese, and the “Hollywood” style of doing business was
immediate. Guber and Peters immediately embarked on a major face-lift of Sony’s new
build an artificial version of a classic studio back lot. “’When the Japanese guys come
visit,’ said one insider, ‘they get the feeling that they’re in an idealized version of a
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Hollywood studio’” (Masters, Headache). The back lot was not designed for filming, or
for tours – it was designed to project an image of success for Sony’s top executives.
The successful image projected by Sony’s Culver City offices did not mirror
reality. By 1995, Sony had spent more than a billion dollars in a futile effort to gain a
1994, 17 lost money (Klein, Tycoon). Sony’s leaders were concerned that the highly
publicized problems within the Sony Pictures Entertainment division would disrupt
harmonious relations inside the larger Sony family, which in Japan is the key to business
success. “A couple of years ago, it looked like Sony was invincible,” said a movie
executive who has dealt extensively with the Japanese. “But then Sony began to take a
huge hit on Columbia; the negative cash flow was climbing into the stratosphere,
It was not just the negative cash flows that concerned Sony’s Japanese leadership.
Even more important from their point of view was the spectacle of managers who were
diverting company resources to private uses. Peter Guber insisted on having expensive
fresh flower arrangements and fruit baskets delivered to top executives’ offices daily.
Jon Peters reportedly sent the Sony jet filled with flowers to London to pick up his
girlfriend at a cost of $30,000. Peters also put his girlfriend and ex-wife on the corporate
payroll for a quarter of a million dollars apiece. “’It was the little things that got the
Japanese,’ said one former Sony Pictures executive. ‘The thing that they kept talking
about over and over again was that Peters had come to one of these meetings in Japan not
wearing socks, and that drove [them] crazy. There were a lot more things to be angry
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Sony eventually fired Jon Peters in 1991, but Sony was reluctant to get rid of
Peter Guber. The Japanese carried on business affairs according to the code of giri, a
concept for which there is no exact Western equivalent, but which is sometimes
“ultimately, the management of a corporation has to accept responsibility for its actions.
But you have to understand that Sony’s culture has always been not to fire people but to
accept people for their strengths (Klein, Tycoon). But Sony seemed blind to the fact that
ruthless self-interest.
Sony’s leaders deny they were “fleeced” by Guber and Peters. Although there
had been signs of overspending, management in Tokyo and New York did not believe the
amounts being spent were “wildly out of line” with the industry (Klein, Tycoon).
However, the Japanese recession and the dramatic appreciation of the yen forced the
electronics company to face reality. Profit margins were being squeezed in Sony’s
traditional “hardware” exports such as TVs and Walkmans, making it harder for the
company to carry the losses of its motion-picture “software.” Even during one of Sony
Pictures’ best years in1992, when it posted profits of $409 million, its income was
entirely erased by the more than $300 million owed in interest payments on its debt, and
$100 million in “goodwill charges” – an annual charge taken over 40 years, reflecting the
difference between what Sony paid for Columbia pictures and the company’s net worth at
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Sony tried to find a strategic partner to invest money into their Hollywood
companies. Sony put out feelers for a “strategic partner”, but no one would meet the
company’s asking price. Top management decided the only way to make the company
more attractive to investors would be to clear the balance sheet of the goodwill charges
by taking a huge onetime write-off – a step tantamount to admitting the company made a
mistake when it purchased the Columbia motion pictures group (Klein, Tycoon).
In 1994, Sony wrote off $2.7 billion of goodwill associated with its acquisition of
Columbia Pictures, as well as $510 million in additional charges for such items as
abandoned movie projects and contract settlements. The $3.2 billion write-off was the
biggest in Hollywood history, and the equivalent of a quarter of the Japanese company’s
stockholders’ equity. What’s more, the decision “raised serious questions about whether
the once seeming invincible Japanese were culturally suited to compete in the
some managerial-changes, starting at the top. Nobuyuki Idei, a board member who was
named Sony’s president in 1995 said, “it will take at lease three years for us to recover in
Tycoon).
Since the write-off, the Sony Pictures Entertainment division has performed
respectably, with an equal share of box office hits and misses (Staff Reporters). It has
Hollywood. Sony ranks fifth on a recent ranking of the world’s top media companies,
with holdings that include: four motion picture studios; three television production
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companies; several recording labels, a movie-theater chain, and video and electronic
Sony survived the difficult and expensive expansion from electronics into
entertainment, but learned some painful lessons along the way. Most industry experts
agree that the clashing corporate cultures between Sony and Hollywood made the
expansion a difficult one. In the words of one studio insider, “The Japanese collective
spirit did not mix well with Hollywood megalomania” (Klein, Hollywood). Even former
Sony Pictures co-chairman, Jon Peters now agrees “the Japanese didn’t know what they
AOL Time Warner hopes the integration of its companies will be less difficult
than Sony’s, but even executives who support the new corporate strategy say it won’t be
easy to get all of the company’s divisions marching in “lockstep” (Yang, Grover, and
Palmer). “AOL has bought a huge media company that has been through two large
mergers in the last decade,” says Elizabeth Sun, senior program director at the Meta
Group, “and it never really integrated its operations with either one,” (Radigan).
“Togetherness” has not historically been the Time Warner way. Each division
has operated like a city-state, with an unquestioned leader who did not always cooperate
with colleagues in other departments. Division heads are used to running their own
operations, with concern for their own bottom-line, and not necessarily the performance
of the company as a whole. Making matters worse, there’s a generational gap between
making deals or launching new ventures, they move at two speeds. It’s “Let’s do lunch”
vs. “Let’s skip lunch,” according to Time CEO, Don Logan (Yang, Grover, and Palmer).
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Perhaps most telling, Time Warner employees learned they would lose their profit-
sharing benefits in favor of stock options – a clear nod to the Internet culture. Not
everyone on the old-economy side of the company was pleased. “Some people are
bummed out about this,” says one Time Inc. writer. “This is a huge cultural change. It’s
replaced our very dependable old-line compensation system with this new Internet
compensation. I just don’t think these options will be worth as much” (Orenstein, Li,
An incident early in the negotiation process illustrated just how strained relations
between the two companies were. David Colburn, AOL’s president of business affairs
was in a meeting in which a Time Warner official didn’t think he was getting enough
respect. “You talk like you’re buying us,” said the Time Warner executive. “We are,
you putz,” replied Colburn (Walsh). Although Colburn has since denied making the
comment, the incident was considered a point of honor by his colleagues who had T-
In order for the merger to work, Time Warner will have to change it’s
decentralized approach to management. On its own, AOL never had much of a problem
centralizing its operations under one roof. But for most of its existence, it was a
relatively small company focused mostly on Internet access. Now the same management
that came out of nowhere and dominated one of the hottest sectors of the New Economy
is faced with integrating at least half a dozen diverse businesses. The last major change in
AOL’s operations was the shift to flat pricing, and the company fumbled it miserably
with widespread service outages as the company couldn’t keep up the increased demand
for its service. This time, the stakes are much higher.
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The man responsible for bringing the two warring tribes together is Robert W.
Pittman, co-Chief Operating Operator of the combined company. Pittman has worked at
both Time Warner and AOL, and has already successfully revamped AOL’s corporate
culture. Pittman was brought on-board AOL in 1996, when the company was in crisis.
Investors were impatient with the company’s fixation on growth at any cost. At the time,
the stock had fallen to a low of $25, down from a high of $83 in February of 1994.
Pittman immediately began refocusing AOL on the bottom line – slashing costs, and
together by holding biweekly operating committee meetings, and forced them to use the
same in-house marketing, engineering, and deal-making teams (Yang, Grover, and
Palmer).
Pittman is using a similar approach at AOL Time Warner, holding meetings every
two or three weeks with all division chiefs. It is the first attempt ever to gather the Time
Warner bosses regularly. So far, the conflicts have been minor. Pittman persuaded Time
Warner executives to trade in their e-mail system for AOL’s. Then, he put all employee-
benefit processing online to cut costs in paperwork. Pittman says the Time Warner
people resisted change at first, but “gave in” after he explained the cost savings the
changes would produce. While serious infighting could still occur, the open discussions
are helping to quell “corporate intrigue”. “It’s all about creating a safe environment of
trust and an expected mode of behavior,” according to Turner President Steven J. Heyer
promotional efforts. Bob Pittman claims the company’s magazines have gained some
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100,000 new subscribers a month through plugs on AOL. Last summer’s Warner
Brother’s hit, The Perfect Storm, got a heavy promotional boost on AOL. The service
also held a Madonna listening party and live chat to coincide with the release of her latest
album – brought to you by none other than Warner Brothers. Meanwhile, to sell
subscriptions, AOL software has been embedded in Warner music CDs (Orenstein, Li,
However, the merger is about more than strategic synergies. The long-lasting
impact of this combination may center on a party that has largely been ignored in all the
hype – advertisers. The AOL Time Warner merger represents a different model,
something media analysts call a “media network.” “Media networks use the power and
experience” (Charron). This creates value for advertisers, because media networks
address key concerns – the struggle to find large audiences in an ever-fragmenting media
drive the market,” according to economist, Jack Myers. “The more dollars that come into
the medium, the faster the technology developments and research developments
proposition created by its “media network” to weather the harshest U.S. advertising
market in a decade.
Merrill Lynch analysts predict that advertising will grow more slowing this year
than U.S. gross domestic product for the first time since 1992, and on-line companies are
expected to be hurt the most. “Advertising spending in this new medium will shrink by
25 per cent this year,” according to one analyst (Grimes and Waters). Early signs of the
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advertising slowdown have already led to disappointing earnings at the Time Warner
cable networks in the final months of last year, and AOL officials admit the pressure is
building. “Advertising ‘overall’ is a little weaker this year than expected”, concedes
Mike Kelly, AOL Time Warner’s chief financial officer (Grimes and Waters ). But Kelly
insists AOL is less likely to be affectd by an advertising drought than old media rivals
AOL Time Warner expects advertising to account for 23% of total revenues, and
despite years of attempts, no media group has set the world on fire with successful large-
scale cross-media marketing programs like those planned by AOL Time Warner (Fine).
Holly Becker, an Internet analyst with Lehman Brothers, warns that AOL Time Warner is
the overall ad market” (Grimes and Waters). However, AOL Time Warner officials
remain confident the company will meet its forecasted advertising revenues. “In bad
times, advertisers will spend their money on the top ad venues, like AOL and Time
Warner properties,” said co-COO Robert Pittman (Yang, Grover, and Palmer).
revenues across the company’s media platforms, AOL Time Warner leaders believe their
ambitious financial objectives are achievable. Those objectives, unveiled shortly after
the merger was approved January 11th of this year, include boosting revenue 12 % to $40
billion, and EBITDA cash flow 30% to $11 billion (Mermigas). The “AOL Time
Warner’s biggest dilemma is that it has to show some progress right away, and most of its
best business initiatives are long-term” said CIBC World Markets analyst John Corcoran
(Mermigas). The key is how quickly management can achieve its financial objectives,
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while juggling the massive integration of companies, a rapidly changing competitive and
hot seat. “The company must hit the numbers expected of it,” he says. “If not, I’ll be
Analysts predict AOL and Time Warner Cable, which generate most of their
revenue from subscriptions, will provide the bulk of that growth. This factor could be
important for investors in a weak advertising climate. The company is expected to shift
its emphasis more toward its subscription and content business. “AOL can still achieve
its financial goals this year,” says Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget. “They are not
immune but they are in a better position than others” (Grimes and Waters). But AOL
Time Warner is not relying exclusively on subscriptions to meet its financial targets.
“When you have the number one position in so many different areas, there are a lot of
different levers you can pull from a revenue perspective. I am more confident today than
The first “lever” the company pulled was the old fashioned one – labeled “job
cuts.” In January, the company announced it would lay off approximately 2,400
numbers will climb even higher when the company sells or closes its 130 Warner
Brothers retails outlets. So far, AOL, Warner Music, and CNN have sustained the largest
cuts. The company insists the layoffs are aimed at reducing duplication in interactive
areas and corporate operations. “In no area are we cutting into the muscle of the
cost-cutting side, the company has already begun to use synergies among AOL, its cable
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properties and its print division to cut marketing costs, and has captured about $70
million in revenue it otherwise would not have by cross-selling advertising deals with
So far, the marriage of the old and new media companies appears to be working.
First quarter results released in March show the company posted strong gains in total
revenues, EBITDA, cash earnings per share, and Free Cash Flow over pro forma results
from last year’s comparable quarter. Total revenues rose 9% to $9.1 billion, while
subscription, advertising, and content revenues for the growth (AOL Time Warner Press
Release).
AOL Time Warner continues to stand by its ambitious financial targets. In fact,
AOL Time Warner chairman, Steve Case, says the company will be able to meet its
objectives without raising its online subscription fee – a price hike many analysts have
anticipated (Mannes). Still on the horizon are plans to extend AOL Time Warner’s reach
beyond the PC, initially through interactive television and wireless devices. AOLTV was
launched earlier this year, but has not captured many fans to date. The media giant is
also considering taking on rival Viacom Inc.’s dominant MTV franchise with the launch
of a cable TV music channel during the next 12 months. The company reaches 12.7
million homes through its cable unit, giving it a solid base for a network launch (Doman).
It will likely take years to assess whether the AOL – Time Warner merger creates
something groundbreaking, to know which divisions have won the battles for control, and
which players have staked out their turf. If the two sides can work out their cultural and
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The AOL Time Warner merger clearly has immense implications for media and
communications companies – and for their audiences. But it may also mark the moment
when the distinction between pure Internet companies and their brick-and-mortar
equivalents began to blur. A year ago, the announcement that AOL would buy Time
Warner signaled a seismic shift: An overgrown ISP barely a decade old was swallowing
one of the world’s most venerable media conglomerates. The old economy was giving
way to the new. Now that view is changing. With Internet stocks gasping for life, e-
What the marriage of Time Warner and AOL symbolizes is the beginning of a
trend towards convergence between online and offline companies, each recognizing the
strengths that the other brings to the table. In coming to their agreement, both Time
Warner and AOL realized that each needs the resources and skills of the other to compete
successfully in the future. The fact that Time Warner, with its brands, content and
of the difficulty that many traditionally companies face when trying to adapt their
As for AOL, it recognized that despite its pre-eminence on the Internet and a
market capitalization that made it by far the world’s most valuable media company, it
was still a vulnerable company. Particularly, in the area of gaining access to cable
systems, which are increasingly seen as the best way to bring broadband services to the
consumer. Under the terms of the deal, its shares are valued in effect at 75 cents on the
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In the future, nearly all companies will be Internet companies in the sense that all
companies today are telephone companies, with the Internet so deeply ingrained in their
cultures that they will no longer think about it. If the merger between TW and AOL
works as intended, they will simply have gotten there a little earlier than most.
of a merger
Pre-Merger
• The announcement of a merger was made on 10 Jan 2000.
every
• AOL shareholders -one share of the new company for every AOL
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how highly Wall Street valued the growth potential of the
• AOL shareholders -one share of the new company for every AOL
how highly Wall Street valued the growth potential of the Internet.
The offer from AOL valued Time Warner at $164.75 billion, about
$40
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Objectives of Merger
• It was a merger between world's largest online service & world's
• Before the merger AOL had already begun upgrading its service to
messaging.
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At Merger
• For the merger process to be complete AOL & Time Warner had to be
• The European Union cleared the merger on 10th May 2000 but
Bertelsmann.
• Under the terms of the deal with FTC, AOL Time Warner, as the
combined company was called, was forced to offer one rival broadband
Internet service provider access to its cable system before AOL can
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begin such a service, followed by at least two additional services within
the deal with conditions that affect instant messaging and Net
cable access.
• But this approval was after FCC imposed further restrictions. The
Post-Merger
• Post merger the dotcom bubble busted in 2001. Also the infamous
• The group posted a loss of $1.8bn for the final quarter of 2001,
merger.
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• AOL Time Warner had to write off $54bn of assets in its accounts
for the first three months of 2002. The write-down reflected the falling
• Culture clash
AOL was never an easy firm to deal with. When the two companies
managers are said to have lorded it over their old media colleagues.
Mutual dislike or contempt of key executives was the result, and made
television, radio and print. This, in turn, made the merger virtually
situation:
mostly missed it. This is because it was too broke to buy Overture
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consummated after the merger. And they paid cash, not stock Back
then, that kind of money might well have been enough to buy Google.
• Time Warner did not use the AOL brand to drive consumers to Time
Roadrunner brand.
that the spinoff will “provide both companies with greater operational
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AOL’s dial up business is worth roughly $1.5 billion based on
thevaluation of EarthLink;
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